



EN

ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2017 for
Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

Action Document for Counterterrorism

1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number	Counterterrorism CRIS number: IFS/2017/040-125 financed under IcSP			
2. Zone benefiting from the action/location	Global			
3. Programming document	Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace - Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017			
4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area	Counterterrorism	DEV. Aid: NO		
5. Amounts concerned	Total estimated cost: EUR 18 000 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution 18 000 000			
6. Aid and implementation modality	Project Modality Direct management – procurement of services			
7 a) DAC code(s)	Not applicable			
b) Main Delivery Channel	Tbd			
8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)	General policy objective	Not targeted	Significant objective	Main objective
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
	Aid to environment	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	RIO Convention markers	Not targeted	Significant objective	Main objective
	Biological diversity	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships	Not applicable		
10. SDGs	Primarily SDG 16 "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels", and subsidiary SDG 3 "Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages" and SDG 5 "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls"			

SUMMARY

In accordance with the IcSP Strategy paper 2014-2020 and Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2014-17, the overall objective of the Action is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

Component A CT CLOSE: This action will enhance local resilience to prevent and counter terrorism reinforcing national administrations in selected countries facing the threat of terrorism promoting a rule of law–based response to terrorism.

Component B Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE): Actions under this component will work with local state and non-state partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. This component foresees a specific action in Afghanistan (**STRIVE Afghanistan**) as well as support to Support to the "**Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)**".

Component C CT MORSE (CT Monitoring, reporting and support mechanism): The specific objective of this component is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various counterterrorism projects financed by the European Union as well as to develop and provide specialised training in the area of Counterterrorism.

1 CONTEXT

1.1 Thematic area

The terrorist threat is increasingly diverse and geographically diffuse. It remains significant, complex, and very unpredictable. The surge of ISIL/Da'esh has accelerated current international efforts on the fight against terrorism and has a deep impact on EU's Counter Terrorism (CT) policy making especially regarding Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) and in particular the issue of returning foreign terrorist fighters.

The threat posed by violent extremism is global and in 2015, the world witnessed an increase of 80% in the total number of deaths caused by terrorism and violent extremism. No area is immune from extremist tendencies and as a result, any coherent response must be tackled globally with actions in every society. The spread of violent extremism over recent years poses a significant threat to the international community's efforts in promoting peace and security, as well as undermining progress made towards fostering sustainable development and upholding human rights. The use of violence to further extreme ideological platforms, be they political, religious, and nationalist or other, is not a new phenomenon. However the rise of violent extremist groups and their widespread messages of intolerance have fostered a renewed concern amongst policy makers and practitioners on preventing and countering violent extremists and mitigating the appeal of extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly young people, is becoming a high priority for many countries around the world.

1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

The Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy¹ (EUGS) was released in June 2016. Informed by input from member states and EU institutions as well as

¹ https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web.pdf

think tanks and civil society organisations, the EUGS begins by highlighting concerns about terrorism and other threats that have increased on European soil and beyond over the past decade. The EUGS also looks at opportunities that lie ahead to preface its vision for the EU to tap its potential and use the tools it has at its disposal to address five key priorities: 1.) the security of the Union; 2.) state and societal resilience to the East and South; 3.) an integrated approach to conflicts; 4.) cooperative regional orders; and 5.) global governance for the 21st century.

In the **Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 9 February 2015² and of 19 June 2017³ on Counter-Terrorism⁴**, the Council decided to step up, as a matter of urgency, its external action on countering terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Council Conclusions called for: promoting EU added value/enhancing common efforts through **external engagement and outreach**, especially to countries in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and the Gulf, close **coordination between internal and external action**, and between relevant EU actors and EU Member States, more emphasis on the **prevention of terrorism**, in particular countering radicalisation, on recruitment, equipment and financing of terrorism whilst addressing underlying factors that provide opportunities for terrorist groups to flourish as well as the **mainstreaming of CT** into EU foreign policy and political dialogue with third countries. The Conclusions also call for the accelerated implementation of the EU Syria and Iraq and Counter-Terrorism/Foreign Fighters Strategy and the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq⁵.

With increasing concerns about the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the security concerns deriving from the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) who have come from over eighty countries, including EU Member States, the EU has developed a Strategy to address the problem of counter-terrorism and foreign fighters. The **EU's Syria and Iraq counter-terrorism/foreign fighter strategy⁶**, with particular focus on foreign fighters was endorsed on 20 October 2014 by the Foreign Affairs Council. The Strategy mentions as an important element to support countries implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2170 and 2178 and related resolutions. The Strategy is founded on the EU's criminal justice-based approach to tackling terrorism while protecting human rights, on the clear premise that the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are the foundation of the fight against terrorism for the EU. The Strategy outlines a series of concrete recommendations across the pillars of the wider EU CT Strategy⁷ (2005) on Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Respond, as well as on matters related to providing military support and engaging with key partners.

The basis for the EU's Prevent work is the **EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism⁸**, which was most recently revised in May 2014. The revised strategy identifies priority areas for EU action, both within and outside of the EU. It calls for a

² <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/>

³ Council of the EU 'Council Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism' (10384/17), 19 June 2017

⁴ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/>

⁵ http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/jordan/documents/news/20160524-arabic-eu-fac-conclusions-syria-23-may-2016_en.pdf

⁶ <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5369-2015-INIT/en/pdf>

⁷ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>

⁸ <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9956-2014-INIT/en/pdf>

joint effort between relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to support vulnerable countries to counter terrorist recruitment and to build community resilience to radicalisation. The European Agenda on Security⁹, adopted by the Commission on 28 April 2015, set out the main actions to ensure an effective EU response to terrorism and security threats over 2015-2020, including the external dimension. Delivering on its European Agenda on Security, the European Commission presented in June 2016 further steps in preventing and countering violent radicalisation leading to terrorism¹⁰, stating that the EU will assist third countries facing similar challenges in addressing radicalisation through law enforcement and human rights compliant responses.

The proposed action document is aligned to **the EU Gender Action Plan**, in particular to the thematic priority 3 on political voice and participation, and objectives 11 – on equal rights and ability for women to participate in policy and governance processes at all levels. It also support the implementation of **UN resolution 1325** which stresses the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping and of **UN resolution 2242** which addresses a number of substantive areas, including a commitment to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers and impacts of violent extremism and greater consultations with women's organizations affected by this violence.

The action is in line with **the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020**¹¹ for Afghanistan which focusses on promoting peace, security and regional stability; reinforcing democracy; encouraging economic and human development and fostering the rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular the rights of women. The programme's strategy is inspired by **the sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 on peace and security**, which states that the international community should "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development" and "strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime." It also contributes to **the SDG 5 aimed to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls**.

The Afghan government does not have a comprehensive formal national P/CVE strategy, but has begun the process to develop one in 2016. Various ministries and offices have P/CVE issues incorporated in their portfolios.

1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

Component A CT CLOSE

Overall, security is anchored in the EU's development and aid effectiveness commitments and the 2030 Agenda (primarily under sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 on the promotion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies), while they are also framed within the strategic perspective of the 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security policy (priority areas; security; resilience; global governance; interconnection) and aim at contributing to President Juncker's priority 9 (EU as a stronger global actor).

The threat picture is evolving fast. The EU and partner countries have to face new security

⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf

¹⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication_preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf

¹¹ https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/multi-annual-indicative-programme-2014-2020_en_0.pdf

challenges and adapt quickly. The EU engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility. The challenging global security environment involving complex conflicts (e.g. Syria, Yemen, Da'esh, Boko Haram, Ukraine, etc.) is putting the traditional concept and implementation of our development policy under unprecedented pressure, with increasing needs to address new issues such as the root causes of terrorism, violent extremism, threats from new modi operandi such as cyber-attacks, bio agents, new forms of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's), etc. The global security situation is also under stress in various regions due to climate change effects which may increase or create new sources of conflict.

Component B STRIVE Afghanistan

The main stakeholders of this action are repatriated migrants, their families and communities, (including village elders, religious leaders, media actors etc.) in selected areas of Afghanistan to be identified during the inception phase of the project. In addition, civil society organisations including women organisations, with direct competence and insight on P/CVE issues are also important stakeholders. Relevant government agencies and services at national and local level will be also targeted by the action.

The proposed action will support community activities that involve the resident local population and families of returning migrants in order to avoid creating or exacerbating existing gaps between returnees and the existing local community.

The proposed action will pay particular attention on extremely vulnerable returnees, especially women and girls by ensuring their involvement and participation in P/CVE activities in targeted communities. Women returnees will be included as specific target group. Violence perpetrated by violent extremist groups has an impact on women that is distinct from that on men. In Afghanistan the actions and narratives of violent extremist groups threaten to roll back many of the gains and hard-won rights women have made and earned over the last fifteen years. The research phase of the proposed action, seeks to understand the role of women in communities with the aim of identifying areas women's organisations could contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalization. The cultural and social restraints that limit women's participation in the social sphere and the potential opposition to the engagement of women in a P/CVE programme will also be explored during the research phase.

The proposed action will also target specific youth initiatives being young returnees considered particularly at risk for recruitment into violent extremist groups and criminal networks if they are not properly reintegrated in their communities. Young returnees can be drawn into violence or be exposed to the messages of extremist groups because they offer economic incentives, a sense of belonging, as well as empowerment, a sense of adventure and a sense of helping others.

Component B Support to Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)

Operating at the nexus of security and development, GCERF is an independent, not-for-profit Swiss foundation, established in 2014 as a public-private partnership, and governed by a multi-stakeholder Governing Board. In response to the escalating threat of global terrorism, GCERF's mandate is to support local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas.

GCERF's funding models represent a strategic effort to support initiatives to prevent and counter radicalisation to violent extremism in order to achieve sustainable, lasting impact within a wider global context of long-term peace, security, and development. Within the

context of the first pillar (prevention) of the EU's counterterrorism strategy, this action seeks to build, promote, and implement initiatives that seek to reduce the threat of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

Particular attention is paid too the three target groups "youth", "women" and "vulnerable groups", of which beneficiaries of current GCERF are distributed as follows: 33 % youth, 41 % women and 26 % vulnerable groups.

GCERF has established two funding mechanisms: the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM) and the Accelerated Funding Mechanism (AFM).

Through its Core Funding Mechanism, GCERF is committed to working in partnership and consultation with governments, civil society, and the private sector in beneficiary countries to support national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism, taking into consideration the features of specific target groups, including among others the gender dimension.

The AFM provides micro, small and medium-size grant awards to support projects of non-governmental organisations, primarily national and locally based organisations, of up to 12 months duration.

Component C CT MORSE

The Commission has taken numerous steps to implement effectively the Council Conclusions on Counterterrorism of 9 February 2015 by prioritising activities on e.g. countering the finance of terrorism; increasing preparedness and response capacities to the terrorism threat in the southern neighbourhood; supporting the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) initiatives and engaging in a range of actions to prevent and counter violent extremism.

Concretely, funding to activities outside the EU with a specific Counterterrorism and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism focus has increased by 62% from 2015 to 2016 - to a total of EUR 225 million at present.

Based on the above data, a coordination mechanism is more needed than ever. CT MORSE was established in January 2015 in recognition of the growing importance placed on the EU's engagement to counter terrorism. Achieving its objective, the CT MORSE has delivered in the following areas:

1. Monitoring: The different components of the CT Programme are closely monitored including a gender sensitive approach and gender sensitive indicators.
2. Coherence and Coordination: The coherence and coordination between the different components of the CT Programme is ensured, both within the programme itself and with respect to any other relevant initiative (EU or non EU).
3. Recommendations to the EU: Opinions and recommendations are provided to the EU on needed and advisable adjustments to on-going projects and appropriate actions to be undertaken under future programming. Particular attention will be made to providing advice on human rights compliance and gender sensitive approaches.
4. Expert analysis and awareness raising: Gender aware expert analytical advice is provided to the EU on reports delivered under the different components of the CT Programme as well as on current trends of terrorism phenomena in the concerned regions; an information gateway and regular update on national, regional and international initiatives/events/activities/projects planned or carried out in domains relevant to the Programme is provided to the EU.

5. Visibility, liaison and information sharing: The visibility of the EU and of the CT Programme is increased within the EU, Member States, beneficiary countries, partner countries and organisations; regular liaison and information sharing with all the components of the Programme as well as with relevant stakeholders is ensured.

1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis

Component A CT CLOSE

The military pressure currently being exerted on Daesh in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has resulted in an increase in the number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters' returnees, in particular to Europe and the Maghreb, presenting a growing challenge to global security. ISIL has also increased the number of attacks outside conflict zones, and employs deadlier tactics.

Increasingly complex and nearly simultaneous attacks in different countries—committed through large-scale operations and individual or small terrorist cells, either directed or inspired by ISIL—have a significant impact and present particular problems to Member States in terms of the security response.

In implementing effective counterterrorism strategies, many States have recognized the benefits of a collaborative and cooperative relationship between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Underscoring the critical role that intelligence and sensitive law enforcement information can play in the prevention of terrorism, Good Practice 6 of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector (Rabat Memorandum) encourages States to enact rule of law-based measures to protect the sources and collection methods of such information in terrorism cases and recommends that:

1. States should make sure that the use of intelligence in criminal investigations and prosecutions is done in a manner that respects the rule of law under both domestic and international law, in particular international human rights law.
2. States should have mechanisms and procedures that allow intelligence information relevant to terrorism threats to be shared, where appropriate, with authorised law enforcement personnel.
3. States should have mechanisms and procedures for guaranteeing that relevant sources and methods that underlie intelligence information provided to law enforcement or judicial officials –the disclosure of which would jeopardise national security, as well as any witnesses who are linked to or give evidence related to that intelligence—are sufficiently protected.
4. To facilitate international intelligence-sharing with regard to countering terrorism, States should develop processes and mechanisms to permit the sharing of relevant intelligence where appropriate, while ensuring the source State maintains control over how that intelligence is used by the receiving State.
5. States should consider implementing effective training and capacity building programs for all of the relevant CT actors, including intelligence officials, law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges and other judicial officials, and parliamentarians. The training must be both targeted, so that each actor can understand the roles, responsibilities, requirements, and legal authorities of the other actors, and joint, so that all of the actors can learn how to effectively cooperate, collaborate and share information –all within a rule of law.

The transnational nature of terrorism requires a coordinated response for all States and actors of the international community. Cooperation in judicial matters is an indispensable

requirement in order to overcome challenges pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts, particularly when the various elements of a case are spread beyond the jurisdictions of several States.

These were some of the conclusions of the 12 December 2016 high-level, open briefing of the United Nations Security Council on international judicial cooperation in countering terrorism.

UNSC Resolution 2322 (2016), unanimously adopted by the Security Council under the presidency of Spain, reinforces mechanisms for mutual legal assistance, and includes references to new information and communication technologies (ICT) including the Internet, to facilitate the process of gathering and sharing of evidence with judicial authorities. The resolution also has a special focus on cooperation in terms of obtaining and preserving e-evidence, and reinforcing a network of so-called Central Authorities.

Component B Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism - STRIVE Afghanistan

Afghans are the third largest refugee group worldwide, and even though the largest numbers of returns come from Pakistan and Iran, an increasing number are being repatriated from Europe. Around 6.5 million Afghan refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2001 mainly from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran but also Europe.

Available literature suggests that the vulnerabilities and frustration returning migrants experience upon return overlap with the factors seen as contributing to recruitment by violent extremism.

A lack of access to land, essential services, and income-earning opportunities and exposure to violent conflict means that returnees often become displaced internally, joining the close to one million current internally displaced persons (IDPs). Returnees are resettling in large numbers in urban areas where they hope to escape the violence and poverty, putting additional strain on services and reportedly creating tensions with longer-term residents. Women returnees face tighter social restrictions in urban areas due to the loss of a sense of community. Restrictions on mobility further affect their access to basic services, including education and health. Recent research on displaced women in urban areas found that they commonly experience significant psychosocial trauma, gender-based violence among returnee families, and an increase in the burden of absorbing economic shocks.

Afghan returnees face food insecurity and exposure to ongoing violence, and are at increased risk of joining insurgent groups. In some cases returnees are going back not only to Taliban controlled areas, but also those experiencing active fighting /contested areas, because they have not had the time to explore other options.

Young male returnees are particularly at risk for recruitment into violent extremist groups and criminal networks. Their high visibility in rural areas, social isolation, and lack of legitimate income opportunities make them easy targets for recruitment. NGOs working with returnees believe that competing violent extremist groups may be more attractive for returnees because of the higher financial incentives they provide.

In addition to the above, only limited literature analysing the radicalisation aspects of the repatriation of returnees to their country of origin exists. Applied research is needed to understand these risks and how to mitigate them.

The underlying motivation behind STRIVE Afghanistan is to understand the drivers of radicalisation among selected returnees groups in Afghanistan through evidence-based analysis in order to define actions to build community resilience towards violent extremism

and radicalisation.

Component B Support to GCERF

In 2015, emphasis on preventing violent extremism (PVE) reached unprecedented heights, with a new understanding of the critical role of local communities. Entering its second year of operations, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) occupies a unique niche in the international PVE community of interest as part of a comprehensive, holistic, whole-of-society approach to this relatively nascent field. The relevance of GCERF has been reinforced by the 2016 United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.

As a funding mechanism, the primary objective of GCERF is to provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas. Local actors understand what drives recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism in their communities and may have some of the solutions, but are often unable to access the funding they need to start to make a difference. Local PVE initiatives may be overlooked by traditional development funding, or they may lack the capacity to access and manage international donor funds where they are available. Traditional development donors have tended to focus on communities at risk of poverty, not at risk of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism – and often these communities are not the same. GCERF aims to fill this funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability.

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Risks	Risk level (H/M/L)	Mitigating measures
Lack of political will and leadership support as each of the results outlined in this fiche requires buy-in from senior officials of countries of intervention	L	The action will be implemented in the context of UNSCR 2178 co-sponsored by most if not all partner countries themselves. Beneficiary countries will be engaged at an early stage to ensure commitment to the project's objectives. To this end, close and regular dialogue will be established with relevant national authorities to ensure adequate national measures are put in place under this programme.
The security situation in Daesh-frontline states and potentially in other countries in the concerned regions is volatile and uncertain.	M	Venues for conducting regional trainings and other project objectives should be selected based on security and safety as the priority concern. Trainings and the conduct of other project objectives at the national level will also require these considerations and may need to be moved to locations in more secure countries in the region as needed.
The lack of support by the host government for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism activities	M	Beneficiary country will be engaged at an early stage to ensure commitment to the project's objectives. To this end, close and regular dialogue will be established with relevant national authorities.
Capacity and capability of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to manage research projects and implementing CVE projects on the ground.	M	Capacity building for CSOs in order to strengthen their project management and implementation capacity will be foreseen under STRIVE.

Lack of gender awareness , gender sensitivity, gender understanding increase existing gender inequality	M	Include gender analysis and gender desegregated data. Make sure there is gender balance among beneficiaries of the action.
Security risks for women and girls involved in P/CVE activities in some of the targeted areas in Afghanistan.	M	Ask for guidance from women and local CSOs on how to label their CVE activities and on necessary security measures.
Assumptions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No further deterioration of the current (very difficult and volatile) security situation, in particular in the concerned regions - Necessary political will at the national and regional level to engage with the EU and the project. - Identified partner countries willing to engage with the project and initiate pilot projects including sharing its experiences with the regional level. - Governments and politicians ready to engage with the project including requesting training and technical assistance from the project. - Relevant international entities and Member States ready to take part in the execution of the activities. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The security situation allows for comprehensive impact monitoring. - Monitoring data is robust and evaluation is possible; - A solid evidence base is to be gathered in the initial phase. 		

3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learnt

Given the nature of IcSP as a niche Instrument at the heart of the development-security nexus, a key principle in defining the proposed actions is their added value in strengthening the internal and external security dimension which is strongly prescribed in the European Agenda on Security from 2015 and further highlighted in the relevant thematic strategies of the EU mentioned in the section 1.1.1. In addition, in the wake of the 2016 Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats, IcSP actions are tailored to directly increase third countries' resilience and preparedness to protect their strategic assets in cases of potential hybrid attacks.

Apart from being complementary, it should also be noted that the IcSP is often used as a tool to launch innovative actions which, if successful, can be 'adopted' by the traditional cooperation instruments.

The research for the identification of the actions found that a number of capacity building activities are being undertaken in the area on Counterterrorism with the support of multiple donors, including the EU. The projects are mostly country-specific but a number of region-wide ongoing or planned projects are also registered. Many of these activities are relevant to these actions, for example in the area of promoting access to justice and strengthening the Rule of Law.

The EU has a longstanding engagement in the covered regions and a considerable experience on cooperation and support exists for projects that are often more CT-relevant than CT-specific. In relation to CT and CVE the EU has developed its engagement in the regions considerably over the past six to seven years which is reflected in various high level Declarations, Communications and Council Conclusions¹² and an intensification of high level dialogue meetings, namely counterterrorism political dialogues.

Main lessons learnt from previous EU programming on P/CVE calls for this to be evidence-based, tailored according to the local context, and adopting a multi-disciplinary approach.

¹² Please refer to section 1.1.1

These aspects have been taken into account in the design of the STRIVE component.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

These interventions have been designed to ensure coordination with the EU funded capacity building in coordination with other on-going or planned regional or bilateral programmes.

The action CLOSE will be closely coordinated with ongoing and planned initiatives on similar issues, notably those funded under Article 3 of the IcSP and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). In the inception phase of this project a coordination mechanism will be established involving relevant services and concerned EU Delegations in order to create synergies, coherence and to avoid duplication.

With reference to the STRIVE Afghanistan, synergies will be developed with existing and planned return and reintegration support initiatives in Afghanistan. In particular, complementarity and synergies will be ensured with the new regional programme "Addressing migration and forced displacement challenges in Asia and the Middles East: a comprehensive regional EU Response". The option of focussing on the same communities targeted by the above mentioned programme in order to increase the impact of both actions, will be explored in the inception phase of the STRIVE Afghanistan. Coordination will be ensured also with other relevant regional programmes.

The "CT MORSE" project will contribute to address the coordination challenges stemming from the significant increase in EU engagement on Counterterrorism.

The actions will secure continuity and complementarity of actions already financed at the national level and by other donors, including international organizations, such as UNODC. The Counter-Financing sub-working group (EU is a member) of the Global Coalition against ISIL/Daesh presents an obvious platform for coordinating capacity building assistance with other donors. At country level the new Security/CT attachés in EU Delegations in most MENA-countries will act as “ambassadors” of the Actions in this region and ensure close coordination with relevant international partners.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

Actions in the area of CT and P/CVE cut across many different sectors and issues, ranging from gender equality, human rights, good governance to rule of law.

The action will promote the integration of gender issues at all stages of the programme cycle, including dialogue, problem analysis, design and implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. It will foster the increased participation of women in all operational activities related to the action. Increasing involvement of women in a sector which is usually characterized by their limited participation as well as awareness raising of local authorities on such issues might have a progressive positive impact on their empowerment and inclusion in the social and economic lives of their respective countries.

Women and girls are predominantly affected directly or indirectly by violence and violent extremism. But women are not only victims of violence and conflict; they also play important roles in international peace and security efforts, including conflict resolution and peacebuilding. On the other hand, there is a long history of women planning, supporting, and executing terrorist attacks. Women in Southeast Asia, for example, have actively supported ISIL and other violent extremist groups through resource mobilization, recruitment (particularly via social media), or encouraging family members to travel abroad to join Da'esh. Policymakers and practitioners have increasingly recognized that a closer understanding of the roles women play in relation to preventing and countering violent

extremism is critical to developing tailored strategies to strengthen resilience against extremist violence, and support victims and survivors of terrorist attacks. The proposed action by recognizing the need for greater focus on the roles of women in terrorism, violent extremism, and P/CVE aims to integrate a gender dimension into such efforts as illustrated in the Action Document.

The proposed action will also contribute to the promotion of a **participatory approach** on direct involvement of civil society and the private sector and **of good governance issues**.

Additional principles governing the implementation of the components of this action include those related to the adequate **protections of human rights and respect for due process throughout all project activities**. Appropriate vetting of all subcontractors is necessary to assure that human rights standards are maintained. All assistance and training aspects must include precautionary measures to assure international human rights standards and norms are met, this is particularly important given perpetration and allegation of human rights violations in targeted countries and regions. Given the objectivities of the activities themselves, elements concerning the respect of human rights and due process, but also more broadly will obviously be integral parts of the training and awareness-raising activities.

To ensure compliance of the proposed action with the obligations stipulated in Article 10 of the IcSP Regulation ("Human rights"), a clear human rights perspective should be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen.

In providing technical assistance and capacity building programming, **the issue of corruption should be carefully considered**, in particular with regards to the control and audit of programmatic funds. Programme implementers must observe regulatory measures to mitigate funds transfers to politically exposed persons or other individuals or entities that may abuse programmatic arrangements. Corruption is of specific concern in the region. To mitigate the challenges posed by endemic corruption, anti-corruption actions will be comprehensively integrated into all parts of the training and awareness raising activities.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

The **overall objective** of all components, in accordance with the IcSP Multi Annual Indicative programme 2014-17, is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

Component A CT CLOSE

The specific **objective** is to improve investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases by relevant entities in the security and justice sectors and cooperation at the national and regional levels.

The **expected output** is enhanced capacities of relevant entities in the security and justice sectors to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate

with each other at national and regional levels.

The action will likely focus on countries in the MENA and Sahel regions (countries close to the EU which are considered political priority regions as per relevant Council Conclusions on CT and with high security threats as well as with direct connection to internal security risks) while not excluding activities in countries in other parts of the world. The specific countries to be targeted will be defined according to emerging priorities and based on political engagements, such as through the EU CT political dialogues.

Component B STRIVE

The objective is to support local state and non-state partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. This component foresees a specific action in Afghanistan (STRIVE Afghanistan) as well as support to the "Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)".

STRIVE Afghanistan

The **specific objective** is to strengthen resilience of communities at risk against violent extremism and radicalisation in selected areas of Afghanistan.

The expected **outputs** are as follows:

Output 1: Increased understanding of the drivers of radicalisation among returning migrants including women in selected areas of Afghanistan.

Output 2: Strengthened capacity of local civil society organisations (including women's organisations) for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism and to fight violent extremism in selected areas of Afghanistan.

Output 3: Improved capacity of media to act as a key actor in preventing and countering violent extremism among returnees and in contributing to their reintegration within the communities of origin.

Support to GCERF

The specific **objective** is to reinforce the resilience of vulnerable communities against violent extremist agendas in countries where the threat and need is greatest. The main instruments of the Fund are:

The Core Funding Mechanism (CFM) to support community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas.

The Accelerated Funding Mechanism (AFM) to support innovative projects and attract private sector investment in building community resilience against violent extremism.

The **expected output** is that communities at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism in selected countries have increased resilience against violent extremist agendas as well as community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.

This action will allow implementation of the political priorities underlined in the Council Conclusions on Counterterrorism calling for promoting international cooperation and enhance further its engagement in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), notably support to GCERF.

Component C CT MORSE

The specific **objective** is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various counterterrorism projects financed by the European Union as well as to develop and provide specialised training in the area of Counterterrorism.

The **expected outputs** are to have enhanced efficiency, strengthened coordination and improved specialisation of EU Counterterrorism related actions.

4.2 Main activities

Component A CT CLOSE

This component will create a Facility to provide demand driven training, technical and legal assistance on CT with a particular focus on intelligence. The Facility will need to have light management procedures and should correspond to the needs of partner countries.

The project is intended to complement existing and future engagements under other geographical instruments in order to cover defined gaps and provide the possibility to engage with law enforcement and security stakeholders including intelligence services which other instruments are not capable of working with (as per ODA criteria).

The assistance provided would cover a wide range of issues depending on need and context. The following specific topics may be considered for support in this regard:

- supporting the update of relevant legal and regulatory frameworks regulating intelligence services and related cross governmental cooperation, including use of intelligence in criminal justice investigations and prosecutions;
- support for ensuring legal and human rights compliance into the business practices of the entire intelligence cycle notably in the development of key intelligence methodologies and doctrines in the intelligence cycle;
- support for using and protecting intelligence in Criminal Justice-Led Investigations and Prosecutions including the development of intelligence (also financial intelligence) into tangible evidence for use in investigations and court procedures;
- support for capacity building in the field of analysis of information including the identification of required technologies and the use of related technologies/software tools e.g. for data processing, filing etc including related training of personnel;
- support for sharing best practices regarding intelligence gathering from prisons;
- support to develop human resources policies and training of intelligence actors;
- support to enhance intelligence-led components within community engagement and community policing strategies;
- support forensic intelligence capacities notably Fingerprint, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and Ballistics disciplines as well as the use of biometric systems;
- support for the development of counterterrorism related media strategies and strategic communications;
- support for specialised analysis related to small and light weapons (identification, tracing, etc);
- support regional cooperation in the field of intelligence/information exchange, notably regarding returnees, including in the framework of EU CT Political dialogues.

Component B STRIVE Afghanistan

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

Under output 1:

- evidence-based studies and surveys on extremism and growth of radicalisation focusing on returning migrants including women, their families and communities of origin; state responses to the emergence, effectiveness of the response, role of non-state actors and concluding with recommendations on strategies to counter radicalisation and also promote and enable de-radicalisation among the identified target group;
- Research's data will be disaggregated by sex, urban/ rural, income, socio-cultural or ethnic background, language, geographical location or age groups and will seek to understand women's role in the communities with a view to being able to identify areas by which engaging with women's organisations could contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalisation.

Under output 2:

Design and Implement pilot activities designed to tackle grievances that are relevant to returning migrants in selected areas of Afghanistan to strengthen beneficiaries' resilience towards violent extremism and radicalisation. Pilot activities may include:

- Provide training on P/CVE issues such as radicalisation of youth or re-integration of former extremists to selected local organisations including women's groups based on the findings of the research phase;
- Facilitating the creation of support centres with specialized staff (educator, psychologist, sociologist etc.) for vulnerable returnees, including women and youth, and their families;
- Engaging with religious leaders in targeted communities and define a set of P/CVE capacity building sessions with religious authorities.
- Develop guidance for women's groups on how to bring the community together and navigate security providers (elders, religious leaders and the government actors) to support them in locally driven de-radicalisation initiatives;
- Convene a minimum of 10 meetings between relevant women's groups and security providing stakeholders in order to identify ways to tackle radicalization in selected areas.

Under output 3:

- Sensitizing local media on returning migrants' situation and assisting in the elaboration of positive messages;
- Supporting local media in the production and dissemination of effective narratives and alternative messages to counter violent extremism and radicalisation among returnees and their communities and to stimulate critical thinking;
- Workshops with journalists to explore challenges/demands of reporting in an environment with a real threat of violent extremism and radicalisation;
- Workshops to discuss the challenges of the local environment, the capacity and effectiveness of current Government communications on violent extremism, and showcasing international good practice;
- Supporting alternative voices by providing advice and guidance on communications

including identifying moderate religious voices and institutions.

Component B Support to GCERF:

- Through its Core Funding Mechanism (CFM), support to national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism, by the provision of grants to initiatives in selected countries aimed at strengthening the resilience of communities to violent extremism agendas.
- Through the Accelerated Funding Mechanism (AFM), provision of micro, small, and medium-size grants in a country or countries (to be identified) in the Maghreb, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, North Africa and the Middle East.

Component C CT MORSE:

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Support the coordination, exchange of information and development of best practice between all EU CT actions and provide a platform for coordination with other actions conducted in this area.
- Monitor, follow-up and provide quality support as necessary to all the components of the IcSP CT Programme through desk analysis and missions in the field.
- Provision of tailor-made support to the efficient formulation and implementation of EU CT actions globally. Particular attention will be made to providing reports and advice on human rights compliance.
- Strengthen the support of the EU participation in the GCTF framework, through the provision of support in organising meetings, missions etc. within the GCTF framework, in particular in areas linked to the Working Group co-chaired by the EU.
- Provision of specialised CT training to EU delegations and other stakeholders on the necessary knowledge and insights into the tools and legal frameworks in countering terrorism. Participants and lecturers will search together for and discuss long-term, effective, international rule-of-law-based strategies and measures from an EU perspective.

4.3 Intervention logic

See Appendix below.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months (48 of implementation of the activities) months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such

amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities

5.3.1 Grant: direct award

Component B STRIVE- Support to GCERF

This action will be implemented with a direct award to GCERF (direct management).

(a) Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results.

The objective of the grant to be awarded under Component B is to work with local state and civil society partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

As the main purpose of the actions under component B is financial support to third parties no maximum amount for sub-granting will apply. The Description of the Action for this grant shall define the types of entities eligible for financial support and include a list with the types of activity which may be eligible for financial support. The criteria for the selection of the third party recipients of this financial support, including the criteria for determining its exact amount, shall also be specified in the Description of the Action.

(b) Justification of a direct grant.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (Article 190 1 f RAP).

(d) Essential selection and award criteria.

The essential selection criteria are the financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(e) Maximum rate of co-financing.

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for this grant is 100%.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, full funding is essential for the action to be carried out. The essentiality of full funding will be further justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(f) Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement: Third quarter 2017.

5.3.2. Procurement (direct management)

Component A, B and C. The implementation method will be direct centralised management through the signature of service contracts with International and/or Public organisations including not for profit organisations, or consortia thereof to achieve the results outlined above.

Subject in generic terms, if possible	Type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
5.3.2 Component A – CT CLOSE	Services	1	3 rd quarter 2017
5.3.2 Component B – STRIVE Afghanistan	Services	1	3 rd quarter 2017
5.3.2.Component C- CT MORSE	Services	1	1 st quarter 2018

5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Budget Article 9(2) (b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.5 Indicative budget

	EU contribution (amount in EUR)	Indicative third party contribution, in currency identified
5.3.2 Component A – CT CLOSE	8 500 000	
5.3.2 Component B STRIVE Afghanistan	3 000 000	
5.3.1 Component B STRIVE GCERF	3 000 000	
5.3.2 Component C – CT MORSE	3 500 000	
5.8 Evaluation, 5.9 – Audit	will be covered by another decision	N.A.
5.10 Communication and visibility	N.A.	N.A.
Contingencies	0	N.A.
Total	18 000 000	0

5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

The implementation of this action will be coordinated and led by the European Commission.

During the inception phase, an appropriate management structure will be established to ensure the coherence of all components.

5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the importance of the action, a final evaluation may be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants.

In the case of STIVE Afghanistan a mid-term and final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels. The lessons drawn could allow the awareness raising of best practises to international, regional, national and local stakeholders in the P/CVE area.

5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation of each action.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

[APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY) ¹³]

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective: Impact	To disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.	Improvement of effectiveness of criminal justice system in countering terrorism in particular through closer cooperation of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities*. Reduction in radicalization and terrorist recruitment in priority areas*.	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Official data from targeted countries	No further deterioration of the current (very difficult and volatile) security situation in targeted countries.
Specific objective(s):	SO1 To improve investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases by relevant entities in the security and justice sectors and cooperation at the national and regional levels	Number of CT related incidents in the targeted regions that are investigated / prosecuted.	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Official data from targeted countries	No further deterioration of the current (very difficult and volatile) security situation, in particular in the concerned regions Monitoring data is robust and evaluation is possible.

¹³ Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with '*' and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with '**'.

	SO2: To strengthen resilience of communities at risk against violent extremism and radicalisation in selected areas of Afghanistan.	<p>Number of incidents of VE and support for such acts in Afghanistan.</p> <p>Existence of a range of well-designed and sustainable programmes with robust processes for assessing STRIVE impact.</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	<p>Official data from GoA; Perception studies in clearly defined intervention areas of positive trends for increased sense of safety and hence reduced risk of violence. Reporting from research phase, monitoring of the interventions and the final evaluation;</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation data from pilots;</p> <p>Papers and conferences facilitated by the implementing parties sharing lessons from the interventions.</p>	<p>No further deterioration of the current (very difficult and volatile) security situation, in particular in the concerned regions</p> <p>Monitoring data is robust and evaluation is possible.</p>
	SO 3 Communities at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism have increased resilience against violent extremist agendas.	Overall targets will be consolidated at a country portfolio level upon signature of grant agreements with all Principal Recipients in country. All targets will be disaggregated by gender and age.	To be determined	To be determined	Regular performance reporting by PRs against established targets upon commencement of grants.	Communities are willing to collaborate with the projects.
	SO 4 To strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various counterterrorism projects financed by the European Union as well as.	<p>Physical and financial progress of EU CT programmes.</p> <p>Response by target groups to project activities.</p> <p>Demand for project knowledge and outreach services (newsletter, website, and monthly briefs) increases.</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	<p>International sources, e.g. Global Terrorism Database. End of cycle programme evaluations and audits.</p>	<p>No further deterioration of the current (very difficult and volatile) security situation, in particular in the concerned regions</p> <p>Monitoring data is robust and evaluation is possible.</p>

Outputs	O1 (SO1) Enhanced capacities of relevant entities in the security and justice sectors to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels	<p>Number of best practices shared by relevant entities in the security and justice sectors.</p> <p>Number of beneficiaries who acquired adequate competences investigation and prosecution of terrorism related cases.</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Official data from targeted countries	
	O2 (SO2) Increased understanding of the drivers of radicalisation among returning migrants including women in selected areas of Afghanistan.	<p>Increased understanding of the relation between returnees and violent extremism and radicalisation in Afghanistan through evidence-based analysis.</p> <p>Increased understanding of women's role in building community resilience towards violent extremism.</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Final research carried out by the project.	The security situation allows for comprehensive impact monitoring.
	O3 (SO2) Strengthened capacity of local civil society organisations (including women's organisations) for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism and to fight violent extremism in selected areas of Afghanistan	<p>Number of beneficiaries including women's organisations who acquired adequate competences on P/CVE.</p> <p>Number of Community-led actions and initiatives adopted to raise awareness of the importance of tolerance, diversity and peace.</p> <p>Number of beneficiaries who acquired capacity to recognise early signs of radicalisation.</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Reports including findings from research, monitoring and evaluation.	Local organisations respond positively to the capacity building activities.

	O4 (SO2) Improved capacity of media to act as a key actor in preventing and countering violent extremism among returnees and in contributing to their reintegration within the communities of origin.	<p>Number of effective narratives and alternative messages to counter violent extremism and radicalisation among returnees and their communities elaborated.</p> <p>Number of effective alternative messages and narratives that stimulate critical thinking specifically targeting women and young returnees are developed.</p> <p>Number of specific partnership actions carried out.</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Reports including findings from research, monitoring and evaluation.	Media are willing to investigate topics relevant for P/CVE and returning migrants.
	O5 (SO3) The “Core Funding Mechanism (CFM) is launched in selected countries”	<p>1.1- “Number of PRs receiving funds” (Op1)</p> <p>1.2 – “ total number # of people benefiting from GCERF funded projects</p> <p>1.3- % women & youth benefiting GCERF funded projects (Op1)</p>	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	GCERF Secretariat annual report CSM reports PRs reports	PRs have the adequate capacity to manage GCERF funds.
	O5 (SO4) Enhanced efficiency, strengthened coordination and improved specialisation of EU Counterterrorism related actions	Number of actions carried out during the project.	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	To be determined by the implementing partners in the preparatory phase	Progress reports of the project	