

OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
LAND BORDERS SECTOR

Annexes of Operational Plan

**JO Flexible Operational Activities 2017 Land
on Border Surveillance
2017/LBS/01**

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ANNEX 1 - CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ALL PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN FRONTEX ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1 Objectives, scope and subject matter

1. The present Code of Conduct aims to promote professional values based on the principles of the rule of law and the respect of fundamental rights and to establish the ethical behaviour standards that guide all persons participating in Frontex activities.
2. In this regard it sets out principles and rules which guide the conduct of all persons participating in Frontex activities, namely, Frontex staff, officers of border guard services of a Member State and other staff performing any actions in a Frontex activity.

Article 2 Definitions

For the purpose of the present Code, the following definitions apply:

- a) The term "participant" refers to any person participating in a Frontex activity.
- b) The term "Frontex activity" means any activity coordinated or led by Frontex within the framework of its tasks as described in the Frontex Regulation, including Joint Operations, Pilot Projects, Joint Return Operations, and Trainings.
- c) The term "Frontex staff" refers to the staff to whom Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants apply and includes also seconded national experts.
- d) The term "law enforcement officers" includes border guards and/or other public officials deployed from a Member State, who enjoy the prerogatives of public authority.
- e) The term "Member State" also includes the Schengen Associated Countries. As regards Joint Return Operations, the terms "home and host Member States" are understood as referring to "participating and organising Member States" respectively.
- f) The term "discrimination" means any unfair treatment or arbitrary action or distinction based on a person's sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.
- g) The term "harassment" means any improper and unwelcome conduct that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offence or humiliation to another person. Harassment may take the form of words, gestures or actions which annoy, alarm, abuse, demean, intimidate, belittle, humiliate or embarrass another or which create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.


CHAPTER II PRINCIPLES

Article 3 Lawfulness

1. Participants in Frontex activities serve the public interest and shall comply with international law, European Union law, the national law of both home and host Member States and the present Code of Conduct.
2. They shall also meet the obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the Operational/Implementation Plan, or other similar agreed rules.

Article 4 Fundamental rights

Participants in Frontex activities shall:

- 
- a) promote and respect human dignity and the fundamental rights of every individual, regardless of their sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation;
 - b) promote compliance with the relevant international and European instruments regarding fundamental rights protection.

Article 5 **International protection**

Participants in Frontex activities shall:

- a) promote, in full compliance with the principle of non refoulement, that persons seeking international protection are recognised, receive adequate assistance, are informed, in an appropriate way, about their rights and relevant procedures and are referred to national authorities responsible for receiving their asylum requests;
- b) provide persons in their custody with proper access to health care;
- c) give special consideration to particularly vulnerable groups of people, including women, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, persons susceptible to exploitation and victims of exploitation or trafficking in human beings.

Article 6 **Performance of duties**

Participants in Frontex activities shall ensure that instructions, directives and required duties are carried out promptly and diligently.

Article 7 **Responsibility**

Participants in Frontex activities are primarily and individually responsible for their actions in their work.

Article 8 **Conflict of interests**

To perform their duties properly, participants in Frontex activities shall refrain from any activities which would undermine or compromise their independence and the appropriate performance of their duties.

Article 9 **Confidentiality**

- 1. Confidential or sensitive information in the possession of a participant in Frontex activities shall not be publicly disclosed, including in social media or environment, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require disclosure or disclosure has been appropriately authorised.
- 2. Participants shall not express themselves regarding Frontex activities in the media unless explicit authorisation is given, in accordance with the Operational Plan or other similar agreed rules.
- 3. Participants are bound by the obligation to behave with discretion regarding current, past, and planned or potential Frontex activities.

Article 10 **Behavioural Standards**

Participants in Frontex activities whether on or off duty shall:

- a) abstain from all behaviour likely to compromise the prestige and the nature of the public mission in which they are invested or to bring discredit upon their organisation or Frontex;
- b) act with fairness and impartiality in their dealings with the public and other participants in Frontex activities, treating all with courtesy and respect, avoiding all forms of victimisation or discrimination, bearing in mind the diverse nature of all people, including backgrounds, origin and/or rank;

- c) abstain from actions contrary to the public order;
- d) refrain from using vulgar, obscene or otherwise offensive speech or gestures that could be considered abusive towards other participants in Frontex activities or the public.

CHAPTER III

PROHIBITED CONDUCTS

Article 11

Abuse of authority

All improper use of a position of influence, power or authority is forbidden.

Article 12

Discrimination

All discriminatory behaviours as defined in Article 2 towards the public or other participants in Frontex activities are forbidden.

Article 13

Harassment

All forms of harassment as defined in Article 2 are forbidden.

Article 14

Corruption

1. The use of public position for illegitimate private gains as well as the acceptance of unjustified rewards for actions taken in Frontex activities is forbidden.
2. Consent to any form of corrupt activity is forbidden.

Article 15

Use of narcotics and drugs

The use or possession of narcotics and drugs, unless prescribed for medical reasons, is forbidden.

Article 16

Consumption of alcohol

1. The consumption of alcohol while on duty is forbidden.
2. The consumption of alcohol off duty shall be moderate, unless the Operational Plan or other similar agreed rules prohibit it.
3. A participant unexpectedly called out for duty is obliged, at no risk of discredit, to say that he/she has consumed alcohol and may not be fit for duty.
4. A participant shall not report for duty or appear in public in a state of intoxication.

Article 17

Sexual services

Using or soliciting any sexual services from any premises, whether public or private, is forbidden.

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

Article 18

Personal and professional behaviour

Given the prerogatives of authority, law enforcement officers have a particular responsibility to act with fairness and impartiality in their dealings with the public or other participants in Frontex activities, treating all with courtesy and respect.

Article 19
Use of force

1. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation, while performing their tasks law enforcement officers may only use force with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.
2. The use of force shall not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances, for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-defence or in legitimate defence of other persons.

Article 20
Use of weapons

1. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Frontex Regulation, while performing their tasks law enforcement officers enjoying guest officer status may only use weapons with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State.
2. The use of weapons is an exceptional measure and it shall not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances, for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-defence or in legitimate defence of other persons.

CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 21
Training

Participants in Frontex activities shall, previous to their engagement in Frontex activities, get acquainted with the content of the present Code through appropriate training provided by national authorities responsible for the deployment of the participants or by Frontex.

Article 22
Reporting

Participants in Frontex activities who have reason to believe that a violation of the present Code has occurred or is about to occur, are obliged to report the matter to Frontex via the appropriate channels.

Article 23
Sanctions

1. In the case of violation of the present Code by a Frontex staff member, the Executive Director will take adequate measures which may include the immediate removal of the Frontex staff member from the activity.
2. If the violation was committed by a person deployed by a Member State, the Executive Director may request the Member State to immediately remove the person concerned from the Frontex activity and expects that the relevant authority of the Member State will use its powers regarding the necessary disciplinary measures and, if applicable, to remove the person concerned from the respective pool for a defined period.
3. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 2, in a case of serious violation of the present Code, the competent authority will adopt immediate measures that may result in the removal of a participant from Frontex activity.

ANNEX 2 - COMPLAINTS MECHANISM

Background information

According to Article 72 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation², the Agency shall, in cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), take the necessary measures to set up a Complaints Mechanism to monitor and ensure the respect for fundamental rights in the operational areas where the activities of the Agency are implemented.

Article 16.3(m) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation mandates the Agency's to adopt in the Operational Plan the mechanism to receive and transmit to the Agency a complaint.

The procedures and instructions of the complaint mechanism defined in this annex apply in the operational areas in which Agency activity takes place: (i) joint operations, (ii) pilot projects, (iii) rapid border intervention, (iv) migration management support team deployment, (v) return operation, (vi) return intervention (vii) rapid return intervention (hereafter - Agency activities).

Complaints include personal data and therefore should be dealt with in confidentiality and not transmitted via any other channel than those specifically designated by the complaints mechanism and established in the rules and procedures that follow.

For more information on Complaints Mechanism please consult Frontex website: www.frontex.europa.eu

General information

Who can complain?

Any person who is directly affected by the actions of staff involved in Agency activity and who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions. The complaint may be presented by any party representing a person with the right to complain.

What is the subject of the complaint?

A concrete fundamental rights violation resulting from an action by participant in Agency activity.

Possible ways to present a complaint

A complaint must be made in writing and may be made on the official complaint form. Although the use of the complaint form is preferable, complaints can be submitted in any format, provided it is in writing.

The complainant has 4 possibilities to present a complaint:

- Using the official complaint form available in Frontex website www.frontex.europa.eu/complaints/
- Sending the complaint via email to complaints@frontex.europa.eu
- Sending the complaint by post:
*Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, Complaints
Frontex, Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland*
- Handing over the complaint where the activity takes place.

² Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.09.2016, p. 1).



Duty to inform

Agency staff and Team Members have the obligation to provide information about the complaints mechanism, including information on the complaint form, the privacy statement and relevant leaflets on procedures to any persons who expresses a wish to report an alleged fundamental rights violation against the staff involved in an Agency activity.

They shall also provide the information on the right to complain when a deployed officer in the Frontex coordinated activity, in the course of any activity (screening, debriefing, etc), indicates a potential violation of fundamental rights or a particular individual is identified as a potential victim of an alleged violation of fundamental rights or expresses in any way a complaint or an interest to lodge a complaint³.

Using the hard copy of the complaint form

The hard copy of the complaint form, privacy statement and leaflets are available and accessible to everyone wishing to file a complaint in the operational areas in places where such availability is feasible, namely the local coordination structures and premises where Frontex coordinated activities are taking place.

Persons who want to file a complaint using the hard copy of the form, will be granted the form, the privacy statement, leaflets on the procedures and an envelope with the addressee printed on it provided by Frontex.

The Complaint Form including the Privacy Statement are available in the Handbook and stored on FOSS.

³ Awareness material and specific training on the complaints mechanisms is planned to be developed during 2017 and will be regularly delivered in cooperation with the FRO

ANNEX 3 - THOUROUGH ASSESSMENT


1. Greek-Turkish border

From 1 January to 12 December 2016, a total of 2 622 irregular migrants were apprehended in the operational area of the Joint Operation FOA 2016 BCU (SE) at the Greek-Turkish land border section. This figure represents a decrease of 12% compared to the same period in 2015 when 2 993 migrants were apprehended.

One of the main factors which contributed to the decreasing number of irregular migrants apprehended in 2016 was the closure of the Western Balkan corridor at the beginning of 2016 which did not allow migrants who travelled illegally from Turkey via the land border to Greece to travel onwards via the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Serbia and further to Hungary or Croatia in order to reach their final destination in Western European Member States.

The [REDACTED]

Figure 1: Migrant apprehensions in Greece per BCU from 1 Jan to 12 Dec 2016 compared with 2015



Even though a slight decreasing trend concerning illegal border-crossings from Turkey to Greece via the land border was reported in 2016, data reported by the Turkish authorities during monthly bilateral meetings with Greek counterparts illustrate considerable migratory pressure on exit from Turkey to Greece. During the last bilateral meeting held on 15 Nov 2016, the Turkish authorities reported, so far in 2016, more than 24 600 migrant apprehensions in the Turkish [REDACTED], which covers the main

parts of the Greek and Bulgarian borders with Turkey; these migrants were attempting to exit Turkey illegally.

In addition, intelligence gathered during interviews indicate that the risk of undetected illegal border-crossings along the Greek Turkish land border remains high.

The majority of migrants have [REDACTED]

The main areas affected by illegal border-crossings during the first 11 months of 2016 were the [REDACTED] with 860 irregular migrant apprehensions, the [REDACTED] with 743 irregular migrant apprehensions, and the [REDACTED] with 480 irregular migrant apprehensions and the [REDACTED] with 318 irregular migrant apprehensions.

Commented [A1]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for development of risk analysis and, in turn, the Agency's operational decision-making. As risk analysis used by Frontex to conduct its operations is based on the information at issue, its disclosure would disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger.

The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as provided in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [A2]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, facilitating irregular migration and thus undermining the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)a of Regulation 1049/2001.


Commented [A3]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

The main nationalities apprehended in Greece between 1 Jan until 12 Dec 2016 were SYR (2 425), IRQ (270), AFG (94) and PAK (67).

In addition in the period between 1 Jan and 12 Dec, a total of 126 people smugglers involved in the people smuggling process were arrested by the Greek authorities. The main nationalities of people smugglers were GRC (35), BGR (26) and PAK (23). During the same period in 2015 the number of people smugglers arrested totalled 125 which represents a stable trend of arrested people smugglers in 2016.

In terms of the level of cooperation with the Turkish authorities, regular bilateral meetings between the Greek and Turkish authorities take place on a monthly basis with the exchange of relevant data and information for the purpose of assessing the latest situation related to irregular migration in Greece and in Turkey. Furthermore, in the event that the Greek authorities observe would-be migrants on Turkish territory, they can inform the Turkish authorities by telephone, sms text message or via e-mail.


Figure 2: Main nationalities apprehended in Greece from 1 Jan to 12 Dec 2016



2. Bulgarian-Turkish border

During the period under review, 1 Jan to 12 Dec 2016, 2 385 irregular migrants were apprehended attempting to cross the border illegally from Turkey to Bulgaria. The reported figure represents a decrease of 57% compared with the same period last year when the number of irregular migrant apprehensions was 5 529. Nevertheless, the high number of migrants detected on exit at the Bulgarian-Serbian border section suggest the likelihood of undetected illegal border-crossings at the Bulgarian-Turkish border section.

Figure 3: Irregular migrant apprehensions in Bulgaria per BCU from 1 Jan to 12 Dec 2016 compared with 2015



2016 from 1 Jan to 12 Dec, 92 people smugglers were arrested by the Bulgarian authorities, of which 84 were Bulgarian nationals.

In 2016, the [redacted] reported the highest number of migrant apprehensions with 1 274 in total. The [redacted] ranked second with 445 migrant apprehensions and the [redacted] third with 323 irregular migrants apprehended attempting to cross the land border illegally from Turkey to Bulgaria.

The main nationalities apprehended by the Bulgarian authorities after having crossed the border illegally from Turkey were AFG (832) followed by IRQ (812), SYR (433) and PAK (182). In addition in


Commented [A4]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

The decrease of migrant apprehensions at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border can be associated to the continuation of the Special Police Operation in Bulgaria which was implemented in November 2013. For the time being 301 additional staff, composed of Border Police and regular Police officers, are deployed at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border to assist regular deployed staff in carrying out border surveillance activities.

In addition

Typically, people smugglers

Figure 4: Main nationalities apprehended at the BGR-TUR border from 1 Jan to 12 Dec 2016




The main areas where people smugglers

The proportion of irregular migrants apprehended in the Bulgarian operational area applying for humanitarian protection immediately after apprehension remained high during the implementation of the JO in 2016. In these types of cases, irregular migrants are transferred to open asylum centres from where they can easily plan their further travel to other EU Member States.

Figure 5: Clandestine entries at the [redacted] from 1 Jan to 12 Dec 2016 compared with 2015

Since the beginning of the JO FOA 2016 BCU (SE) a total number of 843 irregular migrants have been apprehended by the authorities of the Bulgarian [redacted]

[redacted] During the same period in 2015, 1 Jan to 12 Dec, the number of attempts of clandestine entries at these BCPs was 2 996, which denotes a decrease of 72% in 2016



Commented [A5]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

Commented [A6]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.


Commented [A7]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

compared to 2015. The decrease in the number of clandestine entries can be associated with increased control measures adopted by the Turkish authorities in particular at the [REDACTED].

Regular bilateral joint meetings for preventing and resolving border incidents take place under an agreement between the Bulgarian and Turkish authorities. Following established rules, in cases where would-be migrants are observed on Turkish territory, the Turkish authorities are informed by telephone.

3. Bulgarian-Serbian border

Figure 6: Main nationalities apprehended at the BGR-SRB border on exit



Since 4 Feb 2016 the Bulgarian-Serbian land border section has been a part of the operational area of the JO FOA 2016 BCU (SE). The implemented activities include the deployment of border surveillance teams in the area of the [REDACTED]

as well as second-line activities such as the implementation of debriefing and screening activities in [REDACTED]

Since the beginning of the operation at the Bulgarian-Serbian land border 10 799 irregular migrants have been apprehended attempting to cross the border illegally from Bulgaria to Serbia. Of this total, approximately 80% were already registered in Bulgaria before they were apprehended on exit towards Serbia. In this regard, it is worth noting that migrants make multiple

attempts to exit the country illegally from Bulgaria to Serbia.


From 4 Feb to 12 Dec 2016, the [REDACTED] reported the highest number of migrant apprehensions with 5 174 migrants apprehended attempting to exit Bulgaria to Serbia. The reason for the high number of apprehensions at this particular BCU is probably due [REDACTED]

Bulgarian-Serbian border reported 4 151 migrant apprehensions and [REDACTED] reported 903 migrant apprehensions. Other BCUs such as the [REDACTED] reported 427 migrant apprehensions, the [REDACTED] reported 75 and the [REDACTED] reported 69 irregular migrant apprehensions on exit to Serbia.

The main nationalities apprehended at the Bulgarian-Serbian land border section from 4 Feb to 12 Dec 2016 were nationals from Afghanistan (6 624), Iraq (1 753), Pakistan (1 410) and Syria (625). A comparison with operational data from 2015 was not possible because this border section was not part of the JO FOA 2015 land SE.

Migrants who enter illegally from Turkey to Bulgaria are usually [REDACTED]

Figure 7: Migrant apprehension at the BGR-SRB border per BCU from 4 Feb to 12 Dec 2016



Commented [A8]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Commented [A9]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, facilitating irregular migration and thus undermining the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation 1049/2001.

from [REDACTED]

Commented [A10]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, facilitating irregular migration and thus undermining the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)a of Regulation 1049/2001.

4. Hungarian-Serbian border

During the period 1 January - 12 December 2016, a total of 18 717⁴ irregular migrants were detected for illegal border-crossing at the Hungarian border with Serbia.

From 3 February, when the JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 was launched, to 12 December 2016, a total of 24 152 irregular migrants were apprehended within the Hungarian operational area. The main nationalities were Afghan (9 676), Pakistani (4 876), Syrian (2 333), Iraqi (2 185) and Moroccan (821).

[REDACTED]
implementation [REDACTED]

Commented [A11]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials. The text contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied during border control activities which would jeopardize the implementation of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

With regard to the profile of the apprehended migrants, most of them were young males in the 18 to 35 age bracket (the share of females within the total number of apprehended migrants was around 8% and this percentage was relatively stable throughout the operation).

From 3 February to 12 December 2016, 46 people smugglers were arrested and the main nationalities were Serbian (33%), Kosovo citizens (13%) and Hungarian (13%). Most of these people smugglers were residents of the Hungarian-Serbian border area and they were mainly used by migrants who wished to cross this border undetected with the intention of avoiding long periods waiting outside of the two Hungarian transit zones until they are allowed to enter and apply for asylum.

Before the implementation of the abovementioned new Hungarian law, nearly all irregular migrants detected for illegal border-crossing at the Hungarian border with Serbia sought asylum after apprehension (98%) but since 5 July 2016, when this new regulation came into force, all migrants apprehended within 8 kilometres from the external border are escorted back to the transit zones. However, after applying for asylum, most of them abscond from open reception centres for asylum applicants and continue their travel onwards to their countries of destination in other EU MS/SAC.

Migrants who either cross the border from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Serbia or from Bulgaria to Serbia gather in the so-called "Afghan park" in Belgrade. Their numbers vary on a weekly basis depending on the number of new arrivals and those leaving. Most of the migrants living in this park located in the city centre of Belgrade are young Afghan males. According to information from the Serbian authorities, intensified police


⁴ Data submitted through FRAN-JORA between 1 January and 12 December 2016.

controls are being carried out especially in the part of the city which is described by migrants as "Afghan park" in order to implement additional security measures. The number of migrants stranded in the country is increasing and is currently estimated to be in the region of 7 000. Recently, the Serbian authorities tried to accommodate migrants from Belgrade in official centres in the southern part of the country and they refused. It seems likely that they want to remain close to the Hungarian border.

The Hungarian authorities recently adopted new measures to tackle the migration flow with the establishment of fixed checkpoints and mobile border guard patrols along the main routes. These measures have been put in place with the aim of stopping smugglers on their way to pick up migrants in areas close to the border along the second ETO (engineering technical obstacle) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

Figure 8: Detections of illegal border-crossing at the HUN–SRB and HRV–SRB border from 1 January to 12 December 2016



5. Croatian-Serbian border

From 1 January to 12 December 2016, 103 469⁵ persons were reported for illegal border-crossings at the Croatian border with Serbia. However, the situation registered at the Croatian border with Serbia at the beginning of 2016 is not reflected by the figures reported in the JORA. For instance, during the implementation period of the JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 (i.e. February 2016), 6 irregular migrants were apprehended within the Croatian operational area (i.e. [REDACTED]) whilst 34 473 irregular migrants were reported in FRAN during the same period. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that many of the migrants apprehended during the first two months in 2016 at the Croatian border with Serbia were apprehended outside the operational area.

For most of the irregular migrants who entered Croatia from Serbia illegally from 1 January to 12 December 2016 the nationality was not indicated (not specified in FRAN), this was the case for 102 329 people, while 255 were reported as Afghan, 226 as Kosovo citizens, 142 as Pakistani, 110 as Iraqi and 106 as Syrian.

The high share of 'not specified' nationalities can be chiefly attributed to the fact that the Croatian authorities were overwhelmed with the unprecedented irregular migratory influx entering Croatia from Serbia and were unable to screen or identify the apprehended irregular migrants.

⁵ Data submitted through FRAN-JORA between 1 January and 12 December 2016.

Commented [A12]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

Commented [A13]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

In recent years, Serbia has become the main nexus point where migrants travelling across the Western Balkan region gather before entering the EU illegally. About 99% of migrant apprehensions reported, from 3 February to 12 December 2016, at the EU's external borders with Serbia, were registered at the Hungarian border with Serbia and this can be largely attributed to the fact that Hungary represents the only Schengen member neighbouring Serbia.

Travelling across Hungary involved fewer travel difficulties for irregular migrants compared to travelling via Croatia or Romania due to the fact that once migrants successfully entered Hungary they could continue their journey to other destination EU MS/SAC without further border checks. Conversely, would-be migrants travelling across Croatia or Romania would need to avoid not only border controls at the external borders of these countries with Serbia, but also border controls at the borders of these countries with members of the Schengen zone.


However, after 15 September 2015, when the Hungarian authorities reinforced their border with Serbia, most irregular migrants travelling across the Western Balkans changed their route into the EU and instead of travelling towards the Hungarian-Serbian border, they began travelling towards the Croatian border with Serbia.

The situation also turned from a border management issue to a migration management one as, in an attempt to avoid humanitarian problems and the pressure building up on their territories, the most affected countries began organising onward transportation for migrants which triggered an increase in the migratory flow.

In response to the increased irregular migratory pressure, EU MS/SAC and WB countries affected by this crisis implemented a series of measures in November 2015 aimed at tackling and curbing irregular migration inflow. As a result, the number of irregular migrants that have been reported on the Western Balkan route has contracted.

From 3 February to 12 December 2016, the Croatian authorities reported 231⁶ irregular migrants apprehended within the operational area. The main nationalities reported were Kosovo citizens (149), Albanian (25), Turkish (11), Serbian (10), Afghan (10), Syrian (8) and Pakistani (8). The migratory pressure at the Croatian border with Serbia remains low.

Figure 9: Main nationalities apprehended at the HRV-SRB border from 1 January to 12 December 2016



On account of the enhanced security and border control measures introduced in Hungary;

[REDACTED]

Migrants stranded in Serbia in areas close to the dedicated Hungarian transit zones seem to be looking

for new routes into the EU notwithstanding the fact that Croatia is not a Schengen country and represents an additional step on their journey to their final destination in northern and central European countries.

Another fact that migrants' search for new options is that winter has set in and living conditions in makeshift camps or in other types of accommodation, which are typically located in remote areas, are sub-standard thereby

Commented [A14]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of ongoing and future operations, facilitating irregular migration and thus undermining the protection of the public interest as regards public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)a of Regulation 1049/2001.

⁶ Data submitted through JORA.

making the life of migrants very difficult. For instance, these camps are not even equipped with the necessary facilities for covering basic human necessities.


6. Greek-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian border

According to data gathered through the Western Balkans - Risk Analysis Network (WB-RAN), for the first ten months of 2016 a total number of 124 072 migrants were reported for illegally crossing the border from Greece to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; it is worth mentioning that 78% (96 427) of these migrants were reported during the first two months of the year, before the closure of the Western Balkans corridor.

Migrants stranded in Greece are




Figure 10: Comparison trend line on illegal border crossings at the Greek-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian border section



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These migrants try to [redacted] smuggling networks [redacted]



Between 1 January and 12 December 2016, according to figures provided by the EEAS (European External Action Service) in Skopje and collected from the Ministry of Interior to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, "89 628 foreign nationals were registered, including 35 382 males, 19 618 women, 34 402 accompanied minors and 226 unaccompanied minors. Among them, 44 742 were from Syria, 26 546 from Afghanistan and 18 337 from Iraq". In addition, 207 are being hosted by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian authorities in official camps as follows: 79 in the Tabanovce transit centre; 99 in the Vinojug transit centre; 10 in the Vizbegovo asylum centre; 19 in a safe house.

7. Greek-Albanian border

Over the past few years, the Greek-Albanian land border has been affected by two main irregular migratory flows: circular migration of Albanian nationals who entered Greece illegally with the intention of finding work in the black labour market and irregular migrants who entered Greece illegally from Turkey, and continued their journey to their EU MS/SAC of destination via Albania.

The level of threat at the Greek-Albanian border remains high, as it is estimated that, over 60 000 irregular migrants are currently stranded in Greece. They had entered illegally from Turkey, with the intention of travelling onward to other EU countries, but they could not continue their journey after the closure of the Western Balkan corridor.

A total of 1 708,⁷ migrants were reported during the first ten months of 2016 by the Albanian authorities at their border with Greece (average of 35 migrants per week). In addition, the number of detections reported by the Greek authorities (i.e. over 3 988 [REDACTED])

Migrants reported by Greece were mainly associated to the circular route with Albania, thus 98% (3 918) of these migrants were Albanian citizens whilst the other 2% comprised non-regional migrants mainly from Syria, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Information regarding the main nationality of migrants reported by Albania who illegally crossed the border from Greece is not available.

It is worth noting that incidents involving the apprehension of non-regional migrants are very rare and are not the main type of incident reported at the Greek-Albanian border section.

Some main factors make the [REDACTED]

Commented [A16]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

8. Bulgarian- former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia border

According to data gathered through the Western Balkans - Risk Analysis Network (WB-RAN), for the first ten months of 2016 practically no migrants were reported for illegally crossing the border from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Bulgaria (5) or from Bulgaria to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (4). It is worth mentioning that no intelligence is available with reference to the current situation at this border section. In addition, and according to the intelligence collected [REDACTED]

⁷ Source: WB-RAN data as of 12 December 2016. For first ten months of 2016.

⁸ Source: FRAN data as of 12 December 2016. For first ten months of 2016.

[illegible]

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Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined.

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[REDACTED]

21/142

[REDACTED]

- Implement [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Hungarian Operational Area

- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Croatian Operational area

- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Greek Operational area

- Implement [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recommended [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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• [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[illegible]

ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES


General Objectives	Specific Objectives	Indicators / Benchmarks
Enhance border security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carrying out effective border control at external borders in order to detect all suspicious means of transportation enabling to intercept persons, preventing unauthorized border crossings, countering and preventing cross-border criminality and taking measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities Supporting the national authorities in disclosing cases of smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other cross-border crime Fostering MS operational structures (NCC/ICC/R-LCC/FP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Nr of incidents concerning illegal migration.</i> <i>Nr of irregular migrants apprehended.</i> <i>Number of people smugglers apprehended;</i> <i>Nr of incidents concerning the smuggling of drugs / goods.</i> <i>Number of cross-border crimes detected, prevented, intercepted and reported</i>
Enhance operational cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High level of MS participation in operational activities Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations by implementing multi-character operational concept Seeking involvement of Third countries in operational activities / Participation of TC Observers in specific operational activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Nr of participating Home MS/SAC</i> <i>Nr of participating Host MS/SAC</i> <i>Nr of man-days deployed</i> <i>Nr of deployment days</i> <i>Nr of participating Authorities/Entities</i> <i>Nr of participating TC</i> <i>Nr of deployed observers</i>
Enhance exchange of information, including personal data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collection of operational information from all actors involved in order to obtain intelligence Processing at the EU level, personal data relating to individuals suspected of involvement in facilitation, THB, terrorism or other cross-border crimes Distribution of operational information to all involved actors through authorized channels Implementation of fully automated online reporting system Seeking standardized format and quality of the reports and interviews Use of the "Guidelines for JORA Incident Template" giving detailed information on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Average delay in sending incident reports in JORA</i> <i>Level of cooperation in sharing information among main stakeholders (National authorities, Frontex)</i>



	definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes	
Identify possible risks and threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Carrying out debriefing activities to support migration management and obtaining intelligence, thus improving the risk assessments that underpin the operational activities• Monitoring political, economic and social situation in the countries of origin and transit	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Number and quality and timeliness of debriefing interview reports sent to Frontex Risk Analysis Unit</i>• <i>Average level of preparedness and expertise and knowledge of the GOs deployed as debriefing experts</i>• <i>Level of activities and proactiveness of debriefing experts</i>• <i>Level of response of debriefing reports to operational requests to fill in information gaps and needs of RAU</i>
Establish and exchange best practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Delivering and supporting workshops, meetings, operational briefings, other networking events to participants• Supporting targeted training activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>List of workshops, meetings, other networking events implemented in the frame of the JO</i>• <i>Number of operational briefings and debriefings delivered</i>• <i>List of other Frontex activities, services and products implemented in the frame of JO</i>• <i>List training activities implemented in the frame of JO</i>

ANNEX 5 - OPERATIONAL AREA

General map






5.1 South Eastern Land borders



Commented [A21]: The non-disclosed images contain information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.



Greek-Turkish Land Border



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Bulgarian-Turkish Land Border



Bulgarian-Serbian Land Border

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Bulgarian- FYROM Land Border



Greek-FYROM Land Border



Commented [A24]: The non-disclosed images contain information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.



Greek-Albanian Land Border





5.2 Western Balkans area



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ANNEX 6 - DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT)

BULGARIA

ARTICLE 21 par. 4 OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

1. Border surveillance

Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBCGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(a) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

(b) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Patrolling and border surveillance by technical means:

According to Article 39 (3) of the Ministry of Interior Act, Chief Directorate Border is national specialised structure for the purposes of the activities mentioned in Article 6 (1) points 1, 2, 5-7 in the border zone, in the areas of the border check-points, the international air and sea ports, the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent area, the continental shelf, the Bulgarian section of the river Danube and the other border rivers and water basins on the territory of the country.

The border zone depth is 30 km. from the border line. The border strip is 10 to 300 m. depth and any activity in it shall be communicated in advance to and coordinated with the Director of the corresponding Regional Directorate of Border Police in which area of responsibility the activity will be conducted.

Depending on the specific tasks for land border surveillance, the following types of patrols/posts are performed:

- **Patrol** - carries out patrol activities on feet or as **Auto patrol** (by vehicle) in search of any signs (traces) for illegal border crossing; checks the presence and condition of the border signs (border marks) as well as the presence of other patrols;
- **Post** - secures preliminary defined area of the border or object; carries out surveillance with/without technical means from preliminary defined position;
- **Secret patrol** - undisclosed implementation of tasks for surveillance, detection and apprehension of persons;
- **Patrol "Border crossing checkpoint"** - carries out checks of passengers and vehicles at the border area;
- **Operational-Investigation Team** - carries out hot pursuit and apprehension of wanted persons and persons who have illegally crossed the border or intend to cross the border illegally;
- **Convoy Team** - convoys apprehended persons;
- **Blocking/Cordon Team** - blocks main routes with aim to stop persons/vehicles from passing specific area/territory;
- **Mobile Unit for Control and Surveillance** - Joint patrol unit consisted by Border police and Customs' officers who carry out checks of persons, vehicles and facilities for concealed persons and excise goods;
- **Reserve** - carries out suddenly emerged tasks.

The type, composition and the time for carrying the duties of the patrols are determined by the Team leader. The specific tasks for each patrol and the methods of its implementation, along with risk-analysis conclusions and the current situation in the operational area for twenty-four hour period, are communicated to the officers at their Briefings which are not longer than 30 minutes. Officers are briefed prior to their duties implementation. **BGs attendance at the Briefings is obligatory.**

Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

Hot Pursuit is police pursuit of persons violated or attempting to violate the State border. The pursuit can be done along the 30 km. border area and when needed, beyond the border area with the cooperation of other Mol bodies. The pursuit cannot be done in neighbouring country's territory. When persons have been detected for crossing illegally towards neighbouring country, based on the signed bilateral agreement, the neighbouring authorities shall be informed.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Security body searches, transportation to the nearest BPU/BCP, etc.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Transportation of migrants - security standards; rules and instructions;

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Interception/apprehension/detention/arrest:

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons and Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Police officers can do searches, to check and seize personal belongings following the procedures of Ministry of Interior Act, as follows:

Article 80. (1) of MIA: Police bodies shall carry out a search of any person:

1. Detained under the terms of Article 63 (1) of MIA;
 2. Who is reportedly in possession of hazardous or prohibited objects;
 3. Found at the scene of a crime or a violation of the public order, when there is sufficient evidence that he/she is in possession of objects, related to the crime or the violation.
 4. In regard to whom a signal exists in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for applying specific control.
- (2) Personal searches may be carried out only by a person of the same gender as the person searched.

Article 81. (1) Police bodies may search the personal belongings of persons:

1. In respect of persons of whom there is data that they had perpetrated a crime or another violation of the public order;
 2. When required for the purpose of detecting or investigating crimes, and in cases of opened administrative penalty proceedings;
 3. At checkpoints, established by the police;
 4. The identity of a person cannot be established;
 5. An alien, seeking protection under the Asylum and Refugees Act, entered at variance with the legal procedure or is illegally staying in the Republic of Bulgaria.
 6. Who manifests serious mental disorder and by his/her behaviour disturbs the public order or exposes own life or the life of other individuals to clear danger;
 7. A juvenile delinquent, having left his/her home, custodian, guardian or specialised institution in which he/she was placed;
 8. Who had evaded a prison sentence or the premises where he/she was detained as accused by virtue of a police administrative measure or by an order of a judicial body;
 9. Designated for international investigation upon request from another state in regard to his/her extradition or in fulfilment of an European arrest warrant;
 10. When there is sufficient evidence of concealment of physical evidence of crime perpetrated;
 11. In other cases, prescribed by a law.
- The search shall be done in strictly obeying person's dignity.

Article 83. (1) of MIA: Police bodies may carry out inspections in premises without the consent of the owner or the occupant, or in their absence, only when:

1. When an imminent serious crime or one in progress must be prevented;
 2. There is evidence that a perpetrator of a serious crime is hiding on premises;
 3. It is required in order to provide urgent assistance to persons whose lives, health or personal freedom are endangered, or another in case of ultimate necessity is at hand.
- (2) Upon completion of the inspection police bodies must draw up a protocol, indicating:
1. The name and position of the official and his/her place of work;
 2. The identity of the owner or of the occupant;
 3. The legal grounds for the inspection;
 4. The time and place of conducting it;
 5. The outcome.

(b) Transportation of migrants - security standards; rules and instructions;

If the apprehended for illegal border crossing persons cannot be handed over to the neighbouring country in 24 hours period, they shall be transferred to Specialized Facilities for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners which is under the umbrella of Migration Directorate - Mol or to the State Agency for Refugees within the Council of Ministers.

During their transportation, the following internal regulations shall be strictly obeyed:
Ordinance Iz-1143/04.05.2011 for the organization and rules for carrying escorts in Mol;
Internal Methodological Guidelines for carrying escorts;
Ordinance Iz-2271/01.10.2010 for the methods and the organization of carrying land/sea/river border surveillance.

Escorting is compulsory transportation of one or more persons in specific route, carried by Escort Teams. It is conducted:
by feet;
with specialized escort vehicles or service cars;
with regular civil transportation busses;
with railways;
with airplanes;
with sea/river transportation;

The escort type is chosen prior to the convoy and individually for each case, depending on the escorted person/s, operational situation, the weather conditions and the available resources.

It is strictly prohibited to appoint officials for escorting activities who:
does not have police powers;
have family relations or other personal relations with the escorted person/s;
are somehow connected and dependent by the results of the criminal process against the escorted person/s;

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre


Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

(a) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBCGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc

(b) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBCGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBCGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person



intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

(c) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBCGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Interception/apprehension/detention/arrest:

Rules for security checks and evidence collection;

Police officers can do searches, to check and seize personal belongings following the procedures of Ministry of Interior Act, as follows:

Article 80. (1) of MIA: Police bodies shall carry out a search of any person:

1. detained under the terms of Article 63 (1) of MIA;
 2. who is reportedly in possession of hazardous or prohibited objects;
 3. found at the scene of a crime or a violation of the public order, when there is sufficient evidence that he/she is in possession of objects, related to the crime or the violation.
 4. in regard to whom a signal exists in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for applying specific control.
- (2) Personal searches may be carried out only by a person of the same gender as the person searched.

Article 81. (1) Police bodies may search the personal belongings of persons:

1. in respect of persons of whom there is data that they had perpetrated a crime or another violation of the public order;
2. when required for the purpose of detecting or investigating crimes, and in cases of opened administrative penalty proceedings;
3. at checkpoints, established by the police;
4. the identity of a person cannot be established;
5. an alien, seeking protection under the Asylum and Refugees Act, entered at variance with the legal procedure or is illegally staying in the Republic of Bulgaria.
6. who manifests serious mental disorder and by his/her behaviour disturbs the public order or exposes own life or the life of other individuals to clear danger;
7. a juvenile delinquent, having left his/her home, custodian, guardian or specialised institution in which he/she was placed;
8. who had evaded a prison sentence or the premises where he/she was detained as accused by virtue of a police administrative measure or by an order of a judicial body;
9. designated for international investigation upon request from another state in regard to his/her extradition or in fulfilment of an European arrest warrant;
10. when there is sufficient evidence of concealment of physical evidence of crime perpetrated;

11. in other cases, prescribed by a law.

The search shall be done in strictly obeying person's dignity.

Bulgarian Child Protection Act

Police protection

Article 37. (1) Provision of police protection to a child shall be done by the specialized bodies of the Ministry of the Interior.

(2) The bodies under par. 1 shall work in cooperation with child protection bodies.

Grounds

Article 38. Police protection is an urgent measure to be applied when:

1. the child has become subject of crime or there is an immediate threat for his or her life or health, as well as when there is a danger of the child getting involved in a crime;
2. the child has been lost or is in a helpless condition;
3. the child has been left without supervision.

Police protection measures

Article 39. (1) The specialized bodies of the Ministry of the Interior may:

1. accommodate the child in special premises, where they shall not permit any contacts with the child that may prove harmful to him or her;
2. place the child in specialized institutions and where necessary provide him or her with food;
3. return the child back to his or her parents or the persons entrusted with the parental functions.

(2) The specialized bodies under par. 1 shall inform the child and explain to him or her in an understandable manner the measures undertaken and the grounds for them.

Obligation to notify

Article 40. The police bodies, who have implemented the protection, shall notify immediately:

1. the child's parents;
2. the social assistance directorate of the region where protection has been implemented;
3. the social assistance directorate at the current address of the child;
4. the prosecution.

Period

Article 41. The child may not remain under police protection longer than 48 hours.

Article 43. The order and conditions to provide police protection shall be governed by an ordinance issued by the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the State Agency for Child Protection.

Specialized protection of children at public places

Article 43a. (1) Specialized protection of children at public places is setting up of conditions that do not threaten the physical, mental, and moral development of the children.

(2) Specialized protection of children at public places shall be provided by the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, social assistance directorates, municipality, regional educational inspectorates under the Ministry of Education and Science, regional centers of health as well as the owners, tenants, users and organizers of public events, commercial places, cinemas and theatres.

Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

According the provisions of Article 12 of Ordinance I-13/29.01.2004 for the procedures of temporary accommodation of foreigners and the organization and tasks of the specialized facilities for temporary accommodation, the foreigners are subject to obligatory medical examination, which results are recorded in Register. The examination must be conducted by medic from the medical services of Mol or by one of the Specialized Facilities for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners. Emergent medical assistance is provided by the Emergency Assistance Centres within Ministry of Health.

Status assessment and procedure to be followed

CDBP is applying all measures defined in the Ministry of Interior Act (MIA) regarding foreigners detained for irregular crossing of the state border of the Republic of Bulgaria, including those in need of protection. All those measures are mentioned in the MIA and Regulation for the Structure and Functions of Ministry of Interior (RSF of Mol) and respect detainees' rights stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Convention regarding the Status of Refugees since 1951, New York Protocol since 1967 and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Police officers of GDBP-Mol have the power to detain foreigners in the border area while ensuring their rights under the provisions of MIA. Detention of the persons is allowed with written order under the provisions of (RSF of Mol) these written orders cannot be issued for more than 24 hours.

Acting procedures of CDBP officers related to detention of foreigners at the state border Republic of Bulgaria, preparation of the necessary official documents, escort and detention of foreigners in Distribution Centre under State Agency for Refugees (SAR) are based on the existing secondary legislation.

When the foreigner declares in writing, verbally or otherwise to employees GDBP-Mol desire to receive special protection in Bulgaria, pursuant to Art. 59 (1) of Law for Asylum and Refugees (LAR), the document (application) of the applicant should be sent to the SAR.

Verbal or otherwise, the act of an applicant is recorded by an official, signed or otherwise authenticated by the applicant and the translator, interpreter, respectively, as it is obligatory all communication to be performed by them. When communicating with foreigners, with aim to assess the need for protection, the questions used for the interviewing should be open type questions. Thus the interviewee has the opportunity to tell the events in their own way as the open end questions contributing to this.

In the process of their work with detainees border guards should treat them with respect and dignity, which is a necessary condition for successful communication.

In the event of cases in which persons detained in relation with illegal crossing of the state border and have been subjected to violations of their human rights due to illegal actions of law enforcement officers (border guards) from the Ministry of Interior, respectively GDBP the following legal options action are applicable:

disciplinary proceedings can be formed and conducted if there is an evidence of violations of official discipline of employees of the CDBP in relation with the MIA;

an assessment of the professional work of the border guards can be started on the basis of which their employment may be terminated or they can be transferred to another position after a proposal from their relevant management;

investigation and prosecution organs shall be promptly notified of the obtained evidence of an indictable offense under the Penal Code by the staff of the CDBP in order to take actions under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC);

when charges are pressed against officers from CDBP suspension actions against their access to classified information under the Law on the Protection of Classified Information and the follow-up actions on termination of their employment relationship as a civil servants in Mol should be taken.

During the implementation of each of the investigative proceedings is legally provided and guaranteed order (according to MIA and CPC) to ensure the confidentiality of the information under investigation as well as the provision of medical and psychological care and to the provision of legal aid and necessary assistance to those who are victims of crime.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Subsequent to persons' apprehension and their temporary accommodation at the facilities for apprehended persons for a period no longer than 24 hours, a Compulsory Administrative Measure is imposed to the foreigners.

According the Bulgarian Law for Foreigners, Compulsory Administrative Measures are imposed to foreigners, detected for illegal border crossing or detected irregulars at the border area, as well as to those who are illegally staying in Bulgaria. If any obstacles for handling the irregular migrants back to the neighbouring country exist, an ordinance for accommodation at the premises of Migration Directorate's temporary accommodation facilities of foreigners is issued. Their returning back to neighbouring country is carried out when possible.

According the above mentioned law, foreigners who applied for protection shall not be imposed with Compulsory Administrative Measure until the decision for providing protection of the Chairman of State Agency for Refugees is issued.

As it come to families and children seeking asylum in Bulgaria detained during the current year in the area of responsibility of GDBP, this category of foreigners have precedence over the other detainees.

With Families and children who claimed in front employees GDBP desire to obtain protection in Bulgaria should be proceed according to the order mentioned above (for persons seeking special protection in Bulgaria), the actions and activities in the processing of this category of persons is under the principle of preserving the integrity of the family and in the case of unaccompanied children to observe the principle of the best interests of the child. The latest amendments in to the Law for the Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria (LFRB) (article. 44 tons. 9) introduced a ban unaccompanied minors to be forcibly detained in detention centres of Migration Directorate - CDBP -Mol. The law requires this category of persons to be transmitted in the Directorate Social Assistance to take measures for protection under the Law on Child Protection.

As regards detected unaccompanied minors at the border area, their accommodation at the facilities is considered according Article 44 (9) of the Bulgarian Law for Foreigners. Article 38 of the Child Protection Act provides possibilities for "police protection" (Article 37) during the 24 hours arrest.

The conditions for providing police protection of minors are described in Ordinance I-51/12.03.2001 for the conditions and procedures for providing police protection of minors.

If minors are detected in the border area, according Article 3 of the above mentioned Ordinance, they are being transferred to the National Police's authorities for providing police protection. According Article 6 (2) the protection is provided 24/7 hours a day. Minors under police protection are being accompanied by Border police officers to the National police facilities or to the Home for Temporary Accommodation of Children (aged between 3-18) within 15 days strictly following the conditions of Ordinance IZ-2019/09.11.2006 for the organization and rules for accompanying minors by Ministry of interior officials. The approach towards each person who belongs to the vulnerable groups is individual according to person's needs.

4. Use of force/weapons

a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBCGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBCGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

e) *Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons*

f) *Special rules to dog handlers*

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

(a) Define the principles on the use of force;

According Ministry of Interior Act (MIA)

Article 85. (1) Police bodies may apply force and auxiliary means in the course of discharging their official functions only if the latter may not be achieved otherwise, in the following cases:

1. Resistance or refusal to obey a legal order;
2. Detention of an offender who does not obey or resists a police body;
3. Escorting a person or when the person attempts to escape or take his/her life or the life or health of other persons;
4. (Supplemented, SG No. 98/2008) rendering assistance to other state bodies or officials, including the inspectors of the European Commission, who are illegally impeded to fulfil their duties;
5. Attacks on citizens and police bodies;
6. Freeing of hostages;
7. Group violations of the public order;
8. Attacks on buildings, premises, facilities and vehicles;
9. Release of illegally occupied sites, if so ordered by a competent body.

(2) (New, SG No. 88/2010) In the course of discharge of their official duties the bodies of receipt, carriage and delivery of correspondence, containing classified information, shall be entitled to apply physical force and auxiliaries in cases of attempted unauthorised access to the correspondence only if protection from unauthorised access may not be ensured in any other way.

(3) (Renumbered from Paragraph 2, SG No. 88/2010) Auxiliaries shall be: handcuffs; strait jackets; rubber, plastic, assault and electric shock batons and devices; chemical substances approved by the minister of health; service animals - dogs, horses; blank cartridges, rubber/plastic/shock cartridges; roadblock applications; forced entry devices, diverting flash and sound devices; water cannons and air jet machines; armoured vehicles and helicopters.

(4) (Renumbered from Paragraph 3, SG No. 88/2010) The procedure for applying auxiliaries shall be determined by an ordinance of the Minister of Interior.

Article 86. (1) Force and auxiliaries shall be used following a warning, with the exception of the cases of sudden attack and release of hostages.

(2) Use of force and auxiliaries shall reflect the specific circumstances, the nature of the public order violation and the identity of the offender.

(3) In the cases mentioned in article 85 police bodies shall use only absolutely necessary force.

(4) In using force and auxiliaries police bodies must, when possible, protect the targets' health and take all possible measures to protect the targets' lives.

(5) The use of force and auxiliaries shall be terminated immediately after achieving the objective of the applied measure.

(6) Force and auxiliaries may not be used in regard to obviously underage persons and pregnant women. This prohibition shall not apply to mass disorders, when all other means had been exhausted.

(7) The uses of life-threatening force for apprehension or prevention the escape of a person who has committed a non-violent offense if the person is not endangering life and health of others is forbidden.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

Use of firearms is defined, according Ministry of Interior Act (MIA)

Article 87. (1) Police bodies may use firearms as a last resort:

1. in cases of armed attack or threat with firearms;
 2. in the course of releasing hostages and kidnapped persons;
 3. following a warning in the course of detaining a person, committing or having committed a felony, if it resists or tries to escape;
 4. after having issued a warning to prevent the flight of a legally detained felon.
- (2) In using firearms, where possible, police bodies must protect the life of the target person and ensure that the life and the health of other persons shall not be jeopardised.
- (3) (Amended in 2010) Police bodies may use firearms without warning when conducting border surveillance:
1. in the event of armed assault on them;
 2. against persons, putting up armed resistance;
- (4) When conducting border surveillance within the limits of internal sea waters and the territorial sea of the Republic of Bulgaria, police bodies shall be entitled to use firearms in the cases provided for by the Maritime Space, Inland Waterways and Ports of the Republic of Bulgaria Act.
- (5) Police bodies cease use of firearms immediately after the achievement of the legal purpose
- (6) Use of firearms for apprehension or prevention the escape of a person who has committed or who is performing non-violent offense if the person is not endangering life and health of others is strictly prohibited
- (7) After having used firearms, the police bodies shall draw up a report.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible;

Service weapons and equipment which can be used by foreign experts officially while performing service on the territory of the Bulgaria have to comply with following characteristics:

1. Non automatic system short barrel handguns with length of the barrel - not more than 300 mm. long;
2. Ammunitions - not more than 50, the first cartridge-clip have to be "stop" type;
3. Blank cartridges
4. Cartridges with rubber
5. Plastic or shock bullets
6. Batons - plastic and patent;
7. Handcuffs;
8. Assault or electric shock stick and devices;
9. Pepper spray;
10. Specific aerosols -containing „kapsaicionid“.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

While apprehending persons BGs are allowed to use service weapons, force, surveillance equipment as well as auxiliary means according the law.

During the apprehension, any actions and methods which threaten the persons' life or health shall not be undertaken.

Physical force and auxiliary means shall be used after appropriate forewarning except in cases of sudden adversary attack and during hostages rescuing missions.

The usage of physical force and supporting means shall be undertaken according the specific situation, public order violation type and violator's personality.

During the physical force and auxiliary means usage, the BGs are obliged to protect persons' health as well as to take all measures needed to protect the violator's life.

[REDACTED]

The physical force and auxiliary means usage shall be immediately discontinued after reaching the aim of their use. While using service weapons BGs are obliged to protect, when possible, violator's life and not to threaten the life and health of other persons.

The use of physical force and auxiliary means is prohibited against persons apparently looking as minors and pregnant women. The prohibition is not referring to cases of mass disorders when all other means have been useless.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

The border guards must provide first aid assistance of persons injured after the use of weapons, force or auxiliary means. For each individual case of use of service weapons, force and auxiliary measures, BGs must prepare written report, signed by the officer who has conducted the action and/or the superior who has ordered their usage.

The written report must consist of:

- Officer's name, rank and service;
- Place, date, time and type of actions taken (use of service weapon/auxiliary means or force);
- The conditions and reasons of its usage;
- Type and amount/quantity of the used impact;
- If possible, any personal data concerning the person/s against whom the actions was/were taken;
- Follow up health/life safety measures taken of injured persons against whom the actions were taken;
- Visible aftereffects of the actions taken;

g) Special rules to dog handlers

As a last resort, when all other measures for apprehension of violators have been useless, the dog handler releases the dog, as prior the releasing is obligated to command loudly "Police, stop immediately! I will release the dog!"

CROATIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBCGT⁹

ARTICLE 21 par. 4 OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation of this joint operation. The members of EBCGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(c) *Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)*

- **TEAMS FOR BORDER PROTECTION** (vehicle patrols, vessels patrols, off-road motorcycle patrols and patrols on foot with the use of the official dog for protection-researching purposes)

(d) *General tasks of the members of the EBCGT*

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBCGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the atrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(c) *Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method*

- **TEAMS FOR BORDER PROTECTION**

Team for border protection is a group of police officers to protect the border that is managed by the group leader for border protection. Group consists of: a group leader for the border protection, police officers for border protection, which are arranged in a vehicle patrols and patrols on foot in the border sectors. Team

⁹ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

can be accompanied with a Sector border leader, a leader of patrol boats, police officers for combat against cross-border crime, a motorcyclist and a police officer/dog handler with a dog for the border protection.

The methodology of the group:

- mobility, unpredictability and a quick response to the event
 - work on the basis of information, risk analysis and strategic assessment
 - prevention of corruption border police - according to Plan for combat against anti-corruption measures in the border police and the use of technical equipment
-
- sector border leader - participates in the development of risk analysis in the field of the state border protection, participates and directs the preparation of daily schedule, participating in operational tasks
 - group leader for the border protection - meets the overall composition of the group with news relevant to the performance of state border protection, plans operational measures and tactical actions within police station jurisdiction according to the collected information, coordinate the implementation of operational activities and suggests the police officers in the proper performance measures and actions on the protection of state borders in order to prevent illegal crossings, as well as all forms of cross-border crime and cooperate with the leader sector border leader and the head of the shifts
 - leader of patrol boats - apply police powers within inland waterways as defined by international and national law
 - police officers for border protection - acting as a group for the protection of state border, perform border protection tasks, take measures to prevent violations of the state border, control movement and stay in the area along the border, undertake observations, escorts and ambushes in the places of illegal crossings, controlling accuracy of the border marks, submit reports about the identified violations, observations and gathered information regarding the security of the state border
 - directly perform tasks in crime investigation and crime control in order to prevent the execution of criminal acts in the area of cross-border crime, capture and detection of offenders, collect criminal charges, fills the criminal forms about offenses and offenders for EOS record input, and participate in investigative activities that are entrusted to the border police
 - police officer/dog handler - perform with the official dog for protection-research purposes the tasks of protecting the state border in order to prevent illegal border crossings, detecting and finding people who have illegally crossed the state border, helps in performing the tasks of suppression cross-border crime, conducts the training of a dog

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

➤ Temporary restriction of movement:

- National legislation includes cases when can be temporarily restrict access or movement in a particular area or facility or to keep people in order to:
 - preventing a criminal offence prosecuted *ex officio* or a misdemeanor locating and capturing a perpetrator of a criminal offence prosecuted *ex officio* or a misdemeanor punishable by a prison sentence
 - locating and capturing a person for whom the police are searching
 - finding traces and objects which may serve as evidence of a criminal offence prosecuted *ex officio* or a misdemeanour punishable by a prison sentence
 - securing protected persons, buildings and areas
- Unless otherwise stipulated by a special law, detention in a particular area or building may not be extended beyond the time necessary to achieve the purpose for which the power is exercised, and no longer than six hours.
- Temporary restriction of access or movement within a certain area or building may not be extended beyond the time necessary to achieve the purpose for which the power is exercised.
- Temporary restriction of freedom of movement is carried out with following a criminal tactical actions: blockade, raids, ambushes, pursuit and restriction of access, restriction of movement in the area or facility for safety reasons

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

The pursuit is the criminal tactical action that arising out of police powers temporary restriction of movement:

- A police officer is obligated promptly notify the initiated pursuit Operational Communication Centre of Police Department or Operational duty service in police station in order to timely join other law enforcement officers with the necessary resources
- In conducting criminal tactical action the pursuit can be used and other police powers: the use of means of coercion or the use of the device for forcibly stopping the vehicle, the use of official dog and firearms
- A police officer shall use the mildest means of coercion sufficient to achieve the objective
- A police officer shall discontinue using the means of coercion as soon as the reasons for which he applied them are no longer present
- In carrying out police duties on inland waterways police officer is authorized to use police powers to persecution of vessel:
 - The pursuit of a vessel may commence if a vessel fails to stop in response to a call to stop conveyed by visible visual or auditory signals or signals of the International Code of Signals from a distance sufficient for reception of the call.
 - If the pursuit referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article was not interrupted, it may be continued in the high seas until the pursued vessel enters the territorial sea of another state.

- If the pursued vessel fails to stop, a police officer shall endeavour to stop it with a manoeuvre or by other means.
- In the course of pursuit, shots may be fired in the air above the vessel or at a safe distance ahead of the bow in order to warn or intimidate the crew of the vessel.
- If the vessel fails to stop even after the mentioned actions use of firearms against the vessel is permitted.
- When using firearms in the mentioned circumstances the police officer shall make sure not to jeopardise the lives of the persons aboard the pursued vessel.
- Police pursuit and prosecution are prescribed by national legislation in the Law on Police Duties and powers and the Regulations on the conduct of police officers
- If the joint patrol operates close to the common state border, the pursuit can continue at a distance of up to ten kilometers from the border line towards the interior of the state territory in accordance with the implementing protocols arising from agreements on police cooperation with neighbouring countries.
- Nevertheless Frontex Guest Officers cannot be deployed on the territory of non EU countries in line with regulation EC 2007/2004.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Law of state border protection

The Law of Police Duties and powers

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

b) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

A person that was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offense must be immediately:

- informed of the reasons for arrest
- instructed about the right to remain silent
- instructed about his right to legal counsel of his own choice
- instructed that competent authority will, at request inform family member or any other person designated by person arrested

Exceptionally, a person will not be instructed about their legal rights if, under the circumstances, is not possible due to the circumstances.

If there are reasons that justify the arrested individual to be enchained (suspect of escaping or reacts violently), then he is enchained always with his hands behind his back and never in front of him.

The tactic of enchainment is always conducted by one police officer, while the second one covers his partner from a proper distance. The same tactic is been followed in case more police officers participate in the control process or there are more individuals to be apprehended.

All the apprehended persons are transferred to the respective police service or to a designated for them place.

For safety reasons and reasons of respect to the apprehended person police officers must avoid if possible transfer on foot, and call for support of a vehicle unit.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Upon apprehension, body search is carried out while at the same time evidence is collected. Body search can be done visually, by touch, using other senses, using technical means or official dog. Body search for possible explosive devices is performed by specially trained police officer.

Police officers will extract a person over which body search is performed, and familiarize the person with the reasons for the examination.

Body search is performed by two police officers in a manner that one police officer performs a body search while another police officer takes care of the safety of police officers, and in exceptional cases, if there are reasonable grounds; body search can be performed only one police officer.

The search of a person shall be performed by a person of the same sex. Exceptionally, when an emergency search is necessary for the purpose of seizing weapons or objects which can be used for assault or self-injury, the search can be performed by a person of the other sex.

Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

After completed body search and verification of identity a person will be transported with a special vehicle to the police station.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Law of state border protection
The Law of Police Duties and powers

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

After the body search, objects found will be confiscated from persons with confirmation for the seized items.

After the forfeiture of the objects, they will be safely stored and transported together with the person to the police station.

(d) *Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;*

Members of the EBCGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc

Upon the arrival of persons to the police station the persons will be provided with adequate medical care and food and beverage.

(e) *Status assessment and procedure to be followed*

Members of the EBCGTs shall examine the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited. Members of the EBCGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement.

Members of the EBCGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

If a person who is found on the green border asks for an asylum, police officers will take that person to the police station and the police officers for illegal migration will take further action, and provide the person all the rights under the Law on Asylum.

No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

(f) *Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons*

Members of the EBCGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence."

UAM

If these categories of persons are apprehended on the green border they will be taken to the police station and handed over to specialist officers of the Crime police for further action and in case of unaccompanied minors presence of social worker is mandatory. Children or adolescents are transported in vehicles without police insignia and by the police officers in civilian clothes.

UAM cannot be detained in reception centre without legal guardian. Maximum length of detention of minor is 6 months without possibility of extension. UAM are usually accommodated in houses for children.

Victim of trafficking

In case of victim of human trafficking according to national referral mechanism first step is providing first forms of aid and protection to victim. Mobile teams which provide aid and protection are available 24/7, and they arrive upon call by national coordinator from Mol.

All measures undertaken to vulnerable persons must be done in shortest possible time.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Law of state border protection

The Law of Police Duties and powers

Asylum Law

Act on aliens

Protocol about procedure with foreign UAMs.

Protocol on identification, assistance and protection of victims of human trafficking

4. Use of force/weapons

h) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBCGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

Use of force may be applied in cases prescribed by law (Law on police duties and powers) for the protection of human life, overcoming resistance, preventing escape, repel an attack and to eliminate danger if it is likely that issuing a warning or a command will not achieve the goal.

Means of coercion are applied with special regard to the child, the person whose movement is considerably more difficult, a pregnant woman in the visible stage of pregnancy, and the person who is obviously sick.


Use of force is applied following a warning, unless it is likely that a pre-warning could jeopardize achievement of the objective.

A police officer shall use the mildest means of coercion sufficient to achieve the objective.

Police officer will discontinue with the use of force as soon as objective is accomplished.

i) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate



defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBCGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

A police officer is authorized to use firearms:

a) In self-defence,

b) As a last resort if he without the use of firearms cannot remove immediate or imminent danger to his own or another person's life, which otherwise could not be removed,

j) *Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible*

Police officer may use service firearms (pistols and revolvers), also rubber batons, metal handcuffs and sprayer with irritant substances (pepper spray).

k) *Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)*

Prior to the use of firearms officer shall make a verbal command: "Stop, police!", Then the command and warning: "Stop or I will shoot!"

A police officer will after issuing verbal command and warning, fire a warning shot into the air, if this does not create a hazard to the safety of people and property.

The police officer will not make a verbal command and a warning if this would threaten his life or the lives of others or if issuing a verbal command and a warning would brought into question the performance of official duties.

The use of firearms is not allowed when its usage would endanger the lives of other persons, unless the use of firearms only means of defence against attack.

The use of firearms is not allowed against a child or a minor, except when the use of firearms only way to defend against attacks or to prevent the danger.

l) *Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons*

The border guards must provide first aid assistance for persons injured after the use of force/ firearms.

In case there is use of force/firearms by a police officer, he has to report immediately this incident to his Police service.

m) *Special rules to dog handlers*

Official dog with muzzle and leash police officer may use as a means of coercion when it is allowed to use physical force, spray with irritant substances and batons. Official dog without a muzzle and a leash, a police officer may use as a means of coercion, if the conditions for the use of firearms are fulfilled.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Law on police duties and powers

5. Border checks

- a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBCGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

Human rights in Croatia are defined by the Constitution of Republic of Croatia, chapter three, sections 14 through 69. Chapter III of the Constitution guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a large number of individual rights.

Except Constitution, there is many laws which guarantee protection of human rights. One of most important is Croatian Criminal procedure act. In article 7 is proscribed: A person who was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offense must be immediately:

- 1) informed of the reasons of arrest
- 2) instructed that is not obliged to testify
- 3) they can use lawyer
- 4) instructed that authority, on its request, can call somebody of its family or any other person designated by him.

- b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the

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New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

In Croatia is not allowed to forcibly remove or in any way to return an alien to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion or nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or in a country where they are subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

The Republic of Croatia shall grant asylum to an alien who is outside the country of his nationality or to stateless person who is outside the country of habitual residence, which is due to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions.

c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBCGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

According to the Law on the State Border protection the first line of control is place where basic and thorough border control is performed. Second line of control is place where additional checks are performed.

Border control of person can be basic and through.

Basic controls include checking a person's identity by examining the documents required for crossing the border, and consists of a fast and simple validation of documents required for crossing the border.

During border control police officer can, from time to time, by examining the database to check that the person does not pose a threat to public order, national security or public health.

Through control of persons includes checking the conditions for entry and stay, validity of the documents required for crossing the border and checking the relevant database.

Through control of persons on exit includes verification of documents required for crossing the border and checking the eventual reasons for the prohibition of leaving the country, and may include checking the data in the records of wanted persons and the legality of residence.

The basic border control is performing on persons who are Member of the European Economic Area on specially designated and marked line, if is that possible.

Over all other persons a thorough check is performed.

d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

Security body search takes place immediately after the arrest and aims at:

- Discovering and seizing weapons or other objects that may facilitate the escape of the apprehended person.
- Collecting evidence related to the crime, which could be destroyed by the apprehended person.

Search does not involve searching body cavities.

In accordance with the Regulations on the conduct of police officers (Official Gazette 89/2010) police officers will extract a person over which is performing examination and before starting, person will be informed about the reasons of the examination.

Examination of person perform two police officers in a way that one police officer is examining while another police officer take care of the security, and exceptionally, if there are reasonable grounds, examination of the person can perform a single police officer.

Examination of the person performs police officer of the same sex. Exceptionally when urgent examination of a person is necessary (if weapons or items suitable for attack or self-harming are present), examination can be done by a person of the opposite sex.

e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBCGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBCGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

In Croatia is not allowed forcibly remove or in any way to return an alien to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion or nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or in a country where they be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. If police officer performing border checks come across asylum seeker, they should call specially trained officers to work with such person.

f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBCGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

The Asylum Act in Republic of Croatia defined the term vulnerable groups and every police officer while performing duties take special care to these groups. If police officer recognizes a person who belongs to the vulnerable category, they will call specially trained officers to work with such groups. That police officers are trained to recognize their needs and if needed they call other service out of Ministry of the Interior.

g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

For the effective exercise of state border, in order to enable the free movement of persons and goods across the border, while facilitating better border control and protection in the fight against cross-border crime and illegal migration, a

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National information system for the border management is established, which is a part of the information system of the Ministry of Interior.

According to the Law of the State Border Protection, Border Police is authorized in the performance of police duties and implementation of police authority in order to control the border, take photography, take fingerprints, palm prints and other biometric data, perform recording, post video surveillance and used in accordance with the technical achievements and other technical aids.

If the devices for video surveillance and recording posted on the border crossings points, they must be visible, and people who are in this field have to be alerted.

If using device for surveillance and recording personal data, it is necessary to destroy these images within one year, unless they are necessary for the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes or misdemeanors.

h) Procedure related to stamping

In accordance with the Regulations of state border surveillance (Official Gazette 38/2009) purpose of stamping documents required for crossing the state border is a recording of the date of entry and exit from the Republic of Croatia, border crossing where the person entered or left the Republic of Croatia, as well as data logging of refusal of entry, reducing visa annulment entered data, cancelling the validity of certain documents and labelling of expiry of certain documents on the basis of which a right is realized.

Stamp of the entrance and exit of the Republic of Croatia entered in foreigners documents required for state border crossing at entering and exiting the Republic of Croatia, in order to prove the duration of stay, unless otherwise provided by international contract.

At the request of Croatian citizen stamp can be entered in their documents required for crossing state border at entering and exiting the Republic of Croatia.

If entering stamp can inflict heavy damage for foreign national documents, exceptionally on passenger request can give up from stamping the document while entering or exiting Republic of Croatia.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Law of state border protection (Official Gazette 173/03, 141/06, 8/07, 40/07, 146/08, 130/11)

Aliens Act (Official Gazette 130/11)

The law on police (Official Gazette NN 34/11)

The Law of Police Duties and powers (Official Gazette 76/09)

The Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette 121/11, 143/12)

Magistrates Act (Official Gazette 107/07)

Asylum Law (Official Gazette 79/07, 88/10)

Arms Act (Official Gazette 63/07, 146/08, 59/12)

GREECE

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBCGT

INTRODUCTION

Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004

"The responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States. The Agency should facilitate the application of existing and future Community measures relating to the management of external borders by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of those measures." The national border guard service of host country and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBCGT, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

Article 3b (4)

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

BORDER SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

- Patrols
- Ambushes
- Sighting - Surveillance

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBCGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

Tasks in relation to each method

Patrols

Patrol is a small group of two or more police officers performing duties in its area of responsibility.

The composition, specific mission and patrol area of responsibility is determined by the head of the police service who orders it.

Patrols are divided into foot and vehicle patrols.

The mission of the patrol may be either general, including the preservation of order and security in general or specific, appointed to specific tasks.

Patrols:

Are ordered during all 24-hours, in case there are special security and order circumstances or there are reasons to exercise stronger and coordinated policing or when there is a need to carry out special checks, particularly in cases of large-scale police operations, involving numerous police services.

Follow their patrol schedule and do not deviate from it unless they hear any noise or police whistle or they are informed about a crime or other serious incident. In these cases they hurry to the spot and act according to the law and their specific orders.

Assist the Armed Forces patrols, when invited by them, and ask for their assistance in an emergency situation.

The vehicle patrols perform their duties moving on patrol cars or motorcycles.

They have the same responsibilities as foot patrols, and in addition the following, which are peculiar to the place of their movement:

Act swiftly on anything happening in their area of responsibility and is under the responsibility of police. Accompany officials and large amounts of money and values transported.

The patrol cars:

Are manned by police personnel, called crew. If possible, at least one ranked officer participates in the crew. The higher ranked among the crew members is called the crew leader. If it is impossible to man the patrol cars with police officers, patrol cars may, at the discretion of the Director or Head of the police service, patrol with only the driver, in order to perform regular police duties. However, in these cases they are not allowed to move away from inhabited areas and intervene in cases of serious or widespread incidents of disorder, without the assistance of other colleagues.

They move on 24 hours basis or less time, depending on the personnel available and the operative needs of each Police authority.

The police cars are allowed to board, with the approval of the Director or Head of the respective police authority or, in urgent cases, with the approval of the crew leader:

- state officials that collaborate with police, as magistrates, coroners, health workers etc.,
- persons who, due to serious injuries or serious illness require immediate transfer to health care facilities because there is absence of such facilities on the spot having jurisdiction to handle such cases,
- Individuals who have been arrested or being transferred as suspects for examination, verification of identity and information gathering,
- minors, drunk and others individuals set under protective custody,
- individuals who are transferred to the competent judicial authorities upon request or as perpetrators of flagrant crimes.

Ambushes

Ambush is the settlement of a small police force, of at least two people, in some key points or intersections, under full coverage, with specific and clear mission.

The purpose of an ambush is to prevent and suppress crimes and the preservation of a feeling of security mainly to rural populations, achieved through checking passing individuals and vehicles, in order to identify and arrest persons and seize weapons carried, stolen items or other items evidences to a crime.

Ambushes are at any time of the day, in case there are special security circumstances or there are reasons to exercise stronger and coordinated policing or when there is a need to carry out special checks, particularly in cases of large-scale police operations, involving numerous police services.



The composition, armament, mission, duration and location of the ambush are determined by the one ordering this police activity, who also gives the leader of the ambush the necessary instructions. The leader of the ambush leads the police staff participating to settle on the identified spot, taking the necessary precautions and safety measures accordingly. The staff participating in the ambush is prohibited from moving, making noise or giving away its location in any other way. Checks are always performed by part of the staff of the ambush, while the rest is ready to protect those performing the checks.

Sighting

Sighting is the monitoring from appropriate location, of traffic and any other movement, to identify and check persons of concern to the police as suspects or perpetrators of crimes. Sighting is performed during the day from at least two policemen. A sighting may turn into an ambush during the night and vice versa an ambush may turn into a sighting during the day. The purpose of the sighting and the actions to be taken in each case are clearly defined to the leader of the sighting. At the location of the sighting, its leader has the responsibility to take security measures and to deploy the team in a way that its action will be easy and effective. The staff participating in the sighting is prohibited from moving, making noise or giving away its location in any other way.

Special Instructions - Operational Tactics

Each team of the Border Control Units:

Operates in a systematic, methodical and flexible way, to ensure its swift and effective action and additionally to render the measures taken not possible to be predicted or circumvented by facilitators of illegal migrants, or by persons attempting to enter or having entered the country illegally.

Puts special effort into ensuring that the change of shift takes place at the most vulnerable places of its area of responsibility, in order to avoid time gaps, during which illegal migrants, facilitators, etc., may achieve illegal crossing or other cross border criminal activities.

Handles cases related to offenses (crimes) that come to light after the arrest and detention of aliens, and persons involved in them.

Conducts stationary surveillance, ambushes and sighting. To this end, gives great priority to the control of key points (spots) taking always into account the prevailing circumstances and peculiarities of the area and using for this purpose all available technical means.

Implements the respective law on Aliens.

Patrols rendering its presence sound in all areas inhabited areas of responsibility, in order to contact the residents and obtain information.

Moves, behaves and acts in a manner that demonstrates a well-structured and organized group, taking into account what the presence of such a group has a particularly beneficial effect on the psychology of residents and a negative one in the persons under control.

Demonstrates special attention to the legitimacy of its actions and behaviour which in any case must be governed by a spirit of understanding and humanity.

Ensures its continuous communication with the BCU or any other nearest authority, in order to ensure availability of communication in case of emergency need for assistance and exchange of useful information / data on the checked persons and vehicle support to transfer the illegal migrants arrested.

Conducts checks of persons and vehicles, suspected to transport illegal migrants during which:
Takes the necessary self-protection measures.

Performs body checks of illegal immigrants and persons suspected to be facilitators, meticulously researching any luggage and vehicles.

Restriction and access to military areas

Specific areas close to the border line are subject to security measures defined under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Military Authorities.

In the case of Evros, the area close to the borderline constitutes a military restricted area and thus the local Military authorities must be informed in advance prior to any entrance to this area.

Therefore access to that area is only allowed in the presence of a Hellenic Police Officer and only when on specific duty (e.g. border surveillance).

Pursuit

Pursuit is divided into two categories:

- ☐ Pursuit on foot
- ☐ Vehicle Pursuit

Takes place when an unknown criminal runs away in order to avoid arrest by the Police.

Conditions of pursuit on foot:

The police officer has to inform his police service about the pursuit and provide in parallel the characteristics of the person and the direction that he follows.

If the police officer, due to the conditions, loses contact with the pursued person, the pursuit stops and tactical checks are conducted to the nearby area. At the same time the police officer informs his service to conduct coordinated search.

In case the pursued person carries a weapon or his hands cannot be seen by the police officer, the police officer keeps visual contact from a fixed safety distance, while informing regularly his service on his position and the direction that the pursued person follows. The purpose in that case is to arrest the pursued person when feasible, either due to the arrival of reinforces or under other circumstances.

In case the hands of the pursued person are visible and empty, the police officer's aim is to reach the person and arrest it.

Vehicle Pursuit

Takes place when a vehicle runs away not responding to a legal call for control by a police vehicle patrol.

Rules for vehicle pursuit that the police officers must follow:


Report the beginning of the pursuit and any relevant information.

Wear their seatbelts.

Try to drive in controlled speed, behind and to the left of the pursued vehicle, while keeping visual contact from a proper distance.

During the pursuit use the sound and light signals of the patrol car.

Inform their police service regularly on the location and the course of the vehicle, in order for reinforcements to organize a coordinated response.



Avoid answering to any gun firing during the pursuit, when the officers are not in a position to control the secure landing of the projectile and do not attempt to hit, divert or block the pursued vehicle, in order to stop it.

Stop the vehicle pursuit if due to the traffic it is dangerous for the police officers or the citizens.
Keep the firearms secured on their belt, in order to avoid accidental detonation or loss during the pursuit except other circumstances do not allow it.

Pays attention to objects that will possibly be thrown by the pursued vehicle and, without stopping, informs their police service in such case since these objects might be related to illegal actions
In case the patrol cars taking part in the pursuit are more than one, they are moving in a row, one after the other, and not side to side, following the patrol car that has the visual contact with the pursued vehicle, in order to tactically change the leading patrol car, in case of need.
In case vehicle pursuit turns into pursuit on foot and allowed by the circumstances, follow the rules of pursue on foot, while securing the service vehicle.
In case the pursued vehicle stops and one or more people are running away from it, while others do not leave the vehicle, they give priority in apprehending the ones that have stayed and providing description of the others to the police service for further search.
In case a patrol car receives fires from the pursued vehicle, if possible keep the visual contact increasing the distance from it while the police officers avoid to use their firearms if they cannot control the secure landing of their projectiles, informing simultaneously their police service.
In case the pursued vehicle managed to escape the police officers stop the pursuit and perform tactical control to the nearby area while at the same time inform their police service for the search to be coordinated, giving description of the vehicle and the passengers, if possible.
There might be the case that a patrol car is given the order to block the road and technically block the pursued vehicle. In this case this has to be done enough time before the pursued vehicle reaches that point, in order for the spot to be properly signed, so the block could be easily visible from a great distance and avoid accidents. Finally the police officers stand off the spot in a safe place.

INTERCEPTION/APPREHENSION

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station.

Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

During the control process of a suspect and when there is evidence connecting the individual to a criminal action, the suspect is apprehended and body search is conducted while at the same time evidence is collected.

If there are reasons that justify the arrested individual to be enchained (suspect of escaping or reacts violently), then he is enchained always with his hands behind his back and never in front of him.

The tactic of enchainment is always conducted by one police officer, while the second one covers his partner from a proper distance. The same tactic is been followed in case more police officers participate in the control process or there are more individuals to be apprehended.

All the apprehended persons are transferred to the respective police service or to a designated for them place.

For safety reasons and respect to the personality of the apprehended the police officers must avoid if possible transfer on foot, and call for support of a vehicle unit.

Rules for security body searches

Security body search takes place immediately after the arrest and aims at:

Discovering and seizing weapons or other objects that may facilitate the escape of the apprehended person.
Collecting evidence related to the crime, which could be destroyed by the apprehended person.

Body search on women is conducted by a woman police officer. If there is not one on the spot, the police officer indicates another woman to conduct the body search.

During the search the police officers must take care to not offend the personality or to unreasonably bother the individual under search, to the level that this is feasible.

In case no other woman is in the area, police officers pay special attention to secure that women apprehended do not carry any weapon or attempt to throw away possible evidences.

Evidence collection on the spot

The police officers that arrive first on the spot shall:

Keep intact the crime scene prohibiting to anyone non-authorized to approach and affect traces or objects found on the spot which can help in the investigation of the crime.

If the crime was committed in a room, to guard it at the exterior and not allow the entrance to anyone non-authorized.

Verify and report to their superiors the identity of the persons found, upon arrival at the crime scene or within short distance from it.

When evidences is possible to be lost, police officers arriving first on the spot and have no jurisdiction to investigate, list everything in details and submit their report to the investigating officers. They also gather any evidence and any information on the crime and the perpetrator given by the victims and other persons and where possible act in order to pursue and arrest the perpetrator.

Transportation of migrants

Transportation of the apprehended persons on land takes place with special service cars. Exceptionally, if there are no such cars available, any other services vehicle can be used, given that the Commander of the Unit responsible for this transportation considers this vehicle appropriate.

All the apprehended persons are transferred to the respective police service or to a designated for them place.

For safety reasons and respect to the personality of the apprehended the police officers must avoid if possible transfer on foot, and call for support of a vehicle unit.

FOLLOW UP MEASURES AT THE BPU/BCP/RECEPTION CENTRE

Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBCGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBCGTs may assist the local authorities on the examination of the personal circumstances of each person before removal processes. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

Members of the EBCGT may conduct their tasks with respect to the principle of non refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of *non-refoulement*.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBCGTs may support the host MS authorities in applying the special measures foreseen for the protection of vulnerable groups, who have been detected in the area of deployment. For this purpose and in accordance with the relevant EU and national legislation, the Members of the EBCGT will take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of

human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

Introduction and access to asylum

First Reception Service is the competent authority to inform third country citizens for both their rights and obligations after their detection in Hellenic territory by the Hellenic Police officers. Those who seek international protection are being sent over to the responsible Asylum Office, a department of which may be in operation in the first reception center.

In each stage of first reception procedure, submitting a demand of being under international protection obligates the separation of the demanding person and his being sent over to the proper Asylum Office. Receiving the demands and the interviews of the seekers may be held inside the facilities of the first reception services, and the persons remain in the facilities for as long as the examination of their demands lasts. Priority is given to the examination of international protection applications of persons under detention.

If the above mentioned timelines are expired and the international protection demand is not completed, the Asylum Office provides the seeker with a Bulletin of Asylum Demand, and he is being sent over to proper facilities, for which is responsible the Health and Social Care Ministry. Since the demand and the recourse are rejected while the third country citizens remain in the first reception center or unit, they are being sent over to the responsible for the deportation, return and readmission authorities.

After the suggestion of the medical and psychosocial support subdivision supervisor, the Head of each Center or Unit hands over the persons who are considered to be vulnerable to the service which is responsible for social support or protection. In each case, the appropriate cure treatment is ensured when it is demanded. As vulnerable groups are considered the following individuals:

- a. Unaccompanied minors.
- b. Disabled persons or persons with incurable diseases.
- c. Elder people.
- d. Pregnant women.
- e. One parent families with minor children.
- f. Victims of torture, rape, or other severe psychological, somatic, sexual violence or exploitation.
- g. Trafficking victims.

According to the Hellenic Legislation, every alien has the right to submit in person a demand for international protection either for himself/herself or for the members of his/her family, as long as the above mentioned adult members, agree with the demand.

More specifically, for victims of human-trafficking and unaccompanied minors

1. Vulnerable persons-Potential victims of human-trafficking

In the case when in entry points (BCPs, airports, etc.) individuals with evidence of being potential victims of human-trafficking are detected, the first-line (Police) officers (border guards) hands them over to the second-line (Police) Services (Departments and Teams responsible for combating human-trafficking), the personnel of which has undergone special training on the identification, approach and conduct of interviews with potential victims of trafficking with the purpose of acknowledging with certainty their true status. In the latter case, the competent Judicial Authority identifies the person as a "victim of human-trafficking". Afterwards, via the National Center for Social Solidarity, assistance is provided to the victim, in terms of accommodation, legal and psychological support, medical care, residence permit etc. (further details are

foreseen in the Presidential Decree N. 233 of 2003 on the "Protection and assistance of victims of human-trafficking"), with the purpose of social inclusion or the safe repatriation of the victim.

2. Unaccompanied minors

Every unaccompanied minor who is detected arriving in Hellenic territory is referred to the competent Judicial Authorities, according to the national legislation. Afterwards, they are transferred to the First Reception Services, which are responsible for the identification of their nationality and overall status (as unaccompanied). Furthermore, these Services conduct every possible effort for the localization of their families in due time and take all necessary measures for their legal representation. It is important to stress that the Legal Representative can either be a member of the competent local Judicial Authority (on a provisional basis) or a social worker (on a permanent basis).

Then the minors are transferred to "Pre-Removal Detention Centers". In such centers are accommodated migrants awaiting repatriation. The minors are separated from the rest of the migrants and are accommodated in special until the procedures for the specification of their infancy, origin identification and asylum status are completed. Afterwards, they are transferred, according to the national legislation and in cooperation with the National Center for Social Solidarity and NGOs, in special accommodation facilities/youth hostels.

In the case of minors not applying for asylum and when after the conclusion of the relevant investigation, their parents are not tracked in Greece, the INTERPOL is informed for further investigation. Then, repatriation decisions are issued with or without detention for the minors. When they are detained, they are accommodated in special facilities, apart from the rest of (adult) migrants. When their repatriation is not possible due to a variety of reasons, such as the lack of direct flight, they are transferred to Special Centers of Accommodation for youths. Repatriation is always subject to the protection of the child, the reassurance that the child is not put in danger in the country of origin and that the social and family environment can provide for the normal reintegration of the minor.

In the case of unaccompanied minors applying for asylum, the Police Services following the principle of family-reunification, are trying to reunite the minors with other members of their families residing in other MSs of the EU. For this purpose, they cooperate with the UNHCR and with NGOs, in order to compose the relevant applications and manage the transfer of the minors close to their families guaranteeing their safety. Then they are transferred to appropriate accommodation facilities, where all necessary procedures are taking place for the nomination of a guardian, who is assisting the minor through all the asylum processes.

Guide to Behaviour

Thousands of individuals with different religious beliefs and cultural background reside in Greece. In order to promote the protection of fundamental rights and to avoid discrimination towards any human-being living in Greece, the following safeguards are foreseen by the National Constitution:

Article 2 § 1 of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental constitutional principle of respect of human value as a person.

Article 5 § 2 of the Constitution absolutely protects the human life, the honour and the freedom of everyone who lives in the Greek territory without discrimination on nationality, race, language and religious or political beliefs.

Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the inviolability of freedom of religious conscience and in addition protects according to the law every known religion and everything about its worship, which are committed without hindrance, if these do not offend public order and morality.

During police checks, identification, arrest or detention, police officers should be professional avoiding any racist or degrading behaviour. Moreover, police personnel should treat every person equally according to the provisions of the Constitution and relevant national legislation.

Religious Beliefs

All religions are worthy of respect.

It is prohibited to insult sacred texts or symbols.

The disturbance of places in which worship and ceremonies are taking place is prohibited.

Minors

Any person stating that has not yet reached the age of 18 is considered a minor.

Minor residing outside the country and away from any parent or legal guardian is considered an unaccompanied minor.

During the police checks, identification, arrest or detention, police officers should:

- know that when there is no evidence of a person being a minor, then it is considered a minor.
- not bind minors in handcuffs unless it is considered necessary
- inform the parents of the minor immediately
- inform the minor about his/her right to contact a lawyer
- be aware that restricting the freedom of minors is always the last resort and is necessary only for the minimum required time
- be aware that minors are detained in premises specially designated and separate from adults
- be aware that unaccompanied alien minors have the right to seek international protection and asylum.

USE OF FORCE/WEAPONS

Principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBCGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

Principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBCGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

Permissible weapons

According to the provisions of the laws n. 2168/1993 and 3169/2003, policemen (police personnel, special guards and border guards) may carry revolvers and semi-automatic pistols.

The following rules apply for the carrying of service weapons:

"Policemen shall be allowed to possess and carry firearms for which they have been trained, since they are considered physically and mentally appropriate. Policemen shall carry fixed firearms, in accordance with the provisions of the Presidential Decree 141/1991.

Policemen shall always carry personal service firearms during their service, while they shall be allowed to carry such firearms while they are out of service. Exceptionally, policemen shall not carry firearms, when carriage is prohibited by electoral legislation and during their service, upon relevant order. This order shall be given in the event of a particular danger for the success of a mission or their own and the citizens' security or for the keeping of firearms"

Permissible equipment

[REDACTED]

Following the provisions of the law 3169/2003, the following equipment may be carried:

Metal handcuffs and Rubber baton.

Moreover, no kind of spray is allowed for carriage/usage within the Hellenic territory.

The above list is exhaustive and restrictive to any other equipment.

Procedure of issuing weapon permits

When notified by MSs or Opera platform on the advent of new Guest-Officers carrying weapons, the Hellenic NFPoC submits a written request to State Security Division of the Hellenic Police Headquarters in order to issue weapon permits. The request should always include the following:

- Last name, first name and any other id details of the Guest Officers who are about to be deployed in the Hellenic territory.
- Exact deployment period (including arrival/departure dates in Greece).
- Entry/exit point and point of deployment.
- Weapon details (s/n, type, brand, model).
- Ammunition details (possible s/n, type, brand, model, amount).
- Any other personal equipment the Guest Officer may carry (button, handcuffs) and is allowed by the Legislation on Weapons.
- Matching each weapon in each guest officer (the weapon permits are issued separately for every officer and for specific weapons to carry with).
- In case of weapon rotation, the Hellenic NFPoC must be informed about the same above mentioned details.

The State Security Division then orders the proper regional or local authority (according to the entry point or the point of deployment) to issue the relevant weapon permits.

The issued weapon permits shall be given to the Guest Officers at the entry and/or deployment point by the competent authority. In the case of one GO carrying more than one weapons and large amount of ammunition, to be handed over to his/her colleagues on the spot the Hellenic NFPoC must be informed about the above mentioned details, as well as the id details of the one GO who will be responsible for carrying them in and out of the Hellenic territory.

Conditions to use weapons

Use of firearms is defined, according to the law 3169/2003, as activation of firearm against a target and the projection of a missile (shooting). Shooting, accordingly to shooting target shall be ranged in:

Intimidating shooting, when no causation of harm is intended against any target.

Against objects, when causation of harm is intended to objects.

In order to immobilize, when causation of harm to non-vital parts of the body -especially to lower limbs- is intended, and elimination, when causation of harm to a person is intended and his/her death is possible.

(Armed attack shall exist when the person who attacks uses a gun, stipulated in art.1 of Law 2168/1993 against a person or threatens someone by its direct use. As armed attack shall be also defined threat under a convincing imitation of a gun or an inactive gun)

According to the article 3 of the above mentioned law:

(1) Policemen while executing their service shall be allowed to precede their firearm, since there is danger of armed attack against them or a third person.

(2) Policemen shall be allowed to make use of firearms, if is necessary in order to execute their duty, and the following conditions apply:

[REDACTED]

All lighter than shooting means have been used, unless they are not available or convenient in a particular case. Lighter means shall be defined as advice, suggestions, use of barriers, physical violence, police bar, allowed chemical substances or other means, advance notice for use of firearm and threat under firearm. They have declared their capacity and have clearly and understandably notice for possible use of firearm, giving enough time of response, unless something like this is futile under these specific circumstances or intensifies danger of death or physical damage.

Use of firearm shall not consist of excessive means in relation to kind of damage and risk of threat.

(3) In the event that the aforementioned conditions apply, lighter use of firearms shall be done, unless such action is futile under such circumstances or intensifies death risk or physical damage. Lighter use of firearm shall be defined as escalation of its use with the least possible and necessary harm, pursuant to subparagraph d of article 1.

(4) Shooting for intimidation purposes or shooting against objects shall be permitted, especially in cases of danger from an animal or advance notice for shooting against person, since all proper measures have been taken, so as no man shall be hurt by miss or banishment of missile. Shooting against a vehicle, which involves danger of physical damage of persons in it, shall be allowed exclusively under conditions of the following paragraph.

(5) Shooting for immobilization purposes shall be allowed, since it is required:

In order to repel an armed attack, since such attack commenced or is about to commence, and any delay may render defence ineffective.

In order to prevent materialization or continuance of dangerous crime or crime that is committed under the use or threat of physical violence.

In order to arrest a sentenced person or a person under trial or a person under pursuit who shall be detected to commit "flagrante delicto" a felony or a regulatory offence, since such person demonstrated opposition to his/her arrest and there is direct risk to make use of firearm.

In order to prevent illegal entrance in the country or exit from it of persons that shall attempt illegal transfer of people (trafficking in human beings) and objects and shall carry firearms of subparagraph 1, art.1 of Law 2168/1993.

In order to protect public utility facilities or places in which objects that are dangerous for public health or public order or evidence for a crime are kept, since their keeping has been exclusively assigned to policemen and violent access, caution of harm or removal of kept objects is attempted.

In order to prevent an escape or release of a prisoner that is attempted under armed attack.

In order to prevent disarmament of policemen during their service.

(6) Elimination shooting shall be allowed, if required:

In order to repel an attack that involves death risk or heavy physical damage of a person.

In order to rescue hostages who are in risk of death or heavy physical damage.

(7) Shooting for immobilization or elimination shall be prohibited:

If there is serious danger to cause a third person due to miss or banishment of missile.

Against armed crowd, if there is serious danger to cause harm to unarmed people.

Against minors, if it is the only means to prevent a risk of danger.

Against a person who runs away, when he/she is called to go under legal control.

(8) When policemen act as a group, in order to make use of firearms, command by the group head is required, unless policemen are under attack, which involves possibility of heavy physical damage or death.


(9) Unconstitutional or profoundly illegal command by a senior for use of firearm shall not repeal the illegal nature of policemen's action.

(10) Every use of firearms by policemen shall be directly reported in the competent police Authority and Judicial Authority.

Conditions to use police equipment

Following the provisions of the 8517/4/7-µß' dated 17-02-2004 decision of the Minister of Public Order, as it has been amended with later acts:

(Article 9)



Police constables, sergeants and warrant officers are equipped with police baton, the type of which depends on their task.

The use of the police baton is allowed only after an order of a superior and in the case of self-defence. The policeman, who has used his baton, on his own initiative, must report the incident to his Service immediately, also reporting in details the reasons that led him to this decision.

(Article 119)

During the arrest of a person the following rules must be followed:

If there is any suspicion that the person might attempt to escape, because of his record or his behaviour during the arrest, he may be handcuffed, to prevent escape.

Immediate measures to be taken following the use of weapon.

In case there is use of firearms by a police officer he has to immediately report this incident to his Police service.

Special rules to dog handlers

Police dog handlers must always keep their police dogs under constant control. This rule applies with special attention close to the borderline area since the Military Authorities consider crossing of the border line by persons, animals, vehicles and objects, from any point other than the officially designated as "Border Incident".

HUNGARY

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBCGT¹⁰

ARTICLE 21 par. 4 OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBCGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc.)

Patrol is a small group of two or more police officers performing duties in its area of responsibility.

The composition, specific mission and patrol area of responsibility is determined by the head of the police service who orders it.

Patrols are divided into foot and vehicle patrols.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBCGT

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBCGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

¹⁰ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Security body searches, transportation to the nearest BPU/BCP, escort them, etc

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

(a) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBCGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

(b) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBCGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBCGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of

[REDACTED]

suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

(c) *Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons*

Members of the EBCGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

4. Use of force/weapons

a) *Define the principles on the use of force*

When using force, members of the EBCGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state.

b) *Define the principles on the use of weapons*

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBCGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

c) *Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible*

The use of the following equipment are allowed: regular service hand-weapons with ammo, handcuffs, police baton (rubber), chemical spray (capsicum) and service dogs. The dogs must be leashed and muzzled.

d) *Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)*

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

e) *Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons*

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

f) *Special rules to dog handlers*

[REDACTED]

The dogs must be leashed and muzzled.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Provisions pertaining to the members of foreign organizations, carrying out border control tasks

**POLICE ACT of the Republic of Hungary
Act XXXIV. of 1994 on the Police**

Article 62/A (1) A member of the agency carrying out border control tasks of a State applying the Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers may solely, on the territory of the Republic of Hungary:

- a) use physical coercion, under Article 47., handcuffs, under Article 48. and truncheon, under Article 49.,
 - b) may keep his/her service firearm on his/her person, but may only use it in case of rightful defence or a case of emergency;
 - c) may apprehend the person unlawfully present on the territory of the country but is obliged to hand the apprehended person over to the police without delay.
- (2) According to (1) a) and b), a member of the agency carrying out border control tasks may use means of coercion or a firearm as regulated in the country of his/her place of service if the use of such means of coercion or firearm is not prohibited by law on the territory of the Republic of Hungary.
- (3) The member of the foreign agency carrying out border control tasks shall be instructed about the conditions pertaining to the taking of measures and use of means of coercion as under (1).

5. Border checks

- a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBCGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

- b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive

2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

In case when persons/migrants need international protection, the Hungarian Police is not allowed to make official procedure, however it records the asylum application of the persons during the alien policing procedure. In these cases the National Police forwards the asylum applications (and the asylum seekers) to the competent authority, which is the Office of Immigration and Asylum (from the 1st of January 2017 its name will change to the Office of Immigration and Asylum). The unaccompanied minors will be examined by doctors in order to diagnose their real ages. If the result of the examination confirms the age of the migrant, they will be sent to children protection institutes and official caretaker will be appointed by the Police. If the result of the examination doesn't confirm the age of the migrant and the migrant seeks for asylum, see the procedure above. The vulnerable groups will be separated from other groups. If they are under alien policing procedure they have to wait for the result of the procedure at the detention center.

c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBCGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

The GO shall follow the instructions of the border guard of the Host member state, in case of any suspicious act (corruption, break of human rights) the Head of Local Coordinator.

e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBCGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBCGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBCGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

The Hungarian Police does not give access to the national databases. The members of EBCG will be allowed to consult with the experts of the Host Member State but as the final decision about the refusal of entry shall be made "by an authority empowered by national law" (2016/399 Regulation, Art. 14.2). The experts of EBCG are allowed to use the SIS and VIS databases and other databases from their home countries.

h) Procedure related to stamping

The relevant information will be given by the Local Coordinator at the briefing.

11/11/2016

Commented [A26]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the participation of national law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Disclosing the recent deployments would expose the detailed composition of national law enforcement assets allocated to the operation, jeopardizing the implementation of ongoing and future operations. Its publicity would expose sensitive operational information such as *modus operandi* and tasks and responsibilities of authorities involved, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

ANNEX 8 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

1. Operational briefing

During the first day of deployment all participants taking part in the joint operation will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS. Use of Power Point presentation is highly recommendable. Participants shall wear uniforms (if applicable). Briefing meetings are to be attended at least by:

- The members of the teams deployed to the operational area,
- Crews of all technical means (deployed by MS or additional by the national Authorities) such as aerial means, patrol cars, mobile surveillance vehicles etc.
- Internally deployed officers (if applicable)
- Relevant staff from the hosting law enforcement authorities involved (esp. Military and Customs)

A field visit for all deployed members of the teams shall be organized on the briefing day.

1.1. General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex and national authorities.

1.2. National briefing delivered by host MS

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS.

The National briefers are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by Frontex Training Unit (TRU).

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Report to the project manager (TRU) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;
- Prepare Report from National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (TRU);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

In case the local authorities have not nominated National briefers in the location where resources will be deployed, LCC Coordinators are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within the JO.

2. Operational debriefing

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by FOC/FCO/Operational Team members or FSO in close cooperation with local authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- In case the Operational debriefing cannot be organized for each deployed asset, it can be limited to NO within the ICC;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be as part of Operational debriefing.

National Briefer shall attend the Operational debriefing.

ANNEX 9 - COOPERATION WITH OTHER UNION AGENCIES AND BODIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Cooperation with Europol

Frontex and the European Police Office (Europol) cooperate during the JO through exchange of information and intelligence. Frontex and Europol cooperate under the framework of processing personal data for risk analysis (PeDRA).

This cooperation is governed by the Operational Agreement between the two agencies that was signed on 4 December 2015, and is covered by Frontex Management Board Decision 58/2015 adopting Implementing Measures for processing personal data collected during joint operations, pilot projects and rapid interventions.

Under the scope of PeDRA, Frontex may transmit to Europol personal data collected by MS during Frontex coordinated JO and relating to individuals suspected of involvement in facilitation, human trafficking and other cross-border crimes.

Debriefing activities are tailored not only based on intelligence requirements originating from Frontex and the host Member State, but also from requests from Europol resulting from investigative/operational needs and subsequently agreed with Frontex.

The channel for the flow of information from Member States to Frontex and then to Europol is described in Handbook (under PeDRA).

Cooperation with Interpol

Frontex and Interpol cooperate during the JO through collection of data and intelligence. In particular, the information collected during the screening and debriefing activities, with possible links to other criminality such as terrorism, trafficking in human beings and smuggling of illicit goods, will be passed to the host authorities, which is a responsible entity to ensure the further dissemination to Interpol, if relevant.

The access to Interpol's global databases enabling comparison of fingerprints, photographs and travel documents to identify internationally wanted persons using false identities shall be developed and ensured in the registration locations.

Cooperation with EASO

Frontex and EASO have established their cooperation in the area of asylum and migration management, exchanging information and best practices on the functioning of their experts' database, sharing their respective training activities and their reports. The Agencies plan to strengthen their cooperation in operational areas, including training on nationality establishment and best practices and methods to better identify persons in need of international protection and promptly refer them to the competent authorities.

With regard to this JO, Frontex, in cooperation with the host MS, will instruct debriefing members of the teams to collect personal data during operational activities regarding persons who cross the external borders without authorisation. The collection of personal data as referred above and its processing, namely its transmission to EASO, will be subject of special briefing on PeDRA project.

Frontex and EASO will strengthen the coordination of their activities in the operational area in close cooperation with the host Member States authorities to ensure prompt referral and effective access to asylum procedures in accordance with the Common European Asylum Acquis.



Cooperation with FRA

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) can support Frontex in the mainstreaming of fundamental rights in all Frontex activities. Upon request, FRA can provide advice on how to operationalise fundamental rights in Frontex operations. Frontex and FRA also cooperate in the planning and implementation of research at the external EU borders. Staff deployed by Frontex is encouraged to use materials published by FRA available at www.fra.europa.eu, in particular the Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration as well as the Handbook on European data protection law.

Cooperation with UNHCR

During the JO UNHCR will cooperate with Frontex in aspects related to international protection and the implementation of the principle of non-refoulement, starting with the operational briefing where UNHCR, together with Frontex, will brief the members of the teams on access to international protection (a theoretical and practical approach) and fundamental rights. The aim is to give the members of the teams an increased knowledge and further skills in how to tackle fundamental rights in sea border operations while performing border checks.

Cooperation with EUROJUST

In cooperation with the host MS, Frontex shall will instruct members of the teams to collect personal data during operational activities regarding persons who are suspected of involvement in cross-border crime, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings or terrorism, regarding persons who cross the external borders without authorisation and license plate numbers, vehicle identification numbers, telephone numbers or ship identification numbers which are linked to these two categories of persons and which are necessary for investigating cross-border crime. The collection of personal data as referred above and its processing, namely its transmission to EUROJUST will be subject of special briefing on PeDRA project.

ANNEX 10 - COORDINATION STRUCTURE (Tasks and Roles of Participants)

Member States

International Coordination Centre (ICC)

The ICC shall be located in the premises ensuring the most efficient coordination of the joint operation taking into account all the integrated activities.

The operation shall be coordinated from the ICC and be accessible for the Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC), National Officials (NO) and other operational actors on a 24/7 basis.

The ICC shall meet the minimum requirement providing the capability for the ICC to communicate and coordinate the LCCs, assets and experts deployed. The ICC' staff consists of an ICC Coordinator and duty officers. The Host MS has to ensure the participation of English speaking staff in the ICC in order to ensure communication with the participants of JO and Frontex staff.

The ICC shall:

- Lead and coordinate the implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Coordinate, based on a daily threat and risk assessment, the deployment of human and technical resources at the right time and locations;
- Gather, combine and share information and intelligence about all border related incidents;
- Plan an intelligence driven tactical and/or strategic synchronization of available human and technical resources;
- Ensure communication and cooperation between the participants JO;
- Administer the patrolling schedule database: plan patrolling activities and working hours for deployed staff, and record planned and delivered activities;
- Elaborate the daily reports with situational updates from the operational area;
- Follow up and report the cases which need immediate attention, further reporting and handling;
- Coordinate and facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area.

Frontex requirements for the ICC:

- Ensure a 24/7 functioning to achieve the situational awareness and proper coordination of the ongoing operation;
- Be manned by duty officers/operators, be equipped with necessary technical and administrative staff of the host national authorities involved on a 24/7 basis unless otherwise agreed between Frontex and the host MS;
- Have staff with operational experience and sufficient skills in English designated for each working shift to supervise, perform and support the coordination of the operational activities;
- Ensure telecommunication between the ICC and all participants of JO and Frontex;
- Ensure the radio communication between the ICC and all deployed assets;
- Ensure access to the internet and printer for the staff in the ICC;
- Ensure the daily delivery of the Daily Reporting Package to Frontex.

ICC Coordinator

The ICC Coordinator is an officer assigned by the respective national authority of the host MS. He/she is responsible for leading and coordinating the daily operational activities and fulfilment of the tasks of the ICC throughout the joint operation in the whole operational area. The ICC Coordinator is the chairman of the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).

[REDACTED]

To ensure the continuous presence of the ICC Coordinator, he/she shall be deputized by an assigned officer who shall take over the responsibilities and tasks during his/her absence.

The ICC Coordinator shall:

- Lead the coordinated implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Initiate and present adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures to Frontex, when it is justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by operational needs;
- Chair the JCB meetings on a daily basis throughout the joint operation;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Ensure the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (collection of all reports and Daily Reporting Package dissemination);
- Monitor the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further developments regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Work closely and continuously with the NO and the FOC;
- Coordinate and facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area.

Joint Coordinating Board (JCB)

The JCB runs the operation and is established within the ICC. The JCB is composed at least of the ICC Coordinator, the NO and the FOC. Other relevant Frontex staff may take part in the JCB meetings via videoconference.

The JCB carries out meetings on a daily basis (unless otherwise agreed and properly justified), chaired by the ICC Coordinator.

National Official (NO)

The MS deploying their aerial assets to the operational area shall appoint and deploy the NO in the ICC for the period the assets are deployed. As it is already stated under the chapter 3.2.1.2. Terrestrial assets, there is no need for the NO to accompany the deployed Dog Teams, TVV, Patrols Cars or other light TE; nevertheless, it might be accepted if justified based on the operational needs and approved by the Operational Manager. The NO is responsible for coordinating the actions of his/her respective national asset according to the national legislation in close cooperation with the ICC Coordinator.

The National Official shall:

- Contribute to the proper implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Contribute to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by operational needs;
- Take part and contribute to the JCB meetings on a daily basis;
- Ensure that the decisions of the JCB are followed by the asset for which he/she has the coordination responsibility;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further development regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Contribute to the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (deliver Technical Equipment Mission Report, contribute to the incidents reporting, Patrolling Schedule, etc);
- Work closely and continuously with his/her operational entity to ensure an efficient operational management of the assets according to updated risk assessment and operational needs.

Members of the teams and Officers of the host MS

Members of the teams shall have the capacity, under instructions from, and, as a general rule, in presence of the Host Member State officers to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks and/or border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.

On a case by case decision, the host Member State may authorise members of the teams to act on its behalf. Such authorization and the terms and conditions to act shall be transmitted by the team leader. The national border guard service of the host MS and its staff have the leading role in the implementation of the joint operation.

Interpreters/Cultural Mediators

Frontex and the host MS would consider the need to deploy interpreters/cultural mediators. The interpreters will be part of the JDT or screening teams and will provide linguistic support to the local authorities and experts in order to enhance the debriefing/screening as well as increase the quality of information gathered. The interpreters/cultural mediators should be fluent in languages spoken by migrants.

At the request of the host MS, interpreters/cultural mediators could provide linguistic support to the local authorities during official procedures, when this support has been agreed between Frontex and the host MS and is linked to Frontex coordinated operational activities.

Local Coordination Centre (LCC)

The host MS in cooperation with Frontex may establish LCC for the coordination of activities at the local level. The LCC shall operate on a 24/7 basis, providing in real time an operational picture in order to coordinate the human resources and technical means deployed in the JO. The LCC shall meet the minimum requirement providing the capability to communicate and coordinate the resources deployed. The LCC' staff consists of personnel of the respective national authority of the host MS. LCC will operate under the coordination of the ICC, thus both being in permanent contact.

The LCC shall:

- Lead and coordinate the implementation of the operational activity in the area of responsibility as described in the Operational Plan;
- Plan an intelligence driven tactical and/or strategic synchronization of available technical and human resources in the area of responsibility;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promotion of further developments regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Facilitate the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (contribute to the Daily Reporting Package);
- Ensure communication and cooperation between the participants of the JO ;
- Ensure the daily LCC reporting from the area of responsibility;
- Coordinate and facilitate the cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations implementing activities in the operational area on local level.

LCC Coordinator

The LCC Coordinator is a nominated officer of the respective national authority of the host MS. The LCC Coordinator is responsible for leading the daily operational activities in the area of responsibility in close cooperation with and under coordination of the ICC Coordinator throughout the joint operation.

To ensure the continuous presence of the LCC Coordinator he/she shall be deputized by an assigned officer who shall take over the responsibilities and tasks during his/her absence.

[REDACTED]

The LCC Coordinator shall:

- Lead the proper implementation of the joint operation in the area of responsibility as described in the Operational Plan;
- Ensure that the decisions of the JCB and the ICC Coordinator are followed in the area of responsibility;
- Contribute to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by the risk assessment and/or operational needs;
- Contribute to the proper implementation of information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Chair the operational meetings in the LCC;
- Monitor the operational situation in the area of responsibility to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further developments of the organizational and operational issues;
- Provide the ICC with the incident reports on situational updates from the operational area;
- Work closely and continuously with the deployed resources in the area of responsibility and the ;
- Follow instructions of the ICC;
- Coordinate and facilitate the cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations implementing activities in the operational area on local level.

Liaison Officer (LO)

The different authorities of host MS and/or home MS may appoint and deploy a LO in the ICC and LCC if established, to facilitate the cooperation between different components from the involved authorities of host and/or home MS ensuring an effective implementation of the operational activities.

Intelligence officer

The IO shall be nominated by the host MS authorities and deployed to the ICC/RCC or to the LCC if required. The IO shall be tasked to act, on a full time basis, as a daily connection between the local authorities and the ICC/LCC in gathering and sharing relevant operational information and intelligence. The IO cooperates with the ICC/LCC Coordinators, the Frontex Operational Analyst (OA) and the FOC on a daily basis.

The role of the IO is to support data collection and intelligence gathering activities in close cooperation with the Operational Analyst, providing the interviewing experts and the Operational Analyst with constant updates on modus operandi, routes and the involvement of facilitators and any other relevant information available at national level. In the case of unexpected migratory events and new trends or modus operandi, the OA might request the IO to draft special intelligence reports.

The IO should support the coordination of the activities of the Joint Debriefing Teams in close cooperation with the OA, the ICC Coordinator and the Operational Team.

The IO shall also attend and take an active role in the meetings of JCB, especially concerning information that might be operationally valuable for the redeployment of deployed resources, and is responsible for sending the debriefing templates to Frontex by accessing the templates on JORA and performing the validation procedure.

Intelligence units of the national authorities of the host MS should cooperate closely with the IO including the establishment of a network of contact points in order to ensure a constant and adequate flow of information related to the Frontex coordinated operational activities for further analytical assessments.

The IO shall:

- Contribute to the proper implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan in particular to the information gathering/intelligence aspects of the JO;
- In close cooperation with the OA, contribute with facilitating exchange of information, to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedure when it is justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by the operational needs;

- Take part and contribute to the JCB especially concerning information that might be operationally valuable for the redeployment of human and technical resources;
- Be a constant link between the deployed experts and the ICC to facilitate their activities by providing them with regular updates on modus operandi, routes, involvement of facilitators and feedback on the output of interviews, in close cooperation with the FLO, in accordance with the analytical assessments prepared by the OA;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation of the operational activities and promote the further development regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Validate and send interview reports to Frontex on JORA
- Contribute, along with Frontex, to the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (deliver the IO Daily Report, interview/debriefing/screening reports collected from experts, contribute with the complementary information to the Incident Reports and Daily Statistical Reports);
- Work closely with the OA and the FLO, the ICC Coordinator, the NO as well as the FC, for intelligence matters;
- Communicate with the representatives of other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area based on the need to know principle and applicable legislation.

Local staff of the host MS

The experts/assets deployed will be supported by the local staff of different authorities of the host MS during their deployments.

The national authorities of the host MS, have the leading role in the implementation of the operational activities. The participants shall support and, based on their mandate, carry out measures in line and in agreement with the local staff.

The basic tasks of local staff are according to the relevant national law and internal regulations of the national authorities, but additionally they should:

- Cooperate closely and support the participants of the JO to carry out their tasks.
- Be familiar with the Operational Plan and the tasks assigned to the local level;

Based on the operational needs and an agreement between the host MS and Frontex, additional staff of different authorities of the host MS with specific skills and expertise could be deployed to the ICC, LCC or operational area in order to increase the operational capacity and support the participants of JO.

Frontex

Operational Manager and Operational Team

The Operational Team is composed of Operational Manager (OM) and Operational Team Members assigned for the management and coordination of the joint operation.

The OM is responsible for the joint operations acting as the Frontex representative for the defined activity. The OM will be supported by assigned specialized staff from the relevant Frontex units/sectors forming the Operational Team. The OM is responsible for distribution of tasks between the team members and their proper management, whereas the responsibility for the operation remains within the OM.

The OM shall:

- Coordinate the planning, implementation including reporting and evaluation of the operational activity;
- Prepare the relevant joint operation related documentation;
- Elaborate Frontex' financial contribution to the defined activity and ensure that administrative and financial procedures are followed;

- Ensure the professional maintenance and an archiving system of the operational documentation in line with Frontex standards;
- Draft a proposal for the Operational Plan in accordance to the Standard Operational Procedure (SOP), in cooperation and agreement with the host MS and consultation with home MS, for the defined operational activity ;
- Follow the latest developments of the operation, and propose/initiate the updates /amendments of the Operational Plan, if needed;
- Gather, store and analyse an information received from the different sources;
- Follow up the operational budget consumption and management of the available funds;
- Facilitate the cooperation with other units/sectors, the MS and third countries;
- Facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations taking part in the joint operational activities;
- Follow instructions received from line managers and keep them informed about the implementation of assigned tasks;

Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)

The role of the FCO is to foster cooperation and coordination amongst host and participating MS. The nominated FCO, as the Frontex representative, is responsible to provide the host and participating MS with all the relevant information related to the Frontex co-financed activities in the framework of the JO. The FCO shall act on behalf of Frontex in all aspects of the deployment of the teams.

The FCO shall:

- Act as an interface between Frontex and the host MS;
- Act as an interface between Frontex and the members of the teams, providing assistance, on behalf of the Agency, on all issues relating to the conditions of their deployment;
- Monitor the correct implementation of the operational plan;
- Report to Frontex on all aspects of the deployment of the teams.

The FCO may be authorized by the ED to assist in resolving any disagreement on the execution of the Operational Plan and deployment of the teams.

Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)

The FOC is permanently deployed throughout the joint operation in the ICC or at the location wherefrom the most efficient coordination can be accomplished.

The FOC shall:

- Monitor and facilitate the implementation of the operational activities as defined in the Operational Plan;
- Initiate adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or operational needs;
- Be present in the JCB meetings, and give advice, particularly to the ICC Coordinator and the NO;
- Monitor the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further organizational and operational developments;
- Monitor and facilitate the information gathering, sharing and dissemination process as well as the functioning of the reporting system;
- Provide Frontex HQ with daily situation reports from the operational area and specific reports on cases which need immediate attention, further reporting and handling;
- Work closely with and be accessible for the ICC Coordinator;
- Work closely with, follow instructions from and be accessible for the OM and Frontex HQ.

Frontex Support Officer (FSO)

The FCO and/or FOC can be assisted by the FSO acting as the Frontex representative and deployed at the operational locations wherefrom the most efficient support can be accomplished on local level, to ensure the efficient implementation of the operational activities by supporting the LCC Coordinator, the deployed resources and promoting further developments.

The FSO shall:

- Support and monitor the proper implementation of the joint operation as described in the Operational Plan;
- Support and initiate adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures, when justified by updated risk assessment and/or by operational needs;
- Support the monitoring and facilitate the proper implementation of the information gathering, sharing and dissemination and the related reporting system;
- Provide FCO and/or FOC with daily reports/updates from the respective operational area;
- Work closely with and follow instructions from the FCO and/or FOC and the OM.

Operational Analyst (OA)

Frontex shall appoint at least one OA to assess constantly relevant information from all available sources and maintain close contacts with the FLO (if applicable) for the gathering of relevant information for risk analysis. The OA shall produce regular analytical assessments related to the operational activities enabling a wider vision on the risks, threats and overall situation affecting the operational area, supporting decision making on proper operational responses both for the hosting authorities and Frontex.

In addition, the OA will contribute by providing analytical input to the preparation and the evaluation of the operation.

The OA will generate intelligence requirements for JDT for the gathering of tailored information from migrants.

The OA shall:

- Be responsible for the creation and update of the Incident Template in JORA related to the JO in question, including marking/unmarking the mandatory fields and draft the Specific Annex of the Operational Plan describing the indicators of the JORA Template;
- Provide guidelines and briefing for the reporting officers involved in JORA reporting and validating;
- Produce analytical assessments, on a weekly or/and bi-weekly or/and monthly and ad-hoc basis, of the given situation of the operational areas and beyond to be distributed to the Operational Team, and via the FOC to the ICC and home MS;
- Provide feedback and guidelines to the JDT on the quality and content of the interview /debriefing/ screening reports and maintain regularly direct contacts with the JDT;
- Monitor the activities of JDTs in the operational area and make proposals for redeployment or changes in relation to the JDT activities when needed based on the operational situation;
- The OA will brief and debrief the Debriefing Experts;
- Provide the FCO and/or FOC with the analytical support needed for the ongoing reporting;
- Give the OM, the FCO, the FOC and the ICC advice and/or proposals on the planning of operational activities in the predefined operational areas and recommend countermeasures to the authorities encouraging a dynamic approach to the situation;
- Contribute with analytical input through the Tactical Focused Assessment for the purposes of the drafting of the Operational Plan and to the Frontex Evaluation Report (FER) after the termination of the JO;
- Be constantly linked with and report to the OM, the FCO, the FOC and the experts regarding intelligence matters.

Special Advisor for debriefing activities

Based on risk analysis and the operational needs a Debriefing Adviser may be deployed within the joint operation to support the local authorities and JDT in interviewing migrants with his specific knowledge on debriefing, migration and culture of source countries of migrants.

However, the competence of the Debriefing Advisors is limited by Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and (EC) 863/2007 to the support and assistance without any power to act on his/her own.

The ICC and Operational Team shall be informed in advance of the deployment of the Debriefing Advisor concerning the time and place of deployment. At the end of each deployment the Operational Team should receive feedback on the activities carried out and on the main findings of his/her mission.



Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)

Detailed information on the roles, tasks, functioning of FSC and its related products (JORA, FOSS) is provided in this document and in the relevant Specific Annexes.

Situation monitoring – information processing – reporting

The FSC:

- provides a constantly updated picture of the migration situation at the external borders of the EU, with a particular focus on security and irregular migration aspects, as near to real-time as possible;
- carries out situation monitoring;
- carries out validation of incidents reported in the frame of joint operations;
- maintains situational awareness;
- provides a first response in case of crisis or emergency situations that may occur during the Joint Operation;
- acts as the central point of contact for the Coordination Points and Frontex staff, for all operational information that have a direct impact on the Joint Operation;
- carries out media monitoring in open and in grey sources.

More specifically, the FSC is responsible for:

- providing reports showing the figures/data of the JO enriched with additional information from other sources, if available and applicable; the reports shall be uploaded to FOSS;
- collecting and disseminating information related to issues needing specific attention (Serious Incident Reports);
- collecting Document Alerts on false/falsified documents and uploading them to FOSS;
- keeping Frontex management and MS updated concerning the situation;
- monitoring the exchange of information and collecting experience in order to provide improved activities when appropriate;
- Establish communication with the representatives of other EU bodies and international organisations implementing activities in the operational area.

Senior Duty Officer (SDO) Service in FSC

As the central point of contact the FSC provides a 12/7 Senior Duty Officer Service between 08.00 and 20.00 CET. Additionally, the FSC provides a 24/7 on call availability for emergency and crises situations as well as for serious incidents reporting according to the Serious Incident Catalogue.

FSC Senior Duty Officer – Contact Information	
Landline	[REDACTED]
Mobile	[REDACTED]
Email	[REDACTED]

Deployed Support Officers to FSC

Officers from EU MS are sent to FSC as 'FSC Support Officers' in order to support the SDO in

- validating and processing the reported incidents through JORA
- supporting FSC's situation monitoring processes
- maintaining the situational picture by using EUROSUR
- exchanging information by using FOSS.

The responsibility for the FSC Support Officer remains with the FSC Senior Duty Officer and the Senior Incident Validator.

Commented [A31]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]

FSC Support Officer – Contact Information

Landline

[REDACTED]

Email

[REDACTED]

FSC roles concerning Frontex One Stop Shop (FOSS)

In order to enrich situational awareness and share operational-related information during the JO, the FOSS (<https://foss.frontex.europa.eu>) portal is used. More detailed information on FOSS is available under chapter 9 of this document, and in the relevant Specific Annex of the Operational Plan.

FOSS Contact Information

Landline

[REDACTED]

Email

[REDACTED]

FSC roles and responsibilities concerning JORA

The Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) is a framework for operational information exchange, including an IT software system that provides Frontex and its internal and external stakeholders (Member States, other respective external stakeholder) with the capability of sending, verifying, retrieving, visualizing and, in general, managing operational-related data during the entire cycle of the operations coordinated by Frontex. The JORA system is constructed in modules with different capabilities and is continuously developed according to the operational reporting needs.

With reference to the incident reporting for this operation, the Incident Template guidelines shall be made available in FOSS (Operational Activity area).

Incident Reporting (JORA) Product and Service Management Contact information

Landline

[REDACTED]

E-mail

[REDACTED]

Frontex Liaison Office/ European Union Regional Tasks Force (Piraeus)

The Frontex Liaison Office (FLO) / European Union Regional Tasks Force (EURTF) is located in Piraeus (Greece) and provides the platform of a shared office to representatives of EU entities where they can work together to coordinate the EU assistance to the national authorities for identification, registration and return as well as for criminal investigations of people-smuggling networks, which takes place either at ports or in specific reception centres, inter alia. The EU Regional Task Force Office concentrates on hotspots of irregular migration and other border security risks in particular, that require a reinforced presence of Frontex and other EU entities:

Acting as an interface between Frontex and the local authorities;

Networking with all relevant stakeholders involved in the host Member State for operational coordination and intelligence gathering;

Monitoring the implementation of the operational plans;

Gathering and assessing information and intelligence for risk analysis purposes;

Promoting cooperation with other EU agencies (e.g. EASO, Europol) and bodies or international organisations;

Providing support to all resources during their period of deployment in the operational area;

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Providing logistical and operational support regarding deployed experts and assets;
Supporting organisation and accomplishment of operational briefings and debriefings of deployed experts and crews;
Performing field visits in the operational areas aiming at monitoring implementation;
Providing the operational managers (e.g. Frontex Coordinating Officers) with information, remarks, comments and proposals on the implementation of the operations;
Being involved in the introduction and training of experts in order to increase local authorities' capacity.

Training Unit (TRU)

The Frontex Training Unit (TRU) supports the JOU in preparing the material for the briefings in order to ensure that all deployed staff will receive the necessary knowledge regarding Fundamental Rights, access to International Protection, the fight against THB, etc.

Specific EBCGT Profile trainings, as for Debriefing, Screening and Second-line Interview Experts already in place, will be further developed and offered exclusively for EBCGT pool members in order to harmonize knowledge, skills and competences where appropriate. This will ensure, in mid and long term perspective, the promotion of Fundamental Rights under the scope of the specific EBCGT job-competences (in alignment with stipulated EBCGT Profiles) and will further improve the quality of operational activities under Frontex umbrella.

A constantly updated evaluation between operational activities and training is necessary in order to react immediately to latest trends of cross-border crime and to detect training gaps.

The participation in EBCGT training will be documented by TRU via the Opera system.

Team Members seconded to the Agency

Team Members seconded to the Agency are border guards or other relevant staff from the MS selected by Frontex and is considered as a Frontex contribution to the EBCGT. The secondment of TM must not exceed twelve months and may not be shorter than three months.

ANNEX 11 - CONTACT DETAILS

1. South Eastern land borders

ICC Sofia	Name	Contacts
Head of ICC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
ICC Coordinator Bulgaria	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Proxy	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
ICC Coordinator Greece	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Operational Coordinator	Present on rotation base	
Contact person for reporting	BG operator in Operational Centre	[REDACTED]
	GR operator in Operational Centre	[REDACTED]
Contact point in ICC	Duty officer	[REDACTED]

EURTF/Frontex Liaison Office Piraeus	Name	Contacts
Head of EURTF/FX LO	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A33]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]

Intelligence Component	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Component	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A34]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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NFPOC Greece	Name	Contacts
Head of NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NFPOC Staff	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Person for Press Issues	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

NFPOC Bulgaria	Name	Contacts
Head of NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NFPOC Staff	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Head of LCC

Name _____

Contacts

LCC Coordinator

LCC Coordinator

proxy

Intelligence Officer

Debriefing Coordinator

Screening Coordinator

Contact person for reporting		
	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point		
	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point		
	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		

Commented [A36]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point		
	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point		
	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point		
	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		

Commented [A37]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
---------------	------------	------------

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
---------------	------------	------------

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC	[REDACTED]	
LCC Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
proxy	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A39]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A40]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Contact Point		
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	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC		
LCC Coordinator		
Debriefing Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		
Contact point for logistics		

	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC		
LCC Coordinator (
Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point		
Contact point for logistics		

Commented [A41]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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2. Western Balkans

HUNGARY WB ICC	Name	Contacts
Head of ICC	National Coordination Center	[REDACTED]
Contact Person for Press Issues	Press duty officer	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Intelligence Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Debriefing Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A42]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]

Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A43]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact Point	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Contact person for reporting [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Contact person for reporting [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Name	Contacts
Local Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

CROATIA	Name	Contacts
Head of ICC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
ICC Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Contact Person for Press Issues	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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	Name	Contacts
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Head of LCC		
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LCC Coordinator		
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	Name	Contacts
--	------	----------

Local Coordinator		
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Focal Point Coordinator		
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Contact person for reporting		
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	Name	Contacts
--	------	----------

Local Coordinator		
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Contact person for reporting		
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3. Frontex Headquarters

Cabinet	Name	Contacts
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Executive advisor		
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Press Office	Name	Contacts
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Frontex Spokesperson	Ewa Moncure	Ewa.Moncure@frontex.europa.eu
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Commented [A45]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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[REDACTED]

+48 22 205 9635 Office
+48 785 001 374 Mobile

Frontex Spokesperson	Izabella Cooper	Izabella.Cooper@frontex.europa.eu +48 22 205 9535 Office +48 667667292 Mobile
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Operational Team		
Frontex Coordinating Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Coordinating Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational team member	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Analyst	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Analyst	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team Member	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team Member	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Frontex Situation Centre	Name	Contacts
Senior Duty Officer	SDO	[REDACTED]

REMARK:

Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

Commented [A46]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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ANNEX 12 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
JORA Administrator / Service Management	[REDACTED]	FX	FSC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	JOU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Delegated Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	JOU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Template Creator	[REDACTED]	FX	RAU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A47]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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1.1. Bulgaria

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	BGR	NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 2	[REDACTED]	BGR	NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

1.2. Greece

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	GRC	NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 2	[REDACTED]	GRC	NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 3	[REDACTED]	GRC	NFPOC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

1.3. Hungary

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	HUN	NFPoC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

National Access Manager 2	[REDACTED]	HUN	NFPoC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 3	[REDACTED]	HUN	NFPoc	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A48]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

1.4. Croatia

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	HRV	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 2	[REDACTED]	HRV	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 3	[REDACTED]	HRV	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 4	[REDACTED]	HRV	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 5	[REDACTED]	HRV	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 6	[REDACTED]	HRV	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.


NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

JORA Reporting Structure

Incidents reporting structure

The JORA incident reporting structure will follow the Command and Control Structure as defined in the Operational Plan

JORA Reporting Timeline



Commented [A49]: The non-disclosed text contain detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials. The text contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied during border control activities which would jeopardize the implementation of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

BULGARIA

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the *modus operandi* of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A51]: he non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

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Contact [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



In [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[illegible]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[illegible]

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older has increased by 50% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The number of people aged 65 and older is projected to increase to 20% of the total population by the year 2020 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The increase in the number of people aged 65 and older is due to the increase in life expectancy. The life expectancy at birth in the United States has increased from 47 years in 1900 to 77 years in 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The increase in life expectancy is due to a number of factors, including improvements in medical care, better nutrition, and a healthier lifestyle. The increase in life expectancy has led to a number of challenges for society, including the need for more retirement funds, the need for more long-term care, and the need for more social services. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the challenges of aging and the need for social services.

[illegible]

The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Additional information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Additional information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Accommodation recommendations

[REDACTED]

Weather conditions

[REDACTED]

Other useful information

[REDACTED]

Commented [A61]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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a

Address				
GPS Coordinates				
Thermal Vision Van charging (YES OR NO)				
Weapon safe storage (YES OR NO)				
Dog kennel (YES OR NO)				
Road condition to /from borders area				
Road condition to /from the working place				
Safety uniforms (YES OR NO)				
Debriefing office (YES OR NO)				
Screening office (YES OR NO)				
Transportation to the working places				
Recommended hotels-rooms				

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
[REDACTED]

Additional information

It is recommended during winter time that all vehicles deployed in the operational area of [REDACTED] to be equipped with winter tires due to heavy snowfall.

Due to intense rainfall, soil close to the border line may become muddy. In addition, during the winter time, low temperatures (below zero) prevail at the area that require durable clothes and shoes. During the summer time, the weather is sunny and high temperatures may appear but in a tolerant level.

IC [REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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HUNGARY

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3, Weather

[REDACTED]

The climate of Hungary can be described as European continental climate with warm, dry summers and snowy cold winters.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

4, Rental car or service car of Home MS are recommended.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ICC Office

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Police [REDACTED]

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[illegible]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

area [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Weapon

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Weapon

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The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[illegible]

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[illegible]

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

[illegible]

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the *modus operandi* of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A76]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Commented [A78]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>Address [REDACTED]</div>	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO

Commented [A79]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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[REDACTED]

<div><div>pose</div><div></div><div></div></div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	NO
	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	NO
	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>[REDACTED]</div>	NO

Commented [A80]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

PRACTICAL INFORMATION FOR BULGARIA

- Chief Directorate Border Police – Headquarters

Address: "Maria Louisa" Blvd., 46. Sofia 1202, Bulgaria

Link:

<https://maps.google.bg/maps?q=%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%BB.%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F+%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0+46&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=0x40aa8566f25c8dbd:0xd35f75a946ac0fb7,bulevard+%22Knyaginya+Maria+Luiza%22+46,+1202+Sofia&gl=bg&el=6ViDUiPMoblswbghoHIAg&ved=0CCcQ8gEwAA>

- Transport

For your comfort and safety, we recommend that you take a taxi at the designated taxi stands in front of the western exits from Arrivals at Terminal 2:



Alternatively, you could request a taxi at the desks of the taxi companies, which are located in the Arrival hall of the terminal.

Contacts:

"OK Supertrans" AD (+359 2) 973 21 21



Whatever means of transport you choose, it is very advisable to have cash Bulgarian Lev (BGN) to pay with. The price per kilometer varies between 0.79 and 0.90 BGN which is 0.40 - 0.50 EUR, and the price for 1 minute idle time is 0.22 BGN. The amount from Sofia Airport to the city center should be 15 to 20 BGN (7 to 10 EUR) depending on the traffic. ATM machines may be found upon your arrival at Terminal 2 at the Public area hall (see the map below). Always check the prices per kilometer due to the fact that there are taxi companies with similar logos but much more different prices. You can find prices per kilometer on a sticker at the right lower corner of the front window (picture1).

Picture 1



The Currency exchange desk is situated in the Arrival Hall however we do not recommend you to exchange big amounts of money. There are also 2 ATM machines. Official exchange rate is 1.95583 BGN for 1 EURO. Normally the exchange rate should be between 1, 92-1, 95 BGN

If you choose the public transport, more details you could find on the airport web site: <http://www.sofia-airport.bg/en/passengers/and-airport/public-transport>.

FOA 2017 Western Balkans

HUNGARY

Name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car/service car is needed.

Commented [A81]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

CROATIA

Name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO	<p>Commented [A82]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.</p> <p>The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.</p> <p>In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.</p>
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO	