This is an HTML version of an attachment to the Freedom of Information request 'Access to documents request: 2022-05-18 meeting between Věra Jourová and Microsoft Corporation'.




Ref. Ares(2022)6608030 - 26/09/2022





Response 
x The EU sanctions target the core of the Kremlin’s disinformation and war propaganda 
machine in the EU, namely the RT (Russia Today) channels and Sputnik. Our priority is 
the fast and effective implementation of the adopted sanctions on this ‘core’ of the 
propaganda machine with EU-wide relevance.  
x  As a result, the reach of targeted RT channels and Sputnik in the EU is now extremely 
limited. The most relevant, traditional means of distribution, in particular by EU satellite 
providers (Eutelsat and Astra), are tackled and the access to related websites has been 
dramatically reduced. However, the implementation of the sanctions with regard to the 
Internet has its challenges.  
x  We remain in close exchanges with Member States and national regulatory authorities to 
ensure that the sanctions are properly implemented. 
x  We have proposed further three outlets in our latest 6th package of sanctions – still to be 
adopted by the Council. 
x  Due to their role in spreading disinformation, we aim to strengthen the transparency and 
accountability obligations of platforms
x  We are in close contact with you and other main platforms, Google, Meta, Microsoft, 
TikTok and Twitter, who are signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation. 
x  All online platforms have quickly suspended the transmission of Russia Today and 
Sputnik in the EU, and have taken further action.  
x  The information provided to the Commission shows that, in recent weeks, they have 
strengthened their monitoring and intervention tools related to the situation in Ukraine, 
including the following: 
  De-prioritising or removing of proven disinformation content and closing of accounts 
that are persistently disseminating such content. 
  Depriving players who spread disinformation related to the war of funding, and in 
particular avoiding any ‘ad’ placements on and by Russian state affiliated media. 
  Increasing the cooperation with fact-checkers and labelling of state affiliated sources. 
  Promoting authoritative content. 
x  The current extraordinary situation demands extraordinary and decisive action. It shows 
the importance that platforms deliver a strong revised Code of Practice on 
Disinformation
 as soon as possible. The Commission is involved in helping this process 
along. 
x  I thank you Microsoft for its engagement (You may ask how 
sees the process going 
and when 
expects finalisation). 
x  We have also asked the European Digital Media Observatory to focus its activities on 
Ukraine. In addition to this Observatory’s fact-checking and investigating activities, its 
Ukraine task-force also supports researchers in the attempt to get access to online 
platforms’ datasets which are essential to understand disinformation spreaders and tactics 
in the current context. 
x  They also produce – at our request – weekly insights into disinformation narratives and 
trends related to Ukraine. The newest one reports 2 new trends: discrediting media 
reporting on Ukraine and false information on foreign support for Ukraine. 
x  Finally, I welcomed report by the INGE Committee, whose approach and holistic nature is 
very much aligned with our EDAP that we are rolling out – next with the EMFA. 

 



x  The Commission will have the exclusive competence for the designation of very large 
online platforms (VLOPs) and the enforcement of systemic obligations against them. The 
Commission will be able to charge VLOPs an annual supervisory fee, its amount will be 
capped to 0.05% of the worldwide net income of platforms. 
Political ads 
x  As you know, the framework to our response to threats to democracy is EDAP.  
x  On 25 November 2021 we adopted a package of legislative and other measures to 
reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections. It includes soft measures to 
support cooperation on resilient elections and a flagship initiative on political advertising. 
x  We are grateful for Microsoft’s input in the preparation of these initiatives, and would 
kindly invite you to continue to engage with us in this regard. 
x  People must know why they are seeing a political ad, who paid for it, how much and 
what targeting criteria were used. New technologies should be tools for emancipation, not 
for manipulation, and the online platforms must help us make this happen. 
x  Our proposal will introduce common rules for political advertising services across all 
media, to provide legal certainty for service providers, to promote accountability in the use 
of political ads and discourage bad practices and interference, and to empower citizens. 
The proposal protects freedom of expression, does not regulate the content of advertising, 
and is without prejudice to national electoral rules.  
x We will work with industry and other stakeholders to ensure that the labelling 
requirements and transparency notice are effective, improving awareness and offering 
useful information for citizens, supporting the roles of interested entities and authorities in 
the democratic process. We have included safeguards to protect commercial interests, 
privacy and to minimise administrative burden, in particular for SMEs. 
x  The proposal complements and is articulated with the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the 
existing data protection acquis. It addresses the specific problems associated with the 
processing of personal data to target and amplify political advertising in a balanced 
way, which ensure that explicit consent and the targeting necessary to support political 
participation can continue.  
x We have worked with Microsoft in the context of our initiatives. The political ads 
proposal articulates with the DSA, the aims of the code of practice on disinformation, and 
work should advance on both in tandem.  
x  There is a substantial role to be played by Microsoft, other large platforms and their 
associations in making our legislating work to provide accessible, usable transparency 
with political advertising, and to contribute to the success of our policies more broadly, to 
support free and fair elections and resilient democratic processes in the EU. 
x  We look to you to go that extra mile to support our world leading legislation and our 
initiatives combating disinformation. 
Privacy Shield 
x  On 25 March, President von der Leyen and President Biden announced an agreement in 
principle for a transatlantic data transfer framework to replace the Privacy Shield.  
x  This is an important step, but the work continues. 
x  We now need to translate the agreement into legal texts. 
x  As a first step, the US commitments have to be included in a new Executive Order to be 
adopted by the US President and implementing regulations.  

 



 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

Background and more extensive LTTs on selected issues 
 
EDAP and political ads 
Main messages  
x  Our political ads initiative is based on a broad definition of political advertising, to 
cover messages sponsored by political actors in a traditional sense, but also those 
sponsored by other actors, which are liable to influence the outcome of a democratic 
process. 
x  It is essential that we include such ‘issues ads’, which are used increasingly inside and 
outside electoral periods, and to ensure that high transparency and strengthened 
personal data protections
 apply to them.  
x  In our proposal, we aim to ensure that this broad definition is based on objective 
factors, which can be determined using information available to service providers. We 
have provided a process where most political ads will be identified by their sponsors, and 
we will support compliance, including through standards and codes of practice. 
x  The focus of the definition is obviously to cover political advertising, and while some 
commercial adverts might overlap with this or pursue a dual aim, where commercial 
advertisers use advertising which is liable to influence the outcome of democratic 
processes, they should do so transparently. 
x  The same goes for fund-raising and informational advertising, as used by civil society 
actors, for instance. They are not the focus of the definition or the obligations, which we 
impose on service providers. But advertising liable to influence the outcome of an election 
should be transparent, and individual rights should be protected. 
x We will work with industry and other stakeholders to ensure that the labelling 
requirements and transparency notice are effective, improving awareness and offering 
useful information for citizens, supporting the roles of interested entities and authorities in 
the democratic process, while being implemented through streamlined and automated 
processes. We have included safeguards to protect commercial interests, privacy and to 
minimise administrative burden, in particular for SMEs. 
x  The proposal complements and is articulated with the Digital Services Act  (DSA) 
proposal and the existing data protection acquis. It addresses the specific problems 
associated with the processing of personal data to target and amplify political 
advertising in a balanced way, which ensure that explicit consent and the targeting 
necessary to support political participation can continue.  
x  The mechanisms and processes proposed to implement these obligations are compatible 
with the existing and upcoming acquis, and oversight is ensure through existing 
frameworks, which will contribute to certainty for market actors
x  We are working to support the European co-legislators in its negotiations. We have 
valued your substantive input throughout this process and we welcome your willingness to 
continue to engage. 
x We have worked with Microsoft in the context of our initiatives. The political ads 
proposal articulates with the DSA, the aims of the code of practice on disinformation, and 
work should advance on both in tandem.  

 

x  There is a substantial role to be played by Microsoft, other large platforms and their 
associations in making our legislating work to provide accessible, usable transparency 
with political advertising, and to contribute to the success of our policies more broadly, to 
support free and fair elections and resilient democratic processes in the EU. 
x  The Commission has also adopted on 27 April 2022 a strong package to address strategic 
lawsuits against journalists and human rights defenders engaged in public participation 
(SLAPP). It is essential that journalists and human rights defenders are afforded the 
necessary space including to counter disinformation and other manipulative interference 
in the democratic debate. 
x  Delivering on the Commission’s European Democracy Action Plan, a joint mechanism on 
election resilience is offered as of this year to Member States as a capacity-building tool to 
support the exchange of expertise in areas such as disinformation, cybersecurity, and 
online forensics. Member States can use the mechanism to build their capacity to fight 
illegal interference, discover covert political funding or ensure effective implementation of 
their electoral rules online. 
x  The Commission also intends to deliver in the coming year a compendium on e-voting 
practices, as announced in the Democracy Action Plan. 
x  We look to you to go that extra mile to support our world leading legislation and our 
initiatives combating disinformation. 
 
Defensives 
What is the current timeline for the Code? 
x  Disinformation related to the war in Ukraine illustrates the threats and challenges that this 
phenomenon poses to our societies. It reinforces the case for establishing a strong 
framework to fight disinformation.  
x  The Code’s signatories are currently heavily involved in taking urgent action related to the 
aggression of the Russian federation against Ukraine. They indicated that they will need 
additional time to finalise the Code’s revision.  
x  Adjusting the timeline of the Code is therefore not only justified but also useful to 
strengthen the commitments of the future Code 
x  The Commission expects that lessons learned on Ukraine war-related disinformation are 
reflected in a revised and future proof Code. 
x  The Commission would expect a Code before the summer, ideally in May.  
 
What is the Commission’s view on the European Parliament’s proposed ban on 
targeted advertising (displayed by online platforms) based on special categories of 
personal data and personal data of minors to be included in the DSA? 
x  GDPR has already limit if not de facto bans using sensitive data, but I think there is a lot of 
legal creativity in how digital ad sector approaches this. So, I think it is a good idea to try 
to close this loophole wit the DSA. We tried to do the same with the political ads, but in a 
way much closer to the GDPR. Let’s see the final text of the DSA first, but I believe such 
sensitive data should not be used for advertising purposes, especially in a political 
context.  
10 
 

What does the Commission understand by political advertising? 
x  Sponsored political content (‘political advertising’) is often regulated nationally, and there 
are a number of definitions which can include issues-based and partisan adverts, and 
certain other kinds of commercial communication during a defined electoral or campaign 
period. 
x  Online platforms have also established their own approaches to such advertising, which 
do not necessarily align with any relevant national definitions. 
x  An aim of the political advertising initiative will be to harmonise the definitions, as well as 
the relevant transparency obligations. Narrower and broader options are envisaged. 
Will the political ads proposal stop Russia and its proxies disseminating political 
advertising in the EU? 
x  The proposed regulation will introduce a high standard of transparency to political 
advertising circulated in the internal market, including from outside the Union.  
x  It will also introduce stricter rules about how such advertising is disseminated. 
x  It is based on a broad definition of political advertising which covers both adverts bought 
be political actors and those acting on their behalf, as well as many “issues ads” where 
those are liable to influence a democratic process. 
x  The proposal does not affect national competence to establish rules on the content of 
political advertising, and its availability, including prohibitions, but these provisions at EU 
level will make it easier to monitor and enforce such rules, as well as discouraging 
manipulative techniques, such as those using sensitive personal data. 
Who is covered by the new rules? Ad companies, like Google Ads, but what about 
bloggers and newspapers? Does this regulation also cover private persons or only 
political parties and foundations? 
x  The requirements concerning the transparency of political advertising established by the 
new rules will apply to the providers of political advertising services.  
x  This includes all services consisting of the preparation, placement, promotion, publication 
or dissemination, by any means, of a message by, for or on behalf of a political actor, 
unless it is of a purely private or a purely commercial nature; or which is liable to influence 
the outcome of an election or referendum, a legislative or regulatory process or voting 
behaviour.  
x  This would include newspapers and other traditional media such as radio and television 
when they are publishing political advertising, but also bloggers and influencers when they 
are paid to present political messages. It would also cover, for instance, new websites 
which provide paid-for content which meets the new definition. 
x  This could also include, for instance, Google when it provides political ads through its 
search services, or Facebook when it displays political ads to its users.  
x  However, the rules about the transparency of advertising will not be engaged in the 
context of online intermediary services which are provided without consideration for the 
placement, publication or dissemination of a  specific message, unless the user has been 
remunerated by a third party for the political advertisement.  
x  This means that individual’s personal social media posts will not fall under the definition of 
political advertising, unless they have been paid to make political posts. 
11 
 



 The French Presidency presented on 3 May a compromise text on 
chapters I-III that was discussed at GAG in 17 May. 
As regards the Parliament, a first presentation of the new Regulation on transparency and 
targeting took place in the IMCO committee on 10 January. Members’ comments were 
generally supportive, though the Left and Greens called for stricter controls for targeting. 
Questions focused on the scope of definitions, the articulation with the DSA and the extent to 
which third country actors are addressed. EP has resolved the issue of competence on the 
file so that IMCO is in lead, LIBE has exclusive competence on some provisions and shared 
competence for the relevant provisions and CULT has shared competence on some 
provisions. IMCO rapporteur is MEP Sandro Gozi (Renew, FR). 
Microsoft political advertising policies 
x  Advertising for election related content including election canvassing and election polls, 
political parties, candidates, and ballot measures is not allowed. 
x  Fundraising for political candidates, parties, PACs, and ballot measures is not allowed. 
x  Advertising that exploits political agendas, sensitive political issues or uses “hot button” 
political issues or names of prominent politicians is not allowed regardless of whether the 
advertiser has a political agenda. 
x  Use of political figures past or present cannot be linked in text or images to political 
content, products, sensationalized messaging, hot button issues, or as a way to link 
historical topics to current issues/events. For example, an ad with the headline “Lowest to 
Highest Presidential IQs, ranked” with an image of a political figure would not be allowed. 
x  Use of political figures past or present cannot be linked in text or images to political 
content, products, sensationalized messaging, hot button issues, or as a way to link 
historical topics to current issues/events. For example, an ad with the headline “Lowest to 
Highest Presidential IQs, ranked” with an image of a political figure would not be allowed. 
x  Use of political figures past or present cannot be linked in text or images to political 
content, products, sensationalized messaging, hot button issues, or as a way to link 
historical topics to current issues/events. For example, an ad with the headline “Lowest to 
Highest Presidential IQs, ranked” with an image of a political figure would not be allowed. 
x  In 2020 it removed 20 million ads and 10,000 sites over its political advertising policy. 
IAB contribution to the European democracy action plan 
IAB Europe to which Microsoft is a member provided responses in the consultation process 
when preparing the European democracy action plan and then when preparing the proposal 
on political advertising. IAB Europe has also contributed a position paper in the post-adoption 
process, which asks for changes in the scope & definitions proposed (incl. of ‘political 
advertising’ and ‘political actor’), the transparency requirements, targeting provisions (incl. 
alignment with the GDPR) and enforcement. 
IAB Europe is the European-level association for the digital marketing and advertising 
ecosystem. Through its membership of national IABs and media, technology and marketing 
companies, its mission is to lead political representation and promote industry collaboration 
to deliver frameworks, standards and industry programmes that enable business to thrive in 
the European market. 
 
 
13 
 



 
Digital Services Act 
Main messages  
x  The Digital Services Act will include a single set of horizontal rules on the content 
moderation practices of online platforms, in particular the removal of illegal content, and 
their interaction with freedom of speech and a healthy, well-informed public debate.  
x  In this way, the Digital Services Act will be a gold standard that ensures transparency and 
accountability of the online space, enforced by effective democratic oversight across 
Member States, and by the Commission. 
x  The Digital Services Act takes an asymmetric approach, to ensure that very large online 
platforms and search engines (45 million EU users) which have become ‘public spaces’ of 
expression are open and fair. The Digital Services Act requires more from these platforms 
concerning the organisation and design of their systems: they will need to assess, and 
address risks their systems pose to freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. 
x  This includes equipping citizens to understand and interact with the information they see 
online, and giving them rights where currently they are at the discretion of private actors – 
in particular the large online platforms. This includes measures related to online 
advertising, recommender systems, but also core content moderation processes and 
ensuring users are appropriately informed. 
x  The DSA aims at facilitating cross-border enforcement of the specific DSA obligations 
through a structured system of public supervision, based on independent authorities in the 
country-of-origin principle and tools for cooperation cross-border and at EU level. 
x  The DSA also includes specific obligations for marketplaces to ensure a better traceability 
and accountability of their sellers (e.g. Know Your Business Customers (KYBC) rules) as 
well as the products sold on their platforms (compliance-by-design, random checks, 
notices of the illegality of former purchases).  
x  The DSA prohibits online platforms from presenting advertisements to children based on 
profiling, as well as advertisements to any user based on profiling using special categories 
of personal data (e.g. personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, data concerning 
health, etc.).  
x  We are monitoring the situation in Ukraine very closely. We have the dual objective of 
effectively limiting Russian war propaganda in the EU, while allowing access to 
trustworthy information to reach Ukrainian and Russidan audiences. 
x  The DSA contains a range of measures that are useful in a crisis like the one we are in 
today. It contains a dedicated risk management framework to counter, among others, also 
risks related to intentional manipulation of the service, supported by comprehensive 
transparency and accountability tools that will shed greater light on the dynamics of 
information operations and allow the design of adequate response and mitigation 
measures.  
  The DSA’s crisis response mechanisms can essentially be seen as a faster trigger for 
the risk assessment and risk mitigation protocols previously included in the DSA, to 
make sure that these protocols are conducted in an ad hoc manner during specific 
crises. 
  Having a clear mechanism in place will ensure that the crisis response is balanced, 
proportionate and efficient. It will also allow platforms to hold the Commission 
accountable for the measures that it might require from them.  
15 
 





Trade and technology council 
Main messages  
x  In January 2022, we presented the Digital Decade Principles defining our vision of how 
the digital economy should abide by values such as democracy, privacy, solidarity, 
freedom of choice, and security.  
x  Our digital ambitions are high, from setting rules for online platforms, to upholding the 
highest standards of data protection and ensuring a fair taxation of the digital economy. 
x  Digital topics are an important part of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue. The Russian 
aggression against Ukraine acutely demonstrates the need, or even obligation, for 
democratic countries to provide an alternative vision of the world, based on our values. 
x  Creating strategic partnerships with likeminded nations provides a positive narrative and 
shows that digital can be to the service of people, not used to control them. 
x  After a period of difficult relations with US, setting up the TTC is an achievement in itself, a 
closer trans-Atlantic cooperation is re-established.  
x  We have regular dialogues within the ten working groups, made up of key staff, 
addressing a wide range of topics, as defined in the Joint Statement from Pittsburgh. 
x  As you know, on Monday there was a second TTC meeting at ministerial level, where 
there were a number of good results. 
TTC discussions on Standards 
x  In the meeting there was agreement to establish a Strategic Standardisation Information 
(SSI) mechanism to defend common interests in international standardisation activities. 
And we will continue work to foster the development of aligned and interoperable technical 
standards in areas such as AI or Internet of Things. 
 
TTC discussions on AI 
x We strive for new ambitious global norms, AI-related international standardisation 
initiatives and cooperation frameworks, in line with the rules-based multilateral system and 
the values it upholds. 
x  More generally, through bilateral and multilateral efforts the EU aims to ensure a global 
level playing field for trustworthy and ethical use of AI. It seeks to be an active player in 
promoting good governance of AI globally.  
x  As digitalisation spreads through the globe, a closer transatlantic cooperation can provide 
the foundation for a new set of global digital rules aimed at balancing free markets and 
personal liberties. 
x  Yesterday, there was agreement with the US to develop a joint roadmap on evaluation 
and measurement tools for trustworthy AI and risk management 
 
TTC discussions on cybersecurity 
x  The protection of supply chains, notably ICT, is key, for both the EU and the US. We 
share the objective of making them (cyber)secure and resilient. This topic falls under TTC 
Working Group 4 on ICT Security & Competitiveness. 
18