EU TERRORISM SITUATION
AND TREND REPORT
EU TERRORISM SITUATION
AND TREND REPORT
© European Police Office, 2012
All rights reserved. Reproduction in any form or by
any means is allowed only with the prior permission of
The EU Terrorism and Situation and Trend Report
(TE-SAT) has been produced by analysts and
experts at Europol, drawing on contributions from
EU Member States and external partners. Europol
would like to express its gratitude to Member States,
Eurojust, third countries and partner organisations for
their high-quality contributions.
Europol: Max Schmits
Jean Francois Guiot, Fotolia, Shutterstock
Table of contents
Foreword by the Europol Director ...............................................................................................................4
2. Key judgments ............................................................................................................................................6
3. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 7
4. General overview of the situation in the EU in 2011 .....................................................................................8
4.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ...............................................................................................8
4.2. Lone actors .........................................................................................................................................9
4.3. Terrorist and violent extremist activities .............................................................................................9
4.4. Convictions and penalties.................................................................................................................. 12
5. Religiously-inspired terrorism .................................................................................................................... 15
5.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ............................................................................................. 15
5.2. Terrorist activities .............................................................................................................................. 18
5.3. Terrorist situation outside the EU ......................................................................................................19
6. Ethno nationalist and separatist terrorism ................................................................................................22
6.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .............................................................................................22
Left-wing and anarchist terrorism .............................................................................................................26
7.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .............................................................................................26
7.2. Terrorist and violent extremist activities ........................................................................................... 27
8. Right-wing terrorism .................................................................................................................................28
8.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .............................................................................................28
8.2. Violent right-wing extremism ...........................................................................................................28
9. Single-issue terrorism ................................................................................................................................30
9.1. Single-issue terrorist and violent extremist activities ........................................................................30
10. Trends and future outlook ......................................................................................................................... 32
11. Annexes .................................................................................................................................................... 33
1. Foreword by the Europol
Terrorism is the attempt to achieve political goals with
the use or the threat of violence. The ideologies behind
terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into a
number of identifiable main drivers. Examples include
religiously-inspired terrorism and strong ethno-
nationalist sentiments leading to separatist terror-
ism. The identified drivers are not static, however, and
can evolve or vanish over time in response to political
or socio-economic developments, merge with other
ideologies or convictions, or be the building blocks of
new and sometimes very specific and highly individual
motivations. Unclear or vague motives can blur the dis-
tinction between a terrorist offence and other criminal
acts. The bomb attack and killing spree in Norway in
July 2011, referred to in this report, illustrates that a
personal mix of elements from different ideologies can
lead to extremely serious incidents that are difficult to
foresee and prevent.
Following the attacks in Norway, Europol immedi-
ately engaged in close cooperation with Norway and
the most relevant EU Member States via the First
Response Network. As well as supporting the Norwe-
gian authorities with the investigation itself, the First
Response Network also assessed the implications of
the attack on the threat of violent extremism to the
The TE-SAT aims to provide law enforcement offi- Europol could not have produced this report without
cials, policymakers and the general public with facts the contributions of quantitative and qualitative data
and figures regarding terrorism in the EU, while also from Eurojust and the EU Member States. I would
seeking to identify trends in the development of this also like to express my gratitude to Colombia, Croa-
phenomenon. In 2011, the total number of terrorist tia, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzer-
attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU contin- land, Turkey and the United States of America for their
ued to decrease. This is a welcome development, but contributions. Last but not least, I would like to thank
does not necessarily reflect a diminished threat. The all members of the Advisory Board, consisting of the
death of Osama bin Laden has not removed the threat ‘Troika’ (EU Council Presidencies of Poland, Denmark
of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Instead, the threat has and Cyprus), France, Spain, Eurojust, the EU Intelli-
evolved and lone actors or small EU-based groups are gence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the
becoming increasingly prominent, as is the Internet as EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator for their support
a key facilitator for terrorism-related activities.
throughout the year and their valuable contributions
to the 2012 edition of the TESAT.
The incidents in Norway and the arrests in a number
of Member States of individuals for the preparation of Rob Wainwright
terrorist attacks are proof of a continuous need for vigi- Director
lance, and indicate that the reduction of the numbers
of attacks is at least partly due to effective law enforce-
The TE-SAT is a public report produced by Europol on
the basis of information provided and verified by the
competent law-enforcement authorities in the Mem-
ber States of the EU. The arrests and terrorist or vio-
lent extremist incidents that took place in the EU, as
referred to in this report, are those that Member States
have reported to Europol for the purposes of the TE-
2. Key judgments
2011 presented a highly diverse terrorism picture
Al-Qaeda inspired groups and individuals still aim to which will probably be mirrored in 2012, with a pos-
cause mass casualties and select targets based on their sible increase in lone and solo actor plots.
perceived symbolic value. The potentially high number
The death of Osama bin Laden and other important of victims and psychological impact can have a long-
terrorist leaders did not have an impact on terrorist term negative effect on society.
activities carried out in the EU. However, al-Qaeda’s
call for individual violent jihad through the execution The threat of violent right-wing extremism has
of small-scale attacks may result in an increase in such reached new levels in Europe and should not be
attacks. The more al-Qaeda’s core is under pressure, underestimated.
The threat will most likely come from
and the more difficult it becomes to prepare large scale lone actors but organised underground groups also
attacks, the more al-Qaeda will try to recruit individual have the capability and intention to carry out attacks.
supporters in the West to plan and execute attacks.
Attacks performed by individually-operating actors are Cross-border cooperation between violent extrem-
not a practice limited to al-Qaeda inspired terrorism.
, including the provision of support for
violent activities, is steadily increasing. Terrorist and
Radicalisation to violence remains a critical compo-
violent extremist groups have taken full advantage of nent of the terrorist threat.
Radical thinking becomes developments in the communication and technology
a threat when individuals or groups engage in violence sector, allowing them to notify likeminded individuals
to achieve political, ideological or religious goals. High- and groups about upcoming activities, and inspire oth-
profile media exposure or propaganda efforts via the ers by promoting the results of their activities online.
Internet may assist radicalisation and inspire further
like-minded individuals to plan and commit attacks.
A number of developments in recent years point to a
convergence of social and technological factors which
Terrorist and extremist groups have a substantial
may well prove fertile ground for ideologically-moti-
presence in the virtual world of the Internet.
vated electronic attacks
The Internet has become the principal means of
communication for terrorist and violent extremist
individuals and groups. Social media tools facilitate
radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist and violent
Numbers of terrorist incidents and arrests continue
to fall, but overall activity relating to terrorism
and violent extremism still represents a significant
threat to EU Member States.
Between 2009 and 2011, there has been a sustained
decrease in reported attacks and arrests. Neverthe-
less, in 2011, a total of 174 attacks were still executed,
484 individuals were arrested and 316 individuals were
charged with terrorist-related offences.
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and
was established in the aftermath of the 11 September analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism,
2001 attacks in the United States of America (US), as i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to
a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Work- analyse the root causes of terrorism, neither does it
ing Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the Euro- attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of coun-
pean Parliament. The content of the TE-SAT is based ter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures
on information supplied by EU Member States, some taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these.
third states (Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, the The methodology for producing this annual report was
Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US) developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and
and partner organisations (Eurojust and Interpol), as Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.
well as information gained from open sources.
This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by
In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the Europol in consultation with the 2012 TE-SAT Advisory
TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview Board, composed of representatives of the past, pre-
of the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law sent, and future EU Presidencies, i.e. Poland, Denmark
enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and Cyprus (the EU ‘Troika’), along with permanent
and assemble figures regarding terrorist attacks and members, representatives from France and Spain, the
arrests in the European Union. The report also aims to EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), Eurojust,
present trends and new developments from the infor- the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator,
mation available to Europol.
and Europol staff.
The methodology and definitions used in this report
are explained in Annex 5.
4. General overview of the
situation in the EU in 2011
• 174 terrorist attacks in EU Member States
Not one religiously-inspired terrorist attack on EU ter-
• 484 individuals arrested in the EU for terrorist
ritory was reported by Member States, nor were any
single-issue terrorist attacks registered. The killing of
• Lone actors were responsible for the killing
two American military personnel at Frankfurt airport
of two persons in Germany, and 77 persons in
by a religiously-inspired individual in March 2011 is
not a terrorist attack according to German legislation,
• 316 individuals in concluded court proceedings
although the incident clearly carried some such char-
for terrorism charges
acteristics. Of all specified affiliations, the majority of
attacks were committed by separatist groups.
4.1. Terrorist attacks and Most arrests were reported by France (172), followed
by the Republic of Ireland and Spain, with 69 and 64
arrests respectively.3 The number of arrests related to
The decline in the number of attacks in the EU contin- right- and left-wing violent extremism is still low com-
ued in 2011 with a total of 174 attacks in seven Member pared to the arrests for offences related to separatist
States.1 The majority of the reported terrorist attacks violent extremism and terrorism. The latter still repre-
took place in France (85), Spain (47) and the United sent the largest part of all arrests, although they have
Kingdom (26). Spain saw the number of separatist decreased from 412 in 2009 to 349 in 2010, and further
attacks decrease by nearly 50% compared to 2010. A to 247 in 2011.
total of 484 individuals were arrested for terrorism-
Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects, 2007 to 2011
1 For an overview of all attacks per Member State and per affiliation, see Annex 2.
2 For the UK, figures represent the number of charges for 2011, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in the other Member States.
However, at this stage in the criminal justice process it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.
3 For an overview of all arrests per Member State and per affiliation, see Annex 3.
Compared to previous years, there were more arrests reveals that he established his own ideology from vari-
for the membership of a terrorist organisation, prop- ous influences and without a clear affiliation, present-
aganda, possession of arms and explosives, and the ing himself as a “cultural conservative”. His ideology is
dispatch of fighters to conflict. The number of arrests assessed as opposing multiculturalism and more spe-
for most other offences, including the preparation of cifically Islamism.
attacks, attempted attacks and completed attacks,
The existence of a group of right-wing terrorists in
Germany, connected to alleged politically-moti-
4.2. Lone actors
vated murders committed between 2001 and 2007, is
another example and an illustration of the fact that it
Serious threats emanate not only from established ter- is extremely difficult to detect terrorists operating indi-
rorist organisations but increasingly from lone actors4 vidually or in small groups.
and small groups in EU Member States, whose radi-
calisation takes place largely undetected. This devel- 4.3. Terrorist and violent
opment is facilitated by the Internet, and – in the
religiously-inspired strand – is also incited by al-Qaeda
core and its affiliates to compensate for diminished Financing of terrorism
capabilities to direct operations. The practice of “indi- Terrorist organisations are highly pragmatic in their
vidual jihad” was advocated by al-Qaeda in the Arab approach to financing their activities. Religious or
Peninsula (AQAP) through its online magazine, Inspire, political boundaries are easily ignored if they stand in
and in a video published by the organisation in June the way of the acquisition of funds. By the same token,
2011. However, the incidents in Norway in July 2011 these organisations employ tried and trusted methods
prove that attacks performed by individually-operating of fundraising, both licit and illicit, such as the collec-
actors are not a practice limited to al-Qaeda inspired tion of donations from sympathisers and extortion,
next to exploring new technologies for the same pur-
On 22 July 2011, the Norwegian national Anders
Behring Breivik killed 8 people through the explosion Hostage taking with ransom demands has evolved into
of a car bomb (a ‘vehicle-borne improvised explosive a tried and trusted method, a highly lucrative option
device’ (VBIED)) in the government quarter of Oslo. He for terrorist entities. This method is employed in par-
also randomly shot 69 predominantly young people at ticular by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as
a youth camp on the island of Utøya. The perpetrator is was illustrated by the kidnapping in Algeria of an Italian
considered to be a lone actor whose targets were the woman in February 2011, and then of a Spanish male
Norwegian political system, including the government and female and another Italian woman, in October
and the Labour Party. Moreover, he issued a 1518-page 2011. The kidnapping of hostages for ransom by ter-
long manifesto named “2083 – A European Declara- rorist factions is seen throughout Africa, from Niger to
tion of Independence” on the Internet. The manifesto Kenya.
4 Lone actors refers to single terrorists operating in isolation from any other organisation or other associates. Solo terrorists refers to individuals executing acts of terrorism
without others but who are actively supported and assisted by a wider terrorist organisation.
In EU Member States, the abuse of social benefits is companies in France, Greece, Germany, Italy and Swit-
used to fund terrorist activities. In more substantial zerland. Several improvised incendiary devices (IIDs)
terms, terrorist organisations also raise funds through were used in a coordinated action to target railway
multiple global criminal enterprises in and outside the infrastructures in Germany in October 2011.
EU. One example of the latter is the suspected involve-
ment of the PKK in narcotics trafficking to fund and The Breivik case illustrates that precursor chemicals
support terrorist activities.
are easily obtainable for anyone capable of inventing
a plausible reason to procure them. The man responsi-
The cause of Tamil independence is still alive in Europe. ble for the death of 77 people had been able to procure
Intelligence suggests that its supporters in the EU several tonnes of ammonium nitrate-based fertiliser to
remain engaged in extortion, human trafficking, skim- produce his explosives, on the ostensible grounds that
ming schemes and other crimes to raise money to fight they were intended for agricultural use. The materials
for their cause.
he used were shipped from EU Member States.
The Internet is increasingly used for all purposes, both Animal rights violent extremists and related single-issue
legal and illegal, including fundraising to finance terror- organisations are known to use both IEDs and IIDs.
ist activities. Fundraising via the Internet by self-radical-
ised terrorist supporters is becoming more prevalent.
Terrorist and violent extremist actors readily make use
of Internet communication channels to exchange infor-
The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by ter- mation they perceive as safe, secure and inconspicu-
rorists of various affiliations is of growing concern. The ous, and because they have no access to mainstream
components required for the construction of IEDs are media. Consequently, for years the Internet has been
easy to procure, their production requires expertise firmly established as a facilitating factor for both ter-
that can be obtained through open source information, rorist and violent extremist organisations, and its use
and the chemical precursors can be legally obtained is growing as Internet availability extends worldwide.
in EU Member States. The use of commercial explo-
sives, by contrast, continues to decrease, partly due to Online social media sites attract high numbers of users.
increased monitoring and control by law enforcement Internet forums are an effective means to address tar-
geted audiences, including supporters who have no
off-line links to terrorist organisations. Most forums
IEDs are currently the main weapon of choice of ethno- restrict access, wholly or partially, to vetted members
nationalist terrorists in Spain, France and the UK for who need to prove their credentials and loyalty, or be
executing attacks. Both Northern Ireland and France recommended by established members before admis-
witnessed terrorist attacks in 2011 in which these types sion. Forum members are strongly advised by their
of explosives were used.
moderators to use encryption software for direct com-
In 2011, left-wing terrorist groups claimed responsibil-
ity for attacks in which explosives were sent in letters, Organisations use the Internet for a range of purposes,
targeting several public and private institutions and including instruction, the recruitment of supporters,
dispatch of members to conflict areas, fundraising, controls remotely. The sophisticated computer virus
facilitating cooperation with other terrorist organisa- called Stuxnet, supposedly designed to specifically
tions, and the planning and coordination of attacks. target the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in Iran,
Without the Internet, the audience reached would discovered in 2011, illustrates the high potential of
undoubtedly not be as wide. The Internet in particular the use of the Internet with malicious intent. Leading
continues to be used as an effective means of magni- members of al-Qaeda have already encouraged “elec-
fying the propaganda efforts of violent extremist and tronic jihad” against critical infrastructure in Western
countries. The potential threat of such terrorist action
seems moderate or even high.
A substantial proportion of terrorist propaganda on the
Internet is distributed by a limited number of Internet Cyberterrorism
forums. Some have thousands of members, many of There is a lack of international consensus concerning
whom will further distribute messages to other forums the term “cyberterrorism”, which is used variously to
that have no apparent terrorist affiliation. In addition, describe activities including electronic attacks on criti-
individuals posing as media outlets edit, translate cal infrastructure, intellectual property theft relating to
and publish terrorist content issued by foreign terror- research and development, and even the use of Inter-
ist groups, and texts or multimedia content produced net technology for the dissemination of propaganda or
based on such material. Some terrorist organisations for communication purposes.
have designated particular forums or media outlets as
their official communication channels.
While the EU is yet to experience a systematic cam-
paign of cyber attacks by established terrorist groups,
The boundaries between virtual support networks, a number of developments in recent years point to a
media outlets and terrorist organisations have become convergence of social and technological factors which
increasingly blurred. Members, even administrators, may well prove fertile ground for an increase in ideo-
of terrorist and violent extremist forums can go on to logically-motivated electronic attacks.
undertake violent action, an evolution that is framed
ideologically as a commendable development.
One of the challenges of investigating cybercrime is
that in many cases the motivation for criminal activ-
Additionally, the Internet enables individuals to ity becomes apparent only after further investigation.
undergo a process of radicalisation without necessarily Often the methods and tools used in ideologically-
being formally recruited, let alone controlled or guided motivated attacks are the same as in those that are
by a terrorist organisation, which adds to the risk.
profit driven. For example, botnets - networks of many
thousands of compromised computers - may be used
Apart from its use as a communication tool, the Inter- to distribute phishing emails with the intention of har-
net offers new and additional possibilities to carry out vesting personal and financial data, to conduct auto-
terrorist attacks, such as electronic attacks on the mated intrusions, or to provide the necessary network
operating systems of critical infrastructure in EU Mem- traffic or bandwidth for Distributed Denial of Service
ber States, such as energy production facilities and (DDoS) attacks. These aim to saturate servers, web-
transport. Attacks could create power outages, disrupt sites and other networked services until they cease to
traffic or even destroy entire systems by taking over function.
The EU has also witnessed the development of cyber-
crime from a niche activity into a mature service Individuals tried
industry. Criminal tools including botnets, complete
crimeware toolkits and coding activity are retailed in Figure 2: Number of individuals in concluded
the digital underground economy, often with limited court proceedings involving terrorist charges in
knowledge of, or concern for, how these might be used. 2009, 2010 and 20117
At the same time, the rise of hacktivism has introduced
a new online model for distributed disorder, with cel- dating back to the 1980s. The concluded court pro-
lular and lone actors operating under the banner of ceedings in 2011 involved 316 individuals to whom a
global brands, while using cybercriminal tools such total of 346 verdicts were handed down. Some verdicts
as DDoS attacks to express anger or frustration, or as are pending judicial remedy. Out of the 316 individuals,
“punishment” for perceived wrongdoing.
40 were female - a slight increase in comparison with
2010. The majority of the female defendants (33) were
In the context of electronic attacks, therefore, the dis- tried for separatist terrorism.
tinction between organised crime and terrorism and/
or violent extremism is increasingly blurred. The use of The highest number of individuals in concluded court
the same tools and methods for a range of criminal and proceedings for terrorist offences in 2011 was again in
political ends highlights the need not only for a contin- Spain. Denmark, Germany and France saw an increase
uing holistic response to electronic attacks, whatever compared to 2010; Belgium and the Netherlands saw a
their motivation, but also for greater collaboration decrease, whereas Italy and the United Kingdom have
between law enforcement and those responsible for seen a continuous decrease in the past two years. In
protecting critical infrastructure to develop effective 2011, for the first time, Lithuania reported a terrorism-
related court decision.
4.4. Convictions and
In Denmark, several trials took place in 2011 in relation
to attacks targeting the Danish artist who caricatured
the prophet Mohammed as well as the newspaper
In 2011, there were 153 concluded
court proceedings that published the caricatures. In February, one indi-
involving terrorist charges reported in 12 Member vidual was found guilty of attempted terrorism for
States, which is an increase compared to 2009 and having tried to kill the artist. He was also found guilty
2010.6 As in previous years, court cases concluded of assaulting a policeman and of illegal possession of
in 2011 relate mainly to events which occurred in the an axe and knife. He was permanently banned from
years before the timeframe of the TE-SAT 2012, some entering Denmark after serving the sentence. In June,
5 Please refer to Annex 4 for additional information and clarification on the numbers mentioned in this section.
6 If verdicts in 2011 were appealed in the same year and came to a conclusion before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as
one. In Spain, in cases when the 1st instance decision was appealed by some of the defendants and the appeal also took place in 2011, the proceed-
ings were counted as two. Also, trials where an appeal is pending have been included in the reporting, but these judgments are not considered final.
The data for Belgium includes a proceeding in which 3 members of the right-wing group “Blood & Honour” were tried for racism and xenophobia charges. The
data confirmed by Ireland does not cover the whole 2011. The data received from the United Kingdom does not cover Northern Ireland.
7 Data received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for the TE-SAT 2010 and 2011 could not be included in the respective reports.
12 | TE-SAT 2012
a higher court confirmed the judgment and added one defendants were also found guilty. The court handed
more year to the initial sentence of nine years. The down sentences of between two and six years in prison.
case is due in the Supreme Court in 2012.
Also, in May 2011, one individual, prosecuted for an In Germany, four individuals were charged with mem-
attempted attack against the Danish newspaper bership of a terrorist organisation and violation of Ger- “Morgenavisen Jyllandsposten”
by means of a home- man export laws. They were prosecuted for providing
made explosive device, was found guilty of attempted funds and weapons to support the armed struggle of
terrorism and illegal possession of a firearm. He was the LTTE and convicted to prison terms of between
sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, with a perma- nine months and four years, and between nine months
nent ban from entering Denmark after serving the sen- and two years for violating German export laws.
tence. The decision on the case is final.
The percentage of acquittals (31%) has increased in
comparison with previous years (18% in 2009, 27%
As in 2009 and 2010, the majority of reported verdicts in 2010). Of the 40 female defendants, 18 were com-
in 2011 relate to separatist terrorism. Spain has the pletely acquitted and one was acquitted in one pro-
most verdicts for separatist cases in 2011, as well as ceeding and convicted in another.
the highest number of verdicts for religiously-inspired
terrorism. France saw the second highest number of Similar to 2009 and 2010, reported verdicts in relation
verdicts handed down for separatist terrorism, and to separatist terrorism in 2011 had the highest acquit-
Germany and the United Kingdom had the next high- tal rate (34%), followed by left wing and religiously
est number of verdicts for religiously-inspired terror- inspired terrorism-related proceedings, with acquittal
ism. Spain was the only EU Member State with court rates of 27% and 24% respectively.
decisions on left-wing terrorism in 2011. The only right-
wing case concluded in 2011 took place in Belgium.8
Six of the 12 countries with court decisions on terror-
ism cases in 2011 have a full conviction rate with no
In 2011, five individuals were brought to court in the acquittals.9 France and the Republic of Ireland can be
Netherlands for their links with the LTTE. The two main seen as having had mostly successful prosecutions.
suspects were leading members of the Tamil Coordinating
(TCC) in the Netherlands and used the Tamil The acquittal rate in Spain, which has the highest num-
diaspora for fundraising. Both suspects were acquitted ber of verdicts, continues to increase (21% in 2009,
of membership of an organisation that had the objec- 38% in 2010, and 42% in 2011). As stated in last year’s
tive of committing terrorist crimes, as the court decided report, the level of acquittals in Spain can be explained
that - in the relevant period between 10 August 2004 by the characteristics of the Spanish judicial system,
and 26 April 2010 - there was an armed conflict within focused on prevention and protection. Often, Spain
Sri Lanka. On this basis, it could not be considered that criminalises and prosecutes preparatory terrorist acts,
the LTTE was an organisation with the objective of com- such as recruitment and training activities. Also, con-
mitting terrorist crimes. They were, however, convicted spiracy to commit terrorist activities or the support
of membership of a criminal organisation. Three other thereof is prosecuted to prevent acts from occurring.
8 See footnote 6.
9 These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and the Netherlands.
safe house in the French town of Tarbes in December
2002. Also, traces of biological remains were found in
the residence of two ETA members, both convicted
for the attack. The court concluded that the evidence
effectively proved that the accused was in contact
with the perpetrators of the attack; however, it did not
Ireland (Republic of)
demonstrate that he participated in the planning or
execution, and thus the court acquitted him.
The average penalty imposed in 2011 in Europe for acts of
terrorism is approximately eight years. As for the various
types of terrorism in 2011, the average punishment for
verdicts handed down for separatist and left wing terror-
Figure 3: Average penalty per convicted individu-
ism amounts to 12 years, for religiously-inspired terrorism
al (in years) 10
7 years (the same as in 2010), and for right-wing, less than
one year.11 The highest average penalty is for the type
As explained by the Spanish prosecution authorities, “Not specified” due to life sentences given in France.12
these offences are grounded in circumstantial evi-
dence which is then assessed by the courts.
In a UK trial, a former British Airways software engi-
neer was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. His
In a ruling from 2011, a former military chief of ETA was initial intention had been to go overseas to take part in
cleared by the Audiencia Nacional
based on a lack of “jihad” but, following contact with others, he decided
evidence linking him to the 2002 attempted assassina- to stay at BA and explore ways of getting explosives on
tion of a media group’s executive. In the judgment it board aircraft and disrupting international air travel by
was ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecu- crashing the airline’s computer systems. He was found
tion was “insufficient” to link the accused to the terror- guilty on four counts of engaging in conduct in prepara-
ist action. During the trial, the prosecution argued that tion of terrorist acts. He pleaded guilty to further terror-
intelligence experts revealed that the perpetrators of ism offences before the trial began, admitting he was
the attack were members of the ‘K-Olaia command’, involved with extremists who wanted to overthrow a
the defendant allegedly being one of them. The evi- foreign country’s government, as well as to the posses-
dence consisted, inter alia
, of documents related to sion of information likely to be useful to a person com-
the planning of the attack, seized during a raid of ETA’s mitting or preparing an act of terrorism.
10 The average penalties do not include data from Greece. In Spain cumulative sentences of up to 1000 years were given for separatist terrorism offences. In the
United Kingdom and France life sentences were imposed. For the purpose of the overview, sentences exceeding 40 years and life sentences have been counted
as 40 years.
11 See footnote 6.
12 In some countries, suspended sentences have been imposed. These have been included in the figures above. In Germany, youth penalties, community ser-
vice or probation were also given.
It should be noted that, aside from imprisonment, France often imposes a penalty of banishment from the national territory. Spain has a similar type of punish-
ment, taking away civil rights from individuals. Also, in some cases a financial penalty was imposed.
• Violent jihadist terrorist groups provide
indications of an increase in sophistication,
but largely continue to exhibit poor skills and
professional tradecraft, preventing them from
committing effective attacks in the EU
• European home-grown groups are becoming
less homogeneous in terms of ethnicity
• Political changes in Arab countries in 2011
did not lead to visibly increased activities by
al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups in the EU
• The death of Osama bin Laden has had little
impact on the overall threat from al-Qaeda
affiliated or inspired terrorism
• In 2011, no al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired
terrorist attacks were carried out in EU Member
• Two US military personnel were killed in a
religiously-inspired attack in Germany13
• The number of individuals arrested for offences
Figure 4: Number of individuals arrested for
related to violent jihadist terrorism dropped
religiously inspired terrorist offences in Member
from 179 in 2010 to 122 in 2011
States in 2011
5.1. Terrorist attacks and a terrorist act under German legal code. This incident
emphasises both the existence and acute danger of
home-grown extremism and the difficulty of monitor-
The situation relating to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired ing lone actors.
terrorism in EU Member States continues to be diverse.
In 2011, religiously-inspired attack plots included al- As in recent years, the al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired
Qaeda-directed groups, home-grown cells inspired by threat towards Scandinavia and Germany rose stead-
al-Qaeda and self-radicalised, self-directed lone actors. ily during 2011, whilst other Member States, such as
However, Member States have not reported a single France, Spain and the United Kingdom, remained
al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorist attack actually constant targets and centres for radical activities. A
carried out in 2011. The murder of two US military per- number of Member States with a military presence in
sonnel by a lone actor in Germany in March 2011 is con- Afghanistan likewise experienced a persistent threat in
sidered a religiously-inspired attack, whilst not judged various forms.
13 The killing of two American military personnel at Frankfurt airport by a religiously-inspired individual in March 2011 is not a terrorist attack according to
German legislation, although the incident clearly carried some such characteristics.
In 2011, 122 persons were arrested in the EU for An increasing number of the arrested individuals are
offences related to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired ter- not linked to a known terrorist organisation; this may
rorism. More than half of these persons were primar- be an indication of an increase in autonomous violent
ily arrested on suspicion of membership of a terrorist jihadist cells and lone actors.
organisation, such as AQIM or al-Shabab. Seventeen
persons were arrested for the preparation of a terrorist Home-grown religiously-inspired terrorist
attack, a number significantly lower than in 2010, when networks
there were an unprecedented 89 arrests for that rea- Home-grown, religiously-inspired terrorist networks,
son. Other offences included, but were not limited to, particularly those augmented by individuals returning
propaganda (12), recruitment (7), financing of terrorist from violent jihadist training camps abroad, remain
activities (13), the facilitation of terrorist offences (10), the principal concern of many Member States. Despite
the possession of arms and explosives (4), or a combi- the death in 2011 of Osama bin Laden and other key
nation of these and other offences.
al-Qaeda figures, home-grown al-Qaeda inspired indi-
Over the past three years, there has been a decrease in viduals and groups based in Europe have continued to
arrests for attacks and financing-related offences, but plan attacks directed against their countries of resi-
the percentage of arrests for recruitment and sending dence. The most significant attack plots in the EU dur-
volunteers to be trained to fight in conflict zones such ing 2011 centred around home-grown groups based
as the Afghanistan / Pakistan border area and Somalia in Germany and the UK. Four persons arrested in Ger-
many in April and December 2011 had established con-
The average age of those arrested is 30 years. How- nections to al-Qaeda core and other al-Qaeda affiliates
ever, the individuals arrested for the preparation of and it is believed that there were plans for at least one
attacks and sending volunteers are, in the majority of terrorist attack in Germany. The key figure in the cell
cases, younger than 25.
had received terrorist training at camps in Pakistan.
Twelve individuals from Birmingham, arrested in Sep-
Arrests related to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terror- tember and November 2011 in the UK, were charged
ism were reported by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the with terrorism offences, including preparing for an act
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Repub- of terrorism in the UK, providing money for the pur-
lic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, poses of terrorism, and failing to disclose information
Sweden, and the UK.14
about potential acts of terrorism. This British-based
home-grown group likewise demonstrated strong
More than half of the arrested individuals were non- links to Pakistan. Other home-grown plots with less
EU nationals. 14 per cent were of Moroccan nationality sophistication underline the potential of even simplis-
and 12 per cent were Russians. The number of individu- tic attacks to impact upon the EU, as well as the unfal-
als arrested with a Russian nationality increased from 3 tering determination of home-grown violent jihadists
in 2009, to 9 in 2010 and 16 in 2011. A number of these to strike.
arrests are linked to a 2009 investigation into the prep-
aration of an attack.
14 There have been arrests related to religiously-inspired terrorism in the UK, but they are not specified in the quantitative information received from the UK.
2011 has shown that European home-grown networks jihadists become more proficient at reaching conflict
are becoming less homogeneous in terms of ethnic- zones through reflecting upon their earlier errors. In
ity. Instead, a common ideology provides the basis for this context, increased interest in travelling to Somalia
the establishment of groups. In some instances, there via Kenya was noted in 2011. In previous years, most
are increasing contacts between individual networks followers seeking to fight for al-Shabab tended to be
within specific states. In other instances, however, of Somali origin. In 2011, however, al-Shabab attracted
home-grown networks remain small in number, loose European violent jihadists from beyond the Somali
in organisation and lack strong leadership and clear diaspora. Some radicalised individuals have shown
objectives. Some Member States have reported that a preference for travelling to Somalia over Pakistan.
home-grown groups and individuals are often focused However, this may be perceived by al-Qaeda inspired
upon violent jihad abroad rather than committing extremists as simply an easier route to violent jihad
attacks in the West.
rather than a predilection for al-Shabab.
To some extent, European home-grown networks – Despite their failure to commit any attacks during 2011,
particularly those whose members have not attended home-grown groups in the EU nevertheless continued
violent jihadist training camps – continue to exhibit to act as effective force multipliers for violent jihadist
poor professional tradecraft. In this regard, suspects organisations overseas. Despite their relatively small
engaged in attack planning and preparation have done size, violent jihadist groups located in the Afghanistan-
so whilst maintaining an overtly high profile through Pakistan border region, such as the Deutsche Taliban
open postings on new media channels or committing Mudschahidin (DTM), interacted with EU home-grown
minor criminal acts of an extremist nature in tandem networks to pursue attack plots and gain additional
with their more clandestine activities. During 2011, a volunteers.
suspect resident in Germany sought to acquire compo-
nents for home-made explosives (HMEs) despite hav- Solo terrorists and lone actors
ing had his passport confiscated by German authorities As a consequence of sustained military pressure, al-
in 2009 after being suspected of attempting to travel Qaeda core have publicly discouraged sympathisers
to a training camp.
from travelling to conflict zones in order to join them. It
has instead promoted the idea of individually planned
Nevertheless, 2011 provided some indications of and executed attacks in Western countries without the
increasing sophistication amongst home-grown vio- active assistance of any larger organisation.
lent jihadists in some respects. Of note is an evolution
in modus operandi towards the production of HMEs for An indication of a deliberate shift by al-Qaeda core
use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) incorporat- towards formalising a strategy of individual violent
ing components extracted from commercially available jihad is seen through its media wing’s June 2011 release
commodities. Also noteworthy is the ongoing interest of a video message entitled You Are Held Responsible
in receiving flight training for terrorist purposes which, Only For Yourself. In this video, Osama bin Laden’s
in one instance during 2011, involved the use of a vir- successor, Aiman al-Zawahiri, and senior al-Qaeda
tual flight simulator as an alternative instructional tool. ideologues, defined, glorified and incited individual
violent jihadist lone actor attacks in addition to pro-
There are also indications that home-grown violent viding religious justification for them. The video dis-
suades potential jihadists in the West from travelling to conspicuousness of many lone actors when obtain-
Afghanistan-Pakistan and instead encourages them to ing component elements for an attack indicates the
commit attacks in their countries of residence.
shortcomings of al-Qaeda’s individual jihad strategy.
Moreover, through continued glorification of incompe-
Attacks by apparent solo terrorists targeted Western tent attackers, al-Qaeda has not encouraged scrutiny
interests outside Europe with differing degrees of suc- of failed attacks in order to avoid repeating earlier mis-
cess. Most notable was the Marrakech café bombing takes. Consequently, many individual violent jihad plots
in Morocco of 28 April 2011, which killed eight French have failed or have not achieved their full potential.
nationals, a Briton, a Dutchman, a Swiss and a Portu-
guese national. A solo terrorist firearms attack against 5.2. Terrorist activities
the US embassy in Sarajevo in October 2011 was mark-
edly less successful. Other efforts by radicalised indi- Logistics and facilitation
viduals to commit lone attacks elsewhere were foiled Home-grown networks or single persons in the EU
before execution or were poorly executed resulting in continue to support a variety of violent jihadist groups
elsewhere through providing funds or logistical assis-
tance. Other home-grown networks directly engaged
As with home-grown networks, solo home-grown ter- in attack planning have engaged the services of organ-
rorists present larger terrorist structures with the ability ised crime groups (OCGs) to assist their activities, such
to magnify their capabilities through offering to con- as in raising funds through common criminal acts.
duct attacks inside Western states in their name. A solo OCGs have at times been unaware of the terrorist
terrorist of Moroccan origin arrested in August 2011 intentions of those they support.
sought to support al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) in this manner by planning to poison the water Religiously-inspired terrorism continues to exploit EU
supplies of tourist locations in Spain, in retaliation for Member States in Eastern Europe for terrorism-related
the death of bin Laden.
activities. Various religiously-inspired elements have
attempted to establish connections with Eastern Euro-
Lone actor terrorist attacks, however, remain largely pean OCGs involved in the trafficking of human beings
amateur in their planning and execution, and a low- and the production of forged identity documents.
occurrence phenomenon overall. The success of an Other religiously-inspired terrorists have sought to
individual violent jihad attack is likely to be dictated by a enter the EU through this region, often by claiming ref-
combination of skills and training, together with ease of ugee status. A small number of known terrorists were
access to both weaponry and the potential target. Thus also able to capitalise on the refugee surge from North
far, individual jihadists have been incapable of reaching African states to the Italian island of Lampedusa as a
professional levels of planning and execution. Despite consequence of the Arab Spring events. Whilst such
instructing aspiring terrorists on the need for methodi- infiltration is of concern, the principal threat remains
cal preparation, the impetuous and semi-spontaneous that posed by home-grown religiously-inspired terror-
nature of many individual violent jihadists’ planning ism rather than the influx of foreign nationals.
activities suggests that al-Qaeda remains unable to
instil discipline and restrain impulsive acts. Despite the Internet propaganda
promotion of good tradecraft and security measures The engagement of religiously-inspired violent extrem-
by the online magazine, Inspire, the indiscretion and ists, often converts, in Internet activities to support vio-
magazine also identified potential targets, in particu-
lar publicly known persons who have, at some point
in time, been involved in controversy surrounding the
religion of Islam.
5.3. Terrorist situation
outside the EU
“Arab Spring” events in North African and
Middle Eastern countries
lent jihad remains high. The publication of articles and The revolts in a number of Arab countries starting in
videos on al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired Internet sites, late 2010, which resulted in the overturn of several
glorifying attacks for the purposes of recruitment and authoritarian governments in the region, were a severe
fundraising for the organisations, remained a constant setback for terrorist propaganda by al-Qaeda, its affili-
theme during 2011. Violent jihadist groups, such as the ates and supporters of its ideology. The protest move-
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic Movement of ments, most of which remained peaceful and secular
Uzbekistan (IMU), received support by EU nationals in character, illustrated the limited impact of al-Qaeda
posting propaganda texts and videos on the Internet, rhetoric on ordinary Arabs, and resulted in violent
to recruit suicide bombers and radicalise viewers.
jihadists being mere bystanders.
The killing of radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki and Weak governance in some Arab Spring states, together
online propagandist Samir Khan in Yemen in Septem- with the abundance of uncontrolled Libyan arms, in
ber 2011 had significant impact on the production of particular, remain causes for concern. Whilst al-Qaeda
propaganda targeting audiences in Western countries. and its regional affiliates were notably absent from the
Al-Awlaki had been one of the most vocal proponents protests, demonstrations and conflicts in early 2011,
of violence in the name of religion for years, addressing groups such as AQIM and the Nigerian Boko Haram had
his audiences in both English and Arabic. Samir Khan arguably enhanced their positions in some respects by
was the alleged editor of the English-language online the end of 2011. Both groups are likely to have used the
propaganda magazine, Inspire. Since their deaths, Libyan conflict to secure unknown quantities of arms
no new issues of Inspire have been published. In the and ammunition from Libyan arsenals either for future
course of 2010 the magazine had become one of the operations or for onward sale to finance their activities.
principal terrorist propaganda tools published in a
Al-Qaeda affiliates beyond Europe
AQIM continues to pose a notable threat to France
Before their deaths, four new issues of Inspire were and Spain, in particular. Despite repeated threaten-
published on the Internet in 2011. The magazine con- ing statements, the group has thus far failed to dem-
tinued its editorial line of encouraging its readers to onstrate any capacity to directly attack the European
take part in armed action either on “open fronts” or in continent. It has instead sought to finance individual
their home countries. At the same time, the magazine jihadists with personal connections in Europe who are
provided information on the handling of weapons and willing to conduct attacks on its behalf. AQIM never-
the production of improvised explosive devices. The theless carried out a number of kidnappings of West-
ern nationals in the Sahel and Maghreb regions in 2011.
Other religiously-inspired terrorist groups and cells in
the North African region remain intent on attacking
European nationals, as evidenced by the aforemen-
tioned Marrakech café bombing in Morocco.
The death of AQAP’s cleric and lead figure, Anwar al-
Awlaki, killed by a drone on 30 September 2011, was
a substantial blow to the organisation although it did
not directly reduce its operational capabilities. The
designer of the bomb packages intercepted on their
way to the US in October 2010, and of the portable
devices used in the attack on the Saudi Prince Muham- pings. Unknown groups, including Haraket al-Nahda
mad bin Nayef and in the failed attempt to create an wal-Islah (The Movement for Renewal and Reform) in
explosion on a flight between Amsterdam and Detroit Lebanon and the AQIM splinter group Jamat Tawhid
in 2009, is still among AQAP’s leaders.
Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Unity Movement for Jihad
in West Africa) in the Sahel region, claimed responsi-
Although al-Shabab has recently increased its appeal bility for kidnapping EU nationals in 2011. A group of
for European volunteers, the primary objective of the terrorists associated with Boko Haram kidnapped a
group is assessed to be the establishment of an Islamic British and an Italian engineer working for an Italian
state in Somalia rather than planning attacks overseas. construction firm in Nigeria in May 2011.
Nevertheless, individuals from the Somali diaspora in
particular may be inspired to initiate attacks by the The increasing number of groups issuing ransom
group’s propaganda output.
demands is likely to result in increased competition
and rivalry between different groups, particularly in
Northern and Western Africa, where encroachment by
Western nationals travelling or working in Africa, the kidnappers into the ‘territory’ of others may result in
Middle East and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border confrontation.
regions are increasingly being targeted for kidnap-
ping operations by al-Qaeda-inspired groups or other Opportunist organised crime groups in different
religiously-inspired terrorist organisations. Eight EU regions continue to transfer kidnapped victims to reli-
nationals remained hostages at the start of 2011. This giously-inspired terrorist groups, most likely for finan-
figure was increased by at least a further 24 in 2011. cial gain. Other regional OCGs and extremist political
It is assessed that the kidnappers primarily sought to groups may also seek to pose as violent jihadist groups,
secure financing for the terrorist groups concerned as additional leverage against government authorities.
through ransom demands rather than securing politi- The case of seven Estonian tourists kidnapped by Hara-
ket al-Nahda wal-Islah in Lebanon in March 2011 was
not related to terrorism and was not politically moti-
2011 also saw an increase in the number of new reli- vated. The Estonian investigation identified that the
giously-inspired terrorist groups engaged in kidnap- hostage-takers’ sole objective was to kidnap foreigners
for financial gain. The terrorist front group was created However, the legacy of bin Laden, in terms of radicalisa-
on an ad hoc basis for this specific operation. Similarly, tion and inspiration, is enormous. In the ten years since
kidnappings of westerners in the Horn of Africa have 9/11, al-Qaeda has metamorphosised from a small
blurred the distinction between pure criminality and group undertaking international plots into a concept of
global jihad operated by home-grown groups or indi-
viduals without specific direction from bin Laden. His
Death of Osama bin Laden
alliances with other jihadist groupings and the increas-
Whilst the death of Osama bin Laden is of undoubted ing concept of leaderless violent jihad are likely to be
importance, at least in symbolic terms, it has had lit- unaffected by his death.
tle immediate impact on the al-Qaeda affiliated or
inspired terrorism threat in the EU. The many state-
ments by violent jihadist groups and individuals threat-
ening attacks to avenge his death did not translate
into action in 2011. Nevertheless, EU Member States
have been highlighted as desirable targets for terrorist
attacks by al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda.
To a certain extent, bin Laden’s significance in the lead-
ership and direction of a global jihad against western
powers had diminished in recent years and his death,
almost 10 years after 9/11, has far less significance in
2011 than if it had occurred in the years immediately
after the attack. The ability of al-Qaeda core in Pakistan
to direct terrorist attacks abroad has likewise lessened
in tandem with the isolation of the al-Qaeda hierarchy
in the Pakistan region. Whilst bin Laden was arguably a
figure of increasingly peripheral importance, the ongo-
ing Arab Spring developments in the North African and
Middle East region are currently more significant.
6. Ethno nationalist and
• A significant decrease in the number of terrorist
attacks in Spain
• 110 attacks carried out in EU Member States
• 247 individuals arrested for separatist terrorism-
related offences in EU Member States
• EU Member States provide important logistical
support bases for groups based outside the EU
6.1. Terrorist attacks and
In 2011, 110 attacks were claimed or attributed to sepa-
ratist terrorist organisations in France and Spain, while
247 individuals were arrested for offences related to
separatist terrorism in EU Member States.
The majority of the individuals were arrested in France
(126), Republic of Ireland (68) and Spain (41).
Figure 5: Number of failed, foiled or completed
attacks and number of suspects arrested for
2011 was characterised by a significant decrease in ethno nationalist and separatist terrorism in
terrorist activities by ETA and its support groups, fol- Member States in 2011
lowing the announcements made by ETA regarding
the establishment of a ceasefire and, later, about the
definitive cessation of its armed activity.
The extortion of entrepreneurs in the Basque region
In 2011, ETA committed one terrorist attack in France and Navarre (ETA’s main sources of income) seems to
(Valliere, Creuse). Two ETA members opened fire have disappeared, following a decision taken by ETA
against the Gendarmerie while trying to escape from in the context of the cease-fire announced in January
a police checkpoint. In this attack one person was 2011. However, ETA sympathisers reportedly carried
out a “door-to-door” campaign at Christmas to collect
funds from small shops and stores: a “volunteer” con-
Street violence carried out by ETA sympathisers also tribution was requested and the names of those who
decreased significantly in 2011. Only 13 attacks were refused to contribute were recorded.16
perpetrated in the Basque region and Navarre, mostly
making use of home-made explosive and incendiary
15 Crónica (bulletin number 1560), Vasco Press, 9 January 2012.
16 Interior afirma que ETA recauda fondos para tener vivo su ‘aparato logístico, El Mundo, 23 January 2012.
The dismantling of several ETA cells and the seizure Police and judicial activity against ETA, at national
of explosives in Spain, France and Portugal over the and international level, continued in 2011, irrespective
past few years have brought ETA to one of its weakest of the announcements made by the organisation. As
a result, 55 persons were arrested for their member-
ship, support or criminal/terrorist links to ETA.
The most relevant communiqués issued in 2011 were
published on 10 January and 20 October. In the first The most relevant arrests were made in March in Viz-
one, ETA announced a general and permanent cease- caya (Spain), when an operational commando was
fire which could be verified by an “ad-hoc” inter- dismantled,17 and in April in Guipuzcoa (Spain), when
national commission, in an attempt to involve the a logistic cell in charge of producing, storing and
international community in the so-called Basque distributing explosive materials was apprehended.
conflict. In its statement of 20 October (recorded in This last operation confirms the trend that ETA has
a video and distributed to two Basque newspapers, moved, or tried to move, its logistic bases from the
as well as to The New York Times and the BBC), ETA south of France to the north of Spain (Basque region
made public its decision to definitively cease its armed and Cataluña), as well as to Portugal.
The Galician pro-independence movement carried
Although in 2011 ETA announced a permanent cease- out 12 attacks in Galicia. Four attacks can be attrib-
fire and the end of its campaign to collect money via uted with certainty to Resistencia Galega (RG), while
extortion, the recruitment of new members and the the remaining eight were perpetrated by persons or
collection of information on new and future targets small groups ideologically involved in the so-called
are still ongoing. ETA has not announced the surren- radical pro-independence fight.
der of its weaponry or the dissolution of the terrorist
In October, RG published a communiqué on the Inter-
net claiming responsibility for several attacks carried
Experience based on similar announcements made out against political parties, real estate and construc-
in the past may lead to the conclusion that ETA could tion companies, banks, etc., and announced the con-
resume its terrorist activities at any moment, if they tinuation of its terrorist activities by increasing its
fail to achieve their political goals: the establishment armed attacks.
of a peace talk process with the Spanish and French
governments to create an independent state, com- In November and December, a total of six RG mem-
prising the Spanish and French Basque regions plus bers were arrested in Spain. After searching several
Navarre. The appearance of splinter groups, compris- houses, police seized home-made explosive devices.
ing the most radical ETA members, who are against Allegedly, RG had planned coordinated attacks to be
the cessation of terrorist activities, cannot be ruled perpetrated on the anniversary of the approval of the
17 The operational commando, made up of four terrorists, was inactive between 2006 and 2009, and is thought to be responsible for, at least, two casualties.
Dissident republican (DR) terrorist groups (Real Irish Although the number of individuals arrested linked
Republican Army (RIRA), Continuity Irish Republican to the PKK is decreasing, Europe remains a logistical
Army (CIRA), Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) and others) support base for funding, recruitment, training and
remain the most significant threat to national security propaganda. To fulfil these logistical activities, the
in Northern Ireland and, over the past two years, DR PKK has a network of recruiters across Europe, which
groups have demonstrated the capability to carry out could be a cause of concern.
a range of IED and shooting attacks against security In 2011, individuals were arrested for membership of
forces and other targets. Most DR groups are heavily the PKK or criminal support activities to the PKK in
involved in criminal activities such as robberies, extor- France, Germany and Romania.
tion, tobacco and fuel smuggling and paramilitary
assaults within their own community.
The majority of the suspects arrested were involved in
fundraising for guerrilla operations in Turkey and for
The murder of a Catholic police constable in April 2011 the maintenance of guerrilla camps in northern Iraq.
in the UK was the first fatal attack by dissident repub- Some of the funds collected are believed to be used
licans since 2009. Police staff remained the principal to sponsor EU-based propaganda centres and train-
target of dissident republicans, although attacks on ing camps.
premises in public areas, notably high street banks
and the Londonderry City of Culture office, risked Extortion, money laundering, facilitating illegal immi-
gration, drugs and human trafficking remain the main
crimes committed by PKK members in Europe as well
The CIRA, which is undergoing a period of internal as their main profit generators.
turmoil, does not appear to have developed the same
level of consistency in its capabilities as RIRA. The The PKK committed several terrorist attacks on Turk-
CIRA is currently undergoing organisational restruc- ish territory in 2011; however, the total number of
turing but the effective takeover of the CIRA by a attacks committed on Turkish soil has decreased.
potentially more radical internal element remains a
cause for concern.
The tactics used to commit attacks are mainly
unchanged. Use of booby-trapped improvised devices
The RIRA’s continued success in terms of deployment and numbers of coordinated armed attacks carried
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) across a wide out against the military, security services and border
range of targets in Northern Ireland is also a cause for police posts have occurred in predominantly Kurdish
concern. It is evident that, in the past two years, RIRA areas of South-East Turkey.
has improved its engineering and technical capabili-
However some changes in modus operandi have been
observed, for example through the kidnapping of
In France, 62 completed attacks and 13 attempted teachers, targeting of schools and hijacking of public
attacks were reported. All these attacks were carried transport.
out by Corsican terrorist groups. Their main target
remains the tourism sector. Holiday homes and res-
taurants are often targeted.
In the rest of the world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) did not carry out any attacks; no indi-
viduals were arrested in the Member States in 2011.
However, LTTE was re-listed as a terrorist entity by
the EU in July 2011 and the organisation is still consid-
ered active in some EU States.
Currently, the LTTE is assessed to have split into
‘peaceful’ factions that advocate the use of political
means, and ‘active militant’ factions advocating vio-
lence to achieve their aims.
The militant factions of the LTTE are actively looking
for support for their cause in terms of financing, logis-
tics and propaganda in Member States with a large
Tamil diaspora. These militant factions are suspected
of using extortion, running illegal lotteries and human
trafficking to collect funds, and of spreading propa-
ganda on radio and TV stations and via numerous
websites. Many of these activities have been carried
out by various front organisations.
In general, the threat posed by the LTTE is considered
low and attacks by the LTTE in the EU are unlikely.
There is a risk, however, that inter-ethnic (Tamil) con-
flicts could sometimes erupt into violence.
7. Left-wing and anarchist
• 37 terrorist attacks carried out in EU Member States
• 42 individuals arrested in EU Member States
• Increased cooperation between environmental and
left-wing violent extremist and terrorist groups
7.1. Terrorist attacks and
In 2011, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain
reported a total of 37 terrorist attacks by left-wing and
anarchist groups. This number represents a decrease
compared to 2010, when 45 attacks were reported. The
majority of incidents were arson attacks and mainly
targeted government and businesses. The number
of bomb attacks decreased from 23 in 2010 to 11 in
2011. While in 2010 attacks by left-wing and anarchist
groups claimed the lives of six people, in 2011 one per-
son in Greece lost his life during the construction of an Figure 6: Number of failed, foiled or completed at-
improvised explosive device (IED) in the basement of a tacks and number of suspects arrested for left-wing
building. In Italy, two people were injured in separate and anarchist terrorism in Member States in 2011
attacks during the year.
A total of 42 persons were arrested in 2011 for left-wing military barracks and a tax collection company in Italy,
and anarchist terrorist offences in 5 EU Member States: a prison in Greece, the headquarters of a bank in Ger-
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. As in many, the Greek Embassy in France, and the offices
2010, when 34 arrested suspects were reported, most of the Nuclear Industry Federation in Switzerland.
of the arrests occurred in Greece, Italy and Spain. The The devices in Germany and Greece were intercepted
majority of those arrested were suspected of member- before they exploded, but in the other instances three
ship of a terrorist organisation.
people were injured.
The Italian anarchist group FAI (Federazione Anarchica
Similar to 2010, when 12 suspected members of the Informale)
claimed responsibility for a number attacks terrorist organisation Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias
in Italy, Greece, Germany and Switzerland in 2011. For arrested, continued efforts by law enforcement author-
years, the group’s modus operandi has been the coor- ities in Greece in 2011 resulted in additional arrests and
dinated delivery of IEDs by mail or the placing of sev- seizures of large quantities of weapons. The number of
eral IEDs with different targets on the same date.
terrorist attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups in
Greece decreased from 20 in 2010 to six in 2011.
In two separate campaigns, one in March and another In April 2011, law enforcement authorities in Denmark
one in December 2011, parcel bombs were sent to a arrested five persons held responsible for a number of
arson attacks targeting police buildings, a bank and the
Greek Embassy in Copenhagen.
Violent extremist anarchists committed 20 attacks in
2011 in Spain, where the number of arrests has con-
tinued to decrease since 2007. In 2011, two violent
extremist anarchists were arrested in Spain. A further
three arrests were carried out in the framework of
international cooperation to fight terrorism.
other ideological themes of left-wing/anarchist activ-
7.2. Terrorist and violent ism in the Netherlands. Also, in France, a number of
incidents were motivated by the expulsion of asylum
seekers. Besides the traditional meetings and pro-
While the use of incendiary devices by left-wing or test demonstrations, a number of violent incidents,
violent anarchist extremists is not new, the targeting such as arson attacks, clashes with police and criminal
of specific weak points of the railway infrastructure is damage, occurred in 2011. A significant incident in the
notable. Throughout 2011, left-wing/anarchist extrem- Netherlands was a home visit - a tactic frequently used
ists targeted rail facilities in Germany, Italy and Finland. by violent animal rights extremists - damaging the
Between 10 and 13 October 2011, a total of 18 impro- house of the CEO of a construction company. Compa-
vised incendiary devices were discovered at nine rail- nies involved in the construction of detention centres
way locations in Germany. The attacks were claimed for asylum seekers or prisons are preferred targets of
by a previously unknown group. The group justified the anarchist extremists.
placement of the devices as a direct response to Ger- Confrontations between anti-fascist groups and their
man military deployment in Afghanistan and the fact right-wing opponents have hardened and become
that the German railway system provides logistical increasingly violent in recent years.
support for the German army.
While criminal offences in this context in Germany are
Attacks linked to Greek or Italian anarchist circles occur predominantly committed in the context of right-wing
frequently in Europe. In most cases, the motivation is meetings and parades, activists in the Czech Republic
an expression of solidarity with imprisoned anarchists. focus increasingly on attacking individuals. In Swe-
Similar to 2010, signs of increased transnational coor- den, actions have focused on representatives of the
dination between groups were observed in 2011. Com- Sweden Democrats party. In 2011, a number of local
muniqués issued by the Greek terrorist organisation and regional party representatives received harassing Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias
advocated the need to estab- emails and home visits.
lish “an international network of anarchist individuals A shift in direction in some anarchist protests towards
and groups”. The renewed activism of the FAI can be environmental issues was already identified in 2010 in
seen in this context. In documents found inside their the UK. In 2011, anarchists joined the ranks of protest-
parcel bombs, reference is made to the call by Syno-
ers in France and Italy during demonstrations against mosia Pyrinon Fotias
the construction of the future airport of Notre Dame
The number of incidents related to the so-called “No des Landes in Nantes, and the high-speed railway line
Border” campaign is relatively high in comparison to linking France and Italy in Val di Susa.
8. Right-wing terrorism
• The threat from right-wing terrorism and violent
Cologne in 2001 and 2004. These attacks injured more
extremism comes from undetected lone actors
than 30 people, most of them foreigners.
or small groups rather than established extreme
8.2. Violent right-wing
• One right-wing terrorist attack in EU Member
• Five individuals arrested for right-wing terrorism in
During 2011, several Member States reported activi-
EU Member States
ties by violent right-wing extremist groups. The per-
ception of these incidents among the public is shaped
in particular by xenophobic (violent) offences, and
8.1. Terrorist attacks and right-wing parades often referring to public occasions
or commemorations. Violent attacks appear to be, in
most cases, the result of an accidental encounter or a
One right-wing terrorist attack was reported by Spain reciprocal provocation.
in 2011. On 2 November, an arson attack was commit-
ted in Terrassa (Barcelona) on the facilities of a publish- In September 2011, Bulgaria experienced heavy unrest
ing company and an anti-capitalist cooperative society. after the van of a Roma family ran over and killed a
The incident did not cause any casualties or fatalities.
19-year-old man. An angry crowd of about 2000 peo-
ple gathered and attacked three houses owned by the
Five persons were arrested for being involved in right- Roma leader in the village, shouting anti-Roma slo-
wing terrorism. All arrests took place in Germany gans. Further violent demonstrations by nationalist
and were linked to the right-wing extremist/terror- youths gradually spread to other towns. A total of 127
ist group called “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund
persons were arrested during the escalations. The vio-
– NSU” (National Socialist Underground), connected lence was thought to be the worst since 1997, when an
to alleged politically-motivated murders committed economic crisis and hyperinflation brought Bulgarian
between 2001 and 2007.
citizens to the streets.
The group is suspected of being responsible for the The Czech Republic has also experienced rising ten-
murders of nine people of Turkish and Greek origin, as sions against the ethnic minority of Roma people. The
well as for the shooting of a German police woman and escalations started after a group of Roma attacked an
the attempted murder of a male German police officer. individual with a machete last summer in a bar close
The politically- motivated and xenophobic background to the town of Varnsdorf in Bohemia. The Czech ‘Work-
was revealed from pieces of evidence seized after ers Party of Social Justice’ - Delnická Strana Sociálni
two of the NSU members committed suicide in early Spravedlnosti
(DSSS) - seems to have taken advantage
November 2011, having being pursued by the police of this situation and mobilised their regional work by
following a bank robbery. Apart from this, the two male establishing local and regional affiliated organisa-
suspects are believed to be connected to a series of tions, as well as organising frequent anti-Roma protest
bank robberies which they used to finance their opera- marches in several towns.
tions and their undercover lives. Moreover, the sus-
pects are allegedly involved in two explosive attacks in Growing concerns over austerity programmes due to
for the conviction and imprisonment of important rep-
resentatives of the ‘Portuguese Hammerskins’ (PHS),
is trying to recover its strength through the right-wing
music scene and close cooperation with other groups
in Europe. In doing so, an international meeting called
“White Christmas” was organised for the PHS on the
the economic crisis, immigration and multiculturalism outskirts of Lisbon on 3 December 2011.
issues, combined with disillusion with mainstream poli-
tics, may lead to an increase in violent right-wing activi- Acquisition of weapons, ammunition
Several Member States confirmed that members of
Suggestions made in open sources that the attacks in the extreme right-wing scene have access to and/or
Norway in July 2011 were acts of right-wing terrorism, harbour ambitions to acquire weapons, ammunition
or had links with right-wing extremist groups in the EU, and/or explosives, both legally and illegally. In particu-
have not been substantiated.
lar, the ideological orientation on historical National
Socialism, combined with an appreciation of the vir-
International links exist within the violent extreme tue of discipline, often goes along with an affinity for
right-wing scene, but they vary significantly in weapons and arms. This explains the fact that legal
strength. Major public events, such as days of honour, possession of (fire)arms is relatively common among
annual commemoration marches, demonstrations or violent right-wing extremists.
music concerts, play a key role in establishing contacts.
Whilst the seizure of illegal weapons and ammuni-
Propaganda and recruitment
tion, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
Recruitment and the distribution of violent extreme or materials used for the production of IEDs, may be
right-wing propaganda are major causes of concern. an indication of a certain level of militancy for at least
Several Member States carried out investigations on some parts of the scene, police authorities say that this
phenomenon often relates more to the aspect of their
subculture, than to an intention to use these weapons
The Internet, and in particular social network platforms for terrorist ends. Nonetheless, it should be taken into
where White Power Music (WPM) is promoted, is a account that these illegal weapons might be used in
cause of concern.
sporadic incidents to cause significant harm.
In regard to this, the Swedish authorities reported that As in previous years, several arrested right-wing vio-
their WPM movement engages in a series of activities lent extremists were acting alone. These individuals
covering many aspects of the activists’ lives. Most of might share an ideological identification with a violent
their projects are of a social nature and aim to influ- extremist organisation, but do not necessarily commu-
ence public opinion. Portuguese authorities reported nicate with the organisation with which they identify
that their right-wing scene, which has to compensate themselves.
18 “Far Right on Rise in Europe”. www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-europe-report.
9. Single-issue terrorism
• Increased activity by violent animal rights extrem-
to have similarities with violent left-wing extrem-
ist groups have a significant impact on the busi-
ist groups, which could be an explanation for the
increased cooperation between violent left-wing and
• Violent single-issue extremist groups focus on a
violent environmental extremist groups.
broad range of targets, including indirectly related
institutions and businesses
These groups will continue to attract radical individu-
• Increased cross-border cooperation between sev-
als who are ready to use violent tactics. Professional-
eral types of violent extremist groups is a cause for
ism and the often high competencies and capabilities concern
of the group members, such as the effective use of the
Internet for recruitment and propaganda, increase the
threat posed by these groups.
No single-issue terrorist attacks or arrests were
reported by Member States in 2011. Nevertheless, a 9.1. Single-issue terrorist
number of incidents were reported by France, Italy,
and violent extremist
the Netherlands, the UK and the Republic of Ireland
and additional monitoring of open sources shows
that a large number of incidents are never reported Animal rights violent extremism
to the police. These activities carried out by violent It is difficult to estimate the total number of Animal
animal rights extremists (ARE) and violent environ- rights violent extremism (ARE) incidents carried out,
mental extremist groups range from fairly low-level because of Member States’ tendency to focus only on
vandalism incidents to significant acts of destruction major incidents in their reporting. The pharmaceutical
and the use of incendiary or improvised explosive industry reported 262 incidents worldwide in 2011.19
Although the majority of these incidents are demon-
strations with a small number of persons involved, they
Despite the low number of major incidents, the groups’ have a serious impact on these businesses. In addition,
activities remain a cause for concern. Incidents result in they are the main propaganda tool for violent ARE
damage worth millions of Euros to the companies and groups. The pharmaceutical industries and research
institutions involved. Single individuals linked to these laboratories associated with medical schools and clin-
companies, or sometimes even random people, are ics which test food, cosmetics, and medicines on ani-
targeted as victims.
mals, are the favoured target of violent ARE groups.
Related businesses, such as the financial institutions
Although there is no prototype of single-issue violent financing this research, are also becoming a target for
extremist groups or actors, some broad characteris- these groups.
tics apply. The majority are relatively young and can
be found in the group of idealistic, often relatively An airline company transporting animals to different
deprived, youngsters who do not agree with some laboratories throughout the world was also targeted
movements in society and therefore seek to achieve by demonstrations; an airline-sponsored golf green
their goals through violent action. These groups tend was destroyed.
19 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA.
impact if carried out. Additionally, they seek support
via their websites and social networks through disinfor-
mation campaigns. In one case, an ARE group illegally
entered multiple pig and rabbit farms. The footage they
shot inside these farms was published later to show the
alleged malpractices taking place in these farms.
Future changes in legislation regarding animal rights
in the Member States may trigger new and increased
Although the majority of ARE activities are low-scale actions by violent ARE groups.
incidents, an increasing number of Member States
report an intensification of violent extremist activities. Violent environmental extremist groups focus on tar-
Some of these incidents involve incendiary or impro- gets accused of polluting the environment in a broad
vised explosive devices, assaults on persons or hoax sense, such as construction companies, the energy and
bomb telephone calls. Groups such as Stop Hunting- transport sectors, nuclear power and nano-technology.
don Animal Cruelty (SHAC), Militant Forces against The number of incidents remains limited in the EU.
Huntingdon Life Sciences (MFAH) and National Anti-
Vivisection Alliance (NAVA), have been involved in In France, demonstrations against the construction of
assaults on pharmaceutical company personnel and two new airports escalated and resulted in eight casu-
have targeted businesses related to the animal testing alties among law enforcement officers. There were
sector with improvised explosive devices.
also protests against the construction of high-speed
rail connections between France and Italy.
Violent extremist incidents are also related to the
meat, fish and poultry industry, including fast food res- The use of nuclear power remains a focal issue for
taurants and even butchers. In Italy, offices of the Food environmental extremist groups. Traditional actions
Science Department of the University of Bologna were against radioactive waste transport between Member
set on fire and Animal Liberation Front activists set fire States continue.
to a fast food restaurant. The fur and leather industry
is another target. In 2011, there were some minor inci- Gene and nano-technology research is a recent tar-
dents: fur shop owners were threatened and fur coats get for violent environmental extremist groups. Fur-
were sprayed with paint. Incidents also related to other ther developments in these sectors could lead to an
activities involving animals, such as hunting shops, cir- increase in violent activities against them.
cuses and kennels.
Joint transnational protests and actions by violent
Propaganda on the Internet is one of the main tools of left-wing extremist and violent environmental extrem-
violent ARE groups. Most of their actions are published ist groups could be an indication of stronger ties and
and claimed via their websites. The professional man- increased cooperation between these groups. The
agement of these websites gives the impression that future threat of violent environmental extremism
some ARE groups are supported by a large group and might be influenced by cooperation with other violent
that their announced activities might have a serious extremist groups.
10. Trends and future
The outstanding feature identified in this report is the Returning jihadists
from conflict zones continue to wide diversity of threats posed by terrorist and vio-
pose a threat to the EU Member States. These individ-lent extremist groups
to EU Member States.
uals not only have the intention, but also the increased
knowledge, to prepare attacks.
The efforts of al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorists
are likely to remain concentrated on attacking their The connections between terrorist, violent extrem-
long-standing targets in EU Member States and may ist and organised crime
networks may become more
seek to capitalise on major events such as the London
blurred. Terrorist and violent extremist activities are Olympics
to maximise their impact. Violent extrem- often financed through crime or organised crime
ist groups are targeting a broad range of sectors and activities. In some cases the same individuals who are
increasing their influence via social media and the engaged in terrorism or violent extremism are also
involved in organised crime activities.
There is no single factor that explains radicalisation
, The further globalisation of communication
nor is there any agreed method to discover if a radical- the influence that terrorist and violent extremist
ised individual might commit violence. But, radicalisa- groups have on their communities and followers.
tion that can lead to terrorism and violent extremism Through radicalisation and mobilisation in the real and
is often found among the most vulnerable individuals virtual worlds, these groups will seek even more advo-
cacy, support and participation at political, diplomatic
Violent extremist groups make use of social tensions and military levels.
to increase this radicalisation via their propaganda and
The different modi operandi used in the violent extrem-
ist incidents in Norway in July 2011, as well as the inves-
will remain a key player
in the field tigation of the “National Socialist Underground” group
of religiously-inspired terrorism. It will seek to further in Germany, have demonstrated the devastating effect
determine the agenda of associated groups but will of firearms
. Since the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the
also try to influence the thinking of vulnerable groups potential impact of a successful firearms assault
been obvious and may be chosen by future attackers.
Religiously-inspired terrorism will continue to be The increasing sensitivity in society to environmental
largely driven and sustained by geo-political devel-
issues may lead to an increase in violent actions by
and changes in the Middle East, the Sahel single-issue violent extremist
region and the Horn of Africa.
It is likely that attacks from violent jihadist home
grown and independent cells
will surpass the threat of
the structured groups such as AQIM and AQAP directly
linked to al-Qaeda.
Annex 1: Acronyms and translations
Animal Liberation Front
Acción Nacionalista Vasca
Basque Nationalist Action
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Tanzim qa’idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-‘arab
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Tanzim al-qa’ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami
Animal rights extremism
Continuity Irish Republican Army
Distributed Denial of Service
Delnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti
Workers Party of Social Justice
Deutsche Taliban Mudschahidin
Euskadi ta Askatasuna
Basque Fatherland and Liberty
Federazione Anarchica Informale
Informal Anarchist Federation
Improvised explosive device
Improvised incendiary device
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Irish National Liberation Army
EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
(formerly the European Union Situation Centre (SITCEN))
Justice and Home Affairs
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Sciences
National Anti-Vivisection Alliance
National Socialist Underground
Organised crime group
Oglaigh na hEireann
(dissident republican paramilitary group split from CIRA)
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
Real Irish Republican Army
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
Conspiracy of Fire Cells Athens-Thessalonica
Tamil Coordinating Committee
European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
Working Party on Terrorism of the Council of the EU
Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
White power music
Annex 2: Failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2011
per Member State and per affiliation20
20 In 2011, Northern Ireland experienced 26 involved attacks on national security targets - there were no other attacks on national security targets in the UK in
2011. Attacks on national security include those targeting principally (but not exclusively) the security forces, those who support them and premises and institu-
tions associated with policing, justice and security.
Annex 3: Arrests in 2011 per Member State and per
Ireland (Rep. of)
21 For the UK the figures represent the number of charges for 2011, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in the other
Member States. However, at this stage in the criminal justice process, it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.
Annex 4: Data convictions and penalties (Eurojust)
Ireland (Republic of)
4.1. Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorism charges per Member State in 2009,
2010 and 201122
22 Data received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for the TE-SAT 2010 and 2011 could not be included in the respective reports.
In 2011 the data for Belgium includes a proceeding in which three members of the right-wing group “Blood & Honour” were tried for racism and xenophobia
charges. The data confirmed by Republic of Ireland does not cover the whole of 2011. The data for the UK does not cover Northern Ireland. In Republic of Ireland,
two individuals were brought to court for whom a nolle was later entered. In the UK, one individual pleaded guilty but passed away before the court pronounced
its decision. These three are included in the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings in 2011 but not in the number of verdicts. According to the
information provided by national authorities, in 2011 a number of individuals appeared in more than one different court proceeding: one person appeared in five
different court proceedings, two persons appeared in four different court proceedings, five appeared in three different court proceedings, and 13 appeared in two
different court proceedings. One of these individuals was tried in France and all the others in Spain. The verdicts pronounced in the different proceedings were
counted separately when analysing the number of verdicts by country, type of terrorism and severity of penalties.
Ireland (Republic of)
4.2. Number of convictions/acquittals for terrorism charges in 2011, per Member State and per affiliation23
23 The numbers do not include the two individuals in Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the UK.
Ireland (Republic of)
4.3. Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per Member State in 201124
24 The numbers do not include the two individuals in the Republic of Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the United Kingdom.
Pending judicial remedy
Ireland (Republic of)
4.4. Number of final and not final verdicts per Member State in 201125
25 The numbers do not include the two individuals in Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the United Kingdom
Annex 5: Methodology
For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qual- In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the Frame-
itative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the work Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT
EU and data on arrests of people on suspicion of involve- 2012 respects Member States’ definitions of terrorist
ment in those offences, provided or confirmed by Mem- offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to
ber States. Similar data were collected, when available, assess whether a criminal event is to be regarded as an
of offences in which EU interests were affected outside act of ‘terrorism’ or as an act of ‘extremism’. Contrary to
of the EU. Eurojust has contributed data on convictions terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of
and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States. violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may
In addition, open source information gathered by Europol be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural
was used for the production of this report.
patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2012 mentions criminal
acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy
Included as ‘arrests’ are those judicial arrests warranted the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or
by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person social structures of a country, when they were reported
is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to pro-
a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by vide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation
national law. The fact that the person may subsequently to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in
be provisionally released or placed under house arrest the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect
does not impact on the calculation of the number of incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.
Types of terrorism
The definition of the term ‘terrorist offences’ is indicated The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their
in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June source of motivation. However, many groups have a mix-
2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),26 which all ture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ide-
Member States have implemented in their national leg- ology or motivation dominates. The choice of categories
islation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU,
offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or as reported by Member States. The categories are not
context, may seriously damage a country or an interna- necessarily mutually exclusive.
tional organisation when committed with the aim of:
Religiously-inspired terrorism is perpetrated by individu-
• seriously intimidating a population, or
als, groups, networks or organisations that evoke religion
• unduly compelling a government or international to justify their actions. Al-Qaeda inspired or affiliated
organisation to perform or abstain from performing groups belong to this group.
an act, or
• seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are
political, constitutional, economic or social structures motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.
of a country or an international organisation.
26 Amended by the Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008.
Left-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire polit- Eurojust also collected data on the basis of the afore-
ical, social and economic system of a state according to mentioned EU Council Decision, according to which the
an extremist leftist model. Their ideology is often Marxist- Member States are equally obliged to collect all relevant
Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist groups is usu- information concerning prosecutions and convictions for
ally revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. terrorist offences and send the data to Eurojust. Eurojust
Not all Member States distinguish between activities of cross-checked the collected data with the Member States
left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contribu- and, in case of divergences or gaps, this data was also cor-
tions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the rected, complemented and then validated. If convictions
same chapter of this report.
that took place in 2011 were appealed but came to a con-
clusion before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the
Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire proceedings as one. The arrests and convictions may be
political, social and economic system on an extrem- related to terrorist offences that took place before 2011
ist right-wing model. The ideological roots of European and, consequently, may not be related to activities and
right-wing extremism and terrorism can usually be traced attacks referred to in the TE-SAT 2012.
back to National Socialism.
Single-issue terrorism is violence committed with the
desire to change a specific policy or practice within a tar-
get society. The term is generally used to describe animal
rights and environmental terrorist groups.
The EU Council Decision on the exchange of informa-
tion and cooperation concerning terrorist offences of
20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA) obliges Member
States to collect all relevant information concerning
and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by
their law enforcement authorities with respect to ter-
rorist offences, and sets out the conditions under which
this information should be sent to Europol. Europol pro-
cessed the data and the results were cross-checked with
the Member States and, in case of divergences or gaps,
corrected and complemented, and then validated by the
Annex 6: Implementation of the EU framework decision
on combating terrorism in the EU Member States –
Changes in Member States during 2011
In Austria a provision concerning training for terrorism A new DNA law of 7 November 2011 was adopted, where
was included in the Criminal Code (§ 278e), which has terrorism has been inserted in relation to adding the pro-
been in force since 1 January 2011.
file of convicted persons to the database of convicted per-
With the Federal Law Gazette No. 103/2011, published sons.
on 21.11.2011 (BGBl. 103/2011), §§ 278f and 282a were
included in the Austrian Criminal Code implementing
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 Novem-
ber 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA A law of 28 July 2011 implementing amendments
on combating terrorism. According to § 278f it is punish- (adopted on 8 July 2005) to the Vienna Convention, on the
able to provide instructions to commit a terrorist offence; physical protection of nuclear materials, was adopted and
§ 282a punishes the public provocation to commit a ter- could have an indirect/potential link to terrorist offences.
rorist offence and approval of terrorist offences.
In addition, § 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code imple-
ments Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28
November 2008 on combating certain forms and expres-
sions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law
(this provision deals with preachers of hatred).
§§ 278f, 282a and 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code have
been in force since 1 January 2012.
EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
2012 – 45 pp. 21 x 29,7 cm
ISSN Number: 1830-9712
ISBN Number: 978-92-95078-23-9
ISSN Number: 1830-9712