External investigation of GL 2006 Europe in December 2008, lawfulness of OLAF external investigations of FP6 & FP7

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas hat diese access to information Anfrage gestellt an Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

Ihre Anfrage war teilweise erfolgreich.

Von: Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

8. Oktober 2013

Dear European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),

Under the right of access to documents in the EU treaties, as
developed in Regulation 1049/2001, I am requesting documents which
contain the following information:

*****

On the 16/9/2013 the General Court delivered its Judgement in the
case T‑435/09, GL2006 Europe Ltd v European Commission. Paragraph
73 & 74 of the Judgement read:

73. It is clear from the minutes of OLAF’s interview with Mr K.
during the verifications carried out at the applicant’s premises on
8 to 12 December 2008 that the applicant did not supervise the
performance of the tasks linked to its participation in the
projects at issue.

74. In response to the question of the OLAF agents, Mr K. affirmed
that, since 2000, the applicant had no employees and did not carry
out any research activity. He added that it was not for him to
understand the work of the project managers and that ‘the
controlling shareholder’ decided the applicant’s role in the
performance of projects. He also stated that, for the purpose of
carrying out the work linked to the projects, the applicant
concluded contracts, which it merely signed, with independent
consultants included on a list provided by the ‘controlling
shareholder’. He stated moreover that the applicant had no control
over the work, or the consultants, as it was not its
responsibility.

*****

The application concerns the OLAF external investigation in the
context of which OLAF carried out an on-the-spot check to GL 2006
Europe, and in particular copies of the following documents:

1. The Decision of the OLAF Director to open an external
investigation and all annexes thereto.

2. The document(s) with which OLAF informed the British Police
about its intention and plans to carry out an on-the-spot
inspection to GL 2006 Europe, as well as any follow-up documents.

3. Any OLAF notes to the file or similar documents about the legal
competence of British Police to carry out, or participate in,
administrative investigations of the kind of Regulation No
1073/1999. This includes notes of statements of officers of the
British Police.

4. The interview authorisation handed over to Mr. K, an officer of
GL 2006 Europe.

5. The document with the legal rights of Mr. K legal according to
the U.K. laws (as a witness of person concerned, as the case may
be), which was read out to him prior to the interview.

6. The signed record of the interview of Mr. K.

7. The authorisation of every single Commission official who
participated in the interview and the on-the-spot check.

8. The authorisation to carry out an on-the-spot check handed over
to GL 2006 Europe.

9. The report about the on-the-spot check of GL 2006 Europe.

10. The mission report (different document than the latter report).

11. The OLAF final case report

12. The documents OLAF drew up pursuant to article 12(1) of
Regulation No 45/2001 for the persons whose personal data OLAF
obtained from third parties and transferred to other third parties
(e.g. competent authorities).

*****

OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST

In view of:

- OLAF is not a legal person distinct from the Commission
- According to the case law of the EU Courts, in R&D contracts
(e.g. FP6 and FP7) the Commission does not rely on the prerogatives
as a public authority
- The OLAF external investigation about GL 2006 Europe cannot be
severed from the FP6 & FP7 contracts
- OLAF is not duly empowered by Community law to investigate
infringements of private law contracts such as those of FP6 & FP7
- It is highly questionable whether OLAF has filed a proper and
adequate article 25 prior notification for external investigations
of FP6 contractors and FP7 beneficiaries
- It is highly questionable whether OLAF has duly notified the EDPS
pursuant to article 27 of the said Regulation about its external
investigations of FP6 contractors and FP7 beneficiaries
- In the former Commissioner Dalli OLAF investigation, the leaked
report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee has stated that there is
no provision of Union law authorising OLAF to carry out interviews,
both of witnesses and persons concerned, in external investigation.
- The OLAF GL 2006 Europe external investigation is closely and
extensively linked with the DG INFSO external financial audits of
the then S.5 Unit, which Unit has filed a the completely bogus and
deceitful prior notification DPO-3338.1 (containing two false
declarations, and with no legal basis whatsoever)
- At the time of the GL 2006 Europe OLAF on-the-spot check in 2008,
there was no prior notification of DG INFSO covering the external
financial audits. The DG INFSO DPO-3338.1 was filed in early 2011.
This calls into question how DG INFSO relied on the OLAF external
investigation to draw up its own GL 2006 Europe 'audit report'
- OLAF has turned a blind eye to the false declarations of
DPO-3338.1 and its wholly bogus and deceitful nature, even though
it ought to have investigated the matter and ensure that DPO-3338.1
was removed from Europa.

There are big questions about the lawfulness of the OLAF external
investigation of GL 2006 Europe, in particular Regulation No
45/2001 and the compliance of the investigation with Community law.

The release of the documents applied for will enable a scrutiny of
OLAF's actions in external investigations of FP6 contractors and
FP7 beneficiaries.

It is further noted that OLAF has partially released in
asktheeu.org at least one final case report about its internal
investigation of an Union body.

In my view, OLAF should redact from the documents only what is
strictly necessary in order not to transfer personal data.
Moreover, OLAF should not redact parts of the documents containing
information already in the pubic domain (e.g. the Order and the
Judgement of the General Court).

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

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Mike Stabenow Anmerkung hinterlassen ( 9. Oktober 2013)

Quote-marks Apparently OLAF has delegated its investigative function to Madame Day - Secretary General of European Commission. See here at page 3 letter b):

http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/477/r...

http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/madam...

How this works? OLAF performs an investigation and then asks Mrs Day what to do next. OLAF claims that is independent.

Link to this

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas Anmerkung hinterlassen ( 9. Oktober 2013)

Quote-marks Dear Mr. Stabenow,

Thank you for your comments. For the benefit of future requests via asktheeu.org to OLAF I would like to make the following observations.

A. Application for documents about OF/2013/0583

- The OLAF final case report is 'fresh-off the oven', since we are 2.5 months after its drawing up. Article 4(2) third indent protects the 'purposes' of an OLAF investigation. The 'purposes' of an investigation is not the investigation itself, but what will, or will not, take place on the basis of the final case report.

- The SG has been called upon to to assess what action(s) to take - if any - on the basis of the OLAF report. OLAF is right to say the release of the report falls under article 4(3), since SG is considering the matter. In the former Commission vice-President Cresson case (a groundbreaking one) it took the Commission about 5 years to initiate litigation, and the Court of First Instance held that it was a reasonable time in view of the particular circumstances of the affair.

The Judgement of the Court of First Instance, Francait & Byk v Commission action for access to an OLAF final case report concerning themselves, indicates that an OLAF final case report has completed its purposes in one to two years after its drawing up.

B. Application for documents regarding OLAF & GL 2006 Europe

- Request #2 - #5, #7, #8 solely concern documents about one particular aspect of OLAF's procedures in the investigation. The documents are not about the substance of the investigation. Nonetheless, serious deficiencies in those procedures may invalidate the evidence and the statements.

- Requests #9 - #10 are about events of late 2008, that is to say nearly five years ago. OLAF cannot refuse access to the documents, except the personal data of Mr. K.

- I believe that the OLAF final case report (request #11) was drawn up in 2010 or 2011. This will preclude OLAF from relying on the exceptions of article 4(2) third indent or 4(3) to totally refuse access.

- I am confident that OLAF will say that the final case report is linked to other judicial proceedings in Italy, and that in itself justifies a refusal for access. However, this will be contrary to the case law of the EU Courts.

- Request #12 is about an absolute obligation of OLAF to have informed data subjects by October 2013. OLAF is legally obliged to expunge the personal data in those letters and release the documents.

C. Final remark

My application aims primarily at the release of documents enabling the scrutiny of OLAF's investigations with respect to fundamental rights. The substance of the OLAF investigation is a secondary aspect.

That is precisely why the overriding public interest argument makes the case that OLAF's investigations of FP6 contractors have no basis in Union law.

Link to this

Von: Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

21. Oktober 2013

Dear European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),

This is to make enquiries about the status of registering the
initial application that was submitted over email on 8/10/2013.

Whereas eight full working days has run from the 8th of October,
the application registration acknowledgement is nowhere in sight.

All requested documents are held by OLAF. Except one or two
documents under request #3 drawn up by the British Police (if they
exist at all), all other documents were drawn by OLAF. This means
that no other services are involved in handling the initial
application.

I would therefore be obliged if OLAF would promptly register the
initial application.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

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Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

21. Oktober 2013

Dear Mr Ntetsikas,

We acknowledge receipt of your request dated 8 October 2013, registered in OLAF with registration number ARES(2013)3217287 on 10 October 2013, in which you request access to information (External investigation of GL 2006 Europe in December 2008, lawfulness of OLAF external investigations of FP6 & FP7).
You may expect to receive a reply from OLAF within 15 working days of the registration of your request.

Best regards,

European Commission
DG OLAF
Unit C.4- Legal advice

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Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

8. November 2013


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Dear Mr Ntetsikas,

 

Please find herewith a note and annexes from our director Ms Petra Kneuer
for your information.

 

Best regards,

 

 

  [1]cid:image001.png@01CE1437.0F722A20

European Commission

DG OLAF

Unit C.4- Legal advice

 

 

 

References

Visible links

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Von: Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

28. November 2013

Dear European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),

Pursuant to article 7(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 a confirmatory is
respectfully submitted.

I. ASSESSMENT OF THE INITIAL RESPONSE

I.1. Request #3 – Legal competence of the British Police

As OLAF is acutely aware, the British Police has no competence
whatsoever to conduct or participate in administrative
investigations such as those of Regulation 1073/99. The applicant
has very strong reasons to believe that Police Officers had
expressly stated so to OLAF, and that OLAF was obliged to note down
such statements.

As regards Police Officers acting as technical experts indicated by
the passage “external technical experts for the forensic operations
authorised”, OLAF’s attention is drawn to the fact that none of the
Commission officials who participated in the on-the-spot checks of
GL2006 Europe (and to other U.K. economic operators in December
2008) have had any technical competence to carry out computer
forensic operations. Consequently, in the OF/2007/0267 on-the-spot
checks one or more Police Officers had an active role in the
computer forensic operations in England. For all intends and
purposes, in an external investigation computer forensic operations
are the exercise of the powers of article 7 of Regulation 2185/96
because it amounts to the wholesale copying of documents – even
documents completely unrelated to an external investigation like
OF/2007/0267. Unlike an internal investigation, in which an
official’s personal computer is owned by the Institution and OLAF
is empowered to carry out computer forensic operators in such a
computer, in an external investigation wholesale copying of hard
disks – which most likely OLAF did indeed perform in OF/2007/0267 –
is a very different matter.

The above arguments rebut OLAF’s assertion that Police Officers
were mere observers. In fact, at least one Police Officer had an
active participation in the activities surrounding the on-the-spot
check of GL2006 Europe. Therefore, the part(s) of the document(s)
noting the remarks of the Police Officers about their authorisation
to participate or assist in OLAF’s investigatory measures is to be
disclosed.

I.2. Request #5 – Legal rights of Mr. K according to English law

The released interview record of Mr. K shows that OLAF did not read
out to Mr. K his rights according to English law. Yet the interview
record of Mr. Sylvio Zammit in OF/2012/0617, which since May 2013
is a public document,
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7Swai6S...,
shows that the rights of Mr. Zammit according to Maltese law were
read out to him prior to the interview by a Maltese official.
Because the very same legal framework governed both the
OF/2007/0267 and the OF/2012/0617 OLAF investigations, the public
must scrutinise why OLAF did not read out the legal rights to Mr. K
according to English law.

Furthermore, OLAF’s practice in the interview of Mr. K of not
reading his rights according to national law has been repeated in
dozens of other interviews of persons concerned in OLAF’s external
investigations of FP6 contractors and FP7 beneficiaries. This begs
the question to what extent OLAF had been compliant with article
6(4) of Regulation 1073/99.

The statement that “the procedure that was followed was in
accordance with OLAF's internal instructions” means that the
procedure was documented in an internal OLAF document, which was
distinct from the published OLAF Manual of Operations, effective in
December 2008. In the interests of showing OLAF’s observance of its
own internal rules, OLAF should have released the few pages with
those internal rules.

Regarding the statement “the obligations and powers conferred upon
OLAF investigators were orally explained to Mr. K.”, there is
nothing in the released interview record to support such a claim.

I.3. Request #7 – Authorisation of Commission officials,
participation of DG INFSO officials

That the applicant did not use the term ‘OLAF official’ but
‘Commission official’ alluded that the applicant had reasons to
believe that officials of DG INFSO participated in the GL2006
Europe on-the- spot check. The OLAF initial response has overlooked
this very important aspect.

It cannot be denied that the S.5 External Audits Unit of the former
DG INFSO has had as its primary mission the pursuit of a vigorous
campaign of external financial audits. After all, the risk-based
audits were pioneered by that Unit. OLAF officials have two
publications with key officials of the S.5 Unit, meaning that the
S.5 Unit was too close to OLAF.

It has now fully emerged that the S.5 Unit has been a hotbed of
illegalities, with the highlight being the utterly deplorable two
false statements of the prior notification DPO-3338.1 and the
non-existent legal basis.

The S.5 Unit illegalities were taking place as early as mid-2008.
The European Data Protection Supervisor has partially released
under Regulation 1049/2001 the documents about his investigation in
the EDPS case 2008—622,
http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/forme....
From the DG INFSO document of 29/1/2009 D(2008) 103075,
http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/594/r...,
it is evident that the S.5 Unit, first, had illegally transferred
the complainant’s personal data to another legal person (the mother
company of her employer), and second, contravened article 339 TFEU.
All personal data processing of the S.5 Unit has been flagrantly
illegal, as such processing entailed many infringements of
Regulation 45/2001. OLAF is referred to a confirmatory application
pursuant to Regulation 1049/2001 submitted to the Ombudsman,
http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/forme...,
especially section 4.2 “FURTHER GRAVE BREACHES OF THE LAW BY THE DG
INFSO RISK-BASED AUDITS” where the applicant has analysed the
illegalities of the S.5 Unit.

The active participation of the DG INFSO officials in OLAF’s
external investigations of FP6 contractors and FP7 beneficiary is a
truly important issue, calling into question the fairness and
objectivity of OLAF’s investigations – including OLAF’s obligation
to seek both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. Prima facie, the
mere participation of S.5 Unit officials in OLAF’s external
investigations also strongly suggests a conflict of interest.

The release of OLAF’s authorisation to the S.5 officials to
actively participate in OLAF’s external investigations will enable
the scrutiny of the extent to which OLAF had taken all the
necessary measures to ensure the integrity and fairness of its
investigations.

I.4. Request #8. Authorisation to carry out an on-the-spot
inspection to GL2006 Europe

As OLAF is very well aware, a separate document was handed to
GL2006 Europe requiring the company to submit to an on-the-spot
inspection. The document structure is indicated in Annex 1. That
document is lawfully in the possession of tens of individuals.

Therefore, OLAF’s initial response is an implied total refusal.
That OLAF has attempted to conceal its existence is hard to
understand, especially since that document does not state anything
that is not public information.

OLAF is obliged to disclose the documents according to which DG
INFSO officials were duly authorised by OLAF to participate in the
investigatory activities of December 2008 in England.

I.5. Request #9 – On-the-spot check report

An on-the-spot check report is primarily a narrative of OLAF’s acts
during the check, that is to say an account of facts. OLAF form O20
‘Report of on-the-spot check and inspection’ (Annex 3 provides its
template) was to be filled-in.

In my view, OLAF was obliged to partially release it, redacting the
parts of the document falling under articles 4(1)(b) and 4(2) first
indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

Request #10 – Mission report

A mission report concerning an external investigation is primarily
a narrative of OLAF’s acts during the mission, that is to say an
account of facts. OLAF form O14 ‘Mission Report’ (Annex2) was to be
filled-in.

In my view, OLAF was obliged to partially release it, redacting the
parts of the document falling under articles 4(1)(b) and 4(2) first
indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

I.6. Request #11 – Final case report

OLAF has routinely partially released final case reports. One such
example is OF/2007/0488, THOR(2013) 23615 – 19/9/2013, that was
released via asktheeu.org.

I.7. Request #12 – Article 12 of Regulation 45/2001 notification to
third persons
OLAF is referred to the Opinion 2/2012 of the Supervisory
Committee, which is a public document,
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7Swai6S...
. According to the Supervisory Committee, paragraph 40, OLAF has
the obligation under article 12 of Regulation 45/2001 to inform the
persons unrelated to the investigations. The documents at issue in
requests #9 - #11 do indeed contain personal data of persons
unrelated to the investigations. Request #12 is about the documents
with which OLAF notified the unrelated persons in accordance to
article 12.

I.8. Conclusions
This section summarises the above arguments

1. Request #3: OLAF is obliged to release parts of the documents
(which they do indeed exist) noting the lack of competence of the
British Police to participate in administrative investigations.

2. Request #5: The initial response alluded to practices of
investigators, for which at a minimum there must be a few
paragraphs. Failure to release them will imply that OLAF has had a
highly erratic practice in keeping an attitude complying with
national law, as provided for in article 6(4) of Regulation
1073/1999.

3. Request #7. The public is entitled to scrutinise to what extent
the OLAF top management authorised DG INFSO officials to
participate in the OF/2007/0267 external investigations.

4. Request #8: The document manifestly exists and OLAF is obliged
to fully release it.

5. Requests #9 - #11: OLAF is obliged to partially release them.

II. ERRONEOUS RELIANCE ON ARTICLE 4(2) THIRD INDENT – PURPOSES OF
AUDITS

II.1. Risk of undermining future investigations

OLAF believes that “The disclosure of such information could
seriously impede the effectiveness of future investigations
conducted by OLAF. Particularly, the potential fraudsters would be
aware of OLAF's strategy to conduct the investigative acts and
other means to collect information and detect possible fraud or
irregularities”.

Ostensibly, OLAF wants to keep from prospective fraudsters its
strategy and tactics in the interests of being effective in the
future. This presupposes, inter alia, that, first, the strategy and
tactics were not disclosed to the public, and second, that OLAF
took all the precautions to ensure that prospective fraudsters did
not lay their hands on the withheld documents. As the next two
paragraphs argue, both presumptions are manifestly false.

From mid-2005 to 31/1/2012 the applicable OLAF Manuals of
Operations were over some 250 pages long (including annexes). They
provided a great deal of information about the strategy and tactics
of OLAF’s investigations.

OLAF final case reports (mission reports and on-the-spot check
reports are often annexes thereto) are forwarded to national
judicial authorities. Their very purpose is to trigger a further
investigation by the national authorities, which often results in
pressing criminal charges. In the context of the latter
investigations the national authorities provide suspects, inter
alia, with full or partial copies of the final case reports, full
copies of the mission reports and the on-the-spot checks reports,
and full copies of interview records of persons concerned (other
than the suspects). By definition, the individuals who are subject
to a national investigation are most probably the very fraudsters
from whom OLAF wants to withhold its strategy and tactics. The
suspects-fraudsters would most likely hand over the documents
national authorities disclosed to them to other fraudsters, and the
latter to other fraudsters, and so on. Consequently, if OLAF really
meant to keep the strategy and tactics secret from prospective
fraudsters, it ought not to describe in the documents at issue its
strategy and tactics, in so far they would certainly fall into the
hands of prospective fraudsters.

As OLAF is fully aware, dozens of persons have lawfully in their
possession full copies of the documents at issue (requests #9 -
#11). Consequently, either OLAF wholly erroneously described in
documents that were certainly bound to be disclosed to prospective
fraudsters its strategy and tactics – which OLAF is prohibited to
disclose to the public in an application under Regulation 1049/2001
– or OLAF erroneously relied on article 4(2) third indent to refuse
partial access.

II.2. Risk of undermining the willingness of witnesses and
whistleblowers

OLAF is rightly concerned about such matters. However, the primary
concern of witnesses and whistleblowers is keeping their identity
secret from the public and perhaps to those under suspicion or
under investigation. Unless a whistleblower expressly requests that
his/her allegations be not disclosed to those alleged as wrongdoers
and the public (in which case OLAF is obliged to find evidence
about the allegations from different sources, exploiting the
tip-off), he/she is interested in withholding his/her identity
only. After all, a whistleblower informs OLAF for the sake of OLAF
looking into the allegations, and he/she is aware that the
allegations – but not his/her identity - may end up before a Court,
thereby his/her allegations enter into the public domain.

Regarding witnesses who testified before a Court, disclosure to the
public of their statements to OLAF in the documents at issue cannot
be regarded as subject to the exceptions of article 4 of Regulation
1049/2001. The legitimate rights of witnesses who did not testify
before a Court will be fully safeguarded if OLAF would expunge the
parts of the documents disclosing their identity. For instance, a
statement of the accountant of a company like GL2006 Europe to OLAF
about a past shareholder of a company may not necessarily be
regarded as being covered entirely by the exceptions of article 4.

Turning to persons concerned, in so far their statements in the
documents at issue is now lawfully public information (e.g. press
release by the authorities, public Court documents concerning
freezing of assets) OLAF cannot claim that the corresponding parts
of the documents are protected by the said article 4.

In conclusion, the OLAF reasoning about witnesses and persons
concerned do not amount to an automatic and full application of the
exceptions of article 4 to refuse total access. On the contrary,
partial release is warranted.

III. CONFIRMATORY APPLICATION

The confirmatory application concerns requests #3, #5, #7, #8, #9 -
#12. The applicant incorporates by reference his arguments about
the overriding public interest.

********ANNEX 1 **********

OLAF Operations

Subject : Notification of on-the-spot check – Economic operator

Dear < >,

On < >, the Director General of the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF) opened an investigation regarding < >.

Pursuant to Article 6 paragraph 1 of Regulation 2185/96, I hereby
notify you that OLAF investigators have been authorised to carry
out an on-the-spot check of the premises of your company. The
subject matter and purpose of the check are < >.

Pursuant to Article 7 paragraph 1 of the Regulation, you are
required to grant access to OLAF investigators, under the same
conditions as apply to national administrative inspectors and in
compliance with national legislation, to all the information and
documentation on the operations concerned which are required for
the proper conduct of the check.
Your attention is drawn to the privacy statement below.

Yours sincerely,
< >
For the Director

******** ANNEX 2 *********

Mission Report
Case Identification
CMS No. < >
CMS Title < >
Legal Basis < >

Participants
OLAF Staff
Others

Mission Details

Destination(s)
Date(s)
Duration
Purpose
Organisation(s) visited
Number of operational meetings With Government services
With other services
With other interested parties
Total number of meetings

Minutes/Reports of the meetings/statements taken ?
No Yes Number

Number of economic operators controlled/visited Directly involved (
beneficiary )

Indirectly involved ( suppliers, etc )
Minutes/Reports of the visits/controls taken ?
No Yes Number

Number of premises visited

Documentation/material collected No Yes
Persons met
1.
2.
3.

Main activities executed
1.

2.

3.

Number of man/days OLAF
Annexes  Visit report: Annex 1
Statement(s): Annex 2
Documents collected: Annex 3
Interview record: Form 17
Visit of premises ( internal investigations only ): Form 30
Computer Forensic Operation Report: Form 31

Copies of report to

1. Purpose of the mission

2. Report

3. Conclusive remarks

Signatures
Author of report
Investigator in charge
Mission participants
Investigator associated

Visas
Investigator in charge (if not author) [name]
Head of Unit in charge
Director Investigations & Operations

******* ANNEX 3 ********

Report of on-the-spot check and inspection

Case Identification
CMS No. < >
CMS Title < >
Legal Basis < >

Participants

OLAF Staff
Others [All persons present]

Premises Inspected

Location
Date and time of inspection
Purpose of inspection

Results

Items made available [May be listed in an annex]
Documents copied [May be listed in an annex]
Any other act or statement [May be listed in an annex]

1. Purpose of inspection:

2. Facts subject to on-the-spot check and inspection:

3. Actions taken during on-the-spot check and inspection:

4. Results:

Signatures of Persons Present

Annex to report

Number Description Number of Pages Original/ Copy

****************

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

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Von: Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

14. Dezember 2013

Dear European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),

I refer to the confirmatory application submitted on 28 November
2013 via email.

In view of 11 working days having run since the submission
application, I respectfully remind OLAF its obligation under
article 8(1) of Regulation 1049/2001 to promptly register and
acknowledge the confirmatory application.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

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Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

16. Dezember 2013

Dear Mr Ntetsikas,

We acknowledge receipt of your confirmatory application dated 28 November 2013, registered in OLAF with registration number THOR(2013)30743 on 02 December 2013, in which you request the confirmatory application of your request of 8 October.

Best regards,

European Commission
DG OLAF
Unit C.4- Legal advice

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Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

18. Dezember 2013


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Dear Mr Ntetsikas,

 

Please find herewith a note from our director Ms Kneuer for your
information.

 

Best regards,

 

  [1]cid:image001.png@01CE1437.0F722A20

European Commission

DG OLAF

Unit C.4- Legal advice

 

 

 

 

References

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Von: Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

20. Dezember 2013

Dear European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),

Thank you for your letter of 18 December, THOR 32635, the contents
of which are fully noted.

I respectfully submit that the request to provide OLAF with a
certified copy of a national identity document has opened a whole
new chapter of issues. I am delighted that OLAF has provided me
with this opportunity, which I intend to pursue further.

The request of OLAF has several problems. For this reason, I lodged
earlier today an application under Regulation 1049/2001 to the
Secretariat-General,
http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/olafs....

Since OLAF cannot single out the undersigned for an application
under Regulation 1049/2001, and also OLAF does not know my
nationality (which I do not wish to disclose it for now), it is
absolutely necessary that OLAF provided me with a full explanation
about how to proceed with its request for a national of a Member
State that does not issue national identity cards. OLAF is not to
make assumptions about driver’s license or similar documents.

I am looking forward to receiving OLAF’s requested explanation.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Tasos Ntetsikas

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Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

4. Februar 2014

 

Dear Mr. Ntetsikas,

 

I refer to your two e-mails dated the 20 December 2013. For avoidance of
doubt allow me to distinguish them and to deal with the first received on
that day. It is timed as having being sent at 09:14.

 

In this e mail you have asked OLAF to explain how one might comply with
this request if you are a citizen of a Member State which does not issue
national identity cards. OLAF does not wish this request for proof of
identity to be read restrictively and would accept any government issued
document of the Member State concerned which is current and records the
bearer's name. For example, a driver's licence, a national security card,
a military service card, a passport, a taxation office notice or an
electoral roll registration are all types of documents which would
presumably meet OLAF's request.

 

With regard to your second e mail of 20 December 2013, timed as being sent
at 09:35, and for which a reminder was sent on the 29^th of January 2014,
please be advised that this request for information and documents is
currently being examined and you will receive a reply within 15 working
days from the sending of this e mail.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE (OLAF)
Directorate  C: Investigation Support
Unit  C.4 – Legal Advice
Rue Joseph II, 30 • B-1000 Brussels (Belgium)

[1]http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud

Our policy regarding personal data protection can be viewed on
[2]http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/...

 

 

 

 

 

                                                               

 

          

 

 

References

Visible links
1. http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud
2. http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/...

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Europäisches Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung

4. Februar 2014

 

Dear Mr. Ntetsikas,

 

I refer to your two e-mails dated the 20 December 2013. For avoidance of
doubt allow me to distinguish them and to deal with the first received on
that day. It is timed as having being sent at 09:14.

 

In this e mail you have asked OLAF to explain how one might comply with
this request if you are a citizen of a Member State which does not issue
national identity cards. OLAF does not wish this request for proof of
identity to be read restrictively and would accept any government issued
document of the Member State concerned which is current and records the
bearer's name. For example, a driver's licence, a national security card,
a military service card, a passport, a taxation office notice or an
electoral roll registration are all types of documents which would
presumably meet OLAF's request.

 

With regard to your second e mail of 20 December 2013, timed as being sent
at 09:35, and for which a reminder was sent on the 29^th of January 2014,
please be advised that this request for information and documents is
currently being examined and you will receive a reply within 15 working
days from the sending of this e mail.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE (OLAF)
Directorate  C: Investigation Support
Unit  C.4 – Legal Advice
Rue Joseph II, 30 • B-1000 Brussels (Belgium)

[1]http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud

Our policy regarding personal data protection can be viewed on
[2]http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/...

 

 

 

 

 

                                                               

 

          

 

 

References

Visible links
1. http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud
2. http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/...

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