Brussels, 24 November 2015
WK 163/2015 INIT
LIMITE
EF
ECOFIN
SURE
WORKING PAPER
This is a paper intended for a specific community of recipients. Handling and
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WORKING DOCUMENT
From:
Presidency
To:
Working Party on Financial Services - Securitisation
N° prev. doc.:
ST 13835/15
WK 137 2015
WK 151 2015
Subject:
Pre-copy of the second Presidency compromise proposal for the STS Securitisation
Regulation
COM(2015) 472 FINAL
WK 163/2015 INIT
LIMITE EN
link to page 2
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
laying down common rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple,
transparent and standardised securitisation and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC,
2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
1,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1)
Securitisation involves transactions that enable a lender or a creditor – typically a credit
institution or a corporate – to refinance a set of loans, or exposures or receivables, such as
loans for immovable property, auto leases, consumer loans, or credit cards or trade
receivables, by transforming them into tradable securities. The lender pools and repackages
a portfolio of its loans, and organises them into different risk categories for different
investors, thus giving investors access to investments in loans and other exposures to which
they normally would not have direct access. Returns to investors are generated from the cash
flows of the underlying loans.
(2)
In the Investment Plan for Europe presented on 26 November 2014, the Commission
announced its intention to restart high quality securitisation markets, without repeating the
mistakes made before the 2008 financial crisis. The development of a simple, transparent
1
OJ C , , p. .
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and standardised securitisation market constitutes a building block of the Capital Markets
Union (CMU) and contributes to the Commission's priority objective to support job creation
and a return to sustainable growth.
(3)
The European Union does not intent to weaken the legislative framework implemented after
the financial crisis to address the risks inherent in highly complex, opaque and risky
securitisation. It is essential to ensure that rules are adopted to better differentiate simple,
transparent and standardised products from complex, opaque and risky instruments and
apply a more risk-sensitive prudential framework.
(4)
Securitisation is an important element of well-functioning financial markets. Soundly
structured securitisation is an important channel for diversifying funding sources and
allocating risk more efficiently within the Union financial system. It allows for a broader
distribution of financial sector risk and can help to free up originator's balance sheets to
allow for further lending to the economy. Overall, it can improve efficiencies in the financial
system and provide additional investment opportunities. Securitisation can create a bridge
between credit institutions and capital markets with an indirect benefit for businesses and
citizens (through, for example, less expensive loans and business financing, credits for
immovable property and credit cards).
(5)
Establishing a more risk-sensitive prudential framework for simple, transparent and
standardised ("STS") securitisations requires that the Union clearly defines what a STS
securitisation is, since otherwise the more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for credit
institutions and insurance companies would be available for different types of securitisations
in different Member States. This would lead to an un-level playing field and to regulatory
arbitrage.
(6)
It is appropriate to provide, in line with the existing definitions in Union sectoral legislation,
definitions of all the key concepts of securitisation. In particular, a clear and encompassing
definition of securitisation is needed to capture any transaction or scheme whereby the credit
risk associated with an exposure or pool of exposures is tranched. An exposure that creates a
direct payment obligation for a transaction or scheme used to finance or operate physical
assets should not be considered an exposure to a securitisation, even if the transaction or
scheme has payment obligations of different seniority.
(6a) A sponsor should be able to delegate tasks to a servicer, but should remain responsible of the
risk management. In particular a sponsor should not transfer the risk retention requirement
to his servicer. The servicer should be a regulated asset manager such as a UCITS manager,
an AIFM, or a MIFID entity.
(7)
At both the international and European level, much work has already been done to identify
STS securitisation and in Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) 2015/61
2 and (EU)
2015/35
3, criteria have already been set out for simple, transparent and standardised
securitisation for specific purposes, to which a more risk sensitive prudential treatment is
attached.
2
Commission Delegated Regulation of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for Credit Institutions
(OJ L 11,
17.1.2015, p; 1).
3
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2009/138/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and
Reinsurance (Solvency II) (
OJ L 12, 17.1.2015, p. 1).
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(8)
Based on the existing criteria, on the BCBS-IOSCO criteria adopted on 23 July 2015 for
identifying simple, transparent and comparable securitisations and in particular the EBA
Advice on qualifying securitisation published on 7 July 2015, it is essential to establish a
general and cross-sectorally applicable definition of STS securitisation.
(9)
Implementation of the "STS criteria throughout the EU should not lead to divergent
approaches. Those approaches would create potential barriers for cross-border investors by
constraining them to enter into the details of the Member State frameworks and thus
undermining investor confidence in the STS criteria.
(10) It is essential that competent authorities work closely together to ensure a common and
consistent understanding of the STS requirements throughout the Union and to address
potential interpretation issues. In the light of this objective the three ESAs should, in the
framework of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, coordinate their
work and that of the competent authorities to ensure cross-sectoral consistency and assess
practical issues which mightay arise with regards to STS securitisations. In doing so, the
views of market participants should also be requested and taken into account to the extent
possible. The outcome of these discussions should be made public on the websites of the
ESAs so as to help originators, sponsors, SSPEs and investors assess STS securitisations
before issuing or investing in such positions. Such a coordination mechanism would be
particularly important in the period leading to the implementation of this Regulation.
(11) Investments in or exposures to securitisations will not only expose the investor to credit
risks of the underlying loans or exposures, but the structuring process of securitisations
could also lead to other risks such as agency risks, model risk, legal and operational risk,
counterparty risk, servicing risk, liquidity risk and, concentration risk and risks of
operational nature. Therefore, it is essential that institutional investors are subject to
proportionate due diligence requirements ensuring that they properly assess the risks arising
from all types of securitisations, to the benefit of end investors. Due diligence can thus also
enhance confidence in the market and between individual originators, sponsors and
investors. It is necessary that investors also exercise appropriate due diligence with regard to
STS securitisations.. They can inform themselves with the information disclosed by the
securitising parties, in particular the STS notification and the related information disclosed
in this context, which should provide investors with all the relevant information on the way
STS criteria are met. Institutional investors should be able to place appropriate reliance on
the STS notification and the information disclosed by the originator, sponsor and SSPE on
whether a securitisation meets the STS requirements. They should however not solely and
mechanistically rely on such a notification and information.
(12) It is important that the interests of originators, sponsors and original lenders that transform
exposures into tradable securities and investors are aligned. To achieve this, the originator,
sponsor or original lender should retain a significant interest in the underlying exposures of
the securitisation. It is therefore important for the originators, or the sponsors or original
lender to retain a material net economic exposure to the underlying risks in question. More
generally, securitisation transactions should not be structured in such a way so as to avoid
the application of the retention requirement. That requirement should be applicable in all
situations where the economic substance of a securitisation is applicable, whatever legal
structures or instruments are used. There is no need for multiple applications of the retention
requirement. For any given securitisation, it suffices that only the originator, the sponsor or
the original lender is subject to the requirement. Similarly, where securitisation transactions
contain other securitisations positions as underlying exposures, the retention requirement
should be applied only to the securitisation which is subject to the investment. The STS
notification indicate to investors that the originators, sponsor or original lender isare
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retaining a material net economic exposure to the underlying risks. Certain exceptions
should be made for cases when securitised exposures are fully, unconditionally and
irrevocably guaranteed by in particular public authorities. In case support from public
resources provided in the form of guarantees or by other means, any provisions in this
Regulation are without prejudice to State aid rules.
(13) The ability of investors and potential investors to exercise due diligence and thus make an
informed assessment of the creditworthiness of a given securitisation instrument depends on
their access to information on those instruments. Based on the existing acquis, it is
important to create a comprehensive system under which investors and potential investors
will have access to all the relevant information. oOver the entire life of the transactions,
continuous, easy and free access to reliable information on securitisations for investors
should be facilitated and to reduce originators, sponsors and SSPEs reporting tasks for
originators, sponsors and SSPEs reduced, where possible and to facilitate investors'
continuous; easy and free access to reliable information on securitisations.
(13a) Due to the potential level of risks and their inherent complexity, securitisation instruments
are not appropriate for retail investors within the meaning of Directive 2014/65/UE.
(14) Originators, sponsors and SSPE's should make all materially relevant data on the credit
quality and performance of underlying exposures available in the investor report, including
data allowing investors to clearly identify delinquency and default of underlying debtors,
debt restructuring, debt forgiveness, forbearance, repurchases, payment holidays, losses,
charge offs, recoveries and other asset performance remedies in the pool of underlying
exposures. Data on the cash flows generated by underlying exposures and by the liabilities
of the securitisation issuance, including separate disclosure of the securitisation position’s
income and disbursements, that is scheduled principal, scheduled interest, prepaid principal,
past due interest and fees and charges and any data relating to the breach of any triggers
implying changes in the priority of payments or replacement of any counterparties as well as
data on the amount and form of credit enhancement available to each tranche should also be
made available in the investor report.
(14a) Originators, sponsors and original lenders should apply to exposures to be securitised the
same sound and well-defined criteria for credit-granting which they apply to non-securitised
exposures. However, to the extent that trade receivables are not originated in the form of a
loan, credit-granting criteria need not be met with respect to trade receivables.
(14b) Although securitisations that are simple, transparent and standardised have in the past
performed well, the satisfaction of any STS requirements does not mean that the
securitisation position is free of risks, nor does it indicate anything about the credit quality
underlying the securitisation. Instead, it should be understood to indicate that a prudent and
diligent investor will be able to analyse the risks involved in the securitisation.
(14b) There should be two types of STS requirements: one for long-term securitisations and one for
short-term securitisations (ABCP), which should be subject to a large extent to similar
requirements with specific adjustments to reflect the structural features of these two market
segments. The functioning of these markets are different with ABCP programmes relying on
a number of ABCP transactions consisting of short term exposures which need to be
replaced once matured. In addition, STS criteria need also to reflect the specific role of the
sponsor providing liquidity support to the ABCP programmeconduits, especially for fully
supported ABCP programmes.
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(15) This proposal only allows for 'true sale' securitisations to be designated as STS. In a true sale
securitisation, the ownership of the underlying exposures is transferred or effectively
assigned to an issuer entity which is a securitisation special purpose entity (SSPE). The
transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE should not be subject to
severe clawback provisions in the event of the seller's insolvency. Such severe clawback
provisions include but should not be limited to provisions under which the sale, assignment
or transfer of the underlying exposures can be invalidated by the liquidator of the seller
solely on the basis that it was concluded within a certain period before the declaration of the
seller's insolvency or provisions where the SSPE can prevent such invalidation only if it can
prove that it was not aware of the insolvency of the seller at the time of sale, without
prejudice to legal provisions of public order
.
(15a) A legal opinion provided by a qualified legal counsel might confirm the true sale or
assignment or transfer with the same legal effect of the underlying exposures and the
enforceability of that true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect under the
applicable law.
(16) In securitisations which are not 'true sale', the underlying exposures are not transferred to
such an issuer entity, but rather the credit risk related to the underlying exposures is
transferred by means of a derivative contract or guarantees. This introduces an additional
counterparty credit risk and potential complexity related in particular to the content of the
derivative contract. To date, no analysis on an international level or Union level has been
sufficient to identify STS criteria for those types of securitisation instruments. An
assessment in the future of whether some synthetic securitisations that have performed well
during the financial crisis and are simple, transparent and standardised are therefore eligible
to qualify as STS would be essential. On this basis, the Commission will assess whether
securitisations which are not 'true sale' should be covered by the STS designation in a future
proposal. The Commission should present a report and if appropriate a legislative proposal
to to the European Parliament and to the Council on the eligibility of synthetic
securitisations as STS securitisation by one year after entry into force of this Regulation.
(17) The underlying exposures transferred from the seller to the SSPE should meet
predetermined and clearly defined eligibility criteria which do not allow for active portfolio
management of those exposures on a discretionary basis. Substitution of exposures that are
in breach of representations and warranties should in principle not be considered active
portfolio management.
(17a) Underlying exposures should not include exposures in default. A prudent appraoch should
apply to exposures which have been non-performing and have subsequently been
restructured. The inclusion of the latter in the pool of underlying exposure should however
not be excluded in case such exposures have not presented new arrears since the date of the
restructuring which must have taken place at least one year prior to the date of transfer or
assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE. In such case adequate disclosure
should ensure full transparency.
(18) To ensure that investors perform robust due diligence and to facilitate the assessment of
underlying risks, it is important that securitisation transactions are backed by pools of
exposures that are homogenous in asset type, such as pools of residential loans, pools of
corportateommercial loans, leases and credit facilities to undertakings of the same category
to finance capital expenditures or business operations, pools of auto loans and leases to
borrowers or lessees or loans and pools of credit facilities to individuals for personal, family
or household consumption purposes. A pool of underlying exposures should only comprise
one asset type.
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(19) It is essential to prevent the recurrence of purely ‘originate to distribute’ models. In those
situations lenders grant credits applying poor and weak underwriting policies as they know
in advance that related risks are eventually sold to third parties. Thus, the exposures to be
securitised should be originated in the ordinary course of the originator’s or original lender's
business pursuant to underwriting standards that should not be less stringent than those the
originator or original lender applies to origination of similar exposures which are not
securitised. Material changes in underwriting standards should be fully disclosed to potential
investors, or in the case of fully supported ABCP programmes to the sponsor and other
parties directly exposed to the ABCP transaction. The originator’s or original lender should
have sufficient experience in originating exposures of a similar nature to those which have
been securitised. In the case of securitisations where the underlying exposures are residential
loans, the pool of loans should not include any loan that was marketed and underwritten on
the premise that the loan applicant or, where applicable intermediaries, were made aware
that the information provided might not be verified by the lender. The assessment of the
borrower's creditworthiness should also meet where applicable, the requirements set out in
Directives 2014/17/EU or 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council or
equivalent requirements in third countries.
(19a) A strong reliance of the repayment of securitisation positions on the sale of assets securing
the underlying assets creates vulnerabilities as illustrated by the poor performance of parts of
the CMBS market during the financial crisis. Therefore, CMBS should not be considered as
STS securitisations.
(20) Where originators, sponsors and SSPE's would like their securitisations to use the STS
designation, they should notify investors, competent authorities and ESMA that the
securitisation meets the STS requirements. The notification should include an explanation
on how each of the STS crtieria has been complied with. ESMA should then publish it on a
list of transactions made available on its website for information purposes. The inclusion of
a securitisation issuance in ESMA’s list of notified STS securitisations does not imply that
ESMA or other competent authorities have certified that the securitisation meets the STS
requirements. The compliance with the STS requirements remains solely the responsibility
of the originators, sponsors and SSPEs. This will ensure that originators, sponsors and
SSPE's take responsibility for their claim that the securitisation is STS and that there is
transparency on the market.
(21) Where a securitisation no longer meets the STS requirements, the originator, sponsor and
SSPE should immediately notify ESMA and the competent authority. Moreover, where a
competent authority has imposed administrative sanctions or remedial measures with regard
to a securitisation notified as being STS, that competent authority should immediately notify
ESMA for its indication on the STS notifications list allowing investors to be informed
about such sanctions and about the reliability of STS notifications. It is therefore in the
interest of originators, sponsors and SSPE's to make well-considered notifications due to
reputational consequences.
(22) Investors should perform their own due diligence on investments commensurate with the
risks involved but they should be able to rely on the STS notifications and on the
information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE on STS compliance. They should
however not solely and mechanistically rely on such a notification and information.
(23) The involvement of third parties in helping to check compliance of a securitisation with the
STS requirements may be useful for investors, originators, sponsors and SSPE's and could
contribute to increase confidence in the market for STS securitisations. Originators, sponsors
and SSPEs might also use the services of a third party authorised in accordance with this
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regulation to assess whether their securitisation complies with the STS criteria. Those third
parties should be subject to authorisation by competent authorities. The notification to
ESMA and the subsequent publication on ESMA’s website should mention whether STS
compliance was confirmed by an authroised third-party. However, it is essential that
investors make their own assessment, take responsibility for their investment decisions and
do not mechanistically rely on such third parties.
(24) Member States should designate competent authorities and provide them with the necessary
supervisory, investigative and sanctioning powers. Administrative sanctions and remedial
measures should, in principle, be published. Since investors, originators, sponsors, original
lenders and SSPEs can be established in different Member States and supervised by different
sectoral competent authorities close cooperation between relevant competent authorities,
including the European Central Bank (ECB) in accordance with Council Regulation (EU)
No 1024/2013
4, and with the ESAs should be ensured by the mutual exchange of
information and assistance in supervisory activities.
(25) Competent authorities should closely coordinate their supervision and ensure consistent
decisions, especially in case of infringements of this Regulation. Where such an
infringement concerns an incorrect or misleading notification, the competent authority
finding that infringement should also inform the ESAs and the relevant competent
authorities of the Member States concerned, so that ESMA, and, where appropriate, the
Joint-Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, should be able to exercise their
binding mediation powers.
(26) This Regulation promotes the harmonisation of a number of key elements in the
securitisation market without prejudice to further complementary market-led harmonisation
of processes and practices in securitisation markets. For that reason, it is essential that
market participants and their professional associations continue working on further
standardising market practices, and in particular the standardisation of documentation of
securitisations. The Commission will carefully monitor and report on the standardisation
efforts made by market participants.
(27) The UCITS Directive, the Solvency II Directive, the CRA Regulation, the AIFM Directive
and EMIR are amended accordingly to ensure consistency of the EU legal framework with
this Regulation on provisions related to securitisation the main object of which is the
establishment and functioning of the internal market, in particular by ensuring a level
playing field in the internal market for all institutional investors.
(28) As regards the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, over-the-counter ("OTC")
derivative contracts entered into by securitisation special purpose entities should not be
subject to the clearing obligation provided that certain conditions are met. This is because
counterparties to OTC derivative contracts entered into with securitisation special purpose
vehicles are secured creditors under the securitisation arrangements and adequate protection
against counterparty credit risk is usually provided for. With respect to non-centrally cleared
derivatives, the levels of collateral required should also take into account the specific
structure of securitisation arrangements and the protections already provided for therein.
(29) There is a degree of substitutability between covered bonds and securitisations. Therefore, in
order to prevent the possibility of distortion or arbitrage between the use of securitisations
and covered bonds because of the different treatment of OTC derivative contracts entered
4
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (
OJ L 287, 29.10.2013. p.
263).
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into by covered bond entities or by SSPEs, Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should also be
amended to exempt covered bond entities from the clearing obligation and to ensure that
covered bond entities are subject to the same bilateral margins.
(30) In order to specify the risk-retention requirement, the power to adopt acts in accordance with
Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to
the Commission in respect of the adoption of regulatory technical standards laying down the
modalities of retaining risk, the measurement of the level of retention, certain prohibitions
concerning the retained risk, the retention on a consolidated basis and the exemption for
certain transactions. In view of the expertise of EBA, in defining the delegated acts, the
Commission should make use of that expertise on the preparation of the delegated acts. EBA
should consult closely with the other two European Supervisory Authorities.
(31) In order to facilitate investors continuous, easy and free access to reliable information on
securitisations, the same power to adopt acts should be delegated to the Commission in
respect of the adoption of regulatory technical standards for comparable information on
underlying exposures and regular investor reports and for the requirements to be met by the
website on which the information is made available to holders of securitisation positions. In
view of the expertise of ESMA, in defining the delegated acts, the Commission should make
use of that expertise on the preparation of the delegated acts. ESMA should consult closely
with the other two European Supervisory Authorities.
(31a) In order to specify the terms of the cooperation and exchange of information obligation of
competent authorities, the same power to adopt acts should be delegated to the Commission
in respect of the adoption of regulatory technical standards laying down the information to
be exchanged and the content and scope of the notification obligations. In view of the
expertise of ESMA, in defining the delegated acts, the Commission should make use of that
expertise on the preparation of the delegated acts. ESMA should consult closely with the
other two European Supervisory Authorities.
(32) In order to facilitate the process to investors, originators, sponsors and SSPE's, the same
power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the adoption of
regulatory implementing technical standards regarding the template for STS notifications
that will provide investors and competent authorities with sufficient information for their
assessment of compliance with the STS requirements. In view of the expertise of ESMA, in
defining the delegated implementing acts, the Commission should make use of that expertise
on the preparation of the implementingdelegated acts. ESMA should consult closely with the
other two European Supervisory Authorities.
(33) In order to specify the terms of the cooperation and exchange of information obligation of
competent authorities, the same power to adopt acts should be delegated to the Commission
in respect of the adoption of regulatory technical standards laying down the information to
be exchanged and the content and scope of the notification obligations. In view of the
expertise of ESMA, in defining the delegated acts, the Commission should make use of that
expertise on the preparation of the delegated acts. ESMA should consult closely with the
other two European Supervisory Authorities.
(34) The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a
simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European
Parliament and to the Council.
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(35) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
given that securitisation markets operate globally and that a level playing field in the internal
market for all institutional investors and entities involved in securitisation should be ensured
but, by reason of their scale and effects, can be better achieved at Union level, the Union
may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5
of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set
out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve
those objectives.
(36) This Regulation should apply to securitisations the securities of which are issued on or after
the entry into force of this Regulation.
(37) For securitisation positions outstanding as of the date of entry into force of this Regulation,
originators, sponsors and SSPEs may use the designation 'STS' provided that the
securitisation complies with applicablethe STS requirements. Therefore, originators,
sponsors and SSPEs should be able to submit an STS notification pursuant to Article 14 (1)
of this Regulation to ESMA.
(38) ExistingThe due diligence requirements are essentially taken over from existing Union law
and should continue tothus apply to securitisations issued on or after 1 January 2011 but
before the entry into force of this regulation and to securitisations issued before 1 January
2011that date, where new underlying exposures have been added or substituted after 31
December 2014. The relevant articles of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No
625/2014 that specify the risk retention requirements for credit institutions and investments
firms as defined in Article 4(1) points (1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 2013/575 should
remain applicable until the moment that the regulatory technical standards on risk retention
pursuant to this Regulation become of application. For reasons of legal certainty, credit
institutions or investment firms, insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and
alternative investment fund managers should, for securitisation positions outstanding as of
the entry into force of this Regulation; continue to be subject to Article 405 of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 and to Chapter 1, 2 and 3 and Article 22 of Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No 625/2014, Articles 254 and 255 of Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2015/35 and Article 51 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013
respectively. In order to ensure that originators, sponsors and SSPE's comply with their
transparency obligations , until the moment that the regulatory technical standards to be
adopted by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation apply, make the information
mentioned by Annexes I to VIII of Delegated Regulation 2015/3/EU available to the website
referred to in Article 5 (4) of this Regulation.
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HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Chapter 1
General provisions
Article 1
Subject-matter and scope
1.
This Regulation lays down a general framework for securitisation. It defines securitisation
and establishes due diligence, risk retention and transparency requirements for parties
involved in securitisations, such as institutional investors, originators, sponsors, original
lenders and sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntities. It also provides a framework for
sSimple, tTransparent and sStandardised or( 'STS') securitisation.
2.
This Regulation applies to institutional investors becoming exposed to securitisation and to
originators, sponsors, original lenders and sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntities.
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Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
'securitisation' means a transaction or scheme, whereby the credit risk associated with an
exposure or pool of exposures is tranched, having both of the following characteristics:
(a) payments in the transaction or scheme are dependent upon the performance of the
exposure or pool of exposures;
(b) the subordination of tranches determines the distribution of losses during the ongoing
life of the transaction or scheme.
An exposure that creates a direct payment obligation for a transaction or scheme used to
finance or operate physical assets shall not be considered an exposure to a securitisation,
even if the transaction or scheme has payment obligations of different seniority;
(2)
'sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntity' or 'SSPE' means a corporation, trust or other
entity, other than an originator or sponsor, established for the sole purpose of carrying out
one or more securitisations, the activities of which are limited to those appropriate to
accomplishing that objective, the structure of which is intended to isolate the obligations of
the SSPE from those of the originator, and in which the holders of the beneficial interests
have the right to pledge or exchange those interests without restriction;
(3)
'originator' means an entity which:
(a) itself or through related entities, directly or indirectly, was involved in the original
agreement which created the obligations or potential obligations of the debtor or
potential debtor giving rise to the exposures being securitised; or
(b) purchases a third party's exposures on its own account and then sells or assigns them
to an SSPE or transfers the risk of those exposures by the use of credit derivatives or
guarantees;
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(4)
're-securitisation' means securitisation where the risk associated with an underlying pool of
exposures is tranched and at least one of the underlying exposures is a securitisation
position;
(5)
'sponsor' means a credit institution or investment firm as defined in Article 4, paragraph 1,
points (1) and (2) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, other than an
originator, that establishes and manages, directly or by delegation, an asset-backed
commercial paper programme or other securitisation scheme that purchases exposures
from third-party entities. For the purpose of this definition a sponsor shall also be
considered to manage a securitisation transaction or scheme where that scheme or
transaction involves day-to-day active portfolio management which is delegated to an
entity authorised to perform such activity in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU,
Directive 2011/61/EU or Directive 2009/65/EC ;
(6)
'tranche' means a contractually established segment of the credit risk associated with an
exposure or a pool of exposures, where a position in the segment entails a risk of credit
loss greater than or less than a position of the same amount in another segment, without
taking account of credit protection provided by third parties directly to the holders of
positions in the segment or in other segments;
(7)
'asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programme' or ‘ABCP programme’ means a
programme of securitisations held in an SSPE, where the securities issued by which the
SSPE under this programme predominantly take the form of asset-backed commercial
paper with an original maturity of one year or less;
(8)
'asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) transaction' or 'ABCP transaction’ means a
securitisation within an ABCP programme;
(9)
'traditional securitisation' means a securitisation involving the transfer of the economic
interest in the exposures being securitised through the transfer of ownership of the
securitised exposures from the originator to an SSPE or through sub-participation by an
SSPE. The securities issued do not represent payment obligations of the originator;
(10)
'synthetic securitisation' means a securitisation other than a traditional securitisation where
the transfer of risk is achieved by the use of credit derivatives or guarantees, and the
exposures being securitised remain exposures of the originator;
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link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14
(11)
'investor' means a person holding a securitisation position;
(12)
'institutional investors' means an investor which is:
(a) an insurance undertakings as defined in Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the
business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II);
(b) a reinsurance undertakings as defined in Article 13, point (4) of Directive 2009/138/EC;
(c) an institutions for occupational retirement provision falling within the scope of Directive
2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
5 in accordance with Article 2
thereof, unless a Member States has chosen not to apply that Directive in whole or in parts
to that institution in accordance with Article 5 of that Directive or; the delegate of an
institution for occupational retirement provision as defined in Article 19(1) of Directive
2003/41/EC;
(d) an alternative investment fund manager (AIFM) as defined in Article 4, paragraph 1, point (b) of
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
6 that manage and/or
market AIFs in the Union; or
(e) a UCITS management company as defined in Article 2, paragraph 1, point (b) of Directive
2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
7;
(f)or an internally managed UCITS, which is an investment company authorised in accordance with
Directive 2009/65/EC and which has not designated a management company authorised
under that Directive for its management; or
(g) a credit institutions or an investments firms as defined in points (1) and (2) of Article 4(1),
paragraph 1, points (1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
5
Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and
supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (OJ L 235, 23.9.2003, p. 10).
6
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 202 on Alternative Investment
Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009
and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p. 1).
7
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32).
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(13)
'servicer' means an entity as defined in Article 142, paragraph 1, point (8) of Article 142(1)
of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(14)
'liquidity facility' means the securitisation position arising from a contractual agreement to
provide funding to ensure timeliness of cash flows to investors;
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(15)
'revolving exposure' means an exposure whereby borrowers' outstanding balances are
permitted to fluctuate based on their decisions to borrow and repay, up to an agreed limit;
(16)
'revolving securitisation' means a securitisation where the securitisation structure itself
revolves by exposures being added to or removed from the pool of exposures irrespective
of whether the exposures revolve or not;
(17)
'early amortisation provision' means a contractual clause in a securitisation of revolving
exposures or a revolving securitisation which requires, on the occurrence of defined events,
investors' securitisation positions to be redeemed before their originally stated maturity;
(18)
'first loss tranche' means the most subordinated tranche in a securitisation that is the first
tranche to bear losses incurred on the securitised exposures and thereby provides protection
to the second loss and, where relevant, higher ranking tranches;
(19)
'securitisation position' means an exposure to a securitisation;
(20)
'original lender' means the entity that concluded the original agreement which created the
obligations or potential obligations of the debtor or potential debtor giving rise to the
exposures being securitised;
(21)
‘fully-supported ABCP programme’ means an ABCP programme which is supported by a
sponsor providing a liquidity facility which covers all liquidity and credit risks and any
material dilution risks of the securitised exposures as well as any other transaction costs
and programme-wide costs;.
(22)
‘fully-supported ABCP transaction’ means an ABCP transaction within a fully-supported
ABCP programme.
An exposure that meets the criteria listed in Article 147, paragraph 8, points (a) to (c) of Regulation
(EU) No 2013/575 and is used to operate physical assets shall not be considered an exposure to a
securitisation.
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Chapter 2
Provisions applicable to all securitisations
Article 3
Due diligence requirements for institutional investors
1.
An institutional investor shall verify before becoming exposed to a securitisation that:
(a) where the originator or original lender established in the Union is not a credit
institution or an investment firm as defined in Article 4, paragraph (1), points (1) and
(2) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, it the originator or original
lender grants all its credits on the basis of sound and well-defined criteria and clearly
established processes for approving, amending, renewing and financing those credits
and has effective systems in place to apply these those criteria and processes in
accordance with Article 5a of this Regulation;
(aa) where the originator or original lender is established in a third country, the originator
or original lenderit grants all its credits on the basis of sound and well-defined
criteria and clearly established processes for approving, amending, renewing and
financing those credits and has effective systems in place to apply thoese criteria and
processes in line with the criteria and processes laid down in Article 5a;
(b) if established in the Union,where the originator, sponsor or original lender is
established in the Union, it retains on an ongoing basis a material net economic
interest in accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation and that the risk retention is
disclosed to the institutional investor in accordance with Article 5;
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(ba) if established in a third country,where the originator, sponsor or original lender is
established in a third country, it retains on an ongoing basis a material net economic
interest which, in any event, shall not be less than 5% determined in line with the
methodology laid down in Article 4 of this Regulation and it discloses the risk
retention to institutional investors;
(c) the originator, sponsor and SSPE make available the information required by Article
5 of this Regulation in accordance with the frequency and modalities provided in that
Article.
1a.
By derogation from to paragraph 1, as regardsing fully- supported ABCP transactions, the
requirement specified in point (a) of paragraph 1 applies to the sponsor, whicho shall
verify that the originator or original lender which is not a credit institution or an investment
firm grants all its credits on the basis of sound and well-defined criteria and clearly
established processes for approving, amending, renewing and financing those credits and
has effective systems in place to apply thoese criteria and processes.
2.
Before becoming exposed to a securitisation, institutional investors shall also carry out a
due diligence assessment which enables them to assess the risks involved, and, in light of
those risks, consider at least the following aspects:
(a) the risk characteristics of the individual securitisation position and of the underlying
exposures;
(b) all the structural features of the securitisation that can materially impact the
performance of the securitisation position, such as the contractual priorities of
payment and priority of payment-related triggers, credit enhancements, liquidity
enhancements, market value triggers, and transaction-specific definitions of default;
(ba) By derogation from point (b), in case of a fully-supported ABCP transaction,
institutional investors in the relevant commercial papers shall consider the features of the
ABCP programme and the liquidity support by the sponsor.
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(c) with regard to securitisations designated as STS pursuant to Article 6, whether the
securitisation meets the requirements laid down in Sections 1 and 3 of Chapter 3, or
in Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 3. Institutional investors may place appropriate
reliance on the STS notification pursuant to Article 14(, paragraph 1) and on the
information disclosed by the originator, sponsor and SSPE on the compliance with
the STS requirements, without solely or mechanistically relying on thate
prementionned notification or information.
3.
Institutional investors that are exposed to a securitisation shall at least:
(a) establish appropriate written procedures, with regard to the risk profile of the
securitisation position, and appropriate and proportionate to their trading and non-
trading book where relevant, in order to monitor compliance with paragraphs 1 and
2, and the performance of the securitisation position and the underlying exposures on
an ongoing basis. Where relevant with respect to certain securitisation transactions
and types of underlying exposures, those written procedures shall include monitoring
of the exposure type, the percentage of loans more than 30, 60 and 90 days past due,
default rates, prepayment rates, loans in foreclosure, recovery rates, repurchases, loan
modifications, payment holidays, collateral type and occupancy, and frequency
distribution of credit scores or other measures of credit worthiness across underlying
exposures, industry and geographical diversification, frequency distribution of loan
to value ratios with band widths that facilitate adequate sensitivity analysis. Where
the underlying exposures are themselves securitisations, institutional investors shall
also monitor the exposures underlying those securitisations;
(b) for an exposure to a securitisation other than a fully-supported ABCP transaction,
regularly perform stress tests on the cash flows and collateral values supporting the
underlying exposures, or, as applicable, stress tests on loss assumptions, that are
appropriate with regard to the nature, scale and complexity of the risk of the
securitisation position;
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(c) ensure internal reporting to their management body so that they are aware of the
material risk arising from each of their securitisation positions and that the risks from
those investments are adequately managed;
(d) be able to demonstrate, upon request, to their competent authorities that for each of
their securitisation positions they have a comprehensive and thorough understanding
of the position and its underlying exposures and that they have implemented written
policies and procedures for their risk management and documentationrecord keeping
of the verifications and due diligence in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 and of
any other relevant information;
(e) in the case of fully-supported ABCP transactions, be able to demonstrate, upon
request, to their competent authorities, that for each of their ABCP securitisation
positions they have a comprehensive and thorough understanding of the credit
quality of the sponsor and of the terms of the liquidity facility provided.
Article 4
Risk retention
1.
The originator, sponsor or original lender of a securitisation shall retain on an ongoing
basis a material net economic interest in the securitisation of not less than 5 %, which shall
be measured at the origination and shall be determined by the notional value for off-
balance sheet items. Where the originator, sponsor or original lender have not agreed
between them who will retain the material net economic interest, the originator shall retain
the material net economic interest. There shall be no multiple applications of the retention
requirements for any given securitisation. The material net economic interest shall not be
split amongst different types of retainers and not be subject to any credit risk mitigation or
hedging.
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For the purposes of this Article, an entity shall not be considered to be an originator where
the entity has been established or operates for the sole purpose of securitising exposures.
2.
Only the following shall qualify as a retention of a material net economic interest of not
less than 5% within the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) the retention of not less than 5% of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or
transferred to investors;
(b) in the case of revolving securitisations or securitisations of revolving exposures, the
retention of the originator's interest of not less than 5% of the nominal value of each
of the securitised exposures;
(c) the retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to not less than 5% of the
nominal value of the securitised exposures, where such non-securitised exposures
would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number
of potentially securitised exposures is not less than 100 at origination;
(d) the retention of the first loss tranche and, where such retention does not amount to
5% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, if necessary, other tranches
having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to
investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so
that the retention equals in total not less than 5% of the nominal value of the
securitised exposures; or
(e) the retention of a first loss exposure of not less than 5% of every securitised exposure
in the securitisation.
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3.
Where a mixed financial holding company established in the Union within the meaning of
Directive 2002/87/EC, a parent institution or a financial holding company established in
the Union, or one of its subsidiaries within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013,
as an originator or sponsor, securitises exposures from one or more credit institutions,
investment firms or other financial institutions which are included in the scope of
supervision on a consolidated basis, the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 may be
satisfied on the basis of the consolidated situation of the related parent institution, financial
holding company, or mixed financial holding company established in the Union.
The first subparagraph shall apply only where credit institutions, investment firms or
financial institutions which created the securitised exposures adhere to the requirements set
out in Article 79 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
and deliver the information needed to satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 5 of
this Regulation, in a timely manner, to the originator or sponsor and to the EU parent credit
institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company established in
the Union.
4.
Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the securitised exposures are exposures on or exposures
fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by:
(a) central governments or central banks;
(b) regional governments, local authorities and public sector entities within the meaning
of Article 4, paragraph 1, point (8) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
of Member States;
(c) institutions to which a 50% risk weight or less is assigned under Part Three, Title II,
Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(d) the multilateral development banks listed in Article 117 of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013.
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5.
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions based on a clear, transparent and accessible
index, where the underlying reference entities are identical to those that make up an index
of entities that is widely traded, or are other tradable securities other than securitisation
positions.deleted
6.
The European Banking Authority (EBA), in close cooperation with the European
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify
in greater detail the risk retention requirement, in particular with regards to:
(a) the modalities of retaining risk pursuant to paragraph 2, including the fulfilment
through a synthetic or contingent form of retention;
(b) the measurement of the level of retention referred to in paragraph 1;
(c) the prohibition of hedging or selling the retained interest;
(d) the conditions for retention on a consolidated basis in accordance with paragraph 3
(e) the conditions for exempting transactions based on a clear, transparent and accessible
index referred to in paragraph 5deleted.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [
six
months after entry into force of this Regulation].
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to
in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010.
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Article 5
Transparency requirements for originators, sponsors and SSPE's
1.
The originator, sponsor and SSPE of a securitisation shall, in accordance with paragraph 2
of this Article, make at least the following information available to holders of a
securitisation position, and to the competent authorities referred to in Article 15 and to
potential investors of this Regulation:
(a) information on the underlying exposures on a quarterly basis, or, in the case of
ABCP, information on the underlying receivables or credit claims on a monthly
basis;
(b) all underlying documentation that is essential for the understanding of the
transaction, including but not limited to, where applicable, the following documents:
(i) the final offering document or the prospectus together with the closing
transaction documents, excluding legal opinions;
(ii) for traditional securitisation the asset sale agreement, assignment, novation or
transfer agreement and any relevant declaration of trust;
(iii) the derivatives and guarantees agreements and any relevant documents on
collateralisation arrangements where the exposures being securitised remain
exposures of the originator;
(iv) the servicing, back-up servicing, administration and cash management
agreements;
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link to page 25
(v) the trust deed, security deed, agency agreement, account bank agreement,
guaranteed investment contract, incorporated terms or master trust framework
or master definitions agreement or such legal documentation with equivalent
legal value;
(vi) any relevant inter-creditor agreements, derivatives documentation,
subordinated loan agreements, start-up loan agreements and liquidity facility
agreements;
(vii)
deleted
Thoese documents shall include a detailed description of the priority of payments of
the securitisation;
(c) where a prospectus has not been drawn up in compliance with Directive 2003/71/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council
8, a transaction summary or overview
of the main features of the securitisation, including, where applicable:
(i) details regarding the structure of the deal, including the structure diagrams
containing an overview of the transaction, the cash flows and the ownership
structure;
(ii) details regarding the exposure characteristics, cash flows, credit enhancement
and liquidity support features;
(iii) details regarding the voting rights of the holders of a securitisation position and
their relationship to other secured creditors;
8
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to
trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 64).
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link to page 26
(iv) a list of all triggers and events referred to in the documents provided in
accordance with point (b) that could have a material impact on the performance
of the securitisation position;
(v)
deleted
(d) in the case of STS securitisations, the STS notification referred to in Article 14,
paragraph( 1) of this Regulation;
(e) quarterly investor reports, or in the case of ABCP, monthly investor reports,
containing the following:
(i) all materially relevant data on the credit quality and performance of underlying
exposures;
(ii) in the case of a securitisation which is not an ABCP transaction, data on the
cash flows generated by the underlying exposures and by the liabilities of the
securitisation, and, in the case of any securitisation, information on the breach
of any triggers implying changes in the priority of payments or replacement of
any counterparties;
(iii) information about the risk retained in accordance with Article 4;
(f) any inside information relating to the securitisation that the originator, sponsor or
SSPE is obliged to make public in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No
596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council
9 on insider dealing and
market manipulation;
9
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 1).
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(g) where point (f) does not apply, any significant event such as:
(i) a material breach of the obligations laid down in the documents provided in
accordance with point (b), including any remedy, waiver or consent
subsequently provided in relation to such a breach;
(ii) a change in the structural features that can materially impact the performance
of the securitisation;
(iii) a change in the risk characteristics of the securitisation or of the underlying
exposures that can materially impact the performance of the securitisation;
(iv) in the case of STS securitisations, where the securitisation ceases to meet the
STS requirements or where competent authorities have taken remedial or
administrative actions;
(v) any material amendment to transaction documents.
The information described in points (b), (c) and (d) shall be made available without delay
after the closing of the transaction at the latest.
The information described in points (a) and (e) shall be made available at the same
moment each quarter at the latest one month after the due date for the payment of interest
or in the case of ABCP transactions, at the latest one month after the end of the period of
time the report covers.
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, the information described in points (f) and (g) shall be made available without
delay.
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When complying with this paragraph, the originator, sponsor and SSPE of a securitisation
shall comply with national and Union lawegislation governing the protection of
confidentiality of information sources andor the processing of personal data in order to
avoid potential breaches of such legislation as well as any confidentiality obligation
relating to customer, original lender or debtor information, unless such confidential
information is anonymised or aggregated. In particular, with regard to the information
referred to in point (b) the originator, sponsor and SSPE may provide a sum-up of the
concerned documentation. Competent authorities referred to in Article 15 shall be able to
request the provision of such confidential information to them in order to fulfil their duties
under this Regulation.
2.
The originator, sponsor and SSPE of a securitisation shall designate amongst themselves
one entity to fulfil the information requirements pursuant to paragraph 1. The originator,
sponsor and SSPE shall ensure that the information is available free of charge to the holder
of a securitisation position, and competent authorities and, upon request, to potential
investors, in a timely and clear manner. The entity designated to fulfil the requirements set
out in paragraph 1 shall make the information available by means of a website which may
be password protected and shall;
(a) develop a well-functioning data quality control system;
(b) respect appropriate governance standards and ensure the maintenance and operation
of an adequate organisational structure to ensure continuity and orderly functioning;
(c) set up appropriate systems, controls and procedures to ensure that the website can
fulfil its function in a reliable and secure manner and to identify sources of
operational risk;
(d) develop systems to ensure the protection and integrity of the information received
and the prompt recording of the information;
(e) ensure that the information will be available for at least 5 years after the maturity
date of the securitisation.
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The entity designated to fulfil the requirements set out in paragraph 1, and the website where
the information is made available shall be indicated in the final offering documents or
prospectus of the securitisation.
3.
ESMA, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, shall develop draft regulatory
technical standards to specify:
(a) the information that the originator, sponsor and SSPE shallould provide in order to
comply with their obligations under paragraph 1 points (a) and (e) of paragraph 1 and
the format thereof by means of standardised templates taking into account the
usefulness of information for the holder of the securitisation position, whether the
securitisation position is of a short term nature and, in the case of an ABCP
transaction, whether it is fully supported by a sponsor;
(b) the requirements to be met by the website referred to in paragraph 2 on which the
information shall be made available to holders of securitisation positions and to
competent authorities, in particular with regard to:
–
the governance structure of the website and the modalities to access
information;
–
the internal procedures to ensure the well-functioning, operational robustness
and integrity of the website and of the stored information;
–
the procedures in place in order to ensure quality and accuracy of the
information.
ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [
one
year after entry into force of this Regulation].
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred
to in this paragraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
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Article 5a
Criteria for credit- granting
Originators, sponsors and original lenders shall apply to exposures to be securitised the
same sound and well-defined criteria for credit- granting to exposures to be securitised as
which they apply to non-securitised exposures not securitised. To this end the same clearly
established processes for approving and, where relevant, amending, renewing and re-
financing credits shall be applied. Originators, sponsors and original lenders shall have
effective systems in place to apply thoese criteria and processes which in order to ensure
that credit- granting is based on a thorough assessment of the obligor’s creditworthiness
taking appropriate account of factors relevant to verifying the prospect of the obligor to
meet his obligations under the credit agreement.
Where an originator purchases a third party’s exposures for its own account and then
securitises them, such that originator shall ensure that the entity that which was, directly or
indirectly, involved in the original agreement which created the obligations or potential
obligations to be securitised fulfills the requirements in accordance with the first
subparagraph.
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Chapter 3
Simple, transparent and standardised securitisation
Article 6
Use of the designation 'simple, transparent and standardised securitisation'
Originators, sponsors and SSPEs may onlyshall use the designation "STS" or “simple, transparent
and standardised” or a designation that refers directly or indirectly to these terms for their
securitisation only where:
(a) the securitisation meets all the requirements of Section 1 or Section 2 of this Chapter, and
they have notified ESMA pursuant to Article 14, paragraph (1); and
(b) the relevant securitisation has been included in the list referred to in Article 14, paragraph
(4).
Where points (a) and (b) are satisfied, a securitisation shall be considered STS.
The originator, sponsor and SSPE involved in a securitisation considered STS shall be established
within the Union.
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SECTION 1
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-ABCP STS SECURITISATION
Article 7
Simple, transparent and standardised securitisation
Securitisations, except ABCP transactions, that meet the requirements in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of this
Regulation shall be considered STS. The originator, sponsor and SSPE involved in a securitisation
considered STS shall be established within the Union.
Article 8
Requirements relating to simplicity
1.
The title to the underlying exposures shall be acquired by the SSPE by means of a true sale
or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect in a manner that is enforceable against
the seller or any other third party and is not subject to severe any clawback provisions in the
event of the seller's insolvency. without prejudice to the conditions laid down under
applicable provisions of national insolvency law. A legal opinion provided by a qualified
legal counsel may confirm the true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect
of the underlying exposures and the enforceability of such true sale or assignment or transfer
with the same legal effect under the applicable law.
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Where the seller is not the original lender, the true sale or assignment or transfer with the
same legal effect of the underlying exposures to the seller, whether suchthat true sale or
assignment or transfer with the same legal effect is direct or through one or more
intermediate steps, shall meet the requirements set out in the first sub-paragraph.
Where the transfer of the underlying exposures is performed by means of an assignment and
perfected at a later stage than at the closing of the transaction, the triggers to effect such
perfection shallshould, at a minimum, incorporate the following events:
(a) severe deterioration in the seller credit quality standing;
(b) insolvency of the seller; and
(c) unremedied breaches of contractual obligations by the seller, including the seller’s
default.
2.
The underlying exposures included in the securitisation shall not be encumbered or
otherwise in a condition that can be foreseen to adversely affect the enforceability of the
true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect.
3.
The underlying exposures transferred from, or assigned by, the seller to the SSPE shall
meet unambiguous predetermined and clearly documented eligibility criteria which do not
allow for active portfolio management of those exposures on a discretionary basis.
Substitution of exposures that are in breach of representations and warranties shall in
principle not be considered active portfolio management. Exposures transferred to the
SSPE after the closing of the transaction shall meet eligibility criteria that are not less strict
than those applied to the initial underlying exposures.
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4.
The securitisation shall be backed by a pool of underlying exposures that are homogeneous
in terms of asset type, such as pools of residential loans, pools of corporatecommercial
loans, leases and credit facilities to undertakings of the same category to finance capital
expenditures or business operations, pools of auto loans and leases to borrowers or lessees
or loans and pools of credit facilities to individuals for personal, family or household
consumption purposes. A pool of underlying exposures shall only comprise one asset type.
The underlying exposures shall be contractually legal, valid, binding and enforceable
obligations with full recourse to debtors and, where applicable, guarantors. The underlying
exposures shall have , with defined periodic payment streams relating to rental, principal,
interest payments, or related to any other right to receive income from assets
supportingwarranting such payments. The underlying exposures shall not include
transferable securities listed on a trading venue, as defined in Directive 2014/65/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council.
5.
The underlying exposures shall not include any securitisation position.
6.
The underlying exposures shall be originated in the ordinary course of the originator’s or
original lender's business pursuant to underwriting standards that are not less stringent than
those that the originator or original lender applied at the time of origination to similar
exposures that are not securitised. Material changes in underwriting standards shall be fully
disclosed without undue delay to potential investors. In the case of securitisations where
the underlying exposures are residential loans, the pool of loans shall not include any loan
that was marketed and underwritten on the premise that the loan applicant or, where
applicable intermediaries, were made aware that the information provided might not be
verified by the lender.
The assessment of the borrower's creditworthiness shall , where applicable , meet the
requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4, 5, point (a) of paragraph 5, and paragraph 6 of
Article 18 of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council or of
Article 8 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council or, where
applicable, equivalent requirements in third countries.
The originator or original lender shall have experience in originating exposures of a
similar nature to those securitised. Any changes in credit-granting policies or criteria shall
not lead to material deterioration in underwriting standards. The underwriting standards
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pursuant to which the underlying exposures are originated and any material changes to
them shall be fully disclosed without undue delay to potential investors.
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7.
The underlying exposures, at the time of transfer or assignment to the SSPE, shall not
include exposures in default within the meaning of Article 178, paragraph (1) of
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or exposures to a credit-impaired debtor or guarantor, who,
to the best knowledge of the originator or original lender:
(a) has beendeclared insolvency declared insolvent or had a court grant his creditors a
final non-appealable right of enforcement or material damages as a result of a missed
payment within three years prior to the date of origination or has undergone a debt-
restructuring process with regard to his non-performing exposures within three years
prior to the date of transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE,
except if:
(i) a restructured underlying exposure has not presented new arrears since the date of
the restructuring which must have taken place at least one year prior to the date of
transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE; and
(ii) the information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 1, points (a) and (e)(i) explicitly sets out the proportion of
restructured underlying exposures, the time and details of the restructuring as well as
their performance since the date of the restucturing;
(b) was, at the time of origination, and where applicable, on a nationalpublic credit
registry of persons with adverse credit history or other credit registry that is publicly
available to the originator or original lender;
(c) has a credit assessment or a credit score indicating that the risk of contractually
agreed payments not be made is significantly higher than for similar exposures held
by the originator which are not securitised.
8.
The debtors or the guarantors shall have, at the time of transfer of the exposureswhere the
securitisation is structured, made at least one payment, except in case of revolving
securitisations backed by personal overdraft facilities, credit card receivables, trade
receivables and dealer floorplan finance loans or securitisations backed by exposures
payable in a single instalment.
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9.
The repayment of the holders of the securitisation positions shall not depend,
predominantly, on the sale of assets securing the underlying exposures. This shall not
prevent such assets from being subsequently rolled-over or refinanced.
Article 9
Requirements relating to standardisation
1.
The originator, sponsor or original lender shall satisfy the risk retention requirement in
accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation.
2.
Interest rate and currency mismatches arising at transaction level shall be appropriately
mitigated and any measures taken to that effect shall be disclosed. The SSPE shall not
enter into derivatives, unless for the purpose of hedging currency risk and or interest rate
risk. Those derivatives shall be underwritten and documented according to common
standards in international finance.
3.
Any referenced interest payments under the securitisation assets and liabilities shall be
based on generally used market interest rates or sectoral rates reflective of the cost of funds
and shall not reference complex formulae or derivatives.
4.
Where the securitisation has been set up without a revolving period or the revolving period
has terminated and where an enforcement or an acceleration notice has been delivered:
(a) no amount of cash shall be trapped in the SSPE beyond what is necessary to ensure
the operational functioning of the SSPE or the orderly repayment of investors in
accordance with the contractual terms of the securitisation, unless exceptional
circumstances require that trapped amount is trapped in order to be used, in the best
interests of investors, for expenses that will avoid the deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying exposures;
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(b) principal receipts from the underlying exposures shall be passed to investors via
sequential amortisation of the securitisation positions, as determined by the seniority
of the securitisation position. Repayment of the securitisation positions shall not be
reversed with regard to their seniority. Transactions which feature non-sequential
priority of payments shall include triggers relating to the performance of the
underlying exposures resulting in the priority of payments reverting to sequential
payments in order of seniority. Such performance-related triggers shall include at
least the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures below a pre-
determined threshold; and
(c) there shall be no provisions requiring automatic liquidation of the underlying
exposures at market value.
Transactions which feature non-sequential priority of payments shall include triggers relating
to the performance of the underlying exposures resulting in the priority of payments reverting
to sequential payments in order of seniority. Such performance-related triggers shall include
at least the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures below a pre-
determined threshold.
5.
The transaction documentation shall include appropriate early amortisation events or
triggers for termination of the revolving period where the securitisation is ahas been set up
with a revolving securitisationperiod, including at least the following:
(a) a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures to or below a pre-
determined threshold;
(b) the occurrence of an insolvency-related event with regard to the originator or the
servicer;
(c) the value of the underlying exposures held by the SSPE falls below a pre-determined
threshold (early amortisation event);
(d) a failure to generate sufficient new underlying exposures that meet the pre-
determined credit quality (trigger for termination of the revolving period).
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6.
The transaction documentation shall clearly specify:
(a) the contractual obligations, duties and responsibilities of the servicer and, where
applicable, other ancillary service providers and the trustee;
(b) the processes and responsibilities necessary to ensure that a default or insolvency of
the servicer does not result in a termination of servicing which may include a
replacement clause which enables the replacement of the servicer in case of default
or insolvency in the servicing contract;
(c) provisions that ensure the replacement of derivative counterparties, liquidity
providers and the account bank upon their default or, insolvency, and other specified
events, where applicable.
6a. The servicer shall have experience in servicing exposures of a similar nature to those
securitised and shall have well documented policies, procedures and risk management
controls relating to the servicing of exposures.
7.
The transaction documentation shall clearly set out definitions, remedies and actions
relating to the performance of the underlying exposures. The transaction documentation
shall clearly specify the priorities of payment, events which trigger changes in such
priorities of payment as well as the obligation to report such events. Any change in the
priority of payments shall be reported to investors without undue delay.
8.
The transaction documentation shall include clear provisions that facilitate the timely
resolution of conflicts between different classes of investors, voting rights shall be clearly
defined and allocated to noteholders and the responsibilities of the trustee and other entities
with fiduciary duties to investors shall be clearly identified.
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Article 10
Requirements relating to transparency
1.
The originator, sponsor, and SSPE shall provide access to data on static and dynamic
historical default and loss performance, such as delinquency and default data, for
substantially similar exposures to those being securitised to the potential investors before
pricing. Those data shall cover a period no shorter than five years, except for trade
receivables amnd other short term receivables for which the historical period shall be no
shorter than a period of three years. The sources of the data and the basis for claiming
similarity shall be disclosed.
2.
A sample of the underlying exposures shall be subject to external verification prior to
issuance of the securities resulting from the securitisation by an appropriate and
independent party, such as a statutory auditor as defined in Directive 2006/43/EC,
including verification that the data disclosed in respect of the underlying exposures is
accurate, with a confidence level of 95%.
3.
The originator or sponsor shall provide or procure a liability cash flow model to potential
investors, both before the pricing of the securitisation and after pricing shall provide such a
model to investors on an ongoing basis and to potential investors upon request.
4.
The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall be jointly responsible for compliancecomply with
Article 5 of this Regulation. Theyand shall make all information on underlying exposures
transferred or assigned to the SSPErequired by Article 5, paragraph 1, point (a) available
to potential investors before pricing. The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall make the
information required by Article 5, paragraph 1, points (b) to (e) of Article 5(1) of this
Regulation available before pricing at least in draft or initial form, where permissible under
Article 3 of Directive 2003/71/EC. The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall make the final
documentation available to investors at the latest 15 days after closing of the transaction.
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SECTION 2
REQUIREMENTS FOR ABCP STS SECURITISATION
Article 11
Simple, transparent and standardised ABCP securitisation
An ABCP transaction shall be considered STS where it complies with the transaction level
requirements in Article 12.
An ABCP programme shall be considered STS where it complies with the requirements in Article
13 and the sponsor of the ABCP programme complies with the requirements in Article 12a.
For the purpose of this section, a “seller” means “originator” or “original lender”.
Article 12
Transaction level requirements
1.
A transaction within an ABCP programme shall meet the requirements in this Article to be
considered as STS.
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1a.
The title to the underlying exposures shall be acquired by the SSPE by means of a true sale
or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect in a manner that is enforceable against
the seller or any other third party and is not subject to severeany clawback provisions in the
event of the seller's insolvency without prejudice to the conditions laid down under
applicable provisions of national insolvency law. A legal opinion provided by a qualified
legal counsel may confirm the true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect
of the underlying exposures and the enforceability of such true sale or assignment or
transfer with the same legal effect under the applicable law.
Where the seller is not the original lender, the true sale or assignment or transfer with the
same legal effect of the underlying exposures to the seller, whether such that true sale or
assignment or transfer with the same legal effect is direct or through one or more
intermediate steps, shall meet the requirements set out in the first sub-paragraph.
Where the transfer of the underlying exposures is performed by means of an assignment
and perfected at a later stage than at the closing of the transaction, the triggers to effect
such that perfection shallhould, at a minimum, incorporate the following events:
(a) severe deterioration in the seller credit quality standing;
(b) insolvency of the seller; and
(c) unremedied breaches of contractual obligations by the seller, including the seller’s
default.
1b.
The underlying exposures included in the securitisation shall not be encumbered or
otherwise in a condition that can be foreseen to adversely affect the enforceability of the true
sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect.
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1c.
The underlying exposures transferred from, or assigned by, the seller to the SSPE shall meet
unambiguous predetermined and clearly documented eligibility criteria which do not allow
for active portfolio management of those exposures on a discretionary basis. Substitution of
exposures that are in breach of representations and warranties shall in principle not be
considered active portfolio management. Exposures transferred to the SSPE after closing of
the transaction shall meet eligibility criteria that are not less strict than those applied to the
initial underlying exposures.
1d.
The underlying exposures shall not include any securitisation position.
1e.
The underlying exposures, at the time of transfer to the SSPE, shall not include exposures in
default within the meaning of Article 178, paragraph (1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or
exposures to a credit-impaired debtor or guarantor, who, to the best knowledge of the
originator or original lender:
(a) has been declared insolvency insolvent or had a court grant his creditors a final non-
appealable right of enforcement or material damages as a result of a missed payment
within three years prior to the date of origination or has undergone a debt restructuring
process with regard to his non-performing exposures within three years prior to the date
of transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE, except if:
(i) a restructured underlying exposure has not presented new arrears since the date of the
restructuring which must have taken place at least one year prior to the date of transfer
or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE; and
(ii) the information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 1, points (a) and (e)(i) explicitly sets out the proportion of
restructured underlying exposures, the time and details of the restructuring as well as
their performance since the date of the restructuring;
(b)
was, at the time of origination, and where applicable, on a national public credit
registry of persons with adverse credit history or other credit registry that is publicly
available to the originator or original lender;
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(c)
has a credit assessment or a credit score indicating that the risk of contractually
agreed payments not be made is significantly higher than for similar exposures held
by the originator which are not securitised.
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1f.
The debtors or the guarantors shall have, at the time of transfer of the exposures where the
securitisation is structured, made at least one payment, except in the case of revolving
securitisations backed by personal overdraft facilities, credit- card receivables, trade
receivables and dealer floorplan finance loans or securitisations backed by exposures
payable in a single instalment.
1g.
The repayment of the holders of the securitisation positions shall not depend,
predominantly, on the sale of assets securing the underlying exposures. This shall not
prevent such assets from being subsequently rolled-over or refinanced.
1h.
Interest rate and currency mismatches arising at transaction level shall be appropriately
mitigated. The SSPE shall not enter into derivatives, unless for the purpose of hedging
currency risk and or interest rate risk. Those derivatives shall be underwritten and
documented in accordance withaccording to common standards in international finance.
1i.
The transaction documentation shall clearly set out definitions, remedies and actions
relating to the performance of the underlying exposures. The transaction documentation
shall clearly specify the priorities of payment, events which trigger changes in such
priorities of payment as well as the obligation to report such events. Any change in the
priority of payments shall be reported to investors without undue delay.
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1j.
The originator, sponsor, and SSPE shall provide access to data on static and dynamic
historical default and loss performance, such as delinquency and default data, for
substantially similar exposures substantially similar to those being securitised to the
potential investors before pricing. Where the sponsor does not have access to such data, it
shall obtain from the seller access to data on a static or dynamic basis, historical
performance, such as delinquency and default data, for substantially similar exposures
substantially similar to those being securitised. Those data shall cover a period no shorter
than five years, except for trade receivables and other short term receivables for which the
historical period shall be no shorter than a period of three years. The sources of the data
and the basis for claiming similarity shall be disclosed.
2.
Transactions within an ABCP programme shall be backed by a pool of underlying
exposures that are homogeneous in terms of asset type, such as pools of trade receivables,
pools of corporatecommercial loans, leases and credit facilities to undertakings of the same
category to finance capital expenditures or business operations, pools of auto loans and
leases to borrowers or lessees or loans and pools of credit facilities to individuals for
personal, family or household consumption purposes. A pool of underlying exposures shall
only comprise one asset type.
.
The pool of underlying exposures shall have a remaining weighted average life of not more
than onetwo years and none of the underlying exposures shall have a residual maturity of
longer than three years, except for pools of auto loans, auto leases and equipment lease
transactions which shall have a remaining exposure weighted average life of not more than
four[ X ] years and none of the underlying exposures shall have a residual maturity of
longer than seven[ Y ] years.
The underlying exposures shall not include loans secured by residential or commercial
mortgages or fully guaranteed residential loans, as referred to in paragraph 1, point (e) of
Article 129(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. The underlying exposures shall contain
contractually binding and enforceable obligations with full recourse to debtors with
defined payment streams relating to rental, principal, interest, or related to any other right
to receive income from assets warranting such payments. The underlying exposures shall
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not include transferable securities listed on a trading venue, as defined in Directive
2014/65/EU.
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3.
Any referenced interest payments under the ABCP transaction's assets and liabilities shall
be based on generally used market interest rates, but shall not reference complex formulae
or derivatives. Payments on the liabilities of the ABCP transaction may include interest
rates reflective of an ABCP programme’s cost of funds.
4.
Following the seller’s default or an acceleration event, no substantial amount of cash shall
be trapped in the SSPE beyond what is necessary to ensure the operational functioning of
the SSPE or the orderly repayment of investors in accordance with the contractual terms of
the securitisation. Principal receipts from the underlying exposures shall be passed to
investors holding a securitisation position via sequential payment of the securitisation
positions, as determined by the seniority of the securitisation position, unless exceptional
circumstances requires that trapped amount is trapped in order to be is used, in the best
interests of investors, for expenses that will avoid the deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying exposures. There shall be no provisions requiring automatic liquidation of
the underlying exposures at market value.
5.
The underlying exposures shall be originated in the ordinary course of the seller's business
pursuant to underwriting standards that are not less stringent than those that the seller
applies to origination of similar exposures that are not securitised. Material changes in
underwriting standards shall be disclosed to the sponsor and other parties directly exposed
to the ABCP transaction without undue delay. The seller shall have experience in
originating exposures of a similar nature to those securitised.
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6.
Where an ABCP transaction is a revolving securitisation, the transaction documentation
shall include triggers for termination of the revolving period, including at least the
following:
(a) a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures to or below a pre-
determined threshold;
(b) the occurrence of an insolvency-related event with regard to the seller or the servicer.
7.
The transaction documentation shall clearly specify:
(a) the contractual obligations, duties and responsibilities of the sponsor, the servicer and
where applicable, the trustee and other ancillary service providers;
(b) the processes and responsibilities necessary to ensure that a default or insolvency of
the servicer does not result in a termination of servicing;
(c) provisions that ensure the replacement of derivative counterparties and the account
bank upon their default, insolvency or other specified events, where applicable;
(d) how the sponsor meets the requirements of Article 12a, paragraph 3.
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Article 12a
Sponsor of an ABCP programme
1.
The sponsor of the ABCP programme shall be a credit institution supervised under Directive
2013/36/EU.
2.
The sponsor of an ABCP programme shall be a liquidity facility provider and shall support
all securitisation positions on an ABCP programme level by covering all liquidity and credit
risks and any material dilution risks of the securitised exposures as well as any other
transaction costs and programme-wide costs with such support. The sponsor shall disclose a
description of the support provided at transaction level to the investors including a
description of the liquidity facilities provided.
3.
The sponsor of the ABCP programme shall verify before becoming exposed to an ABCP
transaction that, the seller grants all its credits on the basis of sound and well-defined criteria
and clearly established processes for approving, amending, renewing and financing those
credits and has effective systems in place to apply thoese criteria and processes. The sponsor
shall perform its own due diligence and verify that the seller meets sound underwriting
standards, servicing capabilities and collection processes that meet the requirements
specified in points (i) to (m) of Article 259(3), paragraph 3 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
or equivalent requirements in third countries. Policies, procedures and risk management
controls shall be well documented and effective systems shall be in place.
4.
The seller, at the level of a transaction, or the sponsor, at the level of the ABCP programme,
shall satisfy the risk retention requirement in accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation.
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5.
Article 5 of this Regulation shall apply to ABCP programmes. The sponsor of the ABCP
programme shall be responsible for compliance with Article 5 and shall :
(a)
make all aggregated information required by Article 5, paragraph 1, point (a) of
Article 5(1), available to investors, such information being updated on a quarterly
basis ;
(b) make the information required by Article 5, paragraph 1, points (b) to (e) of Article
5(1) of this Regulation, available, where permissible under Article 3 of Directive
2003/71/EC, in a timely manner.
6.
In the event thatcase thethe sponsor does not renew the funding commitment of the liquidity
facility before or within 30 days of its expiry, the liquidity facility shall be drawn down and
the maturing securities shall be repaid.
Article 13
Programme level requirements
1.
All transaction within an ABCP programme shall fulfil the requirements of Article 12 (1a),
(1b), (1c), (1d), (1h), (1i), (1j), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7).
At all times, at least 98%[ Z% ] of the aggregate amount of all transactions within an ABCP
programme shall fulfil the requirements of Article 12 (1e), (1f), (1g) and (2) of this
Regulation.
For the purpose of the second subparagraph, a sample of the underlying exposures shall
regularly be subject to external verification of compliance by an appropriate and independent
party, such as a statutory auditor as defined in Directive 2006/43/EC, with a confidence level
of 95%.
1a. The remaining weighted average life of the underlying exposures of an ABCP programme
shall not be more than two years.
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2.
deleted
2a.
The ABCP programme shall be fully supported by a sponsor in accordance with Article
12a, paragraph( 2).
3.
The ABCP programme shall not contain any re-securitisation and the credit enhancement
shall not establish a second layer of tranching at the programme level.
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4.
deleted
5.
The securities issued by an ABCP programme shall not include call options, extension
clauses or other clauses, at the discretion of the originator, sponsor or SSPE, that have an
effect on their final maturity.
6.
Interest rate and currency mismatches arising at ABCP programme level shall be
appropriately mitigated and any measures taken to that effect shall be disclosed.
Derivatives shall only be used at programme level for the purpose of hedging currency risk
and interest rate risk. Such derivatives shall be documented according to common
standards in international finance.
7.
The documentation relating to the ABCP programme shall clearly specify:
(a) where applicable, the responsibilities of the trustee and other entities with fiduciary
duties to investors;
(b) provisions that facilitate the timely resolution of conflicts between the sponsor and
the holders of securitisation positions;
(c) contractual obligations, duties and responsibilities of the sponsor who shall have
experience in credit underwriting and, where applicable, trustee and other ancillary
service providers;
(d) processes and responsibilities necessary to ensure that a default or insolvency of the
servicer does not result in a termination of servicing;
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(e) provisions for replacement of derivative counterparties, and the account bank at
ABCP programme level upon their default, insolvency and other specified events,
where applicable.;
(f) that upon specified events, default or insolvency of the sponsor remedial steps shall
be provided for to achieve, as appropriate, collateralisation of the funding
commitment or replacement of the liquidity facility provider.
7a.
The servicer shall have experience in servicing exposures of a similar nature to those
securitised and shall have well documented policies, procedures and risk management
controls relating to the servicing of exposures.
8.
deleted
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SECTION 3
STS notificationoption 1
[
Article 14
STS notification requirements and ESMA website
1. 1.
The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall jointly notify ESMA by means of the template
referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article that the securitisation meets the requirements of
Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation ('STS notification'). The STS
notification shall include an explanation concise justification by the originator, sponsor and
SSPE of howregarding the compliance with each of the STS criteria set out in Articles 8 to
10 or Articles 12 and 13 has been complied with. ESMA shall publish the STS notification
on its official website pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article. The originator, sponsor and
SSPE shall also inform their competent authoritiesy. The originator, sponsor and SSPE of a
securitisation and shall designate amongst themselves one entity to be the first contact point
for investors and competent authorities.
1a. Where the originator, sponsor and SSPE use the service ofrely on a third party authorised
pursuant to Article 14a to assess whethercheck that a securitisation complies with Articles 7
to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation, the STS notification shall include a statement
that the compliance with the STS criteria was confirmedchecked by that authorised third
party. The notification shall include the name of the authorised third party, its place of
establishment [OPTION 2B: and the name of the competent authority that authorised it].
2.
Where the originator or original lender is not a credit institution or investment firm as
defined in Article 4, paragraph 1, points (1) and (2) of Article 4(1) of Regulation No
575/2013 established in the Union, the notification pursuant to paragraph 1of this
Regulation shall be accompanied by the following:
(a) confirmation by the originator or original lender that its credit-granting is done on the
basis of sound and well-defined criteria and clearly established processes for
approving, amending, renewing and financing credits and that the originator or
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original lender has effective systems in place to apply such processes in accordance
with Article 5a of this Regulation.
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(b) confirmation by the originator or original lender as toa declaration on whether the
elements mentioned in point (a) are subject to supervision.
3.
The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall immediately notify ESMA and their competent
authority when a securitisation no longer meets the requirements of either Articles 7 to 10
or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation.
4.
ESMA shall maintain a list of all securitisations for which the originators, sponsors and
SSPEs have notified that they meet the requirements of Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13
of this Regulation on its official website. ESMA shall update the list where the
securitisations are no longer considered to be STS following a decision of competent
authorities or a notification by the originator, sponsor or SSPE. Where the competent
authority has imposed administrative sanctions or remedial measures in accordance with
Article 17, it shall immediately notify ESMA thereof. ESMA shall immediately indicate on
the list that a competent authority has imposed administrative sanctions or remedial
measures in relation to the securitisation concerned.
5.
ESMA, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, shall develop draft implementing
technical standards that specifying the format which the information referred to inthat the
originator, sponsor and SSPE provide to comply with their obligations under paragraph 1
and shall provide the format by means of standardised templates.
ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by
[three
six months after entry into force of this Regulation].
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards
referred to in this paragraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15 of
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.]
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Article 14a
Third party verifying STS compliance
1.
A third party referred to in Article 14 paragraph (1a) shall be authorised by [OPTION 2A:
ESMA][OPTION 2B: the competent authority] to assess the compliance of securitisations
with the STS criteria laid down in Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation.
[OPTION 2A: ESMA][OPTION 2B: tThe competent authority] shall grant the
authorisation if the following conditions are met:
(a) the third party operates on a not-for-profit basis. It may only charges non-
discriminatory and cost-based fees to the originators, sponsors or SSPEs involved in
the securitisations which the third party assessesexamines, sufficient to cover the
expenditure relating to the assessment of the compliance with STS criteria without
differentiating fees depending on, or correlated to, the results of its assessment;
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(b) the third party is established for the sole purpose of assessing the compliance with
STS criteria; the third party is not a regulated entity as defined in Article 2(4) of
Directive 2002/87/EC and the performance of the third party’s other activities shall
not compromise the independence or integrity of its assessment;
(ba) the third party shall not provide any form of advisory, audit or equivalent service to
the originator, sponsor or SSPE involved in the securitisations which the third party
assesses;
(c) the members of the management body of the third party have professional
qualifications, knowledge and experience that are adequate for the task of the third
party and they are of good repute and integrity;
(d) the management body of the third party includes at least one third, but no less than
two,a majority of independent directors representing experts and investors in the STS
securitisation market;
(e) the third party takes all necessary steps to ensure that the verification of STS
compliance is not affected by any existing or potential conflicts of interest or
business relationship involving the third party, its shareholders or members,
managers, employees or any other natural person whose services are placed at the
disposal or under the control of the third party. To that end, the third party shall
establish, maintain, enforce and document an effective internal control system
governing the implementation of policies and procedures to identify and to prevent
potential conflicts of interest. Potential or existing conflicts of interest which have
been identified shall be eliminated orand mitigated and disclosed without delay.
possible conflicts of interest and The third party shall establish, maintain, enforce
and document adequate procedures and processes to ensure the independence of the
verification assessment of STS compliance. The third party shall periodically
monitor and review those policies and procedures in order to evaluate their
effectiveness and assess whether they should it is necessary to be updated them ; and
(f) the third party can demonstrate that it has proper operational safeguards and internal
processes that enable it to assess STS compliance.
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[OPTION 2A: ESMA][OPTION 2B: The competent authority] shallmay withdraw the
authorisation when an third party no longer complies with the above conditions.
1a.
A third party authorised in accordance with paragraph 1 shall notify its competent
authority without delay of any material changes to the information provided under that
paragraph, or any other changes that could reasonably be considered to affect the
assessment of its competent authority.
2. 2.
[OPTION 2A: ESMA][OPTION 2B: tThe competent authority] may charge cost-based
fees to the third party referred to in paragraph 1, in order to cover necessary expenditure
relating to the assessment of applications for authorisation and to the subsequent monitoring
of the compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 1. ]
3. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the information to be
provided to the competent authorities in the application for the authorisation of a third party
in accordance with paragraph 1.
ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [six months
after entry into force of this Regulation].
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to
in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No
1095/2010.
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Article 14b
Liability in connection with STS notification
The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall be jointly liable for any losses or damages resulting from a
notification based on an incorrect assessment of the STS criteria. [OPTION 2: Where the originator,
sponsor and SSPE rely on a third party in accordance with Article 14, paragraph 1a to assess the
STS criteria, the third party shall be jointly liable with the originator, sponsor and SSPE for an
incorrect assessment of the STS criteria, except where the third party can prove that its assessment
of the STS criteria was based on fraudulent or incorrect materials submitted to its examination.]
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Chapter 4
Supervision
Article 15
Designation of competent authorities
1.
Compliance with the obligations set out in Article 3 of this Regulation shall be
supervisedensured by the following competent authorities in accordance with the powers
granted by the relevant legal acts:
(a)
for insurance and reinsurance undertakings, the competent authority designated
according to Article 13 (10) of Directive 2009/138/EC;
(b) for alternative investment fund managers, the competent authority designated
according to Article 44 of Directive 2011/61/EU;
(c) for UCITS and UCITS management companies, the competent authority designated
according to Article 97 of Directive 2009/65/EC;
(d) for institutions for occupational retirement provision, the competent authority
designated according to point (g) of Article 6 (g) of Directive 2003/41/EC;
(e) for credit institutions or investments firms, the competent authority designated
according to Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
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2.
Competent authorities responsible for the supervision of sponsors in accordance with
Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall supervise compliance byensure that sponsors
comply with the obligations set out in Articles 4, and 5 and 5a of this Regulation.
3.
Where originators, original lenders and SSPEs are supervised entities in accordance with
Directive 2013/36/EU Directive 2009/138/EC, Directive 2003/41/EC, Directive
2011/61/EU or Directive 2009/65/EC, the relevant competent authorities designated
according to those acts shall superviseensure compliance with the obligations set out in
Articles 4, and 5 and 5a of this Regulation.
4.
For originators, original lenders and SSPEs not covered by the Union legislative acts
referred to in paragraph 3, Member States shall designate one or more competent
authorities to superviseensure compliance with Articles 4, and 5 and 5a of this Regulation.
Member States shall inform the Commission and ESMA of the designation of competent
authorities pursuant to this paragraph by [
one year after the entry into force of this
Regulation].
4a.
Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities to superviseensure
compliance with Articles 6 to 14 [OPTION 2B: and 14a] of this Regulation. Member States
shall inform the Commission and ESMA of the designation of competent authorities
pursuant to this paragraph by [
one year after the entry into force of this Regulation].
4b. Paragraph 4a of this Article shall not apply with regard to corporates selling receivables
under an ABCP programme or another securitisation transaction or scheme. In such a case,
the originator or sponsor shall verify that those corporates fulfil the relevant obligations set
out in Articles 6 to 14 of this Regulation.
5.
ESMA shall publish and keep up-to-date on its official website a list of the competent
authorities referred to in this Article.
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Article 16
Powers of the competent authorities
1.
Each Member State shall ensure that the competent authority, designated in accordance
with Article 15 (1) to (4a) has the supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning powers
necessary to fulfil its duties under this Regulation.
2.
The competent authority shall ensure a regularly review of the arrangements, process and
mechanisms implemented by originators, sponsors, SSPE's and original lenders to comply
with this Regulation.
For all securitisations the review pursuant to the first subparagraph shall in particular
include the processes and mechanisms to correctly measure and retain the material net
economic interest on an ongoing basis, the gathering and timely disclosure of all
information to be made available in accordance with Article 5 and the credit- granting
criteria in accordance with Article 5a.
For STS securitisations which are not a securitisations within an ABCP programme the
review pursuant to the first subparagraph shall in addition particularly include the
processes and mechanisms to ensure compliance with Article 8(, paragraphs 3) and to (8),
Article 9(6), paragraph 6 and Article 10.
For STS securitisations which are securitisations within an ABCP programme the review
pursuant to the first subparagraph shall in addition particularly include the processes and
mechanisms to ensure with regard to ABCP transactions the fulfilment of the requirements
of Article 12 and with regard to ABCP programmes the requirements in accordance with
Article 13(7), paragraphs 7 and (8).
3.
Competent authorities shall ensure require that risks arising from securitisation
transactions, including reputational risks, are evaluated and addressed through appropriate
policies and procedures of originators, sponsors, SSPE's and original lenders.
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Article 17
Administrative sanctions and remedial measures
1.
Without prejudice to the right for Member States to provide for and impose criminal
sanctions pursuant to Article 19 of this Regulation, Member States shall lay down rules
establishing appropriate administrative sanctions and remedial measures applicable at least
to situations where:
(a) an originator, sponsor or original lender has failed to meet the requirements of
Article 4;
(b) an originator, sponsor and SSPE have failed to meet the requirements of Article 5;
(ba) an originator, sponsor and SSPE have failed to meet the requirements of Article 6;
(bb) an originator, sponsor or original lender has failed to meet the requirements of Article
5a;
(c) an originator, sponsor and SSPE have failed to meet the requirements of Articles 7 to
10 or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation;
(d) an orginiator or original lender has failed to meet the requirements of Article 14(,
paragraph 2);
(e) an originator, sponsor and SSPE have failed to meet the requirements of Article 14(,
paragraph 3).
(f) [OPTION 2] A third party authorised pursuant to Article 14a has failed to notify
material changes to the information provided under Article 14a(1), or any other
changes that could reasonably be considered to affect the assessment of its competent
authoritycheck properly the compliance of a securitisation with Articles 7 to 10 or
Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation.
Member States shall also ensure that administrative sanctions and/or remedial measures are
effectively implemented.
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Those sanctions and measures shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
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2.
Member States shall confer on competent authorities the power to apply at least the
following sanctions and measures in the event of the breaches referred to in paragraph 1:
(a) a public statement, which indicates the identity of the natural or legal person and the
nature of the infringement in accordance with Article 22;
(b) an order requiring the natural or legal person to cease the conduct and to desist from
a repetition of that conduct;
(c) a temporary ban against any member of the originator's, sponsor's or SSPE's
management body or any other natural person, who is held responsible, from
exercising management functions in such undertakings;
(d) in case of the infringement referred to in the paragraph 1, point (ba) or (c) of
paragraph 1 of this Article a temporary ban for the originator, sponsor and SSPE to
notify under Article 14(1), paragraph 1 that a securitisation meets the requirements
set out in Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation;
(e) in the case of a natural person, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at
least EUR 5 000 000, or, in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the
corresponding value in the national currency on [
date of entry into force of this
Regulation]
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(f) in the case of a legal person, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least
EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the
corresponding value in the national currency on [date of entry into force of this
Regulation] or of up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover of the legal person
according to the last available accounts approved by the management body; where
the legal person is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of the parent undertaking
which has to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with Directive
2013/34/EU, the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or
the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting
legislative acts according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the
management body of the ultimate parent undertaking;
(g) maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least twice the amount of the
benefit derived from the infringement where that benefit can be determined, even if
that exceeds the maximum amounts in points (e) and (f);
(h) [OPTION 2] in case of the infringement referred to in paragraph 1, point (f) of this
Article, a temporary withdrawal of the authorisation referred to in Article 14a for the
third party to check the compliance of a securitisation with Articles 7 to 10 or
Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation.
3.
Where the provisions referred to in the first paragraph apply to legal persons, Member
States shall provide for competent authorities the power to apply the administrative
sanctions and remedial measures set out in paragraph 2, subject to the conditions laid down
in national law, to members of the management body, and to other individuals who under
national law are responsible for the infringement.
4.
Member States shall ensure that any decision imposing administrative sanctions or
remedial measures set out in paragraph 2 is properly reasoned and is subject to a right of
appeal.
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Article 18
Exercise of the power to impose administrative sanctions and remedial measures
1.
Competent authorities shall exercise the powers to impose administrative sanctions and
remedial measures referred to in Article 17 of this Regulation in accordance with their
national legal frameworks:
(a) directly;
(b) in collaboration with other authorities;
(ba) under their responsibility by delegation to such authorities;
(c) by application to the competent judicial authorities.
2.
Competent authorities, when determining the type and level of an administrative sanction
or remedial measure imposed under Article 17 of this Regulation, shall take into account
all relevant circumstances, including the extent to whichwhether the infringement is
intentional or results from a factual error, and where appropriate:
(a) the materiality, gravity and the duration of the infringement;
(b) the degree of responsibility of the natural or legal person responsible for the
infringement;
(c) the financial strength of the responsible natural or legal person, as indicated for
example by the total turnover of the responsible legal person or the annual income of
the responsible natural person;
(d) the importance of profits gained or losses avoided by the responsible natural or legal
person, insofar as they can be determined;
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(e) the losses for third parties caused by the infringement, insofar as they can be
determined;
(f) the level of cooperation of the responsible natural or legal person with the competent
authority, without prejudice to the need to ensure disgorgement of profits gained or
losses avoided by that person;
(g) previous infringements by the responsible natural or legal person.
Article 19
Provision of criminal sanctions
1.
Member States may decide not to lay down rules for administrative sanctions or remedial
measures for infringements which are subject to criminal sanctions under their national
law.
2.
Where Member States have chosen, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, to lay
down criminal sanctions for the infringement referred to Article 17 (1) of this Regulation,
they shall ensure that appropriate measures are in place so that competent authorities have
all the necessary powers to liaise with judicial, prosecuting, or criminal justice authorities
within their jurisdiction to receive specific information related to criminal investigations or
proceedings commenced for the infringements referred to in Article 17 (1), and to provide
the same information to other competent authorities as well asand ESMA,; EBA and
EIOPA to fulfil their obligation to cooperate for the purposes of this Regulation.
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Article 20
Notification duties
Member States shall notify the laws, regulations and administrative provisions implementing this
Chapter, including any relevant criminal law provisions, to the Commission, ESMA, EBA and
EIOPA by [
one year after entry into force of this Regulation]. Member States shall notify the
Commission, ESMA, EBA and EIOPA without undue delay of any subsequent amendments
thereto.
Article 21
Cooperation between competent authorities and the European Supervisory Authorities
1.
The competent authorities referred to in Article 15 of this Regulation and ESMA, EBA and
EIOPA shall cooperate closely with each other and exchange information to carry out their
duties pursuant to Article 16 to 19.
1a.
Competent authorities shall closely coordinate their supervision in order to identify and
remedy infringements of this Regulation, develop and promote best practice, facilitate
collaboration, aid the consistency of interpretation and provide cross-jurisidictional
assessments in case of any disagreements.
2.
deleted
3.
Where a competent authority finds that this Regulation has been infringed or has reason to
believe so, it shall inform the competent authority of the entity or entities suspected of such
infringement of its findings in a sufficiently detailed manner.
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4.
Where the infringement referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article concerns, in particular, an
incorrect or misleading notification pursuant to Article 14, paragraph (1) of this
Regulation, the competent authority finding that infringement shall notify without delay,
the competent authority of the originator, sponsor and SSPE, as well as ESMA, EBA and
EIOPA of its findings.
5.
Upon receiption of the information referred to in paragraph 3, the competent authority shall
take within 15 working days any necessary action to address the infringement identified
and notify the other competent authorities concerned, in particular those of the originator,
sponsor and SSPE and the competent authorities of the holder of a securitisation position,
when known.
In case the concerned competent authorities agree that the infringement is related to non-
compliance with Article 6 in good faith, they may decide to grant the originator, sponsor
and SSPE a period of up to 3 months to remedy the identified infringement, starting from
the day the originator, sponsor and SSPE were informed of the infringement by the
competent authority. During this period, a securitisation appearing on the list maintained
by ESMA pursuant to Article 14 shall continue to be considered as STS pursuant to
Chapter 3 of this Regulation and shall be maintained on such list.
In case one or more of the competent authorities concerned is of the opinion that the
infringement is not appropriately remedied within the period set out in subparagraph 2,
subparagraph 1 shall apply.
5a.
Where one or more of the competent authorities concerned from different Member States
disagree with the decision under paragraph 5, they shall notify the competent authority
who has taken the action under paragraph 5 of their findings in a sufficiently detailed
manner within 5 working days. Within At the same periodtime they shall notify ESMA,
EBA and EIOPA thereof. The competent authority who has taken the action under
paragraph 5 shall take due consideration of such notification, including whether to revise
the decision made under paragraph 5 within an additional 15 working days.
5b.
In case of persistence of disagreement between competent authorities, the competent
authority of the entity suspected of an infringement referred to in paragraph 3 shall make
its own decision.
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By derogation to the first subparagraph, where such an infringement concerns an incorrect
or misleading notification pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the
decision of the competent authority of the entity referred to in the last sentence ofin
Article 14(, paragraph 1), last sentence shall apply.
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5c.
In the event thatcase any of the competent authorities concerned disagrees with the
decision made in accordance with paragraph 5b of this Article, it may refer the matter to
ESMA and the procedure of Article 19 and, where applicable, Article 20 of Regulation
(EU) No 1095/2010 shall apply. ESMA shall take its decision within one month. In the
absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the competent authority
referred to in paragraph 5b shall apply.
5d.
During the decision process referred to in paragraphs 1 to 5c of this Article, a securitisation
appearing on the list maintained by ESMA pursuant to Article 14 shall continue to be
considered as STS pursuant to Chapter 3 of this Regulation.
6.
ESMA shall, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, develop draft regulatory
technical standards to specify the general cooperation obligation and the information to be
exchanged under paragraph 1 and the notification obligations pursuant to paragraphs 3 and
4.
ESMA shall, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA submit those draft regulatory
technical standards to the Commission [
twelve months after entry into force of this
Regulation].
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred
to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulations (EU) No
1095/2010.
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Article 22
Publication of administrative sanctions and remedial measures
1.
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities publish without undue delay on their
official websites at least any decision imposing an administrative sanction against which
there is no appeal and which are imposed for infringement of Articles 4, 5, 5a or 14(1),
paragraph 1 of this Regulation after the addressee of the sanction has been notified of that
decision.
2.
The publication referred to in paragraph 1 shall include information on the type and nature
of the infringement and the identity of the persons responsible and the sanctions imposed.
3.
Where the publication of the identity, in case of legal persons, or of the identity and
personal data, in the case of natural persons is considered by the competent authority to be
disproportionate following a case-by-case assessment, or where the competent authority
considers that the publication jeopardises the stability of financial markets or an on-going
criminal investigation, or where the publication would cause, insofar as it can be
determined disproportionate damages to the person involved, Member States shall ensure
that competent authorities either:
(a) defer the publication of the decision imposing the administrative sanction until the
moment where the reasons for non-publication cease to exist; or
(b) publish the decision imposing the administrative sanction on an anonymous basis, in
accordance with national law; or
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(c) not publish at all the decision to impose the administrative sanction in the event that
the options set out in points (a) and (b) are considered to be insufficient to ensure:
(i) that the stability of financial markets would not be put in jeopardy;
(ii) the proportionality of the publication of such decisions with regard to measures
which are deemed to be of a minor nature.
4.
In the case of a decision to publish a sanction on an anonymous basis, the publication of
the relevant data may be postponed. Where a competent authority publishes a decision
imposing an administrative sanction against which there is an appeal before the relevant
judicial authorities, competent authorities shall also immediately add on their official
website that information and any subsequent information on the outcome of such appeal.
Any judicial decision annulling a decision imposing an administrative sanction shall also
be published.
5.
Competent authorities shall ensure that any publication referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4
shall remain on their official website for at least five years after its publication. Personal
data contained in the publication shall only be kept on the official website of the competent
authority for the period which is necessary in accordance with the applicable data
protection rules.
6.
Competent authorities shall inform ESMA of all administrative sanctions imposed,
including, where appropriate, any appeal in relation thereto and the outcome thereof.
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7.
ESMA shall maintain a central database of administrative sanctions communicated to it.
That database shall be only accessible to ESMA, EBA, EIOPA and the competent
authorities and shall be updated on the basis of the information provided by the competent
authorities in accordance with paragraph 6.
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Chapter 5
Amendments
Article 23
Amendment to Directive 2009/65/EC
Article 50a of Directive 2009/65/EC is replaced by the following:
UCITS management companies or internally managed UCITS shall act in the best interest of
the investors in the relevant UCITS and take corrective action, if appropriate, where they
discover, after the assumption of an exposure to a securitisation, that the securitisation does
not meet the requirements laid down in Regulation [STS], especially that the determination
and disclosure of the retained interest did not meet the requirements laid down in
Regulation [STS].repealed
Article 24
Amendment to Directive 2009/138/EC
Directive 2009/138/EC is amended as follows:
(1) in Article 135, paragraphs 2 and 3 are replaced by the following
"2. The Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 301a
laying down the specifications for the circumstances under which a proportionate
additional capital charge may be imposed when the requirements laid down in
Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation [the securitisation Regulation] have been breached,
without prejudice to Article 101(3).
3. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation in relation to paragraph 2, EIOPA
shall, subject to Article 301b, develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify
the methodologies for the calculation of a proportionate additional capital charge
referred to therein.
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Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards
referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of
Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010."
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(2) Article 308b(11) is repealed.
Article 25
Amendment to Regulation (EC) No 2009/1060
Regulation (EC) No 2009/1060 is amended as follows:
(1) In recitals 22 and 41, in Articles 8b and 8c and in Annex II, point 1, "structured
finance instrument" is replaced by "securitisation instrument".
(2) In recitals 34 and 40, in Articles 8(4), 8c, 10(3), 39(4) as well as in Annex I, section
A, point 2, paragraph 5, Annex I, section B, point 5, Annex II (title and point 2),
Annex III, Part I, points 8, 24 and 45, Annex III, Part III, point 8, "structured finance
instruments" is replaced by "securitisation instruments".
(3) Iin Article 1 the second subparagraph is replaced by the following
"This Regulation also lays down obligations for issuers and related third parties
established in the Union regarding securitisation instruments."
(4) Iin Article 3, point (l) is replaced by the following:
"(l) ‘securitisation instrument’ means a financial instrument or other assets resulting
from a securitisation transaction or scheme referred to in Article 2 (1) of Regulation
[this Regulation];".
(5)
Article 8b is repealed
(6) In Articles 4(3)(b) and 5(6)(b) the reference to Article 8b is deleted.
(7) In Article 39(5), point (a) is deleted.
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Article 26
Amendment to Directive 2011/61/EU
Article 17 of Directive 2011/61/EU is replaced by the following:
AIFMs shall act in the best interest of the investors in the relevant AIF and take corrective action, if
appropriate, where they discover, after the assumption of an exposure to a securitisation, that the
securitisation does not meet the requirements laid down in Regulation [STS], especially that the
determination and disclosure of the retained interest did not meet the requirements laid down in
Regulation [STS]. repealed
Article 27
Amendment to Regulation (EU) 648/2012
Regulation 648/2012/EU is amended as follows:
(1) in Article 2 points 30 and 31 are added:
"(30) “covered bond” means a bond meeting the requirements of Article 129 of
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013."
(31) “covered bond entity” means the covered bond issuer or cover pool of a covered
bond."
(2) in Article 4 the following paragraphs 5 and 6 are added:
"5. Article 4(1) shall not apply with respect to OTC derivative contracts that are
concluded by covered bond entities in connection with a covered bond, or by a
sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntity in connection with a securitisation, within
the meaning of Regulation [the Securitisation Regulation] provided that:
(a) in the case of sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntities, the sSecuritisation
sSpecial pPurpose eEntity shall solely issue securitisations that meet the
requirements of Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 and Article 6 of Regulation [the
Securitisation Regulation];
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(b) the OTC derivative contract is used only to hedge interest rate or currency
mismatches under the covered bond or securitisation; and
(c) the arrangements under the covered bond or securitisation adequately mitigate
counterparty credit risk with respect to the OTC derivative contracts concluded by
the covered bond entity or sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntity in connection
with the covered bond or securitisation.
6. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, and taking into account the
need to prevent regulatory arbitrage, the ESAs shall develop draft regulatory
technical standards specifying criteria for establishing which arrangements under
covered bonds or securitisations adequately mitigate counterparty credit risk, within
the meaning of paragraph 5.
The ESAs shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission
by [
six months after entry into force of the Securitisation Regulation].
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards
referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010."
(3) in Article 11 paragraph 15 is replaced by the following:
"15. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, the ESAs shall develop
common draft regulatory technical standards specifying:
(a) the risk-management procedures, including the levels and type of collateral and
segregation arrangements, required for compliance with paragraph 3;
(b) the procedures for the counterparties and the relevant competent authorities to be
followed when applying exemptions under paragraphs 6 to 10;
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(c) the applicable criteria referred to in paragraphs 5 to 10 including in particular
what should be considered as a practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer
of own funds and repayment of liabilities between the counterparties.
The level and type of collateral required with respect to OTC derivative contracts
that are concluded by covered bond entities in connection with a covered bond, or by
a sSecuritisation sSpecial pPurpose eEntity in connection with a securitisation within
the meaning of [this Regulation] and meeting the conditions of Artice 4(5) paragraph
5 of this Regulation and the requirements of Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 and
Article 6 of Regulation [the Securitisation Regulation] shall be determined taking
into account any impediments faced in exchanging collateral with respect to existing
collateral arrangements under the covered bond or securitisation.The ESAs shall
submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [
six months
after entry into force of the Securitisation Regulation.]
Depending on the legal nature of the counterparty, power is delegated to the
Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first
subparagraph in accordance with either Articles 10 to 14 of Regulations (EU) No
1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 or (EU) No 1095/2010."
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Chapter 6
Transitional provisions, review and entry into force
Article 28
Transitional provisions
1.
This Regulation shall apply to securitisations the securities of which are issued on or after
[
date of entry into force of this Regulation], subject to paragraphs 2 to 6.
2.
In respect of securitisation positions outstanding as of [
date of entry into force of this
Regulation], originators, sponsors and SSPEs may use the designation 'STS' or 'simple,
transparent and standardised' or a designation that refers directly or indirectly to these
terms only where the requirements set out in Article 6 of this Regulation are complied
with, subject to the following:
.
(a) in Article 10, paragraph 2 “prior to issuance” shall be deemed to read “prior to
notification under Article 14, paragraph 1”;
(b) in Article 10, paragraph 3 “before the pricing of the securitisation” shall be deemed to
read “prior to notification under Article 14, paragraph 1”;
(c) in Article 10, paragraph 4 the first instance of “before pricing” shall be deemed to read
“prior to notification under Article 14, paragraph 1”. The reference to “before pricing at
least in draft or initial form” shall be deemed to read “prior to notification under Article 14,
paragraph 1” and the requirement contained in the final sentence shall not apply.
References to compliance with the requirements of Article 5 shall be construed as if Article
5 applied to those securitisations notwithstanding Article 28, paragraph 1.
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3.
In respect of securitisations the securities of which were issued on or after 1 January 2011
but before the entry into force of this regulation and in respect of securitisations issued
before 1 January 2011that date where new underlying exposures have been added or
substituted after 31 December 2014, the due dilligence requirements as laid down in
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 and
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 respectively shall continue to apply
in the version applicable on [day before date of entry into force of this Regulation]Article 3
of this Regulation shall apply.
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4.
In respect of securitisation positions outstanding as of [
date of entry into force of this
Regulation] credit institutions or investment firms as defined in Article 4 (1), points (1)
and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, insurance undertakings as defined in Article 13
(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC, reinsurance undertakings as defined in Article 13 point (4)
of Directive 2009/138/EC and alternative investment fund managers (AIFM) as defined in
point (b) of Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2011/61/EU shall continue to apply Article 405 of
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and to chapter 1, 2 and 3 and Article 22 of Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 625/2014, Articles 254 and 255 of Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2015/35 and Article 51 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No
231/2013, respectively, in the version applicable on [
day before date of entry into force of
this Regulation].
During the transition period referred to in subparagraph 1, Article 22 of Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 625/2014, Articles 254 and 255 of Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2015/35 and Article 51 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No
231/2013 shall not be repealed.
5.
Until the moment that the regulatory technical standards to be adopted by the Commission
pursuant Article 4 (6) of this Regulation are of application originators, sponsors or the
original lender shall for the purposes of the obligations set out in Article 4 of this
Regulation, apply the provisions in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and Article 22 of Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 625/2014 to securitisations the securities of which are
issued on or after [
date of entry into force of this Regulation].
6.
Until the moment that the regulatory technical standards to be adopted by the Commission
pursuant to Article 5 (3) of this Regulation are of application, originators, sponsors and
SSPE's shall, for the purposes of the obligations set out in points a) and e) of Article 5 (1)
of this Regulation, make the information mentioned by Annexes I to VIII of Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 2015/3 available to the website referred to in Article 5 (2).
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Article 29
Reports
1.
By [
two years after entry into force of this Regulation] and every three years thereafter,
EBA, in close cooperation with ESMA and EIOPA, shall publish a report on the
implementation of the STS requirements as laid down by Articles 6 to 14 of this
Regulation.
2.
The report shall also contain an assessment of the actions that competent authorities have
undertaken, on material risks and new vulnerabilities that may have materialised and on the
actions of market participants to further standardise securitisation documentation.
3.
By [
three years after entry into force of this Regulation] ESMA, in close cooperation with
EBA and EIOPA, shall publish a report on the functioning of the due diligence
requirements in Article 3, the risk retention requirements in Article 4, and the transparency
requirements in Article 5 of this Regulation and the level of transparency of the
securitisation market in the Union.
Article 29a
Synthetic securitisations
1. By [6
months after entry into force of this Regulation], the EBA, in close cooperation with
ESMA and EIOPA, shall publish a report on considering the eligibility of synthetic securitisations
as STS securitisations and, as the case may be, shall set out in that report the determination of the
STS criteria for synthetic securitisations.
2. By [1
year after entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission, taking into consideration
the report referred to in paragraph 1, shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the
Council on the eligibility of synthetic securitisations as STS securitisation, together with a
legislative proposal if appropriate.
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Article 30
Review
By [
four three years after entry into force of this Regulation] the Commission shall present a report
to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of this Regulation, accompanied,
where appropriate, by a legislative proposal. The report shall take into consideration international
developments in the area of securitisation, notably initiatives on simple, transparent and comparable
securitisations, and assess whether in the area of STS securitisations an equivalence regime could
be introduced for third country originators, sponsors and SSPEs.
Article 31
Entry into fForce
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the
Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament
For the Council
The President
The President
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Document Outline
- Where the seller is not the original lender, the true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect of the underlying exposures to the seller, whether suchthat true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect is direct or thr...
- Transactions which feature non-sequential priority of payments shall include triggers relating to the performance of the underlying exposures resulting in the priority of payments reverting to sequential payments in order of seniority. Such performanc...
- Where the seller is not the original lender, the true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect of the underlying exposures to the seller, whether such that true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect is direct or th...
- Where the transfer of the underlying exposures is performed by means of an assignment and perfected at a later stage than at the closing of the transaction, the triggers to effect such that perfection shallhould, at a minimum, incorporate the followin...
- (a) severe deterioration in the seller credit quality standing;
- (b) insolvency of the seller; and
- (c) unremedied breaches of contractual obligations by the seller, including the seller’s default.
- 1b. The underlying exposures included in the securitisation shall not be encumbered or otherwise in a condition that can be foreseen to adversely affect the enforceability of the true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect.
- 1c. The underlying exposures transferred from, or assigned by, the seller to the SSPE shall meet unambiguous predetermined and clearly documented eligibility criteria which do not allow for active portfolio management of those exposures on a discretio...
- 1d. The underlying exposures shall not include any securitisation position.
- 1e. The underlying exposures, at the time of transfer to the SSPE, shall not include exposures in default within the meaning of Article 178, paragraph (1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or exposures to a credit-impaired debtor or guarantor, who, to th...
- (a) has been declared insolvency insolvent or had a court grant his creditors a final non-appealable right of enforcement or material damages as a result of a missed payment within three years prior to the date of origination or has undergone a debt ...
- (i) a restructured underlying exposure has not presented new arrears since the date of the restructuring which must have taken place at least one year prior to the date of transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE; and
- (ii) the information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1, points (a) and (e)(i) explicitly sets out the proportion of restructured underlying exposures, the time and details of the restructuring as we...
- (b) was, at the time of origination, and where applicable, on a national public credit registry of persons with adverse credit history or other credit registry that is publicly available to the originator or original lender;
- (c) has a credit assessment or a credit score indicating that the risk of contractually agreed payments not be made is significantly higher than for similar exposures held by the originator which are not securitised.
- 4. The seller, at the level of a transaction, or the sponsor, at the level of the ABCP programme, shall satisfy the risk retention requirement in accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation.
- For the purpose of the second subparagraph, a sample of the underlying exposures shall regularly be subject to external verification of compliance by an appropriate and independent party, such as a statutory auditor as defined in Directive 2006/43/EC,...
- 1a. The remaining weighted average life of the underlying exposures of an ABCP programme shall not be more than two years.
- 2a. The ABCP programme shall be fully supported by a sponsor in accordance with Article 12a, paragraph( 2).
- 1a. Where the originator, sponsor and SSPE use the service ofrely on a third party authorised pursuant to Article 14a to assess whethercheck that a securitisation complies with Articles 7 to 10 or Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation, the STS notific...
- 4a. Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities to superviseensure compliance with Articles 6 to 14 [OPTION 2B: and 14a] of this Regulation. Member States shall inform the Commission and ESMA of the designation of competent authori...
- 4b. Paragraph 4a of this Article shall not apply with regard to corporates selling receivables under an ABCP programme or another securitisation transaction or scheme. In such a case, the originator or sponsor shall verify that those corporates fulfi...
- For all securitisations the review pursuant to the first subparagraph shall in particular include the processes and mechanisms to correctly measure and retain the material net economic interest on an ongoing basis, the gathering and timely disclosure ...
- For STS securitisations which are not a securitisations within an ABCP programme the review pursuant to the first subparagraph shall in addition particularly include the processes and mechanisms to ensure compliance with Article 8(, paragraphs 3) and ...
- For STS securitisations which are securitisations within an ABCP programme the review pursuant to the first subparagraph shall in addition particularly include the processes and mechanisms to ensure with regard to ABCP transactions the fulfilment of t...
- 1a. Competent authorities shall closely coordinate their supervision in order to identify and remedy infringements of this Regulation, develop and promote best practice, facilitate collaboration, aid the consistency of interpretation and provide cross...
- In case the concerned competent authorities agree that the infringement is related to non-compliance with Article 6 in good faith, they may decide to grant the originator, sponsor and SSPE a period of up to 3 months to remedy the identified infringeme...
- In case one or more of the competent authorities concerned is of the opinion that the infringement is not appropriately remedied within the period set out in subparagraph 2, subparagraph 1 shall apply.
- 5a. Where one or more of the competent authorities concerned from different Member States disagree with the decision under paragraph 5, they shall notify the competent authority who has taken the action under paragraph 5 of their findings in a suffici...
- By derogation to the first subparagraph, where such an infringement concerns an incorrect or misleading notification pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the decision of the competent authority of the entity referred to in the last...
- 5d. During the decision process referred to in paragraphs 1 to 5c of this Article, a securitisation appearing on the list maintained by ESMA pursuant to Article 14 shall continue to be considered as STS pursuant to Chapter 3 of this Regulation.
- (b) in Article 10, paragraph 3 “before the pricing of the securitisation” shall be deemed to read “prior to notification under Article 14, paragraph 1”;
- (c) in Article 10, paragraph 4 the first instance of “before pricing” shall be deemed to read “prior to notification under Article 14, paragraph 1”. The reference to “before pricing at least in draft or initial form” shall be deemed to read “prior to ...
- During the transition period referred to in subparagraph 1, Article 22 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 625/2014, Articles 254 and 255 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 and Article 51 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No ...
- Article 29a
- Synthetic securitisations
- 1. By [6 months after entry into force of this Regulation], the EBA, in close cooperation with ESMA and EIOPA, shall publish a report on considering the eligibility of synthetic securitisations as STS securitisations and, as the case may be, shall set...
- 2. By [1 year after entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission, taking into consideration the report referred to in paragraph 1, shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the eligibility of synthetic securitisations...