Delegations will find attached the 4th revised draft European Union Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions, reflecting the discussion during the EUMCWG on 27 October 2014 on the second part of the concept (until paragraph 42).

As requested by the EUMCWG para 10, 36a and 39b were verified and corrected by the LEGAD.
DRAFT

EUROPEAN UNION CONCEPT FOR

EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS and MISSIONS
## EUROPEAN UNION CONCEPT FOR
EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS and MISIONS

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. Maintaining freedom, security and prosperity in Europe requires that Europe fulfils its potential as a global actor and security provider. In today's world, single states find great difficulty in dealing alone with the new emerging security challenges, ranging from energy security to climate change to economic competiveness to international terrorism, but the European Union (EU) as a whole and by offering a frame for MS participation can address these risks in a comprehensive manner. By connecting the different strands of EU external policy, such as diplomacy, security, trade, development, humanitarian aid, the EU can tackle global security challenges, relating to its responsibility, goals and interests, in a joined up way using its Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) supports the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in order to strengthen the EU's contribution to international peace and security and upholding and developing international law. Furthermore, the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Ref A) highlights the requirement for the EU to share in the responsibility for global security with partners such as UN, NATO and AU and to be able to sustain several operations simultaneously.

2. Under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), current EU crisis management organisations such as the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) work within the structure of the post Lisbon European External Action Service (EEAS) in order to plan and conduct CSDP operations and missions.

3. The Treaty on European Union (Ref B)1 and the ESS contain the range of tasks for potential CSDP operations and missions. The range and scope of these tasks are further developed in the Illustrative Scenarios, (Ref C) (Assistance to Humanitarian Operations, Separation of Parties by Force, Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military advice to third countries, Conflict Prevention and Evacuation Operations (non-permissive/segregated environment).

1 Treaty on European Union, Article 42 & 43
4. The EU is a global actor, ready to share the responsibility for global security. To make these ambitions credible, deployments must be able to support diplomacy and other means for conflict resolution anywhere in the world. Hence, it is envisaged that military power combined with civilian instruments, in symmetric and asymmetric scenarios, needs the capability to project mission tailored forces and expertise, with short preparation time, over strategic distances into remote regions, including austere areas of operation.

5. CSDP operations are, by nature, conducted outside the EU in distant theatres, which may offer little or no Host Nation Support (HNS). Such operations could be described as expeditionary in that they involve the projection over extended lines of communications of independent, specially designed and prepared, sustainable EU military and/or civilian instruments with the ability to work autonomously. Examples include EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUCAP NESTOR and EU NAVFOR Op ATALANTA.

B. **AIM**

6. The purpose of this document is to provide to inter alia military commanders, military staffs, EU civilian staffs, external actors etc., an overarching conceptual framework for EU-led Military Operations and Missions.

C. **SCOPE**

7. An EU-led military operation or mission will involve a number of phases which could include planning, pre-deployment, deployment, initial entry, implementation, transition and redeployment. An analysis of the phases for EU-led military operations and missions is included in this work.

8. Due to its overarching nature, this framework concept draws on and provides coherence for the existing family of EU military concepts.
9. Dependent on scales, EU military components and HQs may be required. These may include Land, Air, Maritime and Special Operations components to create a Joint and Combined effect and are considered within the scope of this document. The nature of a crisis requiring an EU-led military operation or mission will determine the necessary combination of components.

D. ASSUMPTIONS

10. [In accordance with the Treaty on European Union and its article 42.1, EU-led military operations and missions may be conducted outside the Union for peace keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charta. (CY proposal)] or [In accordance with the EU Treaty and recent EU military operations and missions, EU-led military operations and missions will be conducted outside EU territory]. To be decided by EUMCWG during the next discussion.

11. It must be assumed that EU-led military operations and missions will be conducted in austere conditions. In this context the term "austere" implies one or a combination of the following in-theatre conditions; an unstable security situation, extended lines of communication, a scarcity of basic infrastructure, limited Host Nation Support (HNS) and health hazards emanating from natural or man-made sources.

12. Any Crisis Response intervention is likely to be part of a wider and continuous EU engagement (Comprehensive Approach) in that State or Region and coordinated through the EEAS. The local impact on the area of engagement goes beyond the immediate effects of the CSDP operation or mission. The impact on the political, economic, cultural and social dimensions should be considered in planning and conduct.

13. Depending on the nature of the crisis, EU-led military intervention could be executive (military operation) or non-executive (military mission). A military operation may involve a Standard Military Response, a Generic Military Rapid Response or an Express Response (Ref R).

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2 Executive: the operations mandated to conduct actions in replacement of the host nation; non-executive: the operation is supporting the host nation with an advisory role only.
E. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

14. Despite its success in CSDP operations, the EU today faces increasingly complex threats and challenges (Ref D) such as but not limited to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism and organised crime, cyber security, illegal migration, border management, food and water insecurity, energy security, climate change and instability due to fragile states. Hybrid Threats in which adversaries employ an interconnected, unpredictable mix of traditional warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism and organised crime for political, military or other purposes must also be considered. Therefore, the EU, employing, where necessary, a selection or all of the instruments at its disposal in a comprehensive manner, must be able to act as early as possible and if practicable before the onset of a crisis.

15. Increased complexity in the global security environment requires that, for CSDP operations, EU-led military forces, whether acting alone or as part of a wider palette of EU instruments, must be mission tailored and capable of operating in a non-linear and multidimensional engagement space. EU-led military forces must therefore be able to coordinate and employ lethal and non-lethal actions, as part of the EU's comprehensive approach.

16. The increasing tendency by adversaries to take full advantage of the widespread availability of advanced technology and to employ asymmetric means (e.g. Improvised Explosive Devices) has serious implications for the conduct and tempo of EU-led military operations and missions.

17. The design and implementation of clear, coordinated strategic communication, including a clear indication of the desired end state, is critical to establish and sustain support for the entire duration of EU-led military operations and missions within the populations of the Host Nation and the Member States (MS) and across the wider global audience. The strategic communication must match with the overall InfoOp campaign within theatre.
F. PRINCIPLES

18. **Unity of Political Direction and Guidance.** EU complex engagements will require the coordinated leadership of EU instruments in the framework of the EU comprehensive approach. During the planning phase and duration of a mission in order to ensure alignment, complementarity and sequencing of all the required instruments it is vital that all instruments have a shared understanding of the mission and a common purpose throughout all levels and phases of the engagement. The Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) should set the political context, clearly articulating what the crisis is why the EU should act and what instruments could be available. This PFCA is essential to give CSDP and other actors the ability to "hook-in" to commonly agreed overall strategy and objectives. It must be ensured that a clearly defined end state is given.

19. **Complementary Effects in the Theatre.** EU actors must ensure that the effects they create in the theatre are not fragmented or competing but complementary. This requires collaboration and coordination between all EU in-theatre instruments, alongside bilateral MS assistance – "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

20. **Integrated and continuous planning at strategic level.** Increased competence of the EU at the strategic level to plan and conduct military operations without lags or gaps affects EU's effectiveness and credibility. The capability for the upper military layer to assess and control at any time the subordinate layers in close interaction with non-military EU actors and with due respect to the distinctive responsibilities of the tactical/operational levels of command is a factor in success and efficiency in using all available EU means and instruments.

21. **Unity of Effort in Theatre.** To achieve complementary effects in theatre, unity of effort and maximum cooperation between EU military and civilian actors should be ensured, through an EU comprehensive approach. This will firstly require shared awareness doctrine, procedures and training, including multi-layer exercises to ensure the principle is understood and secondly requires leadership and coordination to ensure its application.

22. **Cooperation and Coordination.** Cooperation and coordination between all relevant EU actors, MS, non-EU TCNs, relevant international organisations and Third States is a prerequisite for the efficient and effective conduct of EU-led operations.
23. **Multi-nationality.** The provision of troops and resources for EU-led military operations should be based on the principle of multi-nationality. Actors for such operations could include a combination of personnel from MS, non-EU European NATO countries and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU or other Third-States as decided by the Council or the PSC. However, the key criteria for such operations remain interoperability and operational effectiveness.

24. **Interoperability.** Interoperability aims at providing compatibility between EU Military and Civilian instruments with a view to improved operational effectiveness. A solid culture of confidence, connectivity and cooperation between EU military and non-military at the strategic level can be developed through a more structured interaction. The December European Council discussion on defence highlighted the importance of the EU working closely together with key partners such as NATO, UN and AU. This means working in concert to tackle global security challenges both at the strategic level and on the ground. Interoperability between civilian and military instruments from the EU and other key organisations is important.

25. **Legal Requirements.** EU-led military operations and missions will be conducted in accordance with the basic legal framework as laid down in the Council Decision, relevant International Law (in particular International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Refugee Law (IRL), mission-related international agreements\(^3\) and arrangements, relevant EU Member States' Domestic Legislation) and in addition consideration of Host Nation Law.

G. **CONSIDERATIONS**

26. **Characteristics.** Because EU-led military operations and missions may involve the projection of forces, with their requisite support, over extended lines of communication into distant and austere theatres of operation, it follows that such forces must be agile, versatile, flexible, highly trained, self-sufficient and interoperable. Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) are

\(^3\) In particular status of forces agreements (SOFA) and/or status of mission agreements (SOMA).
responsible for the training of military forces for EU-led military operations and missions. Experience has indicated an increased likelihood that future EU-led military operations and missions will be centred in urban areas - operating in urban areas has its own unique characteristics with respect to intelligence collection, force protection and force organisation (recent examples are Bangui and Mogadishu).

27. **Scale.** The forces for EU-led military operations and missions must be mission-tailored for each specific operation in order to accomplish the mission. Supplies, equipment and infrastructure must be limited and designed to operational necessity.

28. **Host Nation Support (Ref E).** The success of CSDP operations is highly dependent on the capacity to generate, deploy, sustain and redeploy EU-led Forces. Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)/Host Nation Support (HNS) - Adequate military logistics complemented and reinforced with civilian capabilities and resources are necessary to flexibly meet the broad range of operational requirements that CSDP operations may involve. These requirements are especially demanding during the phases of deployment/redeployment and also for the sustainment of the Force during operations. External support, if available, from the State(s) hosting all or part of the EU-led Force or via Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) might facilitate the completion of the logistic functions. The main difference between the concepts of HNS and CSO is the commercial nature under a civil contract on which the latter is based, while the former is the outcome of a formal agreement/arrangement established among the Nations or between the EU and the HN. CSO has become vital for all kinds of military and civilian CSDP engagements. Cost effectiveness leads to an increased need for CSO. Communication between all interested parties, in particular with IOs and NGOs, is a prerequisite in order to achieve coherent planning; this communication is coordinated by the relevant HQ.

29. **Air domain.** Within the framework of the EU, Air Power is defined as the capacity to project power in the air to shape and influence the course of CMO (Ref F). In the context of EU-led operations it may be employed as a stand-alone military operation or as part of a complex engagement and could form part of a Standard Military Response and / or a Military Rapid Response. Air capabilities are versatile and can be used from the outset of a Crisis Management Operation (CMO) to pursue tactical, operational or strategic objectives, in any
combination or all three simultaneously. Air Power offers unique capabilities that must be fully considered and integrated into all military planning.

30. **Land domain.** Land Power is the capacity to project power on the ground to shape and influence the course of CMO. Land forces will always operate in a complex and demanding environment due to many factors (e.g. terrain, threats, hazards, population, involvement of national and internal organizations, governmental and non-governmental structures and other actors in the region). The understanding of this environment is essential to overcome its complexity, particularly in the land domain, as part of the EU multidimensional response. In land operations and missions a special emphasis must be placed on the human dimension of the response in order to be credible, well-accepted and effective. In an EU military operation the land forces can be taken as a symbol of EU's commitment in the region. It can also facilitate other EU or multinational actions in the area, secure or seize areas of responsibility and build third state capabilities by mentoring, advisory and training assessment.

31. **Maritime domain.** The EU's prosperity, its development and well-being are critically dependant on international trade and other multiple activities performed at sea (e.g. fisheries, energy resources exploitation). However, these maritime activities are highly vulnerable to threats and challenges to the security of the maritime environment (Ref G). Within the framework of EU, maritime forces can be used to project power at sea and from the sea in accordance with the EU Maritime Security Strategy (Ref QQ) and its Action Plan and in accordance with all relevant EU concepts. In this regard maritime capabilities under the auspices of CSDP could be called upon to perform a variety of tasks ranging from traditional war fighting operations to specific tasks in support of the Member States maritime security. Sea power has the ability to concentrate forces for a longer period of time in areas far from the home base with a relative self-sustained logistic capacity, high flexibility and without involvement of third countries. The MS maritime forces can contribute to the EU response providing *inter alia* Naval Diplomacy, Crisis Response along with Maritime Deterrence and Defence. The use of maritime capabilities for EU-led military operations and missions should be considered during the planning phase (Ref G).

32. **Force Protection (FP).** FP involves all measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of all in-theatre EU personnel and EU instruments, facilities, equipment, operations and activities to any threat and, in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and operational
effectiveness. EU in-theatre actors could be exposed to a number of threats and dangers which could include, but are not limited to, missile attack, small arms fire, mines, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), technological risks and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attack. Due to their nature, EU-led operations and missions will require a dynamic FP policy consisting of active, passive and recuperation measures and means. One of the challenges for such operations is to achieve the highest degree of force protection while maintaining a light and agile footprint. In a complex engagement, involving armed EU military instruments, the military will normally have a primary role in the provision of FP. In specific circumstances, this role could be filled by appropriate EU civilian actors such as the Police or Gendarmerie or even Private Security Companies (Ref H)\(^4\), with utmost caution to the effects on the HN, both intended and unintended, when choosing such services. However, all in-theatre EU actors must be aware of and contribute to the FP policy, which may involve addressing the following areas:

a. **Security.** In-theatre security encompasses a wide range of activities and procedures which address the security of Personnel, Installations, Information, Equipment and Lines of Communication.

b. **Mine Awareness and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED).** The increased use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in conflicts worldwide is significantly impacting on the number of casualties of civilian and military actors as well as indigenous populations. Therefore, there is a distinct possibility that IEDs will present a considerable threat to EU-led military operations and missions. C-IED involves three lines of operation namely attacking the Networks, Defeating the Device and Preparing the EU in-theatre actors (Ref K).

c. **Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence.** CBRN devices, whether manufactured or improvised, with or without explosive components, industrial and technologic risks constitute a real and permanent threat to EU-led operations, the indigenous population and the operational environment (Ref I).

d. **Air and Missile Defence.** The air and / or missile threat exists through all phases of an EU-led military operation from deployment through Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) to re-deployment.

e. **Personnel Recovery.** The isolation, capture and /or exploitation of personnel during EU-led operations could have a significant negative impact on operations security, morale of

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\(^4\) For limitations see EU Concept for Contractor Support to EU-led military operations (00754/14, dated 4 April 2014).
in-theatre EU personnel and public support. In order to mitigate the risks, the EU therefore requires a system to recover military and civilian personnel. (Ref J).

f. **Environmental Awareness.** Environmental Awareness is an important factor in maintaining the health and well-being of all EU in-theatre actors and the local population by preventing inadvertent damage to the natural environment and/or to significant cultural or historic resources. Environmental Awareness should be considered in all phases of EU-led military operations and missions and in pre-deployment training (Ref L).

33. **Use of Force.**
   a. The authorisation of, and control on, the use of force for EU-led military operations and missions is an essential part of the political guidance and strategic direction for such operations, which is exercised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) under the authority of the Council and the High Representative (HR).
   b. EU-led military operations and missions must be consistent with the provisions of international, EU and national law applicable in the situation in which EU forces are called upon to operate. Guidance on the use of force for each EU-led military operation/mission is included in the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), the Military Strategic Options (MSOs), the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN) pertaining to that operation.
   c. Authorised use of force for mission accomplishment will be laid down in Rules of Engagement (ROE), which are directives to military commanders and forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or other actions, which might be construed as provocative, may, or may not, be applied. Depending on the ROE/legal framework, the OpCdr will select different COAs. This highlights the need for a LEGAD advisory team to be associated with the planning from the outset. The framework and principles governing the use of force by units and individuals of EU-led military operations/missions are defined in the EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led Military Operations and in the EU Concept for Contractor Support to Operations (in cases where the use of force applies also to Private Security Companies) (Ref H & N).

34. **Joint Targeting.** A well-developed, flexible joint targeting process applying a full spectrum approach that blends a variety of capabilities to generate a range of physical and
psychological effects will allow the European Union to meet the challenges of contemporary operations. Using strategic direction operational-level targeting focuses on determining specific effects to generate and synchronise specific lethal and non-lethal actions, to satisfy the Joint Force Commander's objectives.

35. Fratricide Prevention. The possibility of the death of in-theatre EU actors due to "friendly fire" must be avoided or, at the very least, reduced to the absolute minimum by the implementation of measures and procedures such as in-theatre coordination, liaison, situational awareness and use of friendly force tracking systems.

36. Protection of Civilians.
   a. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which consists of treaties and customary international law, attempts to provide protection for those involved in or affected by armed conflict or occupation, including combatants and non-combatant members of the population and to regulate the conduct of armed conflict. It is based on four fundamental principles, namely: military necessity, humanity, proportionality and distinction between combatants and civilians and between military objectives and civilian objects (Ref M).
   b. Efforts to protect non-combatant members of the population can enhance FP of in-theatre EU actors. However, in certain situations it can be difficult to balance FP and civilian protection. Guidelines for the protection of civilians should be included in the planning of EU-led military operations and missions and must be complied with in theatre.

37. Capability Development
   a. The ongoing and future development of EU military capabilities that are robust, deployable, sustainable, interoperable and usable is taken forward through the Capability Development Plan (CDP), which is produced in close cooperation between EU Member States (MS), the European Defence Agency (EDA), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The CDP provides an analysis of capability needs, capability trends and potential capability shortfalls as well as a database of national plans and priorities. It helps MS to develop their national capability plans and to identify and exploit areas of common interest.
b. The CDP takes the following factors into consideration:

(1) Prioritised military capability shortfalls and their associated risks as identified within the framework of the Headline Goal Process.

(2) An estimate of capability requirements for 2025 based on global strategic research, available technology and potential threats.

(3) Current plans and programmes of MS.

(4) Lessons Learned from operations regarding capabilities.

c. Capability development for civilian missions is mainly achieved by building on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 & beyond which utilises the results of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and the experience gained from CSDP civilian missions.

d. Work on the promotion of synergies in the development and use of civilian and military capabilities for EU crisis management operations (Ref O) is ongoing and addresses such areas as, inter alia, logistic support, CIS, medical support, security and force protection, information sharing, intelligence, contracting (e.g. Support Coordination Board) and lessons learned. Such synergies aim to provide a more comprehensive operational capability for EU-led military operations and missions as well as providing a more efficient use of resources.

38. Preparation and Decision Making.

a. The EEAS contributes to the monitoring and early warning of potential crises that may require the intervention of EU-led operations through bodies such as the EU INTCEN, the CMPD, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the EUMS and through the EU Conflict Early Warning System.

b. The EUMC assesses the risks of potential crises and makes recommendations to the PSC, either at the latter's request or on its own initiative acting within the guidelines forwarded by the PSC (Ref P). As a crisis intensifies so too does the requirement for accurate information to enable further assessments and planning. A Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) or Information Gathering Mission (IGM) may be dispatched to the crisis area in order to verify facts and assess the need for further EU action. Having analysed all available information the PSC may decide that EU action is appropriate triggering the activation of the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP).
39. **Planning.**

a. For EU-led military operations and missions planning is an iterative process in which all factors relevant to the impending mission are analysed. It is conducted at the following four levels:

1. The Political and Strategic Level (EU Institutional level) (Ref Q).
2. The Military Strategic Level (OHQ level).
3. The Military Operational Level (FHQ level).
4. The Tactical Level (Component Headquarters level).

b. For EU-led military operations the OpCdr and OHQ operate at the Military Strategic and the FCdr and FHQ at the Operational level. For EU-led military missions currently the Council's practise is to appoint an EU Mission Commander (MCdr) and designate a Mission Headquarters (MHQ) which performs functions on both the strategic and operational level.

c. Advance planning, including civil-military coordination, for military crisis management is conducted by:

1. Non-specific CSDP EEAS elements (inter alia: Geographic, Conflict Prevention, MD CROC, EU Delegations), within the context of developing, implementing and reviewing the EU's overarching, regional or thematic strategies.
2. CMPD through co-ordinating and ensuring the political-strategic framework for military and civilian CSDP instruments.
3. EUMS for military input to the political-strategic planning and development of military strategic options and contingency plans in support of CMPD.
4. CSDP planning may also engage with other services, Commission (FPI, ECHO, DEVCO, HOME), MS embassies etc.

d. Following detection of the crisis the PSC will provide political and strategic guidance for further action and planning, initiating the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). By definition the PFCA then sets out the political context, articulates what the crisis is, why the EU should act and what instruments could be available, and are best suited for that action. It acts as a tool for the CA in that it potentially gets all stakeholders (Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate, Geographical desks and Commission) at the table.

e. As regards options for CSDP engagement the PSC may then task CMPD to develop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which may then result in Military Strategic Options (MSOs) and an Initiating Military Directive (IMD). These products allow the
development of a CONOPS and an OPLAN by the OpCdr/ MCdr. Even after being mandated, the responsiveness of the nominated EU military commanders and HQs is subject to operational lags. There is a continuous requirement to train staff in EU procedures, working practices and familiarity with the content of early planning stages; partly due to lack of institutional memory and corporate knowledge.

f. The specific legal framework for the conduct of EU-led military operations and missions is established in the relevant Council Decisions. Normally a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and/or a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) will be required with the authorities of the countries in which the operation is being conducted. Pending the conclusion of a SOFA/SOMA, the HN may decide to issue an Unilateral Declaration binding it as an interim solution. The SOFA / SOMA ensure adequate legal status (rights and obligations, privileges, immunities and facilities) for in-theatre EU-led actors. It often contains general provision on HNS and therefore must be taken into account in the development of HNS arrangements (Technical Arrangements (TAs), Requirements and Statement of Requirements)\(^5\).

40. **Response and Scale.**

a. For EU-led military operations and missions the urgency and nature of the crisis will determine the scale and timing of the response. A standard Military Response, which is derived from the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, is regarded as the ability to deploy a large scale force within 60 days. The Readiness Status and Response Times are outlined in the Interim EU Military Rapid Response Concept - main body and Annex A (Ref R). In short the concept outlines that a Standard Military Response Time is a period of up to 60 days, a generic Military Rapid Response Time is a period up to 25 days and an Express Response Time is a period up to 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation.

b. An EU Battlegroup (EU BG), which could be used for a stand-alone EU-led military operation or for the initial phase of a larger operation, is a particular form of RR in which the ambition regarding deployment is that forces should start implementing their mission on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation (Ref S). One of the factors governing the deployment of an EU BG is its limited size and therefore its limited capability.

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\(^5\) In EU practice, a TA can directly derive from a SOFA/Unilateral Declaration. There is - in general - no need to conclude or adopt any additional document as an intermediate step (such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)).
c. Air Power has the ability to concentrate force over long distances in a short time and can contribute to an immediate response option across the whole spectrum of Crisis Management tasks.

d. The use of air, land and maritime assets and associated resources for a RR in an EU-led military operation are governed by the Interim EU Rapid Response Concept (Ref R).

41. **Force Generation (FG).** FG is the process where the military assets and capabilities required for an EU-led military operation are designated by Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and/or International Organisations\(^6\) and made available to the OpCdr to meet the requirements of the operation. It comprises the identification and the activation of the required assets and/or capabilities and ends with their TOA by TCN to the OpCdr. TCN are those MS and, after a Council decision, third States providing military assets or capabilities for a particular operation (Ref V). The three phases of FG for EU-led military operations and missions, namely, Identification, Activation and Deployment, and the associated principles and procedures, are described in detail in the EU Concept for Force Generation.

42. **Command and Control (C2).**

   a. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the authority of the Council and the HR, exercises the political control and strategic direction of EU-led military operations and missions, based on the advice and recommendations of the EUMC (for military operations) and where appropriate PMG (Ref W).

   b. Responsibility for the conduct of an EU-led military operation lies with the OpCdr, who is authorised to exercise operational command or operational control over assigned forces. In addition to FG, the OpCdr is also responsible for the development of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The OpCdr, who is supported by an OHQ, which is outside the JOA, coordinates the deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the EU-led military force. Responsibility for the conduct of an EU-led military mission lies with the MCdr, who is authorised by Council to exercise command over assigned forces and mission tailored MHQ in theatre.

   c. The OHQ for a particular EU-led military operation is designated by the Council from one of the following options; one of the five EU OHQs (UK OHQ (PJHQ) Northwood,

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\(^6\) The Berlin + arrangements set the conditions for the release, monitoring and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities for their use in an EU-led military operation.
FR OHQ (CPCO) Mt Valérien, DE OHQ (RFOC) Potsdam, IT OHQ (JOHQ) Rome and EL OHQ Larissa), the EU OPSCEN Brussels or an EU OHQ at SHAPE (Berlin+).

d. An EU-led military operation may also have recourse to a Framework Nation\(^7\), which could include a significant contribution to military strategic planning, operational level planning, the mounting, deployment, execution, support and redeployment of the forces for the operation (Ref X).

e. The EU FCdr, acting under the authority of the OpCdr, executes the EU-led military operation within the JOA. The Component Commanders (CC) of an EU-led military operation, acting under the authority of the EU FCdr, are responsible for making recommendations to the FCdr on the employment of their forces and assets and for planning, coordinating and conducting operations. The Principles, Structure, Command Options, Responsibilities and Coordination relating to C2 for EU-led military operations are described in greater detail in the EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref Y).

43. **Communications and Information Systems (CIS).**

a. CIS Planning for EU-led military operations and missions should include consideration of all levels of command from the Political Strategic to the Tactical and additionally, where necessary, other national, international and non-governmental organisations. The object is to enable the passage of information in a timely manner throughout both the EU military and civilian chains of command and across inter-organisational relationships, in order that timely decisions can be taken and implemented at the appropriate level.

b. The non-fixed C2 structure for EU-led military operations and missions can mean that there are different CIS solutions for each operation. The responsibilities, planning factors and options for CIS for EU-led military operations are described in the EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations (Ref Z).

c. For complex engagements involving EU military and civilian instruments, shared and interconnected networks and systems would result in overall improvements in operational efficiency and effectiveness.

d. As the EU does not have a standing military Command and Control (C2) structure, clear and effective arrangements are needed to facilitate the successful CIS support of these

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\(^7\) A Framework Nation is defined as: "A Member State (MS) or a group of MS that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which the EU exercises political control".
operations. To secure the information exchange between and at all levels of the military C2 structure an agreed set of general information security regulations and procedures must be available. Information Security planning as an integral part of the overall CIS planning has to ensure adequate security right from the start of an operation. The Military CIS Concept for EU-led CMOs identified the need to develop an Information Security Concept and this need was reinforced by the objectives stated in the ECAP 2004 roadmap. The concept (Ref AA) describes the overarching and common security requirements agreed by MS and EU GSC (General Secretariat of the Council). While also taking into consideration MS (Member States) security directives this concept is based on EU Council’s Security Regulations and EU Accreditation Process. These documents are the foundation for Information Security within the EU. Full interoperability between all participants of an EU operation, civil and military, must be achieved. The Concept reinforces the need for EU, MS, TCNs and other organisations to implement common information security policies, procedures and standards. In addition it describes common information security criteria, protective principles, responsibilities and identifies planning factors to support military C2 structures in EU-led CMOs.

e. The EU has established an autonomous capacity to lead military operations within the range of tasks defined through CSDP. These tasks require decision making based on situational awareness. Such situational awareness relies on adequate information that is increasingly provided by computer networks. When military action is considered appropriate, the shape and size of the military assets and capabilities required need to be assigned to each operation. EU network communication is therefore required between decision-makers in Brussels down through the chain of command to the tactical level, external to Brussels and MS, within the JOA and other locations. Therefore, network communications extend beyond the military domain cross geographic, organisational and functional boundaries and into the diverse civilian entities within CSDP. The integrity of computer networks and security of information on networks used at all levels of EU-led operations is critical to achieving the required political and strategic effects. Computer networks therefore need to be defended to preserve their integrity and security.

f. The tasks as defined through CSDP require command and control (C2) and decision making based on situational awareness. Such situational awareness is significantly dependant on information provided through Communication and Information Systems
(CIS) and computer networks. Increasingly too, military capability in its widest sense is reliant on computers and networks to operate. This increase in reliance on computer networks allows us to exploit the benefits of improved Network Enabled Capability (NEC) and is therefore not just a CIS issue: it affects all arms. The Cyber Defence Concept supersedes the EU Concept for Computer Network Operations in EU-led military operations (13537/1/09, 17 March 2010), but does not necessarily address all aspects of Computer Network Operations (CNO), by taking account of the wider context of cyberspace which is defined as the fifth operating environment. An EU Concept (Ref CC) elaborates more on the measures and standards that will improve overall Cyber Defence. The integrity of computer networks and the security of the information on the networks used during EU-led operations is critical to achieving the mission. Cyberspace in general and computer networks in particular, need to be defended to ensure information assurance. Cyber Defence is one capability that, when combined with other measures, such as IT security, physical security and personnel security provides information assurance. In addition the Concept provides a definition of Cyber Defence terminology sets out responsibilities and principles for CSDP Operations and Missions and offers EU Member States, institutions and agencies guidance for the development of military capability requirements for use on EU missions (Ref CC).

g. The European External Action Service (EEAS), supported by the General Secretariat of the Council and European Commission, is responsible for providing all required CIS, including the provision of information assurance. As a minimum this comprises the necessary communications links at the Political Strategic levels including the links to all offered OHQs and FHQs, in their fixed location, the EU SATCEN and other EU actors in theatre. These CIS and links must be available on a permanent basis to reduce planning and reaction time in a crisis situation, and must include centrally provided services to enhance interoperability and information flows. Links to NATO (SHAPE) are also essential on a permanent basis for potential Berlin Plus operations. EEAS must also provide the necessary CIS for Fact Finding Missions and other such missions so that deployed personnel can conduct their mission to the necessary level of confidentiality as well as being able to communicate that information remotely with EEAS organisations and possibly OHQs.
44. **Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance**. (ISTAR) contributes to early warning, risk assessment, situational awareness and target intelligence and thus supports the decision making and planning activities in the framework of EU crisis management. Its products such as warnings, risk assessments and comprehensive analysis are needed on a permanent basis and must be tailored to the user’s requirements and securely processed and disseminated wherever feasible on a near real time basis. They complete the Common Operational Picture (COP) and the situational awareness of decision-makers. The principles for the application of ISTAR in support to EU-led Crisis Management Operations are elaborated further in the EUMS Concept (Ref DD).

45. **Intelligence**. The provision of timely, accessible, relevant, comprehensive and accurate intelligence and identification of potential threats is essential in order to support EU-led military operations and missions. Intelligence from all sources, which include all CSDP actors both in theatre and in Brussels, MS particularly TCN and third parties will play a key role. The nature and scope of the EU-led military operation or mission will determine intelligence requirements and the intelligence architecture to be utilised therein (Ref EE).

**H. CONDUCT**

46. **Entry.**
   a. The initial introduction of EU-led military forces into a JOA is often the period of greatest risk for such forces. Entry is normally accomplished using all available means and capabilities which include the singular or combined employment of airborne, seaborne or overland movement. The presence or creation of some entry points such as an available air or sea port, an assailable coastline, a suitable and supportable drop zone or an accessible frontier is essential for a successful entry phase. Forcible entry involving the seizure of a lodgement area in a hostile environment by military forces employing combative means is the most difficult form of entry and may only have to be considered in the most extreme circumstances. However, the vast majority of EU-led military operations will involve the introduction of EU-led forces into a permissive environment or an environment that has not yet turned hostile.
   b. Initial entry is often associated with preliminary operations which are carried out in-theatre prior to the arrival of the main body of EU-led military forces. Such operations
could include the establishment of logistic nodes, lines of communication, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and CIS architecture. Preliminary operations could also involve the conduct of SOF operations, which in essence can form the Initial Entry Force (IEF).

47. **Strategic Movement and Transport (M&T).**

a. It is essential that EU-led military forces arriving in a JOA or a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) do so in the correct sequence and in accordance with the OpCdr's intent. The sequenced arrival into theatre of EU-led military forces and their requisite supplies is not just dependent on the volume and availability of transport but also on the capacity of the reception facilities and other factors which include political, security, protection and operational/tactical planning issues associated with the operation.

b. M&T support for EU-led military operations is the collective responsibility of relevant EU actors and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). This M&T responsibility extends through all phases of an operation and includes strategic planning and deployment, Reception, Staging and Onward Movement, Integration (RSOI), sustainment and redeployment.

c. Permanent structures which facilitate the high-level planning and coordination of M&T for EU-led military operations include the EU Movement Planning Cell (EUMPC) and the Multinational Movement Coordination Centres (MMCCs). Other M&T structures normally activated during the planning phase of the operation include the EU Movement Coordination Centre (EUMCC), FHQ Logistic Staff (CJ-4 LOG), the National Movement Coordination Centre (NMCC) and the National Support Element (NSE). The EU Concept for Strategic Movement and Transportation for EU-led Military Operations highlights the principles, responsibilities and procedures relating to M&T for EU-led military operations (Ref FF).

d. Where possible, the coordinated use of strategic airlift and in-theatre movement facilities should be employed for complex engagements involving both EU civilian and military actors.

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8 The Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre (AMSCC) and Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) in Eindhoven.
48. **Reception, Staging and Onward Movement, Integration (RSOI).** RSOI is part of the process that enables EU-led military forces and associated materiel deploying in the JOA to become operational (Ref GG).
   a. **Reception.** This is the process whereby EU-led military forces and their requisite materiel arriving in the JOA via land, air or sea strategic / tactical lift are received, offloaded, marshalled and cleared prior to staging.
   b. **Staging.** Staging is the assembly, temporary holding and organisation of EU-led military forces and their requisite materiel into formed units in preparation for onward movement and further activities.
   c. **Onward Movement.** This is the process of moving EU units from reception facilities and staging areas to the final destination.
   d. **Integration.** This is the synchronised transfer of operationally ready units into the Combined Joint EU force. Integration can occur at any point along the strategic deployment and RSOI continuum and is complete when the FCdr has established C2 over the unit.

49. **Deployment Models.** The varied nature of EU-led military operations or missions requires that consideration be given to the different options for the deployment and employment of forces. Employment / deployment options will be influenced by factors such as the nature of the mission, the security situation, the components specific requirements, the political environment, the economic implications, the in-theatre infrastructure and associated geographical and climatic conditions. Any one or a combination of the following employment/ deployment can be adapted for EU-led military operations or missions:
   a. **Strategic Deployment conducted directly into a JOA.** RSOI of EU-led forces takes place in the JOA.
   b. **Strategic Deployment to a Forward Mounting Base (FMB).** RSOI of EU-led forces takes place to the maximum extent possible in the FMB, which is located within the JOA either on land or at sea.
   c. **RSOI conducted at the Port of Embarkation (POE).** Forces are subsequently strategically deployed directly into the JOA. This option is particularly applicable to Rapid Response and initial entry operations.
50. **EU Air Deployable Operating Base (DOB).**
   
a. An EU Air DOB, an operating base from where joint air operations are conducted to accomplish or support one or several EU-led Crisis Management Operations, may be required to ensure the overall success of EU-led military operations. Selection of the most suitable location for the EU Air DOB will depend on factors such as the projected duration of the operation, the risk assessment, the access to the base, the envisaged HNS and the political and legal arrangements required to use an international airport or existing air base. Ideally the establishment, at the tactical level, of an EU Air DOB should be the responsibility of a Framework Nation, in accordance with the principles of the EU Framework Nation Concept.

b. The EUMS is responsible for the initial planning in relation to the establishment of an EU Air DOB. This responsibility transfers to the OHQ as soon as the Initiating Military Directive has been released to the OpCdr. The procedures, mechanisms and command and control structures associated with the activation, sustainment and recovery of an EU Air DOB are described in greater detail in the EU Concept for the Implementation of a EU Air Deployable Operating Base (Ref HH).

51. **EU Sea Deployable Operating Base (DOB).**
   
a. The joint use of seaborne platforms to project, support and sustain EU-led military forces could offer significant advantages for the conduct of EU-led military operations or missions. Such platforms could be located either over the horizon, in sight of shore, in port or utilising some combination of the three locations.

b. Sea basing could help to ensure the expeditious deployment of the force with requisite support into a demanding environment. Depending on the nature of the operation sea basing could range in size from a single ship up to and including an entire fleet and could support an element of or the entire EU-led military force.

c. Sea basing can be used throughout all phases of an operation from initial entry to redeployment and can provide capabilities such as Command and Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Sea Point of Disembarkation (SPOD), Force Protection (FP), Air Defence (AD), Naval Fire Support (NFS), as well as medical facilities, supplies and RSOI enablers.
52. **In-Theatre Operations.**
   a. In-theatre responsibility for the execution of EU-led military operations rests with the FCdr, acting under the authority of the OpCdr. Such operations are normally carried out by conventional EU military forces. However, when conventional military assets and/or capabilities may not be able to fulfil the mission or tasks, there may be a need to conduct special operations either independently or as part of a larger military effort. Special Operations Forces (SOF), which are designated by MS and non-EU TCNs provide a flexible, versatile and unique capability, whether employed alone or complementing other forces or agencies, to attain military-strategic or operational objectives (Ref II).
   b. Throughout the continuum of an EU-led military operation or mission, particularly a complex engagement, the role of the military may change from "supported" where the military have a primary role to that of "supporting" where the military have a secondary role in support of other EU in-theatre instruments. The main role of forces involved in EU-led military operations will invariably involve security operations but it is also possible that such forces could be directed in support of other post-conflict tasks⁹.
   c. In a complex engagement the in-theatre coordination of EU military and civilian operations is vital in order to achieve the overall strategic political objectives.

53. **Information Operations (Info Ops).**
   a. Info Ops for EU-led military operations and missions is a military function that provides advice and coordination of military activities affecting information and information systems¹⁰ in order to support the in-theatre mission and the political objectives of the EU (Ref JJ). The successful integration and coordination of the following core and supporting capabilities and functions will influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting that of the EU, thus facilitating the Info Ops campaign.
      (1) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) (Ref KK).
      (2) Operations Security (OPSEC).
      (3) Deception.
      (4) Electronic Warfare (EW).
      (5) Media Operations.

⁹ UN Indicative post-conflict tasks: Infrastructure, Employment, Economic Governance, Civil Administration, Elections, Political Process, DDR, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Capacity Building.

¹⁰ In this context information systems comprise personnel, technical components, organisational structures, and processes that collect, analyse, assess, create, manipulate, store, retrieve, provide, display, share, transmit and disseminate information.
54. **Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (Ref LL).**
   a. The purpose of CIMIC in EU-led military operations and missions is to establish and maintain cooperation between the in-theatre EU military component, (local) governmental organisations and civilian actors, including IOs and NGOs.
   b. CIMIC, as an operational function, seeks to create the best possible moral, material, operational and tactical conditions for the achievement of the military mission. CIMIC core functions are grouped into the following areas: Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Civil Environment and Support to the Military Force.

55. **Logistic Support.**
   a. Personnel, materiel and infrastructure are the main focus areas in terms of logistic support for EU-led military operations and missions. In all categories the nature and expected operational timeframe will be critical determinants of the overall logistic footprint. However, irrespective of these determinants, successful EU-led military operations and missions will require robust real-time logistic support.
   b. The required logistic support for an EU-led military operation or mission has to be identified early in the planning process and includes consideration of the legal framework, existing multinational logistic solutions, strategic lift, availability of HNS, Contractor Support to Operations and protection of the entire logistic chain. Early planning also involves the production by the OpCdr of a sustainability statement outlining common criteria to be adopted by national contingents. This statement, which is agreed at the earliest stage by TCNs, is required to identify available logistic units and associated assets as well as maintenance and medical policies.
   c. TCNs are ultimately responsible for the provision of resources for national forces. TCNs retain full command over their own logistic forces within the national force contribution but the TOA specifies the command relationship of such forces to the OpCdr. However, multinational support arrangements and common logistics C2 structures optimise the logistic footprint and contribute to operational success.
d. Early establishment of logistic infrastructures is essential in order to properly manage the RSOI process for personnel and materiel. There are different ways to manage the logistic supply flow into the JOA, which depending on the nature of the mission could involve transportation by air, sea or overland.

e. Although logistic support to EU-led military operations is a national responsibility there is a requirement to coordinate and synchronise this function at the operational level. Multinational logistics and solutions will be sought at the earliest stages of the operational planning process and implement prior to the deployment for operations. Even though National Support Elements (NSEs) come under the command of their own national authorities and are not part of the EU-led military force, they should cooperate with the FHQ. Cooperation and centralisation of services among NSEs can produce significant savings. The coordination of logistic support between relevant EU actors, TCNs, and where appropriate, other states, IOs and organisations is essential.

f. For a complex engagement the in-theatre logistics for all CSDP actors could be coordinated in an EU Logistics Centre (EULC) which could be jointly staffed by military and civilian logistics personnel. The principles, characteristics, guidelines, modes, finance and responsibilities relating to the provision of logistic support for EU-led military operations and missions are contained in the EU Concept for Logistic Support to EU-led Military Operations (Ref MM & NN).

56. Health and Medical (H&M) Support.

a. The aim of H&M Support in EU-led military operations and missions is to support same by conserving manpower, preserving life and health and minimising residual physical and mental disabilities. Appropriate medical support makes a major contribution to both force protection and morale through the prevention of disease, rapid evacuation and treatment of the sick, wounded and injured and the return to duty of as many individuals as possible.

b. Contributing MS and non-EU TCNs are ultimately responsible for the provision of H&M Support to their forces involved in EU-led military operations or missions. However, coordination, and in some circumstances, integration of medical assets and capabilities will optimise the provision and use of limited resources and prevent unnecessary redundancies. On TOA the OpCdr has the shared responsibility for the H&M Support of all forces assigned to the operation. Where required, H&M support resources and personnel for EU-led civilian missions are normally sourced through the
Calls for Contributions (CfC) process which is initiated by the CPCC. Medical capabilities and capacities assigned to an EU-led military operation or mission must be sufficient and have the same level of readiness, deployability and sustainability as the personnel they support.

c. In preparing the H&M inputs to the OPLAN and CONOPS the OpCdr is assisted by his Medical Adviser, who is the senior medical staff officer in the OHQ with responsibility for setting the OpCdr's medical policy and ensuring that he and his staff are aware of the health and medical implications associated with the EU-led military operation or mission. For EU-led civilian operations the CivOpCdr is assisted by the HoM in determining the level of H&M Support required for the mission. The Principles, Guidelines, Organisation and Functional Areas for H&M Support for EU-led military operations and missions are described in greater detail in the Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations (Ref OO).

57. In-theatre Coordination. In addition to the normal organisational and coordinating functions provided by the HQ staff for EU-led military operations and missions, further in-theatre coordination, particularly for complex engagements is necessary. There is a requirement for a focal point, where planning, conduct, support and other functions of the EU engagement can be coordinated in theatre e.g. Intelligence, Operations and Logistics. This measure should only be considered where it facilitates the attainment of common goals by in-theatre EU military and civilian actors in a comprehensive manner. It should not be imposed as an additional, complicating factor, requiring more resources, if not needed. Ideally, this focal point should be a single facility with appropriate communications, information systems and meeting rooms where institutions and actors, involved in the engagement, can coordinate their activities.

I. TRANSITION

58. Transitional Phases.

a. The desired end state for EU-led military operations and missions will normally include the provision of outcomes such as a Safe and Secure Environment, Rule of Law, Stable Governance, Sustainable Economy and Social Well-Being. The attainment of the end state for a complex engagement could involve progression through a number of
transitional phases ranging from pre-conflict, high-intensity operations, post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction to long-term development.

b. Throughout this continuum of phases the aim is to lessen the dependency on EU military instruments with an associated and gradual increase in emphasis on EU civilian instruments. However, irrespective of this aim, there is always a possibility of increased military intervention at any stage throughout a complex engagement due to factors such as in-theatre volatility or a change in the security situation.

c. Notwithstanding the possibility of fluctuations in the roles of EU military and civilian instruments throughout the continuum of a crisis, the principal goal must be the facilitation of the transfer of authority to the legal civilian authorities of the host nation as part of the wider political process. Transition must form an integral part of Advance and Crisis Response Planning for EU-led military operations and missions.

d. Every EU-led military operation and mission will have its own internal phases which require sequential execution. Advance Planning (where applicable), Crisis Response Planning, training, exercises, leadership and lessons learned will all help to ensure that the transition between the deployment, employment and redeployment phases of EU-led operations is seamless.

59. **Termination / Redeployment / Recovery.**

a. The decision to terminate an EU-led military operation or mission is made by the Council based on an evaluation by the PSC which includes advice from the EUMC and CIVCOM. In the event that such an operation had recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the PSC informs the NAC. The PSC also requests the EUMC to evaluate lessons learned (LL) on the basis of the reports by the OpCdr and the EUMS. (Ref PP)

b. Redeployment should be regarded as a separate operation aimed at achieving an efficient and ordered exit from theatre. The redeployment of military and/or civilian instruments from an EU-led military operation or mission must be carefully planned as early as possible and, ideally, before the deployment phase is complete. Such planning will be dependent on the nature of the EU operation and the requirements of possible follow-on operations by the EU or other organisations such as the UN. Post-engagement EU residual commitments must be properly managed.

c. Recovery planning will, for example, determine what equipment and supplies will be left in-theatre for follow-on operations and what will actually be recovered. Where it is intended that EU supplies and equipment should be used for non-EU follow-on missions
this must be the subject of clear and unambiguous written agreements between the relevant organisations. NSEs assist the in-theatre logistic function in the withdrawal and recovery of EU-led military forces, equipment and supplies. Where applicable, full settlement must be made with all agencies and organisations that provided in-theatre support to the EU-led military operation or mission.

d. The withdrawal of EU-led military forces from the JOA is executed by the FCdr under the authority of the OpCdr. For EU-led civilian operations this function is carried out by the HoM under the authority of the CivOpCdr.