





OPERATIONS DIVISION Joint Operations Unit Air Border Sector

Specific Annex 1-10 of the Operational Plan

Joint Operation Alexis II 2015 2015/ABS/06



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SPECIFIC ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Introduction

Joint Operation Alexis 2015 has been conceived to support Schengen and Schengen Associated Country airports in respect of their own perceived vulnerabilities/needs concerning operational activities. More specifically, the aim of the second phase of JO Alexis will be to enhance the capabilities of EU airport border guards to detect abuses when performing first line checks, both at arrival and departure gates. Guest Officers deployed during the Joint Operation will focus on the examination of EU travel documents and their identification; examination of Schengen visas and will perform behavioural assessments of passengers. These operational activities will aim to detect and react to abuses such as:

- False documents
- Fraudulently obtained documents
- Miss-issued documents
- Imposters
- Human smuggling and trafficking in human beings

This briefing document has been created in order to provide an overview of the risks and threats presented at the external air borders of the EU in respect of the above identified vulnerabilities/needs.

The document will assess the general threat and risks as well as the more specific ones associated with the airports which have agreed to participate, or are considering their participation, in the operation at the time of the drafting of this document.

2. Data sources and measurable indicators

The following indicators can be measured by reference to Pulsar Data¹ for all the above airports except Marseille (MRS), Lyon (LYS), Riga (RIX) which do not currently report in Pulsar. In addition, a few airports such as Barcelona (BCN), Madrid (MAD), Timisoara (TSR), Vilnius (VNO) do not provide information in Pulsar relating to abused documentation.

Document abuse

Pulsar Data is taken for the whole period 01.01.2015 to 12.08.2015

Human smuggling and trafficking in human beings

Pulsar Data has been utilised for the period 01.01.2015 to 12.08.2015. It is important to mention that not all EU Members States report cases of smuggling and trafficking in human beings in Pulsar. Furthermore, the distinction between smuggling and trafficking in human beings is not always easily established due to the fact that Member States are not clearly and correctly reporting those cases in comments.

3. Airports in the operational area

The following airports have agreed or are considered as participating in the Joint Operation at the time that this document was created:

- Amsterdam (AMS)
- Barcelona (BCN)
- Bratislava (BTS)
- Bucharest (OTP)
- Budapest (BUD)
- Brussels (BRU)

 $^{^{1}}$ Pulsar is FRONTEX Air Border data set collecting the data on irregular migration from more than 150 EU airports.



•	Copenhagen	(CPH)
•	Lyon	(LYS)
•	Ljubljana	(LJU)
	Madrid	(MAD)
	Marseille	(MRS)
•	Oslo	(OSL)
	Paris	(ORY)
•	Paris	(CDG)
•	Prague	(PRG)
•	Riga	(RIX)
	Sofia	(SOF)
•	Stockholm	(ARN)
•	Tallinn	(TLL)
•	Timisoara	(TSR)
	Vienna	(VIE)
•	Vilnius	(VNO)
•	Warsaw	(WAW)
•	Zurich	(ZRH)

4. Main threats and emerging phenomena

Joint Operation Alexis II 2015 will focus on the examination and on the identification of EU travel documents; the examination of Schengen visas; the behavioural assessment of passengers, as well as the identification of human being smugglers and potential victims of trafficking in human beings.

During the course of this operation, the Risk Analysis Unit will request hosting airports to report on the abuse of travel documents and cases related to trafficking in human beings, in particular when it will concern new or emerging trends.

Alexis II will focus on the following aspects:

False documents

The use of false travel documents at air borders is a key issue and represents one of the greatest threats to the security of European external borders. 6 856 abused documents² have been recorded at the EU's external air borders in 2014.

In 2015 (from the 1st January 2015 until the 12th August 2015), a total of 5 521 abused documents were reported to Frontex (Pulsar data collection). Travel documents are the most prevalent form of abuse (see table below).


NO DATA	8
Residence Permit	586
Supportive-Other	398
Travel	3488
Visa	1041
Grand Total	5521

Table - Categories of abused documents reported by EU airports in 2015 (Pulsar data from 01-01-2015 until 12-08-2015)

Commented [A1]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information on threats and risks, modus operandi and trends identified. Their disclosure would be tantamount to releasing pieces of intelligence gathered by law enforcement officers to tackle irregular migration, as well as their follow up actions. The operation would lose its element of surprise. This would weaken similar current and future operations and facilitate irregular migration and criminal activities. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

² Total number of false travel documents detected on exit (from Schengen Area/EU to Third Countries) and on entry (from Schengen Area/EU to Third Countries- Frontex European Union Document Fraud Annual Risk Analysis 2015.





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^{5/43}





Imposters


A number of EU/SAC airports encounter specific issues related to the use of travel documents to impersonate the rightful holder. An imposter is a person who practices deception by assuming another person's identity and name. The practice of impersonation (look-alike) is usually undertaken by a person who closely resembles another and uses his/her travel, supportive document or visa.



Human smuggling and trafficking in human beings

Frontex receives very little information about victims of human smuggling and criminal gangs involved in human beings trafficking.

However, statistical data shows that the number of persons identified as being trafficked increases each year. The vast majority of such cases are reported after arrival in the EU by police forces or social services and not from border guard agencies.




⁴ Frontex- European Union Document Fraud Annual Risk Analysis 2015.

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
 $^{^{\}rm 5}$ Frontex data collection from 01-01-2015 until 12-08-2015.






5. Airports

Amsterdam (AMS)




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
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




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⁷ Pulsar data from 01-01-2015 until 12-08-2015






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 $^{^{9}}$ Only 20 cases or abused documents reported during the period of reference from 01-01-2015 to 12-08-2015





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SPECIFIC ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS

Under the umbrella of the Frontex Programme of Work 2015 this activity contributes to the following corporate goals and prioritized key objectives, as set in the Frontex' Strategy and MAP 2014 - 2017 as well as in concrete in PoW 2015:

- Goal 2: Supporting response, Key Objective nr. 1: Coordinate multipurpose joint activities
 that sustain the operational presence in areas at the external borders exposed to specific
 and disproportionate pressure as well as facing significant uncertainties; including consistent
 action in line with operational reaction mechanism laid down in the EUROSUR Regulation;
 (str.42)
- Goal 3: Emergency response, Key Objective nr. 1: Develop operational contingency modules in the event of emergency situations by reinforcing/modifying ongoing operational activities or launching new joint operations thus ensuring agility and flexibility and efficient use of resources; (52)

The objectives of the activity are as follows:

- 1. Enhance exchange of knowledge among officers (Frontex, MS/SAC & Third Countries)
- 2. Enhance border security (Frontex, MS & SAC)
- 3. Enhance efficiency of border security (Frontex, MS & SAC)
- 4. Enhance operational cooperation (Frontex, MS/SAC & Third Countries)

This activity is expected to deliver the following main benefits:

- Tailored operational support and capacity building strengthening MS/SAC operational capabilities on perceived vulnerabilities/needs.
- Effective and efficient operational response to perceived vulnerabilities meeting existing threats indications (European Situational Awareness) in order to enhance security of external air borders.
- Increased response capacity to emergency situations.

The objectives are meant to be achieved by the following activities:

Objective of the activity	Activity	Indicators of achievement	Expected output
Nr. 1: Enhance exchange of knowledge among officers (Frontex, MS/SAC & Third Countries)	Deployment of guest officers, seconded guest officers and TC observers	Number of MS/SAC and Third Countries participating in the JO Number of man-days deployed during the operation	At least 15 MS/SAC and 3 Third Countries participating in the JO At least 800 GOs man-days deployed in course of the activities At least 90 SGOs man-days deployed in course of the activities



			At least 60 TC observers man-days deployed in course of the activities
Nr. 2: Enhance border security (Frontex & MS/SAC)	Supporting targeted response focusing on perceived vulnerabilities/n eeds	Number of reinforcing actions (e.g. gate check, doc checks with Ref Man experts or any other action what the particular vulnerability requires)	At least 8.000 reinforcing actions by participating airports in accordance to countermeasures suggested in the Standard Operational Procedures
Nr. 3: Enhance efficiency of border security (Frontex & MS/SAC)	Implementing coordinated operational actions according to the operational plan	Number of airports participating	At least 20 participating airports
Nr. 4: Enhance operational cooperation (Frontex, MS/SAC & Third Countries)	Deployment of officers with specific profiles ¹⁰	Number of man-days of requested specific profile officers deployed during the operation	At least 800 man-days of requested specific profile officers deployed in course of the activities

 $^{^{\}rm 10}$ Corresponding to the tackled vulnerabilities and in line with the MB decision nr. 11/2012.



SPECIFIC ANNEX 3 - STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (SOP) ON THE BASIS OF VEGA HANDBOOK

The aim of the second Alexis activity, called JO Alexis II 2015, is to enhance capabilities of EU airport border guards to detect abuses when performing first line checks, arrival and departure gate checks with the focus on:

- Examination of EU travel / Identification documents
- Examination of Schengen Visas
- Behavioral assessment of passengers

Document fraud allows migrants to enter the territory of the Member States illegally and to abuse of free movement in Europe, which also allows freedom of movement to members of criminal networks. Frontex has seen an increase in cases of impersonation in EU/SAC countries.

Moreover the detection of counterfeit and forged passports, ID cards and Driving Licenses has also increased more than usual in recent years. According to ARA report 2015 almost 70 % of the forgery documents detected belong to EU MS.

The use of fake or fraudulently obtained breeder documents is growing and makes the detection of the fraudulent issued documents more difficult, mainly ID Cards and Passports. Perspicacity is needed to detect these kinds of forgeries, which are more difficult when we are dealing with EU/SAC Countries documents.

Fraudulent identity and secure documents are often used for the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons, terrorist mobility and frauds.

Definitions and background knowledge for the purpose of JO Alexis II

1.1. Categories of documents

Bearing in mind the different types of documents that can be used when crossing an external border like the Genève Convention Travel Document, Laissez-Passer (EU/UN), NATO ID Cards (plus Travel Order), Seafarer's Identity Document, Civilian Aircrew Document, among others, the most common are: passports, ID cards, residence permits, Schengen visas.

Passports

The latest models of Passports incorporate an electronic device (a chip) that contains the holder's facial image and fingerprints as well signature and other personal data.

This obligation does not apply to identity cards or to temporary passports and travel documents with a validity of one year or less.

ID Cards

Documents issued by many EU Countries in order to be used to verify aspects of personal identity. However others may accept a driver's license as an effective proof of identity even for boarding on national flights. The identity document includes at least the full name, date of birth, signature, photo and the registration number. It must be issued by a provincial, territorial or national authority.

Residence Permits

The EU has also established a uniform format for non-EU Nationals' Residence Permits, which is used by all EU States as well as by Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein. These residence permits are issued as stand-alone documents and include the same biometric features as the EU passports. A residence card of a family member of a Union citizen is issued to non-EU national family members of an EU citizen who is exercising his/her right to free movement.



Visas

All EU States as well as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein also use a Uniform Format Visa, however, the visa holder's biometric identifiers will not be stored in the visa sticker itself, but in a database (VIS-Visa Information System).

The Schengen Visa allows free movement to its holder within the whole Schengen zone regarding the European Union Schengen members as well as the EFTA Schengen members, up to its validity and types according the final purposes.

Whenever it is possible the Visa Information System (VIS) for exchange information on short stay visas between Member States can be used to confirm the purpose of the travel and traveller.

Breeder documents

A breeder document is used as a basis to obtain another one such as an identity card, a driving license or a passport. Most of the breeder documents does not have the security features of secure documents, once they are not following the recommendations of the ICAO rules. This contributes for an absence of criteria at an EU level for this type of documents. The diversity and lack of security weakens the link between the chain identity and difficulty the detection of fraudulently obtain documents (Passports, ID Cards, Residence Permits, Drivers Licenses and Visas)

Miss-issued documents

Those travel documents issued by mistake by the issuing authorities (logical mistakes and also anomalies as printing errors, malfunctioning chips, reading errors...). There is not fraudulent activity behind it and they are rarely encountered at border checks, but it is important to detect mistakes made by the issuing authorities in order to inform them or the other Frontex partners as soon as possible.

Mis-issued EU visas are visas issued by a diplomatic EU mission overseas in error, either because the mission had not found out all the relevant facts of a case, or because they made any other type of mistake in issuing a visa.

1.2. Distinguishing false and authentic documents

FADO System has been set up to facilitate exchanges of information between EU States. The system storage and exchange of information on genuine and false documents by computerised means. Distinguishing between false and authentic documents is also important for citizens, organisations and businesses.

The European Document Fraud (EDF) follows the scheme of the hierarchical categories of Document Fraud also adopted by the Council's False and Authentic Documents on Line (FADO). For the purpose of definitions the SOP follows the FADO Glossary.

Following the same aim, Frontex with Reference Manual improved tailored information on Documents with the objective to achieve the first line border control of all sectors (Air, Sea and Land borders) as well the Guest Officers deployed during the Frontex JO. A new tailored Alert was produced following the needs of the first line Officers.

Identity - The collective set of distinct personal and physical features, data and qualities that enable a person to be definitively identified from others. In a biometric system, identity is typically established when the person is registered in the system through the use of so-called "breeder documents" such as birth certificate and citizenship certificate.



Genuine/Authentic Document¹¹ - A document issued by a recognised, authorised and competent authority, not altered in any way. Some illegal uses on this category are connected to Impostors and fraudulently obtained documents

False - A document that has been altered (falsified), manufactured or compiled (personalised) by an authorised agent. This category includes:

Forgery - A previously authentic, lawfully issued document that has since been altered (falsified) by an unauthorised agent

Counterfeit - An unissued document, an unauthorised copy or reproduction of a document

Stolen Blank - Is a genuine blank document which was not issued by the competent authorities, but misappropriated and then personalised by an unauthorised agent.

Pseudo Document - Has the appearance of an official document, but is not issued by a legally recognised, existing authority or Institution of a State or organization recognised under international law, and so has no legal validity. This category also includes Fantasy and Camouflage documents.

Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his physical appearance to represent himself as another person for the purpose of using that person's document.

Bio page - The personal details have been altered by changing some of the details of the bio data page. Also related to new bio page when the entire bio data page has been replace or covered with a new bio page. Also could be connected to split bio data page, when just half of a page is removed and replaced by a counterfeit page.

Fraudulently Obtain Documents - The generic term for authentic documents that include both fraudulent applications and fraudulently issued documents.

Unlawfully Used Travel/Supportive documents and visas - Any travel, supportive document or visa which was unlawful used with the purpose of illegal/irregular migration. The aforementioned documents and visas can be either false or genuine.

1.3. Document security

Documents that have incorporated security features to protect their value and prevent fraud abuse. In this regard Passports, ID Cards, Residence Permits, Drivers Licenses or Visas are used for travel purposes or as a proof of identity.

In order to improve security on these documents, the EU has decided to equip them with advanced security features and biometrics (facial image and fingerprints). This set of measures helps to fight against the falsification and counterfeiting of travel documents, while biometric identifiers establish a reliable link between the document and its holder.

Technology can play a key role in improving and reinforcing external borders. Over the past years, the EU has been developing large-scale IT systems for collecting, processing and sharing information relevant to external border management.

The implementation of a global system for e-Passport validation achieved via the exchange of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates is essential for the interoperability benefits of e-Passports to be


¹¹ The below definitions are According to EDF-ARA 2015



realised. The validation is an essential element to improve security and safe air travel all over the world. In this the way Border Control authorities can confirm that:

- The document held by the traveler was issued by an authorized authority.
- The biographical and biometric information endorsed in the document at issuance has not subsequently been altered.
- Provided active authentication and / or chip authentication is supported by the e-Passport, the electronic information in the document is not a copy (i.e. a clone).
- If the document has been reported lost or has been cancelled, the validation check can help confirm whether the document remains in the hands of the person to whom it was issued.

As a result passport issuing authorities can better engage border control authorities in participating countries in identifying and removing from circulation bogus documents.



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Improperly and fraudulently documented passenger

- Improperly documented passenger: traveler who does not hold documents specified by the State as required for entry or transit on that State.
- Fraudulently documented: traveler using illegal means to circumvent or avoid detection during migration controls.

Impostors (also known as look-a-likes)

A person presenting or using some official travel documents originally issued to another person. Such persons use normally genuine travel documents and are also considered undocumented upon arrival.




1.5. Connected modus operandi known

Swapping in Schengen and non-Schengen airports

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1.6. Trafficking in Human Beings and Human Smuggling

The fight against Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) and smuggling is considered as one of the key priorities for effective actions against irregular migration¹² and often the border guards encounter victims in need of protection as well as principal witnesses, facilitators and other persons involved in trafficking or smuggling cases. In order to provide the border guards with a practical guidance, the Frontex Air Border Sector developed Vega Handbook. Based on this Handbook, some indicators are now listed below. However, and in order to avoid duplications, Frontex still recommend to all border guards involved in JO Alexis II 2015 to read and use the Vega Handbook for further and deeper insight into the topic.

First of all, this complex and sensitive topic must be approached bearing in mind the differences between trafficking in human being and smuggling of persons despite the modi operandi used by the networks are so similar in both cases and complicated to be detected, especially in the course of control activities at the air border.

Trafficking include the recruitment and also the transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons for the purpose of exploitation by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion (The Palermo Protocol). The coercion includes even giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person. Trafficking of human beings cannot be considered exclusively a transnational crime because it can take place within the territory of a country.

In this case, exploitation includes at least the exploitation of the prostitution or another type of sexual exploitation as well as forced labours, slavery, servitude or removal of organs. Is important to note that the consent of a victim of trafficking shall be irrelevant.

On the other hand, Smuggling requires a foregone agreement between the migrant and the smuggler with the purpose of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident. Smuggling always requires the movement of persons across the borders. The role of the

¹² Stockholm Programme



smuggler ends once the migrant reaches the territory of the State illegally entered. Smuggling undermines the integrity of countries and communities whereas Trafficking is a crime against persons.

Therefore, during the control activities at the air borders it will be crucial determining if the officer is facing a suspected case of Trafficking or Smuggling and not only for the eventual further criminal procedure but for the consequences for the victim (if not detected).



As earlier pointed out, the consent of the victim shall be irrelevant.

2. Alexis II Standard Operational Procedures (SOP)

Whatever type of border control is carried out, it should be done fully respecting human dignity and may not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. All persons participating in the joint operation should take into account the Frontex Code of Conduct.

Based on the VEGA handbook (uploaded in FOSS) the following operational procedures and countermeasures are recommended in order to enhance capabilities of EU airport border guards to detect and react on abuses when performing first line checks, arrival and departure gate checks as for example, false and fraudulently obtained documents, miss-issued documents, Impostors and cases of Trafficking in Human Beings (THB).

2.1 First Line Border Checks

Examination of EU travel / Identification documents

Target of document checks:

It is considered that the following documents are likely to be abused at air borders:

Commented [A13]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks and in particular on trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officers and harm the course of tuture and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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


According to the article 7(2) of the Schengen Borders Code "all persons shall undergo a minimum check in order to establish their identities on the bases of the production or presentation of their travel documents. Such a minimum check shall consist of a rapid and straightforward verification, where appropriate by using technical devices and by consulting, in the relevant databases, information exclusively on stolen, misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, of the validity of the document authorising the legitimate holder to cross the border and of the presence of signs of falsification or counterfeiting." The minimum Check shall be the rule for persons enjoying the Community right of free movement.



Commented [A16]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the methods used by law enforcement officers when conducting borders checks. Its disclosure would weaken their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.






13 contains some of the information from the Visual Inspection Zone in the form of a sequence of alphanumeric characters and the symbol "«", forming two or three lines. This sequence of characters can be read by document readers in order to facilitate inspections of travel documents (OCR - Optical Character Recognition - fonts).

Commented [A17]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the methods used by law enforcement officers when conducting borders checks. Its disclosure would weaken their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.






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
¹⁴ picture profile





Commented [A19]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the methods used by law enforcement officers when conducting borders checks. Its disclosure would weaken their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.






Commented [A20]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the methods used by law enforcement officers when conducting borders checks. Its disclosure would weaken their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

¹³ <u>Legal Basis:</u> Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. At this stage, it should be highlighted that since the Council Directive required Member States to enact legislation in order to adopt and bring this Directive into force, its implementation may vary from Member State to Member State.






¹⁶ Passenger Name Record: databases are owned by airlines and can be accessed by law enforcement authorities upon national legislation. There is no European Union law available on PNR yet.

7 A person who is refused entry in to, or transit through the Territory of a State by the authorities of that Stat.

Commented [A21]: The blanked out parts contain detailed Commented [A21]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the methods used by law enforcement officers when conducting borders checks. Its disclosure would weaken their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.





¹⁸ Passenger Name Record: databases are owned by airlines and can be accessed by law enforcement authorities upon national legislation. There is no European Union law available on PNR yet.








¹⁹ Passenger Name Record: databases are owned by airlines and can be accessed by law enforcement authorities upon national legislation. There is no European Union law available on PNR yet.

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SPECIFIC ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING

During the first days of deployment all participants from MS and observers from Third Countries will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS.

General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex.

All participants of the joint operation will be briefed by an Air Border Sector team member at the beginning of their deployment. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing, the briefing will be delivered on the spot.

More detailed information about the General briefing delivered by Frontex during JO Alexis II 2015 are in the Main part of the operational plan (Chapter 5.2).

National briefing delivered by host MS and host TC

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host Member State and Third Country (airport representatives) based on the deployment overviews provided by Joint Operations Unit (JOU).

The National briefers (airport representatives) are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by Frontex Training Unit. The National briefers should deliver the National briefing at their airport to the guest officers, seconded guest officers and observers from Third Countries during the first day of the deployment National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews.
- Report to the project manager of Frontex Training Unit (Please, see the Specific Annex 5 and 7) and in copy to
 any irregularities regarding briefings carried out.
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities.
- Prepare Report of National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (Frontex Training Unit).
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

A standard plan for operational briefing and debriefing is available in the General Annex of the Operational Plan.

Commented [A24]: The blanked out part contains detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officers. Its disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



SPECIFIC ANNEX 5 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME

Operational Management and Operational team
Area Manager (AM) for joint operations:
Operational Manager (OM):
Operational Team (OT):
Frontex Coordinating Officers (FCO):
Operational Analyst (OA):
Training Unit for Road Shows
Training Unit for National Briefings:
 Pooled Resources Unit: OPERA team
 Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)
- Senior Duty Officer (SDO)
- Frontex Support Officer (FSO FSC)
- FOSS Service Managers
- JORA Service Managers

Commented [A25]: The non-disclosed parts contain the names of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.



SPECIFIC ANNEX 6 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
		LV/W2	Entity	E-man	riione
JORA Administrator / Service Management		Frontex	FSC		
Frontex Access Manager		Frontex	ABS		
Delegated Frontex Access Manager		Frontex	ABS		
Template Creator		Frontex	RAU		
National Access Manager		Austria	MS		
National Access Manager		Belgium	MS		
National Access Manager		Bulgaria	MS		
National Access Manager		Czech Republic	MS		
National Access Manager	Ŧ	Denmark	MS		
National Access Manager		Estonia	Police and Border Guard Board/NFPOC		
National Access Manager		Finland	MS		
National Access Manager		France	MS		
National Access Manager		France	Marseille		
National Access Manager		France	Lyon		
National Access Manager		Hungary	MS		

Commented [A26]: The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

The blanked out parts also contain information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officers. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security




	Latvia	MS	
Manager			
National Access Manager	Lithuania	MS	
National Access Manager	Netherlands	MS	
National Access Manager	Netherlands	MS	
National Access Manager	Netherlands	MS	
National Access Manager	Norway	MS	
National Access Manager	Poland	MS	
National Access Manager	Portugal	MS	
National Access Manager	Romania	MS	
National Access Manager	Slovakia	MS	
National Access Manager	Slovenia	MS	
National Access Manager	Slovenia	MS	
National Access Manager	Spain	MS	
National Access Manager	Spain	MS	
National Access Manager	Sweden	MS	
National Access Manager	Switzerland	SAC	

NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation



2. JORA Incidents Reporting Structure



Commented [A27]: The blanked out parts contain information regarding the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement engaged in the operation. Its disclosure would expose elements of their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.





3. JORA INCIDENT TEMPLATE ATTRIBUTES' LIST

JORA Attribute	Required	Description
[Incident Number]	(*)	Data set by the JORA
[Reporting Unit]	(*)	Information set by the JORA
[Date of Reporting]	(*)	Date set by the JORA
[Day of Activity]	(*)	Date
1. Arrival gates: number of checks implemented in line with SOP		amount
2. Departure gates: number of checks implemented in line with SOP		amount
3. Arrival and Departure gates: Number of unlawfully used documents detected		amount
4. First Line: Number of unlawfully used documents detected		amount
5. Second Line: Number of unlawfully used documents detected		amount
6. Number of documents with production related mistakes/errors detected ("Miss-Issued documents")		amount
7. Deployed Officers: number of times they participated in the aforementioned activities		amount
8. Modus operandi		Free text
9. Comments		Free text



SPECIFIC ANNEX 7 - CONTACT DETAILS - FRONTEX

1. General

Authority	Address	Email address
Frontex (HQ)	Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	frontex@frontex.europa.eu
Frontex Situation Centre	Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	
Alexis Operational Team	Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	
OPERA team	Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	
JORA team	Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	
FOSS team	Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	

2. Frontex

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address
Area Manager for joint operations			
Operational Manager			
Operational Team Member			
Frontex Coordinating Officers			
Operational Analyst			
Frontex Training Unit			
Frontex Training Unit			
Spokesperson	Izabella Cooper	+48 667 667 292	izabella.cooper@frontex.europa.eu
Press Officer	Ewa Moncure	+48 785 001 374	ewa.moncure@frontex.europa.eu

REMARK:

Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need to know basis.

Commented [A28]: The blanked out parts contain information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officers. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration and criminal activities. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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SPECIFIC ANNEX 8 - AIRPORT ORGANISATIONAL CONTACT DETAILS

Country	Airport	Airport Contact Person	<u>Email</u>	Telephone	Mobile
Austria	Vienna (VIE)				
Austria	Vienna (VIE)				
Belgium	Brussels (BRU)				
Belgium	Brussels (BRU)				
Bulgaria	Sofia (SOF)				
Bulgaria	Sofia (SOF)				
Czech Republic	Prague (PRG)				
Czech	Prague				
Republic	(PRG)				
Denmark	Copenhage n (CPH)				
Estonia	Tallinn				
	(TLL)				
Estonia	Tallinn (TLL)				
Finland	Helsinki (HEL)				
France	Marseille (MRS)				
France	Marseille (MRS)				
France	Paris (CDG)				
France	Paris (CDG)				
France	Paris (ORY)				
France	Paris (ORY)				
France	Lyon (LYS)				
France	Lyon (LYS)				
Hungary	Budapest (BUD)				
Hungary	Budapest (BUD)				
Latvia	Riga (RIX)				
Latvia	Riga (RIX)				

Commented [A30]: The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.



Lithuania	Vilnius					
	(VNO)					
Lithuania	Vilnius					
	(VNO)					
Netherlan	Amsterdam					
ds	(AMS)					
Norway	Oslo (OSL)					
Poland	Warsaw					
	(WAW)					
Portugal	Lisbon					
	(LIS)			_		
Portugal	Lisbon					
	(LIS)					
Portugal	Porto			ı		
Portugal	(OPO)					_
	Porto (OPO)					
Romania	Bucharest					_
Nomania	(OTP)					
Romania	Bucharest					_
	(OTP)					
Romania	Timisoara					
	(TSR)					
Romania	Timisoara					
	(TSR)					
Slovakia	Bratislava					
	(BTS)					
Slovakia	Bratislava					
	(BTS)					
Slovenia	Ljubljana (LJU)					
Slovenia	Ljubljana					_
	(LJU)					
Spain	Barcelona					_
	(BCN)			•		
Spain	Madrid					_
	(MAD)					
Sweden	Stockholm					
	(ARN)					
Switzerla	Zurich					
nd	(ZRH)					
Switzerla	Zurich					
nd	(ZRH)					
Switzerla	Geneva					
nd	(GVA)					_
Switzerla nd	Geneva (GVA)					
IIU	[(GVA)	<u> </u>				_



SPECIFIC ANNEX 9 - INITIAL DEPLOYMENT LIST

Available on a separate sheet.



SPECIFIC ANNEX 10 - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (FRANCE)

Following the terrorist attacks faced by France at beginning of January 2015 and due to the continuously high terror threat in public places, at the beginning of March 2015 France recommend that guest officers deployed at French airports are deployed with service weapons and bullets proof vests.

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT²⁰

1) Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. When deployed in France, members of the EBGTs may apply direct coercion (i.e. physical force, special equipment) only in legitimate self-defense and in legitimate defence of other persons.

To act within the context of self-defense or defence of the others:

- 1. Aggression shall to be:
- -Actual: the danger is imminent
- $\textbf{-Illegal}: the aggression is illegal \ (riposte \ to \ police \ forces \ during \ a \ demonstration \ cannot \ be \ considered \ as \ self-defense)$
- -Real: the aggression should not be reputed imaginary or thought to be possible
 - 2. Defence shall to be:
- -Necessary: there is no other means to escape the danger
- -Concomitant : the reaction must be immediate, for example: we do not have to act out of revenge or with the aim of stopping the runaway aggressor
- -Proportionate to the aggression : the reaction must not be excessive
 - (b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

Weapon and bullets shall not be carried off duty must be stored in the police safe foreseen for it at the end of each shift.

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defense and in legitimate defence of other persons.

To use of firearms within the context of self-defense or defence of the others:

- Aggression shall to be :
- -Actual: the danger is imminent
- -Illegal: the aggression is illegal (riposte to police forces during a demonstration cannot be considered as self-defense)
- $\textbf{-Real}: the \ aggression \ should \ not \ be \ reputed \ imaginary \ or \ thought \ to \ be \ possible$
 - 2. Defence (the use of the weapon) shall to be:
- -Necessary: there is no other means to escape the danger

²⁰ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation



-Concomitant: the reaction must be immediate, for example: we do not have to act out of revenge or with the aim of stopping the runaway aggressor

-Proportionate to the aggression: the reaction must not be excessive

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

Members of the EBGTs from a competent authority of another Member State that is involved in police or customs activity under an international agreement or a legislative act of the European Union may carry firearms (handguns), cut-and-thrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons). Gas weapons or pneumatic weapons cannot be carried by members of the EBGTs deployed in France.

- (d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc.)
- Handcuffs: Handcuffs might be carried by the GO as it might be useful in case of use of force. However,
 «Nobody can be handcuffed unless he is considered dangerous to himself or others [...] (Art.803
 Criminal Procedure Code),

The usefulness of handcuffing is under the responsibility of the French police officer accompanying the GO. Handcuff should be wisely and applies the principle of proportionality depending of the person: age, health, seriousness of the offense. Do respect the dignity. Handcuffing is prohibited for minors under thirteen years old. (DGPN Instructions n° 04-10464 du 13/09/2004)

- cut-and-thrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons): The use of force including use of cut-andthrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons) is only allowed within the context of self-defense or defence of the others:
 - (i) Aggression shall to be:

-Actual: the danger is imminent

-Illegal : the aggression is illegal (riposte to police forces during a demonstration cannot be considered as self-defense)

-Real: the aggression should not be reputed imaginary or thought to be possible

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} \hbox{\it (ii)} & {\it Defence (the use of the weapon) shall to be :} \\ \end{tabular}$

-Necessary: there is no other means to escape the danger

-Concomitant: the reaction must be immediate, for example: we do not have to act out of revenge or with the aim of stopping the runaway aggressor

- {\it Proportionate} to the aggression: the reaction must not be excessive

- (e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons
- The health of those involved in a use of force case is the priority as soon as the assault ended. In this
 context medical examinations of all persons involved are highly recommended.
- In accordance with the Article 10c COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004 « Criminal liability », guest officers are treated in the same way as officials of France with regard to any criminal offences that might be committed against them or by them.



RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

- Self-defense or defence of the others : Articles 122-4, 112-5, 122-7 Penal Code
- Use of force: Article 113-4 de l'arrêté du 6 juin 2006 portant règlement général d'emploi de la police nationale (NOR: INTC0600544A)
- Handcuff: DGPN Instructions n°04-10464 du 13/09/2004