

OPERATIONS DIVISION  
Joint Operations Unit  
SEA BORDERS SECTOR

# Annexes of the Operational Plan

**Amendment No 1**

**EPN Concept**

**Joint Operation EPN Hermes 2014  
2014/SBS/5**



European Agency for the Management  
of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member States  
of the European Union

[www.frontex.europa.eu](http://www.frontex.europa.eu)  
Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland  
Tel. +48 22 205 95 00  
Fax +48 22 205 95 01

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## **ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION**

### **Background**

The Central Mediterranean region has been largely affected by irregular migratory flows in the recent past. More precisely, the operational area and the immediate vicinity of the operational area of the JO Hermes (covering the sea areas between Italy and Tunisia and between Italy and Libya) have been under continued pressure of seaborne arrivals of migrants from various directions using a large palette of modi operandi.

Historically, after the massive influx generated by the Arab Spring in Tunisia and in Libya, the number of seaborne irregular migrants went down in the second half of 2011 and a year of relatively low figures followed in 2012 with 8 265 arrivals in 181 detections in the area of Sicily and the Pelagic Islands.

In 2013, however, a drastic increase was seen again, with a peak in September, when in a single month a total of 8 498 irregular migrants were apprehended in 69 incidents.

In the first quarter of 2014 a total number of 10 076 irregular migrants from Libya were apprehended in 71 incidents (604 migrants in 7 incidents in 2013, with a 1568% increase).

### **Geopolitical Situation in Source and Transit Countries**

#### **1. Syria**

The crisis in Syria has been a constant push factor for Syrian national to leave the country. Even many of those who initially remained in Syria in hope of an improvement of the situation, eventually decided to leave. Intelligence points out that a part of them directly wanted to go to Europe, whereas the rest looked out for a job in other North African or Near East countries first and then ended up in Europe only after having spent some time in such countries.

The vast majority of the migrants from Syria have been Syrian nationals; however several Palestinian and Lebanese nationals declared that they had also departed recently from Syria.

#### **2. Egypt**

The political situation has been unstable in Egypt since the start of the Arab Spring. With the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, the situation of the Syrian immigrants who had been welcome by the Morsi regime became unstable and pushed a large number of Syrian national to leave the country. At first they departed directly from Alexandria by sea directed towards Sicily, but later they chose the land or the air route to Benghazi and Tripoli, to finally leave for Italy from Zuwarah beach.

The number of Egyptian nationals apprehended in Italy was 1 918 in 2013 (780 in 2012, a 146% increase). They almost inclusively arrived in Italy from Egypt, and mainly due to the insecure political and economic atmosphere in the country.

#### **3. Tunisia**

Although still not entirely stable, the political situation has relieved in Tunisia in the past 2 years and most of the irregular migrants coming from there are young economic migrants who desire to find better living conditions mainly in northern Italy or in France.

Three years after declaring a state of emergency, the president of Tunisia president issued a decree to end it. The Tunisian army will now focus more its attention to the original task of protecting the borders. The priority, though, will be the Tunisian-Algerian border given the high level of terrorism threat. The special military zones established on the borders with Algeria and Libya will remain in place.

[REDACTED]

#### 4. Western African Region

When talking about the Western African countries from the point of view of migration it must be taken into account that they are integrated into the ECOWAS community which is, for most of the people in the Western Africa, a primary comfort zone out of cultural, language and religious reasons. If for whatever reasons a Western African citizen cannot find a job in his or her home country or needs to flee for any political/religious/other reason, they will first move to settle down in another ECOWAS member state. Therefore it can be assumed that, for example, not all Gambian migrants actually lived in and departed from the Gambia before they set out to Libya and then onwards to Italy.

At the same time the main factors such as the Mali conflict, drought and famine in the Sahel region can be assumed to have an effect to the entire ECOWAS community to a certain extent. Similarly, the corruption of the officers involved in border protection in Niger might have an impact on any migrant from the West African states wanting to travel to Libya.

With various push factors forcing citizens of ECOWAS countries to leave the region, and pulled by the recruiting work of the facilitation networks, West Africans continued to arrive in Tripoli and then on to [REDACTED]

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**Commented [BW1]:** The marked parts contain detailed information on the analytical findings, risk assessment and recommendations and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

#### 5. Horn of Africa

The majority of the migrants in 2013 arrived at the JO Hermes operational area from the Horn of Africa. The nationality ranking was topped by the Eritrean migrants. In Eritrea, besides the general poverty in the country, the main reason for the people to leave is the obligatory military service. The *Rashiada* ethnic group was mentioned in debriefing interviews, as the members of this ethnic group kidnap other Eritrean nationals either for the purposes of forced labor or to hand them over to the Eritrean army.

The situation related to Somali nationals has not changed recently. The poor economy as well as fear from the *Al Shabab* militant group is the major factor that brings migrants to leave their country.

However, it must be added that a vast number of Horn of Africa migrants travel to Sudan first and try to settle down there. The majority of the Horn of Africa migrants who had ended up in Italy stated that they first had got into touch with the facilitation networks in Al Khartoum, Sudan.

#### 6. Libya

Ever since the Gaddafi regime was overthrown, the situation in Libya has been chaotic in more than one aspect. **Politically**, the country has a government but due to long-existing internal tensions the country is torn into three regions and the governmental power is very weak, and tensions are expected to further escalate with the removal of the prime minister after a vote of no confidence.

From the **economic** point of view Libya is suffering from the political and security consequences of the lack of a central power. Besides, the forceful expulsion of tens of thousands of sub-Saharan workers (together with a

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considerable number of Egyptian, Syrian and other labor power who left during the civil war) created a void in the labor market that is still to be filled. Libya badly needs cheap unskilled labor (which used to be filled by sub-Saharan migrants) and skilled workers (who came from Europe, Egypt, Syria etc. but were evacuated two years ago). However, under such security circumstances it will take time to resume to economic growth.

Regarding **security**, the paramilitary groups that were armed in order to help oust Gaddafi two years ago are reluctant to disarm. During the last two years several clashes have taken place among the groups or fighting the Libyan Army.

From the **cultural** point of view, in Libya the Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan migrants are exposed to racism, discrimination and violence on a daily basis. Extremist Libyan racist groups will not balk at attacking and even killing people from the Horn of Africa or West Africa. The vast majority of migrants interviewed, after arriving in Italy, reported that they had spent several weeks or months in Libyan prisons where mistreatment and torture were common. It must be, however, also remembered that before the ouster of the Gaddafi regime such sub-Saharan migrants lived and worked in Libya for years; they only decided to leave for Italy once the racism and the extremist groups got out of the control of the central power.

## Analytical Findings of the JO EPN Hermes 2013

### 1. General

[REDACTED]

The major factors that contributed to the increase have been:

- the crisis in Syria;
- the unstable political situation in Egypt since the Arab Spring including the ouster of Morsi in July, 2013;
- the well-established facilitation networks in Syria, Sudan, Niger, Egypt and Libya;
- the political, economic instability as well as the deteriorating cultural and security situation in Libya;
- lack of measures preventing the departure of boats with would-be migrants and, at the same time, the development of well organised facilitation networks in the coastal cities of Libya;

The factors that limited the impact on migration have been the weather conditions (mainly during winter) and the well-working repatriation procedures between Italy and Tunisia, and Italy and Egypt. To a certain extent the local authorities in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have reported to be engaged in preventing some departures.

### 2. Profile of Irregular Migrants

*Horn of Africa migrants*

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The Eritrean and Somali migrants have a twofold reason for leaving their countries. Besides the devastated economic situation at home the migrants escape from forced military service in Eritrea, and from the jihadist militant group Al Shabab in Somalia. Once having come to the decision that they want to leave, they will either organize a trip to Europe or some Arabic countries in the Middle East via Egypt, Turkey, Yemen or Jordan (especially since Israel built a physical border fence at her southern border), or “simply” end up in Al Khartoum, Sudan, which is a big hub of Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian migrants, among others.

Once in Khartoum the majority of them try to establish a new life there but after 2-3 years they get disillusioned and more inclined to move onwards. Sudanese, Somali or Eritrean facilitators are there to offer them support to reach Benghazi or Tripoli in Libya, mainly via the oasis of al Kufrah or via the desert of Chad.

At this point of the trip only few of the would-be migrants have the travelling to Europe on their minds: Libya still has the attractive image of a country that is abundant in labour opportunities. Unfortunately, as soon as they enter the country, most of the migrants start to suffer from violence along their journey. Unleashed paramilitary groups of different tribes stop them and they either pay or are put to prison, where they spend a time ranging from some days up to some months. Then they travel further, first reaching Benghazi via Ajdabiya. In 2013, one boat with Eritrean migrants was detected from Benghazi to Italy in June, July and in August as well, totaling over 500 Eritrean migrants.

The ones who travel to Tripoli want to find a job there after arriving; but even if they can, they soon realize that the everyday humiliation and violence performed by the locals on migrants from the Horn of African and sub-Saharan make their lives intolerable and dangerous. They cannot go back, and therefore they start to put money aside for a trip to Europe.

People from the Horn of Africa are recruited by Eritrean, Somali or Ethiopian facilitators. Once the trip is prepared, they leave everything behind and arrive in Italy only with the clothes they are wearing. They ask for an asylum and spend several months in an Italian CARA (asylum) center, awaiting the decision. If they can, they try to find a job or travel further in Europe.

#### *West African migrants*

The migrants of West African countries come from poverty-stricken regions that might be also burdened with tribal feud or constant clashes between religious groups. However, the ECOWAS<sup>1</sup> region is their primary comfort zone from the point of view of history, ethnicity, culture and language. The April 2012 issue of the OECD Development Centre study<sup>2</sup> reports that “75% of West African migrants live within the region and 73% of countries (11 of 15) have another ECOWAS member country as its first destination. Moreover, nearly all member countries (14 out of 15 or 93%) have another member country as the first source of immigrants.” It is clear that only a fraction of those living within the ECOWAS plan to leave it.

But even if they do, according to the migrants’ statements they do not intend to leave Africa. They prefer travelling to North African countries such as Libya or Algeria, which have a more prosperous economy than that of the ECOWAS countries. And that is their secondary comfort zone, considering that most of the West African migrants can speak Arabic (even if they are illiterate) and are Muslims, just like the people in the North African countries.

The ones who decide to go to Libya normally use the traditional Central African Route: they can travel as far as the Nigerien-Libyan border using their passports only, and no support is needed. Therefore, the services of

<sup>1</sup> ECOWAS or the Economic Community of West African States comprises 15 African countries with a mission to promote economic integration across the region, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

<sup>2</sup> See: <http://www.oecd.org/dev/50251899.pdf> - page 23

facilitation networks are typically first hired in Niamey or Agadez, Niger. Alongside their Libyan counterparts, Nigerien facilitators design and assist the migrants' trip as far as Tripoli. Then the local networks take over. Once in Tripoli, their situation, possibilities and future are similar to those of the Horn of Africa migrants.

### Syrian migrants

Unlike migration from the Horn of Africa and the West African region, the arrival of Syrian migrants in Sicily and Lampedusa was a novelty in mid 2013. The motives for Syrian migrants to leave their country go without saying; however, using Libya as a transit country before entering Italy was significant only in the second half of 2013. The countries of last departure used by Syrians were:

| Gender | Percentage |
|--------|------------|
| Men    | 85%        |
| Women  | 75%        |

[illegible][illegible]

[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
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### 3. The Set-up of the Sea Trips to Italy

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## Outlook

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## Analysis for the extension period (October)

### 1. General Situation in 2014

From 1 January until 15 August 2014, the number of migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean Sea towards Italy



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#### 1.1. Migration from Tunisia



**Commented [BW8]:** The marked parts contain detailed information on the analytical findings, risk assessment and recommendations and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

#### 1.2. Migration from Libya<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Due to the heavy workload of Italian authorities processing the migrants, several incidents are still pending validation, therefore the indicated figures are subject to change.

<sup>4</sup> Where known. At the time of writing this assessment the nationality of about 14% of migrants apprehended is still unknown.

[REDACTED]

### 1.3. Migration from Egypt

[REDACTED]

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## 2. Trends and Forecast

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**3.**

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## ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS

| Objectives  | Indicators   |
|---|--|
| Enhance border security                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective border control at external borders maintaining preventive effects including detection and prevention of cross border crime</li> <li>• Support to the national authorities in disclosing cases of smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other cross border crime</li> </ul>   |
| Enhance efficiency of border security             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detection of all suspicious vessels enabling to intercept persons, to prevent unauthorized border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as to report the other illegal activities detected to competent authorities</li> <li>• Carrying out border checks of all persons crossing the external maritime borders including means of transport and objects in their possession</li> </ul> |
| Enhance operational cooperation                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High level of MS participation in operational activities</li> <li>• Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations</li> <li>• Enhanced cooperation between national authorities of host MS as well as on international level</li> <li>• Seeking involvement of Third countries in operational activities</li> <li>• Multi-character operational concept to be applied</li> </ul>  |
| Enhance exchange of information                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collection of operational information from all actors involved and persons debriefed in order to obtain intelligence, thus improving the risk assessments that underpin the operational activities</li> <li>• Distribution of operational information to all involved actors through authorized channels</li> </ul>   |
| Enhance efficiency of the exchange of information | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of fully automated online reporting system</li> <li>• Seeking standardized format and quality of the reports and interviews</li> <li>• Use of the "Guidelines for JORA Incident Template" giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes</li> </ul>  |
| Identify possible risks and threats               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Debriefing activities to support migration management and obtaining intelligence</li> <li>• Monitoring political, economic and social situation in the countries of origin and transit</li> </ul>   |
| Establish and exchange best practices             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fostering practical cooperation between the authorities involved in prevention and tackling irregular migration as well as cross-border crime</li> <li>• Delivering workshops, meetings, operational briefings, other networking events to participants</li> </ul>  |
| Support establishment of permanent structures     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving and fostering cooperation/information exchange between MS NCC/ICC/R/LCC/FP</li> </ul>   |
| Support provision of trainings                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of targeted specific training activities</li> </ul>  |

## **ANNEX 3 - DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO GUEST OFFICERS AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT)**

### **1. General**

#### **Executive powers**

The national border guards of Italy have the leading role in the implementation the joint operation.

Guest officers<sup>5</sup> have the capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code and the following EU and international law:

- The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
- The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
- The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
- The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
- The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
- The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
- The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
- Other relevant instruments.

Guest officers may only perform tasks and exercise powers under instructions from and, as a general rule, in presence of the Italian officers.

#### **Uniform and armbands**

Guest officers shall wear their national uniform and a blue armband with the insignia of the European Union and Frontex on their uniforms while performing their tasks and exercising their powers.

For the reasons explained in the relevant chapter of the Handbook to OPlan on Joint Maritime Operations, the request to wear uniform and armbands is not applicable to Screening and Debriefing experts.

#### **Accreditation document**

Guest officers shall carry visibly at all times an accreditation document for the purposes of identification vis-à-vis the Italian national authorities and its citizens. This document shall be presented on request.

Other participants shall carry an accreditation or participation card, in accordance with their status.

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<sup>5</sup> For the purpose of this document, the expression "guest officer(GO)", includes seconded guest officers(SGO)

### **Use of Force**

When using force, GOs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is absolutely necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of a duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. The use of force or coercive measures shall never be arbitrary or abusive.

All use of force shall be in strict accordance with the applicable laws and practices of the EU MS/SAC conducting the boarding and with applicable international law.

Each MS shall avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of their vessels (units), and where participants are obstructed in the execution of their duties.

Boarding and search teams of MS vessels (units) have the inherent right to use all available means to apply that force reasonably necessary to defend themselves or others from physical harm.

Any use of force shall be immediately and promptly reported with all necessary details to ICC/NCC and Frontex.

### **National rules on the use of Force**

Conduct the search onboard a vessel suspected of being involved in a trafficking of migrants in a secure way either regarding the boarding team either for the crew and, eventually, the migrants. Pay attention to every urgent request by the migrants (water, medical assistance, etc), to assure the incolumity of the migrants and, also of the boarding team. If is necessary the use of force, to repel a violence or defeat a physical opposition, the intensity, the duration and the extent of the reaction shall be proportional to the intensity, to the proximity and to the reality of the threat;

### **Use of weapons**

The use of weapons, as it may affect the life or health of persons, is the last resource of the actions of GOs and should only be envisaged as a last resort. It must be strictly proportionate and may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the GOs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries and minimizes the damages

Any use of force shall be immediately and promptly reported with all necessary details to ICC/NCC and Frontex.

### **Conditions to use weapons (warnings, targets, etc)**

In international water, the use of weapons is under the responsibility of the flag state law. In the territorial water, any use of weapons, by the MS assets is prohibited because is relevant the Italian legislation. Any urgency shall be immediately communicated to the ICC for the proper actions.

The above mentioned guidelines of use of force do not limit a use of force in self-defense.

### **Immediate measures to be taken following the use of force and/or weapons**

After the use of force or weapons, the GO will immediately contact, if not present at the moment, the Italian police officer referent, in order to manage all the related procedures foreseen by the National law.

Any use of force shall be immediately and promptly reported with all necessary details to ICC/NCC and Frontex.

## 2. Border surveillance

In accordance with the operational concept, the joint operation consists of border surveillance at the sea borders of Italy.

The EU patrol vessels (participating units), as well as the Helicopters and Fixed Wing Airplanes, performing border surveillance at the operational area should monitor intensively specific maritime areas on the basis of information provided by the Italian authorities. The scope of these patrols is to prevent unauthorised border crossings and to tackle cross border crime, in particular smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons.

While implementing the operational concept the participants, and in particular the GOs must:

- ✓ bear in mind that the prevention of loss of lives has overall priority in all operational actions;
- ✓ promote and respect the fundamental rights consigned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or other relevant international law, including the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees;
- ✓ take due account of the safety and security of the vessel, its crew and its cargo;
- ✓ not prejudice the national, commercial or legal interests of the Flag State;
- ✓ ensure within available means, that any measure taken with regard to a particular vessel is environmentally sound under the circumstances;
- ✓ ensure that the master of the intercepted vessel is, or has been, afforded at any time the opportunity to contact the vessel's Flag State, and, subject to preserving the safety and security of operations, is, or has been, afforded the opportunity to contact the vessel's owner or manager.

The following operational concept for the assets has to be applied:

- ✓ - Fixed wings airplane and helicopter: Surveillance / detection / tracking / identification
- ✓ - OPV or CPV: Detections / tracking / identification / interceptions
- ✓ - CPB: Tracking / interceptions

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During border surveillance activities, the following specific instructions must be observed:

|Detection|

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[REDACTED]

## Interception

### Interception in the territorial sea

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[REDACTED]

Interception in the contiguous zone

[REDACTED]

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Interception on the High Seas

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#### Search and rescue situations

*Member States* participating in the JO shall *observe their obligation* to render assistance to any *vessel* or person in distress at sea *and, during the operation, they shall ensure that their participating units comply with that obligation, in accordance with international law and in respect of fundamental rights*. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.

**Commented [FG18]:** Comment: The marked parts contain detailed information on law enforcement operational tactics and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

#### **Boarding**

Aiming at the enforcement of international law, in particular relating to immigration, the participating unit may board the suspicious vessel.

#### **Pre-boarding activity**

Before boarding a particular vessel, the participating unit must take in consideration at least the following elements:

(a) Right of approach. The CO of the EU vessel must be aware that under international law, a war vessel, military aircraft, or other duly authorized vessel may approach in international waters any vessel, other than a war vessel or government vessel on non-commercial service, to verify its nationality.

(b) Authority and jurisdiction: The CO of the EU vessel must ascertain whether their authority and jurisdiction exist prior to conducting a boarding and/or taking follow-up law enforcement action. Additionally, they are required to comply with internal practice guidance that may limit the exercise of authority and jurisdiction without first obtaining a statement of no objection from ICC.

(c) Risk/benefit assessment and safeguards. Given the limited number of enforcement resources, the maritime units cannot board all vessels encountered, and therefore, operational cost/benefit decisions should be made by the CO.

While all possible contingencies cannot be addressed, the following factors figure prominently in deciding whether to initiate a boarding:

- Safety of personnel and property.
- Probability of detecting unlawful conduct.
- Impact on maritime commerce and boating public.

### Boarding procedures

Detailed guidance and explicit boarding procedures and tactics have to be developed by each participating MS to ensure that boardings are conducted safely and effectively.

### Boarding teams

COs are responsible for ensuring their law enforcement personnel are properly trained and equipped to carry out their duties. At the discretion of the CO, non-qualified Coast Guard personnel (e.g., break-in boarding personnel, cadets, and engineering personnel) may support the boarding team in the progress of their action.

- ✓ Boarding officer: The boarding officer, under the CO's supervision, is in charge of the boarding team and is responsible for the proper conduct of the boarding.
- ✓ Qualified boarding team members: Law enforcement team members may consist of qualified personnel from different MS.
- ✓ Other law enforcement agencies: When multinational boarding team is used, they agree in advance to follow the boarding officer's direction and comply with customary policy governing the use of force. Special circumstances may dictate deviation from this policy with the agreement of the ICC.
- ✓ Boarding team qualifications: Boarding officers are required to meet the national criteria related to the boarding.
- ✓ Boarding team size: Boarding teams are comprised of at least two qualified personnel, at least one of which is a qualified boarding officer. Boarding team size beyond this minimum requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Factors to be taken into consideration when making these determinations include:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Commented [FG19]:** Comment: The marked parts contain detailed information on law enforcement operational tactics and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

### Detention and release of persons and property

Vessels, the persons aboard, and property associated with either may be detained at sea, by the participating unit, for the time reasonably necessary to:

- (a) ensure the safety of persons and property;
- (b) complete an assessment of a possible violation of law (including interviewing persons on board). Information about the aim of the ongoing procedure must be provided;
- (c) effect other law enforcement action (e.g., seizing the boat, detain a facilitator); and
- (d) carry out the enforcement of a judicial decision where the vessel, person or property is subject to such order (e.g., vessel subject to forfeiture or person subject to arrest).

No person shall, *in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement*, be *forced to enter, conducted to* or otherwise handed over to the authorities of a country where, *inter alia*, there is a serious risk that *he or she* would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, *persecution* or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, *or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion* or from which there is a serious risk of *an* expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

### PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

The participating units shall, without prejudice to the primacy of the safety of the persons intercepted or rescued, the safety of the participating units *or that of third parties, use all means to* identify the intercepted or rescued persons, assess their personal circumstances, *inform them of their destination in a way that those persons understand or may reasonably be presumed to understand* and give them an opportunity to express any reasons for believing that disembarkation in the proposed place would be in violation of the principle of *non-refoulement*.

*For those purposes, Italy ensures the availability of shore-based medical staff, interpreters, legal advisers and other relevant experts that shall provide support for the* screening and personal assessment of the persons apprehended or rescued at the designated points of disembarkation in Italy.

Each participating unit appoints an Officer responsible for the final decision on the personal assessment referred to above that shall collect all information mentioned above and forward it regularly to the ICC and to Frontex.

### Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

All the activities shall be implemented with regards to the National law and the eventual necessity to ask the authorization, through the Italian police officers involved in the operational activities, to the Judicial Authority.

## Disembarkation

No person shall, *in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement*, be disembarked in a country where, *inter alia*, there is a serious risk that *he or she* would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, *persecution* or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, *or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion*; or from which there is a serious risk of *an* expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of *non-refoulement*.

### Disembarkation of people apprehended subsequently to interception

The participating units are authorized by Italy to disembark in its territory the persons intercepted and apprehended in its territorial sea as well as in the operational area beyond its territorial sea.

### Disembarkation of people rescued

The main applicable principle to be observed is that the responsibility to provide a place of safety, or to ensure that a place of safety is provided, falls on the State responsible for the SAR region in which the survivors were recovered, as set forth in relevant applicable international legal instruments.

It shall be ensured that coordination and cooperation with the relevant SAR authorities is carried out in such a way that the persons rescued can be delivered to a place of safety.

Italy and the participating Member States shall *cooperate with the responsible RCC and the MOI - Central Directorate for Immigration and Border Police - National Coordination Centre*, to identify a place of safety and, when it will be designates such a place of safety, they shall ensure that disembarkation of the rescued persons is carried out rapidly and effectively.

*If it is not possible to arrange* for the participating unit *to be* released of its obligation to render assistance as soon as reasonably practicable, taking into account the safety of the rescued persons and that of the participating unit itself, it shall be authorised to disembark the rescued persons in Italy.

The participating units shall inform the ICC of the presence of any persons in need of international protection and vulnerable persons, and the ICC shall transmit that information to the competent national authorities of *the country where disembarkation takes place*.

*The aforementioned paragraphs on PERSONAL ASSESSMENT apply to the disembarkation of rescued persons.*

## Follow-up measures

### Provision of basic human needs

*Each participating unit shall include at least one person with basic first aid training. Furthermore, upon disembarkation, Italy shall, prior to any other action, render the basic human needs of the apprehended and rescued persons such as food, shelter and medical assistance.*

#### Special measures applicable to persons in need of international protection

*Italy and the participating MSs* shall address the special needs of persons in need of international protection.

GOs shall refer to the national Italian officer with whom they work when a person expressed, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks or claims for asylum or any other form of international protection.

The national Italian officer shall hand over those persons referred by the GOs to the competent Italian authority - **local Prefectures (via local Immigration Offices) and Department for Civil Freedom and Immigration** for an examination of their status.

#### Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

*Italy and the participating MSs* shall address the special needs of children, **including unaccompanied minors**, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons in need of urgent medical assistance, **disabled persons**, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation.

GOs shall refer without delay to the national Italian officer with whom they work other vulnerable persons as described above. The national Italian officer shall hand them over to the competent national authority.


The responsible authorities of Italy for ensuring the Follow up measures are:

- local Prefectures (via local Immigration Offices)
- Department for Civil Freedom and Immigration



## ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL AREA

### 1. Operational area



**Commented [FG20]:** Comment: The marked parts contain detailed information on operational area and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. The map should be blackened. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

[illegible]

[illegible]

## ANNEX 5 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

| MS      | Authority          | Human and technical resources | Deployment dates | OMNTE / Additional TE GO/SGO |
|---------|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|
| Austria | Federal Police     | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 30/06 - 01/08    | GO                           |
| Belgium | Police             | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 02/06 - 04/07    | GO                           |
| Denmark | Police             | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 01/09 - 30/09    | GO                           |
| France  | National Police    | 1 Frontex Support Officer     | 05/05 - 01/08    | SGO                          |
| France  | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 02/06 - 04/07    | GO                           |
| France  | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 30/06 - 01/08    | GO                           |
| France  | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 01/09 - 30/09    | GO                           |
| Greece  | Coast Guard        | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 05/05 - 01/08    | SGO                          |
| Greece  | Coast Guard        | 1 Frontex Support Officer     | 28/07 - 01/10    | SGO                          |
| Greece  | Coast Guard        | 1 Debriefing Expert           | 28/07 - 01/10    | SGO                          |
| Iceland | Coast Guard        | 1 Fixed Wing Aircraft         | 01/07 - 31/08    | OMNTE                        |
| Iceland | Coast Guard        | 1 National Official           | 01/07 - 31/08    |                              |
| Italy   | Guardia di Finanza | 1 Helicopter                  | 01/05 - 31/10    | OMNTE                        |
| Italy   | Guardia di Finanza | 1 CPV                         | 01/05 - 31/10    | OMNTE                        |
| Italy   | Guardia Costiera   | 1 CPV                         | 01/05 - 31/10    | OMNTE                        |
| Italy   | Guardia di Finanza | 1 CPV                         | 01/05 - 31/10    | OMNTE                        |
| Italy   | Guardia Costiera   | 1 CPV                         | 01/05 - 31/10    | OMNTE                        |
| Italy   | Guardia di Finanza | 1 ICC Staff                   | 01/05 - 31/10    |                              |
| Italy   | Guardia di Finanza | 1 LCC Staff                   | 01/05 - 31/10    |                              |
| Italy   | Guardia di Finanza | 1 LCC Staff                   | 01/10 - 31/10    |                              |
| Italy   | Polizia di Stato   | 1 Intelligence Officer        | 01/05 - 31/10    |                              |
| Italy   | Polizia di Stato   | 3 Team Leaders                | 01/05 - 31/10    |                              |
| Italy   | Polizia di Stato   | 1 Team Leader                 | 01/10 - 31/10    |                              |
| Italy   | Polizia di Stato   | 3 Cultural Mediators          | 01/05 - 31/10    |                              |

|                |                    |  |               |       |
|----------------|--------------------|--|---------------|-------|
| Italy          | Polizia di Stato   | 1 Cultural Mediator                        | 01/10 - 31/10 |       |
| Italy          | Guardia Costiera   | 1 Liaison Officer                          | 01/05 - 31/10 |       |
| Italy          | Guardia di Finanza | 1 Liaison Officer<br>(Technical Equipment) | 01/06 - 31/10 |       |
| Lithuania      | Border Guards      | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 28/07 - 05/09 | GO    |
| Netherlands    | Royal Marechaussee | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 05/05 - 06/06 | GO    |
| Netherlands    | Coast Guard        | 1 Fixed Wing Aircraft                      | 01/09 - 30/09 | OMNTE |
| Netherlands    | Coast Guard        | 1 National Official                        | 01/09 - 30/09 |       |
| Norway         | Police             | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 28/07 - 05/09 | GO    |
| Norway         | Police             | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 28/07 - 05/09 | GO    |
| Poland         | Border Guards      | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 30/06 - 01/08 | GO    |
| Portugal       | Air Force          | 1 Fixed Wing Aircraft                      | 01/06 - 30/06 | OMNTE |
| Portugal       | Air Force          | 1 National Official                        | 01/06 - 30/06 |       |
| Portugal       | SEF                | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 05/05 - 06/06 | GO    |
| Portugal       | SEF                | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 02/06 - 04/07 | GO    |
| Romania        | Border Guards      | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 30/06 - 01/08 | GO    |
| Slovenia       | Police             | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 01/09 - 30/09 | GO    |
| Spain          | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 05/05 - 06/06 | GO    |
| Spain          | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 05/05 - 06/06 | GO    |
| Spain          | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 05/05 - 01/08 | SGO   |
| Spain          | National Police    | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 28/07 - 01/10 | SGO   |
| Switzerland    | Police             | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 02/06 - 04/07 | GO    |
| United Kingdom | UKBA               | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 28/07 - 05/09 | GO    |
| United Kingdom | UKBA               | 1 Debriefing Expert                        | 01/09 - 30/09 | GO    |
| MS             | MS Authorities     | 5 Debriefing Experts                       | 29/09 - 07/11 | GO    |
| MS             | MS Authorities     | 3 Debriefing Experts                       | 29/09 - 31/10 | SGO   |
| MS             | MS Authorities     | 1 Frontex Support<br>Officer               | 29/09 - 31/10 | SGO   |

|    |              |       |               |  |
|----|--------------|-------|---------------|--|
| MS | MS Authority | 1 FWA | 01/10 - 31/10 |  |
| MS | MS Authority | 1 CPV | 01/10 - 31/10 |  |

REMARK:  
Any changes related to deployments of the resources in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated Deployment Overview will be available upon request during implementation phase. The final list of deployed resources will be available in Frontex Evaluation Report (FER).

## **ANNEX 6 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING**

### **1. Operational briefing**

During the first days of deployment all participants taking part in the joint operation will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS.

#### **1.1. General briefing delivered by Frontex**

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex.

##### **1.1.1. FSO, Debriefing Experts, Cultural Mediators, National Officials, Officers of host MS and Observers from Third Countries**

- All participants listed above will be briefed by the Operational Team together with the representatives from the Ministry of Interior in the beginning of their deployment in a centralized way in the Ministry of Interior's premises;
- Supplementary briefing will be delivered to the JDT by OA and/or Special advisor for debriefing activities;
- Briefing on JORA will be delivered by Operational Team with the support of FSC;

##### **1.1.2. Crew members**

- Crew members will be briefed by Operational Team and/or FSO during the first day of deployment in the operational areas. In case the briefing cannot be delivered on the spot, the NOs in the ICC will be briefed and are responsible for transferring the received information to the crew members.

#### **1.2. National briefing delivered by host MS**

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS based on the deployment overviews provided by Joint Operations Unit (JOU).

The National briefers are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by TRU.

The National briefers nominated by Ministry of Interior will deliver the National briefing to the FSO, experts, NOs, cultural mediators, officers of host MS and observers from Third Countries during the first day of deployment in a centralized way in the premises of the Ministry of Interior. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing in the Ministry of Interior, the national briefing can be delivered on the spot.

The National briefers nominated by Guardia di Finanza will deliver the National briefing to the crew members in the operational areas during the first day of deployment.

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the Operational Team;
- Report to the project manager (TRU) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;

- Prepare Report of National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (TRU);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

If the Italian authorities have not nominated National briefers in the location where assets and resources will be deployed, LCC Coordinators are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO.

## **2. Operational debriefing**

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by Operational Team members or FSO in close cooperation with local authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- If the Operational debriefing cannot be organized for each deployed asset, it can be limited to NO within the ICC;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be a part of the Operational debriefing.

*Standard plan for operational briefing and debriefing is available in Handbook.*

## **ANNEX 7 - COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES**

### **1. Third Country Observers**

The Observers from Third Countries participate in the operation pursuant to Article 14(6) of Frontex Regulation and, when signed, the existing working arrangements between Frontex and the competent authorities of the participating Third Country. They have no executive powers to carry out border control tasks, and are not authorized to take any measures against any person. They may only advice and exchange/obtain practical experience.

In particular, the Observers from Third Countries can:

- Intermediate between the national authorities of the host MS and their national authorities on border related incidents and information sharing;
- Support the officers of national authorities of host MS during the examination of travel documents;
- Assist with special language and/or professional skills;
- Participate in combined patrols at the maritime borders with the local officers;
- Exchange intelligence information regarding the modus operandi, routes and criminal networks operating in the area of concern detected during and in the framework of the operation, in accordance with their respective legislation;
- Participate in JCB meetings, when appropriate and after consultation with the FOC.

Further tasks and duties can be executed according to the national legislation of the home/host country.



## **ANNEX 8 - COOPERATION WITH OTHER UNION AGENCIES AND BODIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

### **1. Cooperation with Europol**

Frontex and Europol cooperate during the JO EPN Hermes 2014 through exchange of information and intelligence. In particular, Frontex shall instruct debriefing experts that any personal data gathered during debriefing on facilitators or persons suspected of being involved in the facilitation of irregular immigration, terrorism or other crimes shall be passed to the hosting authorities.

It is recommended that the host authorities provide Europol, with the personal data referred to above, via the host MS's Europol National Unit, and finally that Europol keeps the host MS informed.

The Europol National Unit of Italy point of contact for JO EPN Hermes 2014 is Mr. Maurizio de Pascalis. (Contact details in Annex 11)

### **2. Cooperation with EFCA**

The cooperation between Frontex and EFCA is carried out through the Italian Coast Guard Liaison officer deployed in the ICC, contact point with the Italian Fisheries Control Centre and assigned contact point of the host MS authorities.

Typically cooperation should focus on the exchange of information, namely sightings, as regards fisheries control within JO EPN Hermes 2014's operational area. EFCA's dedicated contact point will receive, via the competent national authority, (Italian Fisheries Control Centre) the whole collated or collected information (pictures and/or videos) related to possible illegal fishing cases that might be detected by participating assets during patrolling activities. EFCA's template with the minimum requirements for sighting information to be collected will be used by participants in case of detection of a fishing boat. EFCA's contact point will provide the ICC with the list of vessels of interest from the fisheries' perspective. They will also give information on position of detected boats, which could be of possible interest for Frontex, during EFCA's campaign. In addition EFCA will deliver, to the crew members from participating MS airborne and seaborne assets, a tailored briefing package on fisheries control.

Ad-hoc cooperation on a case by case basis can take place.

### **3. Cooperation with EASO**

Frontex and EASO have established their cooperation in the area of asylum and migration management, exchanging information and best practices on the functioning of their experts' database, sharing their respective training activities and their reports. The Agencies plan to strengthen their cooperation in operational areas, including training on nationality establishment and best practices and methods to better identify persons in need of international protection.

With regard to this JO, Frontex and EASO will strengthen the coordination of their activities in the operational area in close cooperation with the host MS authorities in order to ensure prompt referral and effective access to asylum procedures in accordance with the Common European Asylum Acquis.

### **4. Cooperation with EMSA**

Cooperation with EMSA will be carried on based on information exchange channels and structures established by Host MS.


## 5. Cooperation with FRA

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) can support Frontex in the mainstreaming of fundamental rights in all Frontex activities. Upon request, FRA can provide guidance on how to operationalise fundamental rights in Frontex operations. Frontex and FRA also cooperate in the planning and implementation of research at the external EU borders. FRA chairs the Frontex Consultative Forum and works in close cooperation with the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer. Staff deployed by Frontex are encouraged to use materials published by FRA available at [www.fra.europa.eu](http://www.fra.europa.eu), in particular the [Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration](#) as well as the [Handbook on European data protection law](#).

## 6. Cooperation with UNHCR

During the joint operation UNHCR will cooperate with Frontex in aspects related to international protection and the implementation of the principle of non-refoulement, starting with the operational briefing where UNHCR, together with Frontex, will brief the guest officers on access to international protection (a theoretical and practical approach) and fundamental rights. The aim is to give the guest officers an increased knowledge and further skills in how to tackle fundamental rights in sea border operations.

## ANNEX 9 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME



**Commented [FG21]:** Text contains sensitive information about organisation, communication and operational activities, in particular regarding the tactics and modus operandi of law enforcement forces. Disclosure of such information would harm the performance of future operational tasks taking place at the related area and would facilitate performance of illegal activities such as human trafficking and drug smuggling, therefore it would harm the public interest as regards public security. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

## ANNEX 10 - JORA

### 1. JORA Actors


**Commented [MP22]:** Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

| Role                                    | Name       | FX/MS      | Entity     | E-mail     | Phone      |
|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| JORA Administrator / Service Management | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Frontex Access Manager                  | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Delegated Frontex Access Manager        | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Template Creator                        | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| National Access Manager 1               | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| National Access Manager 2               | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| National Access Manager 3               | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

## 2. JORA Incident Reporting Sctructure

**Commented [FG23]:** The marked parts contain detailed information on operational area and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. The map should be blackened. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security



### 3. JORA Incident Template Attributes' List


| General information |                                |                        |                                 |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| No                  | NAME OF ATTRIBUTE              | MANDATORY <sup>a</sup> | 6. REMARKS                      |
| 1                   | Incident Number                |                        | General Information             |
| 2                   | Reporting Unit                 |                        | General Information             |
| 3                   | Operational Area               | x                      | General Information             |
| 4                   | Incident Type                  | x                      | General Information             |
| 5                   | Date of Reporting              |                        | General Information             |
| 6                   | Detection Date                 | x                      | General Information             |
| 7                   | Detected By                    |                        | General Information             |
| 8                   | Latitude Detection             | x                      | General Information             |
| 9                   | Longitude Detection            | x                      | General Information             |
| 10                  | Interception Date              | x                      | General Information             |
| 11                  | Intercepted By                 |                        | General Information             |
| 12                  | Interception Place             |                        | General Information             |
| 13                  | Place of Interception Comments |                        | General Information             |
| 14                  | Latitude Interception          | x                      | General Information             |
| 15                  | Longitud Interception          | x                      | General Information             |
| 16                  | Reference to Operational Area  | x                      | General Information             |
| 17                  | Eurosur Border Section         | x                      | General Information             |
| 18                  | Impact Level                   | x                      | General Information             |
| Persons Information |                                |                        |                                 |
| 19                  | Country of Deprture            | x                      | General Information             |
| 20                  | Place of Departure             |                        | General Information             |
| 21                  | Date of Departure              |                        | General Information             |
| 22                  | Date of Arrival                |                        | General Information             |
| 23                  | Country of Destination         |                        | General Information             |
| 24                  | Disembarkation                 |                        | General Information             |
| 25                  | Migrants Deterred              |                        | General Information             |
| 26                  | Victims of Trafficking         |                        | General Information             |
| 27                  | Death Cases                    |                        | General Information             |
| 28                  | Number of People               |                        | Personal Information/Add person |
| 29                  | Age                            |                        | Personal Information/Add person |
| 30                  | Is Adult                       |                        | Personal Information/Add person |
| 31                  | Nationality Claimed            |                        | Personal Information/Add person |

|    |                         |   |  |
|----|-------------------------|---|--|
| 32 | Nationality Presumed    |   | Personal Information/Add person            |
| 33 | Gender                  |   | Personal Information/Add person            |
| 34 | Accompanied/by relative |   | Personal Information/Add person            |
| 35 | Role of person          |   | Personal Information/Add person            |
| 36 | Reason of Refusal       |   | Personal Information/Add person            |
| 37 | Type of Document        |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 38 | Document Status         |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 39 | Forgery Type            |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 40 | Expiring On             |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 41 | Issuing Country         |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 42 | Issuing Date            |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 43 | Where Issued            |   | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |
| 44 | Comments                | x | Document Alerts Information/Add Doc. Alert |

#### Additional Information

|    |                             |  |   |
|----|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 45 | Number of Transport Means   |  | Additional Information                        |
| 46 | Transport Type              |  | Additional Information                        |
| 47 | Search and Rescued Involved |  | Additional Information                        |
| 48 | Boat destroyed By           |  | Additional Information                        |
| 49 | Comments                    |  | Additional Information                        |
| 50 | Modus Operandi              |  | Additional Information                        |
| 51 | Smuggling Of                |  | Additional Information                        |
| 52 | Smuggling of Number         |  | Additional Information                        |
| 53 | Heading                     |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |
| 54 | Vessel Type                 |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |
| 55 | Flags or Signs              |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |
| 56 | Number of Engines           |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |
| 57 | Vessel Length               |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |
| 58 | Are Engines Operational     |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |
| 59 | Functioning GPS Onboard     |  | Additional Vessel Information/Add Vessel Data |

#### 4. JORA Timeline for reporting



**Commented [FG24]:** Text contains sensitive information about organisation, communication and operational activities, in particular regarding the tactics and modus operandi of law enforcement forces.  
Disclosure of such information would harm the performance of future operational tasks taking place at the related area and would facilitate performance of illegal activities such as human trafficking and drug smuggling, therefore it would harm the public interest as regards public security.  
In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.



## ANNEX 11 - CONTACT DETAILS

**Commented [FG25]:** Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

### 1. General

| Authority                          | Address   | Email address  |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Frontex (HQ)                       | Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland  | <a href="mailto:frontex@frontex.europa.eu">frontex@frontex.europa.eu</a> |
| Ministry of Interior (Mol)         | Ministero dell'Interno, Dipartimento della P.S. Direzione Centrale dell'Immigrazione e della Polizia delle Frontiere, Servizio Immigrazione - 2 <sup>a</sup> Divisione<br>Via Tuscolana n. 1558<br>00173 Roma | [REDACTED]   |
| National Coordination Centre (NCC) | Ministero dell'Interno, Dipartimento della P.S. Direzione Centrale dell'Immigrazione e della Polizia delle Frontiere, Servizio Immigrazione   | [REDACTED]   |

### 2. Frontex

**Commented [FG26]:** Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

| Role                               | Name            | Phone number                        | Email address  |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) | [REDACTED]      | [REDACTED]                          | [REDACTED]   |
| Operational Manager                | [REDACTED]      | [REDACTED]                          | [REDACTED]   |
| Operational Team                   | [REDACTED]      | [REDACTED]                          | [REDACTED]   |
| Operational Team                   | [REDACTED]      | [REDACTED]                          | [REDACTED]   |
| Operational Team                   | [REDACTED]      | [REDACTED]                          | [REDACTED]   |
| Operational Analyst                | [REDACTED]      | [REDACTED]                          | [REDACTED]   |
| Spokesperson                       | Izabella Cooper | +48 22 205 95 35<br>+48 667 667 292 | <a href="mailto:press@frontex.europa.eu">press@frontex.europa.eu</a> |
| Press Officer                      | Ewa Moncure     | +48 22 205 9635<br>+48 785 001 374  | <a href="mailto:press@frontex.europa.eu">press@frontex.europa.eu</a> |

### 3. Host MS - Italy

#### 3.1. Ministry of Interior

| Role                                 | Name       | Phone number | Email address | Location   |
|--------------------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|------------|
| Head of 2 <sup>nd</sup> Division/Mol | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> Division/Mol         | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| Head of 1 <sup>st</sup> Division/Mol | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| Spokeperson                          | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| Press Office                         | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    |            |
|                                      | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    |            |

**Commented [FG27]:** Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

#### 3.2. Guardia di Finanza

| Role       | Name       | Phone number | Email address | Location   |
|------------|------------|--------------|---------------|------------|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |

**Commented [FG28]:** Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

|  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  |  |  |

### 3.3. Guardia Costiera

| Role       | Name       | Phone number | Email address | Location   |
|------------|------------|--------------|---------------|------------|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] |

**Commented [FG29]:** Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

4. Other

| Role | Name | Phone number | Email address | Location |
|------|------|--------------|---------------|----------|
|      |      |              |               |          |
|      |      |              |               |          |

Commented [FG30]: Marked passages contain personal data. Its non-disclosure is thus justified pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

REMARK:

Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

1. Suggested accommodation (see also Yellow Pages available on FOSS)

**Commented [FG31]:** The marked parts contain detailed information on law enforcement operational tactics and its disclosure would harm the course of future operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security

| Location   | Name       | Phone number                           |
|------------|------------|--|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
|            | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
|            | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
|            | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
|            | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
|            | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                             |

|   |                           |                           |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|   |                           | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> |
| 1 | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> |
|   | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> |
|   | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> |
|   | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> | <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> |