L
E U O r g a n i s Oe d CTA
C r i m e T h r e a t A s s e s s m e n t 2 0 0 6
EUROP
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR................................................................................. 3
2. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 4
3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5
4. THE OC ENVIRONMENT IN THE EU............................................................................ 7
4.1.
OC Groups in the EU ............................................................................................. 7
4.2.
Criminal Markets .................................................................................................... 8
4.3.
General Observations ............................................................................................ 9
5. THE THREAT FROM OC ............................................................................................. 11
5.1.
Key Indicators With Regards to OC Groups ........................................................ 11
5.1.1.
The International Dimension ........................................................................ 11
5.1.2.
OC Group Structures ................................................................................... 12
5.1.3.
Use of Legitimate Business Structures ........................................................ 13
5.1.4.
Specialisation ............................................................................................... 13
5.1.5.
Influence and Corruption.............................................................................. 14
5.1.6.
Violence ....................................................................................................... 15
5.1.7.
Counter-measures ....................................................................................... 16
5.2.
Key Facilitating Factors With Regards to Criminal Markets ................................. 17
5.2.1.
Document Forgery and Identity Fraud ......................................................... 18
5.2.2.
Technology................................................................................................... 18
5.2.3.
The Misuse of the Road Transport Sector ................................................... 19
5.2.4.
The Exploitation of the Financial Sector....................................................... 19
5.2.5.
Globalisation ................................................................................................ 20
5.2.6.
Borders......................................................................................................... 22
6. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 23
6.1.
General ................................................................................................................ 23
6.2.
OC Groups ........................................................................................................... 23
6.3.
Criminal Markets ................................................................................................. 25
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1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR
I am delighted to present the public version of the first European Union’s Organised
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). The OCTA is a core product of the intelligence-
led policing concept and its drafting is one of Europol’s top priorities in 2006.
The OCTA should, as its name suggests, develop a threat assessment of current
and expected new trends in organised crime across the EU. The assessment is
based upon existing knowledge and expertise and it is drawn up in order to enable
the decision makers to take the appropriate action to counter the anticipated threat.
The OCTA 2006 is the first attempt for the EU. It marks a new approach to the way
in which Europol, the European institutions and the Member States will think and
operate in the future and in so far, it is a first step into a change of paradigm in
policing. The OCTA fits in firmly with the aim of “The Hague Programme” to provide
a forward looking approach to fight organised crime in a more pro-active than in a
re-active manner. It will be complemented by the development and implementation
of the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM). The OCTA will allow the EU to
develop complementary measures to countering organised crime, linking those at
the ministerial and political levels with those of practitioners and law enforcement
agencies who operate at the front end.
A great number of people and various organisations have contributed to the
production of this first OCTA. All EU-Member States and the two Accession States
have provided us with their respective contributions. We also received valuable
contributions from the institutions at EU-level – Eurojust, Frontex, OLAF, ECB and
EMCDDA. Additionally, a number of third parties provided valuable assistance in
building up our picture of organised crime as it impacts upon the EU. We are
grateful to our law enforcement partners in the US, Canada, Norway and Colombia
as well as to Interpol and SECI for their co-operation. The novel approach taken in
producing this work has also seen consultation with a number of partners from the
private sector and academia and their co-operation has added significant value to
the OCTA. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the staff of Europol deserve
recognition for pulling the respective contributions together and analysing them in
order to produce this document. I appreciate and thank them for their on-going
efforts in the production of this important and groundbreaking work.
Max-Peter Ratzel
Director of Europol
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2. INTRODUCTION
In response to The Hague Programme, as concluded by the European Council in
November 2004, in particular its emphasis on the need for a future oriented
assessment of organised crime (OC) to support law enforcement efforts in the
European Union (EU), it was decided to replace the Organised Crime Report (OCR)
with the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). Whereas the OCR was
primarily focusing on the description of the OC situation in Europe, the OCTA puts
an emphasis on the qualitative assessment of this complex and multi-faceted
phenomenon. The OCTA, being a forward-looking document, will help decision-
makers identify strategic priority areas in the fight against serious and organised
crime and to initiate an intelligence process to define operational targets. By doing
so, the OCTA will also support the streamlining of law enforcement activities at a
European and regional level.
Although the European perspective should be the driving force for the statements
made in the OCTA, it can not be neglected that Europe, due to its geographical
dimension and its cultural, social and historical differences, is not a homogeneous
structure and therefore also may require a regional priority setting. Therefore,
although the European dimension is the prime focus, the OCTA also identifies
regional foci taking into account existing divergences.
The OCTA is based on a multi-source approach, including law enforcement and
non-law enforcement sources. These sources include various European agencies
as well as the private sector. A specific emphasis is put on elaborating the benefits
of an intensified public-private partnership.
Since the OCTA is taking a European or wider regional perspective, the OCTA does
not reflect on all existing OC groups or crime types. As the OCTA is a qualitative
assessment, the application of specific criteria allowed for a pre-selection of the
most relevant criminal phenomena. A different, comprehensive approach would
‘blur’ the focus on the most relevant issues.
The OCTA helps closing the gap between strategic findings and operational
activities. The OCTA helps identifying the highest priorities, which will then be
effectively tackled with the appropriate law enforcement instruments. The OCTA
suggests strategic priorities, but it needs to be realised that the OCTA itself is not
detailed enough to pinpoint specific criminal investigations. In areas where the
OCTA identifies a high level of threat it is required to conduct specific assessments,
which will then be the suitable tool for transforming strategic priorities into more
detailed operational recommendations.
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3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With regard to the OC groups, one overall conclusion to be drawn is the dynamic
relationship between the various indicators employed in the analysis, namely:
1. The international dimension;
2. Group
structures;
3. Use of legitimate business structures;
4. Specialisation;
5. Influence;
6. Use of violence;
7. Counter-measures.
The indicator ‘counter-measures’ especially highlights this aspect. It is clear that
most other aspects of OC group structures can be used as a counter-measure
against law enforcement activities. Thus, it is not enough to look at only one of the
indicators in isolation, but they should all be included in the collection work and
analysis.
The main threatening aspects of OC groups are, first, the overwhelming obstacles in
dismantling them because of their international dimension or influence, and second,
their level of infiltration in society and economy. The first aspect gives them a sort of
impunity and perpetuity that counteracts law enforcement efforts. The second
aspect makes them mingled with the legal world, negatively affecting the willingness
to attack these OC groups, the level of corruption and democratic dynamics. Also,
the more an OC group is established and has infiltrated society, the more the upper
level can gain a layer of respectability and become more difficult to bring to justice.
Four main categories of OC groups can be identified:
• principally territorially based, indigenous OC groups, with extensive
transnational activities; especially such with possibilities to shield their
leadership and assets even inside the EU;
• mainly ethnically homogeneous groups with their leadership and main assets
abroad;
• dynamic networks of perpetrators, whose organisational setup is less viable
to attack from a law enforcement perspective than their communications and
finances;
• OC groups based on strictly defined organisational principles without an
ethnic component, coupled with a large international presence.
With regard to the facilitating factors in the discussion on criminal markets, a general
evolution towards increasingly complex setups for criminal endeavours can be
witnessed. Increasingly, horizontal facilitating factors such as document forgery and
identity theft, technology, the transport sector, the financial sector and the absence
or presence of borders are employed for criminal gain. The latter mainly refers to
opportunities provided by decreased border controls whilst administrative borders
remain.
Taking into consideration the assessment in this report, prevailing priorities with
regard to OC based on years of political and law enforcement experience, and
putting regional variations aside, the following criminal markets should attract
focused attention on the common EU level:
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• Drug trafficking, especially synthetic drugs;
• Exploitation of trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration;
• Fraud;
• Euro
counterfeiting;
• Commodity counterfeiting and intellectual property theft;
• Money
laundering.
Regional patterns worth taking particular note of include:
• South West Europe, in particular with regard to illegal immigration, cocaine
and cannabis trafficking for further distribution in the EU;
• South East Europe, specifically with regard to heroin trafficking, illegal
immigration and trafficking in human beings, aimed at the whole of the EU;
• North East Europe with regard to highly taxed products aimed at the Nordic
countries and beyond.
• Particular transportation hubs, such as harbours and airports pertaining to
the ‘Atlantic region’, used for the movement of various commodities to and
from the EU, in particular drugs.
Traditional destination regions for the smuggling of highly taxed products and
production centres for synthetic drugs should also be highlighted.
There is a need for a close attention on key criminals, their networks, the financial
dimension of the OC groups and their ability to communicate within and between
one another. That is, the functional side of OC must be at the forefront of the
attention, asking the question what they are doing and how rather than who they
are. Such a focus would enable a targeted approach against OC, allowing law
enforcement to keep track of an increasingly fluid criminal environment where both
the criminals and the crimes become increasingly difficult to target in isolation.
Such a functional approach seems to be necessary as a complementary approach
in conjunction with other measures aimed at OC. In addition, it may also increase
the chance to be more successful in dismantling and disrupting OC networks all
over the EU.
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4. THE OC ENVIRONMENT IN THE EU
4.1. OC Groups in the EU
OC is prevalent in all Member States (MS) and increasingly international in its
composition. OC groups are also becoming increasingly heterogeneous and
dynamically organised in structural terms, moving towards loose networks rather
than pyramidal monoliths. They are employing legitimate business structures in their
criminal endeavours, be it for concealment of criminal proceeds or profit, and the
level of specialisation in their activities is also growing. Many are in a position to
influence external parties, be they business partners, public administrators or law
enforcement officers. Violence is an inherent part of many crimes, and one could
argue that it is an inherent part of OC in general, either overtly expressed or tacitly
understood. Increasingly, OC groups are mastering efficient counter-measures
against law enforcement activities.
Some regional patterns in OC in the EU can be discerned. The OC situation in
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, for instance, is mainly conditioned by its proximity to
Russia. The latter is source for illegal tobacco, alcohol and heroin in transit from
Central Asia but also represents a market for stolen vehicles and synthetic drugs.
Also Belarus and Ukraine play a role in this criminal system.
The four Nordic countries also share common traits. Although not exclusively so,
outlaw motorcycle gangs play an important role among the most threatening OC
groups active in this region, with close links into the neighbouring countries. In
Finland the crime-system is heavily affected by Estonian-based OC groups acting
as main providers of illegal goods and services. In Sweden, besides the influence of
Baltic OC and the strong presence of outlaw motorcycle gangs, there are significant
activities by ex-Yugoslavian and ethnic Albanian OC groups.
In Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, OC is
mainly indigenous and homogenous, involved mainly in traditional crime, and using
bogus companies, influence and violence to further and shield criminal interests. It
seems, however, that Poland is the slightly differing criminal market. The OC groups
are quite heterogeneous with strong non-indigenous features. It also seems that the
Polish OC groups have already become strongly involved in crimes against persons,
which does not usually apply to the other countries in the area, in which OC is still
mainly active in economic crime on the one hand and drug or commodity smuggling
on the other.
It seems safe to suggest that Spain, Portugal and to a certain extent Italy can be
associated with mainly heterogeneous OC groups. Naturally, Italy is characterised
by very important homogeneous and indigenous OC structures such as the
’Ndrangheta, but is on the other hand also strongly affected by non-indigenous OC.
Spain and Portugal, and to a lesser degree southern France, have developed some
similar OC characteristics. The Iberian Peninsula continues to be an important hub
for major drug trafficking routes into the EU. In Spain, there are two main factors
affecting the criminal environment: cultural and economic links with South America
and geographical proximity to Morocco. The same could be said about Portugal, in
particular its links to Brazil. Due to the first factor, Spain is a central point for the
distribution of cocaine to Europe with the involvement of many foreign nationals
associated to OC groups operating there.
Other regional patterns can be discerned. For instance, Ireland is affected by its
close relationship to the United Kingdom which, in turn, is linked to the criminal hub
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which seems to have developed in The Netherlands, Belgium, western Germany,
Luxembourg and northern France. Finally, proximity to the Balkans has a strong
impact on the crime scene in Italy and Greece.
Because of its historical heritage, extension and geographical position, Germany’s
situation is one of the most complex ones. There is a strong activity of OC groups
from Turkey, Italy and Serbia and Montenegro, which highlights the influence of the
aforementioned Balkan crime-system. On the other hand, Germany experiences
also a significant presence of Polish, Russian speaking, Lithuanian and Ukrainian
OC groups, which is the sign of the influence of the Baltic crime-system. Nigerian
OC is also strongly present. To make it even more complex, Germany is also
affected by outlaw motorcycle gangs.
Some patterns are less regional in scope. OC groups from the Balkan area have a
direct or indirect impact in most of the MS. Traditionally, Turkish OC is responsible
for importing and distributing heroin in the EU, in co-operation with criminals along
the Balkan routes. Ethnic Albanian OC groups have already shown a significant
involvement in the trafficking of heroin, while Romanian and Bulgarian OC groups,
besides the ethnic Albanians, are more engaged in predatory crimes and trafficking
in human beings.
It is interesting to notice that the significant presence of African OC seems to be
bound to Spain, France, Belgium and partly Italy. The only exception is represented
by Nigerian OC groups which are spread throughout the EU, keeping a low-profile
strategy.
Chinese OC, finally, is still embedded in closed Chinese communities. This result in
a low level of visibility and apparently a low impact on single MS. They facilitate
illegal immigration and exert systematic exploitation of human beings for labour and
sexual purposes. They are also involved in commodity smuggling into the EU.
4.2. Criminal Markets
With regard to types of crime, the criminal situation within the EU is constantly
evolving but does not present sudden and unexpected changes if compared with the
situation in the last few years. Similar to the dynamics in the field of OC groups,
internationalisation and diffusion play important roles in the crime areas themselves.
Violence is an inherent part of many types of crime, be they directed at persons or
property. Likewise, corruption is used in many crime areas. Also, other horizontal
issues worth highlighting include the use of falsified documents, technological
means and the transport sector as facilitating factors to crime. Other facilitating
factors which OC takes advantage of include increasing globalisation and the
presence or not of borders, be they political, cultural or other. The latter mainly
refers to opportunities provided by decreased border controls whilst administrative
borders remain.
Drug trafficking
is the most frequent principal activity of OC groups. Drug
consumption in the EU follows established general trends with slight differences
between the MS. Poly-drug trafficking is increasing. The main problem of drug
trafficking is that the source regions of most drugs are not under the control of the
EU, and often not even under that of the respective governments. The exception is
synthetic drugs, of which Europe seems to be the biggest producer in the world. The
production of drugs depends on the availability of the right precursors, the
production and sale of which is subject to strict controls.
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After drugs, trafficking in human beings, primarily for sexual exploitation, should be
mentioned. It requires a complex organisation, and is linked to facilitating crimes
such as document counterfeiting. The same is true for illegal immigration.
Some MS are transit countries for cars destined for countries in the former Soviet
Union, the Middle East and Africa, many others are source as well as destination
countries for vehicles that are subsequently recycled on the internal market. Stolen
cars are usually rigged, provided with falsified documents and sold to unknowing
buyers, but they can also be dismantled to get spare parts to be sold separately or
even given back to the owner upon payment of a ransom.
Fraud comprises a vast array of different criminal activities based upon deceit.
Credit cards frauds are the most mentioned and are frequently performed by
Eastern European OC groups. Another frequent fraud consists of non-payment of
VAT, or getting undue refunds of it. Financial fraud – ranging from double invoicing
to alcohol excise evasion – is also common. The internet is increasingly used to
commit frauds. A recent modus operandi of fraud through the internet is the
establishment of fake escrow companies to be used in e-commerce. Pretending to
be an impartial third party between the seller and the buyer, OC groups manage to
get hold of both the money and the purchased articles.
The pivotal role of money laundering in OC
is widely recognised. Borders still
provide shelter to money laundering activities, hindering investigations. Investing
dirty money in countries other than that in which the predicate offence was
committed is common practice. Fraud, smuggling, corruption, document forgery and
identity theft are often connected with money laundering. The financial sector is
quite understandably the most affected by money laundering.
Commodity counterfeiting is a rapidly expanding type of crime. Advances in
technology have facilitated the growth of counterfeiting, by enabling the speedy
reproduction of high quality counterfeit goods. Virtually all goods on sale can be –
and are – counterfeited, and, in addition to the significant economic loss, the serious
threat posed to health and safety by counterfeit medicines, spirits, food, cigarettes
and car or aircraft spare parts must be considered. OC groups from East and South
East Asia are frequent perpetrators, but also indigenous OC groups are involved.
Criminals at all levels are involved in commodity counterfeiting, which is to be
expected given the high profits, low risk of detection and often low penalties for
those caught.
Currency counterfeiting
is reported as increasing in some MS (Germany, Lithuania
and the United Kingdom) and decreasing in other (Denmark). A growing attention to
the falsification of euro coins due to the mounting difficulties in producing good
quality counterfeit banknotes can be noted.
Property crime is widespread across Europe, and it is not always easy to determine
the actual involvement of OC.
4.3. General Observations
The situation in OC outlined above emphasise the need to pay close attention to key
criminals, the financial dimension of the OC groups and their ability to communicate
within and between one another. That is, the functional side of OC must be focused
on, asking the question what they are doing and how rather than who they are. Such
an approach will not only be more successful but also necessary as the structures of
the OC groups become increasingly fluid and difficult to address.
The changes in the OC landscape are motivated both by factors internal to OC and
contextual issues. On a general level, internally, the drive to make money without
10
being caught, directs criminals towards, on the one hand, increased levels of co-
operation and, on the other, towards secrecy and isolation. However, it seems that
the balance between the two has tilted towards the money-making side, or at least
that the shielding activities of the OC groups are deemed sufficient enough to
protect their continued activities, strategic leadership and assets.
External factors include changed political and law enforcement priorities together
with economic, social and technological developments. For instance, the tightening
of controls at certain border crossing-points and its subsequent effects, or the
legalisation or criminalisation of certain goods and services changes crime
opportunities in the EU. Decisions with regard to the EU budget, EU directives with
an impact on various economic sectors (for instance transport directives) and other
high-level political issues could also be mentioned. This should be seen together
with the on-going globalisation of products, services and markets, the blurring of the
border between licit and illicit markets, rising trade volumes and control difficulties,
the re-structuring of certain economic sectors and sub-contracting of legitimate
services, changing market demand for certain goods and the link to counterfeiting.
Social issues in relation to OC are also important, for instance more lenient social
controls, urbanisation and other social and cultural issues which have an effect on
crime, for instance by changing people’s propensity to be corrupted or their
willingness to bend under pressure or even gladly take part in crime or knowingly
gain from criminal activities. Finally, technological issues should be considered,
including computer and other technologies as a means for OC.
Political, economic, social and technological variables can also be influenced by
crime. Politically, few OC groups pose a direct threat to the MS. Economically, OC is
already disrupting legal business practices. Socially, the fear that crime instils is
counterproductive to an open society. The technological threat is less visible, but at
the lowest level, continuous criminal assaults on a particular infrastructure, such as
electronic banking, may lead to overprotection resulting in lower efficiency in the
system. The higher cost of developing and maintaining technological systems as a
result of crime is always present.
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5. THE THREAT FROM OC
5.1. Key Indicators With Regards to OC Groups
Seven key areas of interest are considered:
• The international dimension;
• Group
structures;
• Use of legitimate business structures;
• Specialisation;
• Influence;
• Use of violence;
• Counter-measures.
5.1.1. The International Dimension
The international dimension of OC can be captured as
international co-operation,
between non-indigenous1 groups or between an indigenous2 and a non-indigenous
group, or as
international operations carried out directly by an OC group.
The situation where a criminal group resorts to international operations, exploiting its
presence in source, transit and destination countries, presents the most threatening
features.
Within this framework, the highest threat seems to be linked to non-indigenous
criminal groups which aim at managing the distribution phase within the EU
markets, besides the provision to the EU.
A variant of this situation occurs when a non-indigenous group provides the illegal
goods in a transit country (usually the country of origin of a second OC group) for
further smuggling and distribution in the EU.
The situation is even more complex when a non-indigenous OC group acts in
agreement with more established OC groups.
The above mentioned management of the distribution phase in EU by a non-
indigenous OC group may be read as an indicator of the criminal environment
moving or having moved towards one of the two scenarios below:
1) Significant criminal presence in order to manage and uphold the distribution
network coupled with the presence of a noticeable community of reference;
2) Significant criminal presence and strategic level members or assets (as re-
investments) being located outside the EU.
It is also possible that these OC groups start investing their proceeds in the EU. In
this case, there is a strong indication that the OC group is trying to infiltrate the host
society. This consolidation can lead to penetration of other criminal fields or to better
sheltering of the upper levels of the criminal group.
1 Within the scope of this categorisation, a non-indigenous OC group entails a criminal group
dominated by members not having a nationality, origin or ethnicity of any MS.
2 Within the scope of this categorisation, an indigenous criminal group entails a criminal
group dominated by members having the nationality, origin and ethnicity of one or more MS.
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With regard to the second scenario, the first dimension concerns strategic level
members being located outside the EU. They are the ones who are crucial for the
survival and development of the criminal organisation. Disturbing factors linked to
the legal framework, national priorities in using resources, but also, for example, the
criminal group’s capability of local influence plays a major role.
The second dimension concerns assets (as re-investment) being located outside the
EU. This can reinforce the above mentioned disturbing factors, because it could be
the sign that the criminal organisation is aiming at increasing its influence or
infiltration in a country outside the EU.
In conclusion, the situation where a non-indigenous criminal group resorts to
international operations and also aims at managing the distribution phase within the
EU markets is the highest threat. In fact, this could be linked to troubling
developments of the criminal environment where certain OC groups are able to
exploit noticeable communities of reference or have the capability to shield
themselves behind their international dimension. Concerning this last possibility,
assistance initiatives framed in the EU’s external relations policy and the
progressive enlargement of the EU should contribute to lower the threat. Concerning
the ‘communities of reference’ factor, its development seems to be affected by two
contrasting forces: globalisation, pushing for a growth of these communities, and EU
and MS integration policies which should lower the possibilities of their exploitation.
5.1.2. OC
Group
Structures
Modern OC research is increasingly shifting its focus from criminal collectives,
initially organisations and later on criminal networks, to the individual ‘organised
criminal’. Studies have revealed very flexible and fluid patterns of association
between individual criminals. The existence of criminal organisations or networks
should not be taken for granted; attention should instead be paid on the conditions
under which patterns of criminal association and co-offending emerge and exist.
While there are criminal groups organised along the homogeneous and hierarchical
lines, many groups are in practice loose networks of relatively independent
members that coalesce around one or more prominent criminals. These networks
take up tasks of varying structure, length and complexity according to the demand
and concrete profits.
Furthermore, some modern crime types are ever more difficult to categorise
according to group structure or composition. For instance, criminals involved in
hacking of payment card data form occasional networks comprising cells of
expertise that are employed by other cells. Physical proximity or social contacts are
not necessary when the whole criminal process from committing the crime and
marketing and selling the proceeds to transferring the criminal gains takes place on
the internet.
There are several factors conducive to the change in group structures. It can be a
result of shielding activities against law enforcement measures, but more often it can
be regarded as a response to the changing criminal markets. Participation in types
of crime that do not require physical presence (for instance online child abuse and
some types of fraud), the tendency to multi-crime involvement and specialisation are
all factors in this development.
This, however, does not suggest that OC today is synonymous with disorganised
criminals. Structure exists also in the apparent chaos of changing patterns of
criminal association. The actual structures often operate on an isolated and
functional need-to-know basis, and normally feature a substantial distance between
the central function and other structures.
13
In the EU, there are also OC groups characterised by a hierarchical structure. This
seems to be a strength and facilitates the inherent transnational co-operation of the
groups, enhances the role of the head of the group and clarifies the allocation of
tasks and responsibilities of each member. A system of negative sanctions following
any failed action is complied with and respected but, reversely, positive incentives
are also used to ensure group loyalty.
This type of structure also fits the functions of these OC groups and maintains their
closed nature, further complicating any substantial law enforcement measures
against them. In this sense the consistently hierarchical and almost paramilitary
structure of these groups can be an aspect in making them a possible threat.
5.1.3. Use of Legitimate Business Structures
OC does not operate exclusively within a criminal underworld, but makes regular
and widespread use of legal businesses to support and facilitate its criminal
activities. OC groups employ different methods for controlling and influencing – at
varying levels – legal business.
It is possible to divide the use of legitimate business structures by OC in three main
categories:
1. Criminals set up and run the businesses themselves. In many instances, the
chosen legal activity has a direct connection with the type of crime that specific
OC group is involved into. This is the case of OC groups involved in illegal
trafficking that run import-export or transport companies, or criminals involved in
trafficking in human beings or facilitating illegal immigration working as travel
agents, employment agents or impresarios. However, if their legal business is
run to launder money or to give a legal façade to their illicit activities, criminals
may engage in business created ad hoc with no relations with their criminal
sectors.
2. Criminals use legitimate business structures colluding with or coercing
employees, or even managers, working for perfectly legal and trustworthy
companies. Corruption or coercion can be also used to request the hiring as
regular workers of members of the OC group, who will then facilitate the use of
that business for illicit purposes.
3. Criminals use deception and make use of legitimate business, which
unknowingly and unwillingly facilitate them in their illegal endeavours.
The three categories listed above are present, in varying proportions, in all countries
where OC thrives. The first category is the most threatening. A business set up and
run by criminals has a significant social and economic impact.
5.1.4. Specialisation
Specialisation by OC groups could mean the following:
• The acquiring of specialist functions to improve OC activities, increase
professionalism and decrease the chances of detection and prosecution by
law enforcement;
• The provision of specialist services to more than one OC group.
OC groups often have a need for someone with specialist skills or know-how such
as chemists, accountants, financial experts, IT specialists, those with access to
particular goods and services, such as firearms or false passports, or those willing to
carry out specific tasks, such as murder or debt enforcement. These specialists are
either low-level, expendable individuals used on a one-off basis or periodically,
14
whereas others are professional criminals who provide their services on a
continuous basis.
An increasing number of criminal networks have made the provision of specialist
services their core business. They facilitate a range of OC groups with high-quality
services otherwise unavailable because of, for instance, high development or
investment costs. The facilitation of forged documents is one example of this.
OC groups may recruit specialist facilities and individuals such as trucks or drivers.
Others turn to OC groups who facilitate OC in case they are unable or reluctant to
do the specialist job themselves. Certain specialist services are in high demand and
play a pivotal role in the workings of OC groups. These include individuals
facilitating OC groups involved in drug trafficking who bring together buyers and
sellers, and illegal immigration agents and sub-agents, who specialise in selecting
routes, arranging transport, providing documentation or handling the migrants’
needs on arrival.
Although most of the largest importers of heroin and cocaine tend to concentrate on
one or the other type of drug, many drug traffickers appear largely unconcerned
about the different types of drugs they handle and, by inference, the different
penalties they face should they be caught. Traffickers frequently move other
commodities as well as cocaine or heroin, and often move multi-commodity loads
from source to destination country. Shipments consisting of more than one drug are
often found where specialist transporters are moving drugs for a number of
customers.
The trend to use specialist money launderers is increasing. These individuals use
their expertise and apparent respectability to launder criminal proceeds. OC groups
target professionals, such as solicitors or accountants, who have easy access to the
financial sector and who are able to integrate ‘dirty’ money into the legitimate
financial system. These individuals may be witting or unwitting accomplices. In some
cases, they may be coerced.
OC groups will continue to exploit new market opportunities. Investigations and
seizure statistics demonstrate the production and trafficking of a variety of ‘designer’
drugs and medicines, often circumventing legislation. As higher capacity production
spreads across the EU, legitimate companies are likely to be exploited for the
acquisition and subsequent criminal use of scheduled and non-scheduled
chemicals, industrial equipment, specialist glassware and other materials.
Besides already existing and additionally developed specialist skills, the availability
and diffusion of the technical means as well as the constant high-pace
developments involving information technology will strongly influence OC.
Furthermore, the enormous profit potential is well realised by OC groups, who will
always aim to better exploit all possible uses in already existing criminal activities
and in new unregulated sectors.
Specialisation in a particular niche area can provide an OC group with tools for
expanding its activities into other crime areas which would benefit from that skill. For
instance, OC groups specialised in document forgery are also sometimes highly
involved in illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and Euro counterfeiting.
5.1.5. Influence and Corruption
Corruption can be defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. With
regards to OC activities the definition can be further developed to integrate
facilitation payments made to receive preferential treatment for something the
15
individual receiving the bribe is required to do by law, or to obtain services the
individual receiving the bribe is prohibited from providing.
Criminal groups in Europe are known to use influence or corruption for two main
reasons: to lower risks or gain opportunities in relation to their criminal activities, and
as a separate criminal act for financial gain. Lowering risks, or gaining opportunities,
has to do with ensuring a safe environment for their activities – that is to remain
undetected, to avoid investigation or prosecution, or even conviction. In general,
influencing or corrupting people requires a certain level of exchanging benefits
between the two parties, either financial or non-material.
The use of influence and corruption by OC groups can occur at different levels in the
EU: from petty corruption to influencing or corrupting politicians or high-ranked state
officials. The latter is clearly the more threatening to the EU as a whole, as it will
often involve large sums of money and is more difficult to combat in general.
There are different reports which clearly state that corruption in the construction
sector in many European countries seems to be flourishing most. This area, related
to the process of tendering, can be considered of major importance for national law
enforcement authorities.
The use of influence by criminal groups to avoid investigation, prosecution, or even
conviction can be considered as the most threatening. A criminal group attempting
to corrupt low-level officials for creating a safe environment to conduct their criminal
activities poses a less serious threat than the attempts to influence high-level law
enforcement personnel, the judiciary, politicians, and public sector officials. The
latter can occur not only by paying money, but also by exchanging benefits of
different kind, which can be non-financial and is more difficult to combat by law
enforcement. For this reason alone, it poses a considerable threat to the EU.
Furthermore, a distinction must be made between the use of influence and
corruption by indigenous groups inside their country, and by non-indigenous OC
groups inside and outside the EU, but affecting the crime situation in the EU.
Corruption used by non-indigenous OC groups outside the EU is more difficult to
combat.
5.1.6. Violence
The use of violence is inherent in many types of crime, but OC groups can exert
violence for several different reasons other than simply for the sake of committing a
violent crime. Violence can be adopted as an offensive or defensive tactic, it can be
planned or based on reaction, it can be brought to the extreme or limited to the
necessary degree, and it can be publicly exposed or kept hidden.
A distinction must be made between intra-group violence; inter-group violence and
extra-group violence.
Intra-group violence is used to maintain discipline and cohesion within the group. It
will continue to be used by OC groups in the MS in the future.
The use of inter-group violence can be found throughout the EU, and it seems that
the calculated use of violence helps these groups to survive. However, extreme or
spontaneous violence is more likely to be counter-productive, since it attracts law
enforcement attention, distracts the group from its core business activities, and may
result in group members being arrested or killed, and assets lost. It is more likely
that criminal groups will seek collaboration rather than to engage in violent
competition.
The use of violence against persons or companies not belonging to the criminal
world is sometimes an intrinsic feature of crimes such as extortion, exploitation of
16
human beings and robbery. On the other hand, illegal immigration or trafficking in
human beings can take place without using extreme violence. However, the use of
violence in trafficking in human beings is endemic. Based on reputation or mere
appearance, the threat of violence can also be exercised, especially in relation to
individuals. Violence directed at victims who will not, for fear of repercussions or
otherwise, report on it, or against people in closed ethnic communities, which are
never reported, is an additional problem.
A clear distinction must be made between the use of violence as an intrinsic part of
a specific crime, and the planned use of violence by well-established OC groups to
hinder law enforcement activities in a broad sense. To consider certain nationalities
as most threatening, simply because they are using violence as part of their
preferred criminal activity, is problematic. However, certain areas are more violent
than others, and so are certain OC groups or gangs, perhaps because of violent
group ‘culture’.
The use of extra-group violence is the most threatening aspect of the use of
violence in the EU. Violence, or the threat of using violence, will persist in certain
crime areas, as it is an intrinsic feature of the modus operandi OC groups involved
in certain crimes..
5.1.7. Counter-measures
A counter-measure is an action undertaken by an OC group to avoid detection and
ultimately prosecution by law enforcement agencies. A wide variety of actions can
be seen as a counter-measure. In this report, a coverage activity that is part of the
specific modus operandi used by the OC group to commit its main crime is not
considered a counter-measure3.
Counter-measures can be classified under three categories:
1) Avoiding law enforcement detection of the criminal activity;
2) Avoiding law enforcement detection of members of the criminal organisation;
3) Avoiding prosecution and conviction of members of the criminal organisation.
The first category refers to practises in the fields of counter-surveillance, misleading
activities, infiltration against law enforcement agencies, use of certain
communication means or sophistication in hiding money transfers.
The second category deals with efforts spent to hinder investigations starting from
the detection of the criminal activity and aiming at identifying the members of the
criminal organisation. In this field, the use of complex networks of companies, front
men and counterfeit or falsified documents can be mentioned. Similarly, practises
such as the use of nicknames, codes, foreign languages or local idioms are used to
avoid identification from communication interception.
The third category, avoiding prosecution and conviction of members of the criminal
organisation, refers to a wide variety of countermeasures which can be adopted.
These include the use of violence, intimidation, corruption or influence against group
members under trial or investigation, but also against victims, potential witnesses,
law enforcement personnel, or people within the judiciary, public administrators, and
politicians. The international dimension has a relevant role to play in avoiding or
hindering evidence gathering, prosecution and apprehension.
3 For example, the use of import/export companies, transport companies, modified means of
transport when it is meant as part of the modus operandi for smuggling drugs within the EU
without interception by law enforcement agencies.
17
The most threatening manifestations in the field of counter-measures depend on two
considerations. Firstly, criminals need to communicate to co-ordinate their activities.
OC groups are making increasing use of the speed, accessibility and relative
anonymity offered by internet communication. They use e-mail, chat rooms, instant
messaging and ‘peer2peer’ networks, and are beginning to relay messages via the
internet that were traditionally delivered in person or via the telephone. Some
criminals are using internet cafés or encrypting their messages as a further layer of
protection.
Secondly, disruption without dismantling has only very short term effects if any.4
Furthermore, widespread difficulties in achieving a complete understanding of the
structure of the groups under investigation can seriously affect the general
perception concerning OC. In this framework, the most threatening features are
shielding activities based on the international dimension, together with influence and
corruption.
When shielding companies or front men are placed in off-shore or non co-operative
countries, law enforcement action can be seriously hindered. This is compounded
by the difficulties outlined with regard to the international dimension, for instance the
location of assets and upper levels abroad.
With regard to corruption and influence, they can be deployed to create a safe
environment for the upper levels of OC groups against identification, prosecution
and conviction. Corruption and influence as counter-measures can be carried out
within or outside the EU. The latter case seems to be the most threatening one in
terms of obstacles to identification and dismantlement of the groups.
On the one hand, the most threatening feature is the use of widespread technology,
in particular for safe communications. On the other hand, a high level of threat is
posed by shielding activities based on the international dimension or influence and
corruption to create a safe environment outside the EU for the upper levels of
criminal organisations against identification, prosecution and conviction. The EU’s
external relations policy should contribute to lower this threat.
5.2. Key Facilitating Factors With Regards to Criminal Markets
With regard to criminal market aspects of the threat from OC, the following
horizontal indicators should be considered:
1. Document forgery and identity fraud;
2. Technology as a facilitating factor
3. The misuse of the transport sector;
4. The exploitation of the financial sector;
5. Globalisation;
6. Borders.
Today, these six horizontal facilitating factors together present a set of opportunities
to OC. Changes in them could change opportunities into threats.
4 Disruption to a criminal business occurs when the business is hampered for a period of
time, normally as a result of law enforcement action, but is not permanently disabled. The
dismantling of a criminal business occurs when that business is rendered permanently
inoperable, usually as a result of the arrest and detention of key figures within the group
through law enforcement action.
18
5.2.1. Document Forgery and Identity Fraud
Identity fraud is defined as the use of false identifiers, fraudulent documents, or a
stolen identity in the commission of a crime. Identity fraud is broader than identity
theft in that identity fraud refers to the fraudulent use of any identity, real or fictitious,
while identity theft is limited to the theft of a real person’s identity.
Identity fraud provides criminals with the tools they need to remain anonymous, gain
access to goods and services, avoid detection and transfer resources. Forged
documents are also an indispensable facilitator for crimes such as the trafficking of
stolen vehicles.
Document forgery and identity fraud can be lucrative crimes on their own for
specialists such as forgers, counterfeiters, graphic and typography experts and
hackers, but need to be seen as a horizontal criminal activity, carried out as a
necessary facilitator for a wide array of different crimes.
Identity fraud can be divided in two main categories:
• The cases of identity theft, where the perpetrator assumes the identity of an
existing person;
• The cases in which a fictitious but credible identity is made up, creating a
bureaucratic and financial person that hides the real identity of the perpetrator.
The same classification can be extended to counterfeit documents. They can refer
to a real person, vehicle or financial instrument, or to a fictitious one. Sometimes
there is no possibility of choice: in the case of stolen documents, only the picture (if
there is a picture) is changed, while the name and personal data usually remain
unchanged. False financial instruments are often used in fraud schemes. In many
instances they bear a close resemblance to the genuine document.
A higher level of anonymity in virtually all kinds of relations is a facilitating factor of
identity fraud and document counterfeiting. It is hard to validate the identity of the
holder of an ID document, never mind his financial identity. Globalisation favours the
movement of goods and people, with positive economic consequences but with
increasing problems in controls. In the future, the use of falsified documents and
identities by OC groups will increase.
5.2.2. Technology
Technology is increasingly becoming a main facilitator of OC. New types of fraud
such as data streaming of payment card details have emerged in recent years, and
traditional forms of crime such as money laundering, drug sales, the dissemination
of child abuse material and prostitution have evolved as a result of technological
developments. The internet has had an especially profound effect on crime.
The advantages the internet offers in terms of information and communication
technology are extremely beneficial to OC. The underground cultures built around
some of the high technology phenomena such as hacking and cracking are perfect
for support, contacts, recruitment, advice and clients. Communication between OC
groups and its members need to be either wholly secret or sufficiently difficult to
penetrate in order to avoid giving law enforcement foreknowledge of what is planned
or the ability to piece together evidence that a crime has been committed.
OC groups rely on fast and secure means of communication. E-mail, internet chat
rooms and instant messaging all offer new opportunities, as do web-based and
client server mail accounts, websites and message boards. It provides speed of
communication and, combined with encryption tools, offer unprecedented security
19
for the data they store and exchange. Free, encrypted web-based mail is now also
available. Advanced communication networks and in-depth knowledge of
information technology enables OC groups to operate in a well-organised manner
covering both legal and criminal activities.
Economic and financial fraud committed by the use of credit cards will profit from
technological advances. It will further accelerate due to the growing number of
people using electronic payment systems.
There is an increased importance of technology in OC, as well as in law
enforcement efforts to mitigate the threats posed by OC to the EU. A main threat is
the fact that legislation is slow to react to the developing technologies, consequently
practises utilising certain technologies fall outside the scope of current legislation.
5.2.3. The Misuse of the Road Transport Sector
The five major sectors within the transportation industry are air, road, rail, maritime
and pipeline transport. The road transport sector focused on below is the largest
within the industry. Around 44 per cent of all goods are transported by road with 41
per cent by short sea shipping, 8 per cent by rail and 4 per cent by inland
waterways. With regard to OC, for instance, the preferred means of transport of
heroin and cannabis within the EU is road transport, particularly the use of trans-
continental truck drivers.
The road transport sector is used to facilitate a varying assortment of crimes
requiring the transport of goods or people. This has arguably been aided by the
enlargement of the EU. The approach by OC to the sector involves the identifying,
targeting and subsequent corruption of key personnel and the infiltration, purchase
or formation of transportation companies operating in the licit market but with
criminal intent.
Given the size and the pivotal role the transportation industry plays in the facilitation
of crime, infiltration by OC is inevitable. Presently, access to the sector is regulated
by a plethora of legislative requirements at both a national and European level. This
complexity of regulation has allowed easier access to the licit market for OC. The
lack of any strategy, guidance or standard over the vetting of employees, and to a
lesser extent, companies within the industry allows individuals with connections to
OC to easily access the industry.
The approach by OC groups to create new alliances or exploiting existing alliances
within the legitimate transport industry will continue, but the main threatening aspect
of the misuse of the road transport sector is that OC groups will exploit the
opportunities to set up their own transportation companies. OC groups will in that
case be able to minimise the risk of being discovered from within the industry and be
able to transport illicit goods throughout the EU with less scrutiny.
5.2.4. The Exploitation of the Financial Sector
The exploitation of the financial sector relates to the following categories:
• Credit
institutions;
• Financial institutions; including currency exchange offices; money transmission
or remittance offices; insurance companies or intermediaries, and investment
firms;
• Auditors, external accountants, tax advisors, notaries and other independent
legal professionals;
20
• Trust or company service providers;
• Real estate agents;
• Casinos and other gambling sites;
• Other legal or natural persons trading in goods or services (such as cash-
intensive or import/export businesses).5
In different ways, they can all be used for money laundering and re-investment of
criminal proceeds. Some of them could also be used for various types of fraud, for
instance investment fraud. With a view on the international dimension, so-called off-
shore havens or non co-operative countries and territories should be mentioned, for
instance their use in money laundering operations. Overall, the internationalisation
of the misuse of the financial sector is remarkable.
The owners, the directorship, the personnel of legal persons or the natural persons
(not acting as part of a legal person) could be members of the criminal organisation,
or be corrupted or threatened by the criminal organisation. They could also be
simply aware of the ongoing crime or have no knowledge of the ongoing crime.
No specific and structured intelligence is available concerning the nature of the link
between criminals and the operators in the financial sector. However, the situation
when credit or financial institutions are exploited by criminals through the coverage
of legal persons trading goods or, even worse, services, seems to be the most
threatening one.
5.2.5. Globalisation
The substantial migration flows that have been and are spreading in the EU are
contributing to change the social environment. Communities of nationals from third
countries appear to be growing due to legal and illegal immigration. This trend is
leading the integration issue to the centre of the EU political agenda.6 OC can be
seen as a parasite prospering at the expense of society. The development of
significant communities of third countries’ nationals can represent an opportunity for
non-indigenous OC groups in their struggle to gain a stable foothold in the EU
criminal markets while benefiting in full from their transnational links7.
These communities should be interpreted as exploited environments that may
unwittingly act as facilitating factors for the penetration and growth of non-
indigenous OC groups for four reasons.
First, the community may become the target for the criminal group. This statement
refers in particular to markets for which criminal groups play the supplier role, such
as drugs or banned wildlife articles.
Second, the community may become a target for extortion and exploitation crimes.
The less the community is integrated with the host society the more likely this
becomes. In extreme cases, the state may experience great difficulties in
penetrating these communities whose inhabitants seldom think of addressing official
authorities and where basic state functions, such as the exertion of violence,
administration of justice and health care, are therefore taken over by others.
5 In this category, reference is made to companies used as means for moving money and not
as integral parts of the modus operandi referring to the predicate offence.
6 For example, in 2004, the European Commission published the First Annual Report on
Migration and Integration’ and, in 2005, the same body set a common agenda as framework
for national and EU initiatives in this field.
7 Cf. the chapters on the international dimension and counter-measures above.
21
Third, the community may unwittingly become the disguising background for the
criminal group, because:
a) The presence and movement of third country nationals become usual;
b) The volume of trade and financial transactions with this third country
increases;
c) Business undertakings owned or managed by these third country nationals
become usual.
Fourth, this community can represent a pool from which new members can be
recruited, because of, for instance, marginalisation, common cultural background or
family ties.
With this in mind, the future could be characterised by an upgrade in the role of non-
indigenous groups within the OC environment in the EU, especially for the ones
capable of exploiting their international dimension in order to act also as provider of
illegal goods and hinder law enforcement efforts.
On the other hand, globalisation is transforming criminal markets to be dominated by
buyers rather than sellers. It is increasingly easy to get hold of illegal goods or
products needed for crime. This factor, a sort of globalisation of supply, could also
favour indigenous OC groups, because it should erode or prevent monopoly
positions of certain non-indigenous OC groups.
Another effect of globalisation is that OC groups can more easily combine their
resources and acquire a world-wide reach.
Easier circulation of information coupled with easier circulation of investments and
goods are pushing towards a sort of world-wide homogeneity in the consumption
models. This has an immediate effect on criminal activities. This tendency to world-
wide homogeneity is linked to world-wide marketing of certain articles. The
consequence is that their counterfeiting has become very attractive, because it
opens a huge market and not only local markets. On the other hand, a significant
part of the costs is linked to investments in the development of the product itself (for
instance in terms of research and design) and its marketing. This allows the criminal
groups to earn enormous profits while selling the counterfeit goods at far lower
prices than the official ones, not having to bear the burden of these costs.
Furthermore, many companies have moved production processes to third countries,
in particular because of lower costs. This has brought crucial knowledge out of the
EU, increasing the likelihood of misuse of know-how for producing counterfeited
products by OC groups.
There are essential differences between smuggling and counterfeiting. Smuggling is
based on high taxation and national borders, and mainly implies legal production
before illegal introduction. Goods counterfeiting is rooted in the cost structure of
certain products, ‘borderless-ness’ and globalisation of demand and entails illegal
production besides illegal entry. Another difference is linked to human health: it is
not put unwittingly into danger by consumers purchasing a smuggled product
because they get what they asked for. With goods counterfeiting, especially with
reference to food and medicines, it is probable that safety standards are not
respected with possibly heavy consequences for the health of consumers.
Furthermore, counterfeiting entails technical capabilities that are not required in the
smuggling field.
In conclusion, globalisation calls for a closer view on the world outside the EU,
because, for example:
22
1) The penetration of the EU by non-indigenous OC groups, unwittingly favoured
by the growth of extra-EU communities, can be coupled with the undertaking of
strategic level activities, the location of strategic level members and increasing
influence or infiltration in countries outside the EU. This possibility can represent
a major hindrance for dismantling them, already made more difficult by, for
instance, cultural and language barriers;
2) Homogenisation of consumption models and products whose costs are mainly
based on research and marketing create new criminal opportunities that can be
exploited carrying out the main illegal activities far from the EU;
3) The globalisation of supply makes it easier to shift the production of illegal goods
outside the EU, with the immediate effect that OC groups and activities cannot
be seriously hit without expanding law enforcement efforts outside the EU.
The strongest threat at the EU level is now represented by OC groups operating
outside and impacting on the EU. Furthermore, the development of significant
communities of third countries’ nationals can represent an opportunity for non-
indigenous OC groups in their struggle to gain a stable foothold in the EU criminal
markets while benefiting in full from their transnational links.
5.2.6. Borders
The erosion of borders described in the chapter on globalisation above must be
complemented with a discussion about the borders that exist and are susceptible to
criminal misuse.
What is true for companies is also true for OC: the free movement of persons and
goods with administrative barriers nearly totally disappearing is an advantage OC
exploits while MS administrations still have difficulties when it comes to collaborating
with their counterparts.
EU integration is more or less rapidly erasing economic borders between the MS,
which generates opportunities for OC:
• Countries which earlier were not priority targets for OC groups involved in
drug trafficking are now becoming areas of increased interest;
• The adoption of the Euro has made the circulation of money from crime so
much easier since controls for changing money have virtually disappeared.
Growth rates in the new MS and accompanying salary increases provide many OC
opportunities. The same is true for cheap and easy air travel between the MS
allowing everybody, including OC members, to move across the EU with ease.
Economic borders still exist, though, at times motivating people to become involved
in crime. Many people indirectly support OC when buying counterfeited products
which generate huge amounts of money. Buyers of fake cigarettes or of fake goods
in general pay attention to the immediate benefit of their purchase without looking at
its consequences.
Borders of various kinds will continue to provide OC with crime opportunities. The
main threat is administrative borders, hindering international law enforcement
activities whilst OC continues. With regards to political borders and decreased
border controls, the full integration of the MS into the EU common space has a
facilitating effect on OC activities though it is foreseen it will have a negative effect
on OC in the long run by favouring co-operation between MS law enforcement
agencies.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1. General
External factors will continue to provide many opportunities to OC. Thus, political,
economic, social and technological variables influence crime but may also be
influenced by it. An excessive impact from crime, especially OC, on civil society can
be a threat to democracy and the economy. The aggregated OC profits from crime
are large and represent a cost to all citizens in the EU. Worse still, the amassing of
money by criminals is the prelude to undue influence when money is centred on a
certain group or leader. This highlights a few important issues:
• First, when attacking OC, law enforcement is at the heart of political and
economic life in the EU. It is the safeguard against too excessive an impact from
crime, especially OC, on civil society and in the end a protector of democracy
and the economy;
• Second, law enforcement is part of a bigger whole. Especially with regard to
crime prevention, law enforcement benefits from the active support from, and
partnership with, the public and private sectors. Conversely, they benefit from
support by law enforcement;
• Third, the bigger whole is larger than its constituent parts. OC is increasingly
borderless and law enforcement needs to follow suit and surpass OC in its
internationalisation;
• Finally, concerted law enforcement action against the functional side of OC,
aimed at its key members, communications and financial systems, is necessary
since OC is closely linked to a functional change. It also opens complementary
options of crime prevention and repression which might be of additional success.
6.2. OC
Groups
The model adopted in this threat assessments points to the types of OC groups that
must be regarded as the most dangerous. They are the ones characterised by
dynamic combinations of the most threatening features of the seven OC group
indicators.
Stating which particular aspect is the most threatening, or which one is the most
prevalent OC group to be attacked by law enforcement, is a value statement about
the relationship between the indicators. Violence, for instance, often scores high in
overall priority settings, but this is based more on prevailing notions of societal
vulnerabilities than on analytical stringency. There is nothing to suggest that
violence is more important to the sustained presence and impact of an OC group
than, say, its transnational activities.
However, such considerations cannot be overlooked. With this in mind, based on
the threat assessment above, and in light of prevailing political priorities in the EU,
the focus should be on OC groups displaying structural or functional qualities
supporting the resistance of these groups to dismantling attempts. Four main
categories can be identified:8
8 There will be instances where OC groups will show traits from two or more of these
categories, but for analytical stringency it is important to keep them apart.
24
• principally territorially based, indigenous OC groups, with extensive
transnational activities; especially such with possibilities to shield their
leadership and assets even inside the EU;
• mainly ethnically homogeneous groups with their leadership and main assets
abroad;
• dynamic networks of perpetrators, whose organisational setup is less viable
to attack from a law enforcement perspective than their communications and
finances;
• OC groups based on strictly defined organisational principles without an
ethnic component, coupled with a large international presence.
The main threatening aspects of the groups are, first, the overwhelming obstacles in
dismantling them because of their international dimension or influence, and second,
their level of infiltration in society and economy. The first aspect gives them a sort of
impunity and perpetuity that counteracts law enforcement efforts. The second
aspect makes them mingled with the legal world, negatively affecting the willingness
to attack these criminal groups, the level of corruption and democratic dynamics.
Also, the more an OC group is established and has infiltrated society the more the
upper level can gain a layer of respectability and become more difficult to bring to
justice.
The first point mainly refers to non-indigenous OC groups. The characterising
feature is linked to the gradual infiltration of the EU criminal environment while
profiting from the international dimension for supporting the criminal activities and
minimising the possibilities to be dismantled. This is consistent with fluid networks of
cells that in reality are dominated and directed by upper levels that are shielded
mainly through the use of the international dimension.
The second point mainly refers to indigenous groups. Here the infiltration dimension
is emphasised through the use of high levels of influence to create a safe
environment in the EU, set-up and management of businesses that are also used to
re-invest the criminal proceeds, to gain respectability and contacts and to further
corrupt the economy. In this case, the territorial dimension seems to be more
important than for non-indigenous groups. The presence of a traditional hierarchical
structure is more likely than in the case of non-indigenous OC groups. Intimidation
can be used rather than violence, because of a strong reputation, also directed at
state officials and law enforcement officers. The international dimension can still be
essential as a counter-measure to shield the members of the group.
Four sets of regional patterns are especially worth considering, not least as their
internal dynamics could have a knock-on effect on the rest of the EU:
• The south-eastern region of the EU, with a focus on Turkish and Albanian
OC groups;
• The south-western region of the EU, with a focus on certain African OC
groups;
• The north-eastern region of the EU, focusing on the Baltic States and the
influence of Russian speaking OC;
• The Atlantic region, revolving mainly around the pivotal transnational role of
Dutch, British and Belgian criminal organisations.
Regional patterns in OC call for regional approaches, at the local, regional, national
and international level. At times, the work can be performed by a single MS, at other
times, joint efforts are needed. All efforts would benefit greatly from a functional
approach to OC. This functional approach is –
inter alia – necessary as an adequate
25
response to the ‘business-like’ behaviour and organisation of adapted OC groups. It
would support and even strengthen the traditional way of policing OC. Such a focus
would enable a targeted approach against OC, and it seems to be necessary as a
complementary approach in conjunction with other measures aimed at OC,
preventive as well as repressive.
6.3. Criminal
Markets
With regard to the facilitating factors in the discussion on criminal markets, a general
evolution towards increasingly complex setups for criminal endeavours can be
witnessed. Increasingly, horizontal facilitating factors such as document forgery and
identity theft, technology, the transport sector, the financial sector and the presence
or absence of borders are employed for criminal gain. The latter mainly refers to
opportunities provided by decreased border controls whilst administrative and legal
borders remain.
As criminal areas become increasingly complex and intertwined, successful law
enforcement operations will benefit from a focus on facilitating activities and the
ability to pin-point key persons whilst identifying and exploiting their weaknesses
and vulnerabilities. No cross-border crime can continue without the ability to misuse
the transport sector; no criminal can effectively shield his activities without the
support of professionally falsified documents or the use of communication
technologies; no large-scale crime can be pursued without the aptitude to exploit
financial institutions; and no cross-border crime could take place if the dynamics
around borders are effectively controlled. In short, the replication of the criminals’
strive to misuse opportunities in society should be re-directed against them. By
exploiting their vulnerabilities, OC can be more effectively countered.
Weighting crime areas against one another is inherently difficult. This, too, has less
to do with analytical insights than value statements, reflecting different priorities in
the MS and beyond. The exercise becomes even more difficult in light of the
constant intermingling of criminal activities and the continuous dissolution border
between licit and criminal activities.
Nevertheless, this report generally supports current EU priorities, as formulated in
the general programme
Security and Safeguarding Liberties9, focusing on:
• Terrorism;
• Trafficking in persons and offences against children;
• Illicit drug trafficking;
• Illicit arms trafficking;
• Corruption;
• Fraud.
The exceptions are terrorism and illicit arms trafficking. The OCTA only deals with
OC, not terrorism or terrorist networks. Due to the particularities involved in the field
of terrorism, the area is being covered as a separate issue, and the material
available for the OCTA does not allow an in-depth assessment of illicit arms
trafficking. In addition, there is reason to emphasise the need to focus on Euro
counterfeiting, commodity counterfeiting, intellectual property theft and money
laundering.
9 ‘Establishing a framework programme on “Security and Safeguarding Liberties” for the
period 2007-2013’, COM (2005) 124 final, 6 April 2005, and Crimorg 38, 2 May 2005.
26
All in all, taking into consideration the assessment in this report, prevailing priorities
with regard to OC based on years of political and law enforcement experience, and
putting regional variations aside, the following criminal markets should also attract
focused attention on the common EU level:
• Drug trafficking, especially synthetic drugs;
• Exploitation of trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration;
• Fraud;
• Euro
counterfeiting;
• Commodity counterfeiting and intellectual property theft;
• Money
laundering.
Regional patterns worth taking particular note of are some key entry points into the
EU. These include:
• South West Europe, in particular with regard to illegal immigration, cocaine
and cannabis trafficking for further distribution in the EU;
• South East Europe, specifically with regard to heroin trafficking, illegal
immigration and trafficking in human beings, aimed at the whole of the EU;
• North East Europe with regard to highly taxed products aimed at the Nordic
countries and beyond;
• Particular transportation hubs, such as harbours and airports pertaining to
the Atlantic region, used for the movement of various commodities to and
from the EU, in particular drugs.
Traditional destination regions for the smuggling of highly taxed products and
production centres for synthetic drugs should also be highlighted.
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