JOINT OPERATION GOOD WILL
OPERATIONAL PLAN

Ref.: 7432/02.07.2009

Operational plan approved, 03/07/2009

Head of Joint Operation Unit
on behalf of
Director of Operations Division

Head of Risk Analysis Unit

Head of Land Border Sector
on behalf of
Head of Joint Operations Unit

Commented [A1]: The non-disclosed text contains the names of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.
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1. Risk Analysis Background

According to the ARA 2009, in the year 2008, nationals from the CIS countries mostly from Russia and Ukraine represented about 2% of all detections of illegal border crossing at EU level (about 4,200 detections out of 174,000), and about 4% of all detections for illegal stay (20,200 out of 480,000), suggesting a limited flow of illegal migration of CIS nationals to the EU.

The highest rates of detections along the eastern EU external borders were made at the border with Ukraine, which also appears to be the land border with the largest regular traffic. The northern area of the eastern land border with Russia appears not only to have low detection rates along the border, but also rather low regular traffic.

As the CIS countries might also be countries of transit for illegal migration to Europe, it is interesting to consider the detections reported by Member States at the eastern external land borders of the EU. The detections during the whole year of 2008 at the eastern land border (Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) totaled 6,200. Of this total, 5,200 detections were reported from the land border sections of three Member States: Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, most of which at the external border with Ukraine (5,000).

The analysis of the data collected from the Member States for the First Quarterly 2009 reveals that:

most refusals of entry and detections of attempted illegal entries at the eastern external land borders of the EU affected nationals of the neighboring countries such as: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and only to a lower extent Russian nationals (see chart below);

Refusals of entry for a selection of main nationalities

Source: FRAN data as of 27th May 2009

Detections along the eastern land border continued to represent about 3% of all detections for illegal border crossing along the overall EU external border. More than 85% of all detections took place at the border with Ukraine. Along this border, detections dropped from more than 300 in the first quarter 2008 to less than 100 in the first quarter 2009. The drop is due to the absence of detections of nationals from Pakistan, Iraq and Bangladesh in the first quarter 2009 (they totalled 244 in the first quarter 2008).
Finland reported the unusual detections of 14 nationals from Afghanistan in March-April crossing illegally their land border with Russia. On their side, the Russian border guards informed of the detections of 52 nationals from Afghanistan at the border with Finland. Since they did not have travel documents, the Russian border guards suspect that they might have come from the Central Asian Republics, posing as Afghan nationals to increase their chance of obtaining asylum. They might have decided to get to the EU after they lost their businesses or jobs in Russia because of the economic crisis. Similar detections, also at the land borders of Estonia and Latvia, might increase in the near future, as the weather conditions become more favorable for illegal border crossing.

It has to be noted that Lithuania has a specific situation with Russia as its territory is used as a transit corridor to the Kaliningrad Enclave. Special transit rules\(^1\) are applied for the traveling of Russian citizens crossing Lithuania.

After the Schengen enlargement in 2008 the Facilitated Transit Document may offer opportunities for abuse since it functions similarly to a Schengen transit visa, but specifically for Russian citizens for the purpose of crossing Lithuania to Kaliningrad by road. This could be attractive for Belorussian nationals to whom the Schengen visa costs 60 EUR. The EU has no agreement on visa facilitation with Belarus. A proposal for a local border traffic agreement between Belarus and Lithuania was rejected in its current form as Vilnius falls within the border zone where the EU local border crossing agreement would authorise the legal stay. Reliable migration controls could not be guaranteed by the Lithuanian authorities.

An Internal ferry line linking the Baltic States to Finland and Sweden may become targeted by illegal migrants. In this regard the facilitated transit of persons from Russia to Kaliningrad may be exploited.

Finally the abuse of seamen visa should also be considered as an increasingly appearing modus operandi in the New Member States especially in the Baltic States and Poland.

Besides illegal migration, various cross-border crimes have been reported along the eastern land border, in particular the smuggling of highly taxed goods like cigarettes.

To conclude, even though the above mentioned shows that there is some pressure at the EU external borders with Russia, the level of such threat does not reach the threshold that should be addressed by a joint operation with the purpose of reducing the attempts of illegal entry in the EU or reinforcing the borders by allocating additional manpower or equipment.

However, the initiative proposed by Russian border guard authorities with the involvement of Frontex, through cooperation including the exchange of information and best practices at the external EU land borders is considered an important element in enhancing security.

Besides the gathering and exchange of information related to illegal migration, reports received should address also various cross-border crimes that are typical along the eastern land border, in particular the smuggling of highly taxed goods like cigarettes.

To create a relevant overview on the situation at the common the EU MSs and the Russian Federations land border, it would be of a high value to receive information from a whole border.

\(^1\) Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 (3) and (EC) No 694/2003 (4).
2. General Objective

General objective is to strengthen the cooperation and to enhance mutual trust between Border Guard Services of Russian Federation, Member States and Frontex

2.1. Specific objectives

The specific objectives are:

- To exchange information on a daily basis;
- To exchange the information on illegal immigration between Russian Federation, neighboring Member States and Frontex;
- To have an updated picture on the situation concerning the illegal immigration flow across green borders and BCPs to the EU.

2.2. Operational method

The operation will cover all land borders (green border and BCPs) of neighbouring Member States with the Russian Federation.

During the operational phase experts from the Member States and the Russian Federation will exchange the information on passenger flows, refusals of entry, main nationalities and incidents on illegal border crossings, facilitation as well as smuggling of goods and stolen cars, by using Frontex developed Reporting Templates. Information exchange will be carried out on a daily basis and the reports will be filled in and presented to Frontex.

The working language is English: knowledge of Russian language brings automatically benefit to the work.

2.3. Involvement of the Russian Federation

The Working Agreement between the Russian Federation and Frontex has been signed on 14 September 2006. One of the contents of this agreement is the coordination of joint operational measures for maintaining and improving border management between the EU Member States and the Russian Federation and secondly the elaboration of ideas on technical improvements of these measures. On a daily bases there will be an exchange of information between the Russian Authorities and Frontex.

3. Timetable

1. Experts Meeting 13-14 May 2009 in Saint Petersburg
2. Training for experts from MSs and the Russian Federation responsible for reporting during the implementation – 1 July 2009 in Warsaw, Frontex premises
3. Operational phase 6 - 21 July 2009
4. Evaluation meeting - September 2009
5. Evaluation/final report distributed by end of October 2009
3.1. Reporting Countries

Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Russian Federation

3.2. BCPs responsible for collecting information

[Redacted]

4. Coordination elements at the Central level

4.1. Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)
Adresse: Frontex, Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland
Tel: [Redacted]
E-mail: fsc.goodwill@frontex.europa.eu

Polish guest officer deployed in FSC [Redacted]
Tel: [Redacted]
E-mail: fsc.goodwill@frontex.europa.eu

Role of Frontex Situation Centre:
- Manages and monitors the reporting system
- Provides the overview on operational results

4.2. Frontex Coordinator (FC)

[Redacted]

E-mail: goodwill@frontex.europa.eu or [Redacted]

Role of Frontex Coordinator:

Commented [A2]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the operational areas of previous years would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorised border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Commented [A3]: The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of persons participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

Commented [A4]: The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.
4.3. Analytical Support Officer (ASO)

Role of the ASO:
- Defines the data collection and prepares the relevant templates
- Defines together with the project manager the optimal way of reporting
- Provides the training on the reporting system including the filling in the reporting forms
- Monitors and ensures that the established reporting system is respected by all parts involved
- If needed, based on the received information, provides Frontex management and Member States involved with updates concerning the analytical part of the joint operation
- Processes the daily and incident reports and prepares the analytical assessment on the outcome of the joint operation

4.4. Estonia

4.5. Finland

Border Guard Headquarters
Border and Coast Guard Division
P.O Box 3
4.6. Latvia

State Border Guard of the Republic of Latvia
Operative Management Service
Rudolfa Street 5, Riga
LV-1012 Latvia

4.7. Lithuania

State Border Guard Service at the Ministry of the Interior
Activity Planning Board
Operative Management and Operations Division
Savanoriu av. 2
LT-03116 Vilnius
Lithuania

4.8. Norway

National Criminal Investigation Service,
(NCIS Norway)
PO Box 8163 Dep,
NO-0034 OSLO

Commented [A2]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abuse usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The blanked out parts contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.
4.9. Poland

Border Guard Headquarters
Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej - BWM
Al. Niepodległości 100
02-514 Warszawa
Poland

4.10. Russian Federation

Headquarters of JO GOOD WILL for North West Federal District
Duty officer
[Redacted]
e-mail: goodwill2009@lenpu.ru
Remark: 24*

Employer of Headquarters of JO GOOD WILL for North West Federal District
[Redacted]
goodwill2009@lenpu.ru

Colonel lieutenant
Employer of Headquarters of JO GOOD WILL for North West Federal District
Tlx: [Redacted]
Mob: [Redacted]
e-mail: goodwill2009@lenpu.ru

5. Contact points at the local level

Estonia
Angela Simson, Border Guard Master Sergeant, contact officer

Finland

Lithuania

Commented [A9]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Role of Local Contact Point:
- Collects and verifies the daily and incident reports
- Operates as an official contact point for Frontex and the Russian Authorities

6. Reporting
For the analytical evaluation of the operation a reporting system is defined. For data collection reporting templates are prepared by the ASO and to be used by the participating authorities once agreed. Reporting templates shall not be modified except by the ASO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Template</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incident Reports</td>
<td>Reports regarding border related incidents in the predefined operational areas are prepared in the electronic form and sent simultaneously with Daily Reports to <a href="mailto:fsc.goodwill@frontex.europa.eu">fsc.goodwill@frontex.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Reports</td>
<td>Daily Reports will be used to report daily situation during the operational phase from each reporting MS and RF. Daily report shall cover the previous 24 hours (08:00-08:00) and by 12:00 should be sent to <a href="mailto:fsc.goodwill@frontex.europa.eu">fsc.goodwill@frontex.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Statistical data)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Report</td>
<td>Overview of all border related incidents during the past 24 hours in all predefined operational areas - generated by FSC and disseminated to all parts involved not later than 15:00 on a daily basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SITREP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Press communication rules

The general principle of these rules is the fact that keeping low profile on operations is advisable, as publicity is generally likely to act as a pull factor for illegal migration. At the same time, pre-warming signals are sent by publicity which can harm the successful course of operations.

This applies especially to the following:
- timing of the operation (the beginning and end shall not be announced),
- position and timing of patrols and checks,
- detected incidents (during the implementation phase these should not be announced).

In order to coordinate all issues relating to the press, a network of press offices of all national bodies involved in the operation will be established. All national bodies participating in the operation will forward the contact details (e-mail and 24/7 telephone number) of their press offices to Frontex Information and Transparency (e-mail: pr@frontex.europa.eu; desk phone: +4822 544 95 -35 or -32; 24/7).

All press offices of the relevant bodies will stay in touch during the operation to ensure uniformity of messages on its course.

Press offices of national bodies will inform Frontex Information and Transparency on information provided to the media as well as on interviews given to the media in connection with the operation.

After the end of each respective sequel (if the JO is divided into phases), information can be published on the results of that particular sequel. However, as there will be sequels of
operations taking place in the same or similar operational area conducted in the same or similar way, all communication even after the operational time should take this into account.

In case of incidents, the national body directly involved in it will inform Frontex Information and Transparency as well as press offices of all bodies involved, before making a statement to the press. When these bodies need to inform on the event, they will take over the original text and refer to the press office that originally published as the source.

Press presence

The decision to allow representatives of the media on board of technical equipment involved in the operation or into national premises will be taken by the rational body to whom the equipment/premises belong, respecting the necessity not to reveal any operational details. However, Frontex strongly recommends limiting such permissions only to "serious" media and the European Commission’s Audiovisual Service.

If giving such permission, the press office of the respective national body will inform Frontex Information and Transparency.

If a national service makes its own film material/photographs of its involvement in the operation and wants to provide parts of it to the press, it can do so upon the condition that this film material does not reveal any operational details and does not contain information on the involvement of other Member States.

Upon releasing such film material, the national service is kindly asked to inform Frontex Information and Transparency on this fact and if possible, provide the film material to Frontex.