Council of the
Brussels, 20 September 2016
Encryption of data
Over lunch during the informal meeting of the Justice Ministers (Bratislava, 8 July 2016) the issue
of encryption was discussed in the context of the fight against crime. Apart from an exchange on the
national approaches, and the possible benefits of an EU or even global approach, the challenges
which encryption poses to criminal proceedings were also debated. The Member States' positions
varied mostly between those which have recently suffered terrorist attacks and those which have
not. In general, the existence of problems stemming from data/device encryption was recognised as
well as the need for further discussion.
To prepare the follow-up in line with the Justice Ministers' discussion, the Presidency has prepared
a questionnaire to map the situation and identify the obstacles faced by law enforcement authorities
when gathering or securing encrypted e-evidence for the purposes of criminal proceedings.
On the basis of the information be gathered from Member States' replies, the Presidency will
prepare the discussion that will take place in the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues
and consequently in CATS in preparation for the JHA Council in December 2016.
Delegations are kindly invited to fill in the questionnaire as set out in the Annex and return it by
October 3, 2016
to the following e-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org.
Answers for Germany
1. How often do you encounter encryption in your operational activities and while gathering
electronic evidence/evidence in cyber space in the course of criminal procedures?
o almost always
o often (in many cases)
o rarely (in some cases)
Please provide other relevant information:
The police does not compile statistics as to the occurrence of encryption.
2. What are the main types of encryption mostly encountered during criminal investigations
o online encryption
o e-mail (PGP/GPG)
o SSH Tunnelling
o P2P / I2P
o e-data stored in the cloud
o e-communications (through applications such as Skype, WhatsApp, Facebook, etc.)
o others? Please specify:
o offline encryption
o encrypted digital devices (mobile phone / tablet /computer)
o encrypting applications (TrueCrypt / VeraCrypt / DiskCryptor, etc)
o others? Please specify:
Both for on- and offline encryption, police encounters all prevalent encryption methods/software,
including the methods/software mentioned above.
3. Under your national law, is there an obligation for the suspects or accused, or persons who
are in possession of a device/e-data relevant for the criminal proceedings, or any other person
to provide law enforcement authorities with encryption keys/passwords? If so, is a judicial
order (from a prosecutor or a judge) required? Please provide the text of the relevant
provisions of your national law.
- suspects or accused:
, as suspects or accused have a right not to incriminate themselves. - persons in possession of a device/e-data:
only as witnesses, in case they have knowledge of the encryption key or passwords:
German Criminal Procedure Law does not provide for a specific obligation to disclose
encryption keys or passwords for persons in possession of a device/e-data. In general, however,
a password or encryption key may be obtained through the following measures:
Persons other than the suspect or accused can be obliged to testify as witnesses (if no
statutory exception, such as a right to refuse on personal/professional grounds, applies).
According to Section 48 Subsection 1 Sentence 2 Code of Criminal Procedure, witnesses
are obliged to disclose encryption keys/passwords as far as they have knowledge thereof
and when questioned by a judge or prosecutor. For the wording of Sections 48 et seq.
Code of Criminal Procedure, please see below:
In case the key/password is not, as such, known to the witness, but stored on a physical
device or printed on a document, such document or storage device can be requested or
searched and seized according to Sections 94 et seq. upon an order issued by a judge, or,
in exigent circumstances, the police. The wording of Sections 94 et seq. is shown here:
- other persons:
only provider of telecom services concerning passwords and access keys they have
According to Section 100j of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provider of telecommunication
services may be ordered to disclose passwords or access codes to the authorities as far as they
have stored such passwords or access codes (e.g. PIN or PUK code for mobile phones). Such an
order is only admissible if the statutory requirements for the use of the password or access code
have been met. In any case, the request for the password or access key needs to be issued by a
judge, or, in exigent circumstances, the police. The wording of Section 100j Code of Criminal
Procedure can be found here: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html#p0672
4. Under your national law, are service providers obliged to provide law enforcement
authorities with encryption keys/passwords? If so, is a judicial order (from a prosecutor or a
judge) required? Please provide the text of the relevant provisions.
Please specify: Please see answer to question 3; in addition, please note that, even if the
legal requirements for such an obligation are fulfilled service providers can only be
obliged to provide law enforcement authorities with encryption keys/passwords (or, in
case of surveillance measures, unencrypted data streams) if – and only if – the provider
itself applies the encryption layer. Providers cannot be obliged to provide such data
whenever the encryption is applied by the user or by third parties..
5. Under your national law, is it possible to intercept/monitor encrypted data flow to obtain
decrypted data for the purposes of criminal proceedings? If so, is a judicial order (from a
prosecutor or a judge) required?
National Law allows for interception and monitoring of both unencrypted and encrypted
It is possible to obtain encrypted content data the same way and under the same
conditions as non-encrypted data. Stored computer data may be object of a search
(Section 102 German Criminal Procedure Code) and be seized (Section 94 German
Criminal Procedure Code), a court order is required (Sections 98, 105 German Criminal
Procedure Code). Encrypted content data may also be obtained by an interception of
telecommunications. The conditions are laid down in Sections 100a, 100b of the German
Criminal Procedure Code. The measure is only admissible if the suspect has committed a
serious crime listed in the catalogue in subsection (2), the offence is of particular gravity
in the individual case and other means of establishing the facts would be much more
difficult or offer no prospect of success.
A court order is required.
However, to intercept encrypted data is usually not helpful for the purposes of criminal
proceedings, as decryption is very time consuming and expensive.
6. What are the main issues typically encountered while intercepting/monitoring encrypted
data flow in order to obtain decrypted data?
Please specify: The main issue is that recorded data is encrypted, e.g. using end-to-end encryption,
and can therefore not be analyzed in detail. In many cases, analysis of actual communication
content is not feasible.
7. What other approaches/techniques do you use for decrypting encrypted e-evidence and
securing it so that it is admissible as evidence in the criminal proceedings? Do your authorities
use e.g. the services of foreign companies or assistance from Europol for the purposes of
decryption? If so, please provide examples of assistance.
For communication data
One possibility would be to install a software specifically designed for and limited to lawful
interception on a target system and extract communication data before it gets encrypted or after it
has been decrypted (“lawful interception at the source”). A search of data at rest stored on the
system is not possible with such software.
The use of surveillance software for the interception of telecommunications has been regarded
admissible in a verdict of the Constitutional Court in 2008 (BVerfGE 120, 274 ff.), if the
surveillance software can only be used to obtain the ongoing conversation, but not to search the
whole system. The court has reaffirmed this position in a 2016 ruling (1 BvR 966/09, 1 BvR
1140/09). However, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not foresee explicitly the use of such
For data at rest
As explained above, Code of Criminal Procedure does not foresee an authorization for collecting
data at rest through remote surveillance software. Such measures are only possible in cases of
preventive police measures related to combating international terrorism under the Act on the
Federal Criminal Police Office.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, data at rest may be obtained for example by search and
seizure of physical storage devices. Such storage devices may then be examined using forensic
methods in order to extract and/or decrypt stored data.
If you have different experiences in cross-border cases, please specify:
8. Do you consider that your current national law allows sufficiently effective securing of e-
evidence when encrypted? If not, why?
In general, national law allows sufficiently effective securing of e-evidence. However, potential
changes to the legal framework are constantly being examined and discussed.
9. What main issues do you typically encounter when seizing encrypted evidence and
Describe in more detail the issues identified above: Main issues are encountered with regard to
shortcomings in the areas “personal” and “technical”. With sufficient resources, many new and
innovative approaches can be leveraged to mitigate the detrimental effect of encrypted data on
If you have different experiences in cross-border cases, please specify:
10. In your view, will measures in this regard need to be adopted at EU level in the future?
o no EU measures are necessary
o dedicated new legislation
o practical (e. g. development of practical tools for police and judicial authorities)
o improve exchange of information and best practices between police and judicial authorities
o create conditions for improving technical expertise at EU level
o improve the (legislative) conditions of communication with service providers, including
through the establishment of a legislative framework.
Please give examples:
Development of practical tools for LEAs should be supported. This seems possible and
useful in many technical areas, whenever the development can be clearly separated from
the application in the cases and from case data.
Second, information exchange between EU member states and LEAs is an important
aspect, since technical issues and approaches are the same – worldwide. Third, technical
expertise at an EU Level can support an improved information exchange and cooperation
on international cases.
11. Are there other issues that you would like to raise in relation to encryption and the
possible approach to these issues? Please share any relevant national experience or
considerations arising from your practice that need to be taken into account.
Yes. A regulation to prohibit or to weaken encryption for telecommunication and digital services
has to be ruled out, in order to protect privacy and business secrets.