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TE-SAT
EU TERRORISM SITUATION 
AND TREND REPORT 
2007



TE-SAT
EU TERRORISM SITUATION 
AND TREND REPORT 
2007

TE-SAT
2007
TE-SAT 2007
EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007
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©  Europol, March 2007


TE-SAT
2007
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3
A large number of various types of terrorist
available by the Member States’ law enforce-
organisations have an active presence in the EU.
ment authorities.
Some of them aim at Member States or Third
State targets situated in Member States, whereas
The London airplane plot and the trolley bomb
some others who conduct their campaigns
case of Germany targeted civilians and trans-
mainly outside the EU, use the EU as their logis-
portation infrastructure in Member States. The
tical base or for fundraising.
radicalisation process of the suspects in these
cases is reported to have been rapid.
Altogether 498 attacks were carried out in the
EU in 2006. The vast majority of them resulted in
The weapon of choice of Islamist terrorists are
limited material damage and were not intended
Improvised Explosive Devices made with home-
to kill. However, the failed attack in Germany
made explosives. The cases reported by the UK
and the foiled London plot demonstrate that
and Denmark involved the use of Triacetone
Islamist terrorists also aim at mass casualties.
Triperoxide (TATP), a highly volatile explosive
the use of which requires a certain degree of
A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism
expertise.
offences were arrested in 15 Member States in
2006. Investigations into Islamist terrorism are
Half of all the terrorism arrests were related to
clearly a priority for Member States’ law enforce-
Islamist terrorism. France, Spain, Italy and the
ment as demonstrated by the number of arrested
Netherlands had the highest number of arrests
suspects reported by Member States.
of Islamist terrorist suspects. The majority of the
arrested suspects were born in Algeria, Morocco
The small number of suspects arrested for dis-
and Tunisia and had loose affiliations to North
semination of propaganda may indicate the lack
African terrorist groups, such as the Moroccan
of legal basis and difficulty in investigating
Islamic Combatant Group and the Salafist Group
these types of crimes.
for Preaching and Combat.
France, Spain and the UK are the countries most
However, the suspects involved in the foiled
severely affected by terrorism as concluded
plots reported by the UK and Denmark were
from the number of terrorist attacks and arrested
born or raised in a Member State. Converts, who
suspects as well as the average penalties handed
had been radicalised in Europe, were involved in
out by the courts.
both cases.
The frequency of video statements by members
Islamist Terrorism
of the original al-Qaeda leadership and other
Along with the failed terrorist attack that took
Islamist terrorists shows a marked increase. The
place in Germany, Denmark and the UK each
propaganda is of greater sophistication, of high
reported one attempted terrorist attack in
quality and more professional. English is used
2006. No further information on prevented or
more often, either in direct speech or in subtitles,
disrupted Islamist terrorist attacks was made
allowing potential access to a wider audience


TE-SAT
2007
than previous publications in Arabic.
These
the EU is related to the escalation of the terrorist
facts may point to a coordinated global media
campaign of Kurdish terrorists in Turkey.
offensive from Islamist terrorists.
Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorism 
Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist
In 2006, left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried
Terrorism
out 55 attacks in the EU. Their campaigns mainly
In 2006, separatist terrorists carried out 424
targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany.
attacks in the EU. The Member States most
affected were France – with 60 percent of the
Left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out a
attacks – and Spain. Attacks were, for the most
relatively high number of low-intensity attacks
4
part, limited to the Basque regions and Corsica.
which resulted in limited material damage
against business and governmental targets. A
Five attacks took place in the UK and one in
minority of the attacks, however, were intended
Ireland. No group claimed responsibility for
to kill or injure.
these attacks.
A variety of left-wing and anarchist terrorist
After the unilateral cease fire declared in March
groups are active mostly in Germany, Greece, Italy
2006, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) mainly used
and Spain. In Greece, the number of terrorist
Taldes Y to carry out a high number of low inten-
attacks rose rapidly towards the end of 2006.
sity attacks to maintain pressure on the Spanish
government and to demonstrate to its supporters
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are
its determination to fight for its goals. However,
motivated by domestic politics but they are also
the attack at the Madrid airport on 30 December
perpetrated as a part of wider international
2006 by ETA resulted in casualties and injuries.
campaigns; for instance, the G8 Summit 2007
ETA has not only maintained but also rebuilt its
that still has to be held has already been the
capabilities to strike with well-prepared, organ-
target of left-wing and anarchist terrorists.
ised and coordinated attacks against high pro-
file targets.
Right-Wing Terrorism
Separatist terrorists in Corsica carried out a
Right-wing violence is mainly investigated as
very high number of low intensity attacks
right-wing extremism and not as right-wing
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
resulting mainly in limited material damage.
terrorism.
Only six percent of the attacks were committed
against governmental targets. Although Cor-
Although violent acts perpetrated by right-wing
sican separatists have not directly tried to kill
extremists and terrorists may appear sporadic
people, the volume of attacks may increase the
and situational, right-wing extremist activities
risk of casualties.
are organised and transnational. For instance,
details regarding possible targets are collected
The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in
and disseminated on the Internet.


TE-SAT
2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5
1.
Foreword by the Director 
7
2.
Introduction 
8
3.
TE-SAT 2007 Methodology  
9
3.1.
Definitions 9
3.2.
TE-SAT 2007 Data  
10
4.
Overview of the Situation in the EU  
13
4.1.
Terrorist Attacks 
13
4.2.
Arrested Suspects 
14
4.3.
Convictions and Penalties 
15
4.4.
General Findings and Trends 
17
5.
Islamist Terrorism 
18
5.1.
Terrorist Attacks 
18
5.2.
Arrested Suspects 
19
5.3.
Terrorist Activities 
21
5.4.
Situation outside the EU 
23
5.5.
Islamist Terrorist Propaganda  
25
5.6.
Key Findings and Trends 
26
6.
Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist Terrorism 
27
6.1.
Terrorist Attacks 
27
6.2.
Arrested Suspects 
29
6.3.
Terrorist Activities 
29
6.4.
Situation outside the EU  
30
6.5.
Key Findings and Trends 
31
7.
Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorism 
32
7.1.
Terrorist Attacks   
32
7.2.
Arrested Suspects 
34
7.3.
Terrorist Activities 
34
7.4.
Key Findings and Trends 
34
8.
Right-Wing Terrorism 
35
9.
Context of Terrorism in the EU 
36

TE-SAT
2007



TE-SAT
2007
1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR
7
The TE-SAT 2007 is the
cooperation and coordination between Member
fifth edition of the EU
States’ competent authorities. In addition to
Terrorism Situation and
this, we need to have a common assessment of
Trend Report. However,
the situation to be able to counter terrorism in a
this edition is the very
joint effort and to find more effective responses.
first ‘Europol TE-SAT’, as it
is the first TE-SAT pro-
The challenge in understanding terrorism as a
duced after the Council
phenomenon is not the lack of information, but
of the European Union
rather the huge amount and varying quality of
delegated to Europol the
information publicly available.
The TE-SAT
power to approve the
2007 provides an overview of the phenome-
final version of the report. After the EU Organi-
non of terrorism in the EU from the law
sed Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), this is the
enforcement perspective. We believe that this
second major public awareness product for
approach provides a solid basis for decision
which Europol assumes full responsibility. This
making, since terrorism inevitably involves the
formal change was accompanied by a methodo-
commission of violent crimes and other crimi-
logical reorientation. In the beginning of 2006,
nal activities. Consequently, the investigation,
Europol proposed to widen the data collection
trial and punishment of the perpetrators and
for the TE-SAT in order to enhance the quality of
their accomplices, irrespective of their motive,
the report and to make it a better awareness
are clearly a matter for the criminal justice sys-
tool for decision makers.
tem. The TE-SAT 2007 establishes the basic
facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the EU.
based on the Member States’ reporting on crimi-
Nevertheless, in the twenty-first century, the
nal investigations into terrorism and the prose-
threat posed by terrorism to Member States is
cution and convictions for terrorist offences.
more serious than ever. The attacks in Madrid in
2004 and in London in 2005 resulted in mass
The methodology of the TE-SAT 2007 was
casualties, and the failed bomb attacks in
developed in consultation with the Finnish and
Germany, together with a considerable number
German Presidencies, Eurojust and SITCEN.
of plots disrupted in 2006, are a strong reminder
Europol is grateful to their support and valuable
that this threat prevails.
contribution. I would also like to thank the Mem-
ber States and Eurojust for the quantity and the
Virtually all terrorist activities are transnational.
quality of the data provided to Europol for the
Therefore, counter-terrorism in the EU is a matter
TE-SAT 2007.
of solidarity. As stated on many different occa-
sions in the past, effective counter-terrorism in
Max-Peter Ratzel
the EU requires increased information exchange,
Director of Europol


TE-SAT
2007
2. INTRODUCTION
8
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
neither attempts to analyse the root causes of
(TE-SAT) was established as a reporting mecha-
terrorism nor to assess the threat posed by ter-
nism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) to
rorism. Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess
the European Parliament in the aftermath of the
the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism
9/11 attacks in 2001. Four editions of the TE-SAT
policies and law enforcement measures taken,
have been presented to date by the
despite the fact that they form an important
Presidencies “based on a file and on the analyses
part of the phenomenon.
supplied by Europol” from Member States’ con-
tributions.1
The TE-SAT 2007 is an EU report and as such
aims at providing an overview of the situation in
In the beginning of 2006, Europol proposed to
the EU instead of describing the situation in sin-
widen the data collection for the TE-SAT in order
gle Member States as was the case in earlier edi-
to enhance the quality of the report. The pro-
tions of the TE-SAT. It seeks to establish basic
posal was endorsed by the Justice and Home
facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks and
Affairs Council on 1 and 2 June 2006. This TE-SAT
activities in the EU.
follows the new methodology developed by
Europol in consultation with the Finnish and
The TE-SAT is, however, also a trend report. Since
German Presidencies, Eurojust and SITCEN.
a trend can be defined as “a general tendency in
the way a situation is changing or developing”,
According to ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the
the TE-SAT is a forward-looking report, which is
TE-SAT is an unclassified annual document
why the first issue of the Europol TE-SAT is called
which provides information on the phenome-
TE-SAT 2007. However, due to changes in the
non of terrorism in the EU. The phenomenon of
methodology, it is difficult to compare the find-
terrorism is discussed in the TE-SAT 2007 from
ings of the TE-SAT 2007 to earlier editions of the
the law enforcement point of view as a ‘crime’
TE-SAT and establish trends.
although, admittedly, terrorism is fundamentally
a political phenomenon driven by political
The TE-SAT is based mainly on information con-
motives and oriented toward political ends.
tributed by the Member States concerning and
resulting from criminal investigations into ter-
As an analytical report, the TE-SAT is a situation
rorism offences. The TE-SAT does not contain
report. It describes the outward manifestations
information which is classified or which could
of terrorism i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It
jeopardise ongoing investigations.
1
ENFOPOL 41 REV 2 (8466/2/01).


TE-SAT
2007
3. TE-SAT 2007 METHODOLOGY 
9
3.1. Definitions
concerned, which are open to interpretation.
For practical reasons, the data collected for
Terrorism
the TE-SAT 2007 relies on Member States’
Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a
definitions of terrorist offences.
tactic or a method for attaining political goals.
This view is also reflected in the Council
The TE-SAT 2007 focuses on terrorism only.
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on
Extremism as a phenomenon may be related to
Combating Terrorism (2002/275/JHA)2.
All
terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural pat-
Member States had to align their national legis-
terns. Although all terrorists are extremists, not
lation with this Framework Decision by 31
all extremists are terrorists. Extremism does not
December 2002. According to the EU Action
necessarily include the use of violence with the
Plan on Combating Terrorism of 13 February
intention of, for instance, seriously destabilise or
2006, most Member States apart from Slovakia,
destroy the fundamental political, constitution-
Austria, Cyprus and the Czech Republic have
al, economic or social structures of a country as
adapted their national legislation. New legisla-
required for a terrorist offence under Member
tive procedures are in preparation for in all four
States’ national laws. Politically motivated vio-
Member States.3
lent acts and other crimes committed, for
instance, by right-wing or animal rights extrem-
Before the adoption of the Framework Decision,
ists are thus not included in the TE-SAT data col-
seven Member States had specific legislation in
lection unless reported as terrorist activities by
the field of counterterrorism, namely France,
Member States.
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain and the
United Kingdom. In the other countries, ordi-
Types of Terrorism
nary criminal law was used to prosecute these
types of crimes.4 The legal situation with regard
Most statistical reports on terrorism make a dis-
to the implementation of the Framework
tinction between international and domestic
Decision in the eight Member States which pro-
terrorism. International or transnational terror-
vided information on convictions to Eurojust is
ism refers to terrorist activities in more than one
described in Annex 3.
country, while domestic terrorism is confined
within the borders of one country, sometimes
Even if Member States approximated their
within a particular locality in the country.5 In
national legislation fully in this respect, Article
addressing domestic terrorism, a country can be
1 of the Framework Decision includes subjec-
self-reliant if it possesses sufficient resources,
tive elements such as the impact of the act
whereas in the case of transnational terrorism,
2
An outline of this Council Decision is included in the Annex 2.
3
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
4
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
5
See Wilkinson, Paul (2000) Terrorism versus Democracy. The Liberal State Response, p. 19.


TE-SAT
2007
countries’ counter-terrorism policies are interde-
Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change
pendent. Since it was not always possible to
the entire political social and economic system
determine whether terrorist attacks or activities
to an extreme right model. The ideological roots
were transnational or domestic from the basis of
of European right-wing terrorism can usually be
the reported cases, it was decided not to use this
traced back to National Socialism.7
typology in this report. It should be noted that
almost all terrorist campaigns are transnational;
3.2. TE-SAT 2007 Data 
terrorists may seek inspiration and resources –
financing, weapons and expertise – where avail-
The data collection for the TE-SAT covered ter-
able, also outside their own geographical area of
rorist attacks and activities in the EU and terror-
influence.
ist attacks outside the EU, in which EU interests
10
were affected. In addition, Eurojust collected
Types of terrorist organisations in the TE-SAT are
data on prosecutions and convictions for terror-
categorised by their source of motivation.This is,
ist offences in Member States.
however, not an easy task as many groups have
a mixture of motivating ideologies, although
The data collection of terrorist attacks impac-
usually one ideology or motivation dominates.
ting on EU interests outside the EU was not
comprehensive. The distinction between at-
The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT is
tacks related to insurgency, terrorism and even
pragmatic and reflects the current situation in
organised crime is becoming increasingly
the EU. The categories are not necessarily mutu-
blurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore
ally exclusive.
and as an example, some EU-based internation-
OGY 
al companies are being targeted more or less
Islamist terrorism is motivated either in whole
regularly in certain regions. Since it was not
or in part by an extreme interpretation of Islam
always possible to verify the motivation of
and the use of violence is regarded by its practi-
these attacks, they were not included in the
tioners as a divine duty or sacramental act.6 
data collected by Europol unless clearly perpe-
trated by terrorists.
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist
groups, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and
Because of the change in the reporting period,
the  Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which renamed
the data collection covered not only 2006, but
itself  Kongra-Gel in 2003, seek international
also the period of October-December 2005.
recognition and political self-determination.
T 2007 METHODOL
They are usually motivated by nationalism, eth-
Europol extracted quantitative TE-SAT data on
nicity and religion.
terrorist attacks and activities as well as on
arrested suspects from reports on terrorist inci-
TE-SA
Left-wing terrorist groups, such as the
dents contributed by the Member States. As
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C),
requested by Belgium, Belgian data originates
3.
seek to change the entire political social and
mainly from the Monthly Bulletins of the Federal
economic system to an extreme left model and
Police. The processed data was cross-checked
their ideology is often revolutionary Marxist-
and, in case of gaps, complemented by open
Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist
source data.
groups, such as the Unofficial Anarchist Fede-
ration (Federazione Anarchica Informale, FAI), is

The data regarding terrorist attacks was
usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and antiau-
cross-checked with the RAND Incident
thoritarian. For practical reasons, the activities
Database8 as made available by the MIPT
of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups are
Terrorism Knowledge Base (see for more
discussed in the same chapter of this report.
information www.tkb.org).
6
Compare to Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, pp. 83 and 89-97.
7
Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See
Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, p. 237.
8
The RAND Incident Database is regarded as one of the best resources in the world and is widely used in ter-
rorism research.


TE-SAT
2007

The data regarding terrorist activities and
enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist
arrested suspects was cross-checked with
offences and send it to Europol. This informa-
open source data systematically monitored,
tion facilitates Europol’s data collection for the
collected and processed by Europol’s
TE-SAT only to a limited extent, as the TE-SAT
Counter-Terrorism Unit.
does not contain information that may jeopar-
dise ongoing investigations.
After this, Europol requested Member States to
validate their own national data.
The collected data for October-December 2005
and for the year 2006 concerned a total of 549
Thirteen Member States also provided Europol
attacks, 128 terrorist activities, 810 arrested sus-
with qualitative data on terrorist attacks and
pects and 303 trials in the EU. It should be noted
activities.
that the arrests and convictions were not neces-
11
sarily related to terrorist offences that took place
Eurojust collected data based on the Council
during the reporting period.
Decision on the Exchange of Information and
Cooperation Concerning Terrorist Offences
Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be
(2005/671/JHA)9, according to which Member
due to the fact that the investigations into the
States are obliged to collect all relevant informa-
terrorist attack or activities concerned are still
tion concerning prosecutions and convictions
ongoing. It is also known that terrorist activities
for terrorist offences and send it to Eurojust. A
are not always investigated as terrorist offences.
questionnaire was produced at the end of 2006
Furthermore, it seems likely that terrorist attacks
asking for details on convictions related to ter-
and activities with perceived low and/or local
OGY 
rorism including, among others, the crimes with
impact are underreported to Europol.
Since
which the suspects were charged, the crimes for
only the ‘most spectacular’ cases – particularly
which they were sentenced and the penalty
regarding terrorist activities – end up in the
imposed. Twenty-three Member States respond-
media, it is impossible to track these investiga-
ed to the questionnaire. Part of the national data
tions via open sources monitoring and include
was collected at Eurojust through an analysis of
them in the data.
the court rulings.10
As stated before, criminal investigations into
Eight Member States provided Eurojust with
extremist activities were neither reported to nor
information on cases in their national courts.
collected by Europol.
The UK provided information only on a small
T 2007 METHODOL
number of high-profile cases.
Luxemburg,
The level of detail in Member States’ reporting
Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Austria,
on terrorist attacks, activities and arrests varied
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, Malta,
from complete national statistics to general
TE-SA
Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia reported having
descriptions of the situation. For instance, there
had no cases.
Ireland reported having had
were instances where an attack was reported,
3.
cases, but could provide no details as yet. No
but not the number of casualties or fatalities, or
response was received from Greece and Cyprus.
the number of suspects arrested in a major
Although the data is not complete, Member
operation was given, but no further details
States mostly affected by terrorist offences pro-
regarding the age or nationality were made
vided their contribution.11
available.
The abovementioned Council Decision also
The data contributed to the TE-SAT by France
obliges Member States to collect all relevant
and Spain is very detailed and complete, but
information concerning and resulting from
the French data did not cover October-
criminal investigations conducted by their law
December 2005. The UK was unable to give full
9
The deadline for the implementation was 30 June 2006.
10
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
11
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
data due to legal restrictions. For instance, no
violence but rather the direct activity of small
details regarding arrested suspects could be
groups, however popular these groups may be.
made available as the UK does not provide sta-
Even if supported by a larger organisation, the
tistics on cases that are awaiting trial.
number of active militants who engage in ter-
rorism is usually small.12 However, some aspects
The description and analysis of Islamist activities
of the phenomenon such as attacks and arrest-
on the Internet is mainly based on the data col-
ed suspects can also be analysed with the use of
lected by the monitoring of Islamists’ communi-
quantitative research methods. Due to the rela-
cation methods launched in October 2004
tively small number of investigations into terror-
within the Counter-Terrorism Task Force.
ist activities reported by Member States, terror-
ist activities are analysed and described mainly
12
Both quantitative and qualitative Member Sta-
with the help of qualitative data although quan-
tes’ data on terrorist attacks and activities was
titative data was collected to support analytical
collected. Terrorism is not mass or collective
work.
OGY 
T 2007 METHODOL
TE-SA
3.

12
Crenshaw, Martha (2003) Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts, p. 4. In Crenshaw, Martha (ed.)
Terrorism in Context.


TE-SAT
2007
4. OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU 
13
4.1. Terrorist Attacks
the truce declared by ETA in March 2006, sepa-
ratist groups perpetrated 136 attacks, mainly in
Eleven Member States were targeted by 498
the Basque region. Only the attack at the Mad-
terrorist attacks in 2006.
During October-
rid airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in
December 2005, 51 terrorist attacks were car-
casualties.
ried out in the EU. Despite the high number of
terrorist attacks, the vast majority of them
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups cam-
resulted only in material damage and were not
paigned mostly in Greece, Italy, Spain and
intended to kill.
Germany. None of the attacks resulted in casu-
alties, but some of them were intended to kill.
There were no successful Islamist terrorist
attacks in the EU in 2006. However, a coordinat-
Despite Member States’ reports on incidents
ed but ultimately failed attack aimed at mass
involving extreme right-wing violence, only one
casualties took place in Germany.
incident was reported as a terrorist attack in
2006.
The vast majority of terrorist attacks were per-
petrated by separatist terrorist groups target-
The Member States reported criminal inves-
ing France and Spain. In France, 283 attacks
tigations into 59 different terrorist groups.
took place in Corsica in 2006. In Spain, despite
Of these, nine were on the EU list of terrorist
Other/Not
Member State
Islamist
Separatist
Left-Wing
Right-Wing
Total 
Specified
Austria
0
0
0
0
1
1
Belgium
0
0
0
0
1
1
France
0
283
0
0
11
294
Germany
1
0
10
0
2
13
Greece
0
0
25
0
0
25
Ireland
0
1
0
0
0
1
Italy
0
0
11
0
0
11
Poland
0
0
0
1
0
1
Portugal
0
0
1
0
0
1
Spain
0
136
8
0
1
145
UK
0
4
0
0
1
5
Total
1
424
55
1
17
498
FIGURE 1: Terrorist Attacks in 2006 by Type of Terrorism


TE-SAT
2007
organisations.13 One third of the terrorist orga-
of them were related to investigations into ter-
nisations investigated also conduct campaigns
rorist attacks.
outside the EU.
Only seven percent of the arrests were related to
left-wing and anarchist terrorism, a fact which
4.2. Arrested Suspects
may indicate that these groups are not perceived
A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism
as a major threat and a priority by Member
offences were arrested in 15 Member States in
States’ law enforcement for the time being.
2006.
Thirty-two percent of the arrested individuals
Despite the small number of Islamist terrorist
(N=550)15 were suspected of either prepara-
14
attacks in the EU, half of the arrests carried out
tion of or involvement in a terrorist attack (fi-
were related to Islamist terrorism (figure 2).
gure 1). Forty-one percent of the arrested indi-
France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands had the
viduals (N=550) were suspected of being
highest number of arrests of Islamist terrorist
members of a terrorist organisation. Half of
suspects.14
them were linked to a terrorist organisation
that could be specified. Only five of these or-
A high number of people – 188 – were arrested
ganisations were on the EU list of terrorist
in France suspected of separatism. Sixty percent
organisations.
Member State 
Islamist
Separatist
Left-Wing 
Right-Wing
Total
THE EU
Austria
0
1
0
0
1
Belgium
1
0
1
12
14
Denmark
9
0
0
0
6
France
139
188
15
0
342
Germany
11
4
5
0
20
A
TION IN 

Ireland
0
4
0
0
4
Italy
34
0
25
0
59
Luxembourg
0
1
0
0
1
The Netherlands
6
0
0
0
6
THE SITU
Poland
0
0
0
3
3
Slovakia
3
0
0
0
3
Spain
51
28
6
0
85
Sweden
3
0
0
0
3
UK
_
_
_
_
156
Total
257
226
52
15
706
FIGURE 2: Arrested Terrorism Suspects in 2006 by Type of Terrorism 
OVERVIEW OF 
4.

13
Council Common Position 2006/231/CFSP of 20 March 2006 Updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on
the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism and Repealing Common Position 2005/936/CFSP.
14
Based on open sources reporting, it seems that the number of arrests made in relation to Islamist terrorism
in the UK is among the highest in the EU.
15
UK arrests are excluded as no details were made available.


TE-SAT
2007
ween 26 and 46. Approximately 75 percent of
Preparation
the suspects who were younger than 30 or older
Not Specified
Attack/Attack
than 51 were EU citizens.
5%
32%
4.3. Convictions and Penalties
Three hundred and three persons were tried in
relation to terrorism for the period from 1 Oc-
Financing 8%
Recruitment  4%
tober 2005 until 31 December 2006, as notified
Membership
Propaganda 2%
to Eurojust by eight Member States (figure 5).16
Facilitation
Terr Org
8%
Furthermore, 136 court proceedings were
41%
reported for the period concerned. No informa-
15
tion was provided regarding the date when the
FIGURE 3: Involvement of Arrested Suspects in
crime was committed and the time that had
Various Terrorist Activities
elapsed between arrest, trial and date of convic-
tion. Generally, it can be stated that the convic-
Other most common suspected terrorist activities
tions mainly relate to events which occurred
included financing of terrorism and facilitation
before the timeframe of the TE-SAT 2007. 17
such as falsification of documents, organisation
of travel and provision of safe houses. The small
Member State
2005
2006
Total
amount of arrests related to the production
Belgium
0
24
24
and dissemination of propaganda indicates the
France
0
21
21
lack of legal basis and the difficulty in investigat-
Germany
0
16
16
ing this type of cases as, on many occasions, the
THE EU
suspected criminal activities take place on the
Italy
7
0
7
Internet.
Spain
51
154
205
Sweden
2
3
5
Gender
EU
NEU 
Unknown
Total
The Netherlands
1
20
21
Female
71
16
13
100
UK
1
3
4
A
TION IN 

Male
51
35
14
100
Total 
63
240
303
Unknown
4
8
88
100
FIGURE 5: Individuals Tried for Terrorism Charges
Total 
52
31
17
100
FIGURE 4: Nationalities of Arrested Suspects by
THE SITU
Gender
The total of 46 acquittals is to be viewed in rela-
tion to the total of 303 persons tried in the rele-
Almost half of the arrested suspects were EU
vant timeframe (figure 6).18 The percentage of
citizens (figure 4). It should be noted that in
acquittals is relatively high in the Netherlands,
seventeen percent of the cases the nationality
where six of the 21 persons tried were acquitted.
of the suspect was not reported. 70 percent of
This may be seen in relation to the fact that, for
female suspects were EU citizens. Almost all
the first time ever, the Dutch prosecution
suspects coming from outside the EU were
authorities prosecuted two groups – of 14 and
OVERVIEW OF 
men.
six individuals, respectively – in two separate
proceedings on the charge of membership of
4.
The age of the arrested suspects ranged
a criminal and terrorist organisation and on the
between 17 and 76. The average age is 36 years.
charge of preparing for an armed attack and
However, two thirds of them were aged bet-
recruiting for the jihad. Not all members of the
16
The UK provided an overview of high profile cases and not the total number of cases.
17
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
18
Information on appeals pending is not always available, so these convictions and acquittals may not yet be
final.


TE-SAT
2007
group were found to have had the same level of
Figure 7 provides an overview of the average
participation. Appeals are currently pending in
penalty per convicted individual given in the
both proceedings. Additionally, it may be noted
eight Member States. A note of caution howev-
that, at the time of writing, the Dutch Supreme
er is needed for the detention period in Spain,
Court had also ordered a re-trial for the single
where there were a total of 172 convictions dur-
acquittal which took place at the end of 2005. 19
ing the relevant time frame. These individuals
received a total sentence of 8,236 years in
Member 
%
prison, due to the fact that a few individuals
State
Convicted Acquitted Acquitted
received a sentence of several hundreds of years
Belgium
18
6
25
and some even more than a thousand years.
France
21
0
0
Eurojust modified any sentence higher than 40
16
years to 40 years in order to be able to calculate
Germany
16
0
0
the average in all countries.
Italy
7
0
0
Spain
172
33
16
In the cases of suspended sentences – e.g. four
Sweden
4
1
20
years of which three years suspended – the time
The Netherlands
15
6
29
of imprisonment was calculated as four years.
UK
4
0
0
Total 
257
46
15
The high average of penalties in Spain can be
explained by the fact that out of 172 convic-
FIGURE 6: Individuals Convicted and Percentage
tions, 33 convictions were given for murder or
of Acquittals 
for collateral fatalities. The number of sentences
for terrorist attacks causing vast damage and
Member States reported a number of legal chal-
injuries was high in Spain. In comparison, the
THE EU
lenges which were commonly encountered in
German courts handed out a sentence of 15
these types of trials and may have had an effect
years to an individual both for assisting to mur-
on the acquittals, such as:
der in 246 cases and for membership of a terror-
ist organisation. This particular case was con-

a lack of capacity at both investigation and
nected to the 9/11 attacks. In the UK, sentences
A
TION IN 

prosecution stage to deal with the often
were also relatively high, considering that for
huge amount of paper and electronic evi-
instance one individual received a life sentence
dence;
with a minimum term fixed at 40 years for con-
spiracy to murder (plans to bomb building in

the high cost of translation services and the
the US and elsewhere).
amount of time required for the translation
THE SITU
and analysis of the evidence;
In France, no convictions were given for killings
in October-December 2005 and in the year 2006,

the duration of pre-trial detention is strictly
but high sentences were given for conspiracy to
limited, often not offering enough time in
prepare a terrorist activity in conjunction with
these complicated cases;
other charges. One person was convicted as
charged for 20 years; five others for 17 years.

the cost and time demands of the travel and
cooperation required by the cross-border
In the Netherlands, the highest conviction in the
OVERVIEW OF 
nature of the crime;
relevant time frame was for 15 years for the
crimes of ‘membership of a criminal organisa-
4.

the amount of time required for the execu-
tion (with the aim to spread hatred and incite-
tion of letters rogatory ; and
ment) and membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion (with the aim to threaten with a terrorist

the possibility to use intelligence informa-
crime)’. The murderer of the Dutch film maker
tion in court.20
Theo Van Gogh was also convicted again in 2006
19
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
20
Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
18
17
16
14
13
12
tion
10
9
8
ears of deten
6
6
Y
5
5
4
17
3
3
2
0
The
Spain
UK
France
Netherlands Germany
Belgium
Sweden
Italy
Country
   AVERAGE
 Mean
FIGURE 7: Average Penalty per Convicted Individual   
THE EU
for the same charges as above, but no addition-
ted terrorism suspects from outside the EU
al sentence was given to his previous life sen-
were men.
tence for the murder.

The small number of suspects arrested for
dissemination of propaganda may indicate
4.4. General Findings and Trends
the lack of legal basis and difficulty in inves-
A
TION IN 


A large number of various types of terrorist
tigating these types of crimes.
organisations have an active presence in
the EU.
Some of them target Member

The number of acquittals may reflect legal
States or Third State interests in Member
challenges Member States face in terrorism
States, whereas some others use the EU as
trials such as a lack of capacity in both the
THE SITU
their logistical base or for fundraising and
investigation and prosecution stage to deal
conduct their campaigns mainly outside
with the often huge amount of paper and elec-
the EU.
tronic evidence, as well as the fact that the
cross-border nature of the crime requires cost-

Altogether 498 terrorist attacks were com-
ly and time-consuming travel and cooperation.
mitted in the EU in 2006. The vast majority of
them resulted in limited material damage

France, Spain and the UK are the Member
and were not intended to kill. However, the
States that are most severely affected by ter-
OVERVIEW OF 
failed attack in Germany demonstrates that
rorism as concluded from the number of ter-
Islamist terrorists also aim at mass casualties.
rorist attacks and arrested suspects as well as
4.
the average penalties.

Investigations into Islamist terrorism are
clearly a priority for Member States’ law

Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
enforcement as demonstrated by the num-
Slovakia and Slovenia seem to be the
ber of arrested suspects reported by
Member States least affected by terrorism as
Member States.
they reported neither criminal investigations
nor court proceedings related to terrorism

One fifth of the arrested terrorism suspects
during October-December 2005 and the
from the EU were women. Almost all arres-
year 2006.



TE-SAT
2007
5. ISLAMIST TERRORISM
18
5.1. Terrorist Attacks
German Trolley Bomb Case
On 31 July 2006, two Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) packed in two suitcases were
placed onboard two regional trains near
Cologne in an attempted coordinated attack.
The devices failed to detonate. Both so-called
‘trolley bombs’ were made up of a gas cylinder,
an alarm clock, a functioning detonator and
three PET bottles filled with petrol.21 Had the
devices detonated, it is estimated that there
would have been a significant loss of life in the
two trains.22
Two Lebanese nationals studying in Germany
were subsequently arrested on suspicion of
placing the IEDs on the trains.
The suspects were reported to have been moti-
vated by the publication of the Danish cartoons
of the Prophet Muhammad in German newspa-
pers; it was also reported that the Internet
played a role in preparations.
Further, there
were reports that the suspects had undergone a
FIGURE 8: Arrested Suspects Related to Islamist
swift radicalisation process. The suspects initial-
Terrorism in the EU
ly intended to carry out the attack during the
FIFA World Cup but changed their plans due to
Along with the failed terrorist attack that took
the security measures in place.23
place in Germany, Denmark and the UK each
reported one attempted terrorist attack. No fur-
UK Airplane Plot
ther information on prevented or disrupted
Islamist terrorist attacks was made available by
On 10 August 2006, a series of arrests took place
the Member States’ law enforcement authori-
in the UK in connection with an alleged suicide
ties.
bombing plot. The suspects planned to smuggle
21
Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
22
Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
23
Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
the component parts of IEDs onto aircrafts and
Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) supplemented by
assemble and detonate them on board and in
metal splinter shrapnel to increase the bombs’
flight.24 Liquid explosives concealed in plastic
destructive power.29
soft drink bottles were to be detonated with
battery powered detonators aboard trans-
The Danish Minister of Justice stated that the
Atlantic airliners en route from the UK to the US.
group had planned one or several terrorist
If successful, the attack would have caused mass
attacks against undisclosed targets within
murder of potentially thousands of civilian air
Denmark.30
The motivation of the group
travellers. The prevented attacks had a large
remains unknown. However, several commen-
impact on civilian air travel with increased
tators have pointed to Denmark’s military
restrictions on the amount of liquids allowed in
engagement in Iraq and the global row over
handheld cabin luggage.25
the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muham-
19
mad.
Eleven suspects were charged in connection
with the plot. The suspects were predominantly
As in the UK case, the members of the Vollsmose
UK citizens of Pakistani descent.
They were
group were suspected of being so-called ‘home-
reportedly motivated to carry out the attack by
grown’ terrorists. More precisely, they were pre-
the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
dominantly young second-generation Muslim
intended to strike a target that would hit both
immigrants of Middle Eastern origin with Danish
the UK and the US at the same time.26 They
citizenship. One member of the group was a
seem to have undergone a ‘rapid radicalisation’:
Danish convert to Islam.31
in a matter of ‘some weeks and months, not
years’, they were prepared to kill civilians in a sui-
5.2. Arrested Suspects
cide attack.27
During the period between October 2005 and
December 2006, a total of 340 persons were
Danish ‘Homegrown’ Vollsmose Group
reported as having been arrested on Islamist
On 5 September 2006, nine individuals were
terrorism related offences. Two hundred and
arrested in Vollsmose, a suburb of Odense,
sixty arrests were carried out in 2006.32
Denmark. Seven were remanded in custody on
suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack.
Less than ten percent of the arrested individuals
AMIST TERRORISM
Allegedly, they procured material and effects for
were suspected of preparation, planning or exe-
making explosives.28 According to one account,
cution of terrorist attacks. The arrests took place
ISL
the explosives were produced using an
in the Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
5.
unknown quantity of ammonium nitrate and
Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden.
24
‘CPS Authorises Charges in Alleged Aircraft Terror Plot’, Crown Prosecution Service, 21 August 2006. The UK
Metropolitan Police stated to the public that searches had led to the seizure of bomb-making equipment
composed of chemicals, including hydrogen peroxide, electrical components, documents and other items;
see:‘Terrorism Charges – Bulletin 0000000474’, Metropolitan Police Service, 21 August 2006.
25
See for example ‘Details Emerge in British Terror Case’, The New York Times, 28 August 2006.
26
Ibid.
27
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair quoted in ‘UK Airline Bomb Suspects “Radicalised in Weeks”’,
Reuters, 24 January 2007.
28
Denmark’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007. ‘Statement Concerning Terror-Related Arrests’, Lars Findsen,
Director General of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET), 5 September 2006.
29
Taarnby Jensen, Michael (2006) Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in
Denmark 1990-2006, 48-49.
30
‘Terrorplan var rettet mod Danmark’, Politiken, 5 September 2006.
31
Vidino, Lorenzo (2006) ‘The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia’. Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4,
Issue 20; and Taarnby Jensen, op. cit., 47-49.
32
156 terrorism suspects were arrested in the UK in 2006, but no further details regarding their motivation or
background were available. As can be concluded from open sources, a relatively high number of the indi-
viduals arrested in various operations in the UK in 2006 were suspected of Islamist terrorism related offences.


TE-SAT
2007
The vast majority of the arrested individuals
salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, GSPC)
were suspected of being members of a terrorist
and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
organisation. Other frequent criminal activities
(GICM).
were financing of terrorism and facilitation.
More than two thirds of the arrested suspects
Seven percent of the arrested individuals relat-
were aged between 26 and 41. The relatively
ed to Islamist terrorism were women. This figure
small number of young suspects may be part-
rises to 12 percent with regard to all arrested ter-
ly due to the fact that the data on arrested
rorist suspects. Most women arrested in the
suspects in the UK was not available as, for
field of Islamist terrorism were suspected of
instance, the majority of the nineteen individ-
membership in a terrorist organisation and facil-
uals arrested on 10 August 2006 in the con-
20
itation, for instance providing accommodation
text of the alleged airplane plot were aged
and false documents. No female suspects were
between 22 and 25. One of the arrested was
arrested for planning, preparing or executing an
as young as 17.33
attack.
Suspects in the age group between 30 and 41
Seventy percent of the women arrested for
years and those under 30 differ with respect to
Islamist terrorism activities were EU citizens.
the criminal activities of which they were sus-
pected. Membership of a terrorist organisation
The bulk of the arrests took place in France,
represented fifty percent of the arrests in both
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands and the majori-
age groups. Activities such as financing of ter-
ty of those arrested came from Algeria, Morocco
rorism or handling of false documents, on the
and Tunisia. Arrested suspects originating from
other hand, seemed to be more common
North Africa were often loosely affiliated with
among the arrested suspects aged 30 to 41,
North African terrorist groups, such as the
whereas younger suspects were more often
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe
linked to recruitment and facilitation.
16
15
AMIST TERRORISM
14
ISL
12
5.
11
10
10
tage
8
8
r
c
en
7
7
7
7
e
P
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
0
Recruitment
Preparation
Attack
Facilitation
Financing
False
Attack
Documents
Activity
  18-29
  30-41
FIGURE 9: Terrorist Activity per Age Group
33
‘UK names 19 bomb plot suspects, freezes assets’, Reuters News, 11 August 2006.


TE-SAT
2007
Furthermore, of those aged 30 to 41 years, seven
Financing of Terrorism
percent were arrested for executing or attempt-
ing to execute an attack, while only two percent
Financing of terrorism covers two distinct
were arrested for planning or preparing an
aspects: financing of terrorist attacks and fund-
attack. This pattern is reversed among those
ing of terrorist networks.
under 30. A possible explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that younger suspects fail in the
Relatively small sums are necessary to carry out
execution of their plans or that law enforcement
a terrorist attack; estimates for the Madrid
authorities are more successful against this age
bombings in 2004 range from EUR 8,000 to
group.
15,000.
Given the small amount of money
required, the prevention of terrorist financing
appears to some extent unrealistic; hence prior-
21
5.3. Terrorist Activities
ity is given to financial investigations into the
Propaganda
money trail left by terrorists.
In October 2006, an Iraqi citizen was arrested in
Estimating the funds needed by terrorist organi-
Germany on suspicion of providing support to
sations to sustain their activities is difficult if not
foreign terrorist groups. He allegedly dissemi-
impossible. An often quoted estimate places
nated audio and video files showing leading
al-Qaeda’s yearly expenditures aimed at sustaining
personalities of al-Qaeda and  al-Qaeda in
itself during the period preceding the 9/11 attacks
Mesopotamia.34 In addition to this, in 2006 one
in 2001 at USD 30 million.39 There are no estima-
person was arrested in Denmark for Islamist ter-
tes of al-Qaeda’s actual financial needs. There is lit-
rorist propaganda35 and two in the UK for solic-
tle doubt that money for funding Islamist terrorist
iting murder by publishing inciting statements
networks or organisations is gathered in the EU
and running websites inciting murder, urging to
through legal and/or illegal means. In this regard,
fight jihad and raising funds, respectively.36 Law
the fact that almost ten percent of all suspects
enforcement agencies investigated propagan-
arrested in the EU during the reporting period
da offences in Belgium, Denmark, France and
were involved in financial and material support
Germany.37
The number of police investiga-
to terrorist organisations is significant. These sus-
tions into this phenomenon seems small com-
pects are mostly linked to terrorist organisations,
pared to the amount of propaganda circulating
such as the GSPC, the GICM, or al-Qaeda.
AMIST TERRORISM
on the Internet. This is partly explained by the
lack of a legal basis for arrests of or investiga-
Financial and logistic support to terrorist organ-
ISL
tion against persons using the Internet in this
isations is based on funds provided legally or
5.
manner. Law enforcement agencies also have
illegally by sympathisers of terrorist groups.
difficulties in identifying individuals who
spread Islamist terrorist propaganda on the
Funding is procured by establishing and manag-
Internet. As an example, in autumn 2005, a sus-
ing small companies as sources of legal income,
pect arrested in the UK on charges of partici-
which is then used to support radical groups
pating in an alleged bomb plot, turned out to
inside and outside the EU. Another very signifi-
be a key individual that had used the Internet to
cant source originates from private donations,
spread Islamist propaganda.38
and from the misuse of zakat40 payments by
34
Office of the Federal Attorney-General (Germany), press release no. 41 of 10 October 2006.
35
Denmark’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
36
The UK’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
37
Respective Member States’ contributions to TE-SAT 2007.
38
‘Terrorist 007, Exposed’, Washington Post, 26 March 2006.
39
See 9/11 Commission Report and National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Monograph on Terrorism Financing, p. 9.
40
Zakat is the third pillar of Islam and refers to spending a fixed portion of one’s wealth for the poor or needy.
The basic minimum income over which an individual should pay zakat is known as nisab and is equivalent to
the value of 85 grams of gold (that is, app. EUR 1,400).


TE-SAT
2007
Muslims. The funds are mostly collected by
be transferred to another destination or even be
charitable organisations or associations and
sent back to Europe with the aim of concealing
individuals.
the original link between the fundraiser and the
user of the funds.44
No estimates are available about the amount of
money collected legally or illegally within the EU
Recruitment 
which could be misused for terrorism funding.
Six Member States reported investigations into
There are strong suspicions that zakat money
Islamist terrorist recruitment in the EU between
collected within the EU is used to fund terrorism.
October 2005 and December 2006.
A UK-based charity reportedly remitted a large
22
amount of money declared to be relief funds for
In total, 24 individuals were arrested on suspi-
earthquake victims to suspects in Pakistan who
cion of terrorist recruitment45.
were involved in the UK airplane plot.41 Funds
collected legally can be transferred worldwide
The individuals reported as having been arrest-
using the banking system without arousing sus-
ed for recruitment were linked to the Iraqi Sunni
picion; the fact that money has been misused
organisation  Ansar al-Islam. This may suggest
can not easily be established through legal
that they were involved in recruiting volunteers
means; only post incident inquiries may allow to
in the EU for the support of the armed struggle
follow the money trail.
against coalition troops in Iraq.
The range of illegal sources for the funding of
In most instances, the recruitment occurred in
terrorism appears to cover most criminal activi-
schools, spiritual meeting places like mosques,
ties ranging from vehicle-related crimes to for-
or in prisons.46 The modus operandi includes
gery of identity and travel documents or finan-
the use of propaganda material such as videos,
cial crimes, such as the use of false credit cards.42
tracts and movies supporting the claim that
Assessing the amount of illegal money used for
Muslims must take part in the global jihad.47
terrorism financing is also close to impossible.
Most of the profits generated, however, are in
Training
cash and need to be transferred. Transfers via
the banking system and post office bank
Eight persons were arrested in relation with ter-
AMIST TERRORISM
accounts, the use of credit or debit cards,
rorist training. The charges included plotting to
ISL
cheques and travellers’ cheques have been iden-
establish a training camp, providing training and
tified43; however, the most common means of
receiving training in terrorist techniques.
5.
transfer of funds are cash couriers or cash trans-
fers via alternative remittance systems or via
All arrested suspects were men. No background
legal cash transmittance channels such as
information was available concerning their age
Western Union.
or links to terrorist organisations.
The detected transmitting systems are used in
In general, training in extremist ideology and
two directions: from and to Europe. Funds are
terrorist techniques takes place overseas, where
collected in Member States and transmitted to
some of the terrorists receive military and spe-
regions with a well-developed banking system
cialist training.48 Nevertheless, one investiga-
or to Middle Eastern countries. Money can then
tion concerned two training camps that were
41
‘Quake money used to finance UK plane bombing plot’, Daily Times, 12 August 2006.
42
Based on Portugal’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
43
Based on Italy’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
44
Based on Italy’s and the UK’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
45
This figure includes 3 arrests from 2005.
46
Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
47
Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
48
The UK’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
allegedly established in the South of England. In
dismantled in Spain and in Italy were found to
terrorist training camps, participants are taught
be supporting North African groups in Europe
a very radical interpretation of Islam and
and facilitating the dispatching of fighters to
trained in handling explosives, as well as setting
Iraq.55 Only a few of the cases reported concern
up and financing terrorist cells. Trainers usually
the provision of false documentation for the
belong to the militant categories of Islamists,
use by Islamists. However, it should be noted
maintaining international contacts with other
that this offence is often considered a common
members or networks.49
law crime when no link with Islamist terrorism
can be established.
The camps are mainly located in the Middle or
Near East, or in South-East Asia. Training camps
5.4. Situation outside the EU
in the Sahel region, mostly controlled by al-Qaeda
23
in the Islamic Maghreb, seem to acquire increas-
The perceived oppression of Islam or the pre-
ing importance and are used for the training of
sence of ‘foreign’ troops in Islamic lands is often
several terrorists originating in the Maghreb.50
invoked as justification for the execution of ter-
Individuals that receive terrorist training remain
rorist acts in several parts of the world, such as
in contact with both their facilitation networks
Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq or Afghanistan. The idea
and support cells.51 Religious or paramilitary
that these local struggles are part of a global
training activities abroad might be an indicator
jihad, seen as a worldwide war between Islam
that terrorists are in the early planning phase of
and the non-believers, has been actively pro-
an attack.52
moted by Islamist terrorist ideologues and lead-
ers of Islamist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda.
Whereas local insurgency or resistance groups
Facilitation
aim at overthrowing or seceding from the
In 2006, a total of 52 individuals were arrested in
affected state’s government, the ideology of
seven Member States suspected of a wide range
global  jihad identifies the Western world, inclu-
of offences related to facilitation of or support
ding the EU Member States, as the principle
to terrorism. Two thirds of the suspected indi-
enemy and target.
viduals were arrested in France and Spain.
Currently, due to the presence there of Member
Eighty-six percent of those arrested for facilita-
State military forces, the conflicts in Iraq and
AMIST TERRORISM
tion were men, mainly North African or EU
Afghanistan have the largest impact upon the
nationals.
security environment of the EU. Aside from the
ISL
risk of terrorist attacks within Member States
5.
In the reports contributed by the Member
aiming to apply pressure to withdraw their
States, facilitation covers a wide range of sup-
troops, suicide attacks and bomb attacks with
port activities: provision of false identity docu-
IEDs have been perpetrated against officials,
ments, resources and fundraising for terrorist
contractors, journalists and aid workers in
networks engaged in conflict areas.53 Other
Afghanistan and Iraq.
While the majority of
supporters of terrorism provide false adminis-
Islamist terrorist attacks were committed in Iraq,
trative documents, consultancy services or
attacks in Afghanistan have increased sharply,
assistance in marriages of convenience, in par-
killing at least 3,600 persons in 2006. Further-
ticular for illegal immigrants who adhere to
more, there were 117 suicide attacks, a previ-
Islamist ideologies.54 Several cells or networks
ously unknown phenomenon in Afghanistan,
49
Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
50 
Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (CGI).
51
Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
52
Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
53
The UK’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
54
Portugal’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
55
Italy’s and Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
during the period under review, which caused
African counter-terrorism (CT) operations took
278 fatalities.56
Some of these attacks were
place in Morocco, where 56 members of the
reportedly committed by non-Afghans.57
Islamist group calling itself Ansar al-Mahdi were
However, the percentage of suicide attacks in
arrested in early autumn of 200661, and in
Afghanistan is small in comparison to attacks
Tunisia, where security forces intercepted a
overall.
group of suspected GSPC-affiliated terrorists
coming from Algeria in December 2006.62
Other incidents in Afghanistan affecting
Member States include the murders of two
In East Africa, a number of Swedish nationals
German journalists in October 2006, the kidnap-
fighting with the Union of Islamic Courts move-
ping of three French aid workers released in
ment in Somalia were reportedly killed, while
24
September 2006, the kidnapping of an Italian
others were arrested.63
journalist released in November 2006 and the
increased targeting of Non-Governmental
Amid worldwide protests against the publication
Organisations (NGOs) exemplified by the killing
of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad
of local aid workers and the burning and looting
in a Danish newspaper (see below the chapter
of CARE International, ACTED and OXFAM’s offices
on Islamist terrorist propaganda) in February
in Kabul in June 2006.58
2006, a German national was briefly abducted in
the West Bank, while Palestinian gunmen forced
In North Africa, attacks against Western targets
the closing of the European Commission
took place in Egypt and Algeria. On 24 April
Technical Assistance Office in Gaza.64 Also in
2006, the tourist resort of Dahab in the Sinai
Gaza, an Italian photographer was kidnapped
Peninsula, Egypt, was targeted by a group using
and later released in October 2006.65
the name of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Three
explosions killed 23 persons, including a
In Southeast Asia, on 1 October 2005, three sui-
German national, and wounded more than 80,
cide bombers detonated their explosives in
including tourists from Denmark, France,
southern Bali killing 20 and injuring approxi-
Germany and the UK.59 The Algerian GSPC took
mately 130 people. At least one UK citizen was
responsibility for the bomb attack against a bus
among the wounded. The modus operandi was
transporting staff working for a US construction
reportedly similar to the 2002 Bali bombings.
company on 10 December 2006, in which two
The bombing was timed to coincide with the
AMIST TERRORISM
people were killed and eight injured, among
Australian school holidays in order to maximise
ISL
them four UK nationals.60 Noteworthy North
the number of tourists affected.66 The attacks
5.
56
Numbers from Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org; broken down: 206 Afghan civilians, 54
Afghan security personnel and 18 members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
57
For example, on 6 February 2006, a Malian national was arrested while attempting a suicide attack against the
Governor of Balkh. See: ‘The Foreign Makeup of Afghan Suicide Bombers’ (2006) Terrorism Focus, Volume III,
Issue 7.
58
‘Italian freed after being held in Afghanistan for three weeks’, AFP, 3 November 2006; ‘Taleban blamed for
murder of Afghan aid workers’, The Guardian, 31 May 2006; ‘Journalists killed in Afghanistan’, BBC News, 10
August 2006
59
‘Dahab Bombers Inspired by Al-Qaeda’, Asharq Al Awsat (English edition), 29 April 2006.
60
‘Algerian Militants Post Video of December Attack’, Reuters, 21 January 2007.
61
The group planned to attack foreign targets in Morocco. Four of those arrested were women. See ‘Moroccan
Terror Plot Foiled With 56 Arrests, Officials Say’, The New York Times, 2 September 2006.
62
‘Tunisians find explosives, embassy plans: minister’, AFP, 12 January 2007.
63
‘Svenskar uppges dödade i Somalia’, Svenska Dagbladet, 30 January 2007.
64
‘Gunmen in Gaza close EU office’, The Washington Times, 3 February 2006.
65
‘Kidnapped Gaza journalist freed’, BBC News, 24 October 2006.
66
Most deaths and injuries were caused by shrapnel rather than by the blast itself. See ‘Australian police to help
probe Bali bomb’, AFP, 2 October 2005; ‘Paradise island hit again’, The Jakarta Post, 2 October 2005; and ‘A
Terrorist Strike in Bali, Choreographed for the Bombers on a Plotter’s Computer’, The New York Times, 3 July
2006.


TE-SAT
2007
have been attributed to the Islamist group
ly closed down by hackers or law-enforcement
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). On 16 September 2006, a
agencies. Terrorist groups and their supporters
Canadian citizen was among four persons killed
may find online forums that support a radical
in a coordinated detonation of three bombs in
view of Islam to be a more secure way of dis-
Hat Yai, in southern Thailand. About 70 other
seminating their propaganda material. These
people were injured in the blasts, several of
forums target a particular audience and offer
them foreigners. The Thai authorities suspect
details of access to files stored on so-called ‘free-
the involvement of a local Islamist group named
storage sites’. Files containing, for instance, high-
Gerakan Mujahedeen Islam Pattani.67
quality full-length films may be obtained from
such sites. Since this material is spread over
In October 2005, two persons were arrested in
numerous web servers located in different
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for preparing
countries, blocking access to all copies of the
25
a suicide terrorist attack against an undisclosed
files becomes virtually impossible.
target in Bosnia or another European country.
The aim of the attack was to force a withdrawal
Arguably, the most professional and most
of EU military forces from Iraq or Afghanistan.
productive propaganda outlet is currently the
The arrested were one 19 year-old Turkish citi-
al-Sahab Media Production Company. Al-Sahab
zen born and raised in Denmark and one 18
mainly produces video files which can take the
year-old Swedish national of Bosnian origin.
form of documentaries, interviews, speeches or
The two had procured explosive material and
news programmes. Another characteristic of
placed it in a homemade suicide belt before
al-Sahab’s products is that many of them are
their arrest. They received sentences for terror-
accompanied by English subtitles. Where the
ist offences in a Bosnian court of 13 years and
speaker uses English, Arabic subtitles are added.
four months and 15 years and four months in
All known speeches by members of the original
prison, respectively.68
al-Qaeda leadership released after June 2006
carry the al-Sahab logo.
On 9 November 2005, a number of suicide
bombers targeted three hotels in Amman,
Other Islamist terrorist groups have their own
Jordan, known to be frequented by Western mil-
propaganda outlets. Iraqi and Afghan Islamist
itary personnel and tourists, killing 60 and injur-
insurgent groups publish audio and video
ing 115. The attacks were reportedly orchestrat-
speeches of their leaders and videos showing
AMIST TERRORISM
ed by al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia.69
attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces under their
own labels, such as al-Furqan Media Production
ISL
Company of the Islamic State of Iraq, formerly
5.5. Islamist Terrorist Propaganda 
5.
known as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, or the Voice
For more than a decade, supporters of Islamist
of Jihad of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is often
terror groups have published written state-
the case that these groups attempt to emulate
ments, articles by ideological leaders and online
the stylistic features and technical professional-
magazines on the Internet, exploiting the poten-
ism of al-Sahab.
tial for swift and anonymous communication
that this medium offers.
From its base in Algeria, the GSPC actively tries
to compete with other Islamist terrorist propa-
More recently, the use of static websites for the
ganda outlets on the Internet. In September
propagation of Islamist terrorist propaganda
2006, the GSPC was publicly acknowledged by a
appears to be in decline: such websites are easi-
high-ranking  al-Qaeda member as part of the
67
‘Four killed in Thai bomb blasts’, BBC News, 17 September 2006.
68
Sweden’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007; Denmark’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007; and Taarnby Jensen, Michael
(2006) Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in Denmark 1990-2006, 44-47.
69
One of the attacks involved a married couple acting as a team. A claim of responsibility by al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia, naming the attackers, was posted on the Internet on 10 November 2005. See ‘Al-Qaeda claims
Jordan attacks’, BBC News, 10 November 2005.


TE-SAT
2007
organisation following a series of communi-
had loose affiliations to North African ter-
qués. In January 2007, the group changed its
rorist groups, such as the GICM and the
name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
GSPC.
In general, 2006 saw a rise in the frequency of
However, the suspects involved in the foiled
statements and communiqués by Islamist
airplane plot in London and the Danish
groups, especially al-Qaeda. The quality and style
Vollsmose group were born or raised in a
of video messages and filmed attacks are more
Member State, including converts, who had
professional and the techniques used are increas-
been radicalised in Europe.
ingly sophisticated. English, either spoken or in
subtitles, is often the language of choice. This

The amount of women among those arrest-
26
may be an indication that propagandists are
ed suspected of Islamist terrorism was less
attempting to reach as wide an audience as pos-
than among all terrorism suspects and a
sible. The frequency and quality of such propa-
large majority were EU citizens. No female
ganda, together with the possibilities for global
suspects were arrested for planning, prepar-
access, are signs of an ongoing coordinated
ing or executing an attack.
media offensive by Islamist terrorist groups.

Islamist terrorist networks are funded from
legal and illegal sources depending on the
5.6. Key Findings and Trends
individuals involved. The range of illegal

Failed and planned attacks by Islamist terror-
sources for Islamist terrorism funding var-
ist as reported by Member States aimed at
ied from vehicle-related crimes to forgery
indiscriminate mass casualties.
of identity and travel documents or finan-
cial crimes, such as the use of false credit

The London airplane plot and the trolley
cards.
bomb case in Germany targeted civilians
and transportation infrastructure in Member

Volunteers are recruited in the EU to support
States.
Islamist terrorist activities in Iraq, which has
been promoted as the key scene of global
In both cases, the radicalisation process of
jihad by Islamist propagandists.
It seems
the suspects is reported to have been rapid.
likely that, should other regional conflicts,
AMIST TERRORISM
such as those in Somalia and Afghanistan,
ISL

The explosives of choice for Islamist terror-
become ‘marketed’ as global jihad, more vol-
ists are IEDs made with home-made explo-
unteers may be recruited in the EU to sup-
5.
sives. At least two cases involved the use of
port them.
TATP, a highly volatile explosive requiring a
certain degree of expertise.

The frequency of video statements by mem-
bers of the original al-Qaeda leadership and

The foiled plot in London demonstrates a
other Islamist terrorists has shown a marked
high level of sophistication in the prepara-
increase. The propaganda is of greater sop-
tion of an attack and the ability to adapt to
histication, of high quality and more profes-
the latest security measures, as well as a high
sional. English is used more often, either in
degree of creativity in attempting to circum-
direct speech or in subtitles, allowing poten-
vent them.
tial access to a wider audience than previous
Arabic-only publications. These facts may

The majority of the arrested suspects were
point to a coordinated global media offen-
born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and
sive by Islamist terrorists.



TE-SAT
2007
6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST 
AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM
27
6.1. Terrorist Attacks
ponsibility for 11 attacks in Spain and Irrintzi
In 2006, separatist terrorists carried out 424
claimed responsibility for another four in France
attacks in the EU. The Member States most
in 2006. Attacks in Spain were committed most-
affected were France – with 60 percent of the
ly by Taldes Y which refers to a number of organ-
attacks – and Spain. Attacks were, for the most
ised and independent groups of young ETA
part, limited to the Basque regions and Corsica.
sympathisers who, following ETA’s instructions,
usually attack usually minor targets using urban
Five attacks took place in the UK and one in
guerrilla techniques.
Ireland. No group claimed responsibility for
these attacks.
After the declaration of the ceasefire on 24
March 2006, ETA claimed responsibility for only
Basque separatists committed a total of 144
two attacks. However, the attack at Madrid’s
attacks in Spain and France. ETA claimed res-
airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in two
FIGURE 10: Separatist Terrorist Attacks and Arrests in 2006


TE-SAT
2007
casualties and 36 people were injured. The
campaign (figure 11). The campaign also wi-
material damage was initially estimated to EUR
dened geographically to 37 cities; attacks were
30 million.70 The van used in the Vehicle Borne
carried out in small towns.
Explosive Device (VBED) was stolen in south-
western France and the owner of the van was
Taldes Y mainly targeted banks and the offices of
abducted for three days. Usually this modus
the  Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido
operandi typical to ETA is used for imminent
Socialista Obrero Español-PSOE).
attacks and the kidnapped individuals are kept
for a couple of hours only.71 Furthermore, it was
Half of the 282 attacks carried out in Corsica
a few days – an exceptionally long time –
were claimed by the Front de Liberation
before ETA officially claimed responsibility for
Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) – 22 Octobre and the
28
the attack; however, the organisation still insist-
FLNC – Union Des Combattants (UDC). For half of
ed on respecting the permanent ceasefire it
the attacks there was either no claim of respon-
had unilaterally declared. Soon after the attack,
sibility or they could not be attributed to any
the authorities arrested suspects in France with
group. Attacks were committed all around the
aggravating evidence in their possession.72
island.
Before the ceasefire, Taldes Y carried out attacks
Separatist terrorist violence targeted private,
in 14 cities, mainly in or nearby the large north-
business and governmental interests (figure 12).
ern cities of Spain, such as Bilbao, Pamplona and
However, in Corsica, 60 percent of separatist
San Sebastián. Taldes Y temporarily stopped
attacks targeted private property, such as holi-
fighting in April and May, but at the end of June,
day apartments and houses and only 6 percent
they continued and accelerated their terrorist
were carried out against governmental targets.
TERRORISM
30
28
28
25
TIST 
20
ARA
t
15
15
oun
C
13
10
10
10
8
5
5
5
4
3
1
1
1
1
0
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Month
  ETA
TIONALIST  AND SEP
  Taldes Y
FIGURE 11: Attacks by Taldes Y and ETA in Spain by Month
ETHNO-NA
6.

70
‘ETA claims car bombing but says cease-fire stands’, Associated Press Newswires, 10 January 2006.
71
Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (GC).
72
‘Spanish minister links arrested pair to Madrid blast’, Agence France Presse, 10 January 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
Business
6.2. Arrested Suspects
32%
Two hundred and twenty-six persons were
arrested in six Member States in relation to
ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in
2006 (see figure 10). Eighty-two percent of the
arrests were made in France and 12 percent in
Spain; these arrests were mainly related to
Governmental
Corsican and Basque separatism.
26%
Private Property,
Critical
Individuals
Infrastructure
Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg
37%
5%
arrested nine suspects related to the terrorist
activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
29
FIGURE 12: Targeting of Separatist Terrorist Groups
All suspects were Turkish citizens.
Business targets of the Basque separatist groups
More than half of the arrested individuals arrest-
included automatic teller machines (ATM) and
ed in France and Spain were suspected of
banks.
involvement in a terrorist attack or the prepara-
tion of an attack. One third of the individuals
Basque separatists also targeted critical infra-
arrested in France and Spain were suspected of
structure, for instance by placing bombs on the
membership in a terrorist organisation. Other
highways in Spain.73
suspected terrorist activities included financing
of terrorism and facilitation. Only one arrest was
The choice of targets by separatist terrorist
related to propaganda.
groups in the EU partially reflects extreme leftist
elements in their agenda. Yet, it is difficult to put
Almost all separatist terrorist suspects arrested
the high number of attacks against private
in France and Spain were EU citizens. The per-
properties into perspective.
centage of women among separatist terrorism
TERRORISM
suspects was about the same as among all
Most separatist attacks in the Basque regions
arrested terrorism suspects with EU citizenship.
and Corsica were committed by using IEDs and
Two thirds of the separatist terrorist suspects
TIST 
Improvised Incendiary Devices (IIDs). Taldes Y
arrested were aged between 26 and 50; their
also used Molotov cocktails during violent
average age was 38 years. Separatist terrorism
ARA
demonstrations and simple IIDs against banks
suspects in France and Spain are clearly older
and ATMs.
than other arrested terrorism suspects in the EU,
which may indicate a longer involvement in ter-
In Corsica, the FLNC–22 Octobre and the
rorist activities and a higher degree of profes-
FLNC–UDC only claimed responsibility for IED
sionalism.
and IID attacks. The FLNC-UDC also claimed
responsibility for the shooting at the Ministry of
6.3. Terrorist Activities
Interior in Bastia.
Almost one third of the
unclaimed attacks in Corsica consisted in da-
All in all, 15 suspects were arrested in relation to
maging property by shooting.
financing of separatist terrorist activities. Half of
them were connected to ETA and four to
In the UK, separatist groups attacked govern-
Corsican separatism. As there was no claim of
TIONALIST  AND SEP
mental and business targets or rival group
responsibility for half of the attacks against pri-
members. Attacks in Northern Ireland typically
vate property in Corsica, it is possible that these
involved the use of low-level IEDs and IIDs or
attacks may have been carried out for the extor-
firearms.
tion of money which would then be used for the
ETHNO-NA
6.

73
Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
financing of terrorist activities. However, no fur-
24 hours in Istanbul and the tourist destina-
ther data on victims was available.
tions of Marmaris and Antalya killing three
people and injuring 47. In Marmaris, ten UK
In Portugal, the activity of the Galician national-
nationals were injured when an IED device
ist-separatist groups increased in 2006.
In
destroyed a minibus.
Responsibility for the
September 2006, several incendiary devices, fly-
attack was claimed by a group called Kurdistan
ers and propaganda material pertaining to
Freedom Falcons (Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan,
Galician pro-independence groups such as the
TAK); the group stated that foreigners should
self-titled GZ Resistźncia Galega were recovered
stay away from tourist areas in Turkey.78 In
at the Spanish-Portuguese border.74
2005, TAK carried out a similar terrorist attack in
the seaside resort of Kusadasi, where a mini-
30
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist organ-
bus was blown up, killing and injuring British
isations campaigning outside the EU raised
and Irish nationals.79
funds in the EU in 2006 for their terrorist activi-
ties (see next chapter).
On 25 June 2006, an explosion in Manavgat, east
of Antalya, killed Dutch, Hungarian, Norwegian
In July 2006, two PKK members were arrested in
and Turkish tourists. No terrorist organisation
France for money laundering aimed at financing
claimed responsibility for this attack.80
terrorism. At the end of 2005, three members of
the PKK were arrested in Belgium and another
The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds
one in Germany suspected of financing the PKK.
clearly escalated in 2006. For instance, accord-
In Belgium, the authorities seized receipt book-
ing to the Turkish foreign ministry, 91 Turkish
lets indicating that the arrested suspects were
soldiers died in clashes with the PKK in the first
collecting ’tax’ from their fellow countrymen.
seven months of 2006. Turkish politicians and
generals claim that the PKK is using bases in
In early 2006, the UK investigated credit card
northern Iraq to launch attacks on Turkey. In
TERRORISM
skimming case with possible links to the LTTE75.
August 2006, a former NATO commander was
The suspicion that this modus operandi may
nominated by the US Department of Justice to
have been used for the financing of the activi-
co-ordinate US efforts with Turkey and Iraq in
TIST 
ties of the LTTE is supported by the arrest of an
order to eliminate the terrorist threat posed by
LTTE member with a British passport and 28
the PKK and other terrorist groups operating in
credit cards in India on 22 January 2007.76
northern Iraq and across the border to
ARA
Furthermore, the LTTE is also known to ‘collect
Turkey.81
donations’ from the Tamils living in the UK.77
The situation in Sri Lanka deteriorated in 2006.
The organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
6.4. Situation outside the EU 
(LTTE) is suspected of the attacks in Mutur on 22
A number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by
May 2006, which targeted the compounds of
ethno-nationalist and separatist groups in
three Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs),
Turkey and Sri Lanka had a direct or indirect
Non-Violent Peace Force (international), ZOA
impact on some Member States and the EU.
(Dutch) and Inter SOS (Italian).
The attack
against  Non-Violent Peace Force left three per-
On 27 August 2006, five bombs exploded within
sons injured.82
TIONALIST  AND SEP
74
Portugal’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
75
‘Garage scam 'funded terror group'’, Hull Daily Mail, 16 January 2007
76
‘Tamil Tiger credit card racket spreads to Chennai’, Asian Tribune, 22 January 2007
77
‘British Tamils are intimidated into giving money to terrorists’, The Times, 5 February 2006
ETHNO-NA
78
‘Kurdish separatists claim deadly attack on popular holiday resorts’, The Independent, 29 August 2006
6.
79
‘Turkish resort blast kills five’, BBC News, 16 July 2005
80
‘Turkey “covers up terror bombings” to protect tourism‘, The Sunday Times, 2 July 2006
81
‘Clashes with Kurds turn Turks against US’, Financial Times, 13 September 2006.
82
‘LTTE attacks offices of INGOs’, www.nmatnet.com, 22 May 2006.


TE-SAT
2007
The inclusion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Separatist terrorists in Corsica carried out a
Eelam (LTTE) in the EU list of proscribed terrorist
high number of low intensity attacks result-
organisations on 29 May 2006 triggered resent-
ing mainly in limited material damage. More
ment against the EU and its representatives in
than half of the attacks targeted private
Sri Lanka. On 8 June, the LTTE objected to the
property. Only six percent of the attacks
formal engagement of EU citizens in the Sri
were committed against governmental tar-
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) which was
gets. Although Corsican separatists have not
established on 22 February 2002, arguing that it
directly tried to kill people, the volume of
was questionable whether they would be suffi-
attacks may increase the risk of casualties.
ciently impartial to be able to adjudicate critical
matters on the ground. Thirty-nine observers to

Dissident Irish republican terrorist groups
the SLMM from Sweden, Finland and Denmark
continue to engage in acts of terrorism in
31
had to leave Sri Lanka by 1 September 2006.83
Northern Ireland involving the use of low-
level improvised explosive and incendiary
Seventeen local employees of the French NGO
devices against a variety of military or busi-
Action Contre la Faim working on a project for
ness targets.
survivors of the 2004 tsunami were murdered in
Mutur on 4 August 2006. The LTTE was suspect-
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
ed of the attack but has denied its involvement.84
remains committed to the political process.

Separatist terrorism suspects in France and
6.5. Key Findings and Trends
Spain are clearly older than other terrorism

The attack at Madrid’s airport resulted in loss
suspects arrested in the EU, which may indi-
of life and injuries. ETA has not only main-
cate a longer involvement in terrorist activi-
tained but rebuilt its capabilities to strike
ties and a higher degree of professionalism.
with well-prepared, organised and coordi-
nated attacks against high-profile targets.

The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in
TERRORISM
the EU is related to the escalation of the ter-
Three months after the unilateral ceasefire,
rorist campaign of Kurdish terrorists in
ETA started to use Taldes Y to carry out a high
Turkey.
TIST 
number of low intensity attacks to maintain
pressure on the Spanish government and to

In 2006, the security situation in Sri Lanka
ARA
demonstrate to its supporters its determina-
deteriorated with the resumption of violence
tion to fight for its goals.
between governmental forces and the LTTE,
with the potential to affect EU interests in the
The threat posed by ETA to Spain depends also
region. This could also result in an increase in
on its capability to control its own members.
illegal fund raising activities within the EU.
TIONALIST  AND SEP
ETHNO-NA
6.

83
See the Press Release of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 August 2006.
84
‘Politicization of Aid in Sri Lanka Turns Deadly’, www.worldwatch.org, 28 August 2006.



TE-SAT
2007
7. LEFT-WING AND 
ANARCHIST TERRORISM
32
7.1. Terrorist Attacks  
Struggle, Revolutionary Brigade, Revolutionary
Liberating Action, and  Anti-Fascist Action.
In 2006, left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried
Anarchist groups, under occasional names such
out 55 attacks in the EU. Their campaigns main-
as  Comrades Group and  Revolutionary Solidarity
ly targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany
Cells, accelerated their campaigns particularly
(figure 13).
towards the end of the year in order to demon-
strate solidarity to their imprisoned comrades.85
A variety of traditional left-wing, anarchist and
Their activity centred mainly on Athens and, to a
other anti-establishment groups were active in
smaller extent, Thessalonica. The agenda of the
Greece. Half of the 25 attacks carried out were
Greek left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups is
claimed by groups such as Revolutionary
driven mainly by domestic politics and social
FIGURE 13: Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorist Attacks and Arrests in 2006 
85
Greece’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
issues; however, the attack of 26 February 2006,
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups at-
for instance, was called an act of solidarity to the
tacked campaigned mainly governmental and
imprisoned members of the French organisa-
business targets (figure 14). There were no dif-
tion Action Directe.
ferences between Member States in this
respect. In Greece, for instance, diplomatic tar-
Italy reported an increase in attacks by left-wing
gets, police forces, vehicles, politicians’ offices
and anarchist terrorist groups. The organisation
and banks, as well as CCTV traffic cameras were
Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito
attacked.
Communista Combattente (BR-PCC) claimed
responsibility for one attack and the organisa-
On 18 October 2006, in Italy, an attack targeted
tion  Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI) and
a company dealing with electronic components
other anarchist groups were held responsible
for weapon systems. Responsibility for this ac-
33
for nine attacks in Rome, major cities in the
tion was claimed in a flyer signed by the organi-
north of the country and Tuscany.
sation Fronte Rivoluzionario.87
In Spain, six attacks were carried out by the First
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups relied
of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
on similar tactics in all targeted Member States.
in Madrid and Barcelona. Two attacks went un-
Most terrorist attacks (92 percent) were carried
claimed. The level of activity of anarchist terror-
out using various IEDs ranging from small letter
ist groups in Spain remained low in 2006.
bombs targeting individuals to larger scale
devices with the aim to damage or destroy
In Germany, the organisations Militante Gruppe
structures and property. A list of the most seri-
and Working group on Colonialism and War in the
ous attacks reads as follows:
Militant Anti-G8 Campaign claimed responsibili-
ty for ten low-impact attacks resulting in limited

The group Revolutionary Struggle claimed
material damage in 2006.
responsibility for a powerful  bomb attack on
the Greek Culture Minister on 30 May 2006.
TERRORISM
In France, the Turkish group Turkiye Kommunist
It stated that its aim had been to assasinate
Partisi/Marksist-Leninist (TKP/ML) was suspected
the Minister.88
of an arson attack against the Turkish consulate
in Paris on 17 June 2006.86

On 2 June 2006, an anarchist terrorist group
called  Rivolta Anonima Tremenda claimed
responsibility for a double attack against a
police station in the town of Fossano in Italy.
Business
The first explosive device was set off to at-
53%
tract attention. Subsequently, another larger
device was set off targeting the police arriv-
ing at the crime scene.
Arson – intentionally setting fire to cause injury
or damage – was also used by many left-wing
and anarchist terrorist groups.
Private Property,
Governmental
The majority of the IEDs and Molotov cocktails
Individuals
43%
LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST 
4%
were constructed from simple, easily available
7.
ingredients, such as butane gas cylinders and
flammable materials, the use of which does not
require special knowledge, organisation or infra-
FIGURE 14: Targeting of Left-Wing and Anarchist
structure.
Terrorist Groups
86
This attack was included in the French national data but reported by Spain to the TE-SAT 2007.
87
Italy’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
88
Greece’s contributions to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
7.2. Arrested Suspects
its terrorist activities in Turkey through criminal
activities such as kidnapping, extortion and
Fifty-two individuals suspected of left-wing and
money laundering.
anarchist terrorist activities were arrested in five
Member States in 2006. Almost half of them
7.4. Key Findings and Trends
were arrested in Italy. Five (of the 52) were sus-
pected of involvement in a terrorist attack or the

Left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out
preparation of an attack. Most arrested individ-
a relatively high number of low intensity
uals were suspected of memberhip of a terrorist
attacks against business and government
organisation.
targets which resulted in limited material
damage. A minority of the attacks, however,
34
Spain arrested six GRAPO members. One mem-
were intended to kill or injure.
ber of GRAPO and his partner were arrested in
Paris on 17 October 2005, after a joint investiga-

Left-wing and anarchist terrorists prefer to
tion conducted by the Spanish and French
use Molotov cocktails and IEDs made of
authorities.
ingredients which are easily available. Their
tactics of choice are unsophisticated and do
Two  thirds of the arrested suspects in Italy and
not require a high level of training, expertise
Spain were aged between 27 and 43 and were
or preparation.
EU citizens. One third of the arrested suspects
were women, which is a much higher percent-

A variety of left-wing and anarchist terrorist
age than among all terrorism suspects arrested
groups are active mainly in Germany, Greece,
in the EU.
Italy and Spain.
In France, 15 people were arrested as a result of

In Greece, the number of terrorist attacks
the dismantling of the French branch of the
rose rapidly towards the end of 2006.
TERRORISM
Turkish TKP/ML while Germany and Belgium
arrested a total of six members of the DHKP/C.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are
Eighteen out of the 21 Turkish suspects were
motivated by domestic politics but they are
male and aged between 26 and 52.
also perpetrated as a part of wider interna-
tional campaigns; for instance, the G8
Summit has already been targeted of left-
7.3. Terrorist Activities
wing and anarchist terrorists.
Left-wing terrorist groups finance their activities
through common violent crime such as extor-

All arrested suspects in Italy and Spain were
tion, bank robberies and kidnapping. For instan-
EU citizens. The percentage of women was
ce, on 6 February 2006, GRAPO carried out an
much higher than among all arrested terror-
armed attack that caused the death of a busi-
ism suspects in the EU.
ness woman and left her husband seriously
injured.

Although the terrorist attacks committed by
left-wing terrorists resulted in limited materi-
GRAPO also carried out an armed bank robbery
al damage, left-wing terrorist groups finance
and a theft in Spain. 89
their activities by violent means such as
LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST 
extortion, bank robbery and kidnapping.
The dismantling of the French branch of
This indicates the existing potential for vio-
7.
TKP/ML revealed that the organisation financed
lence.
89
Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.


TE-SAT
2007
8. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM
35
Right-wing extremist violence is a serious,
The website disseminated a variety of typical
increasing problem in a number of Member
right-wing extremist propaganda in Polish.
States. However, reporting on right-wing terror-
Another website provided contact details of
ism is random as right-wing violence and other
identified targets for possible extremist and ter-
politically motivated crimes are mainly investi-
rorist attacks. The server was located in the US,
gated as right-wing extremism and not as ter-
but the website was updated in Poland. The
rorist offences.
server and the website were closed in coopera-
tion between the Polish authorities and the
Only one right-wing terrorist attack was report-
FBI.92
ed in 2006. In May 2006, two skinheads stabbed
a member of Antify (Anty Nazi Front) in Warsaw.
Right-wing extremists also attack their political
The personal data and the address of the victim
opponents on the Internet. For instance, on 5
were disseminated on the Internet by Blood and
October 2005, German right-wing extremists
Honour, a neo-Nazi organisation active in a num-
hacked a left-wing extremist mail-order site and
ber of Member States.90
published customers’ personal data on the
Internet. The attack came after left-wing extre-
Altogether, fifteen terrorism suspects (N=550)
mists hacked into right-wing extremist discus-
arrested in 2006 were related to right-wing ter-
sion forums. 93
rorism. Terrorist activities investigated included
preparation of an attack, membership of a ter-
Key Findings 
rorist organisation and dissemination of propa-
ganda.

Right-wing violence is mainly investigated as
right-wing extremism and not as right-wing
In September 2006, 11 men and one woman – all
terrorism.
members of Blood, Soil and Honour, which is a
dissident fraction of Blood and Honour – were

The amount of right-wing extremist violence
arrested in Belgium. Nine of them were suspect-
against people is alarming and poses a seri-
ed of plotting terrorist attacks and three were
ous threat. Although violent acts perpetrat-
suspected of arms trafficking. One of them was
ed by right-wing extremist may appear
also suspected of financing terrorist organisa-
mainly sporadic and situational, right-wing
tions via illegal arms trafficking.91
extremist activities are organised and trans-
national.
The Polish police started an investigation into
the dissemination of propaganda on the

Right-wing violence is partly driven by the
Internet by Blood and Honour in February 2006.
agenda of their perceived opponents.
90
Poland’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
91
Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (Monthly Overview Terrorism, September 2006).
92
Poland’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
93
Annual Report of the Protection of the Constitution 2005. Federal Ministry of the Interior.


TE-SAT
2007
9. CONTEXT OF TERRORISM IN THE EU
36
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in
Not very surprisingly,in the age of globalisation ter-
Europe. It has changed over time as have its
rorists and extremists also seek to ‘go global’ and
causes and outward manifestations. The con-
portray their terrorist activities as having a global
text of terrorism in the EU is set primarily by
reach and impact, even as representing a world-
each Member States’ own historical, political,
wide movement. Since the end of the 1990s, the
economical and social circumstances. How-
Internet has enabled the rapid, pervasive and inex-
ever, the EU as a political institution is increas-
pensive exchange and dissemination of informa-
ingly being identified as a symbol and has
tion worldwide. This has empowered terrorist
already become threatened and targeted by
organisations with the ability to shape and dissem-
terrorists.
inate their message in their own way. The Internet
is used by terrorists in various ways for both internal
The phenomenon of terrorism in the EU cannot
and external communication. Virtually all types of
be put into perspective without taking into
terrorist groups have gone online.
account the international security environ-
ment, especially in the case of Islamist terror-
Terrorism in the EU is essentially a transnational
ism.
Terrorist organisations campaigning in
phenomenon. In order to counter terrorism
Third States use the EU as their logistical basis
effectively, law enforcement needs to share infor-
and for funding. Furthermore, regionally limit-
mation, cooperate closely and coordinate its
ed terrorist phenomena outside the EU may
efforts at European level. Law enforcement does
‘spill over’ and impact on Member States; for
not just investigate terrorist attacks in the EU, but
instance, terrorists may target EU tourists to
also prevents terrorist campaigns outside the EU
attract attention from the international com-
by, for instance, disrupting recruitment and fund-
munity to their cause. Terrorism is also increas-
ing of terrorist networks in Europe. Therefore, it is
ingly characterised by externality: actions
important to have a common tool like the TE-SAT
taken by one country have consequences –
2007 providing an overview of the situation
cost or benefits – on other countries. For
regarding the phenomenon of terrorism in the
instance, protective measures taken by one
EU; with this tool Europol can provide added
country may divert a terrorist attack in another
value and support to the Member States in their
country.94
fight against terrorism.
94
Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd (2006) The Political Economy of Terrorism, pp. 20-21.


TE-SAT
2007
ANNEX 1 Abbreviations
BR-PCC
Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Communista Combattente
New Red Brigades, Communist Combatant Party
DHKP/C
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
ETA
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
Basque Fatherland and Liberty
FAI
Federazione Anarchia Informale
37
Informal Anarchist Federation
FLNC-22 Octobre 
Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse 22 Octobre
FLNC-UDC
Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants
GIMC
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GRAPO
Grupo de Restistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group
GSPC
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat
GZ Resistźncia 
Galega
IED
Improvised Explosive Device
IID
Improvised Incendiary Devices
IRA
Oglaigh na hEireann 
Irish Republican Army
LTTE
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
PKK
Kurdistan Workers' Party
aka Kongra Gel aka Kadek
PIRA
Provisional Irish Republican Army
TAK
Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan 
Kurdistan Freedom Falcons 
Taldes Y
“Groups Y”
TATP
Triacetone Triperoxide
TKP/ML
Turkiye Kommunist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist
Turkish Communist Party /Marxist-Leninist
VBIED
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device


TE-SAT
2007
ANNEX 2 
Excerpt from the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism
According to Article 1 of the Council Frame-
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of
work Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating
public or goods transport;
Terrorism (2002/275/JHA), terrorist offences are
intentional acts which, given their nature or
6. manufacture, possession, acquisition, trans-
context, may seriously damage a country or an
port, supply or use of weapons, explosives or
international organisation where committed.
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
as well as research into and development of
38
Terrorist offences are committed with the aim
biological and chemical weapons;
of
7. release of dangerous substances, or causing

seriously intimidating a population, or 
fires, floods or explosions the effect of which
is to endanger human life;

unduly compelling a Government or interna-
tional organisation to perform or abstain
8. interfering with or disrupting the supply of
from performing an act, or 
water, power or any other fundamental natu-
ral resource the effect of which is to endan-

seriously destabilising or destroying the fun-
ger human life;
damental political, constitutional, economic
or social structures of a country or an inter-
9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed
national organisation.
above.
Terrorist offences include
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 obliges Member States
to take the necessary measures to ensure that
1. attacks upon a person’s life which may cause
directing a terrorist group, participating in its
death;
activities including supplying of information
or material resources, or by funding its activi-
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
ties are punishable.
3. kidnapping or hostage taking;
Article 3 obliges Member States to take the neces-
sary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offen-
4. causing extensive destruction to a Govern-
ces include aggravated theft, extortion and
ment or a public facility, a transport system,
drawing up false administrative documents
an infrastructure facility, including an infor-
with a view to commit certain terrorist offences.
mation system, a fixed platform located on
the continental shelf, a public place or pri-
According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or
vate property likely to endanger human life
abetting offences referred to in the Framework
or result in major economic loss;
Decision should also be made punishable.


TE-SAT
2007
ANNEX 3 
Implementation of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in Member
States which Provided Eurojust with Information on Convictions

Country
Details 
Implementation by 8 January 2004 to include the definition of terrorist offences, new
Belgium
investigative powers have been introduced by law of 27 December 2005, which entered
into force on 30 December 2005.
The Counterterrorism Act of 1986 defines terrorism and the elements of this crime are
defined in the penal code. Existing laws were updated by law (24 January 2006): an act
39
France
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence can be punished up to 30 years
and a penalty of € 500,000 can be imposed. New investigative powers are now also
allowed.
On 28 December 2003, Sections 129a and 129b of the Criminal Code were updated to
Germany
implement the 2002 Council Decision.
Terrorism is defined under section 270 of the Criminal Code which dates back to 1980.
An amendment in 2001 extended the definition of terrorism to include violence against
Italy
international organisations. On 31 July 2005, a new definition was adopted reflecting
elements of the Framework Decision. Law 29 of 25 January 2006 implements the direc-
tive of terrorism financing.
Recruitment for the jihad and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence were criminalised
on 10 August 2004. Maximum penalties were increased (on average by some 50%) if
The Netherlands
committed with terrorist intent. A penalty of 15 years was increased to life or 20 years
for actions committed with terrorist intent and from 1 year to 4 years for conspiracy to
commit a terrorist offence. New investigative powers are in place as of 1 January 2006.
Existing laws were updated on 21 May 2003, where new provisions were introduced
Spain
regarding the financing of terrorism.
A new Swedish law of 1 July 2003 provides for higher penalties when an action is com-
Sweden
mitted with a terrorist intent, up to a life sentence.
Terrorism was already defined with the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act and further
extended with the Terrorism Act of 2000 to include actions that can have very serious
United Kingdom
consequences for public security. The Crime (International Co-operation) Act of 2003
implements the Framework Decision with regard to extra-territorial jurisdiction over a
range of terrorist offences. On 30 March 2006, a new Terrorism Act 2006 was adopted.

TE-SAT
2007









EUROPOL