FORWARDING NOTE

From: Secretariat  
To: Delegations  
No. prev. doc.: 8257/1/01 REV 1 COSDP 100, 11226/01 COSDP 213  
Subject: Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management

Delegations will find attached a revised version of the suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management. This version has been established by amending the previous version (11226/01 COSDP 213) in light of the Military Advice by the Military Committee (11797/01 COSDP 225), the opinion by the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (12135/01) and comments by delegations within the context of discussions in the PSC and PMG. The document is intended to be used, after endorsement by the PSC, in the second workshop on crisis management procedures to be held on 24-25 October 2001.

The suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive, EU crisis management are a "living document", reflecting the current state as laid down in texts agreed so far and should continue to be reviewed and up-dated in light of developments.
SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEDURES FOR COHERENT, COMPREHENSIVE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION

The paper has been drawn up to include crises of the highest degree of complexity. Although the widest range of activities during the crisis cycle are described and appear sequentially, this is only for ease of reference. In other terms, the paper should not be taken to imply that the EU is constrained to rigidly follow the same course of events; on the one hand, many instruments and processes mentioned might be relevant in several or all phases of a crisis, on the other hand, some of the processes mentioned could be skipped altogether. Stability promotion and post-conflict reconstruction are mentioned as a separate phase 7, however, this is a matter of presentation and it is being understood that these are present in all phases.

Coreper exercises the role conferred on it by Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and by Article 19 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure. To that end, it will be informed in good time by the PSC.

The present suggestions are based on current Treaty provisions. After the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice these suggestions will need to be amended accordingly. They should also reflect developments in the EU-NATO arrangements for the implementation of Berlin Plus.

Police aspects, following from the Police Action Plan adopted by the Göteborg European Council, have been introduced in the paper. These will be developed as appropriate as further work on and consideration of these requirements for an EU operational capability for police will be taken forward in the appropriate Council bodies by the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative according to the mandate from Göteborg.

The on-going development of civilian crisis management capacities other than police (i.e. rule of law personnel, administrative experts and civil protection) will be reflected in the document as they evolve as foreseen in Annex III "New concrete targets for civilian aspects of crisis management" of the Presidency ESDP Report to the Göteborg European Council.
The Göteborg European Council also invited the Belgian Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to continue work within the General Affairs Council to work out the practical modalities related to the implementation of the military and civilian aspects of crisis management, including civil-military coordination. Once these have been developed, they will be reflected in the procedures.

It has been widely recognised that the establishment and implementation of a coordinated information policy is of paramount importance in time of crisis. Information policy is mentioned in each phase as a separate section that will need to be developed subsequently.

It is noted that Denmark recalled the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community.

NB. References in the paper to the Council Secretariat include in particular the Directorate General E External Relations and its Police Unit, the EU Military Staff, the Policy Unit, the Legal Service, but can also include other Directorates General as appropriate.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## PHASE 1  ROUTINE PHASE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Stability promotion and conflict prevention</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Monitoring and analysis of the situation, early warning</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consultations and contacts</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Advance planning and preparatory actions, including civil and civil-military coordination</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Information policy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PHASE 2  CRISIS BUILD-UP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Detection of the crisis</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Work within the EU: analyses, policy options, first measures taken</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civil and civil-military coordination</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consultations and contacts</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Consideration that EU action is appropriate: identification of available instruments, capabilities and resources with a view to an overall approach (hereinafter crisis management concept)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Work within the EU, including civil and civil-military coordination</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consultations and contacts</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Information policy</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PHASE 3  APPROVAL OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Approval of the crisis management concept</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Work within the EU</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consultations and contacts</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Development of the military elements of the EU approach</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Development of civilian aspects of the EU approach</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Civil and civil-military coordination</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Information policy</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PHASE 4  FORMAL DECISION TO TAKE ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Council decision to take action</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Selection of a military strategic option</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Option 1: EU military operation without use of NATO assets and capabilities</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Option 2: EU military operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- For Option 1 and Option 2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Development of the civilian aspects</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Police</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CFSP</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community elements</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Civil and civil-military coordination</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Consultations and contacts</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Information policy</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12505/01

ANNEX  DG E VIII  EN
PHASE 5 IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................................................................................ 37

A. GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION, CIVIL AND CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION ......................................................... 37
   - Work within the EU ............................................................................................................................................ 37
   - Consultations and contacts ................................................................................................................................. 38

B. CONDUCT OF THE MILITARY OPERATION ........................................................................................................... 38
C. CONDUCT OF THE POLICE OPERATION ............................................................................................................... 41

D. CIVIL AND CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION ........................................................................................................ 41

E. INFORMATION POLICY ......................................................................................................................................... 41

PHASE 6 REFOCUSING OF EU ACTION ....................................................................................................................... 42

A. REFOCUSING OF EU ACTION ................................................................................................................................ 42
   - Work within the EU ............................................................................................................................................ 42
   - Consultations and contacts ................................................................................................................................. 43

B. TERMINATION OF THE CURRENT MILITARY OPERATION WHERE APPROPRIATE .................................................... 44
C. TERMINATION OF THE POLICE OPERATION ........................................................................................................... 44

D. COUNCIL DECISION ............................................................................................................................................... 44

E. INFORMATION POLICY ......................................................................................................................................... 45

F. DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................................................................................. 45

G. LESSONS LEARNED ............................................................................................................................................... 45

PHASE 7 STABILITY PROMOTION, POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION ................................................................. 47

ANNEX 1: ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF CIVILIAN INSTRUMENTS ......................................................................................... 49

ANNEX 2: TEMPLATE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT .......................................................................................... 50

ANNEX 3: ILLUSTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF A MILITARY STRATEGIC OPTION ....................................................... 53
PHASE 1 ROUTINE PHASE

The procedures outlined in the following are implemented in full compliance with the competencies attributed to Coreper by virtue of TEC Article 207.

- Pre-crisis, support to stability and conflict prevention
- Monitoring and analysis, early warning and advance planning

A. Stability promotion and conflict prevention

1. Following up the principles of the UN Charter and of the OSCE Charter for European Security as well as the objectives of the EU, as outlined in TEU, the Union is active in stability promotion, early warning and conflict prevention and cooperates with the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe and other international organisations in a mutually reinforcing manner. The EU contributes to these objectives for example through projects to combat the destabilising accumulation of small arms, and through a broad range of programmes in support of human rights, democracy, institution building and market economy, through the full range of EU instruments, including Community action and individual Member States' initiatives. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts is being implemented.

N.B. These instruments can be used in all subsequent phases of a crisis.

B. Monitoring and analysis of the situation, early warning

- Work within the EU

2. The Member States and the Commission carry out routine monitoring and exchanges of information within the Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as within the relevant geographic and thematic Council working groups.
3. The EU joint Situation Centre (EU SITCEN), operating on a permanent basis, monitors international developments, provides early warning, receives and evaluates information and disseminates information and evaluation to competent bodies, and acts as point of operational contact for the SG/HR.

4. The EU Satellite Centre (SatCen), as directed by the SG/HR in accordance with the Joint Action contributes to early warning.

5. The Policy Unit provides the PSC in particular with timely assessment and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the EU’s foreign and security policy. The Policy Unit produces policy options papers.

6. The Police Unit \(^1\) works with the SITCEN in collecting and evaluating information, provides information and assessment on public security and criminal issues related to potential crises, and contributes to early warning and situation assessment. \(^2\)

7. The Military Staff monitors potential crises by relying on appropriate national and multinational intelligence capabilities and performs early warning and situation assessment.

8. The Military Committee provides the forum for military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. Its Chairman participates as appropriate in the PSC. The military representatives of the Member States are encouraged to do likewise. The Military Committee assesses the risks of potential crises and provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, at the latter's request or on its own initiative, acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC.

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\(^1\) Coordinating and cooperating with their DG H (Justice and Home Affairs) counterparts, as required.

\(^2\) The 'Police Action Plan', contained in the Presidency report to Goteborg, points to the integration of police expertise and input into EU structures for early warning and timely assessment as an aspect deserving particular attention.
- **Consultations and contacts**

9. The development of the ESDP will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the management of crisis with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making autonomy.

The EU consults and cooperates with NATO in accordance with the provisions of the standing arrangements for consultation outside times of crisis. The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Council Secretariat including the Military Staff maintain regular contacts with NATO at the appropriate level.

10. The EU consults with non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU in accordance with the provisions of the permanent consultation arrangements during non-crisis periods on involvement in crisis management operations with military and/or police forces.

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3 Meetings between the PSC and the NAC will be held not less than three times, and EU-NATO ministerial meetings not less than once, per EU Presidency. Either organisation may request additional meetings as necessary. Meetings between the EU and the NATO Military Committees may be held as required, at the request of either organisation with at least one such meeting during each Presidency. There may also be:

- meetings between subsidiary groups (e.g. PMG/PCG or Military Committee working groups);
- meetings in the form of ad hoc EU/NATO groups;
- expert groups along HTF Plus lines.

When necessary, and in particular where NATO capabilities and expertise are concerned, NATO representatives will be invited to meetings, in accordance with the provisions of the TEU and on a basis of reciprocity. This will apply to:

- the Secretary General of NATO for ministerial meetings, in particular those attended by Defence Ministers;
- the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee for meetings of the Military Committee;
- DSACEUR for meetings of the Military Committee, in view of his responsibilities for the European pillar of NATO and his potential role in EU-led operations.

4 The PSC plays a leading role in the implementation of these arrangements, which include notably during each Presidency:

- a minimum of two meetings in EU+15 format and of two meetings in EU+6 format;
- one ministerial meeting bringing together the 15 and the 6 countries;
- a minimum of two meetings at Military Committee representative level, as well as exchanges at military experts level (in particular concerning the establishment of capability objectives).

Each third country may appoint from its mission an ESDP interlocutor with regard to the PSC. To facilitate the association of third countries wishing to be involved in EU military activities, they may appoint an officer accredited to the EU Military Staff who will serve as a contact. A minimum of two information meetings will be held during each Presidency for these officers from the 15 and the 6 countries.
11. The EU conducts exchanges of information with third countries on ESDP and military crisis management within the framework of political dialogue. Contacts with other third countries are maintained as necessary.

12. Contacts and appropriate cooperation as necessary with the UN and other international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. are maintained.

C. **Advance planning and preparatory actions, including civil and civil-military coordination**

13. The PSC continues to monitor and assess potential crises.

14. The Military Committee continues to provide military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, at the latter's request or on its own initiative, acting within the guidelines forwarded by the PSC.

15. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC and to the other appropriate Council bodies in accordance with their respective competencies. It helps to ensure a higher degree of inter-pillar coherence in the EU's civilian crisis management, and promotes improvements in the crisis response capabilities of the EU. It contributes to the setting-up of mechanisms for the exchange of information, coordination, and rapid reaction between the Union and the Member States. It assists the PSC and other appropriate Council bodies to acquire a comprehensive view of the means available to the EU and to Member States.

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5 The Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council contains provisions on contributions of non-EU states to EU police missions in civilian crisis management (Annex II), the specific modalities of which are to be further elaborated as well as considered by the PSC. The Presidency report states that contributions by non-EU states to EU police missions will be given favourable consideration, in accordance with modalities to be determined with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union. It suggests that dialogue and information in issues related to police could also take place within the EU+15 format. In the event of a crisis, this structure could also serve for consultation, in view of possible contributions to a mission, in the period leading up to a decision of the Council to launch a police operation.

The Member States provide the Coordinating Mechanism for civilian aspects of crisis management, set up at the Council Secretariat and fully interacting with the Commission services (hereafter the "Coordinating Mechanism"), with information on civil crisis management assets available, including their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions. This information will be made available to Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management in order to ensure the necessary exchange of information and coordination between the EU and the Member States.

16. The Military Staff carries out the military aspects of strategic advance planning for the missions set out in Article 17(2) TEU, the so-called Petersberg Missions. It also reviews regularly existing plans.

17. The Police Unit conducts advance planning in close coordination with the Military Staff as appropriate.

18. Crisis management procedures are tested and further developed within a comprehensive exercise policy. All relevant Council Secretariat services, the SatCen Agency, the Commission, Member States and, appropriate external actors participate in the crisis management exercises.

19. The Commission performs advance planning fully interacting, where relevant, with the Coordinating mechanism.

20. Close coordination takes place between the Council Secretariat and the Commission. This includes the possibility of coordinated advance planning.

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7 "A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, should be set up at the Council Secretariat. It would run the database project and the different capabilities initiatives. In particular crises, depending on the EU’s role, it may set up an ad hoc centre to coordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States’ contributions. This should be a lean, efficient, non-bureaucratic structure permitting close interaction with the Commission." (Presidency conclusions Helsinki, Annex 2 to Annex IV).

8 Principles regarding participation and observation in EU exercises are set out in the Exercise policy of the European Union (doc. 8373/1/01 REV 1, p.8, § 18-20).
D. **Information policy**

21. The Presidency, SG/HR, Member States and the Commission implement a coherent information policy during the routine phase.

22. Coordination with a view to a coherent information policy in response to crises takes place in the PSC.
PHASE 2  CRISIS BUILD-UP

– Detection of the crisis, analysis, policy options, first measures taken

The procedures outlined in the following are implemented in full compliance with the competencies attributed to Coreper by virtue of TEC Article 207.

A. Detection of the crisis

- Work within the EU: analyses, policy options, first measures taken

23. The PSC monitors and assesses crises. The SG/HR, the Presidency, the Military Committee, a Member State and/or the Commission draw the PSC's attention to a mounting crisis.

24. The provision of information, including intelligence, from Member States and the Commission is intensified. If necessary, the PSC identifies specific areas or subjects on which additional information is required. The PSC should have access to all necessary information processed through agreed channels (including from NATO, UN, OSCE and other international organisations) and to all proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis.

25. The EU SITCEN steps up the collection of information, processes it, and reports on the situation to the SG/HR and to the competent bodies for crisis management (in particular the PSC and the Military Committee).

26. The Council Secretariat provides analysis papers and policy options. To this end, Member States will provide classified information. The Commission provides policy analysis and policy options. Where relevant, analysis and policy option papers are prepared by the Commission and the Council Secretariat working together.
27. The Military Committee provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, on the latter's request or on its own initiative, acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC, with regard to the military dimension of a crisis and its implications.

28. Relevant geographical working groups examine particular aspects of the situation in greater detail, as appropriate, and report to the PSC.

29. The PSC meets to assess the causes and consequences of the crisis, on the basis of the information, policy options papers, advice and reports presented to it, and with a view to reaching a common political understanding of the crisis.

30. The Commission, which participates fully in the work of the PSC, informs the PSC on measures taken or under preparation and starts reflecting on the possible use of other instruments. Member States do likewise, informing the PSC on measures taken on a national basis.

31. In accordance with its preliminary political assessment, the PSC may review its information requirements and request specific information or types of reports from the EU SITCEN, the Commission and from Member States. The PSC may ask competent bodies (Military Committee, geographical working groups etc.) to provide further analysis of the crisis. The SG/HR gives operational direction to the SatCen to ensure that it will support as effectively as possible the decision-making of the Council and he reports as appropriate to the PSC.

32. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC and to the other appropriate Council bodies in accordance with their respective competencies. The Committee assists these bodies in acquiring a comprehensive view of the means available to the EU and the Member States to respond to a crisis. To this effect, the Committee will use the relevant information form the Coordinating Mechanism and the Police Unit as described below in paragraphs 44 and 45.
33. The SG/HR alerts other Council instances that might be called upon to participate in the crisis management.

34. The Council, either in a regular session or in an ad hoc session, may proceed to assess the situation and provide guidance to the PSC.

35. The PSC may agree that fact-finding missions (FFM) be dispatched to verify facts and assess the needs for further EU action.

- Civil and civil-military coordination

36. The Council Secretariat, including Military Staff and the Police Unit, and the Commission continue coordinated contingency planning for their respective spheres of responsibility.

- Consultations and contacts

37. Contacts and meetings between EU and NATO are stepped up, from the level of relevant services (including military staffs) and bodies, to Ministers if appropriate, so that, in the interest of transparency, consultation and cooperation, the two organisations can discuss their assessments of the crisis and how it may develop, together with any related security problems.

38. Dialogue and consultation with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession⁹ to the EU are intensified at all levels, including ministerial level, in the period leading up to the Council decision. When a crisis develops, these intensified consultations will provide an opportunity for exchanges of views on situation assessment and discussion of the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved.

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⁹ For police, see footnote 5.
39. Exchanges of information with other potential partners take place within the framework of political dialogue. Additional meetings are organised if the Council deems it necessary. Contacts with other third countries are intensified where necessary.

40. Contacts and appropriate cooperation as necessary with the UN and other international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. are intensified.

B. **Consideration that EU action is appropriate:** identification of available instruments, capabilities and resources with a view to an overall approach (hereinafter crisis management concept)

- *Work within the EU, including civil and civil-military coordination*

41. The PSC, possibly in the light of Council guidance, analyses the situation and considers that EU action is appropriate (possibly on request from an international organisation, e.g. the UN or the OSCE.), triggering the development of a crisis management concept. 11 To this end, the PSC should have access to all necessary information processed through agreed channels (including from NATO, UN, OSCE and other international organisations), proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis in order to make a comprehensive assessment. After consulting the Presidency and without prejudice to Article 18 of the TEU, the SG/HR may chair the PSC.

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11 Tentative definition drawing on the "Military bodies in the European Union" paper. Crisis management concept: a conceptual framework describing the EU’s overall approach to the management of a particular crisis, addressing the full range of activities and may include the definition of politico-military objectives for any possible military activities. See Annex 2 for a draft template crisis management concept. This structure of the template concept serves to ensure the coherence and comprehensiveness of possible EU actions by taking account of the range and scale of the different instruments available to the Union. However, the structure of CMC will need to remain flexible and adaptable, as the actual shape of each CMC will be determined by a number of variables, such as the stage of a crisis at which a CMC is developed and presented to the PSC and the nature and location of the crisis. It is likely, for example, that at the beginning of a crisis a CMC might consider a broader range of options reflecting the early stage of internal EU deliberations on that crisis. By contrast, a CMC that was designed to address a crisis that had been extant for some time might focus on a much narrower range of options, reflecting the more developed understanding within the EU about what type of action would be appropriate.
42. An ad hoc crisis response coordinating team, consisting of members of the Council Secretariat and the Commission, is set up\(^{12}\) to develop the draft crisis management concept. The SG can draw on its work so that the draft crisis management concept presented to the PSC is both coherent and comprehensive and encompasses all relevant civilian and military instruments.

43. The Military Staff, under the direction of the Military Committee, provides military expertise to EU bodies and, in particular to SG/HR. In the light of military advice (see § 14, 27, 48), the Military Staff contribute to the elaboration of the crisis management concept, in particular the definition of politico-military objectives for any possible military activities, the objectives and end-state that form the basis of the work on military strategic options.

44. The Member States provide the Coordinating Mechanism with information on civil crisis management assets available, including their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions.

45. The Police Unit identifies how police could contribute to the management/resolution of the crisis, contributes to the definition of a crisis management concept, and identifies available police capabilities and capacities.

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\(^{12}\) The ad hoc crisis response coordinating team is a vehicle for inter-service coordination in response to a given crisis. It will consist of officials from the relevant services in the Council Secretariat and the Commission. It will not be a standing structure but will be pulled together when a particular crisis occurs. As far as the Council Secretariat is concerned, the SG/HR will instruct the relevant services to participate in the team. The ad hoc team is a practical and effective way of ensuring at the working level that the Council and the Commission are in the position to ensure consistency in the external activities of the Union, in accordance with article 3 second subparagraph TEU. The relevant coordination is between services, and is without prejudice to the prerogatives and obligations of the Institutions themselves. The team would thus help to ensure close two-way coordination in the planning of military and civilian measures.

The team is not a Council working group. *A fortiori*, it does not take decisions. The SG can draw on its work so that the draft crisis management concept presented to the PSC is both coherent and comprehensive and encompasses all relevant civilian and military instruments. The PSC reviews the draft crisis management concept with a view to submitting an opinion to Council identifying the political objectives and suggesting a cohesive set of options. In addition, through the participation of Commission officials, the Commission can also use this work as a reference point when taking initiatives within its area of responsibility. This team would continue to work on planning as required in the light of the outcome of PSC meetings. The team would also assist in ensuring full coherence between the civil and military aspects of the EU action in the implementation phase.
46. Close contacts are maintained between the SG/HR and the Commission throughout the process.

47. The SG/HR will present the draft crisis management concept to the PSC. The Commission for its part will present the elements which pertain to its competence. The PSC gives guidance for the further development of the crisis management concept. It will request Military Advice from the Military Committee for the military aspects of the crisis management concept.

48. The Military Committee provides military advice to the PSC on the military dimension of the crisis, on possible military strategic objectives including an assessment of the potential availability of military capabilities and capacities including in support of civilian instruments. Its Chairman participates in the PSC. The military representatives of the Member States are encouraged to do likewise.

49. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management assists the PSC and other appropriate Council bodies to acquire a comprehensive view of the non-military means available to the EU and to the Member States.

50. The PSC:
   • makes the general political assessment, keeping in mind the totality of measures applicable, and
   • reviews the draft crisis management concept, with a view to submitting an opinion to Council identifying the political objective and suggesting a cohesive set of options.

The Commission, which participates fully in the work of PSC, informs the PSC on measures taken or under preparation. Each measure will be dealt with by the competent body according to the applicable procedures: for Community measures, Coreper exercises fully its role. Member States inform the PSC about measures taken or that they intend to take at national level.

51. The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission will ensure the consistency of the work of the Council bodies and of the different Council configurations.
52. Community measures or CFSP measures may be taken during this phase.

53. Meanwhile, monitoring of the developing crisis continues, information gathering is strengthened from all available sources such as missions of the Member States, Commission delegations, international organisations and NGOs on the ground, exploitation of SatCen products, etc.

- **Consultations and contacts**

54. The EU maintains intensified dialogue and consultations with NATO (see § 37).

55. The EU maintains intensified consultations with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU ¹³ (see § 38), in particular:

   a) possibility of extra meetings if circumstances require;

   b) Military Staff holds information meetings for officers from the 15 and the 6 countries serving as contact to the Military Staff.

56. Contacts with other third countries (see § 39) that are envisaging contributing to the management of the crisis are further intensified.

57. Contacts and appropriate cooperation as necessary with the UN and other international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), NGOs etc. that are envisaging contributing to the management of the crisis are further intensified.

C. **Information policy**

58. The PSC coordinates the EU information strategy in relation to the crisis and the possible EU response to the crisis. The Presidency, SG/HR, Member States and the Commission implement this coherent information strategy.

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¹³ For police, see footnote 5.
PHASE 3 APPROVAL OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

The procedures outlined in the following are implemented in full compliance with the competencies attributed to Coreper by virtue of TEC Article 207.

A. Approval of the crisis management concept

- Work within the EU

59. The Council approves, on the basis of an opinion by the PSC, the general political assessment and a cohesive set of options. In particular, the Council:

   a) if European Council conclusions exist, further specifies the EU political objectives; otherwise, the Council may define such objectives;

   b) agrees the crisis management concept;\(^{14}\)

   c) may invite the Commission to submit appropriate proposals or adopt appropriate measures within its area of responsibility in order to pursue the political objectives thus selected.

60. The EU SITCEN continues to produce comprehensive and timely situation reports and assessments, especially to the SG/HR, the PSC and other competent bodies for crisis management.

- Consultations and contacts

61. The EU maintains intensified dialogue and consultations with NATO (see § 37 and § 72).

\(^{14}\) The crisis management concept will evolve as a function of developments of the situation. It might be modified either formally or implicitly as required.
62. The EU intensifies dialogue and consultation with the 15 and with the 6 at all levels\(^1\), including ministerial level, to exchange views on situation assessment and discusses the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved (see also § 71 and § 72, second sub-paragraph).

63. Consultations with other potential partners:

a) take place in the framework of political dialogue; if the Council deems it necessary, additional meetings in the PSC Troika format are organised.

b) when a military operation is being considered, the Troika or the SG/HR drawing on the military advice of the Chairman of the Military Committee as appropriate conduct such consultations, which constitute the framework for exchanges of views and discussions on possible participation by potential partners (see also § 72, second sub-paragraph for Canada). Police issues could be included in the dialogue, cooperation and consultation on ESDP issues with potential partners.\(^2\)

64. Contacts with other third countries are maintained as necessary.

65. Intensive contacts and appropriate cooperation as necessary with the UN and other international\(^3\) and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. are maintained.

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\(^1\) For police, see footnote 5.

\(^2\) The Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council states that police could be included in the dialogue, cooperation and consultation on ESDP issues with potential partners (i.e. Russia, Ukraine, other European States with which the union maintains political dialogue, and other interested states such as Canada) within the framework of existing arrangements.

B. Development of the military elements of the EU approach

66. Upon the PSC's request (including guidance as appropriate), the Military Committee issues a Military Strategic Option Directive to the Director General of the Military Staff to draw up and present prioritised military strategic option(s). This military directive will translate the PSC request, including such guidance as the PSC considers appropriate, into military terms.

67. Member States and, as appropriate, interested third countries, give preliminary indications to the Military Staff in response to its requests of their intention to contribute, initially in support of planning for an EU-led operation.

68. Having received the Military Strategic Option Directive from the Military Committee, the Military Staff develops and prioritises military strategic options as the basis for the military advice of the Military Committee to the PSC by:

a) defining initial broad options;

b) drawing as appropriate on planning support from external sources either using the assured access to NATO\(^\text{18}\) or national planning capabilities or multinational HQs available to the EU which will analyse and further develop those options in more detail;

c) evaluating the results of this more detailed work and commissioning any further work that might be necessary;

d) presenting an overall assessment, with an indication of priorities and recommendations as appropriate, to the EUMC.

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\(^{18}\) Bearing in mind the potential role of DSACEUR.
Developed and prioritised military strategic options should include an assessment of feasibility and risk, a C2 structure including recommendations regarding an Operation Commander, an Operation Headquarters, a Joint Force Commander, a Force Headquarters, Force capability requirements and an indication of forces that might be made available by contributing states;

69. The Military Committee evaluates the prioritised military strategic options developed by the Military Staff and forwards them to the PSC, together with its evaluation and military advice.

70. The PSC, based on the advice by the Military Committee, evaluates the military strategic option(s), and prepares an opinion to Council recommending the preferred military strategic option(s).

71. Consultations with the 15 and with the 6 (which could be held at politico-military experts level) ¹⁹ take place with the aim of ensuring that the countries potentially contributing to an EU-led military crisis management operation are informed of the EU's intentions, particularly with regard to the military strategic options being envisaged.

72. Should the Union intend to look more closely at an option calling for pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities the PSC will so inform the NAC.

Once the EU begins to examine in depth an option requiring the use of NATO assets and capabilities, particular attention will be paid to consultation of the six non-EU European NATO members and with Canada.

¹⁹ For police, see footnote 5.
C. **Development of civilian aspects of the EU approach**

73. The Member States provide the Coordinating Mechanism with information on civil crisis management assets available, including their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Commission assists the PSC and other appropriate Council bodies to acquire a comprehensive view of the means available to the EU and to the Member States.

P.M. The development and validation of arrangements for planning and conduct for operations with police elements at political strategic level are not yet elaborated \(^{20}\).

D. **Civil and civil-military coordination**

74. In order to ensure coherence at the planning stage in the context of a possible Joint Action or where a Joint Action is initiated in parallel to existing or imminent Community measures, the crisis response coordinating team will:

a) work to prepare coordinated plans involving civil instruments from the first and second pillar, particularly but not exclusively in the areas of police, strengthening the Rule of Law, Civil Administration and Civil Protection;

b) ensure consistency and develop the appropriate sequence of military and civilian instruments.

E. **Information policy**

75. The Presidency, SG/HR, Commission and Member States continue to implement the coordinated and coherent information strategy.

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\(^{20}\) The suggested amendment by the Committee for Civilian aspects of crisis management to broaden the PM to cover civilian elements in the broader sense than police has not been retained since its extension to the Community acts and/or the Community budget, would be incompatible with Article 47 of the TEU, with Article 202 of the ECT entrusting the Commission with the implementation of the Community acts and with the "Comitology decision".
PHASE 4 FORMAL DECISION TO TAKE ACTION

The procedures outlined in the following are implemented in full compliance with the competencies attributed to Coreper by virtue of TEC Article 207.

A. Council decision to take action

76. The PSC submits an opinion to the Council recommending the adoption of a decision to take action. The Council adopts the decision to take action to tackle the crisis (this decision could, where appropriate, take the form of a Joint Action in full respect of the single institutional framework and of Article 47 of the TEU). Within that decision, the Council:

a) defines the political context in which the Joint Action is to be carried out;

b) takes the necessary measures to that end;

c) defines the conditions under which the SG/HR will be responsible for implementing political, police (Title V) and military aspects, in particular his role in the implementation of the measures falling within the 'political control and strategic direction' exercised by the PSC for the crisis-management operation. For such measures, SG/HR acts with the PSC assent;

d) invites the Commission to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and priorities of the Joint Action, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures or notes that the Commission intends to do so;

e) invites Member States to direct their action in support of the Joint Action.

f) decides whether third countries will be invited to contribute.

In parallel the Council may adopt any new Commission proposals for additional measures falling under the EC Treaty. Such measures will be agreed following normal procedures and in full respect of the role of Coreper.
B. Selection of a military strategic option

77. The Council, in the light of the opinion delivered by the PSC based on the advice from the Military Committee, selects a military strategic option including a proposed chain of command (cf. § 68), and invites Member States to confirm, subject to national procedures, their readiness to support the selected option.

The Chairman of the Military Committee attends the Council meeting acting as the spokesman of the Military Committee.

78. The military strategic option selected by the Council implies either an EU military operation without use of NATO assets and capabilities or an EU military operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. (NB. The order of the options does not imply a priority choice.)

- **Option 1: EU military operation without use of NATO assets and capabilities**

  a) The Council:

     • appoints the Operation Commander and designates the Operation Headquarters;
     • designates the Force Commander, (the Force Headquarters and the Component Commands, if appropriate)

  b) Non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU having, upon invitation to give such indication, expressed a clear intention to participate in the operation, may deploy liaison officers to European operational headquarters, in order to enable the exchange of information on the operational planning and on the foreseen contribution.

  c) EU keeps NATO informed of the general progress in preparations.
- **Option 2: EU military operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities**

  a) Staffs of the two organisations, in close contact with DSACEUR as strategic coordinator, meet in order to specify the pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities considered for this option.

  b) The EU addresses a formal request to NATO for the use of its assets and capabilities.

  c) NATO assets and capabilities needed for the EU operation, as well as the modalities for their release, including the possible conditions for their recall, are identified at a PSC/NAC meeting.

  d) The Council, on the basis of responses from NATO and the Member States:

     • appoints the Operation Commander and designates the Operation Headquarters;

     • designates the Force Commander, (the Force Headquarters and the Component Commands, if appropriate);

     • approves on the basis of the "Berlin Plus" agreement the arrangements for hand-over and any recall conditions.

  e) The non-EU European allies will be involved in the planning according to the procedures laid down within NATO.
**For Option 1 and Option 2**

79. On the basis of the military strategic option selected by the Council, the PSC sends such guidance to the EUMC as is necessary for EUMC to direct to the EUMS to draft the Initiating Military Directive. The Initiating Military Directive will include those directives required by the Operation Commander to enable him to draw up the necessary planning documents (CONOPS, Statement of Requirements (SOR), OPLAN). The PSC will approve the Initiating Military Directive before its release is authorised by the EUMC.

80. On the basis of the Initiating Military Directive, the Operation Commander prepares a "Concept of operations" (CONOPS), including guidelines on the use of force and a Statement of Requirements (SOR).

81. Upon request of the PSC, the Military Committee tasks the Operation Commander, assisted by the Military Staff, to hold technical exchanges in order to present operational planning work to the non-EU European NATO members and the other candidates for accession to the EU, invited to take part in the operation by the Council, that have expressed their intention in principle of taking part in the operation, so as to enable those countries to determine the nature and volume of the contributions they could make to the EU-led operation. These countries, and other third countries, which have expressed their intention, will provide the Operation Commander with an initial indication of their contribution.

[Alternative A:

82. The PSC submits to the Council its opinion on CONOPS in the light of the advice and recommendations of the Military Committee supported by an evaluation from the Military Staff. The Council, possibly convened in an extraordinary session, approves CONOPS including guidelines on the use of force and formally invites third countries to participate in the operation.]
OR

[Alternative B:

In the light of advice and recommendations of the Military Committee supported by an evaluation from the Military Staff, the PSC reaches agreement on the CONOPS including guidelines on the use of force and suggests that the Council by simplified written procedure agree to formally invite third countries to participate in the operation.]

83. Subsequently, the Operation Commander prepares a "Operation Plan" (OPLAN) with guidelines on the use of force, which will include the Rules of Engagement (RoE).

84. Upon request of the PSC, the Military Committee tasks the Operation Commander, in coordination with the Military Staff, to conduct the Force Generation process.

85. Member States, NATO when appropriate, and other troop contributors confirm the level and quality of their contributions at the Force Generation Conferences.

86. When appropriate, the Council Secretariat will prepare a Status of Forces (SOFA) and negotiate with the receiving nation(s), which will be submitted to the Council via the Military Committee and the PSC.

87. A PSC/NAC meeting will confirm, if appropriate, the availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities and all the practical arrangements, including hand-over and recall.

88. The PSC submits to the Council its opinion on the OPLAN with the advice and recommendations of the Military Committee, supported by an evaluation from the Military Staff.
89. Following the Force Generation Conferences, the Council, possibly convened in an extraordinary session, on the basis of the opinion of the PSC:

a) approves OPLAN and the guidelines on the use of force, which will include the RoE;

b) decides to launch the operation once all preconditions such as the force generation are complete;

c) approves, where appropriate, the SOFA;

d) adopts the decision setting up the Committee of Contributors 21.

The Chairman of the Military Committee, supported by the Operation Commander, attends the Council meeting acting as the spokesman of the Military Committee.

C. Development of the civilian aspects 22

- Police

P.M. The development and validation of concepts and systems for command and control at the operational level for police operations (Title V), including police operations as part of EU crisis management operations including also military means will need to be carried out 23.
90. Upon decision by the Council to launch a police operation or an integrated operation with police components:

- the full strength of Member States’ pledges is assessed on the basis of the Coordinating Mechanism's work and according to modalities to be established;
- non-EU states that are willing and capable of contributing to a particular operation may be invited, by a decision by the Council, to take part in the operation.

- **CFSP**

91. The Council Secretariat undertakes all the preparatory work, in cooperation with the Commission as appropriate, for presentation to the PSC with a view to implementation of CFSP elements.

- **Community elements**

92. All Community measures are put forward by the Commission, and adopted and implemented in accordance with the relevant procedures.

D. **Civil and civil-military coordination**

93. Within the PSC, the Member States and the Commission confirm information on the non-military crisis management assets that they have committed for the implementation of the Council decision as well as their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions.

94. The Commission completes plans for the measures falling within its area of responsibility.

The Council Secretariat including the Police Unit, in consultation with the Commission as appropriate, completes plans for police (Title V) and for other CFSP instruments. The planning capacity of the Council Secretariat could be reinforced by the addition, on an ad hoc basis, of national experts.

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24 Additional modalities to generate the full requirement of a police element may need to be addressed. Reference to Annex II of the Göteborg ESDP report.
95. The crisis response coordinating team completes (cf. § 74) the coordination of the planning required by the Joint Action or for any other coherent response in which military instruments, as well as first and second pillar civilian instruments (particularly but not exclusively in the areas of police, strengthening the Rule of Law, Civil Administration and Civil Protection), to be used in synergy.

96. The EU SITCEN continues to produce comprehensive and timely situation reports and assessments, especially to the SG/HR, the PSC and other competent bodies for crisis management.

E. Consultations and contacts

97. The EU maintains:

   a) intensified dialogue and consultations with NATO (see in particular § 78, Option 1. c) and Option 2;

   b) dialogue and consultations with the 15 and the 6 countries (see also § 78, Option 1. b) and Option 2. e));

   c) contacts with third countries in the framework of political dialogue;

   d) contacts with other third countries concerned where necessary;

   e) contacts and appropriate cooperation as necessary with the UN and other international \(^{25}\) and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc.

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F. Information policy

98. The Presidency, SG/HR, Commission and Member States continue to implement and up-date coordinated and coherent information strategy and information policy.
PHASE 5 IMPLEMENTATION

The procedures outlined in the following are implemented in full compliance with the competencies attributed to Coreper by virtue of TEC Article 207.

A. General implementation, civil and civil-military coordination

- Work within the EU

99. The Council exercises the overall responsibility for the conduct of the action. The Council:

a) receives reports and updates from the SG/HR in his role as PSC Chairman on the follow-up measures (political, police (Title V) and military aspects) it entrusted to him and gives the necessary direction. The Chairman of the Military Committee represents the Military Committee at the Council meetings, as appropriate;

b) adopts any further proposals presented meanwhile by the Commission;

c) receives reports from the Commission on the implementation of measures within its area or responsibility;

d) receives reports from Member States on national measures.

100. Throughout the implementation:

a) the SG/HR takes the necessary follow-up measures as entrusted to him by the Council according to the conditions defined in the Joint Action;

b) in accordance with the provisions set in the Joint Action, without prejudice to the role of the Commission, the PSC supervises the implementation of the measures taken and assesses their effect, recommending adjustments as necessary;
c) the Commission keeps the PSC informed about the measures it has taken or envisages. The Commission ensures the proper implementation of Community measures according to the applicable procedures;

d) the EU SITCEN continues to produce comprehensive and timely situation reports and assessments, especially to the SG/HR, the PSC and other competent bodies for crisis management.

- Consultations and contacts

101. The EU maintains contacts with NATO, the 15 and the 6 countries.

102. Contacts with other third countries concerned are maintained as necessary.

103. Contacts and appropriate cooperation as necessary with the UN and other relevant international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. dealing with the crisis are maintained.

104. For the Committee of Contributors, see § 111 below.

B. Conduct of the military operation

105. The PSC exercises, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the military operation.

106. Throughout the operation, the Chairman of the Military Committee acts as the primary point of contact with the Operation Commander.

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107. The Military Committee, supported by the Military Staff, monitors the proper execution of military operations conducted under the responsibility of the Operation Commander by:

a) reporting regularly to the PSC on the military implementation of the operation; to that end, the Chairman of the Military Committee participates in the PSC.

b) providing, in coordination with the Operation Commander, information and assessments to the PSC;

c) elaborating as necessary, in the light of political and operational developments and in accordance with guidance set by the PSC, new military strategic options (cf. § 68);

d) advising the PSC on the merits of carrying on, changing or terminating the operation.

108. In case of an EU operation without the use of NATO assets and capabilities, the EU keeps NATO informed of the general progress of the operation.

109. In the event of an operation calling on NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will be kept informed of the use of its assets and capabilities throughout the operation, if necessary by convening a meeting of the PSC and the NAC. When NATO command options are being used, NATO will be informed of the development in the situation by appropriate EU bodies, in particular the PSC and the Chair of the Military Committee.  

110. The Military Committee monitors the proper execution of military operations conducted under the responsibility of the Operation Commander. To this effect, the Military Committee may invite the Operation Commander to report on the progress of the operation. The President of the Council and the Chairman of the PSC respectively may invite the Operation Commander to the GAC and the PSC.

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27 In the case of an EU-led operation calling for a NATO command option, the entire chain of command must remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation, after consultation between the EU and NATO. In that framework the operation commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only.
111. The Committee of Contributors meets regularly during the operation. It will be supplied with detailed information regarding the operation on the ground via the EU bodies responsible for follow-up. It receives regular information from the Operation Commander who may be heard by the Committee. It deals with the various problems concerning the implementation of the military operation, the use of forces, and all day to day management matters which are not exclusively, under the instructions he will have received, the responsibility of the Operation Commander. The Committee provides opinions and recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning, including possible adjustments to objectives, which may affect the situation of the forces. In these areas, the PSC, which exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, will take account of the views expressed by the Committee of Contributors. Depending on the nature of its tasks, the Committee may meet in the appropriate format. For Member States, it may be comprised of representatives on the PSC and on the Military Committee.

The Committee of Contributors will usually be chaired by a representative of the SG/HR or the Presidency, assisted by the Chairman of the Military Committee or his Deputy. The Director General of the Military Staff and the Operation Commander may also attend or be represented in the Committee. The Chairman of the Committee of Contributors will be responsible for conveying the outcome of the Committee's discussions to the PSC and to the Military Committee.  

28 The text reflects the current state as laid down in political decisions and should be amended in light of further developments.
C. **Conduct of the police operation**

**PM.** To be developed. ²⁹

112. The PSC exercises, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the police operation. ³⁰

D. **Civil and civil-military coordination**

(see also § 93-96)

113. The crisis response coordinating team will assist in ensuring full coherence between the civil and military aspects of the EU action;

114. The Council Secretariat, where appropriate, reinforced as foreseen in § 94, prepares plans as regards other CFSP instruments.

115. Modalities for coordination in the field between the EU actors and between the EU and international organisations, local authorities and NGOs, as well as between the field and headquarters, must be developed.

E. **Information policy**

116. The Presidency, SG/HR, Commission and Member States continue to implement and up-date the coordinated and coherent information strategy.

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²⁹ Modalities for the day-to-day management of police operations have not yet been developed. However the Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council stated that “All third states, which are making significant contributions to an EU-led police operation, will have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as EU Member States taking part in the operation. To that end, appropriate formulas for day-to-day management should be developed in the case of EU police operations, as well as in the case of integrated operations involving both military and police components.

³⁰ The necessity for political control and strategic direction by the PSC over police (title V) operation was a conclusion reached by the PSC at the first crisis management workshop, it is however not explicitly laid down in any European Council texts.
PHASE 6 REFOCUSING OF EU ACTION

The procedures outlined in the following are implemented in full compliance with the competencies attributed to Coreper by virtue of TEC Article 207.

A. Refocusing of EU Action

NB. Activities are described here for ease of reference but may take place in earlier or subsequent phases.

- Work within the EU

117. The PSC, as part of its continuous political assessment of the situation, as appropriate on the basis of new information, policy options papers, advice and reports presented to it, evaluates the political appropriateness of refocusing EU action and in particular of discontinuing some actions employed to resolve the crisis, including the military operation. The termination of the current military operation may or may not be accompanied by a transition to other military measures or to civilian measures. The refocusing of EU action may trigger a revised crisis management concept which would be developed following the procedures outlined in the previous phases.

118. The crisis response coordinating team as appropriate:

a) works to prepare coordinated plans necessary for the refocused EU action involving civil instruments from the first and second pillar, particularly but not exclusively in the areas of police, strengthening the Rule of Law, Civil Administration and Civil Protection;

b) ensures consistency and develops the appropriate sequence of military and civilian instruments.

119. The Member States provide the Coordinating Mechanism with information on civil crisis management assets available, including their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions.
120. The SG/HR contributes with a view to the PSC deliberations on a set of measures aimed at refocusing the EU action. The SG/HR prepares his contributions in the light of information, including classified, provided by Member States and other parties concerned, and drawing on the work of the crisis response coordinating team.

121. The Commission provides the Council, including the PSC, with a policy analysis and policy options for actions within its competence. It informs the PSC of the nature and details of these plans as concerns those Community measures.

122. The PSC prepares its opinion to the Council on the refocusing of EU action with a cohesive set of options. For the development of these options the procedures outlined in the preceding phases apply.

123. The formal proposals are submitted to and dealt with by the competent bodies according to normal procedures.

- Consultations and contacts

124. The EU maintains contacts with NATO (see in particular § 128).

125. The EU maintains contacts with the 15 and the 6 countries.

126. The EU maintains contacts with other third countries concerned where necessary.
127. Intensive contacts and appropriate cooperation where necessary with the UN and other relevant international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. are maintained.

B. Termination of the current military operation where appropriate

128. If NATO assets and capabilities are being used in the operation, the PSC informs the NAC of the plans to terminate the operation.

129. The Committee of Contributors is consulted on matters related to planning the end of the operation and the withdrawal of forces.

The PSC in the light of the advice of the Military Committee prepares its opinion to the Council on the termination of the military operation.

C. Termination of the police operation

PM. Termination of the police operation or its future role as part of refocused EU action could be included in the revised crisis management concept.

D. Council decision

130. The Council in the light of the opinion by the PSC, when appropriate advised by the Military Committee:

a) decides to terminate the current military operation. The Chairman of the Military Committee represents the Military Committee at the Council;

b) decides to terminate the other measures that are no longer needed;

c) decides about the launching of further actions needed at this stage;

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d) may invite the Commission to re-examine the measures falling under its responsibility, or to make the necessary proposals to that end;

e) invites Member States to re-examine actions taken at national level, and if necessary, to adapt them.

E. Information policy

131. The PSC coordinates guidelines for a coherent information policy. The Presidency, SG/HR, Commission and Member States continue to implement the coordinated and coherent information strategy, concentrating on termination of the military operation and on any transition and follow-up measures.

F. Documentation

132. All decisions of the Council and deliberations of Council bodies leading to decisions will be recorded and archived according to the Council rules and practices.

G. Lessons learned

133. Once the military and/or police operation are terminated, and when other aspects of other civilian aspects of the operation are wound down, the PSC:

a) requests the Military Committee to evaluate lessons learned on the basis of the reports by the Operation Commander and the Military Staff;

b) requests the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis management to evaluate lessons learned. In particular, this Committee will evaluate lessons learned for police operations on the basis of reports by the Police Unit and the police commissioner;

c) may request the Committee of Contributors to provide its assessment of the lessons drawn from the operation;
The Commission provides information to the PSC on lessons learned within its area of responsibility.

The PSC proceeds to an overall assessment.
Phase 7

PHASE 7 STABILITY PROMOTION, POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

PM
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ANNEX 1: ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF CIVILIAN INSTRUMENTS

PM
ANNEX 2: TEMPLATE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT – DRAFT STRUCTURE.

Executive Summary. This should set down the aim of this crisis management concept, highlight the broad options, and specify what action and in what timeframe the PSC is recommended to take to enable the CMC to be developed. In the case where the CMC envisages an EU military role, the CMC provides the framework including political-military objectives for subsequent crisis response military strategic planning.

Situation. This should set down the relevant facts of the crisis relating to the development of options. These facts could include the main dynamics of the crisis itself, with reference to conflict prevention indicators as relevant, and the positions taken towards the crisis by the local parties, neighbouring countries, relevant organisations such as NATO and the UN, the OSCE, and by the 15, the 6 and other close partners of the EU as appropriate.

EU Political Context. This should set down a summary of the key elements of discussions to-date, of the decisions that have been taken and of the first measures that have been initiated, including new or adjusted Community measures. This may include Council and PSC conclusions on the causes and consequences of the crisis, an assessment on the impact and possible future threats to EU nationals and to EU political and material interests and any conclusions that may set general aims or orientation with regard to possible EU action. The Commission will contribute, notably with input from the relevant Commission delegations, to the definition of the political context.

Assumptions. This should set down those assumptions which are needed to enable options to be developed. Assumptions temporarily replace facts for issues where there is incomplete information, a situation that is continually changing or for situations in which the EU does not have exclusive control over an outcome or when it cannot predict an outcome.

Limitations. This should set down those practical, legal and political factors which limit what may be done.
Summary of Broad Options. This should outline the suggested options for consideration by the PSC. In its initial form, the CMC may contain a variety of ‘Desired Endstates’. However, the iterative process should enable a single ‘Desired Endstate’ to be established in subsequent versions of the CMC, which would form the basis for developing broad options. The development of each option would be shaped by considerations such as the phase and the nature of a crisis, its impact on the EU and the level of EU interest in contributing to the resolution of the crisis. The difference between these options would be in the terms of the range and the scale of instruments grouped to achieve each ‘Desired Endstate’.  

a)  **Option 1:**

1. **Desired Endstate** This would include specific criteria such as benchmarks or objectives to be achieved over approximate timeframes.

2. **Achieving the Endstate** This would describe how implementation of the different instruments would succeed in getting to the desired political endstate, and would cover elements such as the balancing of ends and means, timings, ambition and risk.

3. **Diplomatic Instruments**

4. **Economic Instruments**

   (a) **Community Measures**

   (i) Possible Alteration of Existing Measures.

   (ii) Possible Additional Envisaged Measures.

   (b) **Member States’ Bilateral Measures**

   (i) Possible Alteration of Existing Measures.

   (ii) Possible Additional Envisaged Measures.

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32 The broad options relate to planning for a possible overall EU response to a crisis and should not be seen as an obstacle to those actions, particularly such as humanitarian aid or as could be triggered by the Rapid Response Mechanism, which the Commission could decide to deploy as and when required. Furthermore, the structure as suggested in this template CMC is indicative to show that co-ordination of these different elements will be required for a coherent and comprehensive EU response to a crisis and should not be seen to constrain either the development or the deployment of Community instruments in response to a crisis.

33 These elements are solely references in the CMC. They would then be developed and implemented by the Commission.

34 These elements would be included in the CMC after consultation with Member States.
5. **Humanitarian Instruments:**

   (a) **Community Measures**

   (i) Possible Alteration of Existing Measures.

   (ii) Possible Additional Envisaged Measures.

   (b) **Member States' Bilateral Measures**

   (i) Possible Alteration of Existing Measures.

   (ii) Possible Additional Envisaged.

6. **Police Elements:**

   (a) **Executive Elements.**

   (b) **Local Capacity Building Elements**

7. **Other Civilian Instruments**

8. **Military Role.**

   b) **Option 2, ...**

   c) **Option 3, ...etc. (additional options following the same structure as Option 1).**

**Recommendation to Council.**

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35 In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, humanitarian aid "the sole aim of which is to prevent or relieve human suffering, is accorded to victims without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic group, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation and must not be guided by, or subject to, political considerations" (preamble), and is provided on a "non-discriminatory basis" (Article 1).
MILITARY STRATEGIC OPTION

REFERENCES:
Maps, charts, and relevant documents such as a military technical agreement on a cease-fire.

1. SITUATION. Summary of general information to enable the intended reader to appreciate the overall situation.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTION (A general description of the type of military operation)

4. MISSION AND MILITARY TASKS
   a) Mission. (Who will do what, when, where, and why.)
   b) Military Tasks. (What tasks will need to be accomplished to achieve the mission – the list may not be exhaustive)

5. EXECUTION. (A summary of how, in broad terms since no operation planning will have been conducted, the mission and military tasks might be carried out. It should include some initial, broad guidance on the use of force)

6. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. (A description of how effective the mission will need to be in order to achieve the political objectives)

7. RISKS. (A summary of the risks associated with this option)

8. FEASIBILITY. (A statement on the military feasibility of the option)

9. OUTLINE FORCE CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS. (An outline giving the capabilities that any EU force will require in order to be able to execute this option)

10. OUTLINE C2 STRUCTURE. (An outline of the C2 structure required for this option)

11. SUMMARY