EUROPEAN COMMISSION
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Mr Dimitar Dimitrov
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DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES TO REGULATION (EC) NO 1049/2001¹

Subject: Your confirmatory application for access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - GESTDEM 2019/0921

Dear Mr Dimitrov,

I refer to your letter of 10 April 2019, registered on 11 April 2019, in which you submit a confirmatory application in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents² (hereafter ‘Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001’).

1. SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST

In your initial application of 16 February 2019, addressed to the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, your access to document request was formulated as follows: ‘[o]n 14 February 2019 the European Commission posted an article titled “The Copyright Directive: how the mob was told to save the dragon and slay the knight” through its Medium account [1]. The article has subsequently been removed [2]. Under the right of access to documents in the EU treaties, as developed in Regulation 1049/2001, I am requesting a copy of all drafts of this article.’

The European Commission has identified the following document falling within the scope of your request:

- Email exchanges in relation to the subject-matter ‘Myth of the Month: Copyright’, comprising an email of 8 February 2019 and an email of 14

February 2019, reference Ares(2019)2295049 (hereafter the ‘requested document’).

In its initial reply of 1 April 2019, Directorate-General for Communication granted wide partial access to the email dated 8 February 2019, subject only to the redaction of personal data based on the exceptions of point (b) of Article 4(1) (protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

In your confirmatory application, you request a review of this position. You are of the opinion that the redacted data can and should be lawfully disclosed under the applicable data protection rules. You also note that ‘[a]dditionally, the name Joe Lynam is already publicly known and need not be hidden.’ I will address in these arguments below.

2. **ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER REGULATION (EC) NO 1049/2001**

When assessing a confirmatory application for access to documents submitted pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, the Secretariat-General conducts a fresh review of the reply given by the Directorate-General concerned at the initial stage.

Following this review, I can inform you that additional partial access is granted to the email of 14 February 2019 and that the domain parts of the email addresses will be disclosed.

As regards the personal data in the requested document, I have to confirm the initial decision of Directorate-General for Communication to refuse access, based on the exception of point (b) of Article 4(1) (protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, for the reasons set out below.

Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 provides that ‘[t]he institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of [...] privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data’.

In its judgment in Case C-28/08 P (Bavarian Lager)\(^3\), the Court of Justice ruled that when a request is made for access to documents containing personal data, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data\(^4\) (hereafter ‘Regulation (EC) No 45/2001’) becomes fully applicable.

Please note that, as from 11 December 2018, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 has been repealed by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free

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However, the case law issued with regard to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 remains relevant for the interpretation of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

In the above-mentioned judgment, the Court stated that Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 ‘requires that any undermining of privacy and the integrity of the individual must always be examined and assessed in conformity with the legislation of the Union concerning the protection of personal data, and in particular with […] [the Data Protection] Regulation’.\(^6\)

Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 provides that personal data ‘means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person […]’.

As the Court of Justice confirmed in Case C-465/00 (Rechnungshof), ‘there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a professional […] nature from the notion of private life’.\(^7\)

The requested document contain personal data such as the names and email addresses of persons who do not form part of the senior management of the European Commission. A request to transmit personal data (such as the name of a natural person) requires separate processing, which must fulfil the requirements of Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. Consequently, no conclusion can be drawn from the disclosure of a name of a natural person in another context as each processing must be examined individually. However, from the domain part of the email addresses, in itself, the persons’ identity cannot be deduced. Therefore, this part of the email addresses is now disclosed.

The names\(^8\) of the persons concerned as well as other data from which their identity can be deduced (such as office or telephone numbers) undoubtedly constitute personal data in the meaning of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Pursuant to Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, ‘personal data shall only be transmitted to recipients established in the Union other than Union institutions and bodies if ‘[t]he recipient establishes that it is necessary to have the data transmitted for a specific purpose in the public interest and the controller, where there is any reason to assume that the data subject’s legitimate interests might be prejudiced, establishes that it is proportionate to transmit the personal data for that specific purpose after having demonstrably weighed the various competing interests’.

Only if these conditions are fulfilled and the processing constitutes lawful processing in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, can the transmission of personal data occur.

\(^6\) European Commission v The Bavarian Lager judgment, cited above, paragraph 59.
\(^7\) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 May 2003, Rechnungshof and Others v Österreichischer Rundfunk, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 73.
\(^8\) European Commission v The Bavarian Lager judgment, cited above, paragraph 68.
In Case C-615/13 P (*ClientEarth*), the Court of Justice ruled that the institution does not have to examine by itself the existence of a need for transferring personal data. This is also clear from Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, which requires that the necessity to have the personal data transmitted must be established by the recipient.

According to Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the European Commission has to examine the further conditions for the lawful processing of personal data only if the first condition is fulfilled, namely if the recipient establishes that it is necessary to have the data transmitted for a specific purpose in the public interest. It is only in this case that the European Commission has to examine whether there is a reason to assume that the data subject’s legitimate interests might be prejudiced and, in the affirmative, establish the proportionality of the transmission of the personal data for that specific purpose after having demonstrably weighed the various competing interests.

In your confirmatory application, you argue that the disclosure of personal data would be legitimate. The mere fact that the name of the author of the article would be already publicly known is not at all convincing. First, your assertion is not corroborated by any objective factual elements. In addition, the European Commission has not divulged the identity of that person and has no intention to do so insofar as you do not put forward any arguments to establish the necessity to have the data transmitted for a specific purpose in the public interest. Therefore, the European Commission does not have to examine whether there is a reason to assume that the data subjects’ legitimate interests might be prejudiced.

Notwithstanding the above, there are reasons to assume that the legitimate interests of the data subjects concerned would be prejudiced by the disclosure of the personal data reflected in the documents, as there is a real and non-hypothetical risk that such public disclosure would harm their privacy and subject them to unsolicited external contacts.

Consequently, I conclude that, pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, access cannot be granted to the personal data included in the requested document, as the need to obtain access thereto for a purpose in the public interest has not been substantiated and there is no reason to think that the legitimate interests of the individuals concerned would not be prejudiced by the disclosure of the personal data concerned.

3. **OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST IN DISCLOSURE**

Please note that Article 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 do not include the possibility for the exceptions defined therein to be set aside by an overriding public interest.

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4. **PARTIAL ACCESS**

In accordance with Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, I have considered the possibility of granting (further) partial access to the requested document.

For the reasons explained above, wider partial access is now granted without undermining the interests described above.

5. **MEANS OF REDRESS**

Finally, I draw your attention to the means of redress available against this decision. You may either bring proceedings before the General Court or file a complaint with the European Ombudsman under the conditions specified respectively in Articles 263 and 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Yours sincerely,

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**CERTIFIED COPY**
For the Secretary-General.

Jordi AYET PUGARNAU
Director of the Registry
EUROPEAN COMMISSION

For the Commission
Martin SELMAYR
Secretary-General

Enclosure: 1