OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
LAND BORDERS SECTOR

Annexes of Operational Plan

JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 land on Border Checks
2017/LBS/04
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ANNEX 1 - CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ALL PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN FRONTEX ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1
Objectives, scope and subject matter

1. The present Code of Conduct aims to promote professional values based on the principles of the rule of law and the respect of fundamental rights and to establish the ethical behaviour standards that guide all persons participating in Frontex activities.

2. In this regard it sets out principles and rules which guide the conduct of all persons participating in Frontex activities, namely, Frontex staff, officers of border guard services of a Member State and other staff performing any actions in a Frontex activity.

Article 2
Definitions

For the purpose of the present Code, the following definitions apply:

a) The term "participant" refers to any person participating in a Frontex activity.

b) The term "Frontex activity" means any activity coordinated or led by Frontex within the framework of its tasks as described in the Frontex Regulation, including Joint Operations, Pilot Projects, Joint Return Operations, and Trainings.

c) The term "Frontex staff" refers to the staff to whom Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants apply and includes also seconded national experts.

d) The term "law enforcement officers" includes border guards and/or other public officials deployed from a Member State, who enjoy the prerogatives of public authority.

e) The term "Member State" also includes the Schengen Associated Countries. As regards Joint Return Operations, the terms "home and host Member States" are understood as referring to "participating and organising Member States" respectively.

f) The term "discrimination" means any unfair treatment or arbitrary action or distinction based on a person's sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.

g) The term "harassment" means any improper and unwelcome conduct that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offence or humiliation to another person. Harassment may take the form of words, gestures or actions which annoy, alarm, abuse, demean, intimidate, belittle, humiliate or embarrass another or which create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.

CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES

Article 3
Lawfulness

1. Participants in Frontex activities serve the public interest and shall comply with international law, European Union law, the national law of both home and host Member States and the present Code of Conduct.

2. They shall also meet the obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the Operational/Implementation Plan, or other similar agreed rules.

Article 4
Fundamental rights

Participants in Frontex activities shall:

a) promote and respect human dignity and the fundamental rights of every individual, regardless of their sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation;

b) promote compliance with the relevant international and European instruments regarding fundamental rights protection.

Article 5

International protection

Participants in Frontex activities shall:

a) promote, in full compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, that persons seeking international protection are recognised, receive adequate assistance, are informed, in an appropriate way, about their rights and relevant procedures and are referred to national authorities responsible for receiving their asylum requests;

b) provide persons in their custody with proper access to health care;

c) give special consideration to particularly vulnerable groups of people, including women, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, persons susceptible to exploitation and victims of exploitation or trafficking in human beings.

Article 6

Performance of duties

Participants in Frontex activities shall ensure that instructions, directives and required duties are carried out promptly and diligently.

Article 7

Responsibility

Participants in Frontex activities are primarily and individually responsible for their actions in their work.

Article 8

Conflict of interests

To perform their duties properly, participants in Frontex activities shall refrain from any activities which would undermine or compromise their independence and the appropriate performance of their duties.

Article 9

Confidentiality

1. Confidential or sensitive information in the possession of a participant in Frontex activities shall not be publicly disclosed, including in social media or environment, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require disclosure or disclosure has been appropriately authorised.

2. Participants shall not express themselves regarding Frontex activities in the media unless explicit authorisation is given, in accordance with the Operational Plan or other similar agreed rules.

3. Participants are bound by the obligation to behave with discretion regarding current, past, and planned or potential Frontex activities.

Article 10

Behavioural Standards

Participants in Frontex activities whether on or off duty shall:

a) abstain from all behaviour likely to compromise the prestige and the nature of the public mission in which they are invested or to bring discredit upon their organisation or Frontex;
b) act with fairness and impartiality in their dealings with the public and other participants in Frontex activities, treating all with courtesy and respect, avoiding all forms of victimisation or discrimination, bearing in mind the diverse nature of all people, including backgrounds, origin and/or rank;
c) abstain from actions contrary to the public order;
d) refrain from using vulgar, obscene or otherwise offensive speech or gestures that could be considered abusive towards other participants in Frontex activities or the public.

CHAPTER III
PROHIBITED CONDUCTS

Article 11
Abuse of authority
All improper use of a position of influence, power or authority is forbidden.

Article 12
Discrimination
All discriminatory behaviours as defined in Article 2 towards the public or other participants in Frontex activities are forbidden.

Article 13
Harassment
All forms of harassment as defined in Article 2 are forbidden.

Article 14
Corruption
1. The use of public position for illegitimate private gains as well as the acceptance of unjustified rewards for actions taken in Frontex activities is forbidden.
2. Consent to any form of corrupt activity is forbidden.

Article 15
Use of narcotics and drugs
The use or possession of narcotics and drugs, unless prescribed for medical reasons, is forbidden.

Article 16
Consumption of alcohol
1. The consumption of alcohol while on duty is forbidden.
2. The consumption of alcohol off duty shall be moderate, unless the Operational Plan or other similar agreed rules prohibit it.
3. A participant unexpectedly called out for duty is obliged, at no risk of discredit, to say that he/she has consumed alcohol and may not be fit for duty.
4. A participant shall not report for duty or appear in public in a state of intoxication.

Article 17
Sexual services
Using or soliciting any sexual services from any premises, whether public or private, is forbidden.

CHAPTER IV
SPECIAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
Article 18
Personal and professional behaviour

Given the prerogatives of authority, law enforcement officers have a particular responsibility to act with fairness and impartiality in their dealings with the public or other participants in Frontex activities, treating all with courtesy and respect.

Article 19
Use of force

1. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation, while performing their tasks law enforcement officers may only use force with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.

2. The use of force shall not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances, for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-defence or in legitimate defence of other persons.

Article 20
Use of weapons

1. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation, while performing their tasks law enforcement officers enjoying guest officer status may only use weapons with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.

2. The use of weapons is an exceptional measure and it shall not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances, for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-defence or in legitimate defence of other persons.

CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 21
Training

Participants in Frontex activities shall, previous to their engagement in Frontex activities, get acquainted with the content of the present Code through appropriate training provided by national authorities responsible for the deployment of the participants or by Frontex.

Article 22
Reporting

Participants in Frontex activities who have reason to believe that a violation of the present Code has occurred or is about to occur, are obliged to report the matter to Frontex via the appropriate channels.

Article 23
Sanctions

1. In the case of violation of the present Code by a Frontex staff member, the Executive Director will take adequate measures which may include the immediate removal of the Frontex staff member from the activity.

2. If the violation was committed by a person deployed by a Member State, the Executive Director may request the Member State to immediately remove the person concerned from the Frontex activity and expects that the relevant authority of the Member State will use its powers regarding the necessary disciplinary measures and, if applicable, to remove the person concerned from the respective pool for a defined period.

3. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 2, in a case of serious violation of the present Code, the competent authority will adopt immediate measures that may result in the removal of a participant from Frontex activity.
ANNEX 2 - COMPLAINTS MECHANISM

1. ANNEX 2 – COMPLAINTS MECHANISM

Background Information
According to Article 72 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation\(^1\), the Agency shall, in cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), take the necessary measures to set up a Complaints Mechanism to monitor and ensure the respect for fundamental rights in the operational areas where the activities of the Agency are implemented.

Article 16.3m of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation mandates the Agency’s to adopt in the Operational Plan the mechanism to receive and transmit to the Agency a complaint.

The procedures and instructions of the complaint mechanism defined in this annex apply in the operational areas in which Agency activity takes place: (i) joint operations, (ii) pilot projects, (iii) rapid border intervention, (iv) migration management support team deployment, (v) return operation, (vi) return intervention (vii) rapid return intervention (hereafter - Agency activities).

Complaints include personal data and therefore should be dealt with in confidentiality and not transmitted via any other channel than those specifically designated by the complaints mechanism and established in the rules and procedures that follow.

For more information on Complaints Mechanism please consult Frontex website: [www.frontex.europa.eu](http://www.frontex.europa.eu)

General Information

Who can complain?
Any person who is directly affected by the actions of staff involved in Agency activity and who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions. The complaint may be presented by any party representing a person with the right to complain.

What is the subject of the complaint?
A concrete fundamental rights violation resulting from an action by participant in Agency activity.

Possible ways to present a complaint
A complaint must be made in writing and may be made on the official complaint form. Although the use of the complaint form is preferable, complaints can be submitted in any format, provided it is in writing.

The complainant has 4 possibilities to present a complaint:

- Using the official complaint form available in Frontex website [www.frontex.europa.eu/complaints/](http://www.frontex.europa.eu/complaints/)
- Sending the complaint via email to [complaints@frontex.europa.eu](mailto:complaints@frontex.europa.eu)

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JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 (and on Border Checks)

- Sending the complaint by post:
  Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, Complaints
  Frontex, Mac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland

- Handing over the complaint where the activity takes place.

**Duty to inform**

Agency staff and Team Members have the obligation to provide information about the complaints mechanism, including information on the complaint form, the privacy statement and relevant leaflets on procedures to any persons who expresses a wish to report an alleged fundamental rights violation against the staff involved in an Agency activity.

They shall also provide the information on the right to complain when a deployed officer in the Frontex coordinated activity, in the course of any activity (screening, debriefing, etc.), indicates a potential violation of fundamental rights or a particular individual is identified as a potential victim of an alleged violation of fundamental rights or expresses in any way a complaint or an interest to lodge a complaint.

**Using the hard copy of the complaint form**

The hard copy of the complaint form, privacy statement and leaflets are available and accessible to everyone wishing to file a complaint in the operational areas in places where such availability is feasible, namely the local coordination structures and premises where Frontex coordinated activities are taking place.

Persons who want to file a complaint using the hard copy of the form, will be granted the form, the privacy statement, leaflets on the procedures and an envelope with the addressee printed on it provided by Frontex.

*The Complaint Form including the Privacy Statement are available in the Handbook and stored on FOISS.*

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1. Awareness material and specific training on the complaints mechanisms is planned to be developed during 2017 and will be regularly delivered in cooperation with the FEO.
ANNEX 3 - THOROUGH ASSESSMENT

1.1. Introduction

This Tactical Focused Assessment (TFA) describes the situation of border security and illegal immigration at the European Union's external land borders, excluding Turkey. It assesses the volume of irregular migration pressure towards the European Union's external land borders of Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia as well as trends, patterns, routes, modi operandi and nationalities of irregular migrants.

The results of this TFA will form the basis for the planned Frontex coordinated Joint Operation (JO) Focal Points 2017 Land.

1.2. Sources

[Text redacted]

1.3. Assessment

The main quantitative indicators that Frontex has at its disposal to assess the pressure at the EU's external borders, and are reasonably comparable in FRAN and JO Focal Points data gathering, are refusals of entry, illegal stay on exit, illegal border-crossings, clandestine entries, and falsifications. Data for FRAN Indicators consist of all detections between 1 January and 31 October 2016 at the European Union's external land borders and data for JO Focal Points Land only for the reporting Focal Points.9

For the purpose of this analysis, detections at [text redacted] land border sections reported in FRAN were not included.

1.3.1. Refusal of Entry

FRAN data9 show that 138,033 persons were refused entry at the European Union's external land borders in 2016 of which 132,044 were reported to be refused during the implementation period of the JO Focal Points 2016 Land between 1 January and 31 October 2016. During this ten-month period, refusals of entry by Focal

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9 From January to September 2016 only.
Points represent 98% (97% in 2015 on an annual basis) of the total number of refusals at the European Union’s external land border in 2016, although persons refused entry often try to enter repeatedly after being refused and each attempt is reported as a new refusal of entry.

Comparing different land border sections, the border authorities at the land border with Belarus reported in FRAN the highest number of refusals with 60%. The main nationality of refused persons at this land border section was Russian, representing 98% of the total. The main reasons for refusal of entry were “E” (reason E) and “C” (reason C). The second highest number of refused persons was reported from the land borders with Ukraine, with over 19% of the total. Ukrainians with 80% and Tajik nationals with 9% were the most reported nationalities at these border sections and the main reasons for refusal were “E” (reason E) and “C” (reason C). The third highest number of refused persons was reported from the land borders with Serbia, with over 7% of the total. Serbian nationals with 52% and Albanian nationals with 20% were the main reported nationalities of refused persons at the border sections with Serbia and the main reasons for refusal were “E” (reason E) and “H” (reason H) 20%.

FRAN as well as the JO Focal Points Land data show a remarkable increasing trend of refusals at the EU’s external land border with Belarus between 1 January and 31 October 2016. One of the main ‘push factors’ for mainly Russian, Belarusian, Tajik and Armenian nationals to travel to Europe lies in the current economic crisis in Russia where, according to open sources and official government statements, nearly 20 million people now survive on wages which are below the poverty threshold. The collapse in oil prices crushed the Russian “ruble” causing a sharp devaluation in that currency. The currency devaluation is drastically affecting foreign workers residing in Russia, forcing them to emigrate from Russia to EU countries or to return to their countries of origin. Moreover, these countries are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed when the former Soviet Union (now called Russia) totally dissolved in 1991. The CIS consists of eleven countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. So far, however, there has been no significant impact on border security at the EU’s external land borders.

At the land borders with Ukraine, a slight increase of refusals can be noted compared with the same ten-month period in 2015. Ukrainians and Tajik nationals were the top nationalities refused entry with 89% share of refusals. The number of Ukrainians (21,116) refused entry increased by 47% whilst the number of refused Tajik nationals (2,447) increased by 190% in comparison with the same period in 2016.

At the land borders with Serbia, the number of persons refused entry increased roughly by 2% in comparison with the same period in 2015. Serbian and Albanian nationals were the top nationalities refused entry with a 72% share of refusals. The number of Serbs (4,793) refused entry remains stable whilst the number of refused Albanian nationals (1,847) decreased slightly by 4% in comparison with the same period in 2015.

In terms of the nationalities of refused persons, it is worth noting a 60% increase in the number of refused Russian nationals (72,176 in 2016, 10,221 in 2015) as well as a 27% increase in the number of refused Ukrainians (22,039 in 2016, 17,380 in 2015). The increasing trend in the number of refusals related to these two nationalities was mainly linked to “E” (reason E) and “C” (reason C).
Notable Operational Activities 2017 and Border Checks

1.3.2. Overstaying

Overstaying the length of the visa and the period of three months per a six-month period continues to be a frequent modus operandi for migrants staying illegally in the European Union. However, during the first ten months of 2016, the trend sharply increased and according to FRAN data the number of overstayers (21,884) detected on exit at the European Union’s external land borders was 25% higher than in the same period of 2015. The top reported nationality for overstaying was Ukrainian with 11,707 reported persons of which 11,392 were reported at the border with Ukraine. Moldovan nationals were the second most reported nationality for overstaying with 3,154 persons detected. They were mainly detected at the Romanian-Moldovan border.

The highest number of detections was reported at the Polish-Ukrainian land border where 8,956 (5,537 in 2015) persons were detected. The second highest number of detections was reported at the Hungarian-Romanian land border where 2,610 (1,949 in 2015) persons were detected. The third highest number of detections was reported at the Hungarian-Ukrainian land border where 2,560 (1,731 in 2015) persons were detected.

Data on nationalities detected for illegal stay on exit also show a typical pattern concerning third-country nationals from neighbouring countries when detected on their return home after overstaying in the European Union.

Data gathered within the context of the JOD Focal Points Land reveal that a total of 10,704 overstayers were detected between 1 January and 31 October 2016, which represents 49% of all reported overstayers at the EU’s external land border during the same period in 2016. This figure is comparable to the 8,220 overstayers reported from the Focal Points during the same period in 2015, however the share of all reported overstayers at the EU’s external land border was 46%.

According to FRAN data the number of detections for illegal stay in EU Member States is higher than in 2015 and in recent reporting periods. This is a variation on the stable long-term trend registered over the past five years.

1.3.3. Falsified Documents

During the first ten months of 2016, 3,262 persons were detected with falsified documents mainly on entry (66%). Ukrainian (1,873), Russian (150), and Turkish (116) nationals were the top three reported nationalities detected with falsified documents. A total of 4,097 falsified documents were reported from the European Union’s external land borders to the European Union Document - Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN). This figure is 4% higher than the number of falsified documents reported during the same period in 2015 (3,960).

Between 1 January and 31 October 2016, the Polish authorities reported 1,658 detections of falsified documents at its external land borders which represents 41% of all detections at the European Union’s land borders. The Hungarian authorities recorded a total of 997 detections whilst the Lithuanian, Romanian, and Latvian authorities, ranking third, fourth, and fifth, respectively reported 310, 232 and 192 detected falsified documents.

Ukrainian nationals, with 1,873 detections, were the main nationality detected and were mainly reported on entry at the EU’s Polish, Hungarian, and Slovak land borders with Ukraine.

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Russian nationals with 150 falsified documents ranked second. The majority of Russians was reported from the Lithuanian-Russian, Polish-Belarusian and Lithuanian-Belarusian land borders, chiefly on entry and in terms of falsified documents, Turkish nationals with 146 falsified documents ranked third and were almost all reported, on exit and entry, from the Polish-Ukrainian and Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian land borders primarily for

During the same ten-month period of 2016, a total of 2,771 falsified documents were reported in the context of the JO Focal Points Land. Compared with 2015 when 2,995 incidents involving falsified documents were reported during the JO Focal Points Land, a 16% increase can be noted. Nevertheless, the total number of falsified documents reported in the framework of the JO Focal Points Land represents 68% of all detections from January to October 2016 at the European Union’s external land borders within EDF-RAN data.

1.3.4. Illegal Border-Crossing

Between 1 January and 31 October 2016, 132,544 persons were apprehended for illegal border-crossing at the European Union’s external land borders. In comparison with the same ten-month period in 2015, when 521,426 irregular migrants were detected, the number of irregular migrants reported for illegal border crossing during the first ten months of 2016 sharply decreased by 78%.

The most affected border section was the Croatian Serbian land border with 103,441 persons detected (295,950 in 2015) and a 78% share (57% in 2015) of the total number of detections of illegal border-crossings at the land borders. During the first ten months of 2016, the number of illegal border-crossings decreased by 65% compared to the same period in 2015. After the closure of the Hungarian land border with Serbia in mid-September 2015, migration flows quickly shifted towards Croatia where the local authorities were not able to cope with the sudden pressure faced by thousands of migrants arriving at its external border. In order to manage the migration crisis, Croatia organised bus and rail transport for these migrants in concert with the Slovenian and Austrian authorities to Germany making it possible for an estimated 300,000 migrants of unknown nationalities to enter the Schengen area without being fingerprinted or registered.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia imposed stricter entry measures in mid-November 2015 in order to curb and stem migration flows. Thus, irregular migrants intending to transit via the Western Balkan corridor towards the EU were halted at the Greek-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian land border from travelling further north with the exception of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The need for a coordinated approach to the situation brought about several high-level meetings of regional and EU MS officials in February 2016. On 22 February 2016, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia banned Afghan nationals from transiting through their country. Each meeting resulted in gradual transit restrictions at regional level culminating on 9 March with the complete closure of the transit corridor and the return to the full application of the Schengen Borders Code and legislation governing international travel. Later the conclusion of the EU-
Turkey statement in March 2016 further mitigated irregular migration via Turkey to Greece and consequently to the Western Balkan region.

As a consequence of the above measures the number of migrants crossing the Western Balkans decreased significantly month-on-month from 65,000 detections in January (to roughly 3,500 in June and below 2,000 in Aug 2016), indicating a strong downward trend during the first eight months of year. However, the migration pressure along the Western Balkan route is still constant and since April it has been concentrated at the Hungarian land border with Serbia. Moreover, since April 2016, the number of monthly apprehensions has been between 2,000 and 3,000, while, the situation at the Croatian land border remains calm with less than 50 apprehended persons per month.

The three main nationalities apprehended for illegal border-crossing at the Hungarian-Serbian border were Afghan with 6,543 (53,088 in 2015) detections, representing 38% of the total reported for illegal border-crossing, Pakistani with 3,186 (17,029 in 2015) detections, representing 18% of the total, and Syrian with 1,688 (89,676 in 2015) detections, representing 10% of the total.

The three most affected border sections for illegal border-crossings were the Greek-Albanian land border with 3,988 persons apprehended (7,299 in 2015), which represents just 2% of the total number of detections (4% in 2015). After the introduction of visa liberalisation for Albanian nationals in December 2009, the detection of illegal border-crossings decreased significantly at this border section. Nevertheless, Albanian nationals, with over 98% of the total number of detections, remained the predominant nationality detected at this border section.

The fourth most affected border section for illegal border-crossing was the Bulgarian-Turkish land border with 2,996 detections, representing only 2% of the total at the European Union's external land border (1% in 2015). However, detections at this border section decreased by 52% compared to the same ten-month period in 2015, when 6,219 persons were reported for illegal border-crossing. The main nationalities apprehended at this
JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 for on Border Checks

border section were nationals from Afghanistan with 1,140 persons detected (38% share), Iraq with 996 persons detected (33% share), and Syria with 514 persons detected (17% share). Irregular migrants, entering Turkey by land from Syria and Iraq, used mainly the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, and in a lesser extent the Greek-Turkish land border, to enter into the EU illegally.

Therefore, it is expected that this route will continue to be used by irregular migrants sharing the same characteristics as those entering illegally through the Eastern Mediterranean route. The route through the Western Balkans offers a relatively cheap option for migrants to reach their final destinations in the EU, mostly western EU Member States, in comparison with more expensive or dangerous routes by sea.

1.3.5. Clandestine Entry

Compared to the number of illegal border crossings, the number of clandestine entries at the European Union’s external land borders is much lower. However, between 1 January and 31 October 2016, a total of 1,316 clandestine entries were reported to FRAN showing a 53% decrease compared with the same period in 2015 when 2,832 clandestine entries were reported. A total of 737 clandestine entrants were apprehended during the first ten months of 2016 in the JO Focal Points Land, which represents 56% of all clandestine entries at the land borders. According to FRAN reports, clandestine entries have mostly been reported from the Bulgarian land border with Turkey with 844 detections, which represents 64% of all detections of clandestine entry.

Syrian (597) nationals were reported in 45% of all incidents and were mainly detected at the Bulgarian-Turkish (585) land border. Afghan (187) nationals were detected in 14% of all incidents; they were primarily detected at the Bulgarian-Turkish (91) and at the Croatian-Serbian (74) land border sections. Iraq (150) and Moroccan (128) nationals were both reported in 11% and 10% of all incidents, respectively. Iraqis were mainly detected at the Bulgarian-Turkish (139) land border whilst Moroccan nationals (100) were in the main detected at the Hungarian-Serbian land border section.

During the first ten months of 2016, the entry of migrants from the Western Balkans has not been a major concern for the EU. The entry of migrants from the Western Balkans has not been a major concern for the EU.
1.3.6. Asylum

Social and political unrest, armed conflicts, humanitarian and economic crises in third countries in close proximity to the EU continued to be the primary ‘push factors’ for the vast majority of people seeking international protection in the EU in 2016. Nevertheless, since the beginning of 2016, the number of asylum claimants at the EU’s external land borders has been falling significantly. According to FRAN data, the number of asylum claimants between 1 January and 31 October 2016 (29,061) notably decreased by 78%, in comparison with the number of asylum applicants (133,090) recorded during the same period of 2015.

Considering the number of persons who applied for asylum at the EU’s external land borders between 1 January and 31 October 2016, asylum claimants from the Russian Federation ranked first with 6,962 asylum applications lodged (+24% compared with 2015). Afghan nationals who claimed asylum ranked second with 6,365 asylum applications lodged (+81% compared with 2015). Syrian nationals had 4,136 asylum applications lodged (+89% compared with 2015). Asylum claimants from Pakistan lodged 3,447 asylum applications (+73% compared with 2015). Iraqi nationals lodged 2,015 asylum applications (+74% compared with 2015).

Russian citizens mainly applied for asylum at the Polish-Belarussian border while Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis, and Iraqis applied for asylum at the Hungarian-Serbian, Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish land border sections. The most recent measure introduced by the Hungarian authorities to tackle irregular migration flows consists in a new law that allows the Hungarian police to escort migrants back beyond the border fence. Irregular migrants that are apprehended within eight kilometres of the external border will be transferred to Hungarian transit zones located beyond the fence. This new regulation came into force on 5 July 2016. At the land border between Hungary and Serbia, the majority of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq apprehended for illegal border-crossing and clandestine entry were escorted back to the Hungarian transit zones where they had the possibility to submit an asylum application. Every day, 15 migrants are allowed to apply for asylum at each of these two Hungarian transit zones.

People smugglers often advise their clients to

1.3.7. Stolen Vehicles

Only

Between 1 January and 31 October 2016, a total of 282 stolen vehicles were detected at the Focal Points, whilst the total for the same period in 2015 was 318.

In the framework of the JO Focal Point Land, the main land border sections where stolen vehicle incidents were recorded during the aforementioned ten-month reporting period were the border sections with Ukraine (125) with 44%, Serbia (61) with 29%, and Belarus (40) with 14% of the total number of stolen vehicles detected.

The Focal Point

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Commented [WUB]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency.
The main brands of identified stolen vehicles were Mercedes with 54, BMW with 33, Volkswagen with 26, Audi with 24, and Ford with 14 vehicles. At the same time, a total of 14 trucks/trailers, 1 motorbike and 11 outboard motorboat engines were identified as stolen.

Individuals from Ukraine (105) were involved in 103 of the stolen vehicle incidents and almost exclusively at the Polish and Hungarian land border sections with Ukraine. Serbian nationals (29) were involved in 29 of the stolen vehicle cases primarily at the Hungarian and Croatian land borders with Serbia. Belarusian nationals (23) were involved in 22 of the stolen vehicle events mainly at the Polish and Lithuanian land borders with Belarus.

Most stolen vehicles were detected on exit (72%).

During 2016, two alternative modus operandi were identified by Frontex experts deployed within the JO Focal Points 2016 Land. Criminal organisations specialised in stealing vehicles seem to be using a new modus operandi to smuggle cars across Europe. Smugglers

1.3.8. Smuggling

Border guards in cooperation with customs officers and the police are also engaged in combating other criminal activities at the border such as the smuggling of goods and trafficking in human beings.

Comparing the data of the JO Focal Points Land during the first ten months of 2016 with 945 reported incidents of smuggling of goods to data from the previous year with 1,367 reported incidents, a 31% decrease in smuggling cases was reported in 2016 compared with the same period in 2015.

Commented [WU12]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will undermine the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to combat criminal activities would be jeopardised. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing this information contained therein would be of benefit for the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus posing the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 41(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings and thus undermining the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exemption laid down in the first indent of Article 41(a) of Regulation 1049/2001.
1.3.9. Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF)

In accordance with European Council measures agreed on 17.11.2015 specifically:-

"Frontex will:

- contribute to the fight against terrorism and support the coordinated implementation of the Common Risk Indicators (CRI) before the end of 2015,
- assist the Member States to tighten controls of external borders to detect suspicious travels of foreign terrorist fighters and smuggling of firearms, in cooperation with Europol".

Frontex has been instructed to support the Member States with the implementation of the CRIs in order to detect suspected travels of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) as part of all operations that are conducted at BCPs.

Frontex will include this operational objective and related reporting as a distinct activity within all operations taking place at BCPs. The CRIs and explanatory notes are contained in the annex to this TFA. They were provided by Europol, who reviewed them together with Member States in November 2015 and who subsequently validated them.

In order to provide support to the implementation of the CRIs by EU MS/SAC, Frontex will also develop more user-friendly CRI reference material to be used during border control procedures in the joint operation concerned.

Frontex's role is to support EU MS/SAC efforts to implement the CRIs and identify the suspicious travel of FTFs. The planning and conducting of this activity within existing Frontex operations represents a new undertaking for Frontex. The current scope of the CRIs is limited to those enjoying the community right of free movement; this effectively means EU nationals and those third-country nationals with EU MS/SAC residence permits. However, besides triggering the check of those enjoying the community right of free movement, the CRIs could
also help border guards to detect potential third-country foreign terrorist fighters. This would also be in line with the tasking by the Council (assist Member States in tightening controls to detect the suspicious travel of FFTs).

The

Frontex Risk Analysis Unit will collect and analyse data relating to the indicators from all sectors (Land, Sea and Air) as one whole. Updates and feedback concerning all the sectoral activities will be fed back into the weekly/bi-weekly reporting products for the individual operations.

The Risk Analysis Unit will seek to enrich and verify the profiles, based on detected proven incidents, as well as detect BCPs which may be identified as being used by Foreign Terrorist Fighters or those matching their profile. RAU will work closely with Europol in this regard and share its findings.

The Risk Analysis Unit will also seek to measure 1) the increase of checks of those enjoying the community right of free movement and also 2) the correlation between increased checks of persons with EU MS/SAC documents at BCPs and incidences of detection of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

Relevant briefings in the identification of suspects, subsequent activity and completion of the templates will be provided to Team Members and EU MS/SAC representatives of BCPs prior to deployment. In order to provide support to the implementation of the CRIs by EU Member States, Frontex will also develop more user-friendly CRI reference material to be used during border control procedures in the JO concerned.

1.4. Conclusions

- The highest number of refused persons was reported at the land border section with Belarus, Russian, Belarusian, Tajik and Armenian nationals were the most reported nationalities.

- An increase in overstaying at the European Union’s external land borders was recorded. Ukrainian nationals continued to be the top nationality reported for overstaying while Moldovan nationals ranked second.

- A slight growth in the detection of falsified documents at the EU’s external land borders was noted.

Commented [WU11]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen, public security would be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. In particular, the Border Control Points (BCPs) activated within JO Fiscal Points 2017 Land: 'ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years. In the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In the sense of Article 4(1)(a) First Indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.'
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- Since the beginning of 2016, a sharp decreasing trend of illegal border-crossings at the EU's external land borders with Western Balkan countries has been observed. The most affected border section was the Croatian-Serbian land border during the first two months in 2015 but after the closure of the Western Balkan corridor in March 2016 the migration flow shifted towards the Hungarian-Serbian land border section.

- From 1 January and 31 October 2016, the number of asylum applications at the EU's external land borders fell. During the same period, the Hungarian-Serbian and Polish-Belarusian border sections registered the highest number of asylum seekers.

- There was a slight decrease in the number of detected stolen vehicles at the EU's external land borders during the first ten months of 2016. The Focal Points at the Polish external land border continued to report the highest number of detected stolen vehicles, which were mainly driven by Ukrainian nationals.

1.5. General Recommendations

Polish border with Ukraine

- A high number of refusals of entry, overstayers, false or falsified documents and stolen vehicles were reported from the FPs located at the Polish-Ukraine border.

Polish border with Belarus

- Given the high number of persons refused entry and asylum seekers.

Hungarian border with Ukraine

- 

Hungarian border with Serbia

- 

Croatian border with Serbia

Commented [WU13]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen, public security would be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) First indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
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Greek border with Albania

Greek border with Turkey

Greek border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Bulgarian border with Turkey

On account:

Commented [WU14]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen, public security would be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the First Indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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**ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>General Objectives</th>
<th>Specific Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators / Benchmarks</th>
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| Enhance border security | • Carrying out effective border control at external borders in order to detect all suspicious means of transportation enabling to intercept persons, preventing unauthorized border crossings, countering and preventing cross-border criminality and taking measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities | • Number of mandays / monthly deployments of human resources supporting border surveillance at border checks (total and per profile)  
• Number of mandays / monthly deployments / performed of TE (total and per type of TE)  
• Nr of incidents concerning illegal migration  
• Nr of illegal migrants apprehended  
• Nr of suspected facilitators apprehended  
• Nr of incidents related to trafficking in human beings  
• Nr of incidents of forgery/falsification of documents  
• Nr of incidents of stolen vehicles  
• Nr of incidents concerning the smuggling of drugs / goods  
• Assessment of the role of central and local operational structures |
|                     | • Supporting the national authorities in disclosing cases of smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other cross border crime |  |
|                     | • Carrying out border checks of all persons crossing the external borders including means of transport and objects in their possession at Border Crossing Points enabling to intercept persons, refusing entry for third country nationals not fulfilling entry conditions, countering and preventing cross-border criminality and taking measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities |  |
|                     | • Fostering MS operational structures (NCC/ICC/R-LCC/FP) |  |
| Enhance operational cooperation | • High level of MS participation in operational activities | • Nr of participating Home MS/SAC  
• Nr of participating Host MS/SAC  
• Nr of Focal Points activated  
• List other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations involved in the JO |
<p>|                     | • Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations by implementing multi-character operational concept |  |
|                     | • Enhanced cooperation between national authorities of host MS as well as on international level |  |
|                     | • Seeking involvement of Third countries in operational activities / Participation of TC Observers in specific operational activity |  |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Enhance exchange of Information</th>
<th>Collection of operational information from all actors involved in order to obtain intelligence</th>
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<td>Distribution of operational information to all involved actors through authorized channels</td>
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<td>Implementation of fully automated online reporting system</td>
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<td>Seeking standardized format and quality of the reports and interviews</td>
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<td>Use of the &quot;Guidelines for JORA Incident Template&quot; giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a set of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify possible risks and threats</td>
<td>Carrying out second-line activities at the BCP/PP as to support obtaining intelligence, thus improving the risk assessments that underpin the operational activities</td>
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<td>Establish and exchange best practices</td>
<td>Delivering and supporting workshops, meetings, operational briefings, other networking events to participants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Delivering and supporting operational briefings/debriefings to all participants of the joint operations including information on the fundamental rights and access to International protection</td>
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<td>Average delay in sending incident reports in JORA</td>
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<td>List of workshops, meetings, other networking events implemented in the frame of the JÖ</td>
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<tr>
<td>List of other Frontex activities, services and products implemented in the frame of JÖ</td>
<td>List training activities implemented in the frame of JÖ</td>
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ANNEX 6 - DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO TEAM MEMBERS AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT)

BULGARIA

1. Border surveillance

Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the ESBG, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:
- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard’s station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(a) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

(b) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Patrolling and border surveillance by technical means:

According Article 39 (3) of the Ministry of Interior Act, Chief Directorate Border is national specialized structure for the purposes of the activities mentioned in Article 6 (1) points 1, 2, 5-7 in the border zone, in the areas of the border check-points, the International air and sea ports, the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent area, the continental shelf, the Bulgarian section of the river Danube and the other border rivers and water basins on the territory on the country.

The border zone depth is 30 km. from the border line. The border strip is 10 to 300 m. depth and any activity in it shall be communicated in advance to and coordinated with the Director of the corresponding Regional Directorate of Border Police in which area of responsibility the activity will be conducted.

Depending on the specific tasks for land border surveillance, the following types of patrols/posts are performed:
- Patrol - carries out patrol activities on feet or as Auto patrol (by vehicle) in search of any signs (traces) for illegal border crossing; checks the presence and condition of the border signs (border marks) as well as the presence of other patrols;
- Post - secures preliminary defined area of the border or object; carries out surveillance with/without technical means from preliminary defined position;
- Surveillance position - undisclosed implementation of tasks for surveillance, detection and apprehension of persons;
- Patrol "Border crossing checkpoint" - carries out checks of passengers and vehicles at the...
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- Operational-investigation Team - carries out hot pursuit and apprehension of wanted persons and persons who have illegally crossed the border or intend to cross the border illegally;
- Convey Team - conveys apprehended persons;
- Blocking/Gordon Team - blocks main routes with aim to stop persons/vehicles from passing specific area/territory;
- Mobile Unit for Control and Surveillance - Joint patrol unit consisted by Border police and Customs' officers who carry out checks of persons, vehicles and facilities for concealed persons and excise goods;
- Reserve - carries out suddenly emerged tasks.

The type, composition and the time for carrying the duties of the patrols are determined by the Team leader. The specific tasks for each patrol and the methods of its implementation, along with risk-analysis conclusions and the current situation in the operational area for twenty-four hour period, are communicated to the officers at their Briefings which are not longer than 30 minutes. Officers are briefed prior to their duties implementation. BGs attendance at the Briefings is obligatory.

Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

Hot Pursuit is police pursuit of persons violated or attempting to violate the State border. The pursuit can be done along the 30 km. border area and when needed, beyond the border area with the cooperation of other MOL bodies. The pursuit cannot be done in neighbouring country's territory. When persons have been detected for crossing illegally towards neighbouring country, based on the signed bilateral agreement, the neighboring authorities shall be informed.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Security body searches, transportation to the nearest BPU/BCP, etc.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Transportation of migrants - security standards; rules and instructions;

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Interception/apprehension/detention/arrest:

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons and Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Police officers can do searches, to check and seize personal belongings following the procedures of Ministry of Interior Act, as follows:

Article 80, (1) of MIA: Police bodies shall carry out a search of any person:
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1. Detained under the terms of Article 63 (1) of MIA;
2. Who is reported to be in possession of hazardous or prohibited objects;
3. Found at the scene of a crime or a violation of the public order, when there is sufficient evidence that he/she is in possession of objects, related to the crime or the violation.
4. In regard to whom a signal exists in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for applying specific control.

(2) Personal searches may be carried out only by a person of the same gender as the person searched.

Article 81. (1) Police bodies may search the personal belongings of persons:
1. In respect of persons of whom there is data that they had perpetrated a crime or another violation of the public order;
2. When required for the purpose of detecting or investigating crimes, and in cases of opened administrative penalty proceedings;
3. At checkpoints, established by the police;
4. The identity of a person cannot be established;
5. An alien, seeking protection under the Asylum and Refugees Act, entered at variance with the legal procedure or is illegally staying in the Republic of Bulgaria.
6. Who manifests serious mental disorder and by his/her behaviour disturbs the public order or exposes own life or the life of other individuals to clear danger;
7. A juvenile delinquent, having left his/her home, custodian, guardian or specialised institution in which he/she was placed;
8. Who had evaded a prison sentence or the premises where he/she was detained as accused by virtue of a police administrative measure or by an order of a judicial body;
9. Designated for international investigation upon request from another state in regard to his/her extradition or in fulfilment of an European arrest warrant;
10. When there is sufficient evidence of concealment of physical evidence of crime perpetrated;
11. In other cases, prescribed by a law.

The search shall be done in strictly obeying person’s dignity.

Article 82. (1) of MIA: Police bodies may carry out inspections in premises without the consent of the owner or the occupant, or in their absence, only when:
1. When an imminent serious crime or one in progress must be prevented;
2. There is evidence that a perpetrator of a serious crime is hiding on premises;
3. It is required in order to provide urgent assistance to persons whose lives, health or personal freedom are endangered, or another in case of ultimate necessity is at hand.

(2) Upon completion of the inspection police bodies must draw up a protocol, indicating:
1. The name and position of the official and his/her place of work;
2. The identity of the owner or of the occupant;
3. The legal grounds for the inspection;
4. The time and place of conducting it;
5. The outcome.

(b) Transportation of migrants - security standards; rules and instructions;

If the apprehended for illegal border crossing persons cannot be handed over to the neighbouring country in 24 hours period, they shall be transferred to Specialized Facilities for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners which is under the umbrella of Migration Directorate - MoI or to the State Agency for Refugees within the Council of Ministers.

During their transportation, the following internal regulations shall be strictly obeyed:

Ordinance (z-1143/04.05.2011 for the organization and rules for carrying escorts in MoI;

Internal Methodological Guidelines for carrying escorts;
Ordinance 12271/01.10.2010 for the methods and the organization of carrying land/sea/river border surveillance.

Escorting is compulsory transportation of one or more persons in specific route, carried by Escort Teams. It is conducted:
by feet;
with specialized escort vehicles or service cars;
with regular civil transportation busses;
with railways;
with airplanes;
with sea/river transportation;

The escort type is chosen prior to the convoy and individually for each case, depending on the escorted person/s, operational situation, the weather conditions and the available resources.
It is strictly prohibited to appoint officials for escorting activities who:
does not have police powers;
have family relations or other personal relations with the escorted person/s;
are somehow connected and dependent by the results of the criminal process against the escorted person/s;

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

(a) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBGs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

(b) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBG shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBG shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

(c) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
Interception/apprehension/detention/arrest:

Rules for security checks and evidence collection:

Police officers can do searches; to check and seize personal belongings following the procedures of Ministry of Interior Act, as follows:

Article 80. (1) of MIA: Police bodies shall carry out a search of any person:
1. detained under the terms of Article 63 (1) of MIA;
2. who is reportedly in possession of hazardous or prohibited objects;
3. found at the scene of a crime or in violation of the public order, when there is sufficient evidence that he/she is in possession of objects, related to the crime or the violation;
4. in regard to whom a signal exists in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for applying specific control.
(2) Personal searches may be carried out only by a person of the same gender as the person searched.

Article 81. (1) Police bodies may search the personal belongings of persons:
1. In respect of persons of whom there is data that they had perpetrated a crime or another violation of the public order;
2. when required for the purpose of detecting or investigating crimes, and in cases of opened administrative penalty proceedings;
3. at checkpoints, established by the police;
4. the identity of a person cannot be established;
5. an alien, seeking protection under the Asylum and Refugees Act, entered at variance with the legal procedure or is illegally staying in the Republic of Bulgaria;
6. who manifests serious mental disorder and by his/her behaviour disturbs the public order or exposes own life or the life of other Individuals to clear danger;
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8. who had evaded a prison sentence or the premises where he/she was detained as accused by virtue of a police administrative measure or an order of a judicial body;
9. designated for international investigation upon request from another state in regard to his/her extradition or in fulfilment of an European arrest warrant;
10. when there is sufficient evidence of concealment of physical evidence of crime perpetrated;
11. In other cases, prescribed by a law.
The search shall be done in strictly obeying person's dignity.

Bulgarian Child Protection Act
Police protection
Article 37,(1) Provision of police protection to a child shall be done by the specialized bodies of the Ministry of the Interior.
(2) The bodies under par. 1 shall work in cooperation with child protection bodies.

Grounds
Article 38. Police protection is an urgent measure to be applied when:
1. the child has become subject of crime or there is an immediate threat for his or her life or health, as well as when there is a danger of the child getting involved in a crime;
2. the child has been lost or is in a helpless condition;
3. the child has been left without supervision.

Police protection measures
Article 39,(1) The specialized bodies of the Ministry of the Interior may:
1. accommodate the child in social premises, where they shall not permit any contacts with the child that may prove harmful to him or her;
2. place the child in specialized institutions and where necessary provide him or her with food;
3. return the child back to his or her parents or the persons entrusted with the parental functions.
(2) Specialized bodies under par. 1 shall inform the child and explain to him or her in an understandable manner the measures undertaken and the grounds for them.

Obligation to notify
Article 40. The police bodies, who have implemented the protection, shall notify immediately:
1. the child's parents;
2. the social assistance directorate of the region where protection has been implemented;
3. the social assistance directorate at the current address of the child;
4. the prosecution.

Period
Article 41. The child may not remain under police protection longer than 48 hours.
Article 43. The order and conditions to provide police protection shall be governed by an ordinance issued by the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the State Agency for Child Protection.

Specialized protection of children at public places
Article 43a. (1) Specialized protection of children at public places is setting up of conditions that do not threaten the physical, mental, and moral development of the children.
(2) Specialized protection of children at public places shall be provided by the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, social assistance directorates, municipality, regional educational inspectorates under the Ministry of Education and Science, regional centers of health as well as the owners, tenants, users and organizers of public events, commercial places, cinemas and theatres.

Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

According the provisions of Article 12 of Ordinance 1/13/29.01.2004 for the procedures of temporary accommodation of foreigners and the organization and tasks of the specialized facilities for temporary accommodation, the foreigners are subject to obligatory medical examination, which results are recorded in Register. The examination must be conducted by medical from the medical services of MOI or by one of the Specialized Facilities for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners. Emergent medical assistance is provided by the Emergency Assistance Centres within Ministry of Health.

Status assessment and procedure to be followed

CDBP is applying all measures defined in the Ministry of Interior Act (MIA) regarding foreigners detained for irregular crossing of the state border of the Republic of Bulgaria, including those in need of protection. All those measures are mentioned in the MIA and Regulation for the Structure and Functions of Ministry of Interior (RSF of MOI) and respect detainees' rights stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Convention regarding the Status of Refugees since 1951, New York Protocol since 1967 and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Police officers of CDBP-MoI have the power to detain foreigners in the border area while ensuring their rights under the provisions of MIA. Detention of the persons is allowed with written order under the provisions of (RSF of MoI) these written orders cannot be issued for more than 24 hours.

Acting procedures of CDBP officers related to detention of foreigners at the state border Republic of Bulgaria, preparation of the necessary official documents, escort and detention of foreigners in Distribution Centre under State Agency for Refugees (SAR) are based on the existing secondary legislation.

When the foreigner declares in writing, verbally or otherwise to employees CDBP-Mol desire to receive special protection in Bulgaria, pursuant to Art. 59 (1) of Law for Asylum and Refugees (LAR), the document (application) of the applicant should be sent to the SAR.

Verbal or otherwise, the act of an applicant is recorded by an official, signed or otherwise authenticated by the applicant and the translator, interpreter, respectively, as it is obligatory all communication to be
When communicating with foreigners, with aim to assess the need for protection, the questions used for the interviewing should be open type questions. Thus the interviewee has the opportunity to tell the events in their own way as the open end questions contributing to this.

In the process of their work with detainees, border guards should treat them with respect and dignity, which is a necessary condition for successful communication.

In the event of cases in which persons detained in relation with illegal crossing of the state border and have been subjected to violations of their human rights due to illegal actions of law enforcement officers (border guards) from the Ministry of Interior, respectively GOBP, the following legal options action are applicable:

- disciplinary proceedings can be formed and conducted if there is evidence of violations of official discipline of employees of the CBP in relation with the MIA;
- an assessment of the professional work of the border guards can be started on the basis of which their employment may be terminated or they can be transferred to another position after a proposal from their relevant management;
- investigation and prosecution organs shall be promptly notified of the obtained evidence of an indictable offense under the Penal Code by the staff of the CBP in order to take actions under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC);
- when charges are pressed against officers from CBP, suspension actions against their access to classified information under the Law on the Protection of Classified Information and the follow-up actions on termination of their employment relationship as a civil servant in Mol should be taken.

During the implementation of each of the Investigative proceedings is legally provided and guaranteed order (according to MIA and CPC) to ensure the confidentiality of the information under investigation as well as the provision of medical and psychological care and to the provision of legal aid and necessary assistance to those who are victims of crime.

**Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**

- Subsequent to persons' apprehension and their temporary accommodation at the facilities for apprehended persons for a period no longer than 24 hours, a Compulsory Administrative Measure is imposed to the foreigners.
- According the Bulgarian Law for Foreigners, Compulsory Administrative Measures are imposed to foreigners, detected for illegal border crossing or detected irregulars at the border area, as well as to those who are illegally staying in Bulgaria. If any obstacles for handling the irregular migrants back to the neighbouring country exist, an ordinance for accommodation at the premises of Migration Directorate's temporary accommodation facilities of foreigners is issued. Their returning back to neighbouring country is carried out when possible.
- According the above mentioned law, foreigners who applied for protection shall not be imposed with Compulsory Administrative Measure until the decision for providing protection of the Chairman of State Agency for Refugees is issued.
- As it come to families and children seeking asylum in Bulgaria detained during the current year in the area of responsibility of GOBP, this category of foreigners have precedence over the other detainees.
- With Families and children who claimed in front employees GOBP desire to obtain protection in Bulgaria should be proceeded according to the order mentioned above (for persons seeking special protection in Bulgaria), the actions and activities in the processing of this category of persons is under the principle of preserving the integrity of the family and in the case of unaccompanied children to observe the principle of the best interests of the child.
- The latest amendments in to the Law for the Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria (LFRB) (article. 44 tons. 9) introduced a ban unaccompanied minors to be forcibly detained in detention centres of Migration Directorate - CBP - Mol. The law requires this category of persons to be transmitted in the Directorate Social Assistance to take measures for protection under the Law on Child Protection.
- As regards detected unaccompanied minors at the border area, their accommodation at the facilities is considered according Article 44 (9) of the Bulgarian Law for Foreigners. Article 38 of the
4. Use of force/Weapons

a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

c) Define the type of equipment/Weapons permissible

d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc.)

e) Define the Immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/Weapons

f) Special rules to dog handlers

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

(a) Define the principles on the use of force;

According Ministry of Interior Act (MIA)

Article 85. (1) Police bodies may apply force and auxiliary means in the course of discharging their official functions only if the latter may not be achieved otherwise, in the following cases:

1. Resistance or refusal to obey a legal order;
2. Detention of an offender who does not obey or resists a police body;
3. Escorting a person or when the person attempts to escape or take his/her life or the life or health of other persons;
4. (Supplemented, SG No. 98/2008) rendering assistance to other state bodies or officials, including the inspectors of the European Commission, who are legally impeded to fulfill their duties;
5. Attacks on citizens and police bodies;
6. Freeing of hostages;
7. Group violations of the public order;
8. Attacks on buildings, premises, facilities and vehicles;
9. Release of illegally occupied sites, if so ordered by a competent body.

(1) (New, SG No. 88/2010) In the course of discharge of their official duties the bodies of receipt, carriage and delivery of correspondence, containing classified information, shall be entitled to apply physical force and auxiliaries in cases of attempted unauthorized access to the correspondence only if protection from unauthorized access may not be ensured in any other way.

(2) (Renumbered from Paragraph 2, SG No. 88/2010) Auxiliaries shall be: handcuffs; strait jackets; rubber, plastic, assault and electric shock batons and devices; chemical substances approved by the minister of health; service animals - dogs, horses; blank cartridges, rubber/plastic/shock cartridges; roadblock applications; forced entry devices, diverting flash and sound devices; water cannons and air jet machines; armoured vehicles and helicopters.

(3) (Renumbered from Paragraph 3, SG No. 88/2010) The procedure for applying auxiliaries shall be determined by an ordinance of the Minster of Interior.

Article 86. (1) Force and auxiliaries shall be used following a warning, with the exception of the cases of sudden attack and release of hostages.

(2) Use of force and auxiliaries shall reflect the specific circumstances, the nature of the public order violation and the identity of the offender.

(3) In the cases mentioned in article 85 police bodies shall use only absolutely necessary force.

(4) In using force and auxiliaries police bodies must, when possible, protect the targets' health and take all possible measures to protect the targets' lives.

(5) The use of force and auxiliaries shall be terminated immediately after achieving the objective of the applied measure.

(6) Force and auxiliaries may not be used in regard to obviously underage persons and pregnant women.

This prohibition shall not apply to mass disorders, when all other means had been exhausted.

(7) The uses of life-threatening force for apprehension or prevention the escape of a person who has committed a non-violent offense if the person is not endangering life and health of others is forbidden.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

Use of firearms is defined, according Ministry of Interior Act (MIA)

Article 87. (1) Police bodies may use firearms as a last resort:

1. in cases of armed attack or threat with firearms;
2. in the course of releasing hostages and kidnapped persons;
3. following a warning in the course of detaining a person, committing or having committed a felony, if it resists or tries to escape;
4. after having issued a warning to prevent the flight of a legally detained felon.

(2) In using firearms, where possible, police bodies must protect the life of the target person and ensure that the life and the health of other persons shall not be jeopardized.

(3) (Amended in 2010) Police bodies may use firearms without warning when conducting border surveillance:
1. in the event of armed assault on them;
2. against persons, putting up armed resistance;
(e) When conducting border surveillance within the limits of internal sea waters and the territorial sea of the Republic of Bulgaria, police bodies shall be entitled to use firearms in the cases provided for by the Maritime Space, Inland Waterways and Ports of the Republic of Bulgaria Act.

(5) Police bodies cease use of firearms immediately after the achievement of the legal purpose.
(6) Use of firearms for apprehension or prevention the escape of a person who has committed or who is performing non-violent offense if the person is not endangering life and health of others is strictly prohibited.
(7) After having used firearms, the police bodies shall draw up a report.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible;

Service weapons and equipment which can be used by foreign experts officially while performing service on the territory of the Bulgaria have to comply with following characteristics:

1. Non automatic system short barrel handguns with length of the barrel - not more than 300 mm. long;
2. Ammunition - not more than 50, the first cartridge-clip have to be "step" type;
3. Blank cartridges
4. Cartridges with rubber
5. Plastic or shock bullets
6. Batons - plastic and patent;
7. Handcuffs;
8. Assault or electric shock stick and devices;
9. Pepper spray;
10. Specific aerosols - containing "capsaicinoid".

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

While apprehending persons BGs are allowed to use service weapons, force, surveillance equipment as well as auxiliary means according the law.
During the apprehension, any actions and methods which threaten the persons' life or health shall not be undertaken.
Physical force and auxiliary means shall be used after appropriate forewarning except in cases of sudden adversary attack and during hostages rescuing missions.
The usage of physical force and supporting means shall be undertaken according the specific situation, public order violation type and violator's personality.
During the physical force and auxiliary means usage, the BGs are obliged to protect persons' health as well as to take all measures needed to protect the violator's life.
The physical force and auxiliary means usage shall be immediately discontinued after reaching the aim of their use. While using service weapons BGs are obliged to protect, when possible, violator's life and not to threaten the life and health of other persons.
The use of physical force and auxiliary means is prohibited against persons apparently looking as minors and pregnant women. The prohibition is not referring to cases of mass disorders when all other means have been useless.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

The border guards must provide first aid assistance of persons injured after the use of weapons, force or auxiliary means. For each individual case of use of service weapons, force and auxiliary measures, BGs must prepare written report, signed by the officer who has conducted the action and/or the superior who has ordered their usage.
The written report must consist of:
- Officer's name, rank and service;
- Place, date, time and type of actions taken (use of service weapon/auxiliary means or force);
- The conditions and reasons of its usage;
- The type and amount/quantity of the used impact;
- If possible, any personal data concerning the person/s against whom the actions was/were taken;
CROATIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures ..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation of this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(c) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

➢ TEAMS FOR BORDER PROTECTION (vehicle patrols, vessels patrols, off-road motorcycle patrols and patrols on foot with the use of the official dog for protection-researching purposes)

(d) General tasks of the members of the EBGT

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

• to monitor the terrain they operate in,
• to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
• to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
• to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
• to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(c) Specific tasks/Instructions in relation to each surveillance method

➢ TEAMS FOR BORDER PROTECTION
Team for border protection is a group of police officers to protect the border that is managed by the group leader for border protection. Group consists of: a group leader for the border protection, police officers for border protection, which are arranged in a vehicle patrols and patrols on foot in the border sectors. Team can be accompanied with a Sector border leader, a leader of patrol boats, police officers for combat against cross-border crime, a motorcyclist and a police officer/dog handler with a dog for the border protection.

The methodology of the group:

- mobility, unpredictability and a quick response to the event
- work on the basis of information, risk analysis and strategic assessment
- prevention of corruption border police - according to Plan for combat against anti-corruption measures in the border police and the use of technical equipment

- sector border leader - participates in the development of risk analysis in the field of the state border protection, participates and directs the preparation of daily schedule, participating in operational tasks
- group leader for the border protection - meets the overall composition of the group with news relevant to the performance of state border protection, plans operational measures and tactical actions within police station jurisdiction according to the collected information, coordinate the implementation of operational activities and suggests the police officers in the proper performance measures and actions on the protection of state borders in order to prevent illegal crossings, as well as all forms of cross-border crime and cooperate with the leader sector border leader and the head of the shifts
- leader of patrol boats - apply police powers within inland waterways as defined by international and national law
- police officers for border protection - acting as a group for the protection of state border, perform border protection tasks, take measures to prevent violations of the state border, control movement and stay in the area along the border, undertake observations, escorts and ambushes in the places of illegal crossings, controlling accuracy of the border marks, submit reports about the identified violations, observations and gathered information regarding the security of the state border
- directly perform tasks in crime investigation and crime control in order to prevent the execution of criminal acts in the area of cross-border crime, capture and detection of offenders, collect criminal charges, fills the criminal forms about offenses and offenders for EOS record input, and participate in investigative activities that are entrusted to the border police
- police officer/dog handler - perform with the official dog for protection-research purposes the tasks of protecting the state border in order to prevent illegal border crossings, detecting and finding people who have illegally crossed the state border, helps in performing the tasks of suppression cross-border crime, conducts the training of a dog
(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

- Temporary restriction of movement:
  - National legislation includes cases when can be temporarily restrict access or movement in a particular area or facility or to keep people in order to:
    - Preventing a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio or a misdemeanor locating and capturing a perpetrator of a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio or a misdemeanor punishable by a prison sentence
    - Locating and capturing a person for whom the police are searching
    - Finding traces and objects which may serve as evidence of a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio or a misdemeanor punishable by a prison sentence
    - Securing protected persons, buildings and areas
  - Unless otherwise stipulated by a special law, detention in a particular area or building may not be extended beyond the time necessary to achieve the purpose for which the power is exercised, and no longer than six hours.
  - Temporary restriction of access or movement within a certain area or building may not be extended beyond the time necessary to achieve the purpose for which the power is exercised.
  - Temporary restriction of freedom of movement is carried out with following a criminal tactical actions: blockade, raids, ambushes, pursuit and restriction of access, restriction of movement in the area or facility for safety reasons

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

The pursuit is the criminal tactical action that arising out of police powers temporary restriction of movement:

- A police officer is obligated promptly notify the initiated pursuit Operational Communication Centre of Police Department or Operational duty service in police station in order to timely join other law enforcement officers with the necessary resources
- In conducting criminal tactical action the pursuit can be used and other police powers: the use of means of coercion or the use of the device for forcibly stopping the vehicle, the use of official dog and firearms
- A police officer shall use the mildest means of coercion sufficient to achieve the objective
- A police officer shall discontinue using the means of coercion as soon as the reasons for which he applied them are no longer present
- In carrying out police duties on inland waterways police officer is authorized to use police powers to persecution of vessel:
The pursuit of a vessel may commence if a vessel fails to stop in response to a call to stop conveyed by visible visual or auditory signals or signals of the International Code of Signals from a distance sufficient for reception of the call.

If the pursuit referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article was not interrupted, it may be continued in the high seas until the pursued vessel enters the territorial sea of another state.

If the pursued vessel fails to stop, a police officer shall endeavour to stop it with a manoeuvre or by other means.

In the course of pursuit, shots may be fired in the air above the vessel or at a safe distance ahead of the bow in order to warn or intimidate the crew of the vessel.

If the vessel fails to stop even after the mentioned actions use of firearms against the vessel is permitted.

When using firearms in the mentioned circumstances the police officer shall make sure not to jeopardise the lives of the persons aboard the pursued vessel.

Police pursuit and prosecution are prescribed by national legislation in the Law on Police Duties and powers and the Regulations on the conduct of police officers.

If the joint patrol operates close to the common state border, the pursuit can continue at a distance of up to ten kilometers from the border line towards the interior of the state territory in accordance with the implementing protocols arising from agreements on police cooperation with neighboring countries.

Nevertheless Frontex Guest Officers cannot be deployed on the territory of non EU countries in line with regulation EC 2007/2004.

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**
- Law of state border protection
- The Law of Police Duties and powers

2. Interception/apprehension

   Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

   **b) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons**

   A person that was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offense must be immediately:

   - Informed of the reasons for arrest
   - Instructed about the right to remain silent
   - Instructed about his right to legal counsel of his own choice
   - Instructed that competent authority will, at request inform family member or any other person designated by person arrested
JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 land on Border Checks

Exceptionally, a person will not be instructed about their legal rights if, under the circumstances, is not possible due to the circumstances.

If there are reasons that justify the arrested individual to be enchained (suspect of escaping or reacts violently), then he is enchained always with his hands behind his back and never in front of him.

The tactic of enchainment is always conducted by one police officer, while the second one covers his partner from a proper distance. The same tactic is been followed in case more police officers participate in the control process or there are more individuals to be apprehended.

All the apprehended persons are transferred to the respective police service or to a designated for them place.

For safety reasons and reasons of respect to the apprehended person police officers must avoid if possible transfer on foot, and call for support of a vehicle unit.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Upon apprehension, body search is carried out while at the same time evidence is collected. Body search can be done visually, by touch, using other sensors, using technical means or official dog. Body search for possible explosive devices is performed by specially trained police officer.

Police officers will extract a person over which body search is performed, and familiarize the person with the reasons for the examination.

Body search is performed by two police officers in a manner that one police officer performs a body search while another police officer takes care of the safety of police officers, and in exceptional cases, if there are reasonable grounds; body search can be performed only one police officer.

The search of a person shall be performed by a person of the same sex. Exceptionally, when an emergency search is necessary for the purpose of seizing weapons or objects which can be used for assault or self-injury, the search can be performed by a person of the other sex.

Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

After completed body search and verification of identity a person will be transported with a special vehicle to the police station.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
Law of state border protection
The Law of Police Duties and powers

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre
Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/Reception centre;

After the body search, objects found will be confiscated from persons with confirmation for the seized items.

After the forfeiture of the objects, they will be safely stored and transported together with the person to the police station.

(d) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

Upon the arrival of persons to the police station the persons will be provided with adequate medical care and food and beverage.

(e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGTs shall examine the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited. Members of the EBGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.

Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if (s)he asks for asylum.

If a person who is found on the green border asks for an asylum, police officers will take that person to the police station and the police officers for illegal migration will take further action, and provide the person all the rights under the Law on Asylum.

No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened an account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

(f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders
and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence."

_UAM_

If these categories of persons are apprehended on the green border they will be taken to the police station and handed over to specialist officers of the Crime police for further action and in case of unaccompanied minors presence of social worker is mandatory. Children or adolescents are transported in vehicles without police insignia and by the police officers in civilian clothes. UAM cannot be detaining in reception centre without legal guardian. Maximum length of detention of minor is 6 months without possibility of extension. UAM are usually accommodated in houses for children.

_Victim of trafficking_

In case of victim of human trafficking according to national referral mechanism first step is providing first forms of aid and protection to victim. Mobile teams which provide aid and protection are available 24/7, and they arrive upon call by national coordinator from Moi.

All measures undertaken to vulnerable persons must be done in shortest possible time.

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**

- Law of state border protection
- The Law of Police Duties and powers
- Asylum Law
- Act on aliens
- Protocol about procedure with foreign UAMs.
- Protocol on Identification, assistance and protection of victims of human trafficking

4. Use of force/weapons

   h) Define the principles on the use of force

   When using force, members of the EBOFs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

Use of force may be applied in cases prescribed by law (Law on police duties and powers ) for the protection of human life, overcoming resistance, preventing escape, repel an attack and to eliminate danger if it is likely that issuing a warning or a command will not achieve the goal.

Means of coercion are applied with special regard to the child, the person whose movement is considerably more difficult, a pregnant woman in the visible stage of pregnancy, and the person who is obviously sick.

Use of force is applied following a warning, unless it is likely that a pre-warning could jeopardize achievement of the objective.
A police officer shall use the mildest means of coercion sufficient to achieve the objective.

Police officer will discontinue with the use of force as soon as objective is accomplished.

i) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EOGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such way that causes the less possible injuries.

A police officer is authorized to use firearms:

a) In self-defence,

b) As a last resort if he without the use of firearms cannot remove immediate or imminent danger to his own or another person’s life, which otherwise could not be removed,

j) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

Police officer may use service firearms (pistols and revolvers), also rubber batons, metal handcuffs and sprayer with irritant substances (pepper spray).

k) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

Prior to the use of firearms officer shall make a verbal command: “Stop, police!”, Then the command and warning: “Stop or I will shoot!”

A police officer will after issuing verbal command and warning, fire a warning shot into the air, if this does not create a hazard to the safety of people and property.

The police officer will not make a verbal command and a warning if this would threaten his life or the lives of others or if issuing a verbal command and a warning would brought into question the performance of official duties.

The use of firearms is not allowed when its usage would endanger the lives of other persons, unless the use of firearms only means of defence against attack.

The use of firearms is not allowed against a child or a minor, except when the use of firearms only way to defend against attacks or to prevent the danger.

i) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

The border guards must provide first aid assistance for persons injured after the use of force/firearms.

In case there is use of force/firearms by a police officer, he has to report immediately this incident to his Police service.

m) Special rules to dog handlers
Official dog with muzzle and leash police officer may use as a means of coercion when it is allowed to use physical force, spray with irritant substances and batons. Official dog without a muzzle and a leash, a police officer may use as a means of coercion, if the conditions for the use of firearms are fulfilled.

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**
Law on police duties and powers

5. Border checks

a) **Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.**

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBIGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

Human rights in Croatia are defined by the Constitution of Republic of Croatia, chapter three, sections 14 through 69. Chapter III of the Constitution guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a large number of individual rights.

Except Constitution, there is many laws which guarantee protection of human rights. One of most important is Croatian Criminal procedure act. In article 7 is prescribes: A person who was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offense must be immediately:

1) informed of the reasons of arrest
2) instructed that he is not obliged to testify
3) they can use lawyer
4) instructed that authority, on its request, can call somebody of its family or any other person designated by him.

b) **Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)**
All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

In Croatia is not allowed to forcibly remove or in any way to return an alien to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion or nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or in a country where they are subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

The Republic of Croatia shall grant asylum to an alien who is outside the country of his nationality or to stateless person who is outside the country of habitual residence, which is due to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions.

c) **Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)**

According to the Law on the State Border protection the first line of control is place where basic and through border control is performed. Second line of control is place where additional checks are performed.

Border control of person can be basic and through.

Basic controls include checking a person’s identity by examining the documents required for crossing the border, and consists of a fast and simple validation of documents required for crossing the border.

During border control police officer can, from time to time, by examining the database to check that the person does not pose a threat to public order, national security or public health.

Through control of persons includes checking the conditions for entry and stay, validity of the documents required for crossing the border and checking the relevant database.

Through control of persons on exit includes verification of documents required for crossing the border and checking the eventual reasons for the prohibition of leaving the country, and may include checking the data in the records of wanted persons and the legality of residence.

The basic border control is performing on persons who are Member of the European Economic Area on specially designated and marked line, if is that possible.

Over all other persons a thorough check is performed.
d) **Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP**

Security body search takes place immediately after the arrest and aims at:

- Discovering and seizing weapons or other objects that may facilitate the escape of the apprehended person.
- Collecting evidence related to the crime, which could be destroyed by the apprehended person.

Search does not involve searching body cavities.

In accordance with the Regulations on the conduct of police officers (Official Gazette 89/2010) police officers will extract a person over which is performing examination and before starting, person will be informed about the reasons of the examination.

Examination of person perform two police officers in a way that one police officer is examining while another police officer take care of the security, and exceptionally, if there are reasonable grounds, examination of the person can perform a single police officer.

Examination of the person performs police officer of the same sex. Exceptionally when urgent examination of a person is necessary (if weapons or items suitable for attack or self-harming are present), examination can be done by a person of the opposite sex.

e) **Status assessment and procedure to be followed**

Members of the EGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

In Croatia is not allowed forcibly remove or in any way to return an alien to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion or nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or in a country where they be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. If police officer performing border checks come across asylum seeker, they should call specially trained officers to work with such person.

f) **Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**

Members of the EGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

The Asylum Act in Republic of Croatia defined the term vulnerable groups and every police officer while performing duties take special care to these groups. If police officer recognizes a person who belongs to the vulnerable category, they will call specially trained officers to work with such groups. That police officers are trained to recognize their needs and if needed they call other service out of Ministry of the Interior.

g) **Rules regulating consultation of national databases**
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For the effective exercise of state border, in order to enable the free movement of persons and goods across the border, while facilitating better border control and protection in the fight against cross-border crime and illegal migration, a National Information system for the border management is established, which is a part of the information system of the Ministry of Interior.

According to the Law of the State Border Protection, Border Police is authorized in the performance of police duties and implementation of police authority in order to control the border, take photography, take fingerprints, palm prints and other biometric data, perform recording, post video surveillance and used in accordance with the technical achievements and other technical aids.

If the devices for video surveillance and recording posted on the border crossings points, they must be visible, and people who are in this field have to be alerted.

If using device for surveillance and recording personal data, it is necessary to destroy these images within one year, unless they are necessary for the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes or misdemeanors.

h) Procedure related to stamping

In accordance with the Regulations of state border surveillance (Official Gazette 38/2009) purpose of stamping documents required for crossing the state border is a recording of the date of entry and exit from the Republic of Croatia, border crossing where the person entered or left the Republic of Croatia, as well as data logging of refusal of entry, reducing visa annulment entered data, cancelling the validity of certain documents and labelling of expiry of certain documents on the basis of which a right is realized.

Stamp of the entrance and exit of the Republic of Croatia entered in foreigners documents required for state border crossing at entering and exiting the Republic of Croatia, in order to prove the duration of stay, unless otherwise provided by international contract.

At the request of Croatian citizen stamp can be entered in their documents required for crossing state border at entering and exiting the Republic of Croatia.

If entering stamp can inflict heavy damage for foreign national documents, exceptionally on passenger request can give up from stamping the document while entering or exiting Republic of Croatia.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Law of state border protection (Official Gazette 173/03, 141/06, 8/07, 40/07, 146/08, 130/11)
Aliens Act (Official Gazette 130/11)
The law on police (Official Gazette NN 34/11)
The Law of Police Duties and powers (Official Gazette 76/09)
The Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette 121/11, 143/12)
Magistrates Act (Official Gazette 107/07)
Asylum Law (Official Gazette 79/07, 88/10)
Arms Act (Official Gazette 63/07, 146/08, 59/12)
ESTONIA

Description of the Tasks and special Instructions for the members of the EBTG

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

“Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures...”

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBTGs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officials of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(i) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

For border control, the police may travel without hindrance on foot and by vehicles on temporary or private roads adjacent to the state border and transboundary water bodies or leading there and on shore paths without the consent of the owner or possessor. In performing state border surveillance and ensuring the border regime, the police may use relevant technical, including electronic, devices for the purposes of detecting illegal border crossing, identifying objects, ensuring safety in border crossing points and combating cross-border crime.

(ii) General tasks of the members of the EBTG

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBTG, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard’s station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally.

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

-See 1 a)

(f) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

-N/A
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(b) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

A police official in pursuit of a person who has committed or abetted a criminal offence specified in the Council Framework Decision JHA/584/2002 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States shall be permitted to proceed with the pursuit on the territory of another EU Member State without previously requested authorisation in cases where the urgency of the matter prevented the official in question from notifying competent authorities prior to the entry on the territory of the other MS, or where the competent authorities of the other Member State were not present at the scene of the event to take over the pursuit. Cross-border pursuit may take place only across land borders. The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other MS of carrying out cross-border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location and the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Pursuit shall be terminated upon completion of the objective, when 1 hour has passed since the crossing of the state border of the country of location, or upon the demand of the country of location.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
1(a): State Borders Act § 9, § 90
1(e): Police and Border Guard Act § 70-44

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards’ station according to the Schengen Handbook.

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Persons who have not been permitted to cross the border or have illegally crossed the external border shall be detained and returned into the state from or through which they arrived, taking account of the specifications provided for in the Citizen of the European Union Act. Expulsion shall be completed within 48 hours from the moment of detainment. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the offices of the police authorities, police detention houses or expulsion centres. Officials shall take fingerprints of persons apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of the border, if he or she is at least 14 years of age, and shall transmit the data collected upon the taking of the fingerprints for comparison to the Central Unit of Europol. Unaccompanied minors may be expelled if their custody is arranged and the protection of their rights and interests of is ensured in the admitting country.

b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Upon the detention of a person to be expelled, the person and his or her personal effects shall be searched. A person to be expelled shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;
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Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape by the apprehended person, while ensuring the safety of the apprehended person as well as that of their own. Coercive measures (physical force, special equipment or a gas weapon) may be used in circumstances described under 4 d). The use of a gas weapon is only permitted when the person to be expelled fails to obey the lawful orders of the migration official or offers resistance, or when there is good reason to believe that the person may escape or cause damage to other persons or to themselves and other measures have been exhausted.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
2(a): State Borders Act § 9
2(b): Police and Border Guard Act Chapter 4; Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act § 19
2(c): Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act § 19; Guidelines on Escorting Apprehended Persons, Chapters i, 3, 1, 7, 1, 9

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

(g) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

See 2 b) above.

(h) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

In initial reception centres as well as reception centres, asylum seekers shall be provided temporary accommodation, food, essential clothing and other necessities and toiletries, emergency care and medical examinations, essential translation services, information regarding their rights and duties, transportation services necessary for the performance of acts performed on the basis of law and other essential services.

(i) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

An apprehended person may not be expelled to a state to which expulsion may result in consequences specified in Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the application of death penalty. The following circumstances shall be taken into account in determining a safe country of origin: to what extent the country guarantees the protection of persons from persecution and abuse, the principle of prohibition of expulsion or return provided for in the Geneva Convention and a system
of efficient legal protection instruments against the violation of said rights and freedoms, and whether or not the country has acceded and adheres to the main treaties concerning human rights.

(i) **Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**
Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**

3(a): Police and Border Guard Act Chapter 4: Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act § 19
3(b): Act on Granting International Protection to Aliens § 12
3(c): Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act § 17

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) **Define the principles on the use of force**

When using force, members of the EBGs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

A police official may apply direct coercion (i.e. physical force, special equipment or a weapon) if the ensuring of the fulfilment of the obligation to counter a threat or eliminate a disturbance imposed on a person by an administrative act is not possible by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. Direct coercion is permitted to be applied without a prior binding administrative act if the issue of the administrative act is not possible due to the circumstances of the case. Binding means (handcuffs, shackles) may be used when the person has been deprived of liberty pursuant to law and there is reason to believe that he or she may attack another person, offer physical resistance to a police official or an assistant police official or damage a proprietary benefit of great value, escape or injure or kill himself or herself.

(b) **Define the principles on the use of weapons**

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBGs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

For countering a serious threat, the police may use a firearm if countering the threat by another measure of direct coercion is not possible or is not possible in a timely manner and with the consideration that in using a firearm, everything possible shall be done in order not to jeopardise another significant benefit.

(c) **Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible**

Officials from a competent authority of another Member State that is involved in police or customs activity under an international agreement or a legislative act of the European Union may carry firearms (handguns), gas
weapons, cut-and-thrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons) or pneumatic weapons. Permissible special equipment includes handcuffs, shackles, binding means, service animals, etc.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/ weapons (warnings, targets, etc)
Direct coercive measures (i.e. the use of physical force, special equipment or service weapons) may be used if a threat or a disturbance cannot be countered by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. A verbal caution shall be issued before direct coercion is applied. An official from a competent authority of another Member State can use a firearm only in case there is a threat to his/her life or the life of another person. Firearms may not be used against a child, a senior citizen or a woman bearing obvious signs of pregnancy. The use of a firearm in such cases is only allowed in order to prevent an armed attack or an attack from a group of persons or used as an impediment and also for disarming such persons.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/ weapons
If by the application of direct coercion a bodily injury is caused to a person, the police shall be required to guarantee first aid to the person at the first opportunity and, if necessary, call for emergency medical care.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers
Service dogs are considered special equipment under § 27 of the Police and Border Guard Act and are subject to conditions specified under 4a) and 4 d).

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
4(a): Police and Border Guard Act § 30, 32
4(b): Weapons Act § 3; Police and Border Guard Act § 27
4(c): Weapons Act § 3; Police and Border Guard Act § 32
4(d): Weapons Act § 3; Police and Border Guard Act § 31
4(e): Police and Border Guard Act § 32
4(f): Police and Border Guard Act § 27, 30

5. Border checks
i) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.
Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying
out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

f) **Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)**
All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

k) **Define the tasks of the member of the EBTG while border checking of third country nationals**
(First line check, second line check, etc.)

l) **Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP**

-See 2 b) above.

m) **Status assessment and procedure to be followed**
Members of the EBTG shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBTG shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

-See 3 c) above.

n) **Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**
Members of the EBTG shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

o) **Rules regulating consultation of national databases**
Access to national police and border guard databases and NSIS is regulated by the Police and Border Guard Act. As the chief processor, the Police and Border Guard Board is authorised to grant access to these databases. While the Police and Border Guard Act does not regulate in detail the consultation of databases by GOs, there are no legal restrictions thereon.

p) **Procedure related to stamping**
Under the State Borders Act, a police official shall affix, according to the Schengen Borders Code, on the travel document of a third-country national a stamp authorising crossing of the border if such national has been granted authorisation to cross the external border (See Article 10 of Regulation 2007/2004).

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**
5(e): Police and Border Guard Act, Chapter 3, Division 2
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S7(b): State Borders Act § 11

FINLAND

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT deployed in Finland

1. Border surveillance
   a) Surveillance methods:
      - In the border crossing points:
        - border traffic control
        - border crossing points monitoring
      - At the green border:
        - patrolling
        - In the border region:
        - mobile patrols
   b) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method:
      - to cooperate closely with the host staff and support practically their tasks
      - to perform tasks described in the operational plan especially the ones assigned to the place of deployment;
      - to contribute actively to the process of full integration of the host officers and other guest officers (FP missions);
      - to report any incidents concerning his/her deployment including indisposition, health problems, travels/transportation issues, etc. /
      - to stop and bring to the nearest border guard’s station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

2. Use of force/ weapons.

The Finnish Border Guard Act (578/2003): Section 35 'Use of force by border guardsmen':
Border guardsmen acting in an official capacity are entitled, unless otherwise provided by law, to use necessary force that can be considered justifiable to overcome resistance, remove a person from the scene, apprehend a person, prevent the escape of a person who has lost his or her liberty, eliminate an obstacle or address an immediate risk of a crime or other dangerous act being committed or some other dangerous situation developing. When judging the justifiability of force by a border guardsman, the importance and urgency of the official function, the danger posed, the resources available and other factors influencing an overall assessment of the situation shall be taken into account. If the use of force is necessary, it shall be used only to the extent and to the point necessary to perform the statutory official function (the principle of minimum force). In a situation in which it is vital to enlist the help of bystanders in carrying out an extremely important and urgent Border Guard function requiring the use of force, persons temporarily assisting border guardsmen at their request or with their consent have the right, under Border Guard guidance, to exercise any essential force authorized by border guardsmen acting within their powers.
The Finnish Border Guard Act (478/2010); Section 35a: Use of force by Frontex guest officers. The main point below:
- The guest officers are entitled to same rights to use of force as Finnish border guards when working with Finnish border guard and Finnish border guard is present in the situation.

3. Border checks.

a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross Border:
Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travelers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

Any GO's practical activities shall be conducted under supervision and coordination of Finnish border guards.

b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)
All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals:
- to assist at performing border checks in joint teams consisting of officer of Border guard services of the host MS, special advisers and observers and share expertise on his specific subject
- to support the first and second line checks
- to profile passengers in order to detect irregular migrants and victims of cross-border crime
- to detect false/falsified documents and more kinds of cross-border criminality
- to detect stolen vehicles in cooperation with the competent authorities
- to share experience and exchange expertise with officers from the border guard service of the host MS.

d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP:
If any guest officer's activity is concerning body searches or evidence collection or transportation of migrants or other security standards, it shall be realized in cooperation with Finnish border guards.
e) **Status assessment and procedure to be followed:**
Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Finnish border guard.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Finnish border guard.

f) **Rules regulating consultation of national databases:**
Guest officers can use Finnish national databases in cooperation with Finnish border guards.

**GREECE**

**Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT**

**INTRODUCTION**


"The responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States. The Agency should facilitate the application of existing and future Community measures relating to the management of external borders by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of those measures." The national border guard service of host country and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGT, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

Article 3b (4)

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

**BORDER SURVEILLANCE**

Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)
- Patrols
- Ambushes
- Sighting - Surveillance

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:
- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

Tasks in relation to each method
Patrols

Patrol is a small group of two or more police officers performing duties in its area of responsibility. The composition, specific mission and patrol area of responsibility is determined by the head of the police service who orders it.

Patrols are divided into foot and vehicle patrols. The mission of the patrol may be either general, including the preservation of order and security in general or specific, appointed to specific tasks.

Patrols:
Are ordered during all 24-hours. In case there are special security and order circumstances or there are reasons to exercise stronger and coordinated policing or when there is a need to carry out special checks, particularly in cases of large-scale police operations, involving numerous police services. Follow their patrol schedule and do not deviate from it unless they hear any noise or police whistle or they are informed about a crime or other serious incident. In these cases they hurry to the spot and act according to the law and their specific orders.

Assist the Armed Forces patrols, when invited by them, and ask for their assistance in an emergency situation.

The vehicle patrols perform their duties moving on patrol cars or motorcycles.

They have the same responsibilities as foot patrols, and in addition the following, which are peculiar to the place of their movement:

Act swiftly on anything happening in their area of responsibility and is under the responsibility of police. Accompany officials and large amounts of money and values transported.

The patrol cars:
Are manned by police personnel, called crew. If possible, at least one ranked officer participates in the crew. The higher ranked among the crew members is called the crew leader. If it is impossible to man the patrol cars with police officers, patrol cars may, at the discretion of the Director or Head of the police service, patrol with only the driver, in order to perform regular police duties. However, in these cases they are not allowed to move away from inhabited areas and intervene in cases of serious or widespread incidents of disorder, without the assistance of other colleagues.

They move on 24 hours basis or less time, depending on the personnel available and the operative needs of each Police authority.

The police cars are allowed to board, with the approval of the Director or Head of the respective police authority or, in urgent cases, with the approval of the crew leader:
- state officials that collaborate with police, as magistrates, coroners, health workers etc.,
- persons who, due to serious injuries or serious illness require immediate transfer to health care facilities because there is absence of such facilities on the spot having jurisdiction to handle such cases,
- individuals who have been arrested or being transferred as suspects for examination, verification of identity and information gathering,
- minors, drunk and others individuals set under protective custody,
Individuals who are transferred to the competent judicial authorities upon request or as perpetrators of flagrant crimes.

**Ambushes**

Ambush is the settlement of a small police force, of at least two people, in some key points or intersections, under full coverage, with specific and clear mission. The purpose of an ambush is to prevent and suppress crimes and the preservation of a feeling of security mainly to rural populations, achieved through checking passing individuals and vehicles, in order to identify and arrest persons and seize weapons carried, stolen items or other items evidence to a crime. Ambushes are at any time of the day, in case there are special security circumstances or there are reasons to exercise stronger and coordinated policing or when there is a need to carry out special checks, particularly in cases of large-scale police operations, involving numerous police services. The composition, armament, mission, duration and location of the ambush are determined by the one ordering this police activity, who also gives the leader of the ambush the necessary instructions. The leader of the ambush leads the police staff participating to settle on the identified spot, taking the necessary precautions and safety measures accordingly. The staff participating in the ambush is prohibited from moving, making noise or giving away its location in any other way. Checks are always performed by part of the staff of the ambush, while the rest is ready to protect those performing the checks.

**Sighting**

Sighting is the monitoring from appropriate location, of traffic and any other movement, to identify and check persons of concern to the police as suspects or perpetrators of crimes. Sighting is performed during the day from at least two policemen. A sighting may turn into an ambush during the night and vice versa an ambush may turn into a sighting during the day. The purpose of the sighting and the actions to be taken in each case are clearly defined to the leader of the sighting. At the location of the sighting, its leader has the responsibility to take security measures and to deploy the team in a way that its action will be easy and effective. The staff participating in the sighting is prohibited from moving, making noise or giving away its location in any other way.

**Special Instructions - Operational Tactics**

Each team of the Border Control Units:

Operates in a systematic, methodical and flexible way, to ensure its swift and effective action and additionally to render the measures taken not possible to be predicted or circumvented by facilitators of illegal migrants, or by persons attempting to enter or having entered the country illegally.

Puts special effort into ensuring that the change of shift takes place at the most vulnerable places of its area of responsibility, in order to avoid time gaps, during which illegal migrants, facilitators, etc., may achieve illegal crossing or other cross border criminal activities.

Handles cases related to offenses (crimes) that come to light after the arrest and detention of aliens, and persons involved in them.
Conducts stationary surveillance, ambushes and sighting. To this end, gives great priority to the control of key points (spots) taking always into account the prevailing circumstances and peculiarities of the area and using for this purpose all available technical means.

Implements the respective law on Aliens. Patrols rendering its presence sound in all areas inhabited areas of responsibility, in order to contact the residents and obtain information.

Moves, behaves and acts in a manner that demonstrates a well-structured and organized group, taking into account what the presence of such a group has a particularly beneficial effect on the psychology of residents and a negative one in the persons under control.

Demonstrates special attention to the legitimacy of its actions and behaviour which in any case must be governed by a spirit of understanding and humanity.

Ensures its continuous communication with the BCU or any other nearest authority, in order to ensure availability of communication in case of emergency need for assistance and exchange of useful information/data on the checked persons and vehicle support to transfer the illegal migrants arrested.

Conducts checks of persons and vehicles, suspected to transport illegal migrants during which:

- Takes the necessary self-protection measures.
- Performs body checks of illegal immigrants and persons suspected to be facilitators, meticulously researching any luggage and vehicles.

Restriction and access to military areas

Specific areas close to the border line are subject to security measures defined under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Military Authorities. In the case of Evros, the area close to the borderline constitutes a military restricted area and thus the local Military authorities must be informed in advance prior to any entrance to this area. Therefore access to that area is only allowed in the presence of a Hellenic Police Officer and only when on specific duty (e.g. border surveillance).

Pursuit

Pursuit is divided into two categories:

- Pursuit on foot
- Vehicle Pursuit

Takes place when an unknown criminal runs away in order to avoid arrest by the Police.

Conditions of pursuit on foot:

The police officer has to inform his police service about the pursuit and provide in parallel the characteristics of the person and the direction that he follows. If the police officer, due to the conditions, loses contact with the pursued person, the pursuit stops and tactical checks are conducted to the nearby area. At the same time the police officer informs his service to conduct coordinated search.

In case the pursued person carries a weapon or his hands cannot be seen by the police officer, the police officer keeps visual contact from a fixed safety distance, while informing regularly his service on his position and the direction that the pursued person follows. The purpose in that case is to arrest the pursued person when feasible, either due to the arrival of reinforcements or under other circumstances.
In case the hands of the pursued person are visible and empty, the police officer's aim is to reach the person and arrest it.

Vehicle Pursuit

Takes place when a vehicle runs away not responding to a legal call for control by a police vehicle patrol.

Rules for vehicle pursuit that the police officers must follow:

- Report the beginning of the pursuit and any relevant information.
- Wear their seatbelts.
- Try to drive in controlled speed, behind and to the left of the pursued vehicle, while keeping visual contact from a proper distance.
- During the pursuit use the sound and light signals of the patrol car.
- Inform their police service regularly on the location and the course of the vehicle, in order for reinforcements to organize a coordinated response.
- Avoid answering to any gun firing during the pursuit, when the officers are not in a position to control the secure landing of the projectile and do not attempt to hit, divert or block the pursued vehicle, in order to stop it.

Stop the vehicle pursuit if due to the traffic it is dangerous for the police officers or the citizens.

Keep the firearms secured on their belt, in order to avoid accidental detonation or loss during the pursuit except other circumstances do not allow it.

Pays attention to objects that will possibly be thrown by the pursued vehicle and, without stopping, informs their police service in such case since these objects might be related to illegal actions.

In case the patrol cars taking part in the pursuit are more than one, they are moving in a raw, one after the other, and not side to side, following the patrol car that has the visual contact with the pursued vehicle, in order to tactically change the leading patrol car, in case of need.

In case vehicle pursuit turns into pursuit on foot and allowed by the circumstances, follow the rules of pursuit on foot, while securing the service vehicle.

In case the pursued vehicle stops and one or more people are running away from it, while others do not leave the vehicle, they give priority in apprehending the ones that have stayed and providing description of the others to the police service for further search.

In case a patrol car receives fires from the pursued vehicle, if possible keep the visual contact increasing the distance from it while the police officers avoid to use their firearms if they cannot control the secure landing of their projectiles, informing simultaneously their police service.

In case the pursued vehicle managed to escape the police officers stop the pursuit and perform tactical control to the nearby area while at the same time informing their police service for the search to be coordinated, giving description of the vehicle and the passengers, if possible.

There might be the case that a patrol car is given the order to block the road and technically block the pursued vehicle. In this case this has to be done enough time before the pursued vehicle reaches that point, in order for the spot to be properly signed, so the block could be easily visible from a great distance and avoid accidents. Finally the police officers stand off the spot in a safe place.

**INTERCEPTION/APPREHENSION**

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station.

**Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons**

During the control process of a suspect and when there is evidence connecting the individual to a criminal action, the suspect is apprehended and body search is conducted while at the same time evidence is collected.
If there are reasons that justify the arrested individual to be enchained (susspect of escaping or reacts violently), then he is enchained always with his hands behind his back and never in front of him.
The tactic of enchainment is always conducted by one police officer, while the second one covers his partner from a proper distance. The same tactic is been followed in case more police officers participate in the control process or there are more individuals to be apprehended.
All the apprehended persons are transferred to the respective police service or to a designated for them place.
For safety reasons and respect to the personality of the apprehended the police officers must avoid if possible transfer on foot, and call for support of a vehicle unit.

Rules for security body searches

Security body search takes place immediately after the arrest and aims at:
Discovering and seizing weapons or other objects that may facilitate the escape of the apprehended person.
Collecting evidence related to the crime, which could be destroyed by the apprehended person.
Body search on women is conducted by a woman police officer. If there is not one on the spot, the police officer indicates another woman to conduct the body search.
During the search the police officers must take care to not offend the personality or to unreasonably bother the individual under search, to the level that this is feasible.
In case no other woman is in the area, police officers pay special attention to secure that women apprehended do not carry any weapon or attempt to throw away possible evidences.

Evidence collection on the spot

The police officers that arrive first on the spot shall:
Keep intact the crime scene prohibiting to anyone non-authorized to approach and affect traces or objects found on the spot which can help in the investigation of the crime.
If the crime was committed in a room, to guard it at the exterior and not allow the entrance to anyone non-authorized.
Verify and report to their superiors the identity of the persons found, upon arrival at the crime scene or within short distance from it.
When evidences is possible to be lost, police officers arriving first on the spot and have no jurisdiction to investigate, list everything in details and submit their report to the investigating officers. They also gather any evidence and any information on the crime and the perpetrator given by the victims and other persons and where possible act in order to pursue and arrest the perpetrator.

Transportation of migrants

Transportation of the apprehended persons on land takes place with special service cars. Exceptionally, if there are no such cars available, any other service vehicle can be used, given that the Commander of the Unit responsible for this transportation considers this vehicle appropriate.
All the apprehended persons are transferred to the respective police service or to a designated for them place.
For safety reasons and respect to the personality of the apprehended the police officers must avoid if possible transfer on foot, and call for support of a vehicle unit.

FOLLOW UP MEASURES AT THE BPU/BCP/RECEPTION CENTRE

Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;
Members of the EIGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.
Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGT may assist the local authorities in the examination of the personal circumstances of each person before removal processes. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

Members of the EBGT may conduct their tasks with respect to the principle of non-refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs may support the host MS authorities in applying the special measures foreseen for the protection of vulnerable groups, who have been detected in the area of deployment. For this purpose and in accordance with the relevant EU and national legislation, the Members of the EBGT will take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

Introduction and access to asylum

First Reception Service is the competent authority to inform third country citizens for both their rights and obligations after their detection in Hellenic territory by the Hellenic Police officers. Those who seek international protection are being sent over to the responsible Asylum Office, a department of which may be in operation in the first reception center.

In each stage of first reception procedure, submitting a demand of being under international protection obligates the separation of the demanding person and his being sent over to the proper Asylum Office. Receiving the demands and the interviews of the seekers may be held inside the facilities of the first reception services, and the persons remain in the facilities for as long as the examination of their demands lasts. Priority is given to the examination of international protection applications of persons under detention.

If the above mentioned timelines are expired and the international protection demand is not completed, the Asylum Office provides the seeker with a Bulletin of Asylum Demand, and he is being sent over to proper facilities, for which is responsible the Health and Social Care Ministry.

Since the demand and the recourse are rejected while the third country citizens remain in the first reception center or unit, they are being sent over to the responsible for the deportation, return and readmission authorities.

After the suggestion of the medical and psychosocial support subdivision supervisor, the Head of each Center or Unit hands over the persons who are considered to be vulnerable to the service which is responsible for social support or protection. In each case, the appropriate care treatment is ensured when it is demanded. As vulnerable groups are considered the following individuals:

a. Unaccompanied minors.
b. Disabled persons or persons with incurable diseases.
c. Elder people.
d. Pregnant women.
e. One parent families with minor children.
f. Victims of torture, rape, or other severe psychological, somatic, sexual violence or exploitation.
g. Trafficking victims.
According to the Hellenic Legislation, every alien has the right to submit in person a demand for international protection either for himself/herself or for the members of his/her family, as long as the above mentioned adult members, agree with the demand.

More specifically, for victims of human-trafficking and unaccompanied minors

1. Vulnerable persons - Potential victims of human-trafficking

In the case when in entry points (BCPs, airports, etc.) individuals with evidence of being potential victims of human-trafficking are detected, the first-line (Police) officers (border guards) hand them over to the second-line (Police) Services (Deparments and Teams responsible for combating human-trafficking), the personnel of which has undergone special training on the identification, approach and conduct of interviews with potential victims of trafficking with the purpose of acknowledging with certainty their true status.

In the latter case, the competent Judicial Authority identifies the person as a "victim of human-trafficking". Afterwards, via the National Center for Social Solidarity, assistance is provided to the victim, in terms of accommodation, legal and psychological support, medical care, residence permit etc. (further details are foreseen in the Presidential Decree N. 233 of 2003 on the "Protection and assistance of victims of human-trafficking"), with the purpose of social inclusion or the safe repatriation of the victim.

2. Unaccompanied minors

Every unaccompanied minor who is detected arriving in Hellenic territory is referred to the competent Judicial Authorities, according to the national legislation. Afterwards, they are transferred to the First Reception Services, which are responsible for the identification of their nationality and overall status (as unaccompanied). Furthermore, these Services conduct every possible effort for the localization of their families in due time and take all necessary measures for their legal representation. It is important to stress that the Legal Representative can either be a member of the competent local Judicial Authority (on a provisional basis) or a social worker (on a permanent basis).

Then the minors are transferred to "Pre-Removal Detention Centers". In such centers are accommodated migrants awaiting repatriation. The minors are separated from the rest of the migrants and are accommodated in special until the procedures for the specification of their infancy, origin identification and asylum status are completed. Afterwards, they are transferred, according to the national legislation and in cooperation with the National Center for Social Solidarity and NGOs, in special accommodation facilities/youth hostels.

In the case of minors not applying for asylum and when after the conclusion of the relevant investigation, their parents are not tracked in Greece, the INTERPOL is informed for further investigation. Then, repatriation decisions are issued with or without detention for the minors. When they are detained, they are accommodated in special facilities, apart from the rest of (adult) migrants. When their repatriation is not possible due to a variety of reasons, such as the lack of direct flight, they are transferred to Special Centers of Accommodation for youths. Repatriation is always subject to the protection of the child, the reassurance that the child is not put in danger in the country of origin, and that the social and family environment can provide for the normal reintegration of the minor.

In the case of unaccompanied minors applying for asylum, the Police Services following the principle of family-reunification, are trying to reunite the minors with other members of their families residing in other MSs of the EU. For this purpose, they cooperate with the UNHCR and with NGOs, in order to compose the relevant applications and manage the transfer of the minors close to their families guaranteeing their safety. Then they are transferred to appropriate accommodation facilities, where all necessary procedures are taking place for the nomination of a guardian, who is assisting the minor through all the asylum processes.
Guide to Behaviour

Thousands of individuals with different religious beliefs and cultural background reside in Greece. In order to promote the protection of fundamental rights and to avoid discrimination towards any human-being living in Greece, the following safeguards are foreseen by the National Constitution:

Article 3 § 1 of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental constitutional principle of respect of human value as a person.

Article 5 § 2 of the Constitution absolutely protects the human life, the honour and the freedom of everyone who lives in the Greek territory without discrimination on nationality, race, language and religious or political beliefs.

Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the inviolability of freedom of religious conscience and in addition protects according to the law every known religion and everything about its worship, which are committed without hindrance, if these do not offend public order and morality.

During police checks, identification, arrest or detention, police officers should be professional avoiding any racist or degrading behaviour. Moreover, police personnel should treat every person equally according to the provisions of the Constitution and relevant national legislation.

Religious Beliefs

All religions are worthy of respect.

It is prohibited to insult sacred texts or symbols.

The disturbance of places in which worship and ceremonies are taking place is prohibited.

Minors

Any person stating that has not yet reached the age of 18 is considered a minor.

Minor residing outside the country and away from any parent or legal guardian is considered an unaccompanied minor.

During the police checks, identification, arrest or detention, police officers should:

- know that when there is no evidence of a person being a minor, then it is considered a minor.
- not blind minors in handcuffs unless it is considered necessary
- inform the parents of the minor immediately
- inform the minor about his/her right to contact a lawyer
- be aware that restricting the freedom of minors is always the last resort and is necessary only for the minimum required time
- be aware that minors are detained in premises specially designated and separate from adults
- be aware that unaccompanied alien minors have the right to seek international protection and asylum.

USE OF FORCE/WEAPONS

Principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

Principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.
Permissible weapons

According to the provisions of the laws n. 2168/1993 and 3169/2003, policemen (police personnel, special guards and border guards) may carry revolvers and semi-automatic pistols.

The following rules apply for the carrying of service weapons:

"Policemen shall be allowed to possess and carry firearms for which they have been trained, since they are considered physically and mentally appropriate. Policemen shall carry fixed firearms, in accordance with the provisions of the Presidential Decree 141/1991.

Policemen shall always carry personal service firearms during their service, while they shall be allowed to carry such firearms while they are out of service. Exceptionally, policemen shall not carry firearms, when carriage is prohibited by electoral legislation and during their service, upon relevant order. This order shall be given in the event of a particular danger for the success of a mission or their own and the citizens' security or for the keeping of firearms."

Permissible equipment

Following the provisions of the law 3169/2003, the following equipment may be carried:

Metal handcuffs and Rubber baton.
Moreover, no kind of spray is allowed for carriage/usage within the Hellenic territory.
The above list is exhaustive and restrictive to any other equipment.

Procedure of Issuing weapon permits

When notified by MIS or Opera platform on the advent of new Guest-Officers carrying weapons, the Hellenic NFPOC submits a written request to State Security Division of the Hellenic Police Headquarters in order to issue weapon permits. The request should always include the following:

- Last name, first name and any other id details of the Guest Officers who are about to be deployed in the Hellenic territory,
- Exact deployment period (including arrival/departure dates in Greece),
- Entry/exit point and point of deployment,
- Weapon details (s/n, type, brand, model),
- Ammunition details (possible s/n, type, brand, model, amount),
- Any other personal equipment the Guest Officer may carry (button, handcuffs) and is allowed by the Legislation on Weapons,
- Matching each weapon in each guest officer (the weapon permits are issued separately for every officer and for specific weapons to carry with),
- In case of weapon rotation, the Hellenic NFPOC must be informed about the same above mentioned details.

The State Security Division then orders the proper regional or local authority (according to the entry point or the point of deployment) to issue the relevant weapon permits.

The issued weapon permits shall be given to the Guest Officers at the entry and/or deployment point by the competent authority. In the case of one GO carrying more than one weapons and large amount of ammunition, to be handed over to his/her colleagues on the spot the Hellenic NFPOC must be informed about the above mentioned details, as well as the id details of the one GO who will be responsible for carrying them in and out of the Hellenic territory.

Conditions to use weapons
Use of firearms is defined, according to the law 3169/2003, as activation of firearm against a target and the projection of a missile (shooting). Shooting, accordingly to shooting target shall be ranged in:

- intimidating shooting, when no causation of harm is intended against any target.
- shooting against objects, when causation of harm is intended to objects.
- in order to immobilize, when causation of harm to non-vital parts of the body -especially to lower limbs- is intended, and elimination, when causation of harm to a person is intended and his/her death is possible.
- (Armed attack shall exist when the person who attack uses a gun, stipulated in art.1 of Law 2168/1993 against a person or threatens someone by its direct use. As armed attack shall be also defined threat under a convincing imitation of a gun or an inactive gun)

According to the article 3 of the above mentioned law:

(1) Policemen while exercising their service shall be allowed to precede their firearm, since there is danger of armed attack against them or a third person.
(2) Policemen shall be allowed to make use of firearms, if necessary in order to execute their duty, and the following conditions apply:
   - All lighter than shooting means have been used, unless they are not available or convenient in a particular case.
   - Lighter means shall be defined as advice, suggestions, use of barriers, physical violence, police bar, allowed chemical substances or other means, advance notice for use of firearm and threat under firearm.
   - They have declared their capacity and have clearly and understandably notice for possible use of firearm, giving enough time of response, unless something like this is futile under these specific circumstances or intensifies danger of death or physical damage.

Use of firearm shall not consist of excessive means in relation to kind of damage and risk of threat.

(3) In the event that the aforementioned conditions apply, lighter use of firearms shall be done, unless such action is futile under such circumstances or intensifies death risk or physical damage. Lighter use of firearm shall be defined as escalation of its use with the least possible and necessary harm, pursuant to subparagraph d of article 1.

(4) Shooting for intimidation purposes or shooting against objects shall be permitted, especially in cases of danger from an animal or advance notice for shooting against person, since all proper measures have been taken, so as no man shall be hurt by miss or banishment of missile. Shooting against a vehicle, which involves danger of physical damage of persons in it, shall be allowed exclusively under conditions of the following paragraph.

(5) Shooting for immobilization purposes shall be allowed, since it is required:
   - In order to repel an armed attack, since such attack commenced or is about to commence, and any delay may render defence ineffective.
   - In order to prevent materialization or continuance of dangerous crime or crime that is committed under the use or threat of physical violence.
   - In order to arrest a sentenced person or a person under trial or a person under pursuit who shall be detected to commit "flagrant delicto" a felony or a regulatory offence, since such person demonstrated opposition to his/her arrest and there is direct risk to make use of firearm.
   - In order to prevent illegal entrance in the country or exit from it of persons that shall attempt illegal transfer of people (trafficking in human beings) and objects and shall carry firearms of subparagraph 1, art.1 of Law 2168/1993.
   - In order to protect public utility facilities or places in which objects that are dangerous for public health or public order or evidence for a crime are kept, since their keeping has been exclusively assigned to policemen and violent access, caution of harm or removal of kept objects is attempted.
   - In order to prevent an escape or release of a prisoner that is attempted under armed attack.
   - In order to prevent disarmament of policemen during their service.

(6) Elimination shooting shall be allowed, if required:
   - In order to repel an attack that involves death risk or heavy physical damage of a person.
   - In order to rescue hostages who are in risk of death or heavy physical damage.

(7) Shooting for immobilization or elimination shall be prohibited:
   - If there is serious danger to cause a third person due to miss or banishment of missile.
   - Against armed crowd, if there is serious danger to cause harm to unarmed people.
Flexible Operational Activities 2017 and on Border Checks

Against minors, if it is the only means to prevent a risk of danger.
Against a person who runs away, when he/she is called to go under legal control.
(8) When policemen act as a group, in order to make use of firearms, command by the group head is required, unless policemen are under attack, which involves possibility of heavy physical damage or death.
(9) Unconstitutional or profoundly illegal command by a senior for use of firearm shall not repeal the illegal nature of policeman's action.
(10) Every use of firearms by policemen shall be directly reported in the competent police Authority and Judicial Authority.

Conditions to use police equipment

Following the provisions of the 85/174/7-yd's dated 17-02-2004 decision of the Minister of Public Order, as it has been amended with later acts:
(Article 9)
Police constables, sergeants and warrant officers are equipped with police baton, the type of which depends on their task.

The use of the police baton is allowed only after an order of a superior and in the case of self-defence.
The policeman who has used his baton, on his own initiative, must report the incident to his Service immediately, also reporting in details the reasons that led him to this decision.

(Article 119)
During the arrest of a person the following rules must be followed:

If there is any suspicion that the person might attempt to escape, because of his record or his behaviour during the arrest, he may be handcuffed, to prevent escape.

Immediate measures to be taken following the use of weapon.
In case there is use of firearms by a police officer he has to immediately report this incident to his Police service.

Special rules to dog handlers

Police dog handlers must always keep their police dogs under constant control. This rule applies with special attention close to the borderline area since the Military Authorities consider crossing of the border line by persons, animals, vehicles and objects, from any point other than the officially designated as "Border Incident".

HUNGARY

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGTs

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc.)

Patrol is a small group of two or more police officers performing duties in its area of responsibility.
The composition, specific mission and patrol area of responsibility is determined by the head of the police service who orders it.

Patrols are divided into foot and vehicle patrols.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:
- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Security body searches, transportation to the nearest BPU/BCP, escort them, etc.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

Security body searches, transportation to the nearest BPU/BCP, escort them, etc.
The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;
The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

(a) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBGTS shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

(b) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGTS shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBGTS shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if (s)he asks for asylum.

(c) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTS shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

4. Use of force/weapon

a) Define the principles on the use of force
When using force, members of the EBCG shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state.

b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBCGs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

c) Define the type of equipment/weapon permissible

The use of the following equipment are allowed: regular service hand-weapons with ammo, handcuffs, police baton (rubber), chemical spray (capsicum) and service dogs. The dogs must be leashed and muzzled.

d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapon (warnings, targets, etc)

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapon

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

f) Special rules to dog handlers

The dogs must be leashed and muzzled.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Provisions pertaining to the members of foreign organizations, carrying out border control tasks

POLICE ACT of the Republic of Hungary
Act XXXIV. of 1994 on the Police


a) use physical coercion, under Article 47, handcuffs, under Article 48, and truncheons, under Article 49,

b) may keep his/her service firearm on his/her person, but may only use it in case of rightful defence or a case of emergency;

c) may apprehend the person unlawfully present on the territory of the country but is obliged to hand the apprehended person over to the police without delay.

(2) According to (1) a) and b), a member of the agency carrying out border control tasks may use means of coercion or a firearm as regulated in the country of his/her place of service if the use of such means of coercion or firearm is not prohibited by law on the territory of the Republic of Hungary.
5. Border checks

a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e., prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable International, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
Members of the EBGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if (s)he asks for asylum.

f) Special measures applicable to asylum seekers and vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

In case when persons/migrants need international protection, the Hungarian Police is not allowed to make official procedure, however it records the asylum application of the persons during the alien policing procedure. In these cases the National Police forwards the asylum applications (and the asylum seekers) to the competent authority, which is the Office of Immigration and Asylum. The unaccompanied minors will be examined by doctors in order to diagnose their real ages. If the result of the examination confirms the age of the migrant, they will be sent to children protection institutes and official caretaker will be appointed by the Police, if the result of the examination doesn’t confirm the age of the migrant and the migrant seeks for asylum, see the procedure above. The vulnerable groups will be separated from other groups. If they are under alien policing procedure they have to wait for the result of the procedure at the detention center.

g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

The Hungarian Police does not give access to the national databases. The members of EBCG will be allowed to consult with the experts of the Host Member State but as the final decision about the refusal of entry shall be made “by an authority empowered by national law” (2016/399 Regulation, Art. 14.2). The experts of EBCG are allowed to use the SIS and VIS databases and other databases from their home countries.

h) Procedure related to stamping

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

LATVIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

“Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures...”
1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)
For border control and surveillance the border guards may travel without hindrance on foot and by vehicles on temporary or private roads adjacent to the state border and transboundary water bodies or loading there and on shore paths without the consent of the owner or possessor. In performing state border surveillance and ensuring the border regime, the border guards may use relevant technical, including electronic, devices for the purposes of detecting illegal border crossing, identifying objects, ensuring safety in border crossing points and combating cross-border crime.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGs

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

- Patrol: border guard mission in the composition of one or more border guards for the surveillance of a certain border section or state territory, moving on foot, by vehicle or vessel non determined route.
- Observation post: border guard mission in the composition of one or more border guards with the task - surveillance of certain border section during the determined period.
- Technical surveillance post: border guard mission in the composition of two or more border guards with the task - surveillance of certain border section by use the specially equipped vehicle.
- Control post: border guard mission in the composition of two or more border guards with the task of control and surveillance the intersection of the roads or the section of road near the border.
- Search group: border guard mission in the composition of two or more border guards with the task to pursue and detention the state border violators. Search group tasks can be performed by walking or on a vehicle or vessel.

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)
Border guards in the whole border area, as well as the border control points and the border crossing points have the right in prosecuting persons violating the State border or persons violating the regimen of the State border, border areas, border zones, border control points or border crossing points, as well as persons who reside illegally in the State, to enter the premises or buildings that are the property of the State or local government, or natural or legal persons.

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

- The Border Guard Act: When the border guards fulfill the task to search and pursue the state border violators, they have the right to operate throughout the country.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
2. Interception/apprehension

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

- Border guards have the right to arrest persons, who are suspected of the committing of such a criminal offence the investigation of which is within the competence of the Border Guard, as well as persons who have committed administrative violations the examination of which is within the competence of the Border Guard, persons who have attempted to move or have moved across the State border items prohibited to be imported into or exported out of the Republic of Latvia by laws or other regulatory enactments, or otherwise have attempted to import or export goods and other items, evading customs control, and persons or means of transport being sought and persons located in such means of transport. Border guards have the right to expel persons from the State who have entered Latvia or crossed the State border without a valid travel document or a permit from the relevant authority or have not observed prescribed procedures. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the offices of the border guard authorities, border guard detention houses or expulsion centres.

- Officials shall take fingerprints of persons apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of the border, if he or she is at least 14 years of age, and shall transmit the data collected upon the taking of the fingerprints for comparison to the Central Unit of Eurodac.

b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Prior to the placement of a person in the premises (place) of temporary keeping the official shall invite the person to hand over for temporary storing the items which may be used to attack the officials or with which it would be possible to inflict bodily injuries to other persons or to himself or herself and the person shall be searched, in order to remove the mentioned items the person has not willingly handed over. A person shall be searched by an official of the same sex. If it is determined that the person has obvious bodily injuries or he or she complains of his or her state of health, the official shall provide first aid. If necessary, shall ensure the provision of emergency medical assistance and make an entry in the registration journal thereof.

c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP: security standards, rules and instructions;

Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape by the apprehended person, while ensuring the safety of the apprehended person as well as that of their own.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
2(a): Border Guard Law, Section 15 (1) 3
2(b): Cabinet Regulation No.735 2009

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre
a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;
See 2 b) above.

b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities:
In initial reception centres as well as reception centres, asylum seekers shall be provided information regarding their rights and duties, temporary accommodation, food, essential clothing and other necessities and toiletries, emergency care and medical examinations, essential translation services, transportation services necessary for the performance of acts performed on the basis of law and other essential services.

c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
A foreigner shall not be removed, if exist such circumstances: on the basis of justified fear from persecution due to his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group or his or her political views is located outside the country where he or she is a national, and is unable or due to such fear does not wish to accept the protection of the country where he or she is a national, or a stateless person who being outside his former country of habitual residence is unable or unwilling to return there due to the same reasons or a third country national or a stateless person who cannot be granted refugee status, may apply for alternative status if there is a reason to believe that he or she may be exposed to serious harm after return to the country of origin thereof and due to this reason is unable or does not wish to accept the protection of the referred to country.

d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

➤ The operations of the Border Guard shall be organised in conformity with the law, humanism, human rights, transparency, a single command structure, and based upon the assistance of the inhabitants.
➤ The Border Guard shall protect the rights and lawful interests of persons irrespective of their citizenship, social, financial or other status, race or nationality, gender or age, education or language, attitude towards religion, or political or other opinions.
➤ The Border Guard shall ensure that the rights of a person to move from one state to another state are observed.
➤ The Border Guard shall provide an opportunity for arrested persons to exercise their rights to a legal defence.
➤ It is prohibited to use force and firearm against women, persons with visible signs of disability and minors except in cases when their actions threaten the life or health of other persons or when they demonstrate armed resistance or conduct an armed attack.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
3(c): Immigration Law, Section 47, Asylum Law, Sections 20 (1), 23 (1)

4. Use of force/Weapons

a) Define the principles on the use of force
According to Latvian Border Guard Law, border guards, during performance of service duty, have the right to use force, in order:

- to repel an attack on border guards and other persons;
- to arrest law-breakers who, with malicious intent, do not submit to or resist border guards; and
- to repel assault to buildings, separate premises and means of transport that are guarded by border guards, as well as to liberate these objects if they have been taken over by armed persons.

b) **Define the principles on the use of weapons**

A border guard is entitled to use a firearm in order:

- to repel an armed attack in the territory of Latvia or to terminate armed resistance by attackers;
- to arrest a person violating the State border, if there is no other way of arresting the person;
- to repel an attack and to terminate resistance, also an attack and resistance by unarmed persons, if actual threats are created to the life of the border guard or other persons and if it is not possible to prevent such or if it is necessary to prevent an attempt to obtain a firearm through violence;
- to stop a means of transport, causing damage to it, if its driver through his or her actions is causing actual threats to the life or health of a border guard or other persons and does not submit to a request by a border guard to stop the means of transport and if there is no other way to arrest the driver.

c) **Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible**

Border guards, during performance of service duty, have the right to use physical force, special devices (handcuffs, truncheons, electric shock, tear gas or other substances, stopping devices for means of transport).

d) **Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)**

A border guard is entitled to use a firearm in order:

- to repel an armed attack in the territory of Latvia or to terminate armed resistance by attackers;
- to arrest a person violating the State border, if there is no other way of arresting the person;
- to repel an attack and to terminate resistance, also an attack and resistance by unarmed persons, if actual threats are created to the life of the border guard or other persons and if it is not possible to prevent such or if it is necessary to prevent an attempt to obtain a firearm through violence;
- to stop a means of transport, causing damage to it, if its driver through his or her actions is causing actual threats to the life or health of a border guard or other persons and does not submit to a request by a border guard to stop the means of transport and if there is no other way to arrest the driver.

Before using a firearm, a warning that it will be used must be given. If necessary, a warning shot may be given.

A firearm may be used without a warning if the attack is sudden or if weapons or any other type of mechanical means of transport are used in the attack.

A border guard has the right to use a firearm to give an alarm signal or to summon help.

It is prohibited to use a firearm:
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- against women, persons with visible signs of disability and minors except in cases when their actions threaten the life or health of other persons or when they demonstrate armed resistance or conduct an armed attack; and
- in cases when other persons may suffer as a result of its use.

e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

The type of special device used shall be determined by the nature of the specific violation and the individual features of the person committing the violation. In using special devices, the injury caused by such devices shall be minimally restricted, and first aid shall be ensured for victims if it is necessary. If, as a result of the use of physical force or special devices, an injury has been caused to a person, or his or her death has occurred, the border guard shall without delay inform his or her immediate supervisor regarding this, who shall communicate this fact to the relevant district (republic city) prosecutor.

f) Special rules to dog handlers

Service dogs are considered special equipment Border Guard Law and are subject to conditions specified under 4 a) and 4 d).

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
4: Border Guard Law, Sections 17, 18

5. Border checks

a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e.
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

(1) The operations of the Border Guard shall be organised in conformity with the law, humanism, human rights, transparency, a single command structure, and based upon the assistance of the inhabitants.
(2) The Border Guard shall protect the rights and lawful interests of persons irrespective of their citizenship,
social, financial or other status, race or nationality, gender or age, education or language, attitude towards religion, or political or other opinions.
(3) The Border Guard shall ensure that the rights of a person to move from one state to another state are observed.
(4) The Border Guard shall provide an opportunity for arrested persons to exercise their rights to a legal defence.

b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

(1) A person shall submit an application regarding granting of refugee or alternative status (hereinafter - application) in person to the State Border Guard:
- at the border control point prior to entering the Republic of Latvia; or
- in the territorial unit of the State Border Guard, if the person is in the Republic of Latvia.
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(2) An asylum seeker shall be identified by the State Border Guard. The State Border Guard has the following rights:

- to perform inspection of an asylum seeker and possessions thereof, as well as to seize objects and documents, if they may have a significance in examination of an application or if they may pose a threat to the asylum seeker or those around him or her. A report shall be drawn up regarding these activities;
- to specify and organise expert-examinations and inspections of documents, objects or language or medical and other expert-examinations and inspections in order to identify an asylum seeker; and
- to take the fingerprints of an asylum seeker and photograph him or her.

The State Border Guard shall conduct an interview with an asylum seeker. The interview may be recorded by sound and image recording, informing the asylum seeker thereof beforehand. The interview shall not be conducted if, in accordance with the conclusion of a physician, the asylum seeker has permanent health disorders which do not allow it.

The State Border Guard shall submit information regarding an asylum seeker at the disposal thereof, the information obtained during interviews and the application to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (hereinafter - Office).

c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals
(first line check, second line check, etc.)


d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

See 2 b) above.

e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

See 3 c) above.

f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

See 5 a) above.

g) Rules requiring consultation of national databases

The State Border Guard shall organise a Border Guarding Information System for the provision of the State border regime. The following information shall be registered in the Border Guarding Information System:

- regarding events related to illegal crossing of the State border, non-compliance with the requirements specified for the State border zone, borderland and border area or at border crossing points, illegal movement of property and goods across the State border, as well as the persons involved in such events;
- regarding the vessels registered with the State Border Guard and vehicles, which are used in internal waters, along which the external border has been determined; and
- regarding the persons to whom special passes have been issued, cancelled or refused.
The Cabinet shall determine the amount of information to be included in the Border Guarding Information System and the time periods for storage, as well as the State administrative institutions, which shall be granted access to such information.

h) Procedure related to stamping
A border guard shall affix, according to the Schengen Borders Code, on the travel document of a third-country national a stamp authorizing crossing of the border if such national has been granted authorization to cross the external border (See Article 10 of Regulation 2007/2004).

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**
5(a): Border Guard Law, Section 3.
5(b): Asylum Law, Section 6.
5(g): On the State Border of the Republic of Latvia, Section 9.1

**LITHUANIA**

**Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT**

**ARTICLE 35 (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION**

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officials of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

   (a) **Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)**

   - Patrol
   - Observation post
   - Barrier
   - Ambush
   - Video and (or) alarm system operator

   (b) **General tasks of the members of the EBGT**

   In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

   - to monitor the terrain they operate in,
   - to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the
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➤ patrolling area,
➤ to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the
➤ patrol team,
➤ to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to
➤ explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
➤ to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or
➤ tried to cross the border illegally

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

➤ Patrols: on foot, by ski, bicycles, service cars, etc. It is a main border surveillance method to organize
border surveillance at the "green border".
➤ Observation post could be stationary then officers are located in observation towers or other facilities
with stationary equipment or mobile then officers perform their duties in one or more designated
places without fixed monitoring equipment.
➤ Barrier - It is border guards group aligned along threshold to detain persons who illegally crossed the
border or have intentions to do that in an unspecified location.
➤ Ambush - It is a type of border surveillance method then border guard have preliminary findings about
possible illegal activities at the border and are waiting in hidden places to prevent those activities.
➤ Video and (or) alarm system operator is working in border stations or BCP and monitor all situation at
the border sections where surveillance cameras, alarm systems, etc. are installed.

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-
conditions is entitled to access)

Army - it is allowed to enter this room only for duty officers, who are responsible for the security of this
room, management of the units and gunsmiths who are responsible for weapons maintenance.

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

In accordance with Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act Border Guard officers can carry out hot pursuit
at all territory of Republic of Lithuania.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards’
station according to the Schengen Handbook.

e) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Persons who have not been permitted to cross the border or have illegally crossed the external border shall be
detained and returned into the state from or through which they arrived, taking account of the specifications
provided for in the Citizen of the European Union Act. Expulsion shall be completed within 48 hours from the
moment of detention. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the border stations, BCP or other places
where is temporary detention facilities.
Two different categories should be distinguished here: (1) those who have not been permitted to cross the border and (2) those who have illegally crossed the border. Those who have not been permitted to cross the border would be returned to the country from or through which they arrived, and those who crossed the border illegally would be detained, and then their legal status in Lithuania would be considered in accordance with applicable legislation (transfer to a foreign country in accordance with international agreements, expulsion, detention for a period longer than 48 hours). Persons would be detained at SGBS territorial bodies for periods not exceeding 48 hours or, on the basis of a decision of the Court, at the SGBS Foreigners’ Registration Centre for periods exceeding 48 hours.

b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

In accordance with Lithuanian Administrative Code and Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act Border Guard officers can do searches to check and seize personal as follows (Article 20 point. General Officer’s powers):

➢ Make a personal inspection and inspection of objects, to detain individuals suspected of breaking the rules of border crossing and customs rules, border sector or border crossing point regime, deliver offenders to the Office, the police official premises for personal identification and administrative offense protocol recording.

c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards, rules and Instructions;

Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape by the apprehended person, while ensuring the safety of the apprehended person as well as that of their own.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

See 2 b) above.

b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

According to Lithuanian Act “On the legal status of foreigners” the basic human needs are guaranteed only for foreigners who are applying for international protection (including asylum). For them are guaranteed transportation from BCP to Foreigners Registration Centre, accommodation there, food and medical assistance. All basic human needs are only provided till the decision on foreigner status is made.

The Law “On the Legal Status of Foreigners” provides that detained foreigners should be accommodated / detained at the SGBS Foreigners’ Registration Centre. A respective order of Minister of the Interior establishes the accommodation procedures: transportation to the centre, foreigners’ rights, medical care, material and domestic supplies package, etc.
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c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
In case when a person is trying to cross the border expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum members of the EBGTs shall refer to the senior supervising officer of the host MS who will start procedure of the alien’s legal status determination.

d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons
All special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc. is provided after delivering them to Foreigner’s Registration Centre, so EBGT members will not be involved in this activity in Lithuania.

Unaccompanied minors are not accommodated at the SBGS Foreigners’ Registration Centre. They are accommodated at the Refugee Reception Centre which is administered by the Ministry of Social Security and Labour. Decisions on accommodation of unaccompanied minors are adopted by the State Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force
When using force, members of the EBGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

Border guard’s rights of the use of special measures and service weapons are established in the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act.

Article 22. Firearm and the use of special measures principles:
“Officials have the right to use firearms and the specific measures only in situations, established by legal acts an taking into account kind of offence, the offender’s personality and particular situation.”

The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

If circumstances warrant, the firearm and the use of special measures should be aware of shouts a warning shot.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons
The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.
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The same answer as in point a)

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

- All type of firearms
- Other equipment:
  - Aerosol gas jets, sticks with built-in sprinklers, gas generators, handcuffs, gas ammunition, forced stopping means of vehicles, electric shock devices, rescue equipment, sticks, special non-lethal ammunition and guns, service dogs and marking cartridges

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warning, targets, etc)
Border guard’s rights of the use of special measures and service weapons are established in the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act.

Article 23, p 1. The officer has the right to use a firearm:
1. Countering an armed invasion of the Republic of Lithuania, the protected object or preventing a theft of aircraft, ship, or other vehicle with no passengers;
2. When a person, ship, aircraft or other vehicle cross the border outlawed in unidentified place or location or cross the border in an unauthorized way and this creates a real risk officer or another person’s life or health, or disobey official’s clearly expressed orders to stop or there was no possibility to arrest them in any other way;
3. Detaining the vehicle in border area, if the driver with his act creates a real risk officer or another person’s life or health, or disobey official’s clearly expressed orders to stop or there was no possibility to arrest them in any other way;
4. In other cases established in police law.

Article 23, p 2. Use of special measures.
The officer performing its official duties have the right to use special tools (batons, handcuffs, strapping, gas, forced vehicle suspension measures, service dogs, a firearm with a special non-lethal munitions and other active and passive defense measures, confirmed by the Minister of Internal Affairs) in case of:

1. Countering the assault against the officers and other persons who carry out duties at the border, at the border control point and other in the protected areas;
2. Detaining violators of the border or other protected areas, who disobey legal requirements of Officer;
3. Releasing the hostages;
4. Preventing violations of law at the border, border crossing points and protected areas;
5. Countering assaults of protected officials, buildings, individual rooms and vehicle or releasing these objects;
6. In other cases established in police legal acts.

Article 23, p 3, Firearm, special measures may be used without warning:
1. When the officer or other person is attacked using a weapon unexpectedly;
2. When attacked using combat technique, vessel, aircraft or other vehicle;
3. In case of armed resistance;
4. Releasing of the hostages;
5. In other cases established in police law.

Article 23, p 5, Use of firearms or any special tools is forbidden:
1. against a ship, aircraft and other vehicles with passengers;
2. against those officers face accidentally crossed the border by accident or in case of force majeure;
3. in places with explosives, ammunition, flammable materials that could pose a risk to human life and health or public safety;
4. against persons, buildings, facilities, vehicles, having the integrity of law;
5. In crowded places if it endangers other persons;
6. against a person who has got a minors with;
7. against women, it is clear that they are pregnant, as well as against individuals, where it is clear that they are disabled, against minors, if their age is known to official or the appearance matches the age, unless they attack in ways dangerous to life or health.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapon

The use of firearms against person shall be reported to the prosecutor immediately and the use of special measures to the direct superior officer.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers

Then person(s) check is performed by dog handler with service dog he/she must be warned that it is not allowed to do sudden moves and resist to legitimate officers actions, otherwise service dog will be used without warning.

During documents check all person should be visible for service dog.

During foot patrol dog handler goes ahead of other officers in distance which allows to keep good interaction between them.

Before a search of locations, buildings or other objects dog handler must loudly announce: 'The State Border Guard Service, please go out, otherwise it will be used service dog' and then repeat, 'The State Border Guard Service, stand still, service dog is released'.

During inspection of the vehicles dog handler with service dog must check passengers, their luggage, also be familiar with vehicle constructions, possible hiding places installations and give special attention to these places. Be aware of the risk factors, to be able according to the risk characteristics to profile passengers, their luggage and vehicles.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
5. Border checks

(a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e., prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travelers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

(b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

Applications for international protection (including asylum) should be delivered personally by foreigners (exception in case of minors, then one of the family members can do that on behalf of them) to State Border Guard Service officers at BCP, in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, which is covered by the legal regime and Foreigners Registration Centre or to police officers at local Police offices. In 24 hours border guards or police officers should collect all necessary data about foreigner and send his/her case to Migration Department which is responsible for examination of applications. Till decision regarding status of foreigner is made he/she remains in Foreigners Registration Centre.

In case guest officer will have a procedure with a person that would express wish for international protection, she/he would have to inform Lithuanian officer, who would take over the procedure.

(c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

Border check procedures in Lithuania are carried out in accordance with Schengen Borders Code and Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act.

(d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

See 2 b) above.

(e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

See 3 c) above.

(f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

See 3 d) above.
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(g) **Rules regulating consultation of national databases**
In purpose to get an access to National database and SIS, national border guard officer must fill an access request and after short check get an access key. Since the interface of our national databases and SIS is in Lithuanian language, members of the EBTG will be able to consult these national databases only through Lithuanian border guard officers.

(h) **Procedure related to stamping**
Members of the EBTG cannot stamp travel documents.

**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**

**Norway**

**Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBTG**

**Use of force/weapons**

**a) Define the principles on the use of force**
When using force, members of the EBTG shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.
The GO shall follow the instructions of the police/border guard of the host member state.

**b) Define the principles on the use of weapons**
At Storskog BCP, weapons are not carried by the border guards, police officers or customs officers, neither openly nor concealed.

**c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible**
Handcuffs, weapon-stick, pepper spray are being carried by the police and border guard,
Handcuffs are being carried by the Customs.

**Access to information systems**

Guest officers have access to wi-fi Internet. Guest officers will also be given training and access to the registration systems relevant to the border control, in cooperation with Norwegian police/border guard.

**Border checks**

Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must
notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union. All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, police/border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

Any GO’s practical activities shall be conducted under supervision
Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)
All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals:

➢ to assist at performing border checks in joint teams consisting of officer of police, services of the host MS, special advisers and observers and share expertise on his specific subject
➢ to support the first and second line checks
➢ to profile passengers in order to detect irregular migrants and victims of cross-border crime
➢ to detect fake/falsified documents and more kinds of cross-border criminality
➢ to detect stolen vehicles in cooperation with the competent authorities
➢ to share experience and exchange expertise with officers from the border guard service of the host MS.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

Any GO’s activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Norwegian police.

POLAND

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT

All guest officers deployed to perform duties shall realise any service activity under the supervision of the Polish Border Guard officers.
1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods:
- In the border crossing points:
  - border traffic control
  - border crossing points monitoring
- directly at the state border:
  - patrolling
  - use of surveillance vehicles
  - use of mobile thermo-vision cameras
- In the border region:
  - mobile patrols

(b) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method:
- to cooperate closely with the host staff;
- to perform tasks described in the operational plan especially the ones assigned to the place of deployment;
- to support practically the local staff in carrying out their tasks;
- to contribute actively to the process of full integration of the host officers and other guest officers (FP missions);
- to report any incidents concerning his/her deployment including indisposition, health problems, travels/transportation issues, etc./

(c) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas;
the guest officers will have access to the PBG systems/areas under supervision of the local staff

(d) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit:
General rules for pursuit are indicated in the Art. 41 of the Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. With respect to the Polish Border Guard the pursuit issue is regulated by the bilateral agreements and executive acts in the form of Ordinance No 40 issued on 13.10.2011 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Border Guard.

2. Interception/apprehension.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons;

(b) Rules for security of body searches and evidence collection on the spot;

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;
Any GO’s activities concerning a, b and c shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a PBG officer.
Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers of 05.09.2014 on the manner and procedure of exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre.

(a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre
If any activity concerning body searches or evidence collection is necessary from the EBTG Member, it shall be realized under strict supervision of a PBG officer.
Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers of 05.09.2014 on the manner and procedure of exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

(b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities:
Members of the EBTGs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

(c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed:
Members of the EBTGs shall support PBG officers in examining the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited.
Members of the EBTG shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

(d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons:
Members of the EBTGs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.
Any GD's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.
As for the mechanisms applicable at the border for asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors, they are as follows:
The Institutions responsible for reception of application for international protection at the border are Commanders of Border Guards Posts. The Institution responsible for dealing with the application for refugee status (issuing decisions on refugee status) is the Head of the Office for Foreigners.
As a general rule the decision on international protection is issued within 6 months. If the application is manifestly unfounded the decision is issued within 30 days.

If the applicant is to be located in the open reception centre he/she is obliged to report to the reception centre within 2 days as of submitting the application.

The authority admitting the application for granting the international protection, submitted by an unaccompanied minor shall apply immediately to the custody court having jurisdiction over the place in which such minor stays, with an application to establish a custody to represent the minor in the proceeding for granting the international protection and place the minor in care and educational centre.

In case the fact that the applicant is an unaccompanied minor is disclosed already during the proceeding, the Head of the Office for Foreigners shall submit the above mentioned application to the custody court.

The authority admitting the application shall bring an unaccompanied minor to professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situations, or care of an educational centre. The unaccompanied minor shall stay in the professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situation or in care of an educational centre until the moment decision is given by the custodian court.

National legislation does not allow the detention of unaccompanied minors seeking a refugee status. Regular unaccompanied minors of age above 15 years staying illegally (not seeking a refugee status) may be placed in the detention centre. The unaccompanied minors placed in a detention centre are separated from the adults.

The placement of unaccompanied minor in detention centre however has the character of last resort measure because a general rule is to place such a person in care of an educational centre.

The minors may be located in detention centre with their families if there are grounds for detention. The minors are located only in detention centres with appropriate infrastructure and organisation to accommodate families with children. Such detention centres provide for the minors a possibility to attend school and realize a standard school programme appropriate for their age. Except for school programme, there are also special educational recreation and sport classes organised by professional pedagogues trained also in the area of multicultural education.

4. Use of force/weapons.

1) PERMISSIBLE SERVICE WEAPONS

Border guards are equipped with service weapons on the basis of the Border Guard Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard and implementing provisions, i.e.

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of 09.05.2014 on Border Guard’s weapons and Ordinance No. 66 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard of 29 December 2005 regulating the quotas of weapons for individual border guards and groups, as well as quotas of special equipment for organizational units and individual Border Guard officers, as well as the conditions of assigning and using the Border Guard’s weapons.

The Border Guard is equipped with the following firearms:

- firearms, in the form of:
  - pistols, eg.: 9 mm P-83; 9 mm p-99,
  - revolvers, eg.: 9,65 mm revolver 38 R-2; 9,65 mm revolver 38 R-4,
  - smoothbore, eg.: 12/70 smoothbore MOSSBERG
  - submachine guns, eg.: 9 mm PW-98,
  - carbines, eg.: 7,62 mm carbine AKMS,
  - sniper carbines/rifles, eg.: 7, 62 carbine SVD
  - machine guns, eg. 7,62 mm machine gun PKM

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- devices used for throwing chemicals and other incapacitating agents (gas pistols and revolvers, gas (gel) throwers, eg.: disabling net throwers /SIO-84 disabling net set/);
- signal pistols eg. 26 mm signal pistol model 78.

2) PERMISSIBLE AMMUNITION

Border Guard officers are equipped with ammunition for their service weapons on the basis of the Border Guard Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard and implementing provisions, ie:

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of 09.05.2014 on Border Guard weapons and Ordinance No. 66 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard of 29 December 2005 regulating the quotas of weapons for individual border guards and groups, as well as quotas of special equipment for organizational units and individual Border Guard officers, as well as the conditions of assigning and using the Border Guard's weapons.

It is allowed to use all types of ammunition used in a given type of weapons certified for use on the territory of Poland.

3) PERMISSIBLE EQUIPMENT

Means of direct coercion allowed for use by Border Guard officers are specified by Regulation of the Minister of Interior of 09.05.2014 on the coercion means and firearms allowed to be used by the Border Guard. They include:

- physical force in the form of incapacitating holds and other similar techniques of defense and attack;
- (multifunctional) service clubs;
- electric paralyzers;
- handcuffs;
- disabling belts;
- leads;
- straitjackets;
- disabling nets;
- road spikes or other obstacles for stopping vehicles;
- chemical agents (gas, gel throwers);
- dogs;
- non-penetrating bullets fired from firearms;
- battlefield simulation systems;
- disabling nets for devices and throwers etc.

Apart from the above: all special technical equipment and Individual protection measures, border traffic control equipment, optical, night vision, laboratory and inspection equipment, equipment for securing micro-traces, criministics equipment sets, engineering, optical, photographic and audiovisual equipment, individual means for protection against chemical agents and contamination, equipment for small arms and special equipment.

1. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE WEAPONS

Cases in which firearms may be used are specified in the Law on Direct Coercion Means of 24 May 2013.

The permissible weapons may be used in case at least one of the below circumstances occur:

- in order to repel direct and unlawful attempt against life, health or freedom of the officer or another person and in order to counteract activities leading directly to such attempt;
- in order to repel direct and unlawful attempt against structures serving state defense or important to the national economy, as well as structures of the Border Guard or serving state border protection;
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- in order to repel attempt against property, also constituting direct threat to human life, health or freedom;
- in order to repel direct attempt against integrity of the State border by a person / persons attempting to cross the State border by force using a vehicle, firearms or other dangerous objects;
- in order to repel a violent, direct and unlawful attempt against a convoy protecting persons, documents containing information constituting a state secret, money or other valuables;
- against a person not obeying the order to immediately drop their weapons or another dangerous tool the use whereof may endanger life, health or freedom of the officer or another person;
- against a person attempting to take, unlawfully and by force, the firearms from the officer or another person authorised to carry firearms;
- in direct pursuit of a person with regard to whom the use of weapons has been permitted in cases provided for in (1) · (6) or of a person with regard to whom there exists a justified suspicion of committing murder, terrorist attack, abduction of a person in order to extort ransom, or of specific behaviour, mugging, robbery with violence, extortion racket, intentional severe bodily injury, rape, arson or otherwise intentional threats to life or health;
- in order to detain a person / persons suspected of committing a crime, if they have taken refuge in a place difficult of access, and accompanying circumstances imply they may use firearms or another dangerous tool the use whereof may endanger life or health;
- in order to detain or prevent the escape of a person / persons detained, temporarily arrested or serving a sentence of imprisonment, if:
  - escape of an imprisoned person / persons constitutes a threat to human life or health,
  - there exists a justified suspicion that an imprisoned person / persons may use firearms, explosives or a dangerous tools;

(…) In actions by reserve troops within the territorial range of the border crossing point and in the border zone, the use of firearms can solely take place upon the order of the commander thereof. The use of firearms should not be aimed at deprivation of life; the least possible harm should be caused to the persons against whom firearms have been used; third persons should not be exposed to the risk of losing life or health.

Procedures of use of firearms by border guards.

Border guards may use firearms in cases specified above (the Law on Direct Conviction Means of 24 May 2013).

Use of firearms should be understood as releasing a shot in the direction of a person with the aim to overpower this person, after all other procedures have been used.

When using firearms border guards shall act with particular deliberation, and they should treat their firearms as a means of last resort.

Before using firearms the border guards shall:

(1) shout “Freezel Border Guard” (“Strzel Graniczna”) and then order the person to act in accordance with the law, and especially to drop weapons or dangerous tools, cease escaping, cease carrying out illegal activities or committing violence.
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(2) In case of disobedience to the orders mentioned in point 1, threaten to use firearms by shouting: “Freeze, or I shoot” (“Sidle, do stizelam”),

(3) If the orders, mentioned in points 1 and 2, prove ineffective - release a warning shot in such a way as not endanger human life or health.
   - Provisions of section (1) shall not be applied if any delay could cause danger to human life.
   - Use of firearms in the circumstances mentioned in section (2) should be preceded by shouting ‘Freeze! Border Guard’.
   - Use of firearms by releasing a shot shall not involve shooting into the territory of the neighbouring country.

Firearms shall not be used in relation to visibly pregnant women, persons whose appearance suggest that they are in the age of 13 or younger, elderly people or persons with visible disabilities.

If a person is injured as the result of use of firearms, the border guard shall immediately provide first aid to this person, as well as take steps to ensure emergency medical assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services.

The border guard may refrain from providing first aid in case it endangers life, health or safety of the border guard or other persons.

When the use of firearms has caused death of a person or damage of property, the border guard shall:
1) secure traces present in the place where the incident occurred and protect this place against access of strangers,
2) if possible, identify (establish) witnesses of the incident.

The border guard officer shall inform his/her direct superior about every case of use of firearms and he/she shall submit a report concerning the incident in writing to the superior.

The above mentioned report shall include:
- the rank, name and surname of the border guard involved,
- time and place of use of firearms,
- data of the person against whom the firearms was used,
- particular reasons for use of firearms and type of firearms used,
- description of the procedure preceding the use of firearms,
- effects of use of firearms,
- other important circumstances of the Incident,
- data of the identified (established) witnesses of the incident,
- signature of the border guard preparing the report.

Direct superior of the border guard shall immediately secure all traces and evidence connected to the use of firearms and provide the border guard with the necessary assistance.

The competent territorial unit of the Border Guard shall:
- immediately notify every case of use of firearms to a direct superior, and if the use of firearms resulted in death or injury of a person - also to the prosecutor,
- investigate if the use of firearms took place in accordance with applicable provisions.
5. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE AMMUNITION

There are no separate provisions regulating the conditions of use of live ammunition. However, there are general conditions and rules of use means of direct coercion, including firearms (see conditions of use for permissible weapons).

2. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE EQUIPMENT

Conditions and methods of use of means of direct coercion by Border Guard officers are provided for in the Law on Direct Coercion Means of 24 May 2013.

Conditions and methods of use of means of direct coercion by Border Guard officers:

1) Means of direct coercion may be used after previous order to act in accordance with the law and after a warning about their use, which proves ineffective.
2) A border guard may refrain from ordering the person concerned to act in accordance with the law and warning him or her about using the means of direct coercion if any delay could result in a danger to:
   - human life or health,
   - property, if human life, health of freedom is directly threatened at the same time.
3) Means of direct coercion shall be used in such a way as to force obedience to the orders given on the basis of the law and at the same time cause the least possible harm.
4) Various means of direct coercion may be used at the same time if it is necessary to achieve obedience to the orders given.
5) The means of direct coercion should cease to be used once the person, against whom the means were used, begins to obey the orders given.
6) In relation to visibly pregnant women, persons whose appearance suggests that they are in the age of 13 or younger, elderly people or persons with visible disabilities only, incapacitating hold may be used.

The border guard has the right to use the following means of direct coercion:

1) physical force in the form of incapacitating hold and other similar techniques of defense or attack:
   - physical force may be used in defense against an attack or to force obedience or to apprehend a wanted person;
   - the use of physical force shall not consist in hitting, striking, punching etc. unless the border guard acts in defense of necessity or in defense against an attempt against human life or health;

1) technical devices in the form of handcuffs, leads, straitjackets, disabling belts or nets, as well as road spikes or other obstacles for stopping vehicles:
   - handcuffs may be used in relation to apprehended persons in order to prevent their escape, attack or active resistance.
   - handcuffs may be used by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior, the court, or the prosecutor.
   - handcuffs are put on hands at the front (of a person). In case a person is aggressive or dangerous, handcuffs may be put on hands at the back (behind the person's back).
handcuffs shall be immediately removed after bringing the person to the official premises, as well as during interrogation, unless the person performing the interrogation decides otherwise.
handcuffs shall not be used in relation to persons under the age of 17, apart from minors over 15 suspected of committing a crime against life or health.
straitjackets, disabling belts or disabling nets may be used in relation to persons whose behaviour constitutes a danger for:
- human life or health,
- property, if human life, health or freedom is directly threatened at the same time - if using other means of direct coercion is not possible or have proved not effective,
7) straitjackets or disabling belts may be used in relation to persons present in the official premises in case of:
- aggressive behaviour,
- self-aggression,
- destruction of property
1) disabling net may also be used:
- in pursuit of a person, about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed a crime,
- in order to prevent escape of a detained or apprehended person.
2) Persons in relation to whom a straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net was used, should immediately be provided with medical rescue assistance within the meaning of the provisions on State Medical Emergency Service, if there are medical indications for such assistance;
3) A straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net shall be removed immediately if the reasons constituting the grounds for its use cease to exist, or upon the request of a physician;
4) An order to use a straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net is issued by local Border Guard authorities, a person authorised by this authority, or during their absence - the officer on duty (shift manager);
5) During performance of border surveillance tasks, especially patrols or escorting, the order to use the means mentioned in item 1 is issued by the immediate superior of the border guards who carry out the task.
2) Individual chemical incapacitating agents in the form of gas weapons and handheld gas throwers,
   individual chemical incapacitating agents may be used in case of:
   - defense against an attack,
   - countering active resistance,
   - pursuit of a person, about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed a crime,
   - prevention (counteraction) of escape by an apprehended or escorted person,
   - prevention (counteraction) of destruction of property.
   individual chemical incapacitating agents shall be used manually or thrown from firearms.
   individual chemical incapacitating agents should be used carefully, taking into consideration their properties that may constitute a danger to human life.
   The individual chemical incapacitating agents may be used in relation to a person by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.
3) **dogs**, 

A dog may be used in case of:  
- defense against an attack,  
- countering active resistance,  
- pursuit of a person attempting to cross the Polish state border without the required permission or about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed another crime,  
- prevention (counteraction) of an escape by an apprehended or escorted person.

A dog should have a muzzle on, with the exception of situations, when:  
- it is used in defense against an attack,  
- there is a grounded suspicion of a danger to human life or health during carrying out of the duties by the border guards.

A dog may be used by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

4) **service clubs**, 

A service club may be used in the case of:  
- defense against an attack,  
- countering active resistance,  
- prevention (counteraction) of destruction of property.

It is forbidden to:  
- hit with a handle of a service club,  
- use the service club in relation to persons who:  
  - use passive resistance, unless using physical force turned out ineffective,  
  - are handcuffed or in relation to whom a lead, a straightjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net have been used,  
- hit or push a person with a service club in the head, neck, abdomen or non-muscled or particularly vulnerable parts of the body, as well using service club for applying a blocking or lever hold on these parts of the body,  
- it is permissible to hit or push with a service club as well as use it for applying blocking or lever holds on all parts of the body in order to counteract a direct, unlawful attempt against the border guard's own or another person's life or health.

5) **non-penetrating bullets fired from firearms**,  

- non-penetrating bullets may only be bullets of rubber fired from smoothbore firearms, alarm or signal weapons.  
- non-penetrating bullets may be used in case of:  
  - countering a direct, unlawful attempt against human life or health or in a pursuit of a perpetrator of such an attempt,  
  - preventing from destruction of property, if human life, health of freedom is directly endangered at the same time,  
  - group disturbances against the public order.  
- non-penetrating bullets shall be used:
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- when shooting a warning shot into the air (in the above direction),
- when aiming at legs.

➢ the decision on the use of non-penetrating bullets is taken by:
  - competent local Border Guard authority mentioned in Article 5 item 1 of the Act, a person
    authorised by this authority, or during their absence - the officer on duty (shift manager),
  - in cases mentioned above in item 2 point 1 and 2 the border guard decides
    himself/herself or the order is given by his/her direct superior.

6) electric paralysers.

➢ Electric paralysers may be used in case all other means of direct coercion is impossible or proved
ineffective, in the following cases:
  - for disabling a person who refuses to follow an order to immediately drop a dangerous
    tool,
  - defense against an attack,
  - countering active resistance,
  - apprehending a person or direct pursuit after a person in relation to whom there is a
    suspicion that he/she committed a crime,
  - prevention (countering) of an escape by an apprehended or escorted person,
  - prevention (countering) of destruction of theft of property.

➢ An electric paralyser shall be used with due carefulness, taking into consideration its properties that
may constitute a danger to human life.

➢ The electric paralyser may be used in relation to a given person by a border guard on the basis of
his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

USE OF MEANS OF DIRECT COERCION MENTIONED ABOVE MAY NOT CAUSE EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON
THE MANDIBLE AND THE NECK, THE CHEST AND THE ABDOMINAL CAVITY, CAUSE DIFFICULTIES TO BREATHE OR
BLOCK BLOOD CIRCULATION.

7) Road spikes

➢ Road spikes or other obstacle allowing to stop a vehicle may be used by a uniformed border guard for
stopping a vehicle driven by a person, who did not stop regardless the appropriate signal (call), when:
  - there is a grounded suspicion that the person crossed the Polish state border without the
    required permission or committed another crime,
  - he or she transports a person suspected of committing a crime or transporting objects
derived from a crime.

➢ Road spikes shall not be used to stop two-wheeled vehicles. Use of road spikes or other obstacles
should be preceded by:
  - a sign imposing speed limit of:
    - 30 km/h - in built-up area,
    - 60 km/h, and then 30 km/h - outside built-up area,
  - a sign "stop - border control" ("stój - kontrola graniczną"),
  - a stop signal given by a uniformed border guard in a way understandable and visible for the
driver of the stopped vehicle.
- stopping the road traffic in both directions at the distance of no less than 100 m from the road spikes or other obstacle.
  - In case of blocking a road with a marked Border Guard vehicle, it is possible to refrain from stopping road traffic.
  - The order to use road spikes shall be issued by the superior who assigns the task. It might be used only upon an order of a direct superior of the border guards who carry out the task.

If, as the result of using a means of direct coercion, a person gets injured, and in result of using an individual chemical incapacitating agent, a serious irritation of mucous membranes occurs, the border guard shall:
  - immediately provide first aid to this person, as well as take steps to ensure medical emergency assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services,
  - immediately inform the direct superior of this incident.

Medical emergency assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services shall be always provided to a pregnant woman in relation to whom means of direct coercion were used.

If using a means of direct coercion resulted in a death of a person, the border guard shall secure the traces at the place of the incident and not allow third persons to access this location, as well as, as far as possible, establish the witnesses of the incident while the local Border Guard authorities shall immediately inform the direct superior and a prosecutor about the incident.

The fact of use of means of direct coercion shall be noted by the border guard in the service book and reported in writing to the superior. The report shall include:
  - the rank, name and surname of the border guard involved,
  - the time and place of use of means of direct coercion,
  - data of the person against whom the means of direct coercion were used,
  - particular reasons for use of means of direct coercion and type of means of direct coercion used,
  - description of the procedure preceding the use of means of direct coercion,
  - results of applying means of direct coercion,
  - if need be, description of the method of application of provisions of §§ 2 and 15,
  - other important circumstances of the incident,
  - data of the identified (established) witnesses of the incident,
  - signature of the border guard preparing the report.

The superior is always obliged to examine the grounds, conditions and methods of application of means of direct coercion by subordinate border guards.

4) Border checks.

(a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross border:

Members of the EBGs shall support PRG officers in examining the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

Members of the EBGs shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in
contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Any Gd’s practical activities shall be conducted under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border
guard.

(b) Define the tasks of the member of the ERGT while border checking of third country nationals:

- to assist at performing border checks in joint teams consisting of officer of Border guard services of
  the host MSs, special advisers and observers and share expertise on his/her specific subject
- to support the first and second line checks
- to profile passengers in order to detect irregular migrants and victims of cross-border crime
- to detect false/falsified documents and more kinds of cross-border criminality
- to detect stolen vehicles in cooperation with the competent authorities
- to share experience and exchange expertise with officers from the border guard service of the host
  MS.

(c) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP:

If any activity concerning body searches or evidence collection is necessary from the guest officer, it shall be
realized under strict supervision of a Polish border guard.

Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on
the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately
indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers Issued of 23.10.2009 on the manner and procedure of
exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

(d) Status assessment and procedure to be followed:

Members of the ERGT shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a
violation of the principle of non-refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in
contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Any Gd’s activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish
border guard.

As for the mechanisms applicable at the border for international protection seekers and unaccompanied
minors, they are as follows:

The Institutions responsible for reception of application for international protection at the border are
Commanders of Border Guards Posts. The Institution responsible for dealing with the application for refugee
status (issuing decisions on refugee status) is the Head of the Office for Foreigners.

As a general rule the decision on refugee status is issued within 6 months. If the application is manifestly
unfounded the decision is issued within 30 days.
If the applicant is to be located in the open reception centre he/she is obliged to report to the reception centre within 2 days as of submitting the application.

The authority admitting the application for granting the refugee status, submitted by an unaccompanied minor shall apply immediately to the custody court having jurisdiction over the place in which such minor stays, with an application to establish a custody to represent the minor in the proceeding for granting the refugee status and place the minor in care and educational centre.

In case the fact that the applicant is an unaccompanied minor is disclosed already during the proceeding, the Head of the Office for Foreigners shall submit the above mentioned application to the custody court.

The authority admitting the application shall bring an unaccompanied minor to professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situations, or care of an educational centre.

The unaccompanied minor shall stay in the professional, non-related with the child, foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situation or in care of an educational centre until the moment decision is given by the custodian court.

National legislation does not allow the detention of unaccompanied minors seeking a refugee status. Regular unaccompanied minors of age above 15 years staying illegally (not seeking a refugee status) may be placed in the detention centre. The unaccompanied minors placed in a detention centre are separated from the adults.

The placement of unaccompanied minor in detention centre however has the character of last resort measure because a general rule is to place such a person in care of an educational centre.

The minors may be located in detention centre with their families if there are grounds for detention. The minors are located only in detention centres with appropriate infrastructure and organisation to accommodate families with children. Such detention centres provide for the minors a possibility to attend school and realize a standard school programme appropriate for their age. Except for school programme, there are also special educational recreation and sport classes organised by professional pedagogues trained also in the area of multicultural education.

Applicable law:
Act on aliens of 12.12.2013
Act on granting protection to aliens on the territory of Poland of 13.06.2003
Code of Criminal Procedure
Code of Petty Offences

(e) Specific measures applicable to vulnerable persons:
Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

Applicable law
The 1951 Refugee Convention
Council Regulation No 343/2003 of 28.07.1951
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Act on aliens of 13.06.2003
Act on granting protection to aliens on the territory of Poland of 13.06.2003

Rules regulating consultation of national databases;

1. THE DATABASES THAT MAY BE CONSULTED
For practical reasons Polish national as well as European databases will be accessible only through the Polish Border Guard functionaries only in cases connected directly with ongoing service duties.

Procedure related to stamping;
Guest officers are not empowered to stamp any travel documents.

ROMANIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions
for the members of the EBGT pool

ARTICLE 35 (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION
"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate, carry out measures under the supervision of the officials of local staff, in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)
For border control, the police officers of the Romanian Border Police may patrol on foot and by service vehicles on temporary or private roads adjacent to the state border, bodies of water crossing the border or leading there, as well as shore paths, without the consent of the owner or administrator. In performing state border surveillance and ensuring the border regime, the police may use relevant technical, including electronic, devices and equipment for the purposes of detecting illegal border crossings, identifying objects, ensuring safety in border crossing points and combating cross-border crime.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT
The general tasks performed by the members of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook, are:
- survey and patrol the terrain in the operational area,
- ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
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- perform identity checks on persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- stop and bring to the nearest border guard’s station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators. Specific rules and instructions concerning border surveillance are provided by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 on the state border of Romania. Moreover, a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regulate internally the border surveillance related activities.

(c) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators, as each operational area has particularities. Specific rules and instructions concerning border surveillance are provided by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 on the state border of Romania. Moreover, tailored SOPs provide rules, restrictions and limitations that apply to each operational area.

(d) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

A police official in pursuit of a person who has committed or abetted a criminal offence specified in the Council Framework Decision JHA/584/2002 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States shall be permitted to proceed with the pursuit on the territory of another EU Member State, without previously requested authorisation in cases where the urgency of the matter prevented the official in question from notifying competent authorities prior to the entry on the territory of the other MS, or where the competent authorities of the other Member State were not present at the scene of the event to take over the pursuit. Cross-border pursuit may take place only across land borders. The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other MS of carrying out cross-border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location and the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Pursuit shall be terminated upon completion of the objective, when 1 hour has passed since the crossing of the state border of the country of location or upon the demand of the country of location.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 and SOPs related to each procedure (internal regulations). Applicable legislation, instructions and relevant information will be provide during the briefing.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards’ station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Persons who have not been permitted to cross the border or have illegally crossed the external border shall be detained and returned into the state from or through which they arrived, taking account of the specifications provided for in the Citizen of the European Union Act. Expulsion shall be completed within 48 hours from the
moment of detainment. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the offices of the police authorities, police detention houses or expulsion centres. Officials shall take fingerprints of persons apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of the border, if he or she is at least 14 years of age, and shall transmit the data collected upon the taking of the fingerprints for comparison to the Central Unit of EURADAC. Unaccompanied minors may be expelled if their custody is arranged and the protection of their rights and interests is ensured in the admitting country.

No person shall be returned or expelled to places where their lives or freedoms could be threatened. Collective expulsions are prohibited; each person is entitled to an individual decision on his or her expulsion.

(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Upon apprehension, all persons who crossed the border in an illegal manner shall be searched together with their personal effects, including vehicles. Each person shall be searched by an official of the same gender. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be seized and stored for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be logged in a register.

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards, rules and Instructions

Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape of the apprehended persons, while ensuring their safety of the apprehended person as well as that of the police officers. Coercive measures (physical force, use of deterring equipment, weapons or gas devices) may be used in circumstances described under 4 d). The use of force, including weapons, is only permitted when the apprehended person fails to obey the lawful orders of the migration official or offers resistance, or when there is good reason to believe that the person may escape or put in danger other persons or their own lives, after other measures have been exhausted. As a rule, force, including weapons, shall be used as a last resort, gradually and well justified.

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators.

As a rule, body searches and evidence collection shall be carried out only in presence and under coordination of local border guards. Belongings of searched persons, identity / travel documents as well as any type of evidence shall be logged in a register. Each person will be searched in full respect of dignity, by border guards of the same gender.

b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities

Members of the EBCs' shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc. Any procedures and measures shall be postponed until life and health care of intercepted persons are secured.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW: Government Emergency Ordinance no. 104/2001, consolidated version, articles 32 - 37. Detailed rules and restrictions as well as provisions of the relevant legislation will be provided during the briefing, by the local coordinators.
In initial reception centres as well as reception centres, asylum seekers shall be provided medical care, accommodation, food, toiletries, essential clothing, translation services, information regarding their rights and duties, transportation, etc.

c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
Members of the EBTG shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBTG shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

An apprehended person may not be expelled to a state to which expulsion may result in consequences specified in Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the application of death penalty. The following circumstances shall be taken into account in determining a safe country of origin: to what extent the country guarantees the protection of persons from persecution and abuse, the principle of prohibition of expulsion or return provided for in the Geneva Convention and a system of efficient legal protection instruments against the violation of said rights and freedoms, and whether or not the country has acceded and adheres to the main treaties concerning human rights.

d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons
Members of the EBTG shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women, victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
Applicable legislation, recommendations and relevant information will be provided during the briefing, by the local coordinators; non-refoulement principle fully applies for all irregular migrants requesting for any kind of protection.

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force
When using force, members of the EBTG shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

A police official may apply direct coercion (i.e. physical force, special equipment or a weapon) if the ensuring of the fulfilment of the obligation to counter a threat or eliminate a disturbance imposed on a person by an administrative act is not possible by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. Direct coercion is permitted to be applied without a prior binding administrative act if the issue of the administrative act is not possible due to the circumstances of the case. Binding means (handcuffs, shackles) may be used when the person has been deprived of liberty pursuant to law and there is reason to believe that he or she may attack another person, offer physical resistance to a police official or an assistant police official or damage a proprietary benefit of great value, escape or injure or kill himself or herself.
(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

➢ The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the ESBTs shall ensure that it will be done as a last resort, in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

➢ For countering a serious threat, the police may use a firearm if countering the threat by another measure of direct coercion is not possible or is not possible in a timely manner and with the consideration that in using a firearm, everything possible shall be done in order not to jeopardise another significant benefit.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

Officials from a competent authority of another Member State that is involved in police or customs activity under an international agreement or a legislative act of the European Union may carry firearms (handguns), gas weapons, cut-and-thrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons) or pneumatic weapons. Permissible special equipment includes handcuffs, shackles, binding means, service animals, etc.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

Direct coercive measures (i.e. the use of physical force, special equipment or service weapons) may be used if a threat or a disturbance cannot be countered by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. A verbal warning (legal summons) shall be issued before direct coercion is applied, in accordance with Government Emergency Ordinance no 104/2001, consolidated version, articles 32 to 37. An official from a competent authority of another Member State can use a firearm only in case there is a threat to his/her life or the life of another person. Firearms may not be used against a child, old persons or a woman bearing obvious signs of pregnancy. The use of a firearm in such cases is only allowed in order to prevent an armed attack or an attack from a group of persons or used as an impediment and also for disarming such persons.

(e) Define the Immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measures/weapons

If by the application of direct coercion a bodily injury is caused to a person, the police shall be required to guarantee first aid to the person at the first opportunity and, if necessary, call for emergency medical care.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers

Use of tracking dogs and dogs specialised for border surveillance is regulated by internal specific operating procedures. Detailed information will be provided during the operational briefings by the local coordinators.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:


5. Border checks
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(a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.
Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

(b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)
All applications for international protection (including asylum) logged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

(c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

(d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP
Detailed information, applicable legislation and limitations will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators. Applications for international protection received at the border are only logged by the Romanian border police. Applications and persons are handed over afterwards to Romanian Immigration General Inspectorate for Immigration for assessment and legal solution.

(e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
Members of the EBGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

- Detailed Information In accordance with Romanian legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators.
(f) **Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**
Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

(g) **Rules regulating consultation of national databases**
National databases are being administrated by national Romanian authorities and queried based on an username and password subject to national information security protocol. The GOs have access to the information managed in those databases only via the Romanian officers and solely for law enforcement purposes related to their assignment. Further practical information will be provided by local coordinators during the briefing.

(h) **Procedure related to stamping**
Under the State Borders Act, a police official shall affix, according to the Schengen Borders Code, on the travel document of a third-country national a stamp authorising crossing of the border if such national has been granted authorisation to cross the external border (See Article 10 of Regulation 2007/2004). During JOs hosted by Romania only Romanian border guards are authorized to use entry/exit stamps. GOs can support and may share their expertise for all necessary clarifications.

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**RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:**
Applicable legislation and relevant information will be provided during the operational briefings, by the local coordinators.

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**SLOVAKIA**

**Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT**

**ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION**

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1 Border surveillance

(a) **Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc.)**

- Patrolling on foot, by service boats or patrol cars in order to prevent, detect and deter unlawful external land border crossing of persons or vehicles and prevent the illegal traffic of goods across
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- external land border outside border crossing points or at border crossing points outside its opening hours. Patrolling can be enhanced by service dogs or technical means.
- Executing checks on persons and vehicles in the borderland territory of the external land borders in order to detect cross-border crimes.
- Conducting covert observations on individual sections.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT
In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:
- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally.

(f) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method
Specific tasks/Instructions for each patrol and the methods of its implementation in the operational area are communicated to the officers at the briefing prior to each service based on risk-analysis conclusions and current situation in the operational area.

(g) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what conditions is entitled to access)
EBGTs officers shall realise any service activity under the supervision of the local staff.

(h) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit
General rules for pursuit are indicated in the Art. 41 of the Schengen Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement. According Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic with Hungary and Poland cross border pursuit may take place only across the land borders. Policeman in hot pursuit in the territory of another Member State shall demonstrate membership to the Police Force, which should be evident (uniform, reflex tape with Police sign, tactical vest etc.). The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other Member State of carrying out cross border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location, the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Policeman stop hot pursuit if requested by the Member State in whose territory the pursuit is carried out.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts
2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards’ station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons
(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot
(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

EJGTs officers activities concerning above mentioned shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a local officer.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 301/2005 Coll. - Criminal Procedure

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

A person who undergoes security body search shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EJGTs officers shall, when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
Members of the EBGTs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS in cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

d) **Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**
Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

4. Use of force/weapons

a) **Define the principles on the use of force**
When using force, members of the EBGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

The members of EBGTs are rightful to use as coercive means hand hold, grab, hit and kicks of self-defence, means for removing defiance or avert an attack, handcuffs, a police dog, arresting belt and other means for stopping a vehicle by force, strike by a firearm, threat by a firearm, warning shot in the air and a weapon.

b) **Define the principles on the use of weapons**
The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resort of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable, the members of the EBGT shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the least possible injuries.

According to the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. regulating Police Force a police officer is authorised to use a weapon only:

- in necessary self-defence and extreme necessity,
- if a dangerous perpetrator, against whom the police officer is taking an action, after having been challenged, does not give up or hesitates to leave his/her hideaway,
- if the resistance, which is about to hamper his service action, cannot be suppressed by any other means,
- in order to prevent escape of a dangerous perpetrator who cannot be stopped by any other means, a person having been challenged by the use of a weapon or a warning shot in the air does not observe the police officer’s instructions aimed at ensuring his or another person’s safety,
- if there is no other possibility to stop a vehicle whose driver after a repeated challenge or a sign given in accordance with special regulations does not stop and by his/her careless driving seriously endangers life and health of other persons,
- in order to avert a dangerous attack which threatens guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden, and after an unsuccessful challenge to stop the attack,
- to make harmless an animal threatening life or health of people,
to stop a vehicle within the area of state border when its driver after a repeated challenge or a sign given in accordance with special regulations does not stop.

Before using a weapon, a police officer is obliged to challenge the person he is taking action against to desist from unlawful conduct, and to warn this person that a weapon will be used. Before using a firearm the police officer is obliged to fire a warning shot in the air. A police officer can refrain from a challenge and a warning shot in the air only if he is personally attacked, or the life or health of another person is endangered, or the matter cannot be delayed. While using a weapon, the police officer is obliged to be cautious, primarily not endanger the life of other persons and to protect the life of person, who is the object of intervention.

According Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic § 24 - Extreme Necessity is:

1. An act that is otherwise a criminal offence through which someone averts a danger directly threatening an interest protected by this Code is not a criminal offence.
2. It shall not be regarded as a matter of extreme necessity if, in the given circumstances, the danger directly threatening an interest protected under this Code, could have been averted otherwise, or the resulting consequence is clearly more serious than the one which was threatened. It shall not be regarded as extreme necessity too, if the person directly threatened by this danger, was under an obligation to tolerate this danger under national law.

According Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic § 25 Necessary Self defence is:

1. A criminal act punishable otherwise, through which someone averts a directly threatening or continuing attack on an interest protected by this Code is not a crime.
2. Necessary self-defence is not involved, if the defence was evidently disproportionate to the manner of the attack, primarily concerning form, place and time, circumstances relating to attacker or to defender.
3. A person averting the attack by the way stated in paragraph 2, due to extreme disturbance caused by attack, particularly because of a confusion, fear or fright, is excluded for a criminal responsibility.
4. If someone - considering the circumstances of case - mistakenly believes, that there is an imminent threat of attack, criminal responsibility is not excluded for a criminal act committed negligently, if the mistake resides in negligence.

c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

PISTOLS:
Different types of pistols defined as short fire arms, exclusively used type of ammunition 9 x 19 mm LUGER (e.g. CZ 75 and 85, GLOCK 17 and 19, Sig Sauer Z26, etc.)

SHOTGUN:
Calibre 12 mm - Winchester 1300 Defender, Benelli M3T, Benelli NOVA

SIGNAL PISTOL:
Calibre 26.5 mm - model 44, model 44/47, model 44/81

Automated machine guns are inhibited and the EBGTs officers are not rightful to use weapons of mass effectiveness on the territory of the Slovak Republic.
d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/ weapons (warnings, targets, etc.)

Coercive Means

Before coercive means can be used, the police officer is obliged to challenge the person he is acting against to stop the unlawful conduct, and warn him/her that one of the coercive means will be applied. The police officer can omit the challenge or warning only if he himself has been attacked, or the life and health of another person is endangered and the matter cannot be delayed, or if permitted by other circumstances.

The choice of a coercive means to be used is decided by the police officer with respect to actual situation so that the purpose of the intervention could be attained, and the coercive means and intensity of their application are not clearly inadequate to the dangerousness of the attack.

Use of Hand Holds, Grabs, Hits, Kicks of Self-defence and means to remove Defiance or avert an Attack

A police officer is authorised to use handholds, grabs, hits and kicks of self-defence and other means to overcome resistance and avert an attack in order to:

- safeguard his or another person's protection against an attack if after a challenge the attack does not stop, there is an immediate threat of an attack, the attack continues or by all symptoms is likely to continue,
- prevent a disturbance, flight, deliberate damage of property or otherwise rowdy conduct whereby the public peace is breached,
- bring in, detain, arrest or put in custody or convey to prison a person, who actively resists,
- prevent coercive entry of unauthorised persons into guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden.

A police officer is authorised to use handholds and grabs to bring in, detain or arrest a person passively resisting or resisting the taking of identification marks according.

Use of Handcuffs and Binding Belt

A police officer is authorised to use handcuffs

- to handcuff a person being brought in, caught, detained or arrested, or a person who should be conveyed to prison or put in custody and who actively resists or attacks other persons or a police officer, damages property even after an unsuccessful challenge to refrain from such conduct,
- to handcuff together two or more persons being brought in, caught, detained or arrested under the conditions referred to in Paragraph a) herein,
- while carrying actions or procedures regarding the persons brought in, detained, caught or arrested, or the persons in lawful custody or deprived of liberty in prison if there is a well-grounded suspicion that they will attempt to escape,
- while performing police escorts of foreigners through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the state border of the neighbouring country.
A police officer is authorised to use the binding belt, if there is a suspicion that the use of handcuffs could be ineffective.

e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapon
A police officer is obliged to report immediately to his superior officer each service action where he used coercive means. As soon as the police officer discovers that having used coercive means a person was injured, he is obliged, if circumstance allow, to give the injured person first aid and ensure his/her medical treatment.

If any doubts arise with regard to righteousness or adequacy of the use of coercive means, or if their use resulted in death, detriment to health or damage to property, the superior officer is obliged to ascertain that they were used in accordance with the law. He shall submit an official record on his findings.

If a police officer has used coercive means in an area other than his operational task force, he shall report its use at the nearest division of the Police Force.

f) Special rules to dog handlers
Use of a Police Dog
A police officer is authorised to use a police dog in order to

- ensure his own or another person’s safety if after a challenge the attack has not ceased, there is an immediate threat of an attack, it continues or by all symptoms is likely to continue;
- prevent a disturbance, fight, deliberate damage of property or otherwise rowdy conduct whereby the public peace is breached;
- prevent forcible entry of unauthorised persons into guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden;
- pursue a person on the run, who is to be detained, arrested or put in lawful custody or conveyed to prison,
- force a hiding person to leave his/her hideaway who is to be detained, arrested or put in lawful custody or conveyed to prison,
- guard a person brought in, detained, caught or arrested who is to be put in lawful custody or conveyed into prison,
- pursue a person who near the state border has not stopped when challenged, and tries to escape and cannot be stopped in another way,
- ensure his/her own safety or other person while performing the police escorts of foreigners through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the state border of a neighbouring country.

A police officer uses a muzzled dog. If required by the nature and intensity of an attack, or in order to overcome a person’s resistance or character of carrying action, he can use a police dog without a muzzle guard.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.190/2003 Coll. on Firearms and Ammunition
Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.300/2005 Coll. Criminal Code
5. Border checks

i) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

All travelers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable International, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

j) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

k) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)


l) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

A person who undergoes security body search shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

m) Status assessment and procedure to be followed
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Members of the EBGTs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulment. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if he/she is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

n) **Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons**

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

a) **Rules regulating consultation of national databases**

Direct access to the national systems of evidences, or to the national systems of searches of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic is not enabled for EBGTs officers. They may consult the national databases of the Slovak Republic - in accordance with the Act on personal data protection and other relevant legal provisions - only together with a member of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic.

p) **Procedure related to stamping**

Members of EBGTs are not empowered to stamp any travel documents.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.122/2013 Coll. on the protection of personal data and on amendments to certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 301/2005 Coll. Criminal Procedure

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force
ANNEX 7 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

REMARK:

Additional resources can be requested for flexible deployments within the whole extent of operational areas based on the operational situation.

Any changes related to deployments of the resources in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated Deployment Overview will be available upon request during implementation phase. The final list of deployed resources will be available in Frontex Evaluation Report (FER).
ANNEX 8 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

Operational briefing

The Operational Briefing is composed of 2 parts:

- General briefing - delivered by Frontex
- National briefing - provided by National Briefers assigned by the host MS

The General Briefing is delivered by Frontex twice per year for all members of the teams deployed within the JO, while national briefing is delivered by local authorities during the first day of deployment of the member of the teams.

General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General Briefing is delivered by Frontex twice per year for all members of the teams deployed within the JO:

- The first one for the members of the teams deployed in the period 1 February - 19 July 2017, and the second one for members of the teams deployed in the period 19 July - 31 December 2017.
- Prior to the General Briefing, invitation letter will be sent by Frontex, indicating the exact date and place of the meeting.
- All presentations of the General Briefing will be uploaded on FOSS by OT.

Standard plan of the General Briefing:

- Legal framework of Frontex (including role, tasks and current structure of Frontex)
- Legal framework of the joint operation
- Fundamental rights in Frontex activities
- Code of Conduct
- Description and assessment of the situation in the area (if applicable, also specific cross-border crimes like THB, etc.)
- Operational concept, aim and objectives
- Information on Implementation (period, briefing/debriefing, operational areas, participation) of the relevant operational activity
- Main aspects of the Rules of Engagement
- Cooperation with third countries, other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations in the operational area (if applicable)
- The tasks of participants
- Command, control, communications, contact details of Frontex staff
- JGRA, FOSS
- Reporting (incidents, SIR, reports of participants and Frontex, etc)
- Information flow including the information to be exchanged with other EU entities and international organizations
- Press communication rules
- Evaluation (reports)
- Organizational arrangements and logistics
National briefing delivered by Host MS

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS during the first day of deployment of the member of the teams, based on the deployment overviews provided on FOSS by the OT.

During the National part of Operational Briefing all participants should be introduced to the following topics taking into consideration the Common Briefing Pack, in particular:

- Introduction to the national and local border authorities, border management, operational area, organizational structure and responsibilities (incl. tasks, responsibility areas on map, main statistics, etc.) including local coordinators and other local staff, contact persons; advice on practical arrangements in the area of accommodation
- Introduction to the national authorities responsible to deal with vulnerable groups / people seeking International Protection
- Presentation of duty plan/working schedule for the deployment
- National legislation related to the border management for powers and obligations of the member of the teams and instructions (supported by a possible demonstration) for use of force including use of weapons.
- Introduction to responsibilities and tasks of BCP, technological procedures for border control, access to information on national databases
- Working conditions and facilities in the specific operational area
- Transportation/storage/carry of weapons/special technical equipment
- All needed contact details (local contact persons, ICC/R/LCC/FP, contacts of experts currently deployed)
- Logistical information on heavy equipment or spare parts delivery (applicable for crews only).

The National briefers shall be nominated by Home MSs. The National briefers/or FP Local Coordinators are responsible for carrying out National briefings, taking under consideration the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by TRU.

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;

Operational debriefing

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by Local Authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be as part of Operational debriefing.

Operational debriefing should consist of at least the following topics:

- Brief assessment of the deployment period in operation by the participants and observers on:
  - the cooperation with the local authorities and Frontex
  - the quality of the received information from the local authorities and Frontex related to task executing
- Brief feedback of the performance by the host MS representative
- Questions/answers session

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ANNEX 9 - COORDINATION STRUCTURE (TASKS AND ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS)

1.6. Member States

1.6.1. International Coordination Centre (ICC)

The ICC shall be located in the premises ensuring the most efficient coordination of the joint operation taking into account all the integrated activities. Careful consideration of the location should be taken where more than one MS are hosting the joint operation.

The operation shall be coordinated from the ICC and be accessible for the Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC), National Officials (NO) and other operational actors on a 24/7 basis.

The ICC shall meet the minimum requirement providing the capability for the ICC to communicate and coordinate the LCCs, assets and experts deployed. The ICC staff consists of an ICC Coordinator and duty officers. The Host MS has to ensure the participation of English speaking staff in the ICC in order to ensure communication with the participants of JO and Frontex staff.

The ICC shall:

- Lead and coordinate the implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Coordinate, based on a daily threat and risk assessment, the deployment of human and technical resources at the right time and locations;
- Gather, combine and share information and intelligence about all border related incidents;
- Plan an intelligence driven tactical and/or strategic synchronization of available human and technical resources;
- Ensure communication and cooperation between the participants JO;
- Administer the patrolling schedule database: plan patrolling activities and working hours for deployed staff, and record planned and delivered activities;
- Elaborate the daily reports with situational updates from the operational area;
- Follow up and report the cases which need immediate attention, further reporting and handling;
- Coordinate and facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area.

Frontex requirements for the ICC:

- Ensure a 24/7 functioning to achieve the situational awareness and proper coordination of the ongoing operation;
- Be manned by duty officers/operators, be equipped with necessary technical and administrative staff of the host national authorities involved on a 24/7 basis unless otherwise agreed between Frontex and the host MS;
- Have staff with operational experience and sufficient skills in English designated for each working shift to supervise, perform and support the coordination of the operational activities;
- Ensure telecommunication between the ICC and all participants of JO and Frontex;
- Ensure the radio communication between the ICC and all deployed assets;
- Ensure access to the Internet and printer for the staff in the ICC;
- Ensure the daily delivery of the Daily Reporting Package to Frontex.

1.6.2. ICC Coordinator

The ICC Coordinator is an officer assigned by the respective national authority of the host MS. He/she is responsible for leading and coordinating the daily operational activities and fulfillment of the tasks of the ICC throughout the joint operation in the whole operational area. The ICC Coordinator is the chairman of the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).
To ensure the continuous presence of the ICC Coordinator, he/she shall be deputized by an assigned officer who shall take over the responsibilities and tasks during his/her absence.

The ICC Coordinator shall:

- Lead the coordinated implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Initiate and present adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures to Frontex, when it is justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by operational needs;
- Chair the JCB meetings on a daily basis throughout the joint operation;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Ensure the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (collection of all reports and Daily Reporting Package dissemination);
- Monitor the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further developments regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Work closely and continuously with the NO and the FDC;
- Coordinate and facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area.

1.6.3. Joint Coordinating Board (JCB)

The JCB runs the operation and is established within the ICC. The JCB is composed at least of the ICC Coordinator, the NO and the FOC. Other relevant Frontex staff may take part in the JCB meetings via videoconference.

The JCB carries out meetings on a daily basis (unless otherwise agreed and properly justified), chaired by the ICC Coordinator.

1.6.4. National Official (NO)

The MS deploying their aerial assets to the operational area shall appoint and deploy the NO in the ICC for the period the assets are deployed. As it is already stated under the chapter 3.2.1.2. Terrestrial assets, there is no need for the NO to accompany the deployed Dog Teams, TVW, Patrol Cars or other light TL; nevertheless, it might be accepted if justified based on the operational needs and approved by the Operational Manager.

The NO is responsible for coordinating the actions of his/her respective national asset according to the national legislation in close cooperation with the ICC Coordinator.

The NO shall:

- Contribute to the proper implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Contribute to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by operational needs;
- Take part and contribute to the JCB meetings on a daily basis;
- Ensure that the decisions of the JCB are followed by the asset for which he/she has the coordination responsibility;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further development regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Contribute to the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (deliver Technical Equipment Mission Report, contribute to the incidents reporting, Patrolling Schedule, etc.);
- Work closely and continuously with his/her operational entity to ensure an efficient operational management of the assets according to updated risk assessment and operational needs.
1.6.5. Team Members and Officers of the host MS

The Team Members shall have the capacity, under instructions from, and, as a general rule, in presence of the Host MS officers to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks and/or border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code. The national border guard service of the host MS and first of all the local staff has the leading role in the implementation of the joint operation. The experts from home MS support the local staff and based on their mandate carry out measures in line and agreed with the officers of the host MS.

The Team Members shall actively contribute to their full integration with the host MS local staff in shifts/teams and work with them in mutual trust.

1.6.6. Interpreters/Cultural Mediators

Frontex and the host MS would consider the need to deploy interpreters/cultural mediators. The interpreters will be part of the JDT or screening teams and will provide linguistic support to the local authorities and experts in order to enhance the debriefing/screening as well as increase the quality of information gathered. The interpreters/cultural mediators should be fluent in languages spoken by migrants.

1.6.7. Local Coordination Centre (LCC)

The host MS in cooperation with Frontex may establish LCC for the coordination of activities at the local level.

The LCC shall operate on a 24/7 basis, providing in real time an operational picture in order to coordinate the human resources and technical means deployed in the JO. The LCC shall meet the minimum requirement providing the capability to communicate and coordinate the resources deployed. The LCC’s staff consists of personnel of the respective national authority of the host MS. LCC will operate under the coordination of the ICC, thus both being in permanent contact.

The LCC shall:

- Lead and coordinate the implementation of the operational activity in the area of responsibility as described in the Operational Plan;
- Plan an intelligence driven tactical and/or strategic synchronization of available technical and human resources in the area of responsibility;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promotion of further developments regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Facilitate the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (contribute to the Daily Reporting Package);
- Ensure communication and cooperation between the participants of the JO;
- Ensure the daily LCC reporting from the area of responsibility;
- Coordinate and facilitate the cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and International organizations implementing activities in the operational area on local level.

1.6.8. LCC Coordinator

The LCC Coordinator is a nominated officer of the respective national authority of the host MS. The LCC Coordinator is responsible for leading the daily operational activities in the area of responsibility in close cooperation with and under coordination of the ICC Coordinator throughout the Joint operation.

To ensure the continuous presence of the LCC Coordinator he/she shall be deputized by an assigned officer who shall take over the responsibilities and tasks during his/her absence.

The LCC Coordinator shall:

- Lead the proper implementation of the Joint operation in the area of responsibility as described in the Operational Plan;
Ensure that the decisions of the JCS and the ICC Coordinator are followed in the area of responsibility;
Contribute to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by the risk assessment and/or operational needs;
Contribute to the proper implementation of information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
Chair the operational meetings in the LCC;
Monitor the operational situation in the area of responsibility to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further developments of the organizational and operational issues;
Provide the ICC with the incident reports on situational updates from the operational area;
Work closely and continuously with the deployed resources in the area of responsibility and the;
Follow instructions of the ICC;
Coordinate and facilitate the cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations implementing activities in the operational area on local level.

1.6.9. Focal Point (FP)
Host MS in cooperation with Frontex may establish FP for coordinating operational activities at specific BCPs and/or surveillance areas. According to the developed operational needs of certain MSs an additional profile (incl. green border) might be established in order to monitor illegal migration in the focused border area.

1.6.10. FP Local Coordinator
Host MS of FP shall nominate a FP Local Coordinator who will lead, coordinate and ensure the implementation of the operational activities in accordance with the Operational Plan as well as assist the resources deployed in the joint operation. FP Local Coordinator is responsible for the reporting to LCC.

1.6.11. Coordination Point (CP)
Coordination Points are established at the Border Crossing Points between Third Countries and deployed EU experts act as observers at Coordination Points.

1.6.12. CP Local Coordinator
Host Third Country of CP shall nominate a CP Local Coordinator who will lead, coordinate and ensure the implementation of the operational activities in accordance with the Operational Plan as well as assist the resources deployed in the joint operation. CP Local Coordinator shall:

- Cooperate closely with EU experts;
- Be familiar with the Operational Plan and especially the tasks assigned;
- Support the participants in carrying out their tasks with practical contribution;
- Actively contribute to the full integration of deployed experts in shifts/teams and work with them in mutual trust;
- The CP local coordinators, together with the EU expert are liable for reporting the incidents detected to FSC and OT and they are also acting as contact points for FSC duty officer;
- CP Local coordinators actively contribute to briefing and debriefing meetings with deployed EU experts;
- They are to support the analysis of the situation in the implementation area by providing additional information when the case or upon request by OT.

1.6.13. Liaison Officer (LO)
The different authorities of host MS and/or home MS may appoint and deploy a LO in the ICC and LCC if established, to facilitate the cooperation between different components from the involved authorities of host and/or home MS ensuring an effective implementation of the operational activities.

1.6.14. Intelligence officer
The IO shall be nominated by the host MS authorities and deployed to the ICC/RCC or to the LCC if required. The IO shall be tasked to act, on a full time basis, as a daily connection between the local authorities and the ICC/LCC in gathering and sharing relevant operational information and intelligence. The IO cooperates with the ICC/LCC Coordinators, the Frontex Operational Analyst (OA), the FOC and FLO on a daily basis.
The role of the IO is to support data collection and intelligence gathering activities in close cooperation with the Operational Analyst, providing the interviewing experts and the Operational Analyst with constant updates on modus operandi, routes and the involvement of facilitators and any other relevant information available at
national level. In the case of unexpected migratory events and new trends or modus operandi, the OA might request the IO to draft special intelligence reports. The IO should support the coordination of the activities of the Joint Debriefing Teams in close cooperation with the OA, the FLO Intel Component, the ICC Coordinator and the Operational Team. The IO shall also attend and take an active role in the meetings of JCB, especially concerning information that might be operationally valuable for the redeployment of deployed resources.

Intelligence units of the national authorities of the host MS should cooperate closely with the IO including the establishment of a network of contact points in order to ensure a constant and adequate flow of information related to the Frontex coordinated operational activities for further analytical assessments.

The IO shall:

- Contribute to the proper implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan in particular to the information gathering/intelligence aspects of the JO;
- In close cooperation with the OA, contribute with facilitating exchange of information, to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedure when it is justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by the operational needs;
- Take part and contribute to the JCB especially concerning information that might be operationally valuable for the redeployment of human and technical resources;
- Be a constant link between the deployed experts and the ICC to facilitate their activities by providing them with regular updates on modus operandi, routes, involvement of facilitators and feedback on the output of interviews, in close cooperation with the FLO, in accordance with the analytical assessments prepared by the OA;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation of the operational activities and promote the further development regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Contribute, along with Frontex, to the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (deliver the IO Daily Report, interview/debriefing/screening reports collected from experts, contribute with the complementary information to the Incident Reports and Daily Statistical Reports);
- Work closely with the OA and the FLO, the ICC Coordinator, the NO as well as the FC, for intelligence matters;
- Communicate with the representatives of other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area based on the need to know principle and applicable legislation.

1.6.15. Local staff of the host MS

The experts/assets deployed will be supported by the local staff of different authorities of the host MS during their deployments.

The national authorities of the host MS, have the leading role in the implementation of the operational activities. The participants shall support and, based on their mandate, carry out measures in line and in agreement with the local staff.

The basic tasks of local staff are according to the relevant national law and internal regulations of the national authorities, but additionally they should:

- Cooperate closely and support the participants of the JO to carry out their tasks.
- Be familiar with the Operational Plan and the tasks assigned to the local level.

Based on the operational needs and an agreement between the host MS and Frontex, additional staff of different authorities of the host MS with specific skills and expertise could be deployed to the ICC, LCC or operational area in order to increase the operational capacity and support the participants of JO.
1.7. Frontex

1.7.1. Operational Manager and Operational Team

The Operational Team is composed of Operational Manager (OM) and Operational Team Members assigned for the management and coordination of the joint operation.

The OM is responsible for the joint operations acting as the Frontex representative for the defined activity. The OM will be supported by assigned specialized staff from the relevant Frontex units/sectors forming the Operational Team. The OM is responsible for distribution of tasks between the team members and their proper management, whereas the responsibility for the operation remains within the OM.

The OM shall:

- Coordinate the planning, implementation including reporting and evaluation of the operational activity;
- Prepare the relevant joint operation related documentation;
- Elaborate Frontex’ financial contribution to the defined activity and ensure that administrative and financial procedures are followed;
- Ensure the professional maintenance and an archiving system of the operational documentation in line with Frontex standards;
- Draft a proposal for the Operational Plan in accordance to the Standard Operational Procedure (SOP), in cooperation and agreement with the host MS and consultation with home MS, for the defined operational activity;
- Follow the latest developments of the operation, and propose/initiate the updates/amendments of the Operational Plan, if needed;
- Gather, store and analyse all information received from the different sources;
- Follow up the operational budget consumption and management of the available funds;
- Facilitate the cooperation with other units/sectors, the MS and third countries;
- Facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations taking part in the joint operational activities;
- Follow instructions received from line managers and keep them informed about the implementation of assigned tasks;

1.7.2. Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)

According to the Frontex Regulation, a Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) is nominated for the joint operation where members of the European Border Guard Teams will be deployed. The role of the FCO shall be to foster cooperation and coordination amongst host and home MS in close cooperation with the OM. The FCO shall ensure constructive presence during the joint operation when the operational need occurs to fulfill the obligations of the Frontex Regulation (Article 8g).

The nominated FCO, as the Frontex representative, should be able to provide the host and home MS with all the relevant information related to the Frontex co-financed activities in the framework of the JO. The FCO has to ensure that Frontex coordinating actions related to the implementation of the JO comply with the Operational Plan.

The FCO shall act on behalf of Frontex in all aspects of the deployment of the teams.

In particular, the FCO shall:

- Act as an interface between Frontex and the host MS;
- Act as an interface between Frontex and the members of the teams, providing assistance, on behalf of the Agency, on all issues relating to the conditions of their deployment;
- Monitor the correct implementation of the Operational Plan;
- Report to Frontex on all aspects of the deployment of the teams.

The FCO may be authorized by the ED to assist in resolving any disagreement on the execution of the Operational Plan and deployment of the teams.

While performing his/her duties, the FCO shall take instructions only from Frontex.
1.7.3. Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)
The FOC is permanently deployed throughout the joint operation in the ICC or at the location wherefrom the most efficient coordination can be accomplished.

The FOC shall:
- Monitor and facilitate the implementation of the operational activities as defined in the Operational Plan;
- Initiate adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or operational needs;
- Be present in the JCB meetings, monitor the work in the ICC and give adequate advice, particularly to the ICC Coordinator and the HO;
- Monitor the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further organizational and operational developments;
- Monitor and facilitate the information gathering, sharing and dissemination process as well as the functioning of the reporting system;
- Provide Frontex HQ with regular situation reports from the operational area and specific reports on cases which need immediate attention, further reporting and handling;
- Work closely with and be accessible for the ICC Coordinator;
- Work closely with, follow instructions from and be accessible for the OM and Frontex HQ.

1.7.4. Frontex Support Officer (FSO)
The FSO can, and/or FOC can be assisted by the FSO acting as the Frontex representative and deployed at the operational locations wherefrom the most efficient support can be accomplished on local level, to ensure the efficient implementation of the operational activities by supporting the ICC Coordinator, the deployed resources and promoting further developments.

The FSO shall:
- Support and monitor the proper implementation of the joint operation as described in the Operational Plan;
- Support and initiate adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures, when justified by updated risk assessment and/or by operational needs;
- Support the monitoring and facilitate the proper implementation of the information gathering, sharing and dissemination and the related reporting system;
- Provide FCO and/or FOC with daily reports/updates from the respective operational area;
- Work closely with and follow instructions from the FCO and/or FOC and the OM.

1.7.5. Operational Analyst (OA)
Frontex shall appoint at least one OA to assess constantly relevant information from all available sources and maintain close contacts with the FLO (if applicable) for the gathering of relevant information for risk analysis.
The OA shall produce regular analytical assessments related to the operational activities enabling a wider vision on the risks, threats and overall situation affecting the operational area, supporting decision making on proper operational responses both for the hosting authorities and Frontex.
In addition, the OA will contribute by providing analytical input to the preparation and the evaluation of the operation.
The OA will generate intelligence requirements for JDT for the gathering of tailored information from migrants.

The OA shall:
- Be responsible for the creation and update of the Incident Template in JORA related to the JO in question, including marking/unmarking the mandatory fields and draft the Specific Annex of the Operational Plan describing the indicators of the JORA Template;
- Provide guidelines and briefing for the reporting officers involved in JORA reporting and validating;
- Produce analytical assessments, on a weekly or and bi-weekly or and monthly and ad-hoc basis, of the given situation of the operational areas and beyond to be distributed to the Operational Team, and via the FOC to the ICC and home MS;
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- Provide feedback and guidelines to the JDT on the quality and content of the Interview/debriefing/screening reports and maintain regularly direct contacts with the JDT;
- Monitor the activities of JDTs in the operational area and make proposals for redeployment or changes in relation to the JDT activities when needed based on the operational situation;
- The OA and/or FLO Piraeus (if applicable) will brief and debrief the Debriefing Experts;
- Provide the FCO and/or FOC with the analytical support needed for the ongoing reporting;
- Give the OM, the FCO, the FOC and the ICC advice and/or proposals on the planning of operational activities in the predefined operational areas and recommend countermeasures to the authorities encouraging a dynamic approach to the situation;
- Contribute with analytical input through the Tactical Focused Assessment for the purposes of the drafting of the Operational Plan and to the Frontex Evaluation Report (FER) after the termination of the JO;
- Be constantly linked with and report to the OM, the FCO, the FOC, the FLO (if applicable) and the experts regarding intelligence matters.

1.7.6. Special Advisor for debriefing activities

Based on risk analysis and the operational needs a Debriefing Adviser may be deployed within the joint operation to support the local authorities and JDT in interviewing migrants with his specific knowledge on debriefing, migration and culture of source countries of migrants.

However, the competence of the Debriefing Advisors is limited by Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and (EC) 865/2007 to the support and assistance without any power to act on his/her own.

The ICC and Operational Teams shall be informed in advance of the deployment of the Debriefing Advisor concerning the time and place of deployment. At the end of each deployment the Operational Team should receive feedback on the activities carried out and on the main findings of his/her mission.

1.7.7. Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)

Detailed information on the roles, tasks, functioning of FSC and its related products (JORA, FOSS) is provided in this document and in the relevant Specific Annexes.

1.7.8. Situation monitoring - Information processing - reporting

The FSC:
- provides a constantly updated picture of the migration situation at the external borders of the EU, with a particular focus on security and irregular migration aspects, as near to real-time as possible;
- carries out situation monitoring;
- carries out validation of incidents reported in the frame of joint operations;
- maintains situational awareness;
- provides a first response in case of crisis or emergency situations that may occur during the Joint Operation;
- acts as the central point of contact for all operational information that have a direct impact on the Joint Operation;
- carries out operational media monitoring in open and in grey sources.

More specifically, the FSC is responsible for:
- providing reports showing the figures/data of the JO enriched with additional information from other sources, if available and applicable, the reports shall be uploaded to FOSS;
- collecting and disseminating information related to issues needing specific attention (Serious Incident Reports);
- collecting Document Alerts on fake/false documents and new modus operandi and uploading them to FOSS;
- monitoring the exchange of information and collecting experiences in order to provide improved services and products when appropriate;
- Establish communication with the representatives of other EU bodies and international organisations implementing activities in the operational area.
1.7.9. Senior Duty Officer (SDO) Service in FSC

As the central point of contact the FSC provides a 1/7 Senior Duty Officer Service between 08.00 and 20.00 CET.

Additionally, the FSC provides a 24/7 on call availability for emergency and crisis situations as well as for serious incidents reporting according to the Serious Incident Catalogue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSC Senior Duty Officer – Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.7.10. Deployed Support Officers to FSC

Officers from EU MS are deployed to support FSC as ‘FSC Support Officers’ in order to assist the SDOs in:
- validating and processing the reported incidents through JORA
- supporting FSC’s situation monitoring processes, through JORA/EuroSUR
- ensure information exchange in FOSS.

The responsibility for the FSC Support Officer remains with the FSC Senior Duty Officer and the Senior Incident Validator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSC Support Officer – Contact Information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landline</td>
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<td>Email</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1.7.11. FSC roles concerning Frontex One Stop Shop (FOSS)

In order to enrich situational awareness and share operational-related information during the JO, the FOSS (https://foiss.frontex.europa.eu) portal is used. More detailed information on FOSS is available under chapter 9 of this document, and in and in chapter 4 of the Handbook to the Operational Plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOSS Contact Information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landline</td>
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<td>Email</td>
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</table>

1.7.12. FSC roles and responsibilities concerning JORA

The Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) is a framework for operational information exchange, including an IT software system that provides Frontex and its internal and external stakeholders (Member States, other respective external stakeholder) with the capability of sending, verifying, retrieving, visualizing and, in general, managing operational-related data during the entire cycle of the operations coordinated by Frontex. The JORA system is constructed in modules with different capabilities and is continuously developed according to the operational reporting needs.

Detailed information on JORA is contained below (Chapter 11 of this document) and in the relevant Specific Annexes of the Operational Plan.

With reference to the incident reporting for this operation, the Incident Template guidelines shall be made available in FOSS (Operational Activity area).
1.7.13. Seconded members of the teams

Seconded Members of the Teams are border guards or other relevant staff from the Member States who are seconded to Frontex.

The seconded members of the team are selected by Frontex and will be considered as a Frontex contribution to the EBCG. The secondment of a seconded member of the team must not exceed twelve months and may not be shorter than three months.

1.7.14. Fundamental Rights Officer

During implementation of operational plan, the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) has the task to monitor compliance with fundamental rights in the Agency’s activities and as such contribute to the mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights, in accordance with Article 71 of the Regulation. FRO also contributes to operational briefings, debriefings and evaluations of the operations, providing recommendations, guidance during its implementation and separate observations to the Evaluation Reports. In addition FRO handles and decides on admissibility of complaints lodged against staff for potential breaches of fundamental rights during implementation of operational activities by persons directly affected by operational activities. Pursuant to the provisions of the Article 25(4) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, Frontex has the obligation upon consultation with the FRO to suspend or terminate its operational activity in case of serious or persistent violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations.
### ANNEX 10 - CONTACT DETAILS

#### 2.1. General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Address</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frontex (HQ)</td>
<td>Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:frontex@frontex.europa.eu">frontex@frontex.europa.eu</a></td>
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#### 2.2. Frontex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
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<th>Email address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Frontex</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Frontex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Team Member</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Ewa Moncure</td>
<td>Tel: +48 22 205 9635 Mob: +48 785 001 374</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ewa.moncure@frontex.europa.eu">ewa.moncure@frontex.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Officer</td>
<td>Izabella Cooper</td>
<td>Tel: +48 22 205 9535 Mob: +48 667 667 292</td>
<td><a href="mailto:izabella.cooper@frontex.europa.eu">izabella.cooper@frontex.europa.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Duty Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fundamental Rights Officer</td>
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*Commented [WU19]: The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.*

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
### 2.3. Host MS

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<td></td>
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<td>Budapest: Hungary: Teve str. 4-6, 1139</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Riga: Latvia: Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolfa Street 5,</td>
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<td>Riga: Latvia:</td>
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<td>Vilnius: Lithuania:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>02-514 Warszawa: Poland: KSG BWM NFPoC, Al. Niepodleglosci 100,</td>
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*Commented [WU20]: The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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<td>Bureau of Border and Alien Police Bratislava</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia:</td>
<td>Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolfa Street 5, Riga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway:</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Police HQ National Police Directorate Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania:</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC Coordinator</td>
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**Commented (WU223):** The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals, its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operations area. In particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategic advantage or element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
| Deputy ICC Coordinator | Bulgaria: Sofia | Croatia: Zagreb | Finland: Headquarters | Latvia: State Border Guard, Republic of Latvia Rudolfas Street 5, Riga | Poland: |
|------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|

**Commented (WU23):** The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. The operations were targeted at covering similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>LCC Coordinators</th>
<th>Romania: Bucharest</th>
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<td>Bulgaria:</td>
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**Commented [WU24]:** The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Fiscal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2001.
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Border and Alien Police Directorate</td>
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</table>
2.4. Other

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press officer of national authority (Host MS)</td>
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Commented [WU26]: The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harms the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals, its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategic element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
**ANNEX 11 - JORA**

### 3.1. JORA Actors

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<thead>
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<th>Role</th>
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<th>Entity</th>
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<th>Phone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Frontex</td>
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**Commented [WU28]:** The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
### JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 and on Border Checks

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**NOTE:** Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation.

**REMARK:** Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

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**Commented [WU29]:** The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abuse or misuse with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 41(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 41(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
3.2. JORA Reporting Structure

Commented [WU30]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JORI under Operational Plans 2017-2019. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategic and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
3.3. JORA Reporting Timeline

Commented [WU32]: The non-disclosed text contain detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials. The text contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied during border control activities which would jeopardise the implementation of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the First Indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
ANNEX 12 - WORKING CONDITIONS

REMARK: Any changes related to the description of working conditions in course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated information will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

NOTE: Full description (including logistical details) of each Focal Point will be uploaded to FOSS in a separate document.

4.1. Bulgaria

### 4.1.1. Focal Points

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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>General Contact Details</td>
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#### Focal Point Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Point</th>
<th>Number of lanes, entry</th>
<th>Number of lanes, exit</th>
<th>Local Coordinator-contact details</th>
<th>Focal Point Office equipment</th>
<th>Focal Point equipment</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Recommended airport and public transportation</th>
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The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCPs) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

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J0 Flexible Operational Activities 2017 and on Border Checks

### Field Code Changed

**Commented [WU34]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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**Commented [WU35]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCPs) activated within the Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

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### JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 land on Border Checks

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#### Address

#### GPS Coordinates

#### Altitude

#### Focal Point type

#### Number of lanes, entry

#### Number of lanes, exit

#### Local Coordinator contact details

#### Focal Point Office equipment

#### Focal Point equipment

#### Requirements

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#### Address

#### GPS Coordinates

#### Altitude

#### Focal Point type

#### Number of lanes, entry

#### Number of lanes, exit

#### Local Coordinator contact details

Commented [VU93B]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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### 4.3. Estonia

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4.3.2. **Focal Point Table**

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**Commented [WU440]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data. In particular, the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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### 4.4. Finland

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### Commented [NVU41]:

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<tr>
<th>Address</th>
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**Commented [WU42]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 41(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas at the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 41(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 41(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Requirements</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Recommended airport and public transportation</strong></td>
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</table>

| **Address**                                                |
| **GPS Coordinates**                                        |
| **Attitude**                                               |
| **Focal Point type**                                       |
| **Number of lanes**                                        |
| **Local Coordinator-contact details**                      |
| **Focal Point Office equipment**                           |
| **Focal Point equipment**                                  |
| **Requirements**                                           |
| **Recommended airport and public transportation**          |

**Commented (VINUA3):** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

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4.5. Greece

Useful Information

Address
GPS Coordinates
Altitude
Focal Point type
Number of lanes
Local Coordinator-contact details

Commented (WU44): The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 41(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. In particular, the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermines the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 41(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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**Commented [WU45]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and it is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the names and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorised border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 41(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardise their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorised border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 41(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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<td>Number of Lanes</td>
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**Additional Information**

* Members of the Team while performing their tasks could also utilize these technical means.
**JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 land on Border Checks**

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<td><strong>Focal Point Office equipment</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Focal Point equipment</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Requirements</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Recommended airport and public transportation</strong></td>
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* Members of the Team while performing their tasks could also utilize these technical means.

**Additional Information**

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Commented [WU/146]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data. In particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
**Commented [WU43]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals, its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCPs) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

* The Team Members while performing their tasks could also utilize these technical means.

**Additional Information**
4.6. Hungary

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<td>Traffic lanes on exit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommended airport and public transportation</td>
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Commentary: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCPs) activated within the Operational Plan 2017. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the names and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any secrecy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operational area. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardise their work and ham the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
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<tr>
<td>GPS Coordinates</td>
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<td>Local Coordinator-contact details</td>
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</table>

| Focal Point type |
| Traffic lanes on entry |
| Traffic lanes on exit |
| Focal Point Office equipment |

| Focal Point equipment* |
| Requirements |
| Recommended airport and public transportation |

Commented [WU49]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. In particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs. The result of this would only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance. Ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
### 4.7. Latvia

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**Focal Point Type**
- Traffic lanes on entry
- Traffic lanes on exit
- Focal Point Office equipment
- Focal Point equipment

**Recommended airport and public transportation**

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Commented [WU50]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to temper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) First Indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the First Indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
Commented [WUS1]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCPs) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Level. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the names and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated SCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 41(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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### 4.8. Lithuania

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Commented (WUS2): The non-disclosed text contains personal data. In particular, the names of individuals, its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area, in particular the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017 Land. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abuse and usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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### 4.9. Norway

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<td>General Contact Details</td>
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| Focal Point type |  |
| Number of lanes, entry |  |
| Number of lanes, exit |  |
| Local Coordinator-contact details |  |

| Focal Point Office equipment |  |
| Focal Point equipment |  |

| Requirements |  |

Recommended airport and public transportation

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Commented [WUS3]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. In particular, the Border Control Points (BCP) activated within JO Focal Points 2017/1. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the name and coordinates of the BCPs activated in previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing currently activated BCPs.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategic and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

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### 4.10. Poland

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**Commented [WU54]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals, its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Point type</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Focal Point Office equipment</td>
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<td>Focal Point equipment</td>
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**Requirements**

**Recommended airport and public transportation**

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**Address**

**GPS Coordinates**

**Local Coordinator contact details**

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**4.10.4. Focal Point Terespol**

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**Commented [WUSS]:** The non-disclosed text contains personal data. In particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 41(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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<td>Recommended airport and public transportation</td>
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4.11. Romania

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<table>
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JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 (land on Border Checks)

Focal Point Office equipment
Focal Point equipment
Requirements
Recommended airport and public transportation

Address
GPS Coordinates
Altitude
General Contact Details

Focal Point type
Number of lanes, entry
Number of lanes, exit
Local Coordinator-contact details

Focal Point Office equipment
Focal Point equipment
Requirements
Recommended airport and public transportation

4.12. Slovakia

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ANNEX 13 - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CUSTOMS COOPERATION CENTERS (PCCCs) AND THE FOCAL POINTS (FPs)

Description
The core idea of the product PCCCs (Police and Customs Cooperation Centers) involvement in Focal Points activities to be implemented under umbrella of JO Focal Points 2017 Land operation is to provide the Host MS local staff and team members deployed in Frontex coordinated joint operation Focal Points 2017 Land (at Border Crossing Points/Focal Points) with the possibility to check relevant information on persons and vehicles in the appointed Police Custom Cooperation Centers which will take part in the product for the purpose to render more efficient the border check procedure and decrease the response time.

Practically, this annex, Standard Operating Procedure for the Exchange of Information between Police and Customs Cooperation Centers and the Focal Points established under umbrella of the Joint Operation Focal Points 2017 Land has been prepared in order to describe the working procedures, the communications lines and the list of the designated PCCCs and FP has been prepared.

Legal Framework
The exchange of information, including personal data, between officers of the host Member State and/or the team members deployed in a Focal Point and the PCCC aims at enhance the operational cooperation between the Member States' national services responsible for border control and between Member States, as provided for in Articles 16 and 17 of the Schengen Borders Code.

Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement Article 39 requires that "The Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their police authorities shall, in compliance with national law and within the scope of their powers, assist each other for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offences, in so far as national law does not stipulate that the request has to be made and channelled via the judicial authorities and provided that the request or the implementation thereof does not involve the application of measures of constraint by the requested Contracting Party. Where the requested police authorities do not have the power to deal with a request, they shall forward it to the competent authorities."

Frontex supports and coordinates the activity under the framework of Joint Operations - Focal Points, pursuant to Article 2(1) (a) of its funding Regulation.

The exchange of information and international transmission of personal data as described in this annex shall be authorized by national legal framework of participating Member States and should assure that they are obtained by the officers involved.

Content of requests and replies
Requests from Focal Points may generally refer to information that is available in the PCCC by querying national databases. Therefore a list with the available national databases for each PCCC is attached to the annex.

According to national data protection restrictions, replies from the PCCC may be provided either as full information or on a limited hit / no-hit base. Such limitations shall be mentioned beforehand in the above mentioned list as well. National procedures are to be respected.

Reasons for requests
Requests from Focal Point may be submitted to PCCC only in urgent cases which are directly connected to the fulfillment of tasks that result from present border checks according to the Schengen Border Code.

**Request entitlement**

Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or team member on Focal Points can address urgent requests for information directly to the PCCC on behalf of the responsible authority from the host Member State.

**Channel**

For the submission of requests from the Focal Points to the PCCCs and vice versa, secure information channels have to be used. Therefore the Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or team members have to make use of the official communication infrastructure, e.g. office mailboxes, duty phone and fax machine available on the Focal Point.

The only common secure communication channel that is currently available on all Focal Points and in all PCCCs is the [redacted]. Other possible channels may also be used if they are considered as secure.

Individual national solutions do not provide the necessary common harmonized approach.

**Timeframe**

By using the request template, the Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or team member shall rate (urgent, hours) requests to PCCC according to their urgency, following the provisions of the Swedish initiative. The addressed PCCC shall provide the Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or team member with an answer as soon as possible, but at least within the requested time frame.

It is highly recommended that due to nature of Focal Points requests (persons/passengers are subjects of border checks at border crossing points), they are handled as a priority requests in PCCCs.

**Language**

The information exchange between Focal Points and the PCCCs shall generally be done in English by using the respective form.

**Request Template**

The request template shall meet some conditions:

- English
- Short, simple, concise;
- maximum 2 pages;
- mostly predefined text, checkboxes
- Footnote with reference to legal bases

For the sake of data protection issues, the form must contain the name and nationality of the requesting officer. This information is mandatory and should be kept available for further cross checks with the Frontex Focal Point deployment table.
### Focal Points (involved in the PCCC product)

**REMARK:** Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
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**List of PCCCs and available national databases**

**Remark:** Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

### Austria

**Contact Details**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCCC</th>
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<th>Phone number (office and mobile)</th>
<th>Email address</th>
<th>Location</th>
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**Contact Details**

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### Czech Republic

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### List of available national databases

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The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publication would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crimes such as facilitation of irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
Contact Details

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Lithuania
Contact Details

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Latvia

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The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, in the sense of Article 41(1a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 41(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officers. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in these activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 41(1a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 land on Border Checks

Contact Details

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<tr>
<th>PCCC</th>
<th>Contact Person(s)</th>
<th>(Office and mobile)</th>
<th>Phone number</th>
<th>Email address</th>
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List of available national databases

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Commented [WUB8]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter terrorist activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
### Poland

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### Portugal

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The non-disclosed text contains information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officers within the operation. Its disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the First Indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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**Romania**

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<th>Countries (location)</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>RO side details contact (only for checks in RO databases)</th>
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**Slovenia**

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JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 land on Border Checks

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Information Exchange Sheet

Commented (WU73): The non-disclosed text contain detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials. The text contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. It publicly would expose the working methods applied during border control activities which would jeopardize the implementation of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other trans-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 41(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.
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