Esta es la versión HTML de un fichero adjunto a una solicitud de acceso a la información 'Vorlage der Präsidentschaft zum Six-Pack für die 3088. Tagung des Rates der Europäischen Union (Wirtschaft und Finanzen) am 17. Mai 2011'.


COUNCIL OF
Brussels, 12 May 2011
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Interinstitutional Files:
DS 1302/11
2010/0280(COD)
2010/0276(CNS)
2010/0281(COD)
LIMITE
2010/0277(NLE)
2010/0278(COD)
2010/0279(COD)

REPORT
from :
the Presidency
to :
COREPER/Council 
No. Cion prop.: 14520/10 ECOFIN 590 UEM 278 CODEC 969
14496/10 ECOFIN 582 UEM 273
14515/10 ECOFIN 589 UEM 277 SOC 618 CODEC 968
14512/10 ECOFIN 587 UEM 276 SOC 617 CODEC 966
14497/10 ECOFIN 583 UEM 274
14498/10 ECOFIN 584 UEM 275 CODEC 960
Subject :
State of play concerning the Economic Governance Package - Trialogue
I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
On 29 September 2010, the Commission presented the following six proposals on reinforcing 
economic governance:

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament (EP) and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies

Proposal for a Council Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure
DS 1302/11
1
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

·
Proposal for a Council Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States;
·
Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and of the Council on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances

Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and of the Council on enforcement measures to 
correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area

Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and of the Council on the effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area
2.
On 15 March 2011 Council reached an agreement on the general approach related to all six 
legislative proposals.
3.
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs voted on all six legislative proposals on 
19 April 2011. 
4.
The first trialogue meeting was held on 20 April 2011. Further trialogues followed on 3, 4, 10
and 11 May. 
II.
STATE OF PLAY
Concerning the general direction and the main elements of the proposed new economic 
surveillance framework the EP and the Council are broadly on the same line. The following 
paragraphs outline a list of the main differences between the EP's position and the Council's 
general approach. Considering that the EP is co-legislator on four of the six legislative 
proposals, the Presidency is seeking guidance from Member States on the issues on which the 
Council can move towards the EP's position. 
DS 1302/11
2
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

After initial exchange of views with the EP, three key issues and three additional horizontal 
issues were identified to be addressed by the Council. The Presidency considers that a 
concession is crucial on these key issues at the May Ecofin as a precondition for timely 
conclusion of the process by June, repeatedly called for by the European Council. Clear 
political guidance by the Council at this stage would enable the Presidency to preserve the 
momentum and successfully proceed with the negotiations.
Key issues
Issue 1: Application of fines
The EP adopted several amendments related to fines, both in the area of budgetary and 
macroeconomic surveillance:
·
To introduce an interest-bearing deposit in the excessive imbalance procedure as an 
initial enforcement measure, prior to imposing a fine.
·
To introduce the possibility to raise the fine imposed in the context of enforcement of 
excessive imbalance procedure from 0.1 % to 0.3% of GDP in the case of deliberate 
and severe non-compliance with recommendations.
·
To limit total yearly amount of cumulative fines imposed on an individual Member 
State in the context of enforcement of both excessive imbalance procedure and 
budgetary surveillance to 0.5% of GDP. 
·
To introduce an additional fine of 0.5% of GDP, in case of manipulating financial 
data, falsifying statistics or deliberately providing misleading information, in 
particular resulting in a violation of the EU statistical rules.
·
To distribute the accrued interest on deposits and fines in the context of enforcement 
of both excessive imbalance procedure and budgetary surveillance for EU relevant 
projects financed by the European Investment Bank rather than the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) prior to the establishment of a permanent stability 
mechanism.
DS 1302/11
3
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

Way forward:
The Presidency considers that the proposed introduction of the interest bearing deposit is in 
line with the principle of the new Stability and Growth Pact, namely that the sanctions would 
be applied progressively and starting at an earlier stage. At the same time, an upper limit for 
the cumulative yearly amount of fines imposed on a Member State in different procedures
could be explicitly stated. While the Presidency considers the cumulative size of the fines 
should correspond to the Council's general approach, some flexibility could be envisaged as to 
the amount of respective fines. Therefore, the Presidency considers that the amendments 
concerning the amount of individual and cumulative fines, as well as introduction of an 
interest-bearing deposit in the excessive imbalance procedure could be further explored.
Whereas it seems reasonable to introduce an additional fine in case of repeated statistical 
problems, as already foreseen by the Task Force, this could be addressed more adequately 
within a separate Regulation. The Council could publicly invite the Commission to explore 
possibilities for presenting a proposal for a separate act dealing with this matter.
If the accrued interest  and fines and are transferred to the future permanent stability 
mechanism, it seems only natural that before such a mechanism is established, the beneficiary 
of these transfers would be its factual predecessor, the EFSF.
Issue 2: Reversed qualified majority voting
The EP proposes to extend application of reversed qualified majority voting in several 
legislative proposals (1466, 1467 and EIP). The Council general approach is based on the 
principle that reversed qualified majority voting would be limited to the texts providing for 
sanctions.
Among others, the EP inserted the reversed qualified majority voting into 15 separate parts of 
the draft Regulations, including in provisions for which Council's general approach did not
foresee any Council decisions.
DS 1302/11
4
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

Way forward:
A list of these proposals is presented in the annex of the report, where reversed qualified 
majority voting is proposed by the EP. They are divided into different cases:
·
in several instances, the Commission proposal, the Council general approach and the 
proposed EP amendments already coincide;
·
for some others, legal analysis has shown that introduction of reversed qualified 
majority voting would not be in line with the decision-making process set out by the 
Treaty;
The Presidency considers that the possibility to introduce the reversed qualified majority 
voting in some steps of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure could be explored, namely in the 
case of a decision on interest-bearing deposit, and of a recommendation on declaring non 
compliance.
Issue 3: Role of the EP in the adoption of the scoreboard 
The EP attaches great importance to the adoption and content of the scoreboard within the 
draft Regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. The 
Council's general approach was based on the principle that the legislative proposal defines 
only the process through which the scoreboard will be defined, but not the content of the 
scoreboard. 
The EP has two suggestions: first the adoption of the list of indicators by means of delegated 
act and a listing of wider set of indicators (including R&D, unemployment rate, etc.) in the 
legislative text itself.
Way forward: 
The Presidency considers that the scoreboard is an analytical tool therefore it needs to be 
flexible and updated from time-to-time. While the consultation with the Parliament seems to 
be indispensable, a heavy legal procedure must be avoided. Moreover, consideration should 
be given to include some basic guiding principles for selection of indicators in the scoreboard
in the present regulation.
DS 1302/11
5
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

Additional important horizontal issues
Furthermore, several additional important horizontal issues were identified, on which the 
Presidency would also like to seek guidance from the Council.
Issue 4Economic dialogue and transparency
The EP included provisions on economic dialogue in several proposals. These provisions aim 
at introducing a framework for dialogue among the EP, the Council, the Commission and 
national parliaments on macro-economic and budgetary surveillance, whereby the EP may 
conduct hearings with the President of the Eurogroup, organise public debates and invite 
Member States in certain steps of the surveillance procedure. It is also foreseen that Member 
States under a procedure might turn to the EP and request a hearing for themselves. 
Furthermore, the EP proposes the Council and the Commission to take into account the 
outcome of these debates in their decisions.
Way forward: 
From a legal perspective, provisions on hearings, public debates on macro economic and 
budgetary surveillance may affect the inter-institutional balance as set out by the Treaties 
whereby economic coordination is to take place within the Council and whereby economic 
coordination is conceived as a peer review exercise.
The Presidency considers that the concept of the economic dialogue is worth to consider, the 
same way as for example the Monetary Dialogue is conducted. Some elements of the 
economic dialogue could be aligned with the implementation of the European Semester, 
providing a framework for a better flow of information between the institutions. In addition, 
the EP may invite Member States at certain important stages of the procedure as long as this 
discussion does not interfere the decision making procedure of the Council.
DS 1302/11
6
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

Issue 5: Medium-term solutions for crisis management
The EP proposes to empower the Commission to adopt emergency measures in case of a risk 
to the stability in the euro area, followed by a debate in the EP, in the presence of all relevant 
institutions. It furthermore proposes setting up a European Monetary Fund and introducing 
“euro-securities”.
Way forward:
The European Council has already decided on a limited Treaty change empowering the 
Member States whose currency is the euro to establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.
Taking this fact into account, the Presidency considers that tasking the Commission to prepare 
a report on the introduction of “euro-securities” could be explored as part of the review 
exercise.
Issue 6: Codification of the European Semester
The EP included provisions on the European Semester in several proposals. This choice 
responds to the need to have a formalised procedure for the enforcement of the Europe 2020 
goals.
Way forward: 
The Presidency considers that the main elements of the European Semester and the National 
Reform Programmes could be described in a concise manner in the legislation/a recital, 
without threatening the effectiveness of the budgetary surveillance procedure.
DS 1302/11
7
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

III. CONCLUSION
As a general way forward, the Council may wish to ask the Presidency to pursue the 
negotiations with the EP on the basis of the above report.
DS 1302/11
8
DG G I
LIMITE  EN

Annex
Reversed QMV proposals
EIP / EDP sanctions
decision on interest-bearing deposit (Article 3.1, EDP sanctions)
decision on mom-interest-bearing deposit (Article 4.1, EDP sanctions)
decision on fine (Article 5.1, EDP sanctions)
decision on EIP fine (Article 3.1a, EIP sanctions)
decision on interest-bearing deposit (Article 3.1a, EIP sanctions)
EIP
rejection of COM alert mechanism report (Article 4(3)a)
recommendations under Article 121 (2) TFEU for preventive actions (Article 6.1). 
recommendations under Article 121 (4) for corrective policy actions and declaring the existence 
of excessive imbalance (Article 7.2)
endorsing the corrective action plan or inviting the MS concerned to submit a new one (Article 
8.2)
rejection of COM report assessing whether or not the MS concerned has taken the 
recommended action (Article 10.1)
recommendation on declaring non-compliance (Article 10.4)
decision on state of abeyance (Article 10.5)
SGP preventive arm
adoption of the opinion on the Stability programme
decision in case of non-compliance of the recommendation
SGP corrective arm
adoption of the recommendations 126(7) and 126(9)
__________________
DS 1302/11
9
DG G I
LIMITE  EN