

Warsaw, [date] Reg. No Ref:

OPERATIONS DIVISION JOINT OPERATIONS UNIT SEA BORDERS SECTOR

# **Operational Plan**

EPN PROGRAMME
EPN HERMES 2012
[2012/SBS/01]

Prepared by



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### 1. INTRODUCTION

The present version of the Operational Plan may be revised at any time in accordance with the new operational developments. The annexes of the Operational Plan might be also subject to change throughout the course of the joint operation due to operational reasons (e.g. change of indicators, updated of list of operational area airports - module package, list of contacts, guidance tools, etc.). In that case, Frontex will provide an updated version of the respective annex via FOSS to all Member States¹. Those changes will be limited only to the annexes and will not be considered as an amendment of the Operational Plan.

### 1.1. Legal Framework of Frontex

Frontex is an essential instrument of the European Union (EU) in the gradual establishment of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) system. It has been established with an aim to improve the IBM system and it facilitates and renders more effective the application of existing and future EU measures relating to it. However, the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies entirely with the EU Member States.

Frontex was established by the Frontex Regulation<sup>2</sup> on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishing an area of freedom, security and justice<sup>3</sup>. In this area the free movement of persons is ensured by abolishing border control at internal borders between the EU Member States. The abolishment of internal border control requires high and uniform levels of control at the EU external borders. Frontex was thus established to improve and facilitate that task. The legal basis, objectives, tasks and responsibilities of Frontex are formulated in the Frontex Regulation and in its operational activities Frontex is subject to the EU law.

### 1.2. Fundamental Rights in Frontex activities

### 1.2.1. Obligations of Frontex

Frontex is obliged to fulfill its tasks in full compliance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, and fundamental rights.

The Frontex Regulation requires Frontex to put in place an effective mechanism to monitor the respect for fundamental rights in all its activities. One of the steps to fulfill this task was to develop a Frontex Code of Conduct applicable to all Frontex activities (attached to the present Operational Plan). The Frontex Code of Conduct lays down procedures intended to guarantee the principles of the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights with particular focus on unaccompanied minors and vulnerable persons, as well as on persons seeking international protection, and it is applicable to all persons participating in the activities of Frontex. As regards training activities, Frontex is obliged to take the necessary initiatives to ensure that all border guards and other personnel of the Member States who participate in the European Border Guard Teams, as well as Frontex staff members, have received, prior to their participation in operational activities, a training in relevant EU and international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection and guidelines for the purpose of identifying persons seeking protection and directing them towards the appropriate facilities. For the moment this is a transition period, the above mentioned procedure will be implemented in JO starting with 2013.

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For the purposes of the present document, the term "Member State" includes the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, OJ L 349, 25, 11, 2004, as last amended.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Articles 74 and 77 (2) (b) and (d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Furthermore and pursuant to the provisions of the Frontex Regulation, Frontex has an obligation to suspend or terminate its operational activity in a case of serious or persistent violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations.

### 1.2.2. Obligations of all persons involved in Frontex activities

All persons involved in Frontex activities are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for fundamental rights. They are expected to meet obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the present Operational Plan and are obliged to comply with the rules of their mandates. While taking part in Frontex activities they are obliged to comply with the European law, international law, fundamental rights and national law of the host Member State. Furthermore, the home Member State of each border guard shall provide for appropriate disciplinary or other measures in accordance with its national law in case of violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations in the course of an operational activity.

All persons involved in Frontex activities are to act responsibly and proportionately to the current objectives. While performing their duties they shall not discriminate persons on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, belief, age or sexual orientation. They are expected to treat every person with courtesy, respect and due consideration for the nature of any legitimate activity in which they are engaged. They are obliged to report all observations regarding violations of fundamental rights via the appropriate chain of command. Prior to their deployment they have an obligation to participate in the training activities including fundamental rights issues.

### 1.2.3. Confidentiality

Without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, all versions of this document shall only be made available to the authorities referred in each Member State or Schengen Associated Country as "Law Enforcement". This document shall be made available to other interested parties only on a need-to-know basis and in accordance with European and national rules on the protection of sensitive/classified information. Such dissemination of this document shall be done only on a case-by-case basis.

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### 2. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

### 2.1. Background

In 2008, Tunisian nationals were already the most represented among illegal migrants arriving in Lampedusa with 23% of all arrivals. Although the main departure point was Libya, facilitators operating in Libya were Tunisian.

In May 2009, the agreement for joint patrols between the Italian and Libyan authorities showed immediate effect, with the number of detections on the Central Mediterranean route sharply decreasing to a few sporadic arrivals during the remainder of 2009 and during 2010.

In May 2010, the Tunisian authorities once again agreed to readmit Tunisians who had illegally entered Italy during the previous months. As in 2009, the Tunisian authorities would only accept the return of migrants aboard commercial flights at a rate of four to five persons per flight. The Tunisian crisis interrupted this practical cooperation.

In early February 2011, following political turmoil in Tunisia, migratory flows from Tunisia to Lampedusa suddenly increased, reaching particularly high levels in the period from 1 January until 21 February 2011 with the detection of 5 160 illegal migrants who arrived on Lampedusa Island. This figure is staggeringly high in comparison to the 7 200 arrivals during the whole of 2008, at that time the peak year for migrant arrivals in this area.

### 2.1.1. Start of JO Hermes until the fall of Tripoli in August 2011

From the beginning of the JO Hermes on 20 Feb 2011 until the fall of Tripoli in August, the number of illegal migrants who reached Italy continued to increase due to the continuation of arrivals from Tunisia and, in addition, the income from large vessels with sub-Saharan migrants from Libya.

By the end of August, more than 47 000 illegal migrants had arrived in Italy, mainly on the island of Lampedusa. Nearly 20 000 illegal migrants departed from Tunisia while around 27 000 migrants left from Libya. While nearly all those migrants who arrived from Tunisia were Tunisian nationals, the migrants who came from Libya were mainly nationals from sub-Saharan countries. The landings from Libya were mainly organised and facilitated by the Gaddafi regime, sometimes with the cooperation of local facilitation networks.

Gaddafi tried to make true what he announced on Libyan television; the 'flooding of Europe with migrants' as retaliation against the EU's support for the Libyan rebels. As a consequence, large fishing vessels up to 35 metres in length, carrying an average of 300 sub-Saharan migrants, hit the island of Lampedusa during the weeks subsequent to his announcement. Many of these migrants had been living and working in Libya for some years and refused to leave. Nevertheless, they were forced by the Libyan Army to embark vessels and leave for Italy.

The Libyan Army and the police often worked hand in hand to systematically search for and arrest sub-Saharan migrants. Once they were arrested they were gathered into camps to wait for departure. At the time, it was possible to identify most camps in and around Tripoli. Several cases involving deaths were reported of persons refusing to comply with the authorities. The military complex at the ports of Medina, Tripoli, Janzour and Sidi Bilal could be clearly identified as the main departure areas.

At the same time, arrivals from Tunisia to Italy increased significantly due to several reasons. First of all, the situation in Tunisia had been described as chaotic in various parts of the country. The unemployment rate hit new highs each week and the ongoing clashes between Ben Ali supporters and opponents were reported from all over the country. Most of the interviewed migrants stated that they had left the country because of bad living conditions and the poor economic situation.

Having contact with friends or family members who had already successfully arrived in Italy encouraged them to leave the country. As a result, would-be migrants bought small rubber boats to reach Italy by themselves or chartered fishing boats with the help of facilitation networks established particularly in the


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city of Sfax. After the month of September in which a total of 1 597 Tunisian migrants reached Italy, figures dropped to just 49 illegal migrants in October.

### 2.1.2. Migratory flows JO Hermes since the fall of the Gaddafi regime

After the rebels captured Tripoli and forced the Gaddafi loyalists to retreat from the ports and harbours, the organising of migrant crossings to Italy, by the regime, came to an end. The last migration incident from Libya organised by the Gaddafi regime to Lampedusa was reported on 17 August.




this regard, two daily charter flights would depart from Palermo airport, where staff from the Tunisian Consulate in Palermo would conduct swift interviews and issue travel documents straightway. When all the Tunisian nationals have been repatriated from the reception centre, further repatriations will be carried out according to the pre-existing agreement (60 persons to be repatriated on a weekly basis).

In an effort to avoid being repatriated to Tunisia, Tunisian migrants in the reception centre in Lampedusa caused riots and set the reception centre on fire, destroying a significant part of the premises. This resulted in Italy officially declaring Lampedusa as an unsafe port with the consequence that newly arriving illegal migrants were transferred mainly to Sicily.

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### 2.2. Modus Operandi





### 2.3. Current migration flows from Libya and Tunisia towards Italy

### 2.3.1. Tunisia

Being aware of the repatriation policy of the Italian authorities, facilitation networks began targeting Sicily. Skippers are able to successfully return, with the boat, to Tunisia and migrants would then disappear inland. So far, only a few incidents were reported in the current operation Hermes because Sicily and the sea area that is used for crossing towards Sicily are outside the operational area. However, the routes from Tunisia towards Sicily were confirmed during several interviews conducted by debriefing experts within the framework of the JO Hermes 2011.

The islands of Lampedusa, Pantelleria and Linosa seem to have ceased to be targeted by migrants from Tunisia. A few incidents were reported for the island of Pantelleria during the months of December and January 2011/2012 but all of the migrants confessed that they had intended to reach Sicily and only stopped in Pantelleria because of a lack of fuel or because there was a problem with the boat. In one case the facilitator fooled the migrants by disembarking them on Pantelleria and telling them that they were already in Sicily.

### 2.3.2. Libya

After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, migration flows from Libya towards Italy almost came to a halt

So far it is unknown how wide these networks are spread and how many boats are expected to depart from the Libyan coast towards Italy in 2012. The four mentioned cases in Italy and Malta were all Search and Rescue (SAR) cases in which the migrants themselves called for help and wanted to be rescued. It can be assumed that a considerable number of boats which did not make any distress call reached Sicily undertexted.

### 2.4. Trend and Outlook

Notwithstanding the above assertion, the unstable situation in these countries also has to be taken into consideration. A new operation would maintain a European platform for immediate response in case of renewed massive arrivals of illegal migrants towards Sicily and the Pelagic Islands.

For the time being, developments in both countries can be hardly foreseen and political changes are possible within short terms. Following the elections in Tunisia the country appears to be more stable

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although the economic situation remains critical and appears to be the main push factor for young Tunisians to leave the country. The reactivation of pre-civil war facilitation routes in Libya are currently in the early stages of development. It appears that these routes are being used to transport only Somali migrants though to a low extent.

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### 3. OPERATIONAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES

### 3.1. Operational aim

The operational aim of the joint operation EPN Hermes 2012 is to focus on the common efforts to carry out border surveillance to ensure that persons attempting to cross the external maritime borders undergo the border control as required by the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) by tackling and controlling irregular migration flows from Tunisia, Algeria and Libya towards the islands of Lampedusa, Sardinia and Sicily.

### 3.2. Operational objectives

- Enhance border security Enhance efficiency of border security
- Enhance operational cooperation Enhance exchange of information
- Enhance efficiency of the exchange of information ldentify possible risks and threats Establish and exchange best practices

- Support establishment of permanent structures Support provision of trainings

More detailed information regarding operational objectives and indicators is provided in Annex 2. Any amendment of the above mentioned subject will be reflected in revised Annex 2 without amending the

### 4. IMPLEMENTATION

### 4.1. Period of implementation4

Commencement	2 July 2012	09:00 (local time)
Termination	31 October 2012	09:00 (local time)

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### 4.2. Additional information

Travel days	
Briefing / training	
Debriefing	

### 4.3. Operational areas



### 4.4. Participants

Host MS	Italy
Home MS/SAC	Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, France, Iceland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and United Kingdom.
3rd countries	Georgia
Other entities	EUROPOL, EFCA

### 4.5. Operational briefings / debriefings and trainings

### 4.5.1. Operational briefings / debriefings

At the beginning of each deployment of air/naval assets and experts FOC/FOO/OA/FSO will organize operational briefing at local level within the LCCs.

The briefing of the FSO shall be done by the Project Team or FOO together with LCC Coordinator and should preferably be done on the spot to ensure a proper introduction to LCC staff, guest officers, and crews from MS/SAC assets and observers.

The ICC will organize daily operational briefing aiming to update the situational and operational developments in the operational areas and discuss difficulties met and possible instant improvements. Regarding debriefing activities, a specific training will be provided to all the debriefing experts before

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 $<sup>^4</sup>$  Foreseeable duration of the joint operation as indicated in the  $^3$  (a) Article - 1. Paragraph  $e_{\rm s}$ ) - of the Frontex Regulation.

starting their activities in the operation, carried out by the OA, the Frontex debriefing expert and/or the FOO Intel Component, following the Standard Operating Procedures for intelligence gathering.

After deployment of air/naval asset and expert ICC in close cooperation with Project Team FOC/FOO/OA will organize debriefing at local level within the LCCs, where applicable. Debriefing preferably should be done on the spot to ensure a proper feedback. With regard to deployed experts FOO/FOC/FSO actively contributes to debriefing meetings after each deployment.

Standard plan for briefing/debriefing of participants can be found in Annex 19

### 4.5.2. Training by LCC trainers

The LCC trainers are responsible for carrying out national briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants of the joint maritime operation deployed in the operational areas at the local level.

### LCC trainer shall:

- · Assist the project manager in delivering trainings/briefings as requested by the project manager;
- Report to, consult and provide regular updates to the project manager regarding trainings carried out:
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities:
- implementation process of such activities;
  Prepare reports after each activity and submit them to the project manager;
- · Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the project activities.

TRU, in close cooperation with JOU, is responsible to organize the national trainings based on the deployment lists provided by the Project Team members. The reasonable solutions for the duration and date of the trainings shall be found between TRU and JOU in order to achieve the cost effectiveness and to ensure the implementation of training to all participants.

More detailed information regarding deployment table and operational areas of the joint operation is provided in Annexes 4, 1A and 1B. Any amendments of the above mentioned subjects will be reflected in revised Annexes 4, 1A and 1B without amending the Operational Plan.

### 5. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The responsibility for the control of the external borders remains with the MS. Frontex facilitates and renders more effective application of existing and future EU measures related to the management of external borders, by ensuring the coordination of MS actions in the implementation of those measures, thereby contributing to an efficient, high and uniform level of control on persons and surveillance of the external borders of the MS.

All the measures shall be planned and executed based on EU law, the relevant national legislation and existing provisions of international law, both customary and conventional and in close cooperation with the involved authorities of the MS, in particular the host MS.

Actions are coordinated by the ICC without prejudice of the privileges of the national operation chain of command and control specific to each participating MS. The command and control of technical means and experts participating in the operation remain under the authority of the national commands.

In case interception turn to Search and Rescue (SAR) operational tasks need to be execute under the coordination of the responsible MRCC/MRSC according to internationally approved SAR procedures.

Without prejudice to the responsibility of the Rescue Coordination Centre/Sub Centre, and unless otherwise specified in the operational plan, priority should be given to disembarkation in the third country from where the ship carrying the persons departed or through the territorial waters or search and rescue region of which that ship transited and if this is not possible, priority should be given to disembarkation in the host Member State unless it is necessary to act otherwise to ensure the safety of these persons. Recommended rules of engagement based on Council Decision 2010/252/EU in Annex 7.Actions are coordinated by the ICC without prejudice of the privileges of the national operation chain of command and control specific to each participating MS. The command and control of technical means and experts participating in the operation remain under the authority of the national commands.

Hermes 2012 will also focus on debriefing activities.

Border surveillance will be ensured by maritime assets patrolling in predefine area. Deploying aerial assets will enhance the border surveillance by ensuring the early detections of irregular immigrants.

The JO EPN-Hermes 2012 will also focus on the second line activities with the deployment of debriefing experts to facilitate the Italian authorities in information (intelligence) gathering.

The additional deployments will be carried out following the risk assessment recommendations.

All suspicious contacts of interest detected in the international waters shall be reported for the appropriate actions to the relevant authorities via officially established communication channels.

All MS (including Host MS) whenever possible, taking into consideration the emergency situations, must guarantee the examination of the "personal circumstances" of each individual person intercepted/rescued on the high seas thus being under the continuous and exclusive *de jure* and the examination should include:

- a) Examine the "personal circumstances" of each individual and
- b) Enable each individual to put forward their arguments against the measure aiming to return them to the place of departure in 3<sup>rd</sup> country.

Aforementioned recommendations on "examination" do not apply to the persons intercepted/rescued within the Territorial Watters of EU MS.

### 5.1. Main activities assigned to expected achievement of objectives

The actions during the operational phase of JO EPN-Hermes 2012 include deployment of additional technical means, guest officers, cultural mediators at sea border in order to:

- Perform joint patrols at sea border.
- Provide additional support to Italian Authorities in management of border control by providing additional technical resources and optimization of tactical use.
- Encourage the guest officers and local staff to share experiences and exchange expertise as well as to constantly update their knowledge on the illegal migration trends in order to adopt countermeasures to tackle the phenomena.
- Carry out high standard interview procedures in order to collect reliable and valuable information

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- Collect and assess information in order to improve the detection of human smuggling and trafficking in human beings facilitation by individuals and/or criminal networks and assist wherever possible identification and detention of facilitators.
- Provide with clear and updated situational picture concerning the operational areas, modus operandi, main trends and possible rapid changes in this respect.
- Carry out daily and ad-hoc exchange of information with ICC/NCC (via IO)/FSC/Project Team as the main actors responsible for the overall cooperation in the framework of the JO.

The additional deployments of experts and means will be spread during the period of implementation following the risk assessment recommendations.


# Border surveillance shall be carried out by using the MS/SAC offered means - to detect all border crossing incidents and when it is needed to intercept persons to prevent unauthorized border crossing.

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### 5.2.1. Use of Maritime assets |

The task of maritime units is to detect and identify all contacts of interests in the operational area by using all available equipment for surveillance enabling the detection and when needed the interception.

The maritime units shall perform their tasks under the guidance of the ICC, following the planning and schedule confirmed at daily meeting of Joint Coordination Board (JCB) chaired by the ICC Coordinator.




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The aerial means' main tasks should be the surveillance enabling the detections of suspicious contacts of interests and as far as possible classification and identification of them.

The task of aerial units is to detect and identify all contacts of interests in the predefined operational area by using the available equipment for surveillance enabling the detection in order to get a clear and updated overview on the situation in the operational areas and to support the maritime means.



5.3. Interception of persons at sea

Without prejudice to the responsibility of the Rescue Coordination Centre, and unless otherwise specified in the operational plan, priority should be given to disembarkation in the third country from where the ship carrying the persons departed or through the territorial waters or search and rescue region of which that ship transited and if this is not possible, priority should be given to disembarkation in the host Member State unless it is necessary to act otherwise to ensure the safety of these persons. (Council Decision 2010/252/EU).

### 5.3.1. Information on application of relevant jurisdiction and legislation in the operational area

The following international conventions regarding interception, rescue at sea and disembarkation shall apply:

- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (Palermo Convention);
- International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea;
- $\bullet\,$  International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue;
- 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
- Council Decision (2010/252/EU) of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards
  the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by


Commented [BW9]: The marked parts contain detailed information on the concept and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception (aid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

### 5.4. SAR


Search and Rescue (SAR) operations in the operational area are to be conducted under the coordination of the MRCC according to internationally approved SAR procedures.

Rules for sea border operations and guidelines for Search and Rescue can be found in Annex 7.



Commented [BW10]: The marked parts contain detailed information on the concept and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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### 6. COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES AND OTHER ENTITIES

### 6.1. Cooperation with third countries

It is considered highly important to achieve the participation of the third countries

6.2. Cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations

Without prejudice to the counter migration activities the cooperation with the following EU agencies and international organisation will be achieved.

### 6.2.1. Cooperation with Europol

Frontex and Europol shall cooperate during the JO EPN-Hermes 2012 through exchange of Information and intelligence.

### 6.2.2. Cooperation with EFCA

The cooperation between Frontex and EFCA will be carried out through the ICC, where is located the Italian Coast Guard officer, contact point with the Italian Fisheries Control Centre, assigned contact point of the Italian authorities. The cooperation will focus in the exchange of information, namely sightings, as regards fisheries control within JO EPN Hermes 2012 operational area. EFCA will receive, via the ICC, the whole collated or collected information (pictures and/or videos) related to possible illegal fishing cases that might be detected by participating assets during patrolling activities. EFCA will provide the ICC with the following information: list of vessels of interest from fisheries perspective and position of detected boats involved in the transport of irregular migrants. Furthermore, EFCA will prepare a template with minimum requirements for sighting information to be collected in case of detection of a fishing boat. EFCA will provide the participating crew-members with specific training on fisheries control.

Commented [FG11]: The marked parts contain detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the operation. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

Reg. No 19/35

### 7. COORDINATION STUCTURE

### 7.1. Partnership


Frontex is the Community coordinator, initiating, promoting and facilitating the EU MS/SAC synchronized efforts to control the external borders.

Italy, the host Member State, is the operational multiplier, initiator, developer and tasks' executer.

The Italian authorities are responsible for all border-related operational activities in the define operational areas and the predefined detention centres, including border surveillance, processes of identification, acquisition of travel documents and returns regarding illegal migrants, as well as investigation and prosecution of criminal activities. On behalf of Italy, trough the Ministry of Interior, the Italian Polizia di Stato, Guardia di Finanza, Guardia Costiera are the direct partners of Frontex for the activities to be carried out within the joint operation. Other national law enforcing authorities support those activities.

The participating EU MS/SAC will support the operation's objectives and activities by deploying their assets and experts to the defined locations.

### 7.2. Tasks and roles of participants




### 7.2.4. Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)

According to the new Frontex Regulation, Frontex shall nominate a Coordinating Officer for the joint operation where members of the European Border Guard Teams will be deployed. The role of the

Commented [BW12]: The marked parts contain detailed information on the concept and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public Interest as regards public security

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### 7.2.5. Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)

The FOC is to be permanently deployed in Italy

### 7.2.6. Frontex Support Officer (FSO)

The FC can be assisted by a FSO for monitoring and coordinating the operation at the local level as well as for horizontal activities, especially related to the reporting system and documentation expertise.

### 7.2.7. Frontex Operational Office (FOO)

The FOO is established in Piraeus (Greece) in the premises of Frontex to coordinate the operational activities in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Region including Cyprus, Italy and Malta, at all types of borders including return matters.

### 7.2.8. FOO Operational Component

Members of the operational management component of FOO can perform the task of FOC/FSO and other ad hoc task delegated by Frontex HQ.

### 7.2.9. FOO Intelligence Component

The intelligence component of the FOO will ensure the proper gathering and channelling of information and intelligence from the operational area by liaising with the national authorities at local and central level, and maintain close contacts with the appointed intelligence Officer and team leaders, supporting and monitoring the activities of the debriefing experts deployed by Frontex and responding to ad hoc intelligence requirements from the OA, and in close cooperation with the FOC.

### 7.2.10.Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)

All detailed information related to the role, tasks, functioning of FSC and their products (JORA, FOSS) is provided in Annexes 8 to 15.

### 7.2.10.1.Situation monitoring - information processing - reporting

The FSC:


- Provides a constantly updated picture of the irregular migration situation at the external borders of the EU as near to real-time as possible; Carries out situation monitoring;
- · Maintains situational awareness;
- Provides a first response in case of crisis or emergency situations that may occur during the Joint Operation;
- Acts as the central point of contact for the ICC and Frontex staff, for all operational information that have a direct impact on the Joint Operation;
- Carries out media monitoring in open and in grey sources.

Especially, the FSC is responsible for

- Providing reports showing the figures/data of the Joint Operation enriched with additional information from other sources, if available and applicable; the reports shall be uploaded to FOSS;
- Collecting and disseminating information related to issues need specific attention (Serious Incident Reports - Annex 14);

- Collecting document alert on false\falsified document and uploading them to FOSS.
- Keeping Frontex management and Member States updated concerning the situation
- Monitoring the exchange of information and collecting experience in order to provide improved activities when appropriate

### 7.2.10.2.Senior Duty Officer (SDO) Service in FSC




7.2.10.3.Deployed Support Officers to FSC

Officers from EU MS and SAC are sent to Frontex as 'FSC Support Officer FSC' in order to support SDO in:



The responsibility for the Frontex Support Officer FSC remains at the FSC Senior Duty Officer,



### 7.2.10.4.FSC roles and responsibilities concerning JORA

Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) is an IT software system that provides Frontex and its internal and external stakeholders (Member States, other EU institutions and authorities) capabilities of sending, managing and appraise (= to evaluate, especially in an official capacity) the data related to the incidents and other data related to operational activities during the entire cycle of the operations coordinated by Frontex.

JORA is the system constructed in modules developed in parallel based on the constant analysis of the operational reporting needs.

FSC JORA product management - Contact information

Landline

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Commented [BW13]: The marked parts contain detailed information on the concept and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



### 7.2.10.5.Operational data collection in JORA

16). FSC is responsible for managing the information collection and collation in JORA and managing the final validation and approval of reported incident. FSC is responsible for generating reports in JORA and adding additional relevant information to the report according to the needs and specification of the operation.

Detailed description of all relevant information related to the management and using of JORA are available in Annexes 8 to 14.

### 7.2.10.1.FSC roles concerning Frontex One Stop Shop (FOSS)

In order to enrich situational awareness and share operational-related information during the JO the FOSS (<a href="https://foss.frontex.europa.eu">https://foss.frontex.europa.eu</a>) portal is enabled for the use.

FOSS is a web-based and secure portal for sharing the relevant information and it is accessible 24/7. Up-to-date information is available to multiple users, simultaneously. FOSS serves as a documents repository for the operational-related information.

During the JO it will be the main platform used for sharing operational-related information between all parties involved.

The information about ongoing JO (specified documents) will be accessible according to defined standards and amongst users designated respectively for each joint operation. The standards and use of FOSS is described in the Annex 15 of the Operational Plan. Guest Officers will be granted access to the webpage on FOSS after completing the Accreditation Form (Annex 17). Other participants will receive access after submission and authorization of the Specific FOSS User Access Request Form (Annex

FOSS- Contact Information	
Landline	+48 22 205 9675 / 9597
Email	foss@frontex.europa.eu


### 7.2.10.2.Information and Communication Technologies Sector

Responsible for JORA first line support according to agreed JORA SLA and standard Frontex ICT operational hours:

Frontex HelpDesk services opening hours (1st line support):

Monday - Friday: 08:00 - 18:00
 Weekends & public holidays: 09:00 - 17:00

Frontex HelpDesk Contact information:	
Landline	+48 22 544 9740
E-mail	helpdesk@frontex.europa.eu



Commented [BW14]: The marked parts contain detailed information on the concept and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

### 7.2.12. Special Adviser for debriefing activities

Based on the risk analysis and operational needs the special adviser may be deployed within the joint operation, in teams together with the local staff and the debriefing experts supporting them in their tasks with their specialist knowledge.

### 7.2.13.National Official (NO)

The NO shall be appointed by the MS deploying their aerial and/or maritime assets to the operation. The NO shall be deployed to the ICC to coordinate the actions of their respective national assets according to their national legislation in close cooperation with the ICC Coordinator.

### 7.2.14.Commanding Officer


CO is the Commanders of the aerial, maritime and land means according to the national legislation.

### 7.2.15.GO of Joint Debriefing Teams and Team Leader



Special instructions to the GO

7.2.15.1.Follow-up measures



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areas,

### 7.2.16. Cultural Mediators /Interpreters

Frontex and the Host MS shall consider the need to deploy additional Cultural Mediators/Interpreters.

The Cultural Mediators/Interpreters will participate in debriefings teams/MOU assisting the local and guest officers with linguistic support as well as increasing the quality of information gathered.

### 7.2.17. Observers from Third Countries

The Observers from Third Countries can perform tasks and cover role according to the working arrangements signed by Frontex and the competent authorities of the participating Third Country and/or cooperation plans bilaterally agreed between Frontex and the competent authorities of the participating Third Country.

They have no executive powers to carry out border control tasks, and are not authorized to take any measures against any person. They may only advice and exchange/obtain practical experience.

In particular, the Observers from Third Countries can (if prior agreed with the host MS):

- Intermediate between the national authorities of the host MS and their national authorities on border related incidents and information sharing;
- Support the officers of national authorities during the examination of travel documents;
- Assist with the special language and/or professional skills;
- Participate in combined patrols at the maritime borders with the local officers;
- Exchange intelligence information regarding the modus operandi, routes and criminal networks
  operating in the area of concern detected during and in the framework of the operation, in
  accordance with their respective legislation.

Further tasks and duties can be executed according to the national legislation of the home/host country. Bearing in mind limitations mentioned above, their deployment conforms to that of the guest officers.


# 7.2.19.Local staff of the host Member State 7.2.20.Additional staff of the host Member State 7.2.21.Assets and other technical equipment Assets and other technical equipment will be deployed by the host and participating MS in the operational

The contacts and the detailed tasks and roles of participants are defined in the Annexes 3 and 5.

### 8. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS


### 8.1. Command and control

The Operational Command of aerial/naval assets of the participating EU MSs/SACs remains with the respective MS.



Command and control scheme in Annex 3.

### 8.2. Communication



Press communication rules can be found in Annex 29.


### 8.3. Reporting

The daily **Reporting Package** shall be prepared by the ICC Staff and shall consist of the following reports:

Item	Description	Responsibility


Commented [FG15]: The marked parts contain detailed information regarding organization, command and control of the operation. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

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division) — isotto manager — V or final exchanges

### 8.3.1. Incidents reporting




### 8.3.2. Incident management process



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> When referring to FSC, ICC, LCC and BCP in connection to JORA, they represent the reporting/validation levels as described in Annexes 8 and 9

### 8.3.3. Validation at ICC



### 8.3.4. Serious Incident Reports

A Serious Incident Report is an alert message that should be sent immediately to ICC via email addresses

in case an unexpected and relevant incident that needs immediate attention occurs in the operational area.

The categories of the serious incidents are described in the Serious Incidents Catalogue (Annex 14). Due to the diversity of possible incidents to report upon the template 'Serious Incident Report' shall be used (Annex 14).

All participants of the JO are entitled to report serious incidents in the Frontex coordinated joint operations. The detail information about the reporting of serious incidents is described in Annex 14.

Item	Description	Responsibility
Serious Incident Report	An alert message that shall be sent immediately to FSC in case an unexpected and relevant incident that needs immediate attention occurs in the operational area	All participants of the JO
	·	

### 8.3.5. The reports of Experts and Intelligence Officer

Item	Description	Responsibility
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### 8.3.6. Frontex reports



### 8.3.7. Document alert and Reference Manual

Irregular migrants are often using forged/falsified documents. With the available technology forgers have an enlarged range of possibilities reducing the chances for border guards to discover forgeries. In this regard, the exchange of information is crucial to fight this phenomenon. The GO are requested, to compile the Reference Manual Alert Form each time a relevant document forgery is detected. This compiled alert shall be attached to the respective JORA incident report.

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### 9. ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND LOGISTICS

### 9.1. Arrangements of deployed resources

The Operational resources management system (Opera) is an integrated web-based system for the management of the operational resources pooled and deployed in Frontex coordinated activities. Information related to the availability and deployment of the resources is stored in the application and is available for generating statistics, and for automated reporting.

More information about OPERA is provided in Annex 18.

### 9.2. Field visits

Before each air or naval asset of the participating MS/SAC is deployed it should perform a field visit in order to be familiar local authorities and stakeholders. The field visit should be approved by the ICC Coordinator and the Project Manager in advance.

### 9.3. Transport

The use of rental car is to be approved in advance by the Project Team and expenses will be included in the relevant financial documents. In this case participants should arrange in advance by themselves, all practical/logistic issues.

Upon arrival and departure, connection from/to the airports to/from the hotels will be arranged by the participants themselves.

### 9.4. Logistics

Diplomatic clearances for the aerial/ naval and land assets shall be arranged by the participating Member States



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### 10. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

In accordance with the decision of the Frontex Executive Director, Frontex will co-finance the joint operation. Frontex will reimburse eligible costs incurred by participating MS/SAC authorities in relation to deployments of experts and technical equipment provided that the Framework Partnership Agreement is in place.

The Host MS is also eligible for co-financing the eligible costs for additional means/activities and staff deployed.

Frontex will be responsible for the preparation of all necessary financial commitments and the preparation of the legal commitments. Funds are allocated by means of issuing Specific Financing Decision with Estimated Budget and calculation for Running Expenses of Means (if applicable). The Estimated Budget and REM are to be submitted by the partner authority.

Once the SFD is issued by Frontex, the MS/SAC authority is obliged to send back Acknowledgement of Receipt and is entitled to request pre-financing up to 50% of SFD budget. Frontex strongly recommends partner authorities to claim the advance payment.

In accordance with Article II.17 of the Framework Partnership Agreement, payment of the balance, which may not be repeated, is made after the end of the operational activity on the basis of eligible costs actually incurred in carrying out the operational activity. The request for final payment shall be submitted after the end of the joint operation.

Accordingly, Frontex will co-finance the deployments of Third Country observers within the joint operation, provided that Third Country has the Working Arrangement with Frontex. For the purpose of legal and financial commitment, Frontex and the Third Country partner authority mutually sign the Grant Agreement along with the Estimated Budget and General Conditions. Further co-financing details, eligible costs and payment rules for Grant Agreements are analogical to the SFD scheme for EU MS/SAC.

### 11. EVALUATION

### 11.1. MS/SAC

Reports	Benchmarks
Report of Participant	The "Evaluation Report for Participation" shall be filled in by the deployed GO and provided to Frontex, within 15 days after their deployment to email account:
Final Report of MS/SAC and 3 <sup>rd</sup> countries	The MS/SAC and the 3 <sup>rd</sup> countries that participated with experts/observers in the operational activities shall provide Frontex with their contribution to the FER within 15 days after the end of their deployment or the termination of the operational activities to email account: <a href="mailto:epn.hermes@frontex.europa.eu">epn.hermes@frontex.europa.eu</a>

The final payment will not be processed if the Final Report of MS/SAC and 3rd countries or Report of Participant (in case only few guest officers are deployed by the MS/SAC) is not presented. The respective template is provided in Annex 24.

### 11.2. Frontex

Reports	Benchmarks		
Frontex Evaluation Report	The results of the joint operation will be evaluated and the Frontex		
	Evaluation Report (FER) will be transmitted after the termination of		
	the JO to the Management Board together with the observations of		
	the Fundamental Rights Officer referred to in Article 26a of the		
	new Frontex Regulation. FER will be uploaded on FOSS.		

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### **ANNEXES**

1A	ANNEX	OPERATIONAL AREA (LAMPEDUSA)				
1B	ANNEX	OPERATIONAL AREA (SARDINIA)				
2	ANNEX	OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS				
3	ANNEX	COMMAND, CONTROL AND TASKS OF MAIN ACTORS				
4	ANNEX	LIST OF PARTICIPATING RESOURCES				
5	ANNEX	COMMUNICATION TABLE				
6	ANNEX	CODE OF CONDUCT				
7	ANNEX	ROE-GUIDELINES SEA OPERATIONS				
8	ANNEX	JORA GENERAL INFORMATION				
9	ANNEX	STRUCTURE OF THE OPERATION IN JORA				
10	ANNEX	JORA ACTORS				
11	ANNEX	JORA INCIDENT TEMPLATE ATTRIBUTE LIST				
12	ANNEX	JORA END USER FEEDBACK TEMPLATE				
13	ANNEX	INCIDENT REPORT IF JORA MALFUNCTIONS				
14	ANNEX	SERIOUS INCIDENTS REPORTING				
15	ANNEX	FOSS (FRONTEX ONE-STOP-SHOP)				
16	ANNEX	FOSS USER ACCESS REGUEST FORM				
17	ANNEX	ACCREDITATION DOCUMENT + FOSS ACCESS FOR GO				
18	ANNEX	OPERA				
19	ANNEX	STANDARD PLAN FOR BRIEFING-DEBRIEFING OF PARTICIPANTS				
20	ANNEX	JDT GUIDELINES FOR INTERVIEWS				
21	ANNEX	JDT TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEW				
22	ANNEX	JDT TEAM LEADERS DAILY REPORT				
23	ANNEX	DAILY/WEEKLY IO REPORTS				
24	ANNEX	FSO WEEKLY REPORT				
25	ANNEX	STANDARD PATROLLING SCHEDULE				
26	ANNEX	TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT MISSION REPORT				
27	ANNEX	REPORT OF PARTICIPANT				
28	ANNEX	FINAL REPORT OF MS/SAC/THIRD COUNTRIES				
29	ANNEX	PRESS COMMUNICATION RULES				
30	ANNEX	DOCUMENT ALERT TEMPLATE				

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