Dies ist eine HTML Version eines Anhanges der Informationsfreiheitsanfrage 'INTCEN mandate and capabilities'.

Brussels, 15 November 
SN 4546/1/01

from : 
Secretary General/High Representative
to :
General Affairs Council
Subject :
Intelligence cooperation
Delegations will find attached as an annex a contribution of the Secretary General/High 
Representative on the subject of intelligence cooperation.

Defence Ministers meeting informally on 12 October asked me to study 
co-operation between military intelligence services and between civil and 
military intelligence services.   In doing so I have borne in mind the wider 
intelligence picture, in particular the requirement for intelligence in three fields:
intelligence relating to law enforcement and state security;
intelligence relating to CFSP
intelligence relating to crisis management operations
Defence Ministers did not strictly cover the first element and I simply recall here 
the steps already taken, under the direction of the European Council and in 
response to the events of 11 September.  The second and third fields are 
closely linked, and are dealt with in greater detail below.
Co-operation in the fields of law enforcement and state security
Substantial co-operation between intelligence and security services was 
already in place before the events of 11 September, subject of course to any 
limitations imposed by national legislation.  Recent events have given even 
greater emphasis to the need for intense co-operation and co-ordination, both 
in the operational and policy fields.  
As well as intense operational contacts at working level, heads of domestic 
state security services met on 11 and 12 October to discuss how to improve 
co-operation between their services.  Their experts on terrorism are meeting on 
19 November.  Similar contacts have taken place in the police field, with the 
heads of the counter-terrorism units of the 15 police services meeting on 15 
October.  Their co-operation was endorsed by national police chiefs at their 
meeting on 30/31 October.  Increased co-operation is also taking place within 
the framework of EUROPOL, with the establishment of a special unit/task force 
composed of intelligence and police experts in the field of counter terrorism.  It 
is important that co-operation in these fields is both intensified and closely co-

ordinated between the many services involved.
Co-operation in the fields of CFSP, ESDP and crisis management operations
Existing co-operation
The attacks of 11 September are a reminder of the importance of sound early 
warning, which is an essential element in the development of an effective 
CFSP.  This has been recognised by Heads of Government, who at the 
European Council in Amsterdam in 1997, as well as establishing the Policy 
Planning and Early Warning Unit, noted the need for Member States and the 
Commission to provide confidential information to assist the policy planning 
The goal is high quality situation assessments that take account of the widest 
possible range of information sources, including open sources, privileged 
confidential information such as diplomatic reporting and military and political 
intelligence.  These situation assessments are needed by the key decision-
making and advisory bodies of the Council, including the Council itself, 
COREPER, the Political and Security Committee, European Military Committee, 
as well as the SG/HR, the Council Secretariat and EUMS. 
A start has been made with the exchange of diplomatic reporting, but is limited 
and in need of improvement.  The Council disposes too of other important 
sources (for example, EUMM and Special Representatives).  Steps have been 
undertaken to enhance information exchanges with other organisations (UN, 
NATO, OSCE, NGOs etc).  All of these sources can provide valuable inputs to 
the overall information picture, thus contributing to early warning and policy 
planning processes, and procedures have been established within the Council 
Secretariat (PU, DG E, EUMS and Joint Sitcen) to exploit the available material, 
with the Joint Situation Centre already producing integrated all-source situation 

Co-operation in the military intelligence field in support of crisis management 
operations has also been developing as part of the European Union’s Security 
and Defence Policy.  Heads of the Military Intelligence services of the Member 
States met last Autumn and in Spring this year and will meet again shortly on 
27 November.  But most importantly, an Intelligence Division has been 
established within the EU Military Staff.  Arrangements are in place allowing for 
secure transmission of classified information from each Member State to the EU 
Military Staff with a view to it contributing to the early warning and policy 
planning process, as well as in support of specific crisis management 
As well as enhancing co-operation within each of these fields, many Member 
States also taking active measures to improve co-operation between their own 
domestic, external and military intelligence services.  This should continue to be 
 With declaration of operationality expected at Laeken, further improvements 
are necessary.  More extensive and efficient exchanges are needed in the field 
of diplomatic reporting.  Properly protected electronic exchange is vital for real-
time value.  But it is particularly important to make improvements in the field of 
shared political intelligence.  
 Such material is highly sensitive.  If Member States are to share it, they must be 
confident that it will be put to effective use, while at the same time being 
properly protected.  This requires both staff for the analysis of such information 
and sound security procedures and structures.  
 In the light of the above I am implementing a number of structural and 
procedural changes within the Council Secretariat intended to enhance its 
capacity to properly analyse, exploit, protect and distribute sensitive intelligence 

material made available by Member States.
 In terms of improved sources of information, we shall be looking in the following 
directions: intelligence provided by the Member States (generally in an 
assessed form, but not exclusively); assessed intelligence reports from NATO; 
national diplomatic and military reporting; reports from European Commission 
delegations world-wide; image analysis from the EU Satellite Centre; 
information from Council sources, such as EUMM and Special Representatives; 
information exchanges with other organisations (UN, OSCE, NGOs etc), and 
open source information.
 I am putting in place a small group of staff, experienced in the field of 
intelligence analysis, to work in an integrated manner with staff in the 
Intelligence Division of the EU Military Staff, the relevant task forces of the Policy 
Unit and staff of DG E.  Together, their role will be to support the existing early 
warning effort and situation analysis work of the Joint Situation Centre.  It is my 
intention that this additional assessment capability, which could be reinforced 
on my decision, will be operational before the end of the year.
 The success of these arrangements will depend on high standards of security 
being maintained, in line with the requirements of the Council Decision of 
19 March 2001, due to enter into force on 1 December 2001.  Experience to 
date, particularly in the establishment of the Intelligence Division of the EU 
Military Staff, has identified a number of technical/procedural measures needed 
to guarantee the standards set in the Council Decision.
 Secure handling arrangements will be put in place to ensure that assessments 
are distributed securely and appropriately within the Secretariat.  Member 
States should nominate points of contact in Permanent Representations to 
receive assessments.  In due course, protected transmission links will be 
needed, including to and from capitals.

SN 4546/1/01 REV1