Consultation on Climate Change and Migration

6 May 2011
Borschette Centre - Brussels, Belgium

Draft report

The experts’ consultation on "Climate Change and Migration" was organized by the European Commission services (HOME, DEVCO and CLIMA) and brought together EU Member States, partner countries, non-state actors and other stakeholders in the area (see the final list of participants in annex 1).

The aim of the consultation was to discuss the effects of climate change on population displacement in view of sharing ideas for addressing this raising challenge at EU level, as well as to propose new recommendations in light of the forthcoming Communication package on the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), which will include a Staff Working paper on Migration and Climate Change.

Four sessions were organised. The first session had an introductory character and focused on forecast scenarios, terminological debates and other general questions involved in addressing climate change's impact on migration. The second session looked at climate change as an additional driver for migration and addressed ways to strengthen resilience capacities of affected countries. The third session was devoted to the analysis of situation in heavily affected areas, where displacement appears the only available option. Finally, the fourth session focused on legal framework for protecting climate/environmental migrants, both at the international and EU level.

A number of experts from different types of organizations were invited to briefly present their specific views and suggestions for each session. A summary of their interventions can be found in annex 2.

The debate was rich and fruitful and will make a useful contribution to the European Commission's current reflection ahead of the planned Communication package.

This report does not provide a complete transcription of the consultation meeting. It rather aims at highlighting the main points raised during the whole day of discussion that the EC will need to address.

SESSION 1 – FORECAST SCENARIOS AND ISSUES AT STAKE

The session 1 provided a scene setting, covering the key issues at stake. A particularly high interest in understanding the potential impact of climate change related events on the size of migration flows and their geographical distribution was underlined. Urgency was strongly highlighted given that currently environmental crisis resulting in displacement are already taking place and developing countries are probably the most vulnerable. Besides magnitude and frequency of movement are likely to increase as disasters will occur more often and the environment keeps wearing away.
The main matters of concern and issues raised by the participants can be grouped under three themes and summarised as follows:

1) The disagreement among researchers about fundamental key issues, namely estimates and terminology, was perpetuated and remains unsolved.

- The **scope and title of the consultation** was debated. A problematic tendency to link everything to climate change nowadays was underlined. **There was a division among participants on whether it is more appropriate to talk about climate change or more broadly about environment.** Furthermore, there was also no agreement about the use of the terms "migrants" and "displaces", none of them having an internationally agreed definition. However, the term "refugee" was unanimously refused.

- The need for developing knowledge and workable policy options generated an important debate. Qualitative data estimating the numbers of climate migrants is still lacking, especially when it comes to the distinction between internal and international migration, although it is widely acknowledge that producing specific data will be uneasy due to the difficulty to isolate the environment triggers. There is a high amount of anecdotal data (participants were divided about the usefulness and quality of such data). Overall, there exist already several studies on climate change and its implications on migration. Therefore, a continuous reference to the lack of knowledge risks stopping the action and confusing policy-makers.

- The **complex interplay between drivers of migration** and the difficulty to isolate climate change as such a driver was repeatedly stressed.

- There was an agreement among participants on the low probability of wide **international movements** as a result of climate change events as most of the affected persons would remain in their countries and regions of origin.

2) The issues of adaptation and relocation received a special attention.

- **Relocation** must be based not only on human rights principles, but should also guarantee access to sustainable livelihood. It cannot mean pushing migrants to another instable area.

- **The support to migration as an adaptation strategy** was much discussed. However it was stressed that we should be cautious about framing migration simply as another adaptation strategy per se since it does not tackle the root causes entailing the migration process itself.

- It was stressed that migrants are not flexible and independent agents in their migration process. Indeed, **migration depends on a wide range of factors**, including age, gender, health, social and economic status, financial means and access to the network that support migration providing information and reliable contacts.

- It was considered important to integrate **climate change mitigation and adaptation policies into national sustainable development strategies**, linking disaster risk reduction, disaster risk management and climate change adaptation strategies, and bring environmental migration dimensions into existing tools such as National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

- **The distinction between relocation and migration** was highlighted. For instance, in the Sahel people have adapted to climate variability through seasonal migration
throughout centuries. In the case of small island States, permanent relocation to other States could be necessary due to sea-level rise.

- Regarding financial aspect, it was also pointed out that adaptation money should not be spent on relocation.

3) The following recommendations directly for EU action can be brought out from the discussion:

- The EU needs to show leadership in developing knowledge and action on climate change and migration.
- Given that climate change will have an impact on EU foreign relations, environmentally induced migration should be integrated in the relevant instruments and channels for dialogue, including Global Approach to Migration, but also in the relations with the regions and states most affected by climate change.
- The need for policy coherence when formulating an EU policy which can have an impact on climate change was underlined many times. However, policy coherence is difficult to achieve since it is a truly cross-cutting issue. In addition, a coherent, effective and evidence based policy is hindered by uncertain or limited data.
- Developing a policy based on scenarios was supported. It is an adequate way for testing existing policies and identifying gaps. It is important to start from the fact that scenarios are equally plausible (same methodology used by IPCC). Besides, formulating a creative policy that reflects on all scenarios is a way to deal with the uncertainty of future scenarios and data.
- Supporting the development of capacities at local level in order to develop climate change and migration comprehensive strategies and address adaptation challenges at local level.

SESSION 2 - CLIMATE CHANGE AS A RAISING ADDITIONAL DRIVER FOR MIGRATION: HOW TO INCREASE THIRD COUNTRIES RESILIENCE CAPACITIES?

The starting assumption of this session was that there are a range of complex factors that lead people to migrate and climate change is only one of them.

During this session, the need for additional and separate funding for development aid for adaptation was particularly stressed. This position is supported by the European Parliament (see Mitchell report, A7-0078/2009).

Additionally, the following points were retained as particularly pertinent to reflect upon:

1) The need to multiply and foster adaptation alternatives was considered as one of the most important issues of the debate.

- The distinction between adaptation and development should become irrelevant in the near future as it is important to merge the concepts of sustainable development and adaptation and their implementation.
- Positive impacts of migration as an adaptation measure need to be highlighted (e.g. diversification of income sources), but at the same time, investing in other adaptation alternatives is an important way to reduce environmentally induced displacement.
• The importance of monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of adaptation strategies was repeatedly stressed.
• Scaling up good practices to use them more widely was regarded as very important.
• Addressing the socio-economic factors is important as they play a central role and may make climate events catastrophic.

2) Development policies could be better designed to tackle climate/environmental migration.

• The integration in country profiles, migration profiles and sector strategies of environment and climate change was put forward for consideration.
• The need to systematically avoid the negative impact of development projects on the environment was underlined.
• Governments should strengthen capacity to accompany and manage movements.
• Intra-regional mobility should be promoted - the ECOWAS intra-regional mobility policy (including creation of a common passport) is an example of a good practice in the area.
• A particular attention should be paid to the role of remittances. Some available studies already trace their usefulness (see the World Bank study for example).
• Local communities must be involved in planning, construction and management.
• Sustainable development policies must facilitate technology transfers (especially in the key development areas of countries such as agriculture, water management, health services and infrastructure).
• Integrating a gender dimension as an analytical tool was supported, looking beyond the simple observation that women fit into the vulnerable groups.
• Importance of building on passed and ongoing experiences in areas already affected by climate change (Sahel, Bangladesh...)

SESSION 3 – ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN MIGRATION APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY REMAINING OPTION

The strong and successful engagement of the EC with developing country through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) since 2007 was highlighted. The two main objectives of this alliance were reminded: deepening the policy dialogue between the EU and developing countries on climate change, especially in the context of the international negotiations for a post-2012 climate regime, and stepping up support to target countries to implement priority adaptation and mitigation measures and to integrate climate change issues into their development strategies. The Maldives was the first pilot country to receive EU funding through the GCCA.

The special case of the Maldives received a high attention during the debate. Maldivian education methods to become carbon-neutral and potential intentions to buy land in India were discussed. It was pointed out that whatever happens there should be a legal presumption applying of continuation of statehood. Therefore, the situation of small islands threatened by sea-level rise should not be pictured as a question of "disappearance of state".

1) There was a general agreement about the need to involve multiple stakeholders.

• The need to involve diasporas was particularly stressed (as has been the case in
Haiti).

- The need to involve migrants themselves was also underlined (difficulties regarding this issue were specially mentioned).
- The role of social organizations in advocacy work was discussed.
- The involvement of the private sector at grass root level and in the process of building capacities was proposed.
- Also, it was underlined by a few participants that the EU could look at the growing debate about the involvement of the military in rescue situations.

2) Responses to sudden onset events need to be improved in many ways.

- Humanitarian capacities are over-stretched and need to be strengthened to respond to the increasing number of natural disasters.
- The development of early warning system is needed, and the protection systems aiming at addressing the needs of populations forced out by sudden events have to be further developed.
- The need to implement the normative frameworks (especially the 98 Guiding Principles for internally displaced persons) in place for protection of internally displaced persons was underlined.
- The international community also has a responsibility to support governments and local authorities in implementing those standards. Weak state protection of displaced persons may be caused by lack of knowledge of international standards and low state capacity to implement these.
- Strengthened data collection (number and needs of displaced people) is also needed to respond to sudden onset disasters. IDPs profiling is a valid tool in this sense.
- Transition toward recovery and durable solutions need to be further look at.

3) Apprehend positive benefits of migration was considered fundamental.

- It was asked whether migration is something to prevent or of which the positive aspects can be increased. Focusing on ownership and considering that migration should remain a choice should be the guiding principles.
- Climate change can also be an opportunity to reduce migratory pressures (through the development of renewable energies, institutional reform, increase of access to data and information, and capacity building).

SESSION 4 – LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING CLIMATE/ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS (IN THE EU AND AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL)

The recognition of the need of protection was considered as the first step to take. There was a general agreement that the refugee terminology and the 1951 Geneva Convention must not be used. The distinction between slow and sudden onset events was considered as useful for testing policies. The main identified protection gap concerned slow onset events and persons who cross an international border and are long term displaced as a result. At the end actions are dependent on the political will of States. Participants thanked the EC to initiate such a debate and expressed hope that the EU will take a leadership on this issue.
1) A broad portfolio of responses to environmental/climate displacement is needed.

- The use of more individualized and tailor-made responses and more temporary/case by case interventions, especially at regional level, (in other words a "filling the gaps" process) was advocated instead of a "one size fits all".
- The usefulness of a single broad international framework was discussed. Many proposals of international convention (based on a mix of human rights, humanitarian law, refugee law and environmental law) have been put forward for consideration. Those proposals raised interesting questions but it seems unlikely that such a proposal will be adopted in the near future. It was reminded that it took almost 10 years to develop and adopt the 98 GPs.
- There is a gap when it comes to develop long term development oriented responses.
- Regarding internal displacement, the 98 Guiding Principles for internally displaced persons are a significant baseline but contain policy, normative and institutional gaps. The main issues are that they are poorly articulated in legal and normative frameworks (as they are not legally binding by definition) and their focus of protection is only on rapid-onset disasters and during displacement.

2) Any responses must be based on human rights and ownership

- The need to set up a catalogue addressing human rights related issues in the context of displacement due to climate change events was highlighted.
- For individuals, the main rights to focus on are: the right to land property and access to land, political civil rights (especially for planned resettlement schemes), including the right to participate, and the right to live.
- It was underlined that it is important not to forget that priorities are not the same in developing countries and that migration would be seen as differently in developing countries if management and insurance policies would be available.

3) Some national legislations and new concepts can be regarded as a source of inspiration

- Member States legislations, especially Sweden, Finland and Italy, can serve as best practices.
- There is a possibility to draw inspiration from existing labour exchange agreements (e.g. between Colombia and Spain or between Canada and Guatemala)
- The "responsibility to protect" was mentioned as a concept that could be brought into the discussion.

Conclusion:

The EC takes note that there is still a lot of debate on numbers, definition and terminology. This disagreement among researchers somehow puts policy-makers in a waiting position. Many ongoing studies that should soon deliver their results were mentioned. Overall, it was an important discussion and the EC expressed its wish to continue the collaboration with all the stakeholders. It invited participants to further contribute to the EC’s thinking by providing written contribution before end of May.
### Annex 1 - Final list of participants

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<td>Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development - Bielefeld University, Dept. of Sociology, Germany</td>
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The Foresight Global Environmental Migration project
Chair of the Lead Expert Group

Recalled that interest in ‘environmental migration’ dates back to at least the mid-1980s. There has been renewed interest in the last 5 or so years, reflecting new concern about climate change-migration linkages. Yet what is said by experts is wildly different, especially when it comes to estimates. A Christian Aid report predicted that at least one billion people forced to move from their homes between now and 2050 “as the effects of climate change exacerbate the conflicts, natural disasters and development projects that drive displacement”. Nick Stern, in turn, is one of the most influential – his figure of 200 million environmental refugees has been repeated by the UK government, and Stern himself has continued to speak, including in recent weeks, about a looming migration catastrophe if action is not taken on climate change. Yet others disagree: HDR says only “pressure to migrate will intensify; IPCC say numbers are “guesswork”. A recent report by IIED says “Fears of millions of “climate refugees” crossing national borders are not supported by evidence on the ground”.

Explained that this is an interesting thing to look at now because it is a fundamentally interesting question for scientists. If Stern or Christian Aid are right, there is also a very big issue to deal with here. But perhaps more important, this is a classic ‘science’ issue – we have a process (migration) which is caused by many things, and which occurs in many forms; and this in turn is being affected, it is said, by another process (environmental change, climate change) on which there is also significant scientific debate and uncertainty, and a vast number of elements. In all of this, the evidence base is not much, and much of it is anecdotal. So numerous press reports, for example, have announced the world’s first “climate refugees” – the picture is of the Carteret Islands in PNG, but it could have been Lateu Bay (Vanuatu); Bhola islands (Bangladesh); New Orleans; or Newtok village, Alaska (350 people moving with the help of the US military to safer, higher ground). Yet if we go beyond these anecdotes, the stakes are potentially high, especially given that developing countries are probably most vulnerable, and international actors are already galvanising opinion and money to intervene.

Went on talking a bit about some starting assumptions. First, the standard approach to linking environmental or climate change and migration is to identify areas affected by the environmental change, count the number of people living there, and use this to estimate the number likely to be forced to leave. This is how Stern’s estimates were reached - based on calculations made by others over 10 years ago. But such a method is completely unsatisfactory as various factors drive migration, which is already occurring. In fact, the independent effect of climate variability and shocks is extremely difficult to isolate. For example, environmental change might reduce migration if it is happening already - some existing empirical studies suggest (long distance) migration actually declines in drought years. Moreover, it is likely that some areas negatively affected by climate change (cities in low-lying deltas are a case in point) will continue to be destinations for migrants, as other factors that attract migrants continue to outweigh the negative impact of climate. The existence of multiple drivers of migration also makes it hugely problematic to separate out ‘climate change migrants’ or ‘climate change refugees’ for special attention (whether prevention or protection). An alternative approach is to identify existing migration streams and examine how drivers of these specific migrations are vulnerable to climate change. This is the
approach has been trying to adopt with colleagues at Sussex for several years now, looking at marginal impacts, and disaggregating different types of migration. Over the last year specifically, has lead a UK Government Office of Science initiative on the topic, which is due to launch later this year. In the lead expert group, one thing to point out here is that they have tried to bring together both natural and social scientists, since to date, a fair amount of the controversy has been between climate/ environment specialists (Norman Myers) and migration specialists (not himself).

Unfortunately, could not tell you much about the conclusions of the project yet as they will report in October. They have spent quite a lot of time developing a framework to understand what drives migration, and how environmental factors might influence these migration drivers. Migration drivers include economic, political, demographic, social and environmental. Environmental variability might directly drive migration (e.g. in the West African Sahel), whereas environmental change is conceptualised as indirectly affecting migration via any or all of those drivers (Sahelian climate might become more variable over time or space, increasing or decreasing pressure to migrate).

In practice, they take a driver of migration: conflict; or African urbanisation pressures (which come from both urban growth and rural poverty); or demographic change (notably the ageing of populations in much of the developed world); and then explore how and to what extent environmental change is likely to influence these drivers up to 2030 and 2060. All of this will contribute to part A of the report, which will set out what they would expect to happen up to 2030 and 2060 in the context of known drivers of migration, and their best estimates of environmental (and other) change. They are adopting a scenario-based approach, where the key axes driving different scenarios are economic growth (on the one hand) and levels of inclusiveness/connectedness of governance. These scenarios also play out at regional and national level.

The second element of what they are doing is then to look at policy interventions that might address this change. Specifically mentioned: remittances, disaster preparedness and legal frameworks.

In addition to considering drivers of change at a global level, the project is focusing on several types of ecosystem where the interplay of environmental and non-environmental drivers is likely to be of particular interest to policy-makers. These are: dryland margins (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa), low-elevation coastal zones and small island states (e.g. Bangladesh), the Mediterranean, and mountainous regions (e.g. the Himalayas). Alongside driver reviews, they have commissioned reviews of the interplay of environmental and non-environmental drivers of migration in these ecosystems. The Project has also recently held workshops in locations relevant to each. These workshops have sought to understand the extent to which the project’s global analysis and emerging conclusions apply in the regional context; learn from regional actors about relevant policy interventions and action; and understand local perspectives on the issue and secure engagement for the project.

Finally, the regional analysis has provided a foundation for investigating smaller scale case studies, which are currently ongoing. Now, phase 2 of the project is about "refining understanding and addressing the challenges/ opportunities".

*Environmental Change & Human Migration: Current Evidence and the Role of the EU in filling gaps* 
JNU-EHS

stressed that the central idea of the presentation is that the European Commission should lead in knowledge creation and action on climate change and migration because it holds the key to our stable and secure future. In fact, the EC has already made a
significant contribution by funding the first major global study on the issue – the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR).

The EACH-FOR project found that environmental changes are a driver in migration patterns today, and that these drivers will likely become more pronounced in migration patterns in the future. The environment has driven human movements since time immemorial. Yet today, we have no widely agreed upon, measurable definition of what an environmental or climate – related migrant is. This makes the lives of researchers and decision makers both interesting and complicated. Here is a list of the terms we see in circulation: refugee, migrant, displacee, forced migrant, flee-ant, emergency migrant, survival migrant, etc. There are particular problems with the combination of the terms “climate” and “refugee”, since “refugee” has a legally specific meaning in the context of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

Fortunately, the IOM has contributed a useful working term “environmentally induced migration” to get us in the ballpark. But still, we are left with only a general understanding that the environment affects human movement.

Who migrates? Many of the EACH-FOR case studies show clearly that people who want to leave their villages/regions/country can only do so if they have the necessary financial means and access to networks that support migration. In fact, the financial means are often not available, since environmental degradation has a negative impact on household income or the overall political or economic context overrides the environmental push factor. Government interventions in the form of resettlement programs are observable in some countries like Vietnam, Mozambique, Egypt, and others.

Environmental displacements today mainly encompassed three patterns: seasonal migration, disaster displacement and short distance semi-permanent migration of groups.

Hypothesis 1: Climate change influences food security. Combined, climate change and food security drive migration in a number of ways and patterns which differ (and have different policy needs) from today’s seasonal and cyclical migration patterns. To explore hypothesis 1, we will strive to understand and model relationship between the independent variables of rainfall changes over time, food security, and intervening social factors, and the dependent variable of human mobility.

Hypothesis 2: Combined, climate change and food security have the potential to become a significant driver of human mobility in particular regions of the world in the medium (2015 to 2030) to long term (2030 to 2080). To explore hypothesis 2, we will use participatory methods and fieldwork, combined with mapping approaches to assess the scenarios and potential for our independent variables to affect human mobility in particular areas of the world.

Hypothesis 3: In the context of climate change, a combination of policies to reduce vulnerability and enhance the range of choices about adaptation (including migration) can increase the likelihood that human mobility occurs in an orderly and planned way which does not undermine stability or exacerbate human insecurity in the face of climate change in hotspot areas of the world. To explore hypothesis 3, we will use scenarios and participatory methods to test a spectrum of policy recommendations with stakeholders about managing human mobility in the face of changing rainfall patterns and food security.

Highlighted five tasks for European leadership:

1. Support the best of European science to expand the knowledge base on specific interactions – like desertification, rainfall variability, disaster occurrence, coastal erosion – with human mobility.
2. Multiply adaptation alternatives—this is the most important point. Where possible, help people stay through sustainable rural and urban development. Where necessary, help people move in safety and dignity.
3. Involve the diaspora in designing and funding adaptation strategies that enable their home countries and communities to cope with climate change.


5. Innovate in guiding principles, effective practices and institutional frameworks to help governments in developing appropriate laws, policies and programs to address both internal and international migration resulting from climate change.

To conclude, [URL] stressed that few of the migrants they encountered in their fieldwork worldwide were able to migrate internationally. This will increasingly require countries to work together, especially to help developing countries manage the increasing challenges of environmental and climate change. The decisions of the European Union and its neighbors today will determine whether migration becomes a matter of choice amongst a range of adaptation options, or merely a matter of survival due to a collective failure to find alternatives.

*Climate change, environmental degradation and human mobility: knowledge, challenges and capacities*  

IOM

highlighted the three main objectives for IOM: 1) minimize forced migration, 2) ensure protection and assistance for people who move and 3) facilitate migration as an adaptation strategy.

Pointed out that last year, the Cancún Agreements concluded at the United Nations Climate Change Conference called attention to “climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation”.

Provided information on the complex nexus between climate change, environmental degradation and migration. In this context, [URL] stressed that environmental migration is understood as a multi-causal phenomenon yet one in which environmental drivers play a significant and increasingly determinative role. [URL] reminded the IOM’s definition of environmental migrant: “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”.

Pointed out what are the critical knowledge issues: specific data on environmental migration are little and scattered; most data available are only linked to natural disasters; there is a lack of sharpened definitions and terminology; the distinction between “forced” and “voluntary” migration is blurred; identifying and understanding climate change triggers remain complex. As a result, it is difficult to 1) produce specific data on environmental migration, 2) sharpen definitions and terminology, 3) identify climate change triggers and affected groups, and 4) analyze the effects of environmental factors on migration.

Also highlighted five critical policy issues: 1) migration and climate change links are barely mentioned in adaptation plans, 2) the impact of existing policies and legal frameworks is not evaluated, 3) most focus is on emergency responses, 4) migration is still in the process of being mainstreamed in development strategies and 5) the task to achieve coherence between environment, development and migration policies is difficult.

Then he presented IOM’s programmatic strategy (regarding policy, research and operations) and partnerships (e.g. CCEMA).
Lastly, paved the way forward. According to IOM, it will be important to focus on: 1) Building capacities (building knowledge and improving available data, creating coherent policy, legal and institutional, legal frameworks and reinforcing operational and technical intervention), 2) Extending dialogue and cooperation and 3) Developing comprehensive migration management strategies (integrating climate change mitigation and adaptation policies into national sustainable development strategies, linking Disaster Risk Reduction, Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation strategies, and bringing environmental migration dimensions into existing tools: NAPAs, PRSPs, UNDAFs).

SESSION 2 – CLIMATE CHANGE AS A RAISING ADDITIONAL DRIVER FOR MIGRATION: HOW TO INCREASE THIRD COUNTRIES RESILIENCE CAPACITIES?

Integration of climate change constraints into development projects

DG DEVCO

provided information on budget lines available for funding actions addressing environmental/climate migration, including some specific budget lines such as the environment budget line (ENRT), and the GGCA support facility (example of the Solomon Islands).

The thematic programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy (ENRT) helps developing countries and partner organisations to address environmental and natural resource management issues. Moreover, it helps to meet their obligations under multilateral environmental agreements and to take international policy leadership in such areas as fighting climate change, tackling land degradation and desertification, biodiversity protection and proper management of chemicals and wastes. Its legal base is Article 13 of the EU Regulation establishing the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI). In order to address the challenges having a deep effect on the lives of poor people (rapidly degrading key ecosystems, climate change, poor global environmental governance, inadequate access to and security of energy supply), the ENRTP is based on the following priorities: 1: assisting developing countries to make better progress on integrating environmental sustainability in decision making by means of support to civil society stakeholders, 2: promoting the implementation of initiatives and commitments made at both European and international level, 3: increasing the prominence of environmental issues in EU external policy, 4: strengthening international governance on the environment and make EU actions a key part of the process, 5: broadening the options as regards sustainable energy, in particular by developing a legislative and administrative framework which favours investments and businesses, and also by stimulating international cooperation. The added value of this programme is that it offers: the possibility of greater integration of the environment and energy into development policies/strategies and planning through more targeted activities and more effective instruments, greater opportunity to address issues that are often not priorities under the geographical instruments, the possibility of addressing issues that are common to groups of countries that do not belong to a single region (i.e. that are not easily covered by a single geographical instrument), and enhanced ability to address the external dimension of EU environment and energy policies, for which purpose no other instruments are available.

Then, talked about mainstreaming of climate change into development projects. This is done at two levels: in the programming phase and at project level (see "Environmental Integration Handbook"). The programming phase is crucial for environmental integration because key decisions concerning the overall co-operation process are made that might be difficult to adjust in later phases. Under geographical co-operation instruments, programming
generally culminates in the production of Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and National
Indicative Programmes (NIP). The main environmental integration tool at this stage is the
Country Environmental Profile (CEP) that provides the necessary information to integrate
environmental concerns in the country analysis. A comprehensive country analysis is an
initial step in programming. This analysis focuses on the national situation and policies and
includes an overview of past and ongoing cooperation with the EC as well as with other
donors. It also includes a chapter on climate change (vulnerability, mitigation and adaptation
strategies are analysed). Integrating the environment in this analysis provides opportunities to
undertake policy dialogue and programming on a better understanding of the challenges posed
by sustainable development, which is the long term objective of EC cooperation.

At project level, a screening questionnaire ("Strategic Environment Assessment") on
environment and climate change is completed during identification when preparing a project
fiche. Based on the SEA, there are two major options for environmental integration in the
formulation phase: sector programmes not requiring an SEA and sector programmes requiring
an SEA.

Migration and Adaptation to Climate Change: Pathways for increasing adaptive capacity
through development cooperation

Presented the two possible pathways when it comes to evaluate the relevance of
the climate-migration nexus for development cooperation. The first pathway is to
avoid/reduce migration via adaptation. The second pathway is to adapt via migration.

focuses on the first one. In this regard, stressed that there is weak causal links between
climate and migration. Any approach to managing the climate-migration nexus must address
multiple factors. also stressed that evidence suggests that socio-economic factors play a
central role in the ultimate decision to migrate. Thus they need to be identified and addressed.

She provided a project example entitled "Climate Proofing for Development in Tra Vinh
Province, Mekong Delta, Vietnam". The achievements of this project were highlighted
(climate proofing for development helps in safeguarding success in poverty reduction; the
project has increased capacities of communities to understand the causes and impacts of
climate change, and to take account of climate risks in development and investment planning;
local knowledge and community adaptive capacities recognized in provincial planning; and
provincial government plans to make the approach a standard element of local development
planning). Then provided information on the work done by GIZ on climate change adaptation.

Lastly, mentioned possible areas of cooperation for future work between EU and GIZ.

proposed to apply a migration lens to adaptation. In this regard it is important to monitor
and evaluate the impacts of adaptation measures on migration in order to close the gaps of
empirical evidence. It is also important to target identify hotspots, target adaptation measures,
and upscale existing good practices to use them on a wider scale.

Regarding migration as an adaptation strategy, also pointed out areas for work. At
local level, encouraged the development of provision of technical and advisory services
for local governments (e.g. climate proofing for development or urban planning) and support
for the monitoring of movements and identifying decisions to move. At institutional level,
proposed to establish service centers for migrants. And at national/macro level, advocated
the development of advisory services for mainstreaming climate considerations into migration
strategies.
key messages for the EU were: 1) Don’t become susceptible to alarmist predictions. A backlash of isolationist policies will only harm the poorest and most vulnerable. 2) Address the socio-economic context. This is the largely the factor that makes climate change events so catastrophic. 3) Lots of good practices out there. Upscale and implement. And 4) Support trends in the adaptation field (economics of adaptation and monitoring adaptation).

Migration movements in the Sahel and challenges in data collection

UNEP

Presented the study on “Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel” conducted by UNEP in partnership with IOM, OCHA, UNU, the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and with input from OECD’s Club de Sahel. Climate Change has been identified as an exacerbating factor to existing vulnerabilities (UN and EU high level reports) and the Sahel is considered as «Ground zero» for climate change. The study area is comprised of the nine CILSS countries, as well as the eight additional members of ECOWAS. This report examines how different livelihoods respond through migration and/or conflict when faced with changes in the availability of natural resources, and how best to inform adaptation policy.

The main feature of migration in the Sahel is its regional orientation. The strong relationship between coastal West African countries and the Sahelian countries is also to be noted. Regional migration has always existed as a way of life. It includes seasonal labor migration, as well as migration in search of improved resources (i.e. improved areas for grazing, better fish catches, etc.).

Trend 1: More permanent migration southwards to cities and the coast. Several reasons of which one is a move away from the hot and dry north with some communities pushing permanently into southern areas. Drought and rainfall changes have also contributed to a decline in sustainable water bodies and a more permanent migration of fishers to a dwindling number of lakes, rivers and coast regions that have sustainable fish catches.

Trend 2: Environmentally induced migration due to rapid onset disasters. There was a greater frequency and coverage of floods in some areas of the Sahel over the last 24 years. More particularly, 42% of the CILSS population was affected by seven or more flood events. Such abrupt climate events can contribute to migration by destroying homes and critical infrastructure

The study has encountered a large gap in data availability. Latest survey conducted by the specialised intergovernmental agency on migration in the region (INSAH) in 1992 - due to lack of funding. Migration trends can vary quite rapidly – today the situation is probably quite different from the situation of the latest survey (example Cote d’Ivoire, potential return to home countries). The study will be published next summer.

Adaptation Strategies that have durably increased the resilience of local communities in Bangladesh

Embassy of Bangladesh in Brussels

Started by reminding that Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to the impacts of climate change. It has experienced growing phenomenon of environmental migration following natural disasters. The rural-urban migration has increased over the years and caused huge pressures in the cities. As this migration is not properly managed, it gives rise to socio-economic problems. So the adaptive measures are necessary to increase resilience of the people and community so that they do not opt for migration as an escape at...
the first stage. But in some cases, when the people have no other way but to leave their locality, ‘migration’ apparently becomes the last resort to survive. As such, studies need to be conducted so that this type of migration takes place in a planned and orderly fashion without encumbering the destination communities.

The high incidence of poverty and heavy reliance on agriculture has increased vulnerability to climate change. Over the last 35 years, the government of Bangladesh has invested over USD 10 billion to make the country less vulnerable to natural disasters. These investments have been made with the support of the development partners. Some of these successful projects include, development of early warning system, flood management and flood protection scheme, coastal embankment projects, construction of cyclone shelters, comprehensive disaster management projects, irrigation scheme in the lean season and in the drought prone areas, agricultural research programs and coastal green belt projects etc.

These investments have had a major impact on economic growth and poverty reduction. They have raised rural incomes and created jobs for the poor people in the agricultural sector and made the country largely food secure

Thus over the decades, Bangladesh has also learnt how to plan and implement these programmes more sustainably by involving communities in planning, construction and management.

Bangladesh submitted National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) to the UNFCCC in 2005. There are 15 prioritized projects to enhance country’s adaptability. Bangladesh has successfully implemented the first project ‘Reduction of Climate change hazards through Coastal Afforestation and community participation’ financed by LDC fund. Other projects require huge funding from the donor countries. The government has taken initiatives within its budgetary measures to implement some of the projects integrating it with national development and poverty reduction target. The government has also created ‘Climate Change Resilience Fund’ to channel a minimum of $110 million to millions of citizens around the country to strengthen resilience to the effects of climate change. The fund will support implementation of Bangladesh’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan for 2009-2018 by supporting vulnerable communities in adapting to greater climate uncertainty and changing agricultural conditions. It will be managed and implemented by the Bangladesh government, with initial contributions from some European Development partners of Bangladesh.

International cooperation in technology transfer may also support the adaptation strategies and projects in Bangladesh. For example, Bangladesh badly needs water treatment technology and water treatment plants for providing safe drinking water to the coastal region where saline water has intruded. In Bangladesh research programs have been taken on drought, flood and salt tolerant varieties of crops to facilitate adaptation in future. Knowledge sharing in this sector would greatly benefit the mankind. In Bangladesh, many industries lack the effluent treatment plants which cause degradation of environment. If we get technical support from the developed countries it would help avoiding environmental pollution.

To protect migration from vulnerable areas require continuous investment in infrastructure developments, awareness raising campaigns and opportunities for livelihood diversification. There should be facilities available to compensate the loss. Introduction of certain funds and grants may alleviate the situation to some extent. In cases, for example, river erosion or sea level rise which may compel a great number of people to migrate, provisions should be made nearby urban areas or cities to cope with the excess population, its need and opportunities for livelihood. As a low lying country, Bangladesh may experience displacement of 25 to 40 million people from the coastal zone if sea level rises 0.5 meter or more. As Bangladesh is already a very densely populated country, it would have hardly any scope to lessen the problem by internal migration only; in larger context international migration may follow.
Finally thanked the EU Commission that has recently contributed 10 million euro as assistance to the victims of the latest severe cyclonic storm AILA that hit Bangladesh on 25 May 2009. But the main problem is half of the displaced people are yet to return to their homes.

SESSION 3 – ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN MIGRATION APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY REMAINING OPTION

*Humanitarian challenges emerging from climate change: Preparedness and protection responses to displacement resulting from sudden onset disasters in high risk areas*  
Norwegian Refugee Council

Reminded participants about the Nansen conference on climate change and displacement, co-organised with NRC and Cicero in Oslo in June. Natural disasters have become a leading cause of forced migration as a survival strategy. The number of recorded natural disasters has doubled from approximately 200 to over 400 per year over the past two decades. The majority are climate-related – that is, disasters which climate changes can influence in terms of frequency and severity. Climate change and displacement challenges the international humanitarian system and affected states in all phases; prevention, preparedness and response. Protection as a cross cutting issue is of particular concern to humanitarian organisations like NRC.

Concerning protection in natural disasters, highlighted that a focus on climate-related displacement specifically can be justified in order to establish climate change as an important cause or accelerator of forced migration, as well as the wider responsibility for prevention, preparedness and response. From a protection perspective, however, there is normally no compelling reason to distinguish between people displaced by climate-related or other natural disasters, such as earthquakes or tsunamis. Displaced people may all be particularly vulnerable due to threats to safety and security, loss of family members, inadequate shelter, discrimination in aid distribution, psychosocial stress or risk of sexual and gender based violence. With time, further concerns regarding the protection of their human rights arise, including lack of access to basic services such as health and education, loss of livelihood, loss of personal documentation, obstacles to access housing, land and property, and unsafe or involuntary return. These are all challenges to durable solutions. Most people displaced by sudden onset natural disasters remain within the borders of their home countries.

Normative frameworks for protection of internally displaced people, based upon - and consistent with - international human rights law, are already in place: the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), the framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (2010) and the Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters (2011). In practice, ensuring the implementation of these standards and guidelines is needed. It is a government responsibility to protect and ensure fulfilment of the human rights of its affected populations, including of course those internally displaced by natural disasters. However, the international community also has a responsibility to operationalize protection frameworks in the response, as well as support governments and local authorities to do so. Weak state protection of displaced persons may be caused by lack of knowledge of international standards and low state capacity to implement these.

Regarding preparedness and early warning, stressed the need to develop early warning to take early action to reduce the negative impacts on lives and livelihoods by adverse climatic events. However, existing early warning systems, though diverse, may not fully meet the requirements for information to support appropriate humanitarian preparedness and response. Regular monitoring of migration and displacement patterns is needed; including distress