



Joint Operation Focal Points 2010 Land

2010/OPS/21 OPERATIONS UNIT LAND BORDERS SECTOR

FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT FER 2010

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular, the name and signature of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Approved by

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on



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PART I: Summary (public document)

1. Short introduction/background information


According to its' role to improve the Integrated Border Management (IBM) and to increase the operational coordination of Member States (MSs) at the European external borders, Frontex established and developed Focal Points (FP) as permanent platforms for coordinated operational cooperation and information gathering.

During the last years, FPs have operated in the framework of separated projects at the land and air borders.

The FPs system has proven to be a useful instrument in enhancing border security, increasing the capability to react adequately at hot-spots at the EU external borders and providing permanent situational awareness. However, in order to improve the synchronization and have a more efficient utilization of available resources based on the experiences, operational results and the increasing number of FPs, there was a clear need identified for:

- a higher level of internal coordination and planning, especially regarding the FPs at the different types of borders,
- multiannual foresight, and
- standard procedures and structures under the umbrella of a multiannual Programme.

As a response to that, the multiannual Programme Focal Points 2010-2013 was initiated and approved in the Directorate Board Meeting on the 13th January 2010. Different projects are foreseen to be implemented in the framework of the Programme regarding various types of borders and activities. One of them is Joint Operation (JO) Focal Points 2010 Land, as a follow up of the similar projects implemented during the last years, but at the same time merged in the framework of above mentioned Programme.




The document contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control [and/or coast guard duties]. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, it would undermine the protection of public security. Accordingly, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

JO Focal Points 2010 Land started on 1 March and finished on 31 December 2010. In order to avoid gaps between the implementation and to have better operational coordination, the activity was extended till 28 February 2011.

The list of nominated FPs for 2010 was based on risk analysis and agreed with host MSs.

In 2010, a total of 29 FPs were established (see map on Annex 1): 16 were permanent and 13 temporary.



The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

During the 12 month operation, the FPs **Kalotina (Permanent)** and **Varsand (Temporary)** were not activated and no information was received from the area.

2. Achievements of the objectives

2.1. General objective

The primary goal of the Multiannual Program FPs was to facilitate the implementation of the IBM concept at the EU's external borders by establishing a permanent FPs system at hot spots along the external border and using them as platforms for JOs and information gathering in the framework of the Multiannual Program.

With this concept in mind, the general objective of the JO Focal Points 2010 Land was to coordinate in an effective way the joint activities at the external land border and to enhance efforts at securing the external borders of the MSs of the European Union. This was to be achieved by facilitating the establishment of permanent coordination structures giving rise to standard procedures for the implementation of other JOFs.

As the objective is quite broad, it proved challenging to assess its accomplishments. In this context, it was difficult to identify clear outcomes due to the lack of specific benchmarks. Therefore, the feedback received from the MSs involved remains the only indicator that can be observed. The appreciation shown by those MSs participating in the operation and also the positive feedback received with regard to interoperability and coordination of other Frontex operational activities leads to the conclusion that this objective was achieved.

2.2 Specific objectives

- *To enhance efficiency in overall border control in operational areas, including checks at BCPs and to enhance surveillance activities with the focus on the detection of persons hidden in vehicles.* The FPs are entities used not only for strict operational purposes but also for the coordination and exchange of experience in the field of border management. Their activation in certain areas was of added value for border control in general and provided support in different specific areas.

- *To support other joint activities in the same operational areas including the reporting system.* As stated above, one of the aims of the FPs is to become a platform meant to support Frontex coordinated operational activities implemented in the same area as the FP. During 2010, the FPs provided support for the JO Poseidon Land, Neptune and Jupiter in terms of logistics, coordination,

- *To improve information gathering during joint activities, for the purpose of the identification of illegal migrants as well as to improve intelligence gathering with the aim of establishing "real time" information flows.*

The above stated objective is quite ambitious and is a long term view for FPs. Their activation is of added value even though the information/intelligence gathering proved challenging even for FPs as an operation. Notwithstanding the difficulties faced, considerable steps were taken during the year for the accomplishment of this objective (e.g establishing a the forum of local coordinators, briefings and trainings for the Guest Officers deployed, direct contact with all the actors involved during the interim evaluation and field visits) but for the time being the objective was not achieved. Its complexity requires for the future, on one hand, a more active involvement of both home and host Member States

that will commit to the achievement of this objective and on the other hand, deployment of debriefings teams (where appropriate) which, together with the rest of GO deployed will provide additional¹ and detailed information about the detections in the operational area.

- *To collect and to share best practices, developing standard procedures for the implementation of JOs and promoting the development of a handbook.*

JO Focal Points 2010 Land and the GOs deployed focused mainly on very operational aspects rather than on good practices and standard procedures. The idea of developing a handbook was vaguely promoted and no further steps were taken. The support given to border control proved to be a priority which was detrimental to the abovementioned objective and therefore the objective was **partially achieved**.

- *To support the provision of training.*

The GOs deployed at the FPs, upon request, provided training to the local staff in regard to the detection of forged documents, impersonators and stolen vehicles. This was highly appreciated in some of the host MS. Also, during the briefing meetings for other operational activities, the FPs GOs supported the training which was provided by the host MS. This objective can be considered **achieved**.

- *To facilitate and improve cooperation with third countries (TC), in particular, in exchanging operational information and in the active deployment of TC observers.*

During the JO Focal Points 2010 Land, a total of 12observers² from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Serbia were deployed in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania as observers. The deployment of observers from third countries³, meant closer cooperation and exchange of views and best practices in the field of border control in general. This objective can be considered **achieved**.

- *To establish permanent information sources regarding the main illegal migration routes.*

The FPs were meant to be a platform for information exchange. In this regard, the reported information should not only have been reliable and consistent but also provided in real time in order to achieve the above mentioned objective. However, as the report describes further on, important steps were taken on these points and therefore the objective can be considered **partially achieved**.

3. Results, outcome and impact of the Joint Operation

The period and duration in which the FPs were activated varied according to the specific trends and patterns of illegal migration identified by our Risk Analysis.⁴ The operation comprised 10 082 operational days,⁵ and local authorities with the support of 238 deployed GOs the following outcomes were achieved:

- ✓ 2 800 persons were detected at the green border;
- ✓ 169 facilitators were identified;
- ✓ 658 forged documents were detected;
- ✓ 31 744 persons were refused entry;
- ✓ 5 229 overstayers were identified;
- ✓ 3 920 asylum claims were received;
- ✓ 400 stolen vehicles were detected.

During the implementation of the JO, Frontex and GOs received valuable information about the tendencies concerning illegal migration via external EU borders.

¹ Additional to the statistical data provided

² three from each third country

³ which have signed a Working Arrangement with Frontex

⁴ the duration varied from a period of 3 to 44 weeks

⁵ sum of working days of the guest officers

The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials conducting return operations of third country nationals. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, putting at risk the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to return third-country nationals who are the subject of national return decisions. This would endanger the public order as well as Member States' security and, concretely, jeopardize the orderly conduct of return flights and threaten the safety of the aircraft, its passengers and crew. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and therefore must be refused.

The deployment of human resources and additional technical means for the surveillance of the green borders resulted in effective operational activities.

The cooperation between host MSs, participating MSs, TCs and Frontex was sufficient one and was further developed. Local coordinators of FPs and GOs deployed at different FPs have created a network among themselves; those contacts are utilized not only within cooperation of the joint activity but also after the execution of it.

4. Implementation of budget

As approved, the total costs of the JO were the following:

- The complete approved budget of the project: 2,038,393.77 (initial 1,200,000.00 €);
- Total project commitments: 2,038,393.77 € (100 % of planned budget);
- Paid commitments: 1,933,993.14 € (~95% of total project commitments).

5. Link to usefulness for other Frontex activities

The GOs depoloyed for a long time period at the FPs have developed good contacts with the local officers and have exhaustive knowledge of the local working methods, the current situation at the specific operational areas and the modus operandi of the illegal networks. They effectively supported other JOs by assisting GOs in fast integration with local staff.

The support was provided to the JOs Jupiter 2010, Neptune 2010 and Poseidon Land 2010; and was highly appreciated by host MSs and GOs deployed within framework of these activities.

Based on this positive experience, the FPs can be used in the future the support of any activity coordinated by Frontex.

6. Value added of the Joint Operation

Awareness – to achieve the situational awareness of the EU external borders

Information gathering by GOs deployed at different FPs and analysis of the information done by Frontex have created a picture on current situation at the external borders.

Response – to establish synchronization and efficient utilization of available resources

Deployment of human and technical resources provided by the MSs for long term deployments established and maintained a good cooperation with local officers and resulted in a more effective support.

This long term operation allows flexible deployments whenever operational needs appear and can operate as a platform for permanent exchange of information with other MSs.

Interoperability – to ensure development and integration of required tools and platforms

The interaction between the GOs deployed and the authorities of the host MS entrusted with the border control resulted in a common acceptance of the working methods in complacence with the Schengen Borders Code and consequently ensured not only the interoperability necessary to carry out enhanced border control but also a real time synergy between the actors involved. The operational needs led to identification of the existing gaps and the necessity of enhancing the existing context for increased cooperation.

Performance – to enhance the quality and quantity of border control

The above mentioned interoperability between the representatives of the authorities involved in the operation resulted in an enhanced border control both in terms of quantity and quality.

PART II: Internal assessment

1. Brief general description of the Joint Operation

Starting with 2010, the JO Focal Points 2010 Land was implemented under the umbrella of the Multiannual Programme Focal Points 2010-2013. This enabled not only an open approach to be taken towards the implementation of the concept but also marked the establishment of standardized procedures to prepare and implement missions, exchange information, facilitate the future use of RABITs and FJSTs and support operational activities.

The concept of the JO Focal Points is different to other operations: the duration of the deployment, the permanent and temporary character of the FPs and the length of the implementation are elements that give a long term strategic value to the operation. Specific to this operation was that MSs could propose the deployment of their officers or open a FP based on national needs.

The Annual Risk Assessment 2010 identifies three major migration routes that affect the EU's land border: the Western Balkan, Eastern European and the South Eastern Mediterranean Routes.

In addition, reports sent by GOs deployed at FPs are an important source of information that allows Frontex to establish and maintain direct contact with the external borders and which shall enable Frontex to assess changes in illegal migration patterns and trends. Moreover, the FPs are becoming platforms for the implementation of Frontex coordinated operational activities and for this reason they can be reinforced with additional equipment.


Taking into account the evaluation of the last year's activities the list of FPs has been revised. This concerns changes in the operational situation, the latest patterns of illegal migration and foreseen changes in the border control environment such as the expansion of the Schengen area. In addition, the visa-free regime for nationals of Serbia, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which began on the 19 December 2009 was an important issue that was also considered.

The sources used in the preparation of this report were:

- Statistical data provided by the GOs deployed and the local staff from the operational area in the format of weekly/daily statistical reports; these data are based on six indicators of illegal migration, complemented by additional information on the volume of traffic and number of second line checks;
- Incident reports provided from the operational area;
- The Annual Risk Assessment (ARA 2011);
- Bi-Monthly Analytical reports provided via ICONET by MSs in the operational area;
- Evaluation Reports of the JOs organized and implemented by Frontex;
- Open Sources;
- Findings of the missions carried out in the operational area;

Although numerous, the abovementioned sources were not very comprehensive and it often proved difficult to reach a relevant conclusion.

2. Coordination structure used during the Joint Operation



The local coordinator of the respective FPs was responsible for briefing/debriefing of the GOs, and was in constant contact with them, reporting to Frontex on daily/weekly bases on the operational results from particular operational area.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials used to efficiently perform border control tasks and counter illegal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. Therefore, public security would be affected. Consequentially, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The role of (host and home) NFPOCs for JO Focal Points 2010 Land and their close cooperation should be underlined. As the duration of deployments of GOs and technical means within this joint activity differ (from one month till nine months), this requires constant monitoring from Project Manager's and participating MSs side.

3. Reporting system and information flow

During the implementation of the operation the following reports were used:

- **Daily report;**
- **Weekly statistical report;**
- **Incident Report** describing the details of the incident;
- **Guest officer mission report** filled in by the GO after accomplishment of the mission;
- **Country Report** with feedback of host MS on performed mission of GO or technical mean.

The reporting system within JO Focal Points 2010 Land was defined as daily reporting system according to the original operational plan and it was changed from weekly to daily in order to test future JORA system (as JORA will be based on incident reports).

The feedback provided to the participants during the implementation of the operation in 2010 in regards to operational results was not very detailed (e.g SitRep for JO Focal Points 2010 Land was not produced as there was no capacity in FSC). Participating MSs have expressed their interests to be informed what is happening at other FPs; in this regard it is recommended to produce SitRep in the future in order to have MSs updated on operational results close to real time.

The data/information collected is stored and can be accessed by all project team members.

4. Briefing/Training of guest officers

In the course of the implementing of the Joint Operation Focal Points 2010 Land, two briefing sessions were organized and carried out by Frontex for GOs to be deployed in 2010. The meetings took place at the School of Law Enforcement in Szeged/Hungary.

Another aim was to have direct feedback from GOs concerning their previous deployments at FPs with the view to use it for the further improvement and development for the planning and implementation of the project.

It should be stressed that due to a limited national pool of GOs deployed for FPs (GOs are deployed at the same FPs several times) the concept of briefing performed by Frontex should be revised in the future in order to adapt to the participating GOs and their needs.

Additionally, prior to each deployment of a GO at a FP, there was a national briefing delivered by local staff (mainly by local coordinator of FP). The aim of this briefing was to present the operational area, modus operandi, working conditions and methods, to present the working schedule and any other organisational issues. The briefing concept was described in the National Briefing Package prepared by MSs and Frontex (TRU, JOU and RAU). Training Unit was in charge to initiate the national briefings

according to plan, however in practice it started working just in the end of 2010. Despite the fact that Training Unit was not implementing the project since the beginning of the Joint Operation, the national briefings were organised by local authorities.

Due to different durations and timing of the deployments, in the future it is highly recommended to fix Tuesday as arrival day of the GO to FP. In this regard the national briefing will be always organized on Wednesday (as the case is in regional operations); GOs will be able to attend the briefing and to meet other GOs.

It should be stressed that the procedure for national briefing is quite complicated; based on the deployment plan of GOs the separate invitation for national trainers (in most cases, the national trainer is also the local coordinator of FP) is sent with request to deliver such briefing. As deployment plan is changed during the year at least several times due to operational reasons (additional deployments, cancellation of some deployments, change of the GOs foreseen for particular deployment and etc.) it is advisable to simplify the procedure (to issue one invitation letter to national trainers which will be valid for the duration of the operation; the responsibility of the national trainer will be to supply the report after accomplishment of such briefing, at the final stage, the Project Manager of the JO can verify that such deployment took place at a FP at a particular time).

5. Operational method

In the course of the implementation, experts from the MSs [REDACTED]

Longterm deployments of experienced GOs at different FPs had an added value for the operation. GOs [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additionally, experts and technical means were deployed for the enhancement of the border surveillance activities.

Together with the local officers, GOs performed tasks related to:

[REDACTED]

6. Performance of host MS authorities

Due to the scope of the operation, there were 11 host MSs where FPs were established. The main findings regarding the performance of the host MSs:

- In general terms the cooperation between host, home MSs and Frontex was sufficient.
- Local authorities and local staff working at the FPs has gained a lot of experience from previous deployments; therefore the cooperation between local staff and GOs was good.
- Local authorities provided full support to the GOs and Frontex during the performed field visits in the operational areas;
- Some host MSs provided the transportation for GOs deployed;

- In some MSs still there was not enough English speaking staff hosting GOs deployed at FP;

The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials conducting return operations of third country nationals. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, putting at risk the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to return third-country nationals who are the subject of national return decisions. This would endanger the public order as well as Member States' security and, concretely, jeopardize the orderly conduct of return flights and threaten the safety of the aircraft, its passengers and crew. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and therefore must be refused.

- In case of the involvement of GOs in personal incidents (a car crash of Bulgarian GO in Poland and serious illness of Austrian GO in Slovakia) host MSs had provided full support to the GOs and their national authorities in order to simplify the procedures and to assist in any situation.
- Exchange of experience and expertise and the fact that a network for information exchange was created had a positive influence to the effectiveness of the JO.

Since Frontex is co-financing running costs of FPs (in case of activated day is up to 27 Euro); the situation concerning the working conditions were significantly improved; FPs have international phone lines, laptops equipped with internet connection, copy machines and some pieces of furniture.

7. Performance of deployed resources

In total, 16 MSs and 4 TCs have expressed their willingness and participated in the JO Focal Points 2010 Land. It should be mentioned that the operation is becoming more attractive; the contribution of MSs is above Frontex request.

Republic of Belorussia, Ukraine, Russian Federation and Serbia participated by deploying their officers at FPs as observers, based on the Working Agreements signed with Frontex. It should be mentioned that Republic of Belorussia has deployed their observers within Frontex coordinated activities for the first time; however it was very positively evaluated by host MS.

The deployment of TCs observers has a positive impact to the JO. However once again it should be underlined that observers have to be

The deployed GOs were integrated into the shift schedule and worked together with host MSs' officers. They were wearing their national uniforms, had the Frontex armbands and the accreditation document with them. It should be mentioned that in some cases Accreditation documents of GOs did not reach GOs on time due to the late provision of information in advance by home MS. This should be improved in the future.

During the preparations of the joint activity more attention was paid on the requested profiles of the GOs; in this regard there were no situations with mismatching of the profiles.

The GOs deployed are bound to report the detections made during the operational period to Frontex via the established reporting system. As often not all the relevant issues are covered in the incident report submitted, the GOs were requested for additional details according to the provisions of the Operational Plan.

It is mandatory that in the future, the awareness of the GO regarding their role in intelligence gathering from the area where they are deployed and reporting it to Frontex is increased in order to achieve the aims set for the JO.

GOs deployed at FPs were sharing their knowledge and experience not only with staff deployed in the same shift; there were internal meetings organized for all staff working at BCP/BCU and GO had a

presentation on the latest training he/she attended, latest trends, falsifications and etc. This is identified as best practice and should be followed in the future.

In general GOs had a high professional level and performed good cooperation with local staff.

In case of the implementation of the regional operation in the same operational area, GOs deployed at FPs were supporting GOs deployed to the regional operation to be familiar with working circumstances and were assisting with any other issues. Positive feedback was received from project teams of Poseidon Land 2010, Jupiter 2010 and Neptune 2010.

GOs based on the request of the host MS and agreement of their home MSs were providing support for the neighboring BCP/BCU where FP is not established or FP is not activated. This was very positively evaluated and appreciated by host MSs' authorities.

The exchange of experiences and information as well as personal and institutional cooperation were mutually beneficial for all parties in this JO. The establishment of direct contacts proved to be a supportive instrument which is operative after operational implementation.

In the preparatory phase of the JO none of host MSs has requested the deployment of the technical means, however during the implementation the situation has changed. Greece was supported with deployment of Finnish and German heart beat detectors, Lithuanian mobile unit, Bulgarian thermo vision vans and Polish night vision cameras. Additionally, Latvian authority has deployed a dog handler with service dog at [REDACTED]

The establishment of the FPs network has proved to be a very useful tool not only for the operation, but for future cooperation also. GOs from different FPs were communicating with each other and due to close cooperation and information exchange there were detections of stolen vehicles and the identification of false/falsified documents.

8. Role of FX-coordinator and other actors

The planning, preparation, implementation and evaluation of the JO were managed by the project manager and project team in close cooperation with RAU, FSC and TRU. The nomination of same project manager for this joint activity for several years ensures the constant monitoring and further development of this operation following a certain concept which needs time to be implemented and reach maximum feasibility.

Due to the specific character (no defined implementation phases, different deployment timing of GOs, different recruitment of the officers, staying in constant contact with NFPOC, local coordinators of FPs and GOs deployed) the activity requires a lot of efforts and accurate, precise work in order to have a smooth implementation. Monthly meetings organized by the project manager within Multiannual Programme Focal Points 2010-2013 with involvement of respective units can be identified as good practice as the cooperation in some fields was significantly improved.

The project team carried out few field visits, which gave the possibility to have an overview about the situation and to clarify operational issues on the spot. In the future this practice has to be continued.

9. Outcomes of the operation

9.1 Illegal migrants

During the analyzed operational period, a total of 2 800 persons were detected at the green border area. As the Fig.1 depicts⁶, a large proportion of the detections were reported from the [REDACTED] There is [REDACTED]

⁶ All the charts can be found in the Part III of the report, chapter 6, starting with page 25

The second highest volume of detections at the green border was reported from [REDACTED]. The circular migration flows from Albania to Greece has, for many years, been one of the most important migration flows across the EU's external borders.⁷ The volume of detections decreased in 2010 compared with 2009 and the main reason for this may have been that there were fewer employment opportunities available in Greece in 2010. However, with regard to those Albanian nationals who already had working arrangements in place in Greece, border surveillance did not constitute an impediment in reaching the alleged place of employment: if detected and returned to Albania, they quickly repeated their attempt to enter Greece, until they succeeded.

It is worth mentioning that the [REDACTED] located at the same border section as [REDACTED] did not report any detection at the green border. This fact is not consistent with intelligence collected in the area and should be further analyzed in order to identify if there are any reasons for the lack of detections.

Ranking third, the detections reported from [REDACTED] reveal a similar volume when compared to the detections reported in 2009 by the FP. It should be borne in mind that due to the close proximity of the Greek land border with Turkey in relating to the [REDACTED] that the Bulgarian border with Turkey could have constituted a possible alternative route for illegal migration. Notwithstanding this salient observation, the intelligence collected and the accumulation of statistics relating to detections in the area indicate that this did not happen.

From the point of view of nationality, of those illegal migrants detected during the analysed period at the green border, as the chart below shows, Albanian nationals ranked first. Most of them⁸ were detected at [REDACTED] and a small number⁹ at [REDACTED]. Ranking second in terms of volume of detections were Kosovo nationals apprehended at [REDACTED]. It might be that the migrants detected at [REDACTED] were also targeting the area of [REDACTED] but were confused by the similar terrain in the area.

Afghan, Palestinian and Iraqi nationals were detected together at three main FPs: [REDACTED], in varying proportions. Most of the Afghan¹² and Palestinian¹³ nationals were detected at [REDACTED] and to a considerably lesser extent at [REDACTED]. With regard to Iraqi nationals, the place of detection at the green border was mostly the [REDACTED] (261 detections out of a total of 300) followed by [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The detections at [REDACTED] combined with those detections made at the Romanian border with Hungary might indicate a possible intra - EU route. In this regard, it is advisable that in 2011, an interview expert is deployed at [REDACTED] in order to debrief migrants generally and about the particular route taken from Bulgaria.

7 Annual Risk Analysis 2011

8 717 persons

9 34 persons

10 378 persons

11 19 persons

12 232 out of 317 persons

13 217 out of a total of 307 persons

14 69 persons

15 5 persons

The document contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, it would undermine the protection of public security. Accordingly, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the names of Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

9.2 False/Falsified documents

Document fraud detection cases refer to forged documents used by illegal migrants. A total of 658 forged documents were detected during the period analysed: 524 were used to enter the EU and 134 were detected during exit checks.

Compared with those detections reported in 2009 the framework of JO Focal Points Land,¹⁶ the abovementioned figure constitutes an increase in the volume of detections of forged documents. This enlarged figure may be due to the increased number of GOs deployed and the establishment of three additional FPs. Nevertheless, this trend is consistent with the increase in the detection of forged documents identified by the data reported to FRAN.

As illustrated in the Fig 2, more than half of the documents detected were reported from [REDACTED]. In the overwhelming majority of reported cases¹⁷ from this BCP, the persons detected using forged documents were Ukrainian nationals. They mostly used [REDACTED] stamps affixed to or stamped in genuine Ukrainian passports. From the intelligence collected, it appears [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Received incident reports have indicated the names of [REDACTED]

With regard to those detections reported from the second ranking FP in terms of document fraud – Roszke, nationals mainly from Kosovo, Albanian, Serbian and Turkish were using, in most of the cases, [REDACTED]

Unlike in the case of other BCPs, more than half²⁰ of the forged documents identified at [REDACTED] were detected on exit from the EU. Although the overall number of forged documents detected at this BPC is not high, a more detailed analysis with regard to detections made on exit should be conducted as soon as additional intelligence is available

9.3 Facilitators

During the activation period, the FPs reported a total of 169 facilitators identified. Due to the reasons already recognized in 2009, namely the provisions of the national legislation in Bulgaria which identifies facilitators as all persons detected in the same vehicle with the illegal migrants. In this regard, [REDACTED] reported the highest volume of facilitators identified as shown on the chart on the right. The Fig. 3 shows a relevant number of detections at [REDACTED] which reported the highest volume of migrants detected at the green border.

16 A total of 378 forged documents detected
17 336 out of 344 cases
18 For a forged visa sticker
19 For a genuine visa
20 52 documents out of a total of 99

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. It would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

All facilitators identified at [REDACTED] supported the migrants to cross the green border area and were detected in the vicinity of the border or during inland controls, whereas facilitators identified at FP [REDACTED] were only identified at the BCP. Due to the lack of intelligence,²¹ a more in-depth analysis is not yet possible.

The division of facilitators by nationality (see Fig 4) indicates that Turkish nationals detected at [REDACTED] had the highest volume in detections. German citizens ranked second in the chart, this came as a surprise as most facilitators are third country nationals. Information provided by GOs indicates that [REDACTED]

9.4 Refusals of entry

A total of 31 744 persons were refused entry at the FPs activated during the operational period of JO Focal Points 2010 Land. Compared with the findings from the operation implemented in 2009 when 15 322 persons were refused entry, the volume of refusals doubled. This is mainly due to the high number²³ of refusals of entry for the reason 'other' reported from [REDACTED]. In practice, the reason for refusal was the poor technical condition of the vehicle. The chart on the right also indicates the reason 'other' reported from [REDACTED] where the cause was the possession of goods not eligible for legal transportation into the EU.

Unlike in 2009, the highest volume of refusals was reported from the [REDACTED] where the reason for more than half of the refusals of entry was the lack of valid visa or residence permit ('C').

In general, the volume of refusals was directly proportional to the number of activation days and the number of deployed GOs which suggests that additional manpower and updated professional skills leads to higher detections and, consequently, to enhanced border security.

21 Only one incident report was provided from [REDACTED] in regard to facilitation during the activation period
22 For 20 out of the 24 persons detected
23 A total of 8 260 persons

The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for development of risk analysis and, in turn, the Agency's operational decision-making. As risk analysis used by Frontex to conduct its operations is based on the information at issue, its disclosure would disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the names of Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]

9.5 Overstayers

Overstaying visas is an illegal immigration related pattern difficult to tackle at the border. It is challenging for the border checks officers to prove the intent to disregard conditions of stay especially when the person presents supportive documents to prove the fake travel reason.

During the operational period of JO Focal Points 2010 Land, 5 229 persons were detected as having overstayed their visa. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The FP that reported the highest number of detected overstayers was [REDACTED] and 73% of those detected persons were Georgian nationals. One of the reasons for the high numbers reported from [REDACTED] might be enhanced checks carried out during the RABIT deployment that included this BCP as well.

The period of overstaying was in most of the cases more than 3 months and the information provided by GOs indicates that in all cases the overstaying was planned and never due to accidental reasons.

[REDACTED]

9.6 Asylum claims

The institution of asylum is based on a humanitarian concept which unfortunately is sometimes exploited by illegal migrants to reach and illegally stay in EU MSs. During the operational period, a total of 3 920 asylum claims were reported. The overwhelming majority (3 838) came from [REDACTED] and were requested mainly by Russian (82%) and Georgian (14%) nationals.

[REDACTED]

9.7 Stolen vehicles

The Interpol database on stolen motor vehicles indicates an increase of almost 1 million vehicles stolen in 2010 as compared with 2009.²⁵ In this context, according to the same source, the number of stolen vehicles detected increased from 26 434 in 2009 to 34 199 in 2010.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the names of Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

24

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The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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In the year 2008, the FPs reported a total of 52 stolen vehicles detected mostly at the Slovenian border with Croatia. Due to an intelligence driven deployment and concentrated efforts on this topic, 2009 saw the volume of stolen vehicles detected increase to 223 with detections mainly reported from the same BCPs but also from the Eastern Land Borders. As the analysis indicated changes in the trend, in 2010, the deployment of stolen vehicles experts focused also on the Eastern Land Borders and during the operational period of the JO Focal Points 2010 Land, a total of 400 stolen vehicles were identified.

The Fig.7 illustrates the volume and location of detected stolen vehicles broken down by year. From the total of 400 vehicles, 44% were detected at the [REDACTED]

The highest number of stolen vehicles detected was reported from the [REDACTED] which had a permanent deployment throughout the year, this was followed by FPs at the Eastern Land Borders, namely [REDACTED]

The stolen vehicles detected at the Eastern Land Borders were driven at the moment of detection by Ukrainian (46%), Polish (14%), Belarusian (11%) and German (5%) nationals.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁵ From 8 222 374 vehicles declared stolen in 2009 to 7 155 279 in 2010. During this period three more States have become members of Interpol.


²⁶ Interim Evaluation Report of the Joint Operation Focal Points 2010 Land Ref. 10065/09.07.2010

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
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The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. It would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.




10. Strengths and weakness of the Joint Operation


10.1 Strengths



10.2 Weaknesses



11. Conclusions and recommendations




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Analytical Conclusions:



28 For a forged visa sticker

The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for development of risk analysis and, in turn, the Agency's operational decision-making. As risk analysis used by Frontex to conduct its operations is based on the information at issue, its disclosure would disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their *modus operandi* accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger.

The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Technical Conclusions:


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Operational Recommendations:

-

Frontex evaluation report JO F

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials used to efficiently perform border control tasks and counter illegal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. Therefore, public security would be affected. Consequentially, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



The document contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, it would undermine the protection of public security. Accordingly, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

PART III: Fact sheets – statistics

1. Phases of the Joint Operation

The JO Focal Points 2010 Land was implemented from March 2010 – 31 December 2010 with extension till 28 February 2011.

2. Preparation of the JO and planning procedures

JO Focal Points 2010 Land Implementation schedule:

29/09/2019	Host countries conference
12-15/10/2009	Presentation on bi-lateral talks
14/01/2010	Approval of project template and budget
03/02/2010	Planning meeting
22 – 23/02/2010	Briefing Meeting; (for GO' deployment in the first half of 2010)
29 – 30/06/2010	Briefing Meeting; (for GOs' deployment in the second half of 2010)
06/07/2010	Mid-term evaluation meeting
04 - 05/2011	Final evaluation phase
19/07/2011	Evaluation meeting

3. Participated countries, deployed experts and assets

Host Member States (11): Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania

Participated Member States (16): Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden

Participated Third Countries (4):

Republic of Belorussia, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Serbia



The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in each operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type, capabilities and weaknesses of the equipment, as well as their usual position, opening way for abuse. The result of this would only be to hamper the course of ongoing and future similar operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of human resources deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of operations and exposing law enforcement officials and their assets to security risks. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

4. Implementation of budget

The main budgetary lines of the project were as follows:

Initial: 1,100,000.00 EUR

Final: 2,038,393.77 EUR

There were 10 budget amendments to account for the increased need of financial resources to cover the costs of deployments of GOs in the second half of 2010 and to ensure smooth implementation of the project during the extension period in January – February 2011. During the implementation phase the JO Focal Points 2010 was reinforced in terms of deployments of TCs observers and technical means.

Total project commitments: 2,038,393.77 € (100 % of planned budget) which was divided accordingly to;

Missions 26 850.00 €

Participants 88 224.78 €²⁹


Global 1,923,318.99 €

Paid commitments: 1,933,993.14 € (~95% of total project commitments);

Pending payments: 2,700.00 € (Greece, Note of Understanding for running costs of FPs);

Budget carried over to 2011 and used for payments: 573,846.74 €.

Budget allocations




²⁹ The commitment for participants is high due to the fact that the different types of the meetings were foreseen to be covered under umbrella of Multiannual Programme Focal Points 2010-2013

4.1 Commitments vs payments


JO Focal Points 2010 Land

The non-disclosed text contains information in regard to human resources and technical equipment deployed in borders as well as sensitive information obtained in the scope of cooperation with another EU MS related to the effectiveness of border security. Its disclosure would reveal strengths and weaknesses of external borders which, once public, would be explored by terrorist and criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The disclosure of such information would undermine the public interest as regards public security. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.





4.2 Main financial problems



The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials conducting return operations of third country nationals. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, putting at risk the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to return third-country nationals who are the subject of national return decisions. This would endanger the public order as well as Member States' security and, concretely, jeopardize the orderly conduct of return flights and threaten the safety of the aircraft, its passengers and crew. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and therefore must be refused.

In the framework of JO Focal Points 2010 Land during the implementation all the reports (Incident, Daily and Weekly) were collected from operational areas. The reports were verified and stored by FSC. All reports can be found in the designated folder of the JO.

Figure 1



Figure 3




Figure 4

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing the names of Border Control Points would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. As a result, the course of the ongoing operations would be hampered by depriving officials of any strategy and element of surprise which could be exercised during border surveillance, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality and to prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



Figure 5




Figure 6

Main nationalities refused





Figure 7

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7. Map referring to the operational area

