



№ 1165 /2007

9 November 2007

Dear Mr. Aizsalnieks, *Janis*

Further to our cooperation on the Outcome Evaluation "UNDP contribution towards socio-economic rehabilitation in Chernobyl affected areas since 2001", I am pleased to share with you the final Report on the Outcome Evaluation resulted from the analytical work performed by the evaluation mission during 24 September – 5 October 2007.

The evaluation mission produced the Report based on an initial review of essential documentation followed by visits with key stakeholders in both Minsk (government, donor community and UN system) and the four Chernobyl districts of the CORE Programme with a total number of meetings conducted 36 and 88 respondents involved.

When reviewing the development context, appropriateness of the stated outcome, indicators and targets, the evaluation mission analyzed UNDP outputs, resources, partnerships and management strategies. The evaluation also tried to define the factors within and beyond UNDP's interventions that are affecting or that will affect the achievement of the outcome.

The evaluation of UNDP's cooperation in this sphere is positive. The Report provides several recommendations aimed to improving the established frameworks and mechanisms of cooperation in regard to the concrete outcome as well as to the overall programming issue. I hope that you will find the Report relevant and significant for our further continued cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

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UNDP Resident Representative

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Attachment: Report "Outcome Evaluation of UNDP's contribution to socio-economic rehabilitation in the Chernobyl-affected areas since 2001"

OUTCOME EVALUATION OF UNDP'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC REHABILITATION IN THE CHERNOBYL AFFECTED AREAS SINCE 2001.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. UNDP's response to the effects of Chernobyl in Belarus needs to be analysed from a number of vantage points: - within Belarus as well as at the global and sub regional levels. This outcome evaluation therefore needs to look at not only the two projects involved but also the support the UNDP office in Minsk has provided to Belarus in its efforts to respond to a major and complex international problem.
2. The disaster had global significance and did, in the early years, engender a global response. It appears that many short run problems have been addressed and the UN system has played a part in that. Some excellent work has been carried out by the countries concerned with, on occasion, the help of the outside world.
3. Part of the UN system's response has been to facilitate the evolution of the approach from disaster response to sustainable development. The initial approach, decided on by the governments and agencies concerned, was one of response to the immediate effects of the disaster and this was what was put into effect. The evolution was made possible by the active involvement of the three UNDP country offices concerned (Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine); all part of a global capacity, the UN system, which functioned well in this instance.
4. It is not clear that, following all this, the inventory of all of the long term, medium term and immediate problems is complete and readily actionable. Therefore the three countries most directly concerned and the UN agencies most technically relevant, perhaps International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO) and UNDP, could perhaps review the inventory that exists, and then draw on the stock of lessons already learned to see which problems are well in hand, which are in the process of being tackled and which, if any, have yet to be more than dimly foreseen.¹

1. The Chernobyl forum has of course been active in this area but apparently its efforts have not been completely successful so alternatives may be worth examining at this stage, building on the significant achievements made by the Forum to date. In addition the most recent international conference on the subject, held in Vienna under the auspices of the Forum in 2005 concluded that "Targeted research of some long term environmental, health and social consequences of the Chernobyl accident should be continued for decades to come. Preservation of the tacit knowledge developed in the mitigation of the accident consequences is essential." From Main Conclusions of the International Conference: 'Chernobyl - Looking Back to Go Forwards Towards a United Nations Consensus on the Effects of the Accident and the Future,' Vienna, 6-7 September, 2005

5. A task for the international community and the region going forward could be to help the three countries most directly concerned to use all available information resources and results of various researches (i.e. 2002 UN Report, Chernobyl Forum, etc.) to maintain the inventory of the short term, medium term and long term problems created by Chernobyl, and to clarify on an ongoing basis where the country, the sub region, the region, the international community can best play a part in resolving them. That would provide a scientific and policy basis for a concerted effort going forward at global, regional and national levels. Problems that are subregional/ regional in nature could best be addressed by regional means such as the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (RBEC) regional programme or via EU resources or perhaps a combination of the two. Problems specific to each country should be addressed accordingly.

6. The assessment of the two UNDP projects contribution in Belarus is broadly favourable. Autonomous development in the four most affected regions of Belarus has been initiated; a national structure and apparatus has been created to achieve this end. The task for Belarusian society now is to deliver so that the process becomes sustainable in a fashion that it finds appropriate. In doing so the government and in particular the management of the CORE programme may wish to take due account of the concern expressed in several districts regarding the large number of project proposals put forward, which were still pending approval, and of those approved still pending financing. This means few have actually been implemented. Regardless of the reasons why, it reduces the credibility of any programme of autonomous development if expectations are raised but then implementation does not take place. So actual benefits realised at community or individual level should be the target going forward.

7. This is the kind of issue into which the multi-stakeholder evaluation of the CORE programmes, foreseen for early 2009 should look. If Government so desires, UNDP may wish to consider assisting the government to organise and lead this exercise involving all major partners and stakeholders both financially and substantively so major strategic issues of interest to all can be addressed.

8. UNDP has over the years before the inception of these two projects tried to influence the international response to the Chernobyl disaster in ways that were seen to be the best for the time and circumstances and the two projects are only part of what UNDP and UNDP Belarus has done and continues to do to address the issue.

9. UNDP has addressed the problem both as a disaster response issue and as a sustainable development issue in the 20+ years since the catastrophe and has fostered the evolution of the response, both by the international community and the governments and communities concerned. The current Resident Co-ordinator has devoted time and effort to successful promotion of the CORE approach. This involved the further development of a project preparation, presentation and approval process that was attractive to outside partners. This was appreciated by the major partners involved, including the NGO community active in Belarus and is a good example of the kind of positive effect that UNDP can achieve through conscious

exercise of the RC's convening and advocacy role, something which is not captured by just looking at the amount of project activities funded by UNDP.

10. This being said the UNDP programme monitoring and evaluation instruments are not optimal. Monitoring and evaluation has definitely taken place at the project level. There has been little or no monitoring of the Country programme objective of creating favourable conditions for socio economic development in the Chernobyl affected areas, nor do systems to do so appear to exist. There is a gap between achievements at the project level and the wider development effects sought via UNDP and UN system assistance. This comment could be made about most, perhaps all UNDP offices. In as sophisticated a society as Belarus there is perhaps scope to do something about it.²

11. The recent progress made towards approval of the proposal submitted to the UN Trust Fund for Human Security "Enhancing Human Security in the Chernobyl Affected Areas of Belarus" means that some \$1.45 million should become available for activities in Belarus. Looking forward it would seem best for UNDP to concentrate its scarce financial resources and the other assets it brings to Belarus on those areas where it appears to have a comparative advantage.

12. In going beyond the autonomous sustainable development approach already initiated, UNDP, both at the level of Minsk and at the subregional level, may wish to promote a systematic approach to returning to productive use, at the appropriate time, as much of the affected areas as possible, and the maximum of the population affected by the disaster enjoying the fruits of human development so enabled. Within Belarus this could mean initially extending the autonomous development approach to the rest of the country.

² See Recommendation vii et seq. for possible actions to address this

INTRODUCTION

1. This evaluation was foreseen by UNDP Belarus as part of its Evaluation Plan for 2007. The focus of the UNDP support, the international response to the Chernobyl disaster, is a key component of UNDP's collaboration with Belarus. The link to the Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF) in the country programme is through crisis prevention and recovery.
2. Current UNDP assistance to the society's response efforts are run through the support project to the CORE programme, which ends in 2007. The CORE programme ends in 2009 but an independent international review of the CORE programme is foreseen at the end of the programme and a mid term review of the programme is already slightly overdue. Also in the next 2 years, UNDP faces the task of a new programming exercise for a programme due to begin in 2011. In such circumstances an outcome evaluation is pertinent to the concerns not only of UNDP but also to its national partners as well as in the international community.
3. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the potential for achieving the desired outcome and UNDP's potential contributions in achieving that outcome.³ It considers the scope, relevance, efficiency, and sustainability of UNDP's support and makes recommendations on how UNDP could improve the prospects of achieving the selected outcome through adjusting its programming, partnership arrangements, resource mobilization strategies, working methods or management structures. It analyses the objectives at the output level and the effectiveness of the implementation strategy, thus far, and considers whether a course re-direction is required for the remaining period of the current programme cycle. And whether the outputs, as they are currently conceived, can realistically facilitate the achievement of the outcome level objectives.
4. The evaluation was also asked to :i.) Assess organizational and operational effectiveness of the projects in terms of their contribution to the rehabilitation and sustainable development of Chernobyl affected regions and in accordance to the projects' objectives; ii.) Provide a platform for evidence-based strategic decision-making by UNDP, iii.) Build knowledge, learning and ownership amongst all stakeholders; through the prism of the criteria of Relevance; Efficiency; Effectiveness; Impact; and Sustainability.

³ The underlying objectives of the evaluation as stated in the TOR are to

1. "Provide appraisal on the validity/relevance of the outcome for UNDP assisted interventions, and the extent to which the set objectives and envisaged outcomes have been achieved;
2. Assess the level of efficiency and relevance of the UNDP assisted interventions vis-à-vis the state programmes on mitigating the consequences of Chernobyl disaster and interventions of other major donors.
3. Identify gaps and weaknesses in the strategy, and what could be recommended regarding the achievement of the envisaged outcomes.
4. Identify lessons learnt from previous and ongoing interventions in this area with a view to ascertaining suitability of such interventions for continuation; discontinuation, refining and adoption in future work.
5. Provide an example for the Country office and its partners of a sound methodology for conducting future outcome evaluations and to share the experience widely."

Background Information

1. As noted in the terms of reference for this exercise Belarus suffered the most widespread consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe of 1986 with 23% of its territory and 2 million people, including 500,000 children, directly affected. Approximately 70% of the nuclear radiation fallout landed inside the territory of Belarus. Upon independence in 1991, Belarus found itself alone in coping with the consequences of a disaster that occurred under another state (the USSR), and in another place (Ukraine). 2,640 km of agricultural land became abandoned and 20% of all forest was contaminated; 54 collective and state farms were disbanded, 9 factories shut down.

2. It is estimated that about 1.3 million people including over 200,000 children live in the contaminated areas today. Around 135,000 people have been resettled from the most contaminated and dangerous zones. Chernobyl changed the perceptions of the Belarusian people about the larger world community. Recent national and international studies from the World Bank, the European Union and the UN, among others, have emphasized the demand of affected people for the development of new approaches for the improvement of their living conditions. The UN Report, *'Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for Recovery'*, which was issued in early 2002, pointed out that this goal needs to be achieved through a holistic and integrated approach, accounting for diverse and interrelated issues including public health, environment, economic development, dosimetry, radiological protection, education to mention but a few.

3. The consequences of the catastrophe have been a national priority of the Belarusian government for several years. The Government adopted three consecutive state programmes on mitigation of consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident and according to its figures, the costs of dealing with consequences of Chernobyl has been of 6-25 % of Belarus annual budget, amounting till now to a total of US\$17 billion. The international community has also made significant efforts including a wide range of humanitarian initiatives dealing with humanitarian assistance and children recuperation abroad, scientific and technical projects. Current international initiatives, amongst others, include the "Cooperation for Rehabilitation" (CORE) Programme, the funding of a dedicated website to Chernobyl issues, the Chernobyl Forum, a scientific forum under the aegis of IAEA and the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network (ICRIN) aimed at addressing the information needs of the population living in the affected territories.

4. The Chernobyl-affected regions have been trying to recover from the unprecedented nature and consequences of the disaster over the past 20 years. Since 1986 United Nations system organizations and major non-governmental organizations and foundations have launched more than 230⁴ different projects in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia in addition to significant recovery efforts taken by the governments of the three countries. Nonetheless, both the direct impact of radiation contamination and the indirect effects on the socio-economic situation, health and environment continue to be a major hurdle for sustainable development.

⁴ <http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/countries.html>

5. Under the previous CCF (2001-2005), UNDP provided assistance to the Government in post-Chernobyl recovery under the area of "Environmental conservation and management". This programme area supported the Government in the design of appropriate policies and development of capacity for sustainable management of environment resources and included the promotion of viable approaches to the development of areas affected by fall-out from the Chernobyl catastrophe. Support was based on provisions of environmental international conventions and by adopting an approach that recognizes people-environment interactions and social, economic and environmental linkages for sustainable development. UNDP targeted community-based approaches to sustainable development to improve the lives of people affected by consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

6. To mitigate the effects from the Chernobyl disaster and provide alternatives, UNDP assisted the Government in improving the lives of people affected by the Chernobyl disaster by supporting local efforts to improve economic and social conditions.

7. Since international humanitarian appeals had brought a relatively small response or benefit and because of the uncertainty in the economic environment in the affected areas, the programme used community-based institutional approaches, based on self-help and self-management. Special consideration was given to linkages among social, economic and environmental factors to help reduce the continuing consequences from the radio-active fall-out. This was done by strengthening the institutional capacities and networking of local authorities and NGOs.

8. UNDP provided the Government with what it saw as viable institutional and policy options for environmental management and sustainable development and facilitated resource mobilization from the international community. Selection of the areas, and the work itself, employed approaches and capacities developed under other parts of the UNDP programme, and took into account the scientific work undertaken by Belarusian and international institutions with support from WHO, IAEA and the Office of the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) and the work done with Belarusian communities in partnership with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donors.

9. In 2001 UNDP initiated the project "Strengthening Partnerships and Resource Mobilization Mechanisms to Mitigate the Chernobyl Disaster Consequences". The project assisted the Government in formation of the International Chernobyl Research and Information network (ICRIN) bodies in Belarus, in completing the multi-stakeholder process to identify information needs of the Chernobyl-affected population in the country and publishing final report "An Information Needs Assessment of the Chernobyl-affected Population in the Republic of Belarus". In 2003 UNDP helped to prepare and signed the Declaration of Principles for Cooperation for Rehabilitation Programme (CORE) and started a new "Support Project for the Programme "Cooperation for Rehabilitation".

Description of Approach/Methodology of the Evaluation

10. The approach followed has been a joint effort of one national and one international consultant. The international consultant was not Russian. There was an initial review of essential documentation followed by visits with key stakeholders in both Minsk (government, donor community and UN system) and the four districts, covered by the CORE programme. Prior to those visits some structured but simple questionnaires were prepared and circulated so that some at least those interviewed had reasonable foreknowledge of the issues to be discussed with the evaluation team.

11. For future exercises, such as the eventual multi stakeholder evaluation it may be appropriate to allow a little more time at the outset, partly to permit the members to review and absorb the wealth of relevant documentation, but also to build a team out of what it is to be hoped are representatives of the different stakeholders, each with their separate relevant skills. This point is elaborated somewhat in the Recommendations.

12. Beginning in 2001 UNDP became a vocal advocate for a shift from a disaster response approach to one that stressed sustainable development in the seriously affected areas. All three UN RCs in 2000-1 were active in promoting a process which came up with "The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for Recovery", a report commissioned by UNDP and UNICEF with the support of OCHA and WHO which was issued in early 2002. This shifted the rationale for Chernobyl response to the current concern with promoting sustainable development. The change involved a medium term strategy laid out in the UNDP/UNICEF strategy paper.⁵

13. The UN system's response to the Chernobyl disaster began immediately after the event and there has been extensive involvement of the relevant parts of the system. In the initial stages the UN response as for the rest of the international community was centred on a disaster management approach. A multipronged and diverse international effort was mounted that involved all three states involved Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Even though UNDP opened an office in Minsk soon after the creation of a separate Belarussian state in 1991 UNDP was

⁵ "The approach of defining the most serious problems and addressing them with special measures, while pursuing an overall policy of promoting a return to normality, should apply to the affected territories as well as to the affected individuals and communities. Where in the light of the best scientific knowledge it is reasonably possible, measures should be adopted to integrate less severely affected areas back into productive use as soon as is practicable. This combination of measures – focusing resources on those most in need, while actively promoting integration with mainstream provision wherever possible – is not a second best. ----- They will protect the most vulnerable and ensure that the most severely affected areas will enable the authorities to promote an orderly

facilitating the continued disaster based response. By the end of the 1990s as international interest in the disaster waned, the need for an approach that contained a greater emphasis on the sustainability and development emerged. The UN system mission, led by UNDP⁶, that took place in mid 2001 recommended that "Chernobyl related needs should be addressed in the framework of

- i. A holistic view of the needs of the individuals and communities concerned and, increasingly, of the needs of society as a whole;
- ii. the aim must be to help individuals to take control of their own lives and communities to take control of their own futures;
- iii. efficient use of resources means focusing on the most affected people and communities, and on children. The response must be commensurate to the scale of the needs;
- iv. the new approach should seek changes that are sustainable and long-term, and based on a developmental approach;
- v. the international effort can only be effective if it supports, amplifies and acts as a lever for change in the far larger efforts made by local and national government agencies and the voluntary sector in the three countries.

Appropriateness of stated outcome, indicators and targets.

14. If the overall objective is autonomous and endogenous development then the first outcome 'local authorities in rural and urban areas involved in planning and management including provision of public services' is appropriate as far as it goes. The intended outputs and targets are less so. Whether local authorities are involved and responsible can best be judged by seeing them take on progressively more and more responsibility, and how well they do it. The outcome indicator here is given as 'the number of regional authorities that established a mechanism for involvement of local communities'. But the problem is not whether the mechanism has been set up but whether it works and will continue to do so in future especially after government and donor interest moves on to other issues.

15. The outcome(s) that is/are sought by this endeavour is/are processes rather than fixed targets. Some of the processes are explicit, some of them are implicit. The explicit desired outcome is sustainable development. This is an imprecise, sometimes protean, concept at best. Given this, precise measurement is not to be expected or perhaps desired. Not desired because even if you could measure some level of sustainable development, the measurement would be irrelevant in the next moment after it had been measured and measurement is costly. The need here is for some observable indicators of progress towards a sustainable development path on the part of the communities in the four districts. To elaborate such observable indicators, it is suggested that some wise men and women with very relevant knowledge and experience be asked to suggest what they would look for at the middle and at the end of the programme if they were managing or assessing it.

⁶ Composed of six specialists from three disciplines: ecology, health and economics. Three members of the team were recruited internationally, while the other three were national experts, recruited one from each of the three countries directly concerned.

16. The implicit goal appears to be even more slippery. It is a rational and helpful response by the international community to the problems caused in the three countries most affected. Again this needs to be seen as a process with any evaluation comparing the actual process that has been followed with some ideal notion of what an ideal process could have been. And wise men and women need to be drafted into assessing it.

17. UNDP's response to the Chernobyl needs to be seen from the organisational vantage point and at the country level. It should be analysed at global, sub regional level as well as within Belarus, both at the level of UNDP's overall contribution to the country and at the level of the two projects that are the specific focus of this outcome evaluation.

18. However the picture appears to be slightly more complex. Issues of how globalisation is to be addressed face all economies, including those like Belarus, which are in transition. It is not clear from a brief mission the extent to which the government wishes to embrace a process of modifying well established practices of economic regulation and whether the external support to the CORE programme provides a welcome opportunity to test some of these ideas in a limited part of the country that has considerable needs.

19. As far as the explicit outcomes are concerned, what should be looked at is whether a set of processes have been set in motion that are positive and that show that individuals and communities in Belarus' four most Chernobyl affected areas are more capable of taking control of more and more dimensions of their lives and are in fact doing so. The broader issues of the process of social economic change and the extent to which and the rate at which Belarus' society and administration choose to adapt to the process of globalisation, do not figure in the project document, but should not perhaps be forgotten by any interested observer.

20. Broadly speaking they are appropriate at the project level, perhaps less so at the programme and developmental level. As noted above the intended outcomes, involvement of local communities and authorities, expansion of a competitive market oriented private sector, a centre for practical radio ecological culture established and functioning, were all dynamic targets. In general the indicators used for achievement do not include observable measures or signals that indicate whether progress is being made.

21. Thus the first intended output⁷ is a well functioning structure for implementation and the intended output is the general co-ordination strategy established and the associated activity is the creation and support of the CORE Programme coordination team. There is nothing wrong with this formulation in so far as it goes. If you are going to set up a decentralised dynamic process you frequently do need a 'centre' with certain capacities and establishing it may need to come first. But this structure will have no value if it has not achieved/is not achieving its purpose of having local authorities and communities involved in planning and management and then actually planning and managing. There are no evident indicators to capture the degree of genuine community participation. Perhaps a little more reflection on what is the appropriate structure to have at the centre and how much could be decentralised to the districts or to a strategically placed city such as Gomel may be needed.

⁷ Of BYE/03/004

22. Output targets 5 and 6 are well functioning district co-ordination and local CORE programme management and monitoring organisations established and functioning. There are indicators for inputs and activities related to this. This is fine in so far as it goes but again there is no indicator that registers individual or group involvement or achievement let alone well functioning district co-ordination or integration. The same can be said for output target 6.

23. As for expansion of a competitive market oriented private sector, the outcome indicator was the number of registered domestic private sector firms and the intended outputs centre on a rural enterprise development rather the amount of economic activity passing through the hands of individuals or domestic private sector firms. In both cases the real purposes, community and individual activism and involvement and dynamism of private entrepreneurs and how reality is changing are not being captured. They may be very difficult to measure but they should be observable by qualified observers. Difficulty in measurement is no excuse for not trying to find things you can observe even if you cannot measure them.

Current status and prospects for achieving the outcome with the indicated inputs and within the indicated timeframe

24. The CORE programme administration has been established successfully at the level of Minsk. There are some issues about the quality of the facilitators, the ease with which they have been welcomed by the communities and the resources available to them there. Many more project proposals have been prepared than approved and many more approved than financed. Based on the limited data available, there is little prospect yet of full and active involvement of local communities and authorities. Greater involvement would seem to depend at least in part on successful implementation of proposals from the communities.

25. Expansion of a competitive market oriented private sector appears quite far from being achieved. This is a delicate matter for all transition economies and expecting a simple transformation is neither realistic nor helpful. It may be appropriate for UNDP if the government so desires to mobilise all the good practices that can be gleaned from other countries also facing the challenge of a similar social and economic evolution and to include some realistic expectations for the process and then help the concerned actors manage for those results

26. Establishment of the Centre for Practical Radiological Culture (CPRD) appears to be completed. As noted however the objective is greater radioecological awareness. That is an evolving state, both as children mature and are capable of handling learning in new ways and as the science advances. It was not clear that all of those involved with the centre had such a view of their responsibilities.

Main factors within and beyond UNDP's interventions that are affecting or that will affect the achievement of the outcome?

27. The principal factors that will affect the outcome are largely beyond UNDP's and in particular UNDP/Minsk's span of control. Seen in the broad context of what is going on

outside the country they are the various interactions between Belarus and the process of globalisation⁸. What UNDP has done very commendably is to assist, perhaps initiate, a positive process of change in the relation between the government and the outside world. The government response from 1994 through 1998 was to ask the outside world for assistance on the basis that Chernobyl was a disaster which merited global help. The UN system including the newly opened office aided and abetted the government in this demarche to the outside. However valid that may have been at the time and perhaps even still be today, the cruel fact is that the international community's memory of, and concern for, individual disasters has a relatively short half life, much less than the radioactivity released by the Chernobyl catastrophe⁹.

28. In such circumstances, reliance on global solidarity for resources to overcome Chernobyl's effects appears to have long outlived its usefulness as a strategy. Indeed to the extent that it helped to produce an attitude of victim hood in the affected communities and a consequent dependency complex, it may not have been particularly beneficial to Belarus in the long run. Perhaps if UNDP Belarus, the UN system and the rest of the international community had been more active as advocates for a swift transition from relief activities to the path of sustainable development swifter progress could have been made. One lesson to be drawn is that the effects of international support to such an initiative can have far reaching and long lasting effects, which need to be traced if a fuller assessment of the outcome of such collaboration is to be made.

29. If the ultimate desired outcome is the affected areas of Belarus restored and acting as normal parts of a functioning modern society, then perhaps a fruitful approach going forward and building on the achievement to date would be to take stock of the problems created by Chernobyl in Belarus. It is not clear that that inventory has been compiled or if it has been, shared publicly with all concerned. It would permit those concerned to identify those problems that are Belarusian in scope and those that transcend national boundaries with Russia and Ukraine and those that have even wider reach, those that have already been dealt with, others that are being dealt with, others that will emerge over time and for which a prudent society and sub region would plan; those for which solutions are more or less known, those for which nobody has much of an idea how to solve.

30. Presenting the outside world and its own citizenry with a considered approach to this array of problems suggesting where the country, the sub region, the region, the international community can best play a part, may be a way forward. In this scenario those problems that

⁸ "We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people. ----- We recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation". Millennium Declaration Section I. para 5

⁹ The exception, and it is a rare one, is the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, which generated a popular global response that exceeded the capacity of the relief and development agencies and some of the governments concerned to use the resources so made available.

have transboundary significance to Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, to Europe and to the rest of the world would be clearly identified, which should help in making focussed requests for carefully targeted resources. Interested organisations such as the European Commission (EC) or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) could be enlisted as partners in this process.

31. Currently community initiatives that are implemented in each district ('rayon') appear in most cases to be independent and have no connection between them. However, if the aim is to introduce a participatory approach and if measurable or observable change is expected on the community level it may be sensible to look at how independent community initiatives and projects can interact, share methodologies (may be resources) and create synergy. The role of CORE local facilitator is crucial here as he/she can encourage and facilitate such dialogue and as he/she has a generic picture of community needs and community initiatives.

32. Projects within CORE do appear to tend to treat project participants as passive 'beneficiaries' served by the project. Thus, teachers, doctors or psychologists that run such projects make an effort to change a life of disabled children, or pregnant women. But, children and women are not always encouraged to act as actors in these changes, taking charge of their own lives. Some peer-to-peer interaction within the projects and focus on further multiplication of project activity and results (through information sharing, publicizing, expanding of geographic coverage) could promote greater activism of beneficiaries. Training in this area may be appropriate.

Are UNDP's proposed contributions to the achievement of the outcome appropriate, sufficient, effective and sustainable?

33. If the proposed contributions referred to are financial, then the desired outcomes both explicit and implicit are beyond those proposed/ foreseen from UNDP contributions. But looking at the problem in that way is not optimal. This is not a 'problematique' amenable to a simple linear solution of 'add resources to achieve the desired result'. Social change, particularly when it seeks to promote autonomy and initiative in communities that have been unused to acting thus, is a delicate task. It demands that a great deal of trust be built up among the beneficiaries before the desired changes will emerge.

34. It is interesting in this context that the most successful part of the CORE approach has apparently been CORE-AGRI, which was implemented through the UNDP support project. Its approach, we were informed, has been to attend to the needs for individuals and communities to be able to sell their surplus production. Having helped them to raise their disposable incomes in this way, they are then in a position to engage with the proposed beneficiaries in a dialogue about the other entirely laudable goals of the CORE approach, education, health, culture and memory of the disaster as well as radiological awareness.

35. So to ask whether UNDP can bring about autonomous development is not the best way to consider the question. The question is whether the process of autonomous development has been set in motion in a timely fashion and is sustainable. Development is a dynamic process. Hopefully the dynamic is positive. A development outcome is a process that has been either

created or modified by some action. In this case we are interested in what has happened because UNDP was there and because it took certain actions based on specific choices based on the data and analysis available to it at a particular time. So UNDP's choices and actions when the programme was formulated and since then, while it has been implemented, may have set certain processes in motion or changed them.

36. In this instance UNDP's contribution, particularly in a society as capable and well resourced as Belarus, is not principally as a bringer of money. UNDP interacts with societies in which it is active in a variety of roles. One way to evaluate the activities and contribution of UNDP is to divide and assess them according to the role that is being played. Under one such taxonomy, UNDP and the UN country team have a convening role, helping as part of the UN system in creating the preconditions and fora for the community of different states to come to an agreement on global and regional norms; and then in applying them at the national level offering a mechanism there for different parties to come together to address issues of common concern. They, along with the rest of the UN system, contribute to the setting of those global norms, based in some small measure on its and the system's experience. Third, various parts of the UN country team undertake advocacy at national level on behalf of those globally or regionally agreed norms and standards. Fourth, various parts of it undertake operations in support of national priorities that are consistent with those norms. Any evaluation of the outcome of UNDP's support to Chernobyl response should in theory cover all the efforts made, if it is to be comprehensive.

37. Through its convening /norm setting roles UNDP clearly has fostered the evolution of a shift in international response to Chernobyl. Beginning in 2001 UNDP became an advocate for a shift from a disaster response approach to one that stressed sustainable development in the seriously affected areas. All three UN Resident Coordinators (RC) in 2000-1 were active in promoting a process which came up with "The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for Recovery", the report commissioned by UNDP and UNICEF with the support of OCHA and WHO in 2002. This shifted the rationale for post Chernobyl response to the current concern with promoting sustainable development in the region. The change involved promoting autonomy in the minds and actions of individuals and communities in the Chernobyl affected districts.

38. UNDP has also helped move the focus of government requests for flows of know how and resources from the outside from one of disaster relief to help for sustainable development¹⁰. So it has been a successful advocate and convener at the local level. Indeed the approval process set up within the CORE programme would seem to be excellent evidence of this convening role. By supporting the creation of a CORE programme administration and the Preparation and Assessment Committee (PAC) process UNDP has supported creation of a capacity at the national level that could potentially be useful. UNDP is striving to help technical agencies such as IAEA and WHO make their expertise on technical matters available to the society as far as various relevant norms to be followed in atomic energy and health issues.

¹⁰ With sustainable development being here a code word for autonomous and participatory approaches to development

39. However the advantage for the international community present in Minsk appears to have been their perception that working through the CORE programme and the PAC they could more easily implement projects in areas on topics they were eager to use as vehicles for their various ideas and priorities, than working through established channels for technical assistance projects implementation. This has not turned out to be the case, so the virtues of the CORE programme at the level of Minsk seem to have been limited in the eyes of some of the country's external partners, many of who already prefer to convey their collaboration through NGOs than through more official channels. Some NGOs have a less than totally sympathetic understanding of the intricacies of government procedures and this appears to be the case in Belarus with perhaps a negative effect on the inflow of resources and useful know how.

40. Many governments have well established views regarding the primacy of national priorities. However there have been some recent developments that impinge on this traditional view. The heads of state of the nations of the world approved the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. Whatever their views on the importance or supremacy of national priorities, it is relevant to note that, by adhering to the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, all governments have created a need to reframe traditional and well established views regarding the primacy of national priorities, by creating a set of responsibilities for all states that are in addition to, and go beyond, their particular priorities. The post-Chernobyl recovery process should be considered from this perspective as well. Hence the efficiency, likely impact and sustainability of UNDP's contributions to the achievement of the outcome are significantly dependent on how far Belarus would advance in such an evolution of views.

Output analysis

41. There are two projects involved here. The first was BYE/01/03. Its outputs were
- i. pilot projects addressing consequences of Chernobyl developed and implemented
 - ii. a public advisory council on Chernobyl,
 - iii. a data base, and
 - iv. new partnerships of local administrations with other organisations to carry out joint activities,
 - v. staff of the Chernobyl committee trained and
 - vi. updated *web facilities* for the committee.

42. The first output was very relevant to the outcome and had it been fully realised it would have made the whole initiative a success The M& E indicators are good in so far as they reflect delivery of inputs and initiation and completion of activities; they are less satisfactory in addressing whether outputs are leading to desired outcomes.

43. The second project BYE/03/004 was essentially focussed towards the same ends but in a more complex way. The outputs are,

- i. a well functioning consolidating structure supervising implementation of the Declaration of principles of the Core Programme

- ii. a rural development agency established and operational, which means new proactive and market oriented attitudes among private farmers and better understanding among farmers and local authorities of their role as micro economic agents
- iii. a centre for practical radioecological culture established and functioning.

The related intended outcomes as stated in the Country Strategic Results Framework were

- iv. Local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas involved in planning and management including provision of public services,
- v. Expansion of a competitive market oriented private sector based on principles of equitable and sustainable growth,
- vi. Centre for Development of practical Radioecological Culture for school age children is established and functioning¹¹

44. It does appear that a central capacity has been created at the level of Minsk to co-ordinate the CORE programme so that output appears to have been achieved. It would now be the responsibility of the government to decide whether it wishes to support and maintain this capacity going forward.

45. The rural development agency in Stolin is up and running in the sense that it is working with small scale rural producers helping them with technology and know-how. UNDP assistance to the centre has been completed since end 2006 but the centre has been successful in attracting support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and some resources for pomology from the GEF small grants programmes.

46. The CPRD has been established and is functioning. Through provision of its measurement equipment children have the possibility to acquire practical skills relative to radioecological issues and through them their parents. However it does not appear that much thought has yet been given to keeping its services up to date in line with the evolving needs of Belarus' children.

Resources, partnerships, and management analysis

47. The essence of the approach taken was a complex move to promote partnerships between local and external partners and UNDP's approach appears to have been as appropriate as it could be given the circumstances in which it was operating. The goals were complex to promote a new approach by government and international community and to promote a bottom up locally driven approach to development. This should not have been conceived as a simple

¹¹ It is a little puzzling that the intended output of the project and the intended outcome as stated in the CSRF are the same. It would perhaps have been better to present the latter in terms of how well the education received at the centre translated into wiser behaviour by pupils and their parents and how this component was mainstreamed into the larger educational curriculum. In the same vein it is noteworthy that the versions of the project document available to the mission do not actually contain a detailed budget. Detailed budgets were available within the annual work plans.

straight line process and it has not turned out to be so.¹² There is a chronic shortage of aid resources in the region so UNDP Belarus as others has always to be looking to resource mobilisation issues and ways of combining its various roles and capacities with other partners in order to produce desired effects.

48. UNDP's partnership strategy in this area appears appropriate. As to its effectiveness in achieving the outputs and ultimately the outcome, the response on this has to be mixed. The amount of financial resources mobilised through the two projects has not been very great because advantages of ease of operation for donors (particularly the NGOs they use or approve), that had been achieved by the establishment of the CORE programme and the PAC process have been set back because apparently there has been a turn to a time consuming process for project registration; avoiding which had been a major factor in donors approbation of the 'CORE approach' and PAC mechanism.

49. It appears the Government's approach is that, as it is responsible for managing rationally the allocation and use of resources, it should have full knowledge of every external input and ensure that as much as possible of such resources, nominally made available, are actually spent on and for Belarus. This is an entirely reasonable approach and much of UNDP efforts in many countries have been designed to strengthen government capacity to do just the same. However there are transaction costs in the process and it worth exploring, if external resources are sought particularly for Chernobyl response, whether the incremental flow from the use of the CORE approach and the PAC approach generates sufficient resources to compensate for any sub-optimality in the process for allocating those resources.

50. The resources available are not adequate for achieving the objectives but they never will be nor should they be for such process goals.

51. UNDP's management structures and working methods appear appropriate. They have tried an approach which appears to have worked partially. They have checked their approach inter alia via this evaluation and are refining their approach. Some of the objectives have been achieved, there is a CORE programme approach established and a certain amount of national capacity has been created. It has not been fully effective in achieving the objectives, but significantly for reasons beyond the span of control of the office.

52. UNDP's partnership and management arrangements in seeking to achieve its objectives appear relevant and appropriately ambitious in scope. Major partners such as the EU delegation, OSCE and SDC as well as NGOs all testified to the positive role UNDP had been trying to play facilitating co-operation with the Government and in some instances reducing the transaction costs of such collaboration.

53. As for the efficiency and sustainability of UNDP's partnership and management arrangements in achieving its objectives, such judgments about efficiency could only really be

¹² For more on this please see Chapter by Peter Morgan in *Capacity-Building and Poverty Eradication: Evaluation and Lessons of UN system experience*, United Nations, New York, 2002, accessible at http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/Capacity_Building_for_Poverty_Eradication.pdf

made in the light of alternative possible arrangements, none of which were apparent to the mission. As to the sustainability of UNDP's partnership and management arrangements they are not central questions. What is more important is whether they further or hinder the setting in motion of the changes sought as part of the response to Chernobyl. The answer is, as indicated earlier, broadly positive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

i. UNDP in its capacity of UN Coordinator for post-Chernobyl recovery may wish to consider using all available information resources and the results of various research efforts (i.e. 2002 UN report, Chernobyl Forum, etc.) to maintain an inventory of the short term, medium term and long term problems created by Chernobyl, and to clarify where a country concerned, sub region, the region, the international community can best play a part in resolving them. That would provide a scientific and policy basis for a concerted effort going forward at all three levels, global, regional and national. Such inventory should be updated regularly and shared publicly with all concerned.

ii. In this scenario those problems that have transboundary significance to Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, to Europe and to the rest of the world would be clearly identified, which should help in making focussed requests for carefully targeted resources. UNDP/RBEC would have a role here as would UNDP Belarus and interested organisations such as the EC or OSCE could be enlisted as partners in this process, both in Belarus and at the sub regional level. One goal could be to have the response to outstanding Chernobyl related problems being carried on in a tight collaboration at national and subregional level, with UNDP involved in both.

iii. UNDP Belarus should consider focussing its programming, partnership arrangements, resource mobilization strategies, working methods and/or management structures to increase the probability that the processes of change already initiated via the programme continue to move forward. This means that the office's efforts and its resources should help forward those initiatives, which are consistent with the intent of the programme. *Diversifying the sustainable development approach and extending it to other districts that the government consider to be priority may be helpful.*

iv. UNDP Belarus, even with the resources foreseen under the Trust fund project, the Area based development project and any resources the donor/NGO community supply, cannot ensure that the outputs and proposed outcome will be fully achieved by the end of the programme period (31 December 2009). But given those resources UNDP can and should make it probable that good progress will have been made and that the sustainable development process will be seen by Belarusian observers as a viable one.

v. The CORE-AGRI approach of addressing the expressed concerns of individuals and communities, which to date have tended in the first instance to be economic, appears to be working well and to provide a sound basis for further action with those individuals and communities in support of sustainable human development. Introducing such an approach in other districts may be worth looking into. There is scope for greater learning by communities via community networks and between individuals via *greater peer-to-peer interaction* within the projects: also learning through participatory evaluation of community work. *Training in these areas may be appropriate.*

vi. The CORE programme has a planned mid term evaluation overdue. *UNDP and the Government may wish to treat it as a strategic opportunity and organise a multi stakeholder*

evaluation in which each player (bilateral, International Financial Institutions, and NGO) would be represented and to which each would supply at least one area of expertise. This would permit all parties to raise what they consider to be key strategic issues and facilitate pooling of relevant knowledge and views and rational examination of both. One outcome that could be asked of the multi donor/stakeholder strategic evaluation would be a set of programme level indicators against which all parties could manage for the remaining years of the programme. The outcomes of such an exercise should be worthy of the attention of senior decision makers. It would be important for the multi stakeholder team to spend some time together at the outset examining all the relevant documentation and creating a working team, and at the end of the mission presenting and discussing their results to appropriate levels of government and the international community.

vii. Among the outcomes of such an exercise could be an approach melding the various donor/NGO supported efforts together into a national programme or series of programmes designed to respond the immediate medium term and long term issues posed by Chernobyl and its aftermath. This programme would have elements that work at the subregional level and other at the national and should be based on firm financial commitments from all the various parties to it.

viii. There is a need to strengthen programme level monitoring and evaluation at the level of UNDP Belarus. Currently such monitoring and evaluation takes place only at the project level, so there is a gap between achievements at that level and the wider development effects which Belarus seeks to achieve via collaboration with UNDP and the UN system. Given the need to respond to the wider demands for accountability but also mindful of the need for UNDP's M&E system to be strongly linked to, aligned and working in partnership with the national M&E system, there may be benefits to *a joint programme of work of the Ministry that coordinates external co-operation and UNDP*. They could work together *to agree on programme level indicators that are suitable and practical for further socioeconomic evolution in Belarus*, which could also be applicable to other donor agencies and organisations working with Belarus. The shared process would be the desired outcome¹³.

¹³ UNDP's Evaluation Policy approved by its Executive Board on 23 June 2006 2006/20 inter alia,

1. *Welcomes* the evaluation policy contained in document DP/2006/28 as an important step towards establishing a common institutional basis for increasing transparency, coherence and efficiency in generating and using evaluative knowledge for organizational learning and effective management for results, to support accountability and to ensure impartiality;

2. *Requests* UNDP to conduct evaluations of its operations at the country level, in close consultation with national governments;

UNDP Minsk and the Government were both represented at the Regional Workshop on Results-Oriented Monitoring & Evaluation for RBEC Countries, Bratislava, Slovakia, 3- 4 March 2005, which noted among many other good points that,

i. outcomes are developmental changes between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impacts. As such, outcome is a medium term achievement leading to impact, which is mainly accomplished through partnerships' (p 8)

ii. the need to ensure that UNDP M&E strongly links and aligns with national M&E systems – and promotes partnership in the entire M&E process. Results of M&E need to be owned by government that also requires setting mechanism for increasing sense of ownership of evaluation, and implementation of recommendations.

ix. Their initial joint work could focus on whatever are the programme level goals at issue. So for the CORE programme, if autonomous development of communities is the goal that is sought, then they should seek indicators of community autonomy and initiative that can be measured or observed. If scope for private initiative is the goal, then measure or observe that. If community based economic activities, which apply market principles while keeping any resulting surplus for the common good is the goal, then monitor, measure or observe that.

x. In this collaborative task, care needs to be taken to keep the indicators simple so the energy spent by both Government and UNDP in collecting/ analyzing the information is not greater than the benefits (greater clarity, better programme management and organisational learning) gained. In some, maybe many, instances measurement will not be easy, cost effective or, in some cases, even possible¹⁴. If so, then asking people, who have a profound knowledge and understanding of the questions at hand, to articulate and record reasonable expectations of the activity or process being examined, will permit judgments of the wise later by those monitoring or evaluating the programme when they consider how things have evolved.

xi. There may perhaps be scope for UNDP Belarus, through facilities such as *the GEF small grant programme, to look for win-win proposals that could attract appropriate donors*. As an example proposals along the following lines could be considered. Some of the poorer schools in the affected districts burn wood for heating during the winter. If the wood is radio active this disperses radio nucleides into the atmosphere, affecting the rest of Belarus and its neighbours. Some donors in Europe produce solar photovoltaic and geothermal pump technology and could perhaps be persuaded to donate/provide/install it at a reduced cost. Schools would be warm and more productive, the atmosphere, locally and regionally, cleaner, a new renewable technology would be tried out and learned about in a country desirous of reducing its dependence on foreign energy resources. This is just one example of the kind of process that could be followed, seeking interventions that are of benefit to Belarus, its international partners and the donors concerned.

xii. In at least one district there was an interest in drawing on the talents of expatriate Belarusians. In this connection there may be scope for **the TOKTEN¹⁵ programme run through the UN Volunteer programme in Bonn to be helpful.**

¹⁴ "The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which can't be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't very important. This is blindness. The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really doesn't exist. This is suicide." Daniel Yankelovich

¹⁵ Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals

Annex 1

Evaluation mission itinerary

The evaluation mission, composed of a national consultant Mr Alexei Golontsov and an international consultant Mr Roger Maconick, started in Minsk on 24 September, 2007. A series of meetings, discussions and interviews were conducted with national-level stakeholders involving UN system officials, international organizations and donors and government authorities.

At the preparatory stage of the evaluation UNDP office initiated creation of an Evaluation Working Group (EWG). This helped to reinforce evaluation team of international and national evaluation consultants by participation of UNDP, Ministry of Emergency Situations, Ministry of Economy, UNICEF and UNFPA. From the beginning of UNDP Outcome Evaluation on Chernobyl EWG became a platform for sharing and discussing of evaluation methodology and getting a common sense among stakeholders regarding evaluation purpose and expectations. The EWG served as a practical participatory technique in evaluation and prepared a solid background for further structured discussions during interviews and meeting with stakeholders at national and local levels.

Taking into consideration that duration of evaluation mission is limited all national-level stakeholders involved in interviews were carefully selected in accordance with certain criteria:

- Balanced as well as diversified representation of four main parties involved in Chernobyl response: UN system, government, international community local stakeholders;
- Well-informed about UN system work in Belarus and independent thinking about it;
- Direct and substantial or at least partly involvement in Chernobyl response;
- Openness for collaboration with UNDP initiated evaluation mission.

During the first two days in Minsk the evaluation mission collected initial feedback from major national-level stakeholders in accordance with the outcome evaluation's objectives and obtained different visions, concerns and recommendations.

24 September, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Guided discussion	UNDP	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)
2	Interview	Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoES)	Minsk MoES office (5, Revolutsionnaya str.)
3	Interview	UNICEF	Minsk UNICEF office (17, Kirova str.)
4	Interview	World Bank	Minsk World bank office (2-A, Gertsena str.)

5	Interview	TACIS branch office, Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus	Minsk TACIS/EC office (34-A, Engelsa str.)
25 September, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Guided discussion	Coordination Team of CORE Support Project	Minsk CORE support project office (23/1, Pobeditelei ave.)
2	Interview	SDC	Minsk SDC office (18, Klary Tsetkin str.)
3	Interview	UNFPA	Minsk
4	Interview	OSCE	Minsk OSCE office (11, Gazety Pravdy ave.)
5	Interview	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)	Minsk USAID office (46, Starovilenskaya str.)

After the two-day assessment at national level evaluation team conducted field visits to all **four districts** (Slavgorod, Bragin, Chechersk and Stolin) targeted by Cooperation for Rehabilitation (CORE) Programme – one of the main UNDP sponsored interventions in Chernobyl affected area. Gomel city was included in evaluation team schedule of visits as it was intended to get involved greater variety of respondents on different levels national–regional/oblast–local/district. Multi-level approach helped evaluation team to overview Chernobyl response in a holistic way from national-level strategies to local community initiatives and get vital qualitative data from different sources.

During the field visits evaluation mission engaged following main parties involved in development process to mitigate consequences of Chernobyl accident:

- local-level policy makers (local government);
- providers and implementers of development interventions (government entities, regional agencies, NGOs, facilitators);
- participants and direct beneficiaries of development programmes (representatives of local populations living on affected territories).

Local community facilitators working under CORE Programme umbrella in four targeted districts provided remarkable assistance to the evaluation team. All the meetings in Slavgorod, Bragin, Chechersk and Stolin were arranged by them as well as ongoing organizational support to the evaluation mission was offered during the site visits.

Local community members capable to represent and reflect opinion of certain community group (parents, children, teachers, farmers, elderly, etc.) were the audience of interviews and focus group discussions. Thus, meeting with about 10 community leaders helped to get a sense about profile of entire community.

26 September, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Interview	CORE facilitator in Slavgorod district	Slavgorod
2	Focus group discussion	Local community leaders, average community members	Slavgorod, District Palace of Culture
3	Site visit	Vaskovichi Radio-ecological Consultations Center	Vaskovichi school
27 September, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Interview	Gomel Regional Agency of Economic Development (GRAED)	Gomel GRAED office (2A, Lenina ave.)
2	Interview	Gomel Regional Executive Committee, Department of Chernobyl	Gomel Executive Committee (2, Lenina ave.)
3	Interview	Gomel NGO "Community Development Projects"	Gomel NGO office (9-110, Knizhnaya str.)
28 September, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Interview	CORE facilitator in Bragin district	Bragin
2	Focus group discussion	Local community leaders, average community members	Bragin, District Hospital
3	Interview	Bragin District Executive Committee	Bragin
29 September, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Interview	CORE facilitators in Chechersk district	Chechersk

2	Interview	Chechersk District Executive Committee	Chechersk
3	Focus group discussion	Local community leaders, average community members	Chechersk, District Library
01 October, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Interview	Stolin District Executive Committee	Stolin
2	Focus group discussion	Local community leaders, average community members	Stolin, District Museum
3	Interview	CORE facilitators in Stolin district	Stolin

From October 02 to October 06 evaluation team was working in Minsk, where additional meetings with international organizations, donors and ministries were conducted.

02 October, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Follow up meeting/ discussion	UNDP management group	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)
2	Meeting	UNDP, Regional Audit Services Center	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)
3	Interview	British Embassy Minsk	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)
03 October, 2007			
#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Follow up meeting/ discussion	UNDP programme officers	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)
2	Interview	French Embassy Minsk	Minsk French Embassy (11, Svobody ave.)
3	Follow up meeting/ discussion	Management of CORE Support Project	Minsk

4	Discussion	Ministry of Economy (MoE)	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)
5	Follow up meeting/ discussion	Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoES)	Minsk MoES office (5, Revolutsionnaya str.)
6	Interview	Association Fert (Belarus)/ CORE-Agri project	Minsk Fert-Belarus office (90-1, Kazintsa str.)

05 October, 2007

#	Type of activity	Participants	Place
1	Discussion	German Government Support Programme to Belarus	Minsk IBB office (11, Gazety Pravdy ave.)
2	Interview	UN Department of Public Information (UNDPI)	Minsk UNDP office (17, Kirova str.)

All the meetings planned at the preliminary stage of evaluation mission were taken place. Almost all of the selected stakeholders participated in the evaluation exercise and made their remarkable contribution to the evaluation results. Exception was Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was not reached by the evaluation team during this period.

Due to the hectic working schedule of the evaluation team during the mission the opportunity to involve all UN-Belarus office in the process was missed. It would be appropriate to build UN office in-house capacity in evaluation by conducting an inception and final meetings with all UN officers and specialist presenting methodology, initial results and observations.

However, it is expected that UNDP outcome evaluation on Chernobyl will contribute to future evaluations initiated by UN office by sharing evaluation report and promoting participatory experience obtained within EWG.

Annex 2

List of persons interviewed

<i>Minsk</i>			
#	Respondent's name	Respondent's position	Organization
1	Cihan Sultanoglu	Resident Representative	UNDP
2	Levan Bouadze	Deputy Resident Representative	
3	Valentina Stalyho	Programme Manager	
4	Anna Litvinova	Programme Officer	
5	Anna Chernyshova	Programme Officer	
6	Vladimir Tsalko	Deputy Minister	Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoES)
7	Nikolai Tsybulka	Deputy Chief of the Chernobyl Department	
8	Svetlana Moshchinskaya	Head of the International Projects Sector	
9	Ludmila Sergeeva	Senior Specialist Chernobyl Department	
10	Irina Chutkova	Programme Officer, Social Policy	UNICEF
11	Alexander Karankevich	Assistant Programme Officer, Child Protection	
12	Valentina Dogonova	Assistant Programme Officer, Monitoring & Evaluation	
13	Elena Klochan	Operations Officer	World Bank
14	Irina Oleinik	Communications Specialist	
15	Janis Aizsalnieks	Head of the TACIS Office	TACIS branch office, Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus
16	Jean-Eric Holzapfel	First Counselor, Relations with Belarus	
17	Vladislav Mikhnevich	Project Manager	Coordination Team of CORE Support Project
18	Zoya Trafimchik	CORE Programme Coordinator / UNDP Support Project Manager	
19	Oleg Sobolev	Deputy UNDP Support Project Manager	
20	Tatyana Korzhitskaya	Coordinator Assistant	
21	Alexei Tchistodarski	Communications Specialist	Swiss Agency for Development and
22	Dietrich Dreyer	Country Director	

23	Olga Safranovich	National Programme Officer	Cooperation (SDC)
24	Tatyana Haplichnick	Programme Coordinator	UNFPA
25	Tatyana Pronko	Programme Assistant	
26	Francois-Vadim de Harting	Advisor, Economy and Environment	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
27	Jahor Novikau	Activities Manager	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
28	Hock-Chye Ong	Chief	Regional Audit Services Center,
29	Peter Vas'ina	Audit Specialist	UNDP Office of Audit and Performance Review
30	Dr. Ubavka Dizdarevic'	Programme Specialist	
31	Melanie Tankard	Vice Consul/ 3 rd Secretary	British Embassy Minsk
32	Cynthia Re'aud	Officer, Scientific and technical cooperation	French Embassy Minsk
33	Ivan Belchik	Head, Department of Cooperation with International Organizations and Coordination of International Assistance	Ministry of Economy (MoE)
34	Stanislav Matuk	Head, Department for Regional Development and Environment	
35	Sergei Tarasiuk	Programme Manager	Association Fert (Belarus)/ CORE-Agri project
36	Astrid Sahm	Director	German Government Support Programme to Belarus
37	Viktor Radivinovsky	DPI Officer-in-charge	UNDP, Department of Public Information (DPI)

<i>Gomel</i>			
#	Respondent's name	Respondent's position	Organization
1	Nina Kekuh	Director	Gomel NGO "Community Development Projects"
2	Victor Buryi	Director	Gomel Regional Agency of Economic Development

3	Ludmila Lisiuk	Deputy Head	Department of overcoming Chernobyl disaster consequences, Gomel Regional Executive Committee,
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<i>Slavgorod</i>			
#	Respondent's name	Respondent's position	Type of involvement in evaluation
1	Vitali Herdzi	District Coordinator for CORE-AGRI	Focus group discussion
2	Ruslan Talanov	Doctor, Slavgorod district hospital	
3	Tatiana Gurina	Farmer	
4	Zhanna Dauhaliova	Community member	
5	Antonina Lukashkova	Community member	
9	Dmitry Tverdovski	Local facilitator in Slavgorod district	Individual interview

<i>Bragin</i>			
#	Respondent's name	Respondent's position	Type of involvement in evaluation
1	Anastasia Fedosenko	Specialist, Komarin Center of Radio-ecological control	Focus group discussion
2	Svetlana Maksimenko	Nurse, Komarin school	
3	Irina Vinogradova	Specialist, Bragin district educational department	
4	Youri Shpilevskiy	Farmer	
5	Anzhela Dubotdel	Specialist, Bragin district library	
9	Tatiana Kotlobai	Director, Charitable Fund "Sprout of Life"	
10	Inessa Germanenko	Psychologist, Bragin school	
11	Natalia Mazhurenko	Psychologist, Bragin rehabilitation center for children with special needs	
12	Galina Kovalets	Director, Bragin rehabilitation center for children with special needs	Group interview
13	Anna Bobrinyova	Deputy Chair of the Bragin District Executive Committee	

14	Lina Piatnitskaya	Head of Bragin Culture Department	
15	Igor Kirenya	Head-doctor of Bragin District Hospital	
16	Vassily Vlasov	Local facilitator in Bragin district	Individual interview

<i>Chechersk</i>			
#	Respondent's name	Respondent's position	Type of involvement in evaluation
1	Vassily Maksimenko	Chair of Chechersk District Executive Committee	Individual interview
2	Maria Bogdanova	Director, Chechersk district library	Focus group discussion
3	Sergei Korsak	Head-doctor, Chechersk district hospital	
4	Svetlana Chernova	Teacher	
5	Ludmila Ulchenko	Director, Chechersk district palace of children creativity	
6	Tamara Makeeva	Director, Chechersk district rehabilitation center for children with special needs	
7	Alla Balysh	Director of museum	
8	Lubov Golubitskaya	Director, Merkulovichi school	Group interview
9	Lana Melnikova	Local facilitator in Chechersk district	
10	Tatyana Murzayeva	Local facilitator in Chechersk district	

<i>Stolin</i>			
#	Respondent's name	Respondent's position	Type of involvement in evaluation
1	Mikhail Nesterovich	Deputy Chair, Stolin District Executive Committee	Individual interview
2	Malvina Vydritskaya	Director, Stolin branch of NGO "Belarusian Association of Assistance to Disabled Children and Young People"	Focus group discussion
3	Vasily Erumeichik	Doctor, Stolin District Hospital	
4	Raisa Misyra	Deputy head, Stolin district health care department, Coordinator of small project "Healthy maternity"	

5	Antonina Pachko	Community member	
6	Fedor Leshkevich	Specialist, Stolin educational department, Coordinator of small project "Clean water"	
7	Mikhail Kozhulia	Coordinator of small project	
8	Svetlana Verenich	Coordinator of small project	
9	Svetlana Novik	Coordinator of small project	
10	Ludmila Tsupa	Director, Terezhova school	
11	Alla Vasilevich	Community member	
12	Natalia Potapchuk	Local facilitator in Stolin district	Group interview
13	Dmitry Strekha	Local facilitator in Stolin district	

Total number of meetings (interviews, focus groups) conducted: **36**

Total number of respondents involved: **88**