

Brussels, 17 September 2015 (OR. en)

11000/15 ADD 1 EXT1

CSDP/PSDC 424 CFSP/PESC 417 COPS 234 CSC 173 ESPACE 14

COVER NOTE

| From: | European External Action Service (EEAS) |
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| To: | Political and Security Committee (PSC) |
| Subject: | "Complete Operational Procedures" framework for the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Security Architecture |

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2015) 1047 ADD 1 EXT1.

Encl.: EEAS(2015) 1047 ADD 1 EXT1

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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



Space Task Force

Document partially accessible to the public (10.09.2015)

Addendum 1 to the

Working document of the European External Action Service

of 15/07/2015

| EEAS Reference | EEAS(2015) 1047 ADD 1 EXT 1 |
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| Distribution marking | Limited Public |
| To [and/or G\$C distribution acronyms] | Political and Security Committee [Council distribution codes: CSDP/PSDC; PESC; COPS; CSC; SPACE] |
| Title / Subject | "Complete Operational Procedures" framework for the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Security Architecture |

Delegations will find here enclosed two unclassified annexes to the draft "Complete Operational Procedures" for the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Security Architecture – document EEAS(2015) 1047 (classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED).

Annex C - List of principal points of contact.

This list should be kept updated.

Member States and other stakeholders are requested to identify their point of contact, to communicate – and keep update – the relevant contact details to the EEAS Situation Room, cc EEAS Space Task Force.

The EEAS Situation Room will test the point of contact on a monthly basis.

Member States, and Norway, which have one or more ground segment element(s) on their territory can list a second point of contact to be contacted if the threat concerns the particular ground segment element(s).

| Member State or o stakeholder | ther | Point of contact | Contact details |
|----------------------------------|------|---|-----------------|
| AT – Austria | | | |
| BE – Belgium | | | |
| | | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment elements on Belgian territory | |
| BG – Bulgaria | | | |
| CY – Cyprus | | | |
| CZ – Czech Republic | | | |
| DE – Germany | | | |
| | | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment element on German territory | |
| DK – Denmark | | | |
| EE – Estonia | | | |
| ES – Spain | | | |
| FI – Finland | | | |

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| FR – France | | |
|------------------|---|--|
| | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment elements on French territory | |
| GR – Greece | • | |
| HR – Croatia | | |
| HU – Hungary | | |
| IE – Ireland | | |
| IT – Italy | | |
| | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment elements on Italian territory | |
| LT – Lituania | , | |
| LU – Luxembourg | | |
| LV – Latvia | | |
| MT – Malta | | |
| NL - Netherlands | | |
| PL - Poland | | |
| PT – Portugal | | |
| | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment element on German territory | |
| RO – Romania | | |
| SE – Sweden | | |
| | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment elements on Swedish territory | |
| SI – Slovenia | | |
| SK – Slovakia | | |

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| UK - United Kindgom | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--|
| | (poss) a second point of contact for the ground segment elements on UK territory | |
| NO – Norway | | |
| | point of contact for the ground segment elements on Norwegian territory | |
| Council of the European Union | GSC | |
| CION – European Commission | | |
| GSA – European GNSS Agency | GSMC-Nucleus | |

Annex D – Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of ../2015 on Operational Procedures for the European GNSS Security

Architecture in relation to Council Decision 2014/496/CFSP

ADMIN(2015)16.

ADMIN(2015) 16

Ref. Ares(2015)2623232 - 23/06/2015

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Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

of 23/06/2015

on Operational Procedures for the European GNSS Security Architecture in relation to Council Decision 2014/496/CFSP

ADMIN(2015) 16

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THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

- Having regard to Council Decision 2014/496/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on aspects of the deployment, operation and use of the European Global Navigation Satellite System affecting the security of the European Union and repealing Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP (hereinafter referred to as "the Council Decision") 1;
- Having consulted the Commission;
- Following the approval by the Political and Security Committee;

Has decided as follows:

Article 1: Scope

This Decision regulates the implementation of Council Decision 2014/496/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on aspects of the deployment, operation and use of the European Global Navigation Satellite System affecting the security of the European Union and repealing Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP (hereinafter referred to as "the Council Decision").

Article 2: Definitions

For the purpose of this decision, the following definitions shall apply:

- "Threat": a threat in the sense of Art. 1 of the Council Decision exists when the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is informed by the Member States, the Commission or the European GNSS Agency (GSA), in accordance with Article 2 of the Council Decision, that
 - o The security of the European Union or one or more Member States is affected; or
 - Serious harm to the essential interests of the Union or of one or more Member States arising from the deployment, operation or use of the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) needs to be mitigated; or
 - The operation of the system itself or its services are affected.
- "Urgency": A status of urgency exists
 - In the event that the situation requires immediate action to be taken before the Council has taken a decision under Art. 3(1) of the Council Decision; and/or

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OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, p. 53.

- When a threat has already taken effect and immediate measures must be taken to mitigate serious harm to the essential interests of the Union or one or more of its Member States.
- "European GNSS Threat Response Architecture (GTRA)": the structures, processes and activities related to the implementation of the Council Decision.

Article 3: GNSS Threat Response Architecture (GTRA) Responsibilities

The European GNSS Threat Response Architecture (GTRA) is hereby established.

The GTRA comprises the structures, the organisational arrangements and standard procedures that will respond to threats as defined in Art. 1 of the Council Decision.

the GTRA


shall support the High Representative in taking the necessary actions as required by the Council Decision and in accordance with the related operational procedures. GTRA activity will assist the High Representative with:

- Decision-making;
- · Drafting a proposal for Council instructions to the GSA; and/or
- · Issuing the necessary provisional instructions to the GSA.

For this purpose, the GTRA shall:

- Receive, assess and process relevant information and intelligence on threats;
- Advise the High Representative on the situation and propose instructions to be given, in coordination with the Commission and the GSA;
- Liaise with Member States, the Council Secretariat and other actors.

Working with the Member States, the GSA, the Commission and the Council, the GTRA shall develop detailed operational procedures that establish the appropriate operational response.



Based on the operational procedures, the GTRA must enable the High Representative to take the necessary decisions and to issue the instructions taking time and confidentiality constraints into account.

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Article 4: GTRA Meetings

| 4.1. GTRA Meetings |
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| The GTRA ensures the 24-hour, seven-days-a-week availability of a competent member of personnel |
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| 4.3 The Situation Room |
| The Situation Room operates on a 24/7 basis. |
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| The Situation Room transmits the instructions issued on the basis of the Council Decision to | the |
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| GSA via the GSA's Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC). | |
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| Article 5: Process | |
| Article 5. Process | |
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| The GTRA identifies the operational procedures to be impleme | |
| and notifies Member States that might be affected by the threat or by any envisaged decision mitigation. | on its |
| The GTRA advises the High Representative on whether or not a case of urgency exists. | |
| The High Representative decides whether the status of urgency exists. | |
| Cases of urgency (Art. 4 of the Council Decision) | |
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| The CTDA | |
| The GTRA proposes to the High Representative the decision on the necessary provisions instructions to the GSA. | al |
| instructions to the GOA. | |
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
 On the basis of this proposal, the High Representative takes a decision on the necessary provisional instructions.


- The decision taken by the High Representative is communicated immediately to the Council and to the Commission
- After issuing the provisional instructions, the High Representative convenes a Council meeting that confirms, modifies or revokes the provisional instructions.
- The provisional instructions are kept under constant review and, as appropriate, are amended or revoked.
- The provisional instructions expire four weeks after being issued. If, in this case, the threat still
 persists, the High Representative takes a new decision in accordance with Article 4 of the
 Council Decision.

If the High Representative decides that no state of urgency exists:

Normal cases (Art. 3 of the Council Decision)

- The GTRA prepares the proposed instructions to be issued to the GSA, taking into account any
 advice from the Commission and the GSA as appropriate on the likely wider impact on the
 Galileo system.
- The draft decision is communicated to the PSC which will provide an opinion.
- The draft decision is submitted to the Council for decision, taking the opinion of the PSC into account
- The decision taken by the Council is communicated via the Situation Room to the GSA.





Article 9: Testing and Operational Procedures

The GTRA and all current and future operational procedures shall be tested with all stakeholders at least annually and at any other time as deemed appropriate.

Lessons learned from this testing will contribute to the development and refinement of these operational procedures.

The GTRA shall keep the operational procedures for the implementation of the Council Decision up to date in cooperation with the GSA and the Commission, and with the support of experts from Member States.

For the consultation of Member States, the EEAS shall convene dedicated meetings principally in the format of the EEAS Security Committee.

The operational procedures are to be revised in accordance with Article 7 of the Council Decision.