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European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders  
of the Member States of the European Union



## **RABIT OPERATION 2010**

### **OPERATIONAL PLAN**

Document Reference No. 15965/29.10.2010

Amended on

Warsaw, \_\_\_/December/2010

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Herby the Deputy Executive Director of Frontex and .....

.....

agree on the amendment of the Operational Plan of the RABIT Operation 2010.

..... December 2010

Gil Arias

For the Hellenic Police Headquarters

.....

Deputy Executive Director

.....

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**INDEX**

INTRODUCTION .....	55
a. Legal Framework of Rapid Border Intervention Teams .....	55
b. Fundamental Rights in Frontex operational activities .....	55
c. Security .....	66
1. MISSION .....	66
1.1. General Objective.....	66
1.2. Specific Objectives.....	66
2. SITUATION .....	77
2.1 Risk Assessment.....	77
2.2 Operational area .....	77
2.3 Phases/duration .....	88
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RABIT OPERATION 2010 .....	88
3.1 Concept of Operations.....	88
3.1.1 Responsibility of host MS.....	88
3.1.2 Responsibility of home MSs.....	99
3.1.3 Coordination Role of Frontex .....	99
3.1.4 Frontex coordinated activities in the operational area / operational synergies.....	1040
3.2 Readiness for implementation.....	1040
3.2.1 Phase 1 Setting up the operational environment.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
3.2.2 Phase 2 Familiarisation and briefing.....	1040
3.3 Implementation (tasking) .....	1144
3.4 Tasks and Roles of Participants .....	1343
3.5 Technical Equipment .....	2124
3.6 Debriefing meetings and evaluation.....	2124
4. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS.....	2323
4.1 Reporting System .....	2323
4.1.1 Daily reports.....	2424
4.1.2 Incident reports.....	2424
4.1.3 Debriefing (Interview) reports .....	2525
5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.....	2525
5.1 Finances.....	2525
5.2 Logistics, transportation and lodging .....	2626
5.3 Transport .....	2626
6. ANNEXES.....	2727
ANNEX A OPERATION AREA MAP .....	2727
ANNEX B TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT.....	2727
ANNEX C COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIGRAM .....	2727
ANNEX D LIST OF CONTACT DETAILS .....	2727
ANNEX E PARTICIPATING RABITs AND EXPERTS .....	2727
ANNEX F MISSION REPORT – RABITs AND OTHER EXPERTS.....	2727
ANNEX G PRESS COMMUNICATION .....	2727

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ANNEX H	EXECUTIVE POWERS FOR GUEST OFFICERS; WEAPONS	
	AMMUNITION, ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT;.....	<del>2727</del>
	USE OF WEAPON AND FORCE .....	<del>2727</del>
ANNEX I	BASIC SAFETY RULES .....	<del>2727</del>
ANNEX J	PRESS COMMUNICATION RULES - CARD.....	<del>2727</del>
ANNEX K	DAILY REPORT .....	<del>2727</del>
ANNEX L	INCIDENT REPORT .....	<del>2727</del>
ANNEX M	DEBRIEFING (INTERVIEW) REPORT.....	<del>2727</del>

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### INTRODUCTION

#### **a. Legal Framework of Rapid Border Intervention Teams**

Following article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing FRONTEX, „The Agency shall perform the following task:

*To deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Member States in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of 11<sup>th</sup> July 2007 and establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers.*

According to Article 8a of Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004

*At the request of a Member State faced with a situation of urgent and exceptional pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of that Member State illegally, the Agency may deploy for a limited period one or more Rapid Border Intervention Teams (hereinafter referred to as "team(s)") on the territory of the requesting Member State for the appropriate duration, in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 863/2007.*

#### **b. Fundamental Rights in Frontex operational activities**

Border control must be carried out in a way that fully respects human dignity. All people involved in Frontex operational activities<sup>1</sup> maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for fundamental rights. This particularly applies vis-à-vis persons who in the need of international protection. They are expected to meet obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the Operational Plan and shall comply with the rules of their mandates. While taking part in Frontex operational activities personnel shall respect the European law, the national law of the Member State. They shall maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct. They are to act responsibly and proportionately to current objectives. While carrying out border checks, personnel must not discriminate persons on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, belief, age or sexual orientation. Personnel are expected to treat every person with courtesy, respect and due consideration for the nature of any legitimate activity in which they are engaged. During the implementation of the RABIT Operation a “zero tolerance” has to be applied as leading principle with regard to the infringement of fundamental human rights.

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<sup>1</sup>Namely, Frontex staff, officers of border guard services, officers of Member States or of a Schengen Associated Country and other staff deployed by a Member State or of a Schengen Associated Country participating in Frontex operational activity.

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### **c. Security**

Without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, all versions of this document shall be made available to the authorities referred in each Member State or Schengen associated Country (SAC) as "**Law Enforcement**". This document shall be made available to interested parties on a need-to-know basis, in accordance with national rules for the dissemination of levels of information. This will be done on a case-by-case basis.

## **1. MISSION**

### **1.1. General Objective**

The deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams to the request of Greece **aims** to implement adequate operational response capacity of EU Member States' Border Guards tackling the current exceptional and urgent situation of irregular migration towards Greece with a desired deterrence effect, and to demonstrate well coordinated operational solidarity of the EU Member States to render effective border security at EU External borders.

### **1.2. Specific Objectives**

➤ Assisting Greece in overall management of border control in the operational areas at the Greek-Turkish land borders with significantly improved border surveillance and reception capacity by providing additional resources and optimization of their tactical use;

➤ Providing sustainable support for strengthened border control aiming at reducing irregular migration flows by enhancing coordinated border control measures covering adjacent EU External south-eastern border areas and focal points of relevance, increased quality of border checks in the detection of facilitators, forged documents and hidden persons, systematic gathering of information, maintaining awareness and managing changes in the situation;

➤ Assisting Greece in developing an adequate mapped process for more effective border management and building capacity to implement activities under national responsibility, including the readmission capabilities;

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## 2. SITUATION

### 2.1 Risk Assessment

In [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
The deployment of the RABIT teams [REDACTED] has resulted in an inversion of this increasing trend, which reached its peak in October 2010 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

The number of detections has fallen significantly [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] where irregular migrants were previously entering Greece in large groups. Furthermore, [REDACTED] persons were arrested while trying to facilitate the illegal crossing of the border during the RABIT Joint Operation. As a result, facilitators currently no longer accompany migrants across the border.

In addition to the increased effectiveness of border surveillance, the deployment of RABIT resources has supported the reinforcement of [REDACTED] activities [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

The reinforcement of [REDACTED] activities combined with the progressive reduction of the level of pressure at the Greek land border to Turkey, may produce an improvement in the capacity of the Greek authorities to manage the problem. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
In this context, Frontex has previously provided effective operational support and will continue to do so in the future

### 2.2 Operational area

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Commented [A1]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed information on the analytical findings, risk assessment and recommendations.  
Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations, facilitating the performance of illegal activities and thus reasonably harming the public interest by threatening public security.  
In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents

**Commented [A2]:**  
Text contains sensitive information about the overall organisation and communication of the RABIT 2010 Operation, including operational area.  
Disclosure of such information would harm the performance of future operations taking place in the related area, facilitating the performance of illegal activities. Disclosure would therefore harm the public interest as regards public security.  
In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

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**2.3 Phases/duration**

Planned time/date of the operation is:

**Start: at 14:00 (Local Time) 02 November 2010**

Estimated end of RABIT Operation 2010 is 02nd March 2011.

**3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RABIT OPERATION 2010**

**3.1 Concept of Operations**

**3.1.1 Responsibility of host MS**

- To conduct, lead, command and control of the overall border control measures strengthened by RABIT Operation
- To carry out effective border control at Greek External borders implementing Community Law and National Legal provisions
- To guarantee the proper implementation of the RABIT Operation in collaboration with Frontex and cooperation with participating MSs
- To ensure the national conditions for implementation the Operational Plan
- To ensure the deployment of all available additional human resources and technical equipment in order to guarantee the successful implementation of RABIT Operation



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- To ensure adequate working conditions for technical equipment and human resources from other Member States
- To lead and coordinate the sharing of relevant information among national authorities, and the home MSs
- To ensure the implementation of Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 (Eurodac)
- To handle identified persons in need of protection.
- To enhance appropriate and effective activities in the process of migration management and return, supported by ongoing Frontex project ATTICA

### ***3.1.2 Responsibility of home MSs***

- To ensure national contribution and deployment in line with regulation (EC) 863/2007
- To ensure deployment of skilled and equipped experts according to operational needs
- To ensure deployment of technical means ready to operate
- To ensure the provision of the Operational Plan to own deployed experts
- To organize the transportation of service weapons, ammunition and equipment, if applicable
- To provide any other additional support to achieve the objectives of the Operation

### ***3.1.3 Coordination Role of Frontex***

- to further develop the organisational structure for coordinated implementation of the Operation
- to coordinate MS activities in the implementation of the Operation
- to stimulate, coordinate and facilitate the sharing of relevant information among national authorities, operational organisational structures, Frontex and home MSs; as general principle the information exchange in RABIT Operation to be provided to Frontex Headquarters will exclude any information related to personal data of irregular migrants and other apprehended persons
- to monitor the development of irregular migration patterns and trends in the operational areas by maintaining a near-to-real time situational picture and conducting on-going risk analyses
- allocation of Frontex resources, including human resources, technical and financial means
- to contribute to development of capacity of Hellenic Police in terms of management of irregular migrants

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- to manage and coordinate all kind of communication between the host and home MSs and facilitate practical arrangements with regard to the preparation and implementation of the RABIT Operation

### 3.1.4 Frontex coordinated activities in the operational area / operational synergies

The following joint operations and projects are ongoing in the framework of Multiannual Regional Program Poseidon

- Attica Project
- JO Focal Points 2010 Land Extension
- JO EPN-Poseidon 2010 Sea Extension
- JO Focal Points 2010 Air Extension

All activities ongoing in the operational area will at least have reporting connections to the RABIT Operation 2010 during its implementation following the current Operational Plan. Attica project will be subordinated to the RABIT Operation.

JO Focal Points 2010 Land and Air will remain activated and adequately reinforced.

Upon completion of RABIT Operation 2010 (02nd February 2010), JO POSEIDON 2011 as permanent activity will take over the tasks at designated border area.

The JO EPN-Poseidon 2010 Sea will continue as planned.

### 3.2 Readiness for implementation

#### 3.2.1 Familiarisation and briefing

Upon

[Redacted text block]

**Commented [A3]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi of police forces and organization of operational activities. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

The operational briefing(s) shall contain at least the following elements:

- Presentation on the rules for fundamental rights safeguarding to be followed in the course of the implementation

- Presentation on the local situation concerning irregular migration; main trends in migration flow, results, analytical data
- Presentation of and instructions on the Operational Plan, in particular tasking of all involved staff
- Instructions on relevant provisions of the national legislation of the host Member State on conditions for use of force and legitimate self – defence including practical demonstrations
- Introduction in the national and local border policing authorities, operational area, organizational structure and responsibilities (incl. tasks, responsibility areas on map, main statistics etc.)
- Introduction of Head of mission, Commanding officers, Frontex Coordinating Officer, Frontex deployment coordinators and other contact persons
- Introduction of the management structure of the operation, including the introduction of team members in leading functions
- Instructions on the reporting system, including introduction of templates etc.
- Presentation of duty plan/working schedule for the deployment period per team member. Method and timing of transportation between accommodation and workplaces
- Distribution of a contact list (local contact persons/field coordinators, LCC, etc)
- Instructions on practical arrangements, such as accommodation, transportation, catering, etc.
- Providing team members with accreditation documents and armbands
- Media policy should be followed

24/7

**Operational Plan**  
**RABIT OPERATION 2010**  
**Page 11 of 27**

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

### 3.4 Tasks and Roles of Participants

Host [REDACTED]

**Head of Mission** - ensures the achievement of the objectives of the operation by commanding all operational resources in the operational area

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Commented [A5]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including tasks and assignments of police forces and organization of operational activities. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Public communication**

- Frontex and Hellenic authorities agreed on public communication rules and arrangements and this tasks have to be carried out as it's stated in Annex G

**Rapid Border Intervention Teams**

Executive powers

a) Powers

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Members of the teams have the capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), and that are necessary for the realisation of the objectives of that Regulation. Members of the teams may only perform tasks and exercise powers under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of Hellenic Police officers.

### b) Uniform

All members of the teams wear their own field uniform while performing their tasks and exercising their powers.

Team members should wear their field uniforms, including appropriate boots for Border Surveillance activities.

### c) Armbands

All members of the teams wear a blue armband with the insignia of the European Union and Frontex on their uniforms, identifying them as participating in a deployment of the teams.

### d) Accreditation document

All members of the teams carry at all times an accreditation document for the purposes of identification vis-à-vis the national authorities of the host Member State and its citizens. This document will be presented on request.

### e) Permissible service weapons, ammunition and equipment

Based on the security situation in the operational area team members should carry their service weapon, ammunition and equipment.

According to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Commented [A6]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi and equipment of police forces.

Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security.

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### f) Databases

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Greece [REDACTED]

**Commented [A7]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi and equipment of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

### g) Use of force

The relevant provisions of the Greek national legislation on using force can be found in Annex H. Additionally, practical instructions and demonstrations will be provided in the operational briefing.

**Commented [A8]:** Cosmin: I don't see any danger in disclosing such general information

### Team members

- Built and used following the implementation structure (Chapter 3.3)
- Performing the tasks accordingly

### Team and unit leaders

- Cooperating with and receiving instructions from the Commanding Officer
- Cooperating with the Frontex Coordinating Officer and Deployment Coordinator, including permanent availability
- Lead and manage a team or unit of Rapid Border Intervention Teams, including organisation of briefing, reporting, etc.

### Screening experts

Establishing [REDACTED]

**Commented [A9]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi and tactics of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents

### Debriefing teams

The aim of debriefing activity is to [REDACTED]

**Commented [A10]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi and tactics of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents

- Debriefing Teams perform their tasks deployed to different local units ([REDACTED]) and other locations in premises where migrants are available for debriefing
- Debriefing Teams should be composed of one or two Debriefing Expert and an Interpreter speaking Arabic or languages used in Afghanistan.

**Commented [A11]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including detailed location of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.



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- The local authorities should assign a head officer to the Debriefing Teams to facilitate the channelling of specific information relevant for criminal investigation;
- Debriefing Teams [REDACTED];
- Debriefing Teams should provide additional information and intelligence to the Frontex Analyst (ASO) and the FOO (intelligence component);
- The activity of Debriefing Teams on the spot should be steered on a daily basis by FOO Intelligence component, based on intelligence requirements generated by the ASO
- Debriefing Teams should submit the completed interview reports timely directly to RCC following the reporting line;
- A specific debriefing template shall be used for any interview performed by Debriefing Officers;
- Debriefing reports should be treated confidentially.

**Commented [A12]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

### Duty officer in the Border Control Unit (BCU)

- To support the duty officer of the local unit in implementation of observation and patrolling activities of combined teams  
To facilitate [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- To provide proper communication between RCC (Frontex Coordination and Management Group) and the relevant local unit [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- To contribute on daily reporting issues from local unit to RCC/LCC
- To facilitate all kind of practical arrangements related to the duty performance of RABITs and other experts

**Commented [A13]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi and location of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

### Frontex Tasks

#### General

- To coordinate the Member States in the implementation of the RABIT Operation
- Monitoring the developments of irregular migration patterns and trends in the operational area by maintaining a near to real-time situational picture and by conducting on-going risk analyses
- To stimulate, lead and coordinate the sharing of all useful border related information among the Hellenic authorities, Frontex, Member States and all relevant external partners
- To facilitate operational cooperation between Member States

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- To evaluate the operation and produce reports about the current developments, achievement and challenges

### **HQ Task Force and Operational Team**

- to coordinate the implementation of the Operational Plan
- to continue monitoring the situation during the deployment of RABITs
- to prepare and implement the communication with Third Countries
- to prepare and implement the communication with Press according to the needs;
- to propose the end of the rapid operational assistance to the ED
- to ensure that deadlines are kept;
- to recommend operational follow-up measures coordinated by Frontex

**HQ FSC** is responsible for collecting information, monitoring all available sources including media and provides a constant updated situational picture to all involved stakeholders including external partners. FSC collects all operational reporting during the RABIT operation.

Duty Officer in the Frontex Situation Centre in Warsaw monitors the situation, develops products providing a constant updated situational picture and act as central point of contact in Frontex.

### **HQ RAU/ASO**

- Defines the data collection for analysis purpose and prepares the relevant templates;
- Provides input for the training on the reporting for analysis purpose;
- In close cooperation with the Intelligence Component of the FOO, provides constant intelligence updates for the Debriefing Teams on the situation of irregular migration and border security at the operational area and provides feedback to their work.
- Constantly collaborates with, and assigns intelligence tasks to the FOO Intelligence Component for the gathering of additional information and intelligence within the area of operation and beyond, if required;
- Provides Frontex management and all relevant stakeholders with updated intelligence concerning the situation of immigration and border security at the operational area.
- Contributes actively to the preparation, planning, implementation and evaluation of the operation by preparing analytical input.

### **HQ Information and Transparency**

Role and tasks are in force as listed in Annex G

The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including the overall organization and chain of command of the operation.

Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security.

In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

### **3.5 Technical Equipment**

As listed in Annex B

Mobile [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Commented [A15]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including modus operandi and equipment of police forces.  
Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security.  
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### **3.6 Debriefing meetings and evaluation**

The Hellenic Police will organise together with FCO debriefing meeting at the end of the Operation. The team members and other experts should receive instant feedback and evaluation about the Operation, and they will be given the opportunity to immediately give comments and provide recommendations. Main topics for the debriefing meeting are the following:

- Presentation about operational results; Organisational response or how the relevant border security tasks were carried out during RABIT Operation
- Evaluation of the RABIT's performance and deployment of technical means
- Reporting system / exchange of information
- Planning and practical arrangements before/during implementation

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- Involvement of Focal Points
- Transportation/storage/carry/use of weapons/special technical equipment
- Organization for transportation and departure to home countries
- Comments, suggestions

**Evaluation**

Frontex will evaluate this Operation together with the host and home MSs as well.

**Mission report of deployed Team Members and experts**

All participating Guest Officers have to provide the Frontex Project Team (via NFPOCs) with mission reports within two weeks after the end of their deployment in the operation, using the template as attached in Annex F

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#### 4. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Command organigram



**Commented [A16]:**

The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including the overall organization and chain of command of the operation.  
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##### 4.1 Reporting System

The reporting system is defined for the creation of a monitoring system on the implementation of the Rabit operation and for analytical purposes.

The

**Commented [A17]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including reporting line and methods ensuring the effective implementation of the operation.  
Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security.  
In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## **5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

### **5.1 Finances**

In accordance with the decision of the Frontex Executive Director, Frontex will finance the operation. Frontex will reimburse costs to participating MS and SAC authorities in accordance with signed Specific Financing Decisions (SFDs) based on deployments of experts. SFDs for the RABIT Operation have been developed by Frontex Finance and Legal units to cover both costs covered by the RABIT regulation and other costs necessary for a successful implementation of the Operational Plan.

Pooled Resources Unit will be responsible for the preparation of all necessary financial commitments and the preparation of the legal commitments (including SFDs).

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**5.2 Logistics, transportation and lodging**

Practical arrangement concerning accommodation, transportation of deployed RABIT is coordinated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Commented [A18]:** The blanked out parts contain detailed operational information, including information on modus operandi and equipment of police forces. Its disclosure would harm the course of future operations and, thus, facilitate illegal activities. Furthermore, it would harm the public interest, by facilitating breaches in public security. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

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**6. ANNEXES**

ANNEX A            OPERATION AREA MAP  
ANNEX B            TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT  
ANNEX C            COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIGRAM  
ANNEX D            LIST OF CONTACT DETAILS

ANNEX E            PARTICPATING RABITs AND EXPERTS

**Composition of the teams**

ANNEX F            MISSION REPORT – RABITs AND OTHER EXPERTS  
ANNEX G            PRESS COMMUNICATION

ANNEX H            EXECUTIVE POWERS FOR GUEST OFFICERS; WEAPONS  
AMMUNITION, ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT;  
USE OF WEAPON AND FORCE

ANNEX I            BASIC SAFETY RULES


ANNEX J            PRESS COMMUNICATION RULES - CARD

ANNEX K            DAILY REPORT


ANNEX L            INCIDENT REPORT

ANNEX M            DEBRIEFING (INTERVIEW) REPORT






**Commented [A1]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular maps of operational maps and areas of Operation RABIT. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



**Commented [A2]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular maps of operational maps and areas of Operation RABIT. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



**Commented [A3]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular maps of operational maps and areas of Operation RABIT. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

## Annex B Deployment of technical equipment

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
The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular the deployment of technical equipment during the RABIT activity. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

### Commented [A5]:

The non-disclosed text (blanked) refers to the name of persons involved in the implementation of the Joint Operation. Its disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the person concerned and constitute the violation of EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, the information is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001



## CHAIN OF COMMAND (COMMUNICATION LEVEL)



### Commented [A6]:

The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular the chain of command applicable during the RABIT activity. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

## ANNEX D

### DETAILS

#### **Commented [A7]:**

The non-disclosed text (blanked) refers to the name of persons involved in the implementation of the Joint Operation. Its disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the person concerned and constitute the violation of EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, the information is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001

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Device Type	Percentage (%)
Smartphone	95
Tablet	85
Smartwatch	15
Smart TV	45
Smart Home Device	40
Smart Car	35
Smart City	25
Smart Building	20
Smart Office	15
Smart Home	10

[illegible]

Duration	Percentage of Respondents
0-1 years	100%
1-2 years	85%
2-3 years	75%
3-4 years	65%
4-5 years	55%
5-6 years	45%
6-7 years	35%
7-8 years	25%
8-9 years	15%
9-10 years	10%

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**Annex E**  
**Deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and other  
experts**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Contact

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Commented [A8]:**

The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular information regarding deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and other experts during Operation RABIT. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

**Commented [A9]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) refers to the name of persons involved in the implementation of the Joint Operation. Its disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the person concerned and constitute the violation of EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, the information is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001

## **ANNEX G**

### **4. General**

All authorities involved in the execution of the JO RABIT 2010 will ensure full transparency of all actions undertaken.

Information given to the media cannot hamper the course of the operation.

National authorities sending border guards to JO RABIT 2010 should limit their statements to the public to general objectives of the operation, numbers and profiles of experts sent.

RABIT team members are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by the specific guidelines for the participating officers below. Each RABIT team member taking part in the operation shall receive a plastic card with the specific guidelines.

A network of press offices of all involved authorities will be established. All contact details shall be sent to [press@frontex.europa.eu](mailto:press@frontex.europa.eu) address.

A compiled list will be distributed to all parties involved.

### **5. Rules of Engagement**

The communication strategy on the Border Control Operational Actions in the Hellenic Republic territory is common for Frontex and the Hellenic Police Authorities.

The joint Frontex/Hellenic Police Temporary Press Office (TPO) personnel are working closely with the Regional Coordinator Centre Commander.

Press Lines regarding joint Border Control Operational Issues and Actions are agreed by Frontex and Hellenic Police.

Press Lines regarding specific incidents are agreed by Frontex and Hellenic Authorities.

### **6. Function of Press Office**

The joint Frontex/Hellenic Police TPO, with personnel from Frontex and Liaison Officers of the Hellenic Police Authorities, will be set up in a selected area in the city of Orestiada in order to handle the media arriving to the operational theater.

Press visits to the JO RABIT 2010 operation will be organized together by Frontex and the Hellenic authorities.

The Joint Frontex / Hellenic Police Temporary Press Office personnel's functions include:

- Informing the Media Representatives on the Frontex mission and activities, as well as on the daily activities of RABIT 2010, in cooperation with the Hellenic Police HQs Press Office.
- Being the local Point of Contact for media requests.
- Handling requests by the Media Representatives in cooperation with the Hellenic Police HQs Press Office.
- Fixing interviews with representatives of the Hellenic Authorities as well as with selected members of RABIT.
- Fixing filming opportunities, in close cooperation with the competent Hellenic Authorities (Hellenic Police HQs Press Office, NFPOC, General Secretariat of Communication) for the representatives of TV channels.
- Media monitoring and analysis of Media tendencies (neutral, positive, negative) in cooperation with Secretariat General of Communication
- Drafting, reproducing, sending and distributing Press Releases, Statements and the rest of the communication issues, according to the circumstances and in close cooperation with the competent Hellenic Authorities (Hellenic Police HQs Press Office, Regional Coordinator Centre Commander etc).
- Promoting the activities of RABIT 2010 and, jointly with the Hellenic Police HQs Press Office, present the results of operations in the area.
- Establishing relationships with residents in the area

#### **7. Management of Press Requests**

The communication strategy on the Frontex mission and activities in general, is under the auspices of the agency.

Given that journalists need to get an authorization from the Hellenic Authorities to visit the area, the following procedure must be kept:

- Individual and on the spot media requests must be directed to the Secretariat General of Communication and to the Hellenic Police HQs Press Office electronically.
- The Secretariat General of Communication, the Hellenic Police HQs Press Office and the TPO will inform the media representatives that they must provide for an insurance coverage. This insurance policy must cover the specific land patrol stating that the Hellenic Ministry of Citizen's Protection will not be responsible should anything happen to the media representative or his equipment.
- The Secretariat General of Communication will coordinate the flow of press requests received, gathering additional information about the journalists and the



media represented, and will send official press requests to the Hellenic Police HQs Press Office, while informing Frontex Information and Transparency Unit

- The Hellenic Authorities will decide upon authorizing / not authorizing a journalist to the operational area
- The Secretariat General of Communication will inform the interested parties, Frontex Information and Transparency and the TPO about the decision
- Frontex TPO and/or local Press Office of the Hellenic Police will host the media representative. Media Representatives will be asked to present the insurance papers or press credentials before participating in the land patrol and also to sign a written statement that the Hellenic Ministry of Citizen's Protection will not bare any responsibility should anything happen to the media representative or his equipment

#### **5. Specific guidelines for the participating officers:**

What you can say:

- This is a first deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams coordinated by the European Agency Frontex.
- 26 Member States (including Greece) and Schengen Associated Countries take part in the 2010 RABIT Deployment at the Greek-Turkish border.
- These countries participate either by providing experts or technical equipment for border control purposes.
- I am a border guard from (name of your country) deployed to this operation. I am assisting Greek officers in border control activities. I am an expert in (e.g. first line control, interviews etc.)
- I am not authorised to give the media any more details - please contact the Frontex press office.


What you should not say:

- Do not give details of the operation
- Do not talk about the exact area covered by the operation
- Do not give details of the technical means deployed
- Do not talk about the patrolling schedule
- Do not discuss the migratory situation at the Greek border (let the Greek authorities cover this)
- Do not talk about the individual incidents that may have taken place during the operation (let the Greek authorities and Frontex press office handle this)
- Do not try to answer detailed questions about what Frontex is (let Frontex press office handle this)

Please refer the journalists to Frontex spokespeople for further details or call Frontex press office in case of doubt (you can also send an sms and we will call you back).

[illegible]

**Commented [A10]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) refers to the name of persons involved in the implementation of the Joint Operation. Its disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the person concerned and constitute the violation of EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, the information is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001



## ANNEX I

### 8. BASIC SAFETY RULES

In order to carry out the tasks in the most appropriate and safe way the RABITs have to follow/keep the following rules :

- in case of weapon issues strictly follow the law 2168/1993 and 3169/2003 ( use of force and weapon rules in Greece – Annex H) and instructions given by the local authorities

[REDACTED]

Escorts deployed for the transportation of the irregular migrants:

[REDACTED]

- The deployed officers should ensure they are aware of any health issues within detention places and pay attention to any medical recommendations.

(during the briefing meeting before the start of the operation the detailed rules will be presented by the local authorities)

**Commented [A11]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the RABIT operation, in particular the safety rules applicable during the RABIT activity. Its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operational similar activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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

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The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the operation, in particular the reporting on incidents and interviews. Its disclosure could harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



A(1) + P(8)

**Commented [A2]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the operation, in particular the reporting on incidents and interviews. Its disclosure could harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.







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INCIDENT REPORT

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

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
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**Commented [A6]:** The non-disclosed text (blanked) contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the operation, in particular the reporting on incidents and interviews. Its disclosure could harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.





Article 6(5), Regulation (EC) No [///]/2007

While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of the teams may carry service weapons, ammunition and equipment as authorised according to the home member State's national law. However the host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain weapons, ammunition and equipment, provided that its own legislation applies the same prohibition to its own border guards. The host Member State shall, in advance of the deployment of the teams, inform the Agency of permissible service weapons, ammunition and equipment and of the conditions for their use. The Agency shall make this information available to Member States.

Article 10(5), Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004

By way of derogation from paragraph 2, while performing their tasks and exercising their powers, guest officers may carry service weapons, ammunition and equipment as authorised by the home Member State's national law. However, the host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain weapons ammunition and equipment, provided that its own legislation applies the same prohibition to its own border guards. The host Member State shall, in advance of the deployment of the guest officers, inform the Agency of the permissible service weapons, ammunition and equipment and of the conditions for their use. The Agency shall make this information available to Member States.

PLEASE LIST:

**I. PERMISSIBLE SERVICE WEAPONS**

According to the provisions of the laws n. 2168/1993 and 3169/2003, policemen (police personnel, special guards and border guards) may carry revolvers and semiautomatic pistols.

The following rules apply for the carrying of service weapons.

“Policemen shall be allowed to possess and carry firearms for which they have been trained, since they are considered physically and mentally appropriate. Policemen shall carry fixed firearms, in accordance with the provisions of the Presidential Decree 141/1991 (G.G. 58 A').

Policemen shall always carry personal service firearms during their service, while they shall be allowed to carry such firearms while they are out of service. Exceptionally, policemen shall not carry firearms, when carriage is prohibited by electoral legislation and during their service, upon relevant order. This order shall be given in the event of a particular danger for the success of a mission or their own and the citizens' security or for the keeping of firearms”

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**2. PERMISSIBLE AMMUNITION**

No restrictions apply for the permissible ammunition.



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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

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**3. PERMISSIBLE EQUIPMENT**

Following the provisions of the law 3169/2003, the following equipment may be carried:

Metal handcuffs and Rubber baton.

The above list is restrictive.



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#### 4. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE WEAPONS

Use of firearms is defined, according to the law 3169/2003, as activation of firearm against a target and the projection of a missile (shooting). Shooting, accordingly to shooting target shall be ranged in:

1. Intimidating shooting, when no causation of harm is intended against any target.
2. Against objects, when causation of harm is intended to objects.
3. In order to immobilize, when causation of harm to non vital parts of the body especially to lower limbs- is intended, and
4. Elimination, when causation of harm to a person is intended and his/her death is possible.

(Armed attack shall exist when the person who attacks uses a gun, stipulated in art.1 of Law 2168/1993 against a person or threatens someone by its direct use. As armed attack shall be also defined threat under a convincing imitation of a gun or an inactive gun)

According to the article 3 of the above mentioned law:

1. Policemen while executing their service shall be allowed to precede their firearm, since there is danger of armed attack against them or a third person.
2. Policemen shall be allowed to make use of firearms, if is necessary in order to execute their duty, and the following conditions apply:
  - a. All lighter than shooting means have been used, unless they are not available or convenient in a particular case. Lighter means shall be defined as advice, suggestions, use of barriers, physical violence, police bar, allowed chemical substances or other means, advance notice for use of firearm and threat under firearm.
  - b. They have declared their capacity and have clearly and understandably notice for possible use of firearm, giving enough time of response, unless something like this is futile under these specific circumstances or intensifies danger of death or physical damage.
  - c. Use of firearm shall not consist of excessive means in relation to kind of damage and risk of threat.
3. In the event that the aforementioned conditions apply, lighter use of firearms shall be done, unless such action is futile under such circumstances or intensifies death risk or physical damage. Lighter use of firearm shall be defined as escalation of its use with the least possible and necessary harm, pursuant to subparagraph d of article 1.
4. Shooting for intimidation purposes or shooting against objects shall be permitted, especially in cases of danger from an animal or advance notice for shooting

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against person, since all proper measures have been taken, so as no man shall be hurt by miss or banishment of missile. Shooting against a vehicle, which involves danger of

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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: **GREECE**

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physical damage of persons in it, shall be allowed exclusively under conditions of the following paragraph.

5. Shooting for immobilization purposes shall be allowed, since it is required:

- a. In order to repel an armed attack, since such attack commenced or is about to commence, and any delay may render defense ineffective.
- b. In order to prevent materialization or continuance of dangerous crime or crime that is committed under the use or threat of physical violence.
- c. In order to arrest a sentenced person or a person under trial or a person under pursuit who shall be detected to commit "flagrante delicto" a felony or a regulatory offence, since such person demonstrated opposition to his/her arrest and there is direct risk to make use of firearm.
- d. In order to prevent illegal entrance in the country or exit from it of persons that shall attempt illegal transfer of people (trafficking in human beings) and objects and shall carry firearms of subparagraph 1, art.1 of Law 2168/1993.
- e. In order to protect public utility facilities or places in which objects that are dangerous for public health or public order or evidence for a crime are kept, since their keeping has been exclusively assigned to policemen and violent access, caution of harm or removal of kept objects is attempted.
- f. In order to prevent an escape or release of a prisoner that is attempted under armed attack.
- g. In order to prevent disbarment of policemen during their service.

6. Elimination shooting shall be allowed, if required:

- a. In order to repel an attack that involves death risk or heavy physical damage of a person.
- b. In order to rescue hostages who are in risk of death or heavy physical damage.

7. Shooting for immobilization or elimination shall be prohibited:

- a. If there is serious danger to cause a third person due to miss or banishment of missile.
- b. Against armed crowd, if there is serious danger to cause harm to unarmed people.
- c. Against minors, if it is the only means to prevent a risk of danger.
- d. Against a person who runs away, when he/she is called to go under legal control.

8. When policemen act as a group, in order to make use of firearms, command by the group head is required, unless policemen are under attack, which involves possibility of heavy physical damage or death.

9. Unconstitutional or profoundly illegal command by a senior for use of firearm shall not repeal the illegal nature of policemen's action.



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10. Every use of firearms by policemen shall be directly reported in the competent police Authority and Judicial Authority.

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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE



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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE


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**5. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE AMMUNITION**

There are no conditions that apply for the use of ammunition. The rules for the use of service weapons apply here.

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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

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**5. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE EQUIPMENT**

Following the provisions of the 8517/4/7-μβ' dated 17-02-2004 decision of the Minister of Public Order, as it has been amended with later acts:

(Article 9)

Police constables, sergeants and warrant officers are equipped with police baton, the type of which depends on their task.

The use of the police baton is allowed only in the following cases:

- a) After an order of a superior and
- b) In the case of self-defense.

The policeman, who has used his baton, on his own initiative, must report the incident to his Service immediately, also reporting in details the reasons that led him to this decision.

(Article 119)

During the arrest of a person the following rules must be followed:

- a) ...

d) If there is any suspicion that the person might attempt to escape, because of his record or his behavior during the arrest, he may be handcuffed, to prevent arrest.

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
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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE



MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: **GREECE**

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Article 6(8), Regulation (EC) No [///]/2007

For the purpose of this Regulation, the host Member State may authorise the members of the teams to consult its national and European databases which are necessary for border checks and surveillance. The members of the teams shall consult only those data which are required for performing their tasks and exercising their powers. The host Member State shall, in advance of the deployment of the teams, inform the Agency of the national and European databases which may be consulted. The Agency shall make this information available to all Member States participating in the deployment.

Article 10(8), Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004

For the purpose of this Regulation, the host Member State may authorise guest officers to consult its national and European databases which are necessary for border checks and surveillance. The guest officers shall consult only those data which are required for performing their tasks and exercising their powers. The host Member State shall, in advance of the deployment of the guest officers, inform the Agency of the national and European databases which may be consulted. The Agency shall make this information available to all Member States participating in the deployment.

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PLEASE LIST:

1. THE NATIONAL DATABASES THAT MAY BE CONSULTED

The national databases cannot be consulted as this requires special authorization and an access code, but they will have access to the existing national (border control, stolen cars etc) and European databases that our officers use, according to their position and rank, and in cooperation with the competent colleagues of our country.

MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

PLEASE LIST:

2. THE EUROPEAN DATABASES THAT MAY BE CONSULTED

The same apply for the consultation of the European databases.

MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

PLEASE LIST:

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MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: **GREECE**

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3. RELEVANT LEGISLATION/INTERNATIONAL TREATIES THAT MAY EXTEND ACCESS TO DATABASES TO SOME, BUT NOT ALL MEMBER STATES (E.G. PRUM TREATY)

MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

PLEASE LIST:

Article 6(6), Regulation (EC) No [///]/2007

While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of the teams shall be authorised to use force, including service weapons, ammunition and equipment, with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.

Article 10(6), Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004

By way of derogation from paragraph 2, while performing their tasks and exercising their powers, guest officers shall be authorised to use force, including service weapons, ammunition and equipment, with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.

QUESTION 3

1. RELEVANT LEGISLATION, CASE LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS/GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE BY BORDER GUARDS



MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

PLEASE LIST:

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QUESTION 3

Article 6(7), Regulation (EC) No [///]/2007

By way of derogation from paragraph 6, service weapons, ammunition and equipment may be used in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of members of the teams or of other persons, in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.
--

Article 10(7), Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004

By way of derogation from paragraph 6, service weapons, ammunition and equipment may be used in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of guest officers or of other persons, in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.
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QUESTION 4

4. RELEVANT LEGISLATION, CASE LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS/GUIDELINES REGARDING SELF-DEFENCE BY BORDER GUARDS.

MEMBER STATE/SCHENGEN ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: GREECE

PLEASE LIST:

QUESTION 4



Warsaw, 15

RAU/S2/IH/KH/TW

Ref. 2144 / 15.02.2010

## Reporting templates

### Example template

[illegible]

Contact e-mail: [fsc@frontex.europa.eu](mailto:fsc@frontex.europa.eu)

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## 1 Introduction

The Daily Reporting Template was created to collect data from land border operational activities coordinated by Frontex.

Structured data collection, combined with the use of common templates across all Joint Operations, allows the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) to routinely gather and analyse data that are directly comparable. Another important benefit is that a consistent template is quicker and easier for officers to use, and for new officers to familiarise themselves with.

Thus, in 2010 a single reporting template will be used which will cover pre and post operational, as well as weekly and daily reporting. In this template the Asylum seekers column has been moved to the right end of the table for practical reasons. Two new indicators have also been added to the template: firstly, the collection of information on victims of trafficking, and secondly, information on direct readmissions, according to the relevant readmission agreements with the neighbouring or third country.



The Template is in MS Excel and utilizes a macro that imports all data in a common data base. Although, it is not possible for users to make changes to the template, you are invited to make comments to help us improve the templates.

## 2 Use of the templates

### 2.1 Settings

Before you open the template, you will need to change the Excel 'macro security settings' to "medium or low" (See screenshot below). For this change to come into effect you will need to close, and then reopen the Excel application. Note: closing a worksheet will not apply security settings changes – the Excel application itself should be closed and reopened.)

If your Excel macro security settings remain at the default setting of "high", you be unable use the template!



Start a new report by clicking on 'opening of the template file in .xls format'. This method has several advantages. Firstly you will be always presented with a blank report in which all data fields are empty. This guarantees that you will not overwrite previously saved reports. You can also avoid submitting reports containing some fields of old data, which frequently happens when old, saved reports are used as templates for new reports.

When saving the files the following name is suggested:

E.g.: DR\_Medyka\_2010.02.10; PRE\_Medyka\_2010.02.10

Please use English characters only! Do not use national characters as these will lead to duplications and errors during data validation.

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Guidelines for Reporting Template

Data fields with red marks in the corner (see image below) contain a 'help message box' with a short definition or explanation of the required data format. The message box appears automatically when you hover the cursor over the cell.

ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS					Asyl	OVERSTAY	SMUGGLING				
documents	means of transportation	border crossings			ms	s	documents			carton 20	Stolen car

Third Country Nationals who have been detected by Member State authorities while not fulfilling, or no longer fulfilling, the conditions for stay or residence in the Member State.



## 2.2 The Headings

The report includes data on the activity of the individual Focal Point (FP), Border Crossing Point (BCP) or Border Patrol Office (BCO) during the reporting period; the purpose of the headings is to identify the FP/BCP/BPO.

When using the drop down list (see image below) please select the country, the reporting FP/BCP/BPO and the border section where the FP/BCP/BPO is located. If your FP/BCP/BPO is not on the list you can also fill the fields in manually.

Country	BCP/BPO	Border	Day	Type
Hungary	<div><div></div><div>Roszke</div><div>Záhony</div><div>Nagylak</div><div>Kelebia</div><div>Barabas</div><div>Beregsurany</div></div>			
Hungary	Nagylak	<div><div></div><div>Romania</div></div>		

Please insert the date of the report, format (dd/mm/yyyy) and chose the type of Focal Point i.e. BCP or Border Patrol Office carrying out surveillance tasks exclusively<sup>1</sup>.

Country	BCP/BPO	Border	Day	Type
Hungary	Nagylak	Romania	04/03/2009	Surveillance

**Format**  
dd/mm/yyyy

## 2.3 Comment box

The comment box is available for any information you deem relevant, i.e. if there is something exceptional that should be communicated.

I

## 2.5 Main table

<sup>1</sup> Surveillance at the green border outside of the BCP.

Each row in the table represents a single person refused or detected, such that the number of rows will be equal to the total number of persons. This is important because a single person can have several different noteworthy characteristics. For example, a detected person could be refused for several reasons, or could be both a facilitator and someone who crossed the green border. This is extremely important for data validation and for analytical purposes.

## Guidelines for Reporting Template

Here, each cell includes a drop down list in which you can select or directly type in the 3-letter ISO code<sup>2</sup> of the nationality of the person refused or involved in border incidents, including but not limited to attempted illegal border crossing, overstay or smuggling or claimed asylum.

## 2.6 Column 'Refused Persons'

This column contains the number of persons refused at the BCP, which will always be '1' as each row contains data for different individuals.

On the right (green) you find the reasons for refusals according to the Schengen Border Code plus one called "other". If you use "other" please provide also short explanation in the comment box.

There is no refusal without a reason, but an individual can be refused for several reasons

## 2.7 Column 'Detected persons'

This column counts the number of persons that were not refused but involved in border incidents (attempts of illegal border crossings, overstay or smuggling etc.) In addition at the right end of the table it also includes asylum claims.

Remember, an individual can be involved in several different incidents, for example both using a false document and smuggling drugs; or being detected hiding in cargo and then submitting an asylum claim

If the person was refused after detection, please do not put in the 'detected persons' column but include as normal in the refusals section according to the measures applied at the BCP. Please remember to use a separate row for every detected person to allow easy validation and automated collation.

## 2.8 Further explanation

The column 'Refused Persons' 2.6 counts the total number of persons refused.

The column 'Detected persons' 2.7 counts the number detained after being detected or submitting an asylum claim at the FP/BCP/BPO.

These two columns are mutually exclusive. This means that it is not possible to put the same person in both of these columns. If there is a person involved either in refusal or other incidents he/she should be included in either column 2.6 or 2.7; see image on next page.

Other columns indicate the reason of refusal (green), or the type of incident in which the person was involved (grey) or in case of smuggling the amount of smuggled items (yellow); see image on next page.

If persons with the same nationality are involved in several cases it is recommended to write them in separate rows (e.g. Row# 21-22 (in the case of Afghanis).

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<sup>2</sup> ISO codes can be found on the second work sheet.

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Pre Operational Report																										201	
Country		Reporting Office		Border		Day		Type																			
Report is to be sent to																											
Comments																											
2.6																											
2.7																											
<div>Days</div> <div>Sun</div> <div>Mon</div> <div>Tue</div> <div>Wed</div> <div>Thu</div> <div>Fri</div>																											
<div>FR</div> <div>1 000 001</div>																											
REASONS OF REFUSAL										ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS				OVERSTAY		SMUGGLING											
NATIONALITY	Refused persons	A - no valid travel document	B - false (counterfeit/forged) travel document	C - no valid visa or residence permit	D - false (counterfeit/forged) travel document	E - no appropriate documentation for entry purpose and conditions of stay	F - stayed for three months during a 90-day period	G - insufficient means	H - alert issued in SIS or national data base	I - threat	Other	Detected persons	False travel documents	Hiding in means of transportation	Green border crossings	Other	Overstayers	Using false documents or e.v.a	Smuggler	Drug (kg)	Cigarette (carton 200 pieces)	Alcohol (litre)	Other	Stolen car	Asylum claims	Victims of Trafficking	Readmission
afg												1															
afg												1															
dza												1															
mmr	1	1										1															
ukr	1					1	1					1							2								

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