EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
2011 – 45 pp. 21 x 29,7 cm
ISSN Number: 1830-9712
EU TERRORISM SITUATION
AND TREND REPORT
eu terrorism situ
tion and trend repor
ISSN Number: 1830-9712
EU TERRORISM SITUATION
AND TREND REPORT
© European Police Office, 2011
Al rights reserved. Reproduction in any form or
by any means is al owed only with the prior permis-
sion of Europol.
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
(TE-SAT) has been produced by analysts and
experts at Europol, drawing on contributions from
EU Member States and external partners. Europol
would like to express its gratitude to Member
States, Eurojust, third countries and partner or-
ganisations for their high-quality contributions.
Europol: Jo Gidney, Max Schmits; European law
enforcement authorities: France: GIGN; Greece:
Greek Police Bomb Squad; Portugal: PJ-UNCT
(Counter Terrorist National Unit of the Judicial Police);
Sweden: Swedish Bomb Data Centre; Shutterstock;
and Peter Wehle.
Table of contents
1. Foreword by the Director .................................................................................................................4
2. Key judgments .................................................................................................................................6
4. General overview of the situation in the EU in 2010 ..........................................................................9
4.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .....................................................................................9
4.2. Threat statements recorded ................................................................................................... 10
4.3. Terrorist and extremist activities ............................................................................................ 11
4.4. Terrorism and organised crime ............................................................................................... 12
4.5. Convictions and penalties ....................................................................................................... 12
5. Islamist terrorism ........................................................................................................................... 15
5.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ................................................................................... 15
5.2. Terrorist activities .................................................................................................................. 17
5.3. The situation outside the EU .................................................................................................. 18
6. Separatist terrorism ....................................................................................................................... 21
6.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ................................................................................... 21
6.2. Terrorist activities .................................................................................................................. 22
Left-wing and anarchist terrorism .................................................................................................. 25
7.1. Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ................................................................................... 25
7.2. Terrorist and extremist activities ............................................................................................ 27
8. Right-wing terrorism .....................................................................................................................29
8.1. Terrorist activities ..................................................................................................................29
8.2. Right-wing extremist activities ...............................................................................................29
9. Single-issue terrorism .................................................................................................................... 31
9.1. Single-issue terrorist and extremist activities ......................................................................... 31
10. Annexes ........................................................................................................................................ 34
1. Foreword by the director
After the Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(OCTA), the TE-SAT is Europol’s most significant
strategic analysis product. It provides law enforce-
ment officials, policymakers and the general public
with facts, figures and trends regarding terrorism in
the EU. It is a public document produced annually on
the basis of information provided and verified by the
competent authorities of the EU Member States. This
and previous editions of the TE-SAT reports are avail-
able on Europol’s website: www.europol.europa.eu.
In some cases it remains difficult to differentiate be-
tween crime and acts of terrorism and extremism. EU
Member States have agreed to regard terrorist acts
as those which aim to intimidate populations, compel
states to comply with the perpetrators demands and/
Europol plays a key role in the fight against organised or destabilise the fundamental political, constitutional,
crime and terrorism, utilising its unique information economical or social structures of a country or an inter-
capabilities and expertise to support the competent national organisation. The TE-SAT recognises that defi-
authorities of the EU Member States. Nearly ten nition in the col ection and reporting of its source data.
years after the attacks of 11 September 2001, ter-
rorism continues to pose a serious threat to the Eu- In 2010, terrorist attacks took place in nine Member
ropean Union and its citizens. In 2010, seven people States. An increasing number of individuals were ar-
died and scores of individuals were injured as a result rested for the preparation of attacks in the EU. Also,
of terrorist attacks in EU Member States. The fight Member States prevented the execution of various
against terrorism, therefore, remains a top priority attacks, including attacks by Islamist terrorist groups,
for the European Union and for Europol.
which aimed to cause mass casualties.
Meanwhile, developments affecting the political sta- I would like to thank all Member States and Eurojust
bility of neighbouring regions have registered an im- for their contributions, which are essential to the an-
pact on the internal security of the EU. Developments nual production of the TE-SAT. I would also like to
in the Northern Caucasus, North Africa and some express my gratitude to Colombia, Croatia, Iceland,
conflict zones, for example, have influenced terrorist Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States of
activities carried out in Europe.
America and Interpol for their own valuable contri-
butions. Finally, particular thanks go to the members
The economic recession has led to political and so- of the Advisory Board for their advice and support
cial tensions and, in a number of Member States, has throughout the year and their unique input to the
fuelled the conditions for terrorism and extremism. 2011 edition of the TE-SAT.
Although the number of attacks executed by sepa-
ratist terrorist groups decreased and a high number Rob Wainwright
of leaders of these terrorist groups were arrested, the Director
threat from these groups remains substantial. Left-
wing, anarchist, terrorist and extremist activities be-
came more violent in 2010 and led to the death of six
people. Right-wing extremists are increasingly using
the internet for propaganda and single-issue extrem-
ist groups, including animal-rights extremists, are co-
operating more on an international level.
In conclusion, therefore, this report finds that the
threat from terrorism remains high in the EU and is
diversifying in scope and impact.
2. Key judgments
The threat of attacks by Islamist terrorists in the al-Qaeda
but it could also result in more powerful
EU remains high and diverse.
terrorist organisations impacting the EU
, and an
increase in the radicalisation of individuals both in
In the past year, several EU Member States have North Africa and the EU. In the short term, the ab-
successful y prevented attacks by Islamist terrorist sence of terrorist organisations amongst the mass
groups, which aimed to cause mass casualties. Dur- Arab protests across the region has left al-Qaeda
ing 2010, 179 individuals were arrested for offences struggling for a response. Should Arab expecta-
linked to Islamist terrorism, representing a 50% in- tions not be met, the consequence may be a surge
crease compared with 2009. Furthermore a higher in support for those terrorist organisations, and an
proportion of those arrests related to the prepara- increase in radicalisation, both in North Africa and
tion of attacks in the EU (47% compared with 10% elsewhere.
The current and future flow of immigrants origi-
Additional y, the high number of threat statements nating from North Africa
could have an influence
to the EU (46) posted by Islamist terrorist organisa- on the EU’s security situation. Individuals with ter-
tions or their media fronts indicates terrorist groups’ rorist aims could easily enter Europe amongst the
clear intent to target the European Union.
large numbers of immigrants.
Islamist terrorist groups are changing
in composi- Although the goals of terrorist and organised crime
tion and leadership. Terrorist groups are becoming groups (OCGs) are different, the connections be-
multi-national, command and control from outside tween terrorist and organised criminal activities
the EU is decreasing and more lone actors
with EU appear to be growing. Crime is being extensively
citizenship are involved in terrorist activities.
used to finance terrorist activities. Criminal ac-
tivities that terrorist groups are involved in, either
from conflict zones continue to through affiliation with individual criminals and
be a threat to the EU. They return with specific con- criminal groups or through their own operations,
tacts, skil s and modi operandi, and the potential in- can include the trafficking of il egal goods and sub-
tent to apply these in EU Member States.
stances such as weapons and drugs, trafficking in
human beings, financial fraud, money laundering
The political situation in the Northern Caucasus
is and extortion. Separatist terrorist groups such as
increasingly reflected by the activities of members the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and LTTE are involved in the
of the Caucasian diaspora in the EU, supporting ac- trafficking of drugs and human beings to raise funds
tivities of terrorist groups in the Northern Caucasus for their terrorism activities.
financial y and otherwise.
Separatist and ethno-nationalist terrorist groups
The turmoil in North Africa that began in January
rely substantial y on extortion
to finance their ac-2011
is likely to impact al-Qaeda’s core and affiliat-
tivities. It is unlikely that ceasefire declarations by ed organisations
, in both the short and long term. separatist terrorist groups wil mark the end of ter-
The current situation could lead to a setback for
rorist attacks or activities. In 2010, 123 individuals
in France and 104 in Spain were arrested on terror- - they use various methods of communication to pri-
ist offences related to violent separatist activities. oritise, coordinate and support direct action. Cam-
These figures represent a decline from 2009 levels.
paigns of animal-rights activists indicate a shift of
activities from the UK towards the European main-
The economic recession
is conducive to political land which started in 2008/2009 and continued in
tensions and, in a number of Member States, is 2010. There are indications that some members of
triggering both left- and right-wing extremists to animal rights, anarchist and environmental extrem-
demonstrate their views both on the recession’s ist groups are moving towards a shared ideology.
causes and on the solutions required. This is raising Environmental extremism is on the increase.
public order concerns and threatening social cohe-
sion. Growing unemployment, especial y among Terrorist and extremist groups are demonstrating
young people seeking to enter the job market, has increased professionalism in using web-based tech-
radicalised some youths, even those with relatively nologies to present themselves and communicate
high levels of education. In 2010, 45 left-wing and
their ideologies to a larger audience. The internet is
attacks occurred. The increased use of developing into a crucial facilitator
for both terror-violence
led to six fatalities.
ists and extremists.
Evidence shows increased international coop-
between terrorist and extremist groups in
and outside the EU. Left–wing, but also separatist
groups, are col aborating international y. During
2010, clear links between ETA and FARC were de-
termined. The coordination of activities is greatly
facilitated by the wide availability of online commu-
nication tools and applications, and the rise of social
The professionalism of right-wing propaganda
shows that right-wing extremist groups have the
wil to enlarge and spread their ideology, and still
pose a threat in EU Member States. If the unrest in
North Africa leads to a major influx of immigrants
into Europe, right-wing terrorism might gain a new
lease of life by articulating more widespread public
apprehension about immigration.
In 2010, protests by single-issue extremist groups
increasingly focused on the fur industry. These
groups are becoming increasingly network-based
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and anal-
was established in the aftermath of the 11 September yses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terror-
2001 attacks in the United States of America (US), as a ist attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the
reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess
(TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parlia- the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies
ment. The content of the TE-SAT reports is based on and law enforcement measures taken, although it can
information supplied by EU Member States, some third serve to il ustrate some of these. The methodology for
states (Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzer- producing this annual report was developed by Europol
land, Turkey, and the United States of America) and third five years ago and was endorsed by the Justice and Home
organisations (Eurojust and Interpol), as wel as informa- Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.
tion gained from open sources.
This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol
In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT in consultation with the 2011 TE-SAT Advisory Board,
is produced annual y to provide an overview of the ter- composed of representatives of the past, present, and
rorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement future EU Presidencies, i.e. Belgium, Hungary and Poland
perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble (the ‘Troika’), along with permanent members, repre-
figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the Eu- sentatives of France and Spain, the EU Situation Centre
ropean Union. The report also aims to present trends and (EU SITCEN),1 Eurojust and Europol staff.
new developments from the information available to
1 The EU SITCEN provides early warning, situational awareness and intelligence analysis to assist policy development in the areas of the CFSP (Common For-
eign and Security Policy), the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) and counter terrorism. Focus lies on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU SITCEN functions under the authority of Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy.
4. General overview of the
situation in the EU in 2010
• 249 terrorist attacks
Terrorism continues to impact on the lives of EU citizens -
• 611 individuals arrested for terrorist
in 2010, seven people died in the EU as a result of terrorist
• 46 threat statements against EU
Islamist terrorists carried out three attacks on EU terri-
• 307 individuals tried for terrorism charges
tory. Separatist groups, on the other hand, were respon-
• the internet: a crucial facilitating factor for
sible for 160 attacks, while left-wing and anarchist groups
terrorists and extremists
were responsible for 45 attacks. One single-issue attack
was reported from Greece.
4.1. Terrorist attacks and In 2010, 611 individuals were arrested for terrorism-re-
lated offences. An increased percentage of individuals
linked to Islamist terrorism (47%) were arrested for the
In 2010, 249 terrorist attacks were reported in nine Mem- preparation of attacks in Member States – an indication
ber States, while 611 individuals were arrested for terror- that Islamist terrorists continue to undertake attack plan-
ism-related offences. The majority of these attacks were ning against Member States.
in France (84) and Spain (90). A recent fal in attacks in
the EU was reflected by a drop of nearly 50% in attacks in
Spain. Several Member States were successful in prevent-
ing attacks by terrorist groups including those by Islamist
Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects, 2009 and 20102
2 A complete overview of the attacks and arrests per Member State and per affiliation can be found in Annex 2 and 3. For the UK, the figures represent the number of
charges for 2009 and 2010, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in other Member States. However, at this stage in the criminal justice
process it is not possible to assign an affiliation to individual cases.
4.2. Threat statements
For the purpose of this overview, only threat statements Figure 2: Number of threat statements recorded,
made by terrorist organisations were taken into account. 2009 and 2010
Threat statements by and against individuals (often hoax-
es) were not taken into consideration. In 2009 and 2010, • deployment of troops in support of the Afghan gov-
88 threat declarations3 were made by terrorist organisa-
ernment’s fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
tions (42 in 2009, 46 in 2010).
Islamist terrorists deliberately and repeatedly use sym-
The vast majority of these threat statements had an Is- bolic cases in their propaganda (like the Muhammad
lamist terrorist background. The threat statements fo- caricatures or the veil issue) to mobilise support. Threats
cused either on the European Union as a whole, on in- originating from Islamist terrorist groups might also be
dividual Member States, or were directed at European used as a tool for seeking logistical and financial support
interests abroad. Other threat statements were made by and as a means of recruitment.
separatist, left-wing and anarchist groups.
Many of these controversial issues are not new, however
In recent years, there has been a notable increase in they are stil cited as reasons for Islamist terrorist groups
statements written in Western languages (French, Ger- to engage in acts of terrorism against the EU or against
man, Spanish, etc), which broadens the audience for such European interests abroad, as in, for example:
statements. In December 2010, the Court of Appeal in
Brussels, Belgium delivered a verdict for two defendants. Osama bin Laden’s audio speech “To the French peo-
The investigations concerned the use of a Jihadist Salafist ple” as broadcast by al-Jazeera on 27 October 2010:
propaganda tool on the internet – mainly used to cal for
Jihad against France. The website was run from Belgium.
“How can it be right that you intervene in the affairs of Mus-
Although most Islamist terrorist threats are in the form lims in North and West Africa in particular, support your
of more general communiqués addressed to EU Member agents against us and take much of our resources by means
States, some are more specific and appear to be issued of shady deals, whereas our people there experience many
in the hope of inciting vulnerable individuals to commit kinds of misery and poverty? And if you become abusive and
violent acts in the EU. In most cases, the threats refer you think that you have the right to prevent free women
to issues perceived as expressions of Western anti-Islam from wearing the hijab, do we not have the right to expel
sentiments, such as the:
your invading men by striking the necks?”
• Muhammad caricature publishing incidents in Den-
mark and Sweden,
Although most of these statements are not direct indi-
• banning of the veil in France,
cators of future attacks, they may serve as a motivating
• Swiss vote regarding the construction of further factor for home-grown terrorists or diaspora groups to
engage in terrorist activities.
3 The data regarding threat statements is based on Member State contributions and open source intel igence (OSINT).
Left-wing, anarchist and separatist groups often prefer tion, easy, quick, and not restricted by borders. Of note
to use newspapers or TV stations as conduits for threats. are developments in money transfer via mobile phones.
Reviewing the threats issued by these groups in recent
years, it has become clear that these often precede actual Some of the money is financing terrorist organisations
outside the EU. Police investigations in Spain have led to
the detention of 11 individuals linked to Islamist terrorist
4.3. Terrorist and
groups that were active in recruiting new members and in
financing terrorism. There are indications that an increas-
ing number of Islamist terrorist cel s in Europe are col-
lecting money for their own activities and no longer send
Al terrorist organisations need logistical support for their much to their parent organisations outside the EU. Mem-
activities. The maintenance of a network, the support of ber States with Kurdish diasporas are witnessing - and
cel s and the procurement of material items (tools, weap- actively combating - fundraising activities of adherents
ons, communication systems, false identity documents) of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL in their jurisdictions. There are
al cost money. These activities, together with recruit- also indications that criminal y obtained funds are being
ment, training and transport, can be a severe drain on used to support terrorist groups in the North Caucasus.
resources. In recent years, an increasing number of Mem-
ber States have reported on specific instances and meth- Communication
ods of financing of terrorism, in al likelihood an indica- The internet
is currently a crucial facilitating factor
tion that more terrorist groups are attempting to increase both terrorists and extremists. The internet has reached
their resource bases.
a firmly established position in the array of instruments
used for radicalisation and self-radicalisation, propa-
In order to acquire the necessary means to fund their il- ganda, incitement and recruitment
. The use of social
legal activities or establish and further expand their posi- media
broadens exposure and increases the speed of
tion, terrorist groups tend to resort to various sources of
communication, enabling terrorist and extremist net-financing
which may, in a few cases, include state spon- works, individuals and associates to share information
sorship. More common are voluntary or coercive contri- quickly. Internet videos explaining a movement’s ideol-
butions from domestic or diaspora
communities. Inter- ogy and tactics al ow groups to transmit important infor-
net and mobile telecommunication platforms are used mation to fol owers without having to travel across bor-
to send video clips to potential donors on their mobile ders.
phones, fol owed by requests for financial support.
Another method of communication used by separatist
Money for terrorist activities can be generated from le- terrorist groups, is the posting of messages
gal investments and legitimate businesses. Alternatively, text via a television network
. They use these methods to
terrorists resort to criminal acts, such as kidnapping and try and reduce the risk of their communications being in-
extortion, fraud, armed robbery, counterfeiting opera- tercepted.
tions, and trafficking drugs and human beings. Terrorist
groups in the Sahel region, in particular, rely heavily on Although terrorist and extremist propaganda on the in-
kidnappings for ransom. This is facilitated by the transfer ternet is a powerful tool for the mobilisation and radi-
of money which is now, thanks to global telecommunica- calisation of vulnerable individuals, the internet and so-
money laundering, and fraud for the purpose of funding
terrorist (support) operations. Several Member States
also report that terrorist groups are in contact with OCGs
to procure weapons.
Low level, individual and tribal contacts between OCGs
active in drugs trafficking in West Africa, and ‘sub groups’
of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), raises the
possibility that drugs trafficking to the EU could become
a source of funding for some terrorist groups operating in
the Sahel region.
4.5. Convictions and
In 2010, there were 125 court proceedings involving ter-
cial media alone might not initiate terrorist or extremist rorist charges reported in 10 Member States. In 2010, 307
activities. Social media tools al ow al kinds of groups to individuals were tried on terrorism charges, for which a
lower the cost of participation, organisation, recruitment total of 332 verdicts were handed down. Out of those 307,
and training; they also al ow members of terrorist groups 26 were female. The number of individuals tried in 2010
to communicate easily among themselves and often in a decreased compared to 2009, when 398 individuals were
relatively secure way. Despite net-based communication tried.
technology, face-to-face contact and real world interac-
tion remain important.
The highest number of individuals tried for terrorist of-
fences in 2010 were in Spain, repeating the trend shown
4.4. Terrorism and
in 2009. France reported a decrease in the number of in-
dividuals brought before court. Germany, Ireland and the
Netherlands saw an increase compared to 2009, whereas
Although the goals of terrorist and organised crime Italy and the UK have seen a steady decrease in the past
groups (OCGs) are different, an issue which is of growing three years.
concern to EU law enforcement are the connections be-
tween terrorist and organised crime groups’ activities.
Not al individuals arrested in one reporting period wil be
brought to trial in the same or fol owing year. Many of the
Drugs and human trafficking are occasional y joint ven- cases reported are linked to events of previous years. In
tures between organised crime and terrorist groups, and 2009 there was a significant decrease in the number of ar-
are sometimes an in-house activity of terrorist groups. rests compared to previous years. Equal y, the number of
Information obtained from EU Member States shows, individuals brought to trial in 2010 declined by almost a
for instance, that both the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and LTTE quarter, for example:
are actively involved in drugs and human trafficking, the
facilitation of il egal immigration, credit card skimming,
12 | TE-SAT 2011
trials conducted for Islamist and left-wing terrorism.
France comes second with regard to the number of ver-
dicts handed down for separatist and Islamist terrorism.
Figure 3: Number of individuals tried for terrorism
Italy is third for verdicts of left-wing terrorism, fol owed charges in 2009 and 20104
by the UK with Islamist terrorism. In Germany and Bel-
gium, Islamist terrorism accounted for ten and nine ver-
A German court in Düsseldorf convicted four men in dicts respectively.
connection with a foiled terrorist plot against Western
targets. Evidence showed that they had begun mixing In early 2010, the Audiencia Nacional
in Spain tried a case
explosive materials that could have resulted in a strong of seven individuals, who were held responsible for a
blast, more powerful than the attacks in July 2005 on bomb attack in the city of Vigo in May 2000. Two secu-
London’s public transport network and the 2004 Madrid rity guards were kil ed and four others seriously injured in
Atocha train bombings. In 2007, the German defendants the attack. Two of the suspects are considered leaders of
of the Sauerland group had stockpiled 700 kgs of highly the GRAPO, who gave orders to commit terrorist actions
concentrated hydrogen peroxide; mixed with other sub- and who have been prosecuted in the past for numerous
stances it could have led to the manufacture of explosives terrorist attacks. Five defendants were convicted by the
equivalent to 500 kgs of dynamite. The German authori- court.
ties had, during the surveil ance period, covertly replaced
the hydrogen peroxide with a diluted substitute that Across the EU, the percentage of acquittals has gone up
could not have been used to produce a working bomb. from 17% in 2009 to 27% in 2010. In 2008, that percentage
The group’s planned targets included the Ramstein Air was 23%.
Base and other U.S. military and diplomatic instal ations
in Germany, with the aim of forcing Germany to stop us- Reported court proceedings in relation to separatist ter-
ing an air base in Uzbekistan to supply German troops in rorism have the highest acquittal rate (32%), fol owed by
Afghanistan. The defendants had been members of the proceedings related to left-wing and Islamist terrorism,
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) since 2006 and had trained at with an acquittal rate of 22% and 21% respectively. This
camps in Pakistan. They were found guilty of member- fol ows similar reports in 2009.
ship of a terrorist organisation and of providing support
to the organisation. Al defendants confessed to their role Five out of ten Member States have a ful conviction rate.
in the plot, which contributed to the successful comple- Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the UK have had mostly suc-
tion of the trial. Sentences of up to 12 years’ imprison- cessful prosecutions. Of the 332 verdicts, 157 were still
ment were handed down.
pending appeal at the end of 2010.
The majority of reported verdicts in EU Member States The acquittal rate in Spain, which has the largest number
in 2010, as with 2009, relate to separatist terrorism. The of verdicts, went up from 21% in 2009 to 38% in 2010.
total number of verdicts decreased from 408 in 2009 to These acquittals are due to characteristics of the Spanish
332 in 2010. Spain continues to experience the majority judicial system, which is strongly focused on prevention
of separatist attacks. It also has the highest number of and protection.
4 Details per Member State, see annex 4.
Ireland (Republic of)
Figure 4: Average penalty per convicted
individual (in years)5
The average penalty imposed in Europe is now approxi-
mately 6 years. The average punishment appears to be 11
years for verdicts handed down for separatist terrorism, 13
years for left-wing and 7 years for Islamist terrorism acts.
5 In the UK, there were four life sentences given for conspiracy to murder. For the purpose of the overview, sentences exceeding 40 years and life sentences
have been counted as equivalents of 40 years.
5. Islamist terrorism
• 3 Islamist terrorist attacks carried out in the Mem-
in the preparation of an attack and the ability to adapt
security measures, as wel as a high degree of creativity in
• 179 individuals arrested for Islamist terrorist
circumventing them. This incident could have caused se-
rious damage and possible loss of life for a large number
• 89 individuals arrested for the preparation of at-
of EU citizens.
tacks in the EU
• Terrorist recruitment and support networks are ac-
The number of Islamist terrorist attacks actual y carried
tive in many EU Member States
out in the EU was limited to three attacks in 2010. They
• The security situation outside the EU impacts on
caused minimal damage to the intended targets. Poten-
Islamist terrorist activities inside the EU
tial y, however, at least two of these attacks could have
caused mass casualties and multiple fatalities. The at-
tacks shared some characteristics of motive, location
5.1. Terrorist attacks and
and, fortunately, lack of familiarity with explosives:
• On 1 January 2010, a 28-year-old Somali, linked to the
In line with previous years, Member States reported that
radical Islamist organisation al-Shabab, attempted to
the threat of Islamist terrorism by Al-Qaeda inspired
kil the Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. The car-
groups and affiliates is high - although the threat level is
toonist has been living under police protection since
not the same in al Member States. Moreover, a diverse
his caricature of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad,
spectrum of actors poses a risk, from organised terrorist
first published in a Danish newspaper in 2005, caused
to radicalised individuals
, inspired by extremist
agitation in Islamist circles. On the occasion of this at-
ideologies. These latter individuals are often hard to iden-
tack, Westergaard managed to save his life by locking
tify as they act alone
and their activities can be unpredict-
himself in a panic room in his house until the police
able and difficult to prevent.
arrived. On 4 February 2011, the defendant was sen-
tenced to nine years imprisonment.
In November 2010, two packages containing explosive • On 10 September 2010, a minor and apparently pre-
devices, sent on 29 October by airfreight from Yemen to
mature explosion was caused by a Russian national of
the US, were intercepted. One of the two packages was
Chechen origin in a hotel toilet in Copenhagen, close
intercepted at East Midlands Airport in the UK, the oth-
to the offices of the Jylands Posten newspaper that
er in Dubai. Both devices originated in Sanaa and were
published the cartoons some years previously. The
addressed to synagogues in Chicago. Highly-explosive
suspect used a Belgian passport with a false name.
PETN was hidden in printer toner cartridges in the pack- • On 11 December, an attack took place in Sweden,
ages. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed
consisting of two separate explosions in the centre of
credit for this attempted attack. As the two packages
Stockholm. The first explosion occurred in a vehicle re-
were not addressed to European destinations, it would be
portedly registered to the originator of several audio-
misleading to claim that the EU, as such, was targeted.
file threats e-mailed to the Swedish TT news agency,
However, one of these explosive devices could very well
and addressed to the Swedish Security Service, from
have exploded on the ground during the stopover in the
a Hotmail account moments before the attack. In
UK, or somewhere in the air above European territory.
the audio-file, the perpetrator claimed to be carrying
This incident demonstrated a high level of sophistication
out a terrorist attack in retaliation for cartoons of the
In common with previous years, individuals born in North The boundaries between networks, media outlets and
Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) represent one Islamist terrorist organisations appear increasingly po-
third of al arrested suspects. The proportion of persons rous. Some media outlets have been specifical y created
with EU citizenship or born in the EU is further increas- to authenticate statements from a particular terrorist
ing. This suggests that home-grown terrorism
and the organisation. Occasional y, they also relay communica-
extreme radicalisation of EU citizens is an ongoing source tions from other groups; an example is AQIM’s media arm
, which published a statement from a Nigerian Boko Haram
leader in October.
Member States on the Eastern borders of the EU
so far, been less of a target for Islamist terrorists. Howev- In July 2010, AQAP launched its first English-language on-
er, a number of arrests in Romania indicate that some EU line magazine, cal ed ‘Inspire’. Denmark, the Netherlands
Member States may be used as transit countries
to other and the UK were mentioned as potential targets in the
parts of Europe. Also, the possibility cannot be ruled out October issue of this magazine. Other European coun-
that those countries serve as operational rear bases from tries specifical y mentioned in Islamist terrorist propagan-
which terrorist groups can develop their logistical and fi- da in 2010 included Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and Sweden.
5.2. Terrorist activities
The internet and online jihadist forums are a major con-
tributing factor to the radicalisation of vulnerable indi-
Propaganda, radicalisation, incitement
viduals. Social networks are also considered useful com-
munication channels for Islamists. In addition, organised
Islamist propaganda on the internet is distributed by 10 meetings in private homes or mosques provide personal
to 20 wel established major forums that have thousands contacts. These are often essential to the radicalisation
of regular members worldwide. These forums are run by and recruitment processes.
several administrators and spread over various web serv-
ers located in countries where internet regulations are The EU remains the focus of a propaganda campaign, in
not applied as in Europe. Therefore, the arrest of one ad- which videos featuring EU nationals are broadcast on the
ministrator would not significantly impact the activities internet. In April 2010, the German Taleban Mujahideen
of the forum. Administrators exchange instructions on released a video showing German- and English-speaking
procedures to fol ow if one of them is arrested, to ensure members inciting individuals to travel to Afghanistan to ‘business continuity’
for each forum.
join the jihad. Such publications in the media are consid-
ered powerful tools for mobilisation and radicalisation,
Parts of forums are usual y made accessible to non- thereby increasing the pool of potential activists in the EU.
registered visitors. The rest of the forum has restricted
access to ensure anonymity of the users and to protect In many Member States there is evidence of the exist-
against infiltration. Islamist terrorist organisations claim ence of wel -organised recruitment and logistical sup-
that their ‘official’ statements are released only through port networks. Volunteers are recruited in the EU to sup-
specific forums, indicating that other sources are not con- port Islamist terrorist activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the Northern Caucasus, Somalia and Yemen, to men-
tion the most important conflict zones. In May 2010, a
logistical support and recruitment network was disman- 5.3.1. Threats to the EU from abroad
tled in France. That network was responsible for the re- EU Member States are mentioned in terrorist publica-
cruitment and travel of nine French and Tunisian men tions as potential targets with varying emphasis. Reasons
who left France between July 2008 and April 2009 to join include al eged European support for the ‘occupation’ of
the fight against the coalition forces in Afghanistan. They Palestine, the American ‘invasion’ in Afghanistan and,
were likely to be recruited and trained to commit terrorist previously, in Iraq, playing a part in the al eged blasphemy
actions upon their return to France. Manuals to avoid de- of the Prophet Muhammad, and the banning of the veil.
tection by law enforcement authorities and intel igence These ‘justifications’ for terrorist attacks mainly serve
services were found during these investigations.
to create a semblance of legitimacy. They also apply to
Member States who have not been targeted until now.
It is clear that, should other regional conflicts become
‘marketed’ as ‘jihadist theatres’, additional volunteers 5.3.2 EU citizens and interests targeted abroad
may be recruited in the EU to support them. The current A number of EU nationals became victims of Islamist ter-
number of Europeans in jihadist theatres is estimated to rorist activities outside the EU in 2010.
be in the low hundreds – a smal number but nevertheless
potential y very dangerous.
North Africa and the Sahel region
In al-Qaeda propaganda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
5.3. The situation outside
the struggle against the Algerian government, and more
recently the Mauritanian government, remains the pre-
dominant topic to which the group has added elements
The phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in the EU cannot of al-Qaeda’s ideology of ‘global jihad’ and solidarity
be put into perspective without taking into account the messages to the al-Qaeda senior leadership and other
international security environment.
al-Qaeda affiliates. AQIM is considered a major source
of concern, in particular for both Spain and France. Spain
The security situation of EU Member States can be influ- is often referred to in AQIM statements on the internet.
enced in many ways - from direct attacks carried out from Under the pretext of its ‘occupation’ of Ceuta and Melil a,
the outside on EU Member States, to funding and facili- Spain is criticised, threatened, and confronted with cal s
tating the radicalisation of EU citizens to undermine soci- to “take back Ceuta and Melil a by force, because they
ety from the inside. The targeting of EU citizens and inter- were taken by force”. AQIM has not specifical y threat-
ests abroad is also a source of major concern. Anger over ened an attack on French or Spanish soil, but this possibil-
the cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad, after its re-issue ity has to be taken into consideration.
in 2008, inspired one of Indonesia’s most wanted terror
suspects to plan a 2010 attack on the Danish embassy in The growing number of Western nationals abducted in
Jakarta,6 identifying not only the cartoonist, but Denmark Mali, Mauritania and Niger in recent years underlines
and Danish interests abroad as targets for ‘retaliation’.
AQIM’s enlargement strategy and permanent presence
in the Sahel region.
The fol owing paragraphs describe some developments
and events relating to terrorism in regions outside the EU AQIM is being held responsible for kidnapping several EU
that could have a possible impact on Member States or citizens. In 2010, five French nationals were kidnapped
their interests abroad.
and a 79-year-old French hostage was kil ed in
6 “Indonesia foils plot on Danish Embassy: report”, Associated Press, 25 June 2010.
Mali. Fol owing the first incident, Osama bin Laden him- also capable of chal enging legitimate Western interests
self made a statement to the effect that the kidnapping of outside the EU. The instability of state security forces may
the five French nationals had been prompted by “France’s weaken the ability of states such as Algeria to effectively
unjust treatment of Muslims”, linking the kidnapping to tackle a group such as AQIM. Furthermore, such organi-
France’s presence in Afghanistan. It appears that AQIM is sations may be able to take advantage of the temporary
increasing its threats to French interests and French na- reduction of state control for terrorist purposes.
tionals in West Africa.
On the other hand, the absence of terrorist organisations
has become an area for terrorist activities and amongst the protesting mass of Arabs across the region
is the home to AQAP fol owing its expulsion from Saudi has left the al-Qaeda core and its affiliates struggling
Arabia. AQAP leadership declared that the group would for a response. To a large degree, organisations such as
free the host country of “crusaders and their apostate AQIM have been reduced to observers, incapable of in-
agents”, that they are “in [the] early stages” and would fluencing events in any significant fashion. Moreover,
conduct a “war of attrition” against the Yemeni army.7 the failure of terrorist organisations in North Africa to re-
Several attacks have been carried out in the country, pri- move dictatorial regimes through decades of bombings
marily targeting the military, tourism and oil industries. and assassinations contrasts significantly with the rapid
Attacks affecting Western interests involved the U.S. Em- success of peaceful mass protests. Such clear contradic-
bassy and the UK Consul’s vehicle. In June 2009, a German tion to what al-Qaeda has insisted is the only means of
family of five, together with four other foreign nationals, defeating entrenched regimes is likely to result in a nota-
were taken hostage by unidentified militants in Yemen. ble setback for terrorist organisations in terms of support
Two of the children of the family were rescued almost a and recruitment.
year later, in May 2010.
is home to the Lashkar e Taiba (LeT), which
is no longer a major theatre of conflict, a is thought to have become a more global terrorist or-
number of attacks were stil executed over the reporting ganisation. The exact size of the group is unknown, but
year, some also targeting EU interests. On 4 April 2010, estimates cite several thousand members. The LeT is
suicide bombers detonated their explosives-laden vehi- accused of numerous terrorist attacks, including the No-
cles outside the Egyptian, German, Iranian and Spanish vember 2008 assault in Mumbai that kil ed nearly two
embassies in Baghdad, kil ing 41 people and wounding hundred people and injured more than three hundred.
more than 200.
In May 2010, the founder and leader of the LeT criticised
the intention of France and Belgium to ban the wearing
Recent political developments in countries such as Tunisia of burqas, and explained this as a move by the West to
and Egypt show that peaceful demonstrations by ordinary split Muslims. The issue of burqas has caused controversy
people may be more effective than terrorist attacks in in several EU countries.
overthrowing autocratic regimes. Such mass actions may,
however, create a democratic space for organisations In early September, the senior commander of the Tehrik-
with similar objectives as those of AQIM in Algeria and e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) announced that the organi-
AQAP in Yemen, al owing them to expand their activities sation was planning terrorist strikes against targets in
and develop into forces wil ing and, perhaps in the future, Europe and the US, in response to drone attacks aimed
7 “AQAP leader announces formation of ‘Aden-Abyan Army’ in Yemen”, Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report - Daily Update, 12 October 2010.
at its leadership. The failed bomb attempt in New York’s Caucasus in 2010 have had an impact on North Caucasian
Times Square on 1 May was al egedly directed, and also communities in Europe. Suggestions that North Cauca-
possibly financed, by the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) in Paki- sian networks in Europe are developing activities to facili-
stan. The American-Pakistani perpetrator held responsi- tate, fund and support
Islamist insurgency in the North
ble for the failed attack had just returned to the US from Caucasus appear to have been confirmed by arrests made
in 2010. The possibility that radicalised North Caucasians
could attack non-Russian targets in the EU is a matter of
5.3.3. Returning jihadists
Of ongoing concern is the number of predominantly young EU nationals travel ing to conflict areas
clude the Afghan/Pakistani border, Somalia and Yemen
with the intent to take part in armed combat or join train-
ing camps. Those individuals pose a serious risk, because
of the contacts, skil s and modi operandi used in combat
zones and the potential intent to apply these on EU soil.
In a video posted on the internet, the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU) praised the five German jihadists
who were kil ed by a drone attack in Pakistan. The video
Al Shabab, Somalia
, now poses an imminent threat to showed a member of the IMU speaking in German for
East African countries and is also a serious concern to 30 minutes in front of a video montage of violent im-
Western interests in the region. The group has the re- ages. Another recruiting video in German, produced by
solve to attack East African countries and has developed the IMU, was posted on an Al Qaeda website. The video
the operational capability to carry out substantial attacks shows how European Jihadists are joining combatants
outside Somalia, as demonstrated by the bomb attacks fighting in Pakistan’s mountainous tribal areas. It includes
in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010, for which they claimed a cal to arms, exhorting young sympathisers to join them
responsibility. At least 64 people were kil ed as they in their fight against Pakistan and its American al y. These
watched coverage of the World Cup final in South Africa.
and other video messages, posted online by Islamist ter-
rorist groups, play an important role in radicalising sus-
If Al-Shabab were to become involved in piracy, such a ceptible individuals.
move could affect the overal dynamic of the conflict in
Somalia, and increase the risk of terrorism in the Gulf of
Aden, posing an immediate threat to Western and Asian
Investigations in several Member States underline the
hypothesis that some North Caucasian
lished in Europe appear to be linked to Islamist extrem-
ist circles, and that the increased tensions in the North
6. Separatist terrorism
• 160 separatist attacks occurred in 2010, mainly in
France and Spain
• A police officer was kil ed by ETA in France
• 349 individuals arrested for separatist terrorist
• Most of the separatist groups finance their
activities through extortion
• Increased international cooperation between sepa-
ratist terrorist groups inside and outside the EU
• Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups,
such as ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna)8 and the PKK/
KONGRA-GEL, continue to seek international rec-
ognition and political self-determination. They are
motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion
6.1. Terrorist attacks and
Figure 6: Number of failed, foiled or completed
attacks and number of suspects arrested for
separatist terrorism in Member States in 2010
In 2010, 160 attacks were claimed or attributed to separa-
tist terrorist organisations in Austria, France, Italy, Northern No attacks were carried out by ETA itself in Spain. Howev-
Ireland (UK) and Spain. Ten percent of the attacks failed.
er, SEGI (and its Taldes Y
)9 carried out a total of 55 attacks
in Spain. This represents a decrease of 56% compared to
In France and the UK, the number of separatist terrorist 2009. Incendiary and home-made explosive devices were
attacks increased, while in Spain the number of attacks used in the SEGI attacks. In 2010, 104 individuals were ar-
rested for separatist terrorist related offences in Spain;
the vast majority of these were linked to ETA.
The majority of individuals held responsible for terrorist
attacks were arrested in France (123), Spain (104), and the Of those arrested, 22% were female - a high percent-
Republic of Ireland (57). Of these, 75% of the individuals age in comparison to other types of terrorism. The vast
were linked to organisations that executed attacks in the majority of these women were arrested for membership
EU during 2010.
of a terrorist organisation or for facilitation. ETA and SEGI
members were also arrested in other European states,
Separatist terrorism continues to target government of- such as Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK.
ficials. In France a police officer was kil ed by ETA.
8 The names of groups/organisations will be in the original language in the body of the document. For translations and an explanation of acronyms,
please see Annex 1.
9 SEGI is the youth organisation of ETA, responsible for street violence (or low intensity terrorism). The attacks, mainly by incendiary devices, are executed by
SEGI’s Taldes Y. ETA is responsible for the command and control of SEGI and other organisations, such as BATASUNA.
In the Galicia region, the number of attacks increased In January 2010, a parcel bomb was sent to the Indian Em-
(nine in 2009 and nineteen in 2010), but these should be bassy in Italy and claimed by LTTE. In 2010, 27 individuals
classified into two different categories: four of them can were arrested for terrorist offences linked to the financing
be attributed with certainty to the terrorist group Resist-
of LTTE in France, Germany and the Netherlands. encia Galega
,10 whereas the other fifteen could have been
committed by individuals or smal groups whose actions 6.2. Terrorist activities
appear to be an answer to Resistencia Galega’s separatist
cal , but whose membership of the organisation cannot The main source of income for separatist terrorist
groups in Europe is extortion.
It is estimated that, in
the first semester of 2010 alone, ETA col ected 3.1 mil-
In 2009, France
saw a historical decrease in violent ac- lion euros from businessmen from the Basque region
tions by Corsican separatist groups. 2010 saw a signifi- and Navarra. Some extortion letters demanded up to
cant increase: 83 attacks were reported and 42 individuals 400 000 euros.11
arrested. More than half of the attacks were on private
properties, bearing resemblance to criminal extortion
The PKK/KONGRA-GEL and LTTE also col ect money attempts.
from their members, using labels like ‘donations’ and
‘membership fees’, but are in fact extortion and il egal
The violent campaign by ‘Irrintzi’ in the French Basque taxation. In addition to organised extortion campaigns,
country, targeting the tourism and real estate sectors, there are indications that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and
has significantly decreased in intensity: in 2010 there was the LTTE are actively involved in money laundering, il icit
only one attempted
drugs and human trafficking, as wel as il egal immigra-
tion inside and outside the EU. In March 2010, a simulta-
A total of 40 attacks
were carried out by Northern Irish neous and joint operation against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL
and Republican terrorist groups. As a result, 57 individu- was carried out in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
als were arrested in the Republic of Ireland, some for of- Turkey. Investigations into the PKK/KONGRA-GEL were
fences directly connected to attacks in Northern Ireland. also conducted in Italy, Romania and Slovakia. These
The majority were members of the Real IRA (RIRA).
investigations into PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities were
linked to recruitment, financing, logistical support, prop-
Republican terrorist groups (RTG), notably the Real IRA aganda and training camps.
(RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA), continue to pose a
threat in the UK. The size and capability of these terror- The likelihood that the ceasefire declarations
ist groups has increased in recent years. Attacks were separatist terrorist groups real y mark the end of terrorist
principal y on law enforcement personnel and premises, attacks or activities must, based on previous experience,
and they involved attack methods such as vehicle-borne be considered low.
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) using home made
10 Resistencia Galega is an embryonic terrorist group in the Galicia region of Spain which made its first public appearance in July 2005. Its main goals are self-
determination for Galicia, independence from Spain, and the establishment of a socialist state. Their main targets are: banks, (national) political parties, security
and armed forces, energy companies, real estate and temporary job agencies, (national) mass media.
11 Source: Spanish media El Diario Vasco, ETA envió en agosto una remesa de cartas de extorsión a empresarios, 6 September 2010.
attempt by ETA’s political wing (BATASUNA) to partici-
pate in the upcoming local elections, which wil take place
The announcement, in June 2010, of the PKK/KONGRA-
GEL intention to enter a more violent period of its history
was immediately fol owed by the declaration of a cease-
fire which was, in turn, belied by the bomb attack in Is-
tanbul in October 2010. No execution of attacks in the EU
show the PKK/KONGRA-GEL’s double strategy of armed
struggle in Turkey while at the same time seeking to gain
a greater degree of legitimacy abroad. It is assumed that
the organisation wil continue to fol ow this double strate-
gy. The terrorism threat posed by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL
to EU Member States and the intention can currently be
considered as relatively low. However the large number
of PKK/KONGRA-GEL militants living in the EU and the
is currently operating at one of its weakest continuing support activities in the EU, like large demon-
moments ever - it announced in September 2010 it would strations organised in the past, show that the PKK/KON-
stop its ‘offensive actions’ - it is stil involved in recruit- GRA-GEL is in a position to mobilise its constituency at
ing new members, col ecting money via extortion and any time and is an indication that it maintains the capabil-
looking for new caches to store explosives and weapons. ity to execute attacks in the EU.
ETA has a long history of cal ing permanent cease fires
only to resume militant activities months later. Similar
announcements were made in 1998 and 2006, after the
terrorist group suffered organisational setbacks. The ar-
rests of prominent leaders in several Member States, the
disruption of the group’s logistical bases and moves to
other locations (mainly Portugal), and the dismantling
of operational units, prevented ETA from committing at-
tacks and led the terrorist organisation to focus on its own
While ETA’s power decreased, the underlying ideology
has al owed the separatist movement to come back
under different leaderships and continue its use of vio-
lence for political purposes. This could mean that ETA is
prepared to commit attacks again in the future - to show
that it maintains some operational capabilities. The an-
nouncement of September 2010 could be seen as an Precursors for home-made explosives, ETA, Portugal
Separatist terrorist groups
are becoming increasingly self-reliant
. ETA has resorted to homemade explosives
They obtain precursors, either by buying them on the
market or stealing them from companies, inside or out-
side Spain, who specialise in the production or storage
of these precursors. These companies are general y less
secure against theft than those that manufacture explo-
sives. Portugal and France remain ETA’s main logistical
bases but further law enforcement operations in these
countries could have an impact on ETA’s search for other
logistical safe havens.
Greater levels of cooperation have been observed be-
tween separatist terrorist groups inside and outside
. Separatist terrorist groups are increasingly ex-
changing expertise and knowledge. Contacts between
ETA and FARC members came to the notice of authorities
in 2010. Frequent travel by ETA members to Venezuela
indicates that there is a link between ETA and FARC. ETA
trains FARC members to make explosives.
Separatist groups use international propaganda and
their own media
(TV and radio stations). Member States
report that separatist organisations, such as the LTTE,
ETA and the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, spread their ideas at
cultural gatherings, during demonstrations and sporting
events, and through television channels, such as the Tamil
Television Network and ROJ TV.
ETA also maintained its propaganda
activities in 2010,
disseminating five statements and giving one interview,
sometimes seeking interviews or coverage with foreign
in an attempt to attract international attention.
7. Left-wing and anarchist
• 45 left- wing and anarchist terrorist
An increasing number of Member States are now making
attacks occurred in 2010
a distinction between the activities of left-wing and anar-
• 6 fatalities including 1 Greek police officer
chist groups. This distinction is reflected in the descriptive
• 34 individuals arrested for left-wing and
parts of this report, but does not show in the statistics.
anarchist terrorist activities
A number of incidents which occurred in the EU were
• Increased violence in attacks
claimed by anarchist groups, most often on the internet.
• Increased transnational coordination
They were prosecuted as extremist attacks, as opposed
between terrorist and extremist left-wing and
to terrorist attacks, and therefore do not appear in the
statistics since these cover terrorist attacks exclusively.
7.1. Terrorist attacks and
In 2010, left-wing and anarchist groups remained very
active in Europe. More attacks occurred than in previous
years and the increased use of violence
in their actions
led to six fatalities.
Traditional y, these groups are most active in Greece, Italy
and Spain. However, a number of other countries have
also seen increased activity in 2010. Social unrest among
the population, caused by the global economic downturn
and the reduction of state spending on social welfare,
may have influenced this development, which has been
noticeable since 2007. The modus operandi in a number
of attacks showed signs of increased internationalisa-
of left-wing and anarchist groups – although both
have historical y been international in outlook.
Figure 7: Number of failed, foiled or completed
attacks and number of suspects arrested for left-
In 2010, a total of 45 terrorist attacks by left-wing and wing and anarchist terrorism in Member States in
anarchist groups were reported by Austria, the Czech 2010
Republic, Greece, Italy and Spain. This represents an in-
crease of 12% compared to 2009. In Greece, five terrorist
Left-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire po- groups carried out a total of 20 attacks - an increase of
litical, social and economic system of a state according over 30% compared to 2009.
to an extremist left-wing model. Their ideology is of-
ten Marxist-Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist
groups is revolutionary and anti-capitalist but also anti-
Anarchist groups in Spain are mainly active in Catalonia;
they carried out 16 attacks in 2010. Most were arson at-
tacks, targeting business and governmental interests,
without causing injuries.
Although traditional y most attacks occur in Greece, Italy
and Spain, in 2010, an arson attack damaged the Greek
Embassy in the Czech Republic. A job centre in the Aus-
trian capital, Vienna, was also targeted.
34 persons were arrested for left-wing and anarchist of-
fences in 2010. These arrests took place in five EU Mem-
ber States: Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain.
Parcel bomb, Greece
The majority of those arrested for left-wing and anarchist
violence were suspected of membership of a terrorist or-
in left-wing and anarchist attacks, ganisation.
which has been seen since 2007, persisted in 2010
Greece, attacks claimed the lives of six people in 2010. Successful law enforcement operations have led to a sig-
The explosion of a parcel bomb at the Ministry for Citizen nificant increase in the number of suspects arrested in
Protection on 24 June kil ed a police officer. On 19 July, a Greece and have also led to the dismantling of one of the
journalist was murdered outside his house. This particu- country’s main terrorist organisations. In March, the ter-
larly violent attack involving firearms was claimed by the rorist organisation Epanastatikos Agonas
organisation Sekta Epanastaton
and it could be linked to after the arrest of six persons and the seizure of several
the assassination of a police officer in 2009. Both of these machine guns, a rocket launcher, hand grenades, and ex-
attacks were clearly designed to kil . Despite the fact that plosive materials. The investigation into the parcel bomb
left-wing and anarchist extremists general y try to avoid campaign of November resulted in the arrest of 12 sus-
casualties in most of their attacks, a 15-year-old boy died pected members of Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias.
on 28 March when he manipulated an explosive device
ostensibly placed to carry out a terrorist attack; his moth- The downward trend in left-wing terrorism in Spain is il-
er and sister were injured. During a demonstration in Ath- lustrated by the decreasing number of arrests since 2007.
ens on 5 May, anarchists caused a fire in a bank, which The organisation Grupos Antifascistas Primer de Octubre
resulted in the death of three employees.
did not re-establish after it was dismantled in
recent years. In Italy, no attacks were attributed to left-
The proportion of bomb attacks increased from 20% in wing terrorist groups in 2010, as a result of a number of
2009 to 51% in 2010, while arson attacks remained at the successful investigations in 2009.
same level of 42%. Since 2008, government targets have
continued to be favoured over business targets.
7.2. Terrorist and
slightly in 2010, there were a number of attacks against
right-wing political opponents and violent confrontations
between the two groups. In the run-up to the parliamen-
Some attacks in 2010 showed signs of increased trans-
tary elections, a number of political parties were targeted national coordination between groups
. A parcel bomb by anarchist extremists. Most offences were in the form
campaign in November targeted various embassies, for- of wilful damage and there were relatively few physical
eign Heads of State, and European institutions.
attacks on individuals. The Czech Republic reported a
decline in violent confrontations between left- and right-
It is the first time that the Greek terrorist organisation wing groups. Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias
has staged such a large-scale
synchronised attack, which attracted widespread media Besides traditional ideological themes such as anti-capi-
coverage. The motive and selection of targets remain un- talism, anti-militarism and anti-fascism, in 2010 left-wing
clear. It appears that the organisation has raised its profile and anarchist extremists also focused on the global eco-
towards a more international dimension. An international nomic recession
. A number of EU Member States expe-
cal for action was issued in a communiqué and promptly rienced large-scale protests against austerity measures
caused similar actions in Italy and Argentina.
taken by governments to reduce the debt burden and
stem the impact of the economic crisis. The arson attack
Two out of three parcel bombs, which were sent to the against a job centre in Austria can also be placed in this
Swiss, Chilean and Greek embassies in Rome on 23 and context.
27 December, exploded and caused minor injuries. The
attacks were claimed by FAI (Federazione Anarchica Infor-
In some instances, the ranks of protesters were infiltrated male).
by extremist groups, which resulted in violent clashes
with police. However, attempts to gain ground amongst
The Chilean and Swiss embassies were targeted to ex- the population are general y seen as unsuccessful in most
press solidarity with imprisoned ‘comrades’ - a typical Member States.
motive for anarchist groups.
In Belgium and Italy, increased activity by anarchist
An important field of action for members of the left-wing groups on topics such as anti-authority, anti-law enforce-
scene has remained the confrontation with right-wing
ment and anti-prison issues continued in 2010. The trend opponents
. This occurs under the guise of discrediting of using more violence in such attacks, which was already
‘fascist’ campaigns, targeted attacks on individuals, as- identified in last year’s report, persisted. Anarchist groups
sets and property, and direct physical confrontation dur- do not hesitate to enter into direct confrontation with law
enforcement personnel. This was seen in Belgium, where
a police station was attacked, another one was the sub-
In January, the Danish police arrested a group of left-wing ject of an arson attack, and several police vehicles were
extremists. One of them is suspected of having planned damaged.
and organised violent attacks against various radical
right-wing opponents. An increase in tensions towards Germany reported a considerable decrease in the number
extreme right-wing groups was also noticed in Italy. Al- of offences related to left-wing and anarchist extremism.
though the Swedish anarchist movement weakened Austria also observed a general decrease in anarchist
activities, except in the capital Vienna. Squatters, who
were rather active in 2009, only staged a few uncoordi-
The indications that international coordination is deve-
, is exemplified by the choice of common targets
in different cities or countries, as wel as the use of similar
modus operandi or series of initiatives by different groups
in solidarity with imprisoned comrades. In this regard, the
increase in arrests in Greece wil result in some important
court cases which could trigger more solidarity attacks
across Europe. Therefore, anarchist violence can be ex-
pected to continue developing in the European Union
8. Right-wing terrorism
• No right-wing terrorist attacks occurred in the EU
Such confrontations invariably result in physical violence.
In May 2010, a White Power supporter was assaulted and
• Right-wing extremist groups are becoming more
knifed in Sweden during a demonstration staged by the
professional in their manifestations
White Power movement. An activist was arrested on sus-
picion of aggravated assault and attempted murder.
Traditional y, right-wing terrorist groups seek to change
the political, social and economic system in a way that
favours authoritarian, anti-Semitic and often racist ‘solu-
tions’ to social problems. The ideological roots of Euro-
pean right-wing extremism and terrorism can usual y be
traced back to Fascism and National Socialism.
8.1. Terrorist activities
Member States were not confronted with major acts of
right-wing terrorism in 2010. There were almost no ar-
rests related to right-wing terrorism over the whole year.
Lack of cohesion, a lower degree of overal coordination Right-wing extremists attempt to gain a political fol ow-
of right-wing terrorist and extremist groups, little public ing and achieve publicity outside the traditional political
support, and effective law enforcement operations lead- process through marches, ral ies, demonstrations and
ing to arrests and prosecutions of prominent right-wing concerts.
The presence of like-minded nationals from
terrorists and extremists, went a long way towards ac- other EU Member States at right-wing events, such as
counting for the diminished impact of right-wing terror- White Power Music (WPM) concerts, suggests that indi-
ism and extremism in the EU.
viduals drawn to right-wing extremism maintain close
contacts throughout the EU
. WPM concerts attract hun-
8.2. Right-wing extremist
dreds of people from al over Europe. Concerts are only
announced on the internet and take place at secret loca-
tions. Law enforcement activities directed against WPM
Some incidents that occurred in 2010 could be classified concerts have forced extremist groups to abstain from
as right-wing extremism. These raised public order con- public announcements and public performances.
cerns, but have not in any way endangered the political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of any of the Right-wing extremists are also increasingly active in
Member States. They can, however, present considerable online social networking
, to reach out to a younger
chal enges to policing and seriously threaten community generation. The internet is a cheap and effective way of
communicating with targeted audiences. This is adding a
new dimension to the threat right-wing extremism may
Public manifestations of right-wing extremism can often present in the future.
provoke counter activity by extreme left-wing
Right-wing extremist groups are becoming more pro-
fessional. A young audience is lured into the right-wing
extremist scene with imagery and rhetoric from youth
culture. Professional y developed websites
add to the
impact of presentations of historical events and politics.
Against an anti-Semitic and xenophobic background,
right-wing presentations focus on sensitive topics of pub-
lic debate such as immigration, corruption and the finan-
Propaganda offences, in line with the quantity and qual-
ity of the activities displayed in this field, account for a
major part of criminal offences committed by right-wing
Although the overal threat from right-wing extremism
appears to be on the wane and the numbers of right-wing
extremist criminal offences are relatively low, the profes-
sionalism in their propaganda and organisation shows
that right-wing extremist groups have the wil to en-
large and spread their ideology
and stil pose a threat
EU Member States. If the unrest in the Arab world, espe-
cial y in North Africa, leads to a major influx of immigrants
into Europe, right-wing extremism and terrorism might
gain a new lease of life by articulating more widespread
public apprehension about immigration from Muslim
countries into Europe.
9. Single-issue terrorism
• Extremist environmental activities increased in
• Single-issue terrorist and extremist groups mainly
focused on the fur industry
9.1. Single-issue terrorist
and extremist activities
Single-issue terrorism is violence committed with the de-
sire to change a specific policy or practice within a target
society. In Europe, the term is general y used to describe
animal rights groups and environmental eco-terrorist
of a campaign label ed Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
. Arson and paint attacks against the personal
In 2010, one single issue terrorist attack was carried out property of senior employees of companies connected
in Greece, no arrests related to single issue terrorist of- with animal research, and the companies’ premises, were
fences were reported by Member States. With regard to claimed by a group cal ing itself ‘Militant Forces Against
single-issue extremism, a large number of animal rights
Huntingdon Life Sciences’ (MFAH). extremism (ARE)
related incidents and an increasing
number of environmentalist activities
Incidents were recorded in Belgium, France, Germany
and Sweden. In France, two arson attacks were carried
Animal rights extremist groups focus on four main
out, targeting individuals wrongly identified as employ-
ees of a firm suspected of financing pharmaceutical test-
• Companies and institutions involved in scientific
ing on animals. These campaigns indicate a shift of activi-
research and pharmaceutical testing on animals,
ties towards the European mainland which was initiated
• The fur breeding industry,
in 2008 and continued through 2009-2010.
• The meat industry, and
• Circuses and hunting.
To reach their goals, ARE use authorised protests, as
wel as il egal methods of protest and direct action
In 2010, more than 200 single-issue extremism related ARE militants do not hesitate in using blackmail, send-
incidents were recorded in the EU, including 24 arson at- ing threatening emails or making warning phone cal s to
tacks using improvised incendiary or explosive devices.
their targets, often threatening their family and commit-
ting physical assault against their property (in so-cal ed
A number of these were related to the ‘anti-vivisection home visits). This has sometimes resulted in arson attacks
campaign’, which targets scientific research and pharma- against cars or property. Single-issue extremist groups
ceutical testing on animals.
are also actively targeting the fur trade industry and the
fur-breeding animal industry. This has resulted mainly in
In the past, the majority of il egal activities by single-issue the mass release of animals or the destruction of feeding
extremist groups took place in the UK, in the framework or water instal ations for the animals. In Belgium, activists
released 300 minks; in Greece, more than 45 000 minks ticipated in protests and attacks al over Europe, uniting
were released by extremists, with the unintended result their forces in common initiatives. In some cases, this
that a large number of the animals died on the streets. interaction between different groups and nationalities
Both activities were carried out by groups whose mem- led to escalation from peaceful protest to violent destruc-
bers were of mixed nationality.
tion. Single-issue extremist groups are becoming increas-
ingly network-based. They use various methods of com-
In addition to such attacks, ARE activists also use disin-
munication in order to prioritise, coordinate and support formation methods
in order to discredit their targets direct action - in addition to general social networking.
and weaken their public acceptance. Images of sick and The internet is a vital tool in this process. Campaign web-
abused animals are embedded in video footage and sites, social networking sites and mailing lists al play an
important role in making it possible for extremists to be
informed on the upcoming (international) agenda in their
Environmental extremism is increasing
and gaining area of concern.
support from other extremist groups. Some anarchist
groups appear to be attracted to environmental and
ecological causes. This is demonstrated by a number of
incidents related to the oil industry, accused of pol uting
the environment. Another target is the nuclear industry.
Activists oppose the construction of new nuclear power
stations and attempt to prevent the transportation of nu-
clear waste for re-processing.
Three members of environmental anarchist groups – two
Italian nationals and a Swiss national - were identified in
a regular traffic check at which the suspects’ rental car
was discovered to be transporting industrial explosives,
gas cylinders and detonators. They intended to attack
a research laboratory working on nanotechnologies. It
should be noted that the parcel bombs targeting the
Swiss embassies in Athens and Rome were apparently
support actions to free the three anarchists arrested. It
can be expected that other incidents in support of fel ow
prisoners wil occur in the near future. Trials and sentenc-
ing wil be used as opportunities to stage violent protests
against the authorities and trigger solidarity action in dif-
There is a dynamic interaction between groups and in-
in different countries,
with language or nation-
ality forming no barrier to cooperation. Extremist groups
and individuals from different countries and groups par-
Annex 1: Acronyms and translations
Animal Liberation Front
African Union Mission in Somalia
Acción Nacionalista Vasca
Basque Nationalist Action
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Tanzim qa’idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-‘arab
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Tanzim al-qa’ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami
Al-Qaeda Senior Leadership
Animal rights extremism
Comité d’Action Viticole
Committee for Viticultural Action
Comité de Coordination Tamoul France
Tamil Coordinating Committee France
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Centro di Identificazione ed Espulsione
(formerly CPT: Centro di Permanenza Temporanea)
Identification and Expulsion Centre
Continuity Irish Republican Army
Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front
Euskadi ta Askatasuna
Basque Fatherland and Liberty
European Union Situation Centre
Federazione Anarchica Informale
Informal Anarchist Federation
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica
Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group
Hungarian Arrows National Liberation Army
Improvised explosive device
Improvised incendiary device
Irish National Liberation Army
International Security Assistance Force
Justice and Home Affairs
Kongra Gelê Kurdistan
People’s Congress of Kurdistan
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Science
Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas
Basque Nationalist Action
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
Real Irish Republican Army
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
Conspiracy of Fire Cel s Athens-Thessalonica
European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
Terrorism Working Party of the EU Council
Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
White power music
Annex 2: Failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2010,
per member state and per affiliation
Annex 3: Arrests in 2010 per member state and per
Ireland (Republic of)
12 For the UK, the figures represent the number of charges for 2009 and 2010, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in
other Member States. However, at this stage in the criminal justice process it is not possible to assign an affiliation to individual cases.
Annex 4: Data convictions and penalties (Eurojust)
Ireland (Republic of)
1. Number of individuals tried in 2010 for terrorism charges, by Member State14
Ireland (republic of)
2. Number of convictions/acquittals for terrorism charges in 2010, per Member State and
13 Verdicts received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for TE-SAT 2011 could not be included.
14 According to the information provided by national authorities, in 2010 one person appeared in five different court proceedings, three other persons were
tried three times for terrorist offences, whilst another fifteen individuals each appeared in two different proceedings. These cases all originated from Spain.
15 Figure 2 connects the reported verdicts in the Member States to the group type. It should be noted that ten individuals (the majority of them separatists)
received more than one verdict and they have therefore been counted more than once in the calculation.
Ireland (Republic of)
3. Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per Member State in 2010
Ireland (Republic of)
4. Number of final and not final verdicts per Member State in 201016
16 Some verdicts are pending appeal or recourse. In those cases, where no confirmation was received on the finality of the decision, they have been considered
as not final.
Annex 5: Methodology
The TE-SAT is both a situation and a trend report. A trend With the approval of the TE-SAT Advisory Board, neigh-
can be defined as ‘a general or new tendency in the way bouring countries of the EU that have a Liaison Bureau
a situation is changing or developing’. The TE-SAT 2011 at Europol, and other non-EU states with which Europol
presents trends analysis and new developments for the has signed cooperation agreements, were approached to
period 2007 to 2010.
provide qualitative data for the TE-SAT 2011, when their
information could shed light on a certain situation or phe-
nomenon in the EU. Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway,
The EU Council Decision on the exchange of information Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States of America
and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, of 20 Sep- reported information relevant to the security situation in
tember 2005 (2005/671/JHA), obliges Member States to the EU.
col ect al relevant information concerning and resulting
from criminal investigations conducted by their law en- TE-SAT data analysis
forcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences, The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations accord-
and sets out the conditions under which this informa- ing to their source of motivation. However, many groups
tion should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usual y
data and the results were cross-checked with the Mem- one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice of cat-
ber States and, in case of divergences or gaps, corrected egories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation
and complemented, and then validated by the Member in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories
are not necessarily mutual y exclusive.
Eurojust also col ected data on the basis of the afore- Although EU Member States continue to report on terror-
mentioned EU Council Decision, according to which the ist attacks and arrests with varying degrees of depth, it
Member States are equal y obliged to col ect al relevant can general y be stated that the data contributed by the
information concerning prosecutions and convictions for Member States for 2010 was of high quality.
terrorist offences and send the data to Eurojust. Eurojust Gaps in the data col ected by Europol may be due to the
cross-checked the col ected data with the Member States fact that the investigations into the terrorist attacks or ac-
and, in case of divergences or gaps, this data was also cor- tivities in question are stil ongoing. In addition, a number
rected, complemented and then validated.
of criminal offences committed in support of terrorist ac-
tivities are not systematical y prosecuted under terrorism
Annex 6: Implementation of the eu framework decision
on combating terrorism in the member states – changes
in member states during 201017
Listed below are countries where there have been changes in legislation or legislative initiatives in the fight
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money
In Greece, law 3875/2010 which incorporates the United laundering and terrorist financing; it provides for: the reg-
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized istration of persons directing private members’ clubs; the
Crime (Palermo Convention of 2000) and its Protocols, amendment of the Central Bank Act 1942 and the Courts
among them the Protocol against the Il icit Manufactur- (supplemental provisions) Act 1961; the consequential re-
ing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Compo- peal of certain provisions of the criminal justice Act 1994
nents and Ammunition, brought amendments to article and the consequential amendment of certain enactments
187 of the Penal Code. The most significant one is the and the revocation of certain statutory instruments.
criminalisation of advertising and financial support of ter-
rorist organisations. A penalty of up to 10 years imprison-
ment is foreseen.
In Luxembourg, new legislation directed at reinforcing
In the same article, there are some changes regarding the fight against money laundering and financing of ter-
criminal procedures, identification of terms and differen- rorism was passed on 27 October 2010. It refers to the
tiation of penalties. Final y, the same amendment made organisation of controls of the physical transportation
“delictum sui generis” the manufacturing of weapons, of cash entering, transiting or exiting the territory of the
chemicals, biological materials or harmful radiation for Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
The new piece of legislation amends a series of legislative
Acts, including the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedural
Republic of Ireland
Code, the 12 November 2004 law regarding the fight
On 5 May 2010, the Third Anti Money Laundering Direc- against money laundering and financing of terrorism,
tive (2005/60/EC) was transposed in Ireland by the Crimi- the 20 June 2001 law regarding extradition, the 17 March
nal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) 2004 law on the European Arrest Warrant and the 8 Au-
Act 2010 (number 6 of 2010). The aim of the Third Anti gust 2000 law on international mutual legal assistance in
Money Laundering Directive is to widen the scope of criminal matters.
previous anti-money laundering and terrorist financing
legislation based on the revised recommendations of the The Act is also meant to transpose, into Luxembourg law,
Financial Action Task Force.
the United Nations Security Council resolutions and the
normative Acts adopted by the European Union regarding
Act number 6 of 2010 provides for offences of, and related interdictions and restrictive measures of a financial nature
to, money laundering in and outside the state; gives effect taken against certain persons, entities and groups within
to directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and the context of combating the financing of terrorism.
of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of
17 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2011: Eurojust.
On the same date, Luxembourg passed a law which ap- Criminal Code. The current definition is more specific in
proves the Rome 10 March 1988 Convention for the Sup- describing the ways of committing the offence, e.g. it
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime covers situations when a person gathers financial or other
Navigation and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful means with the intention to use them for terrorism pur-
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the poses, provides his knowledge about biological or chemi-
Continental Shelf. The aforementioned law modifies the cal weapons with the same purpose, publicly incites the
14 April 1992 law regarding the adoption of a disciplinary commission of a crime of terrorism.
and criminal code for the marine.
Spain introduced a new law (Organic law 5/2010) in June
2010, which entered into force on 23 December 2010.
On 4 March 2010, the Netherlands confirmed the ratifica- This change of law implements the Framework Decision
tion of the Council of Europe Convention on the Preven- 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, as wel as United
tion of Terrorism, adopted in Warsaw in May 2005, which Nations instruments.
requires Member States to establish ‘training for terror-
ism’ as a criminal offence under its domestic law. The The new law declares that the statute of limitations is not
participation and cooperation in terrorist training camps applicable when terrorist acts result in fatalities - a provi-
are both criminal offences that carry a maximum prison sion included upon request of terrorism victims organisa-
sentence of eight years.
The new law includes a more comprehensive definition
of conduct related to membership of a terrorist organi-
In Slovakia, amendments of the Slovak criminal Code re- sation/group, adapting to the new regulation of the par-
lated to terrorism were adopted by the Act 576/2009 col . ticipation in a criminal organisation/group devoted to the
and came into force on 1 January 2010.
perpetration of any criminal activities. Given the serious-
ness and danger of terrorism, no difference is being made
Section 129 of the Criminal Code was amended to incrimi- between stable terrorist organisations and temporary
nate the financial support of a terrorist group. According- terrorist organisations, set up with the sole aim of com-
ly, the new wording of part 7 of this section is:
mitting specific attacks.
“Support of criminal group or terrorist group means the
intentional acting consisting in providing financial or There are two levels of seriousness of these conducts:
other means, services, cooperation, or creation of other - Promotion, establishment, organisation or leadership
conditions for the purpose of:
of a terrorist organisation/group,
a) Forming or maintenance of existence of such a group, - Participation or membership in the organisation.
b) Commission of criminal offences as referred to in para- The crime of financing of terrorist activities is now pun-
graph 4 or 5 by such a group.”
ishable, going beyond facilitation and giving economical
support, but also making negligent behaviour punishable.
Furthermore, this Act changed the wording of the crime If negligent behaviour consists of not taking sufficient
of terrorism. This offence is defined in section 419 of the measures to prevent money laundering, so that the con-
duct facilitates or unwil ingly supports the terrorist activi-
ties financial y, this conduct can be prosecuted.
Although previously punishable, the activities of recruit-
ment and training with a view to joining a terrorist organi-
sation/group are specifical y described in order to facili-
tate the prosecution and mutual legal assistance.
Final y, the distribution, or otherwise public dissemina-
tion, of messages or slogans aimed at inciting or favour-
ing the perpetration of terrorist conducts has been crimi-
In Sweden, a new law on punishment for public provoca-
tion, recruitment and training for terrorist offences and
other particularly serious criminal offences was passed on
29 April 2010 and entered into force on 1 December 2010.
This Act has been adopted in order to comply with the 16
May 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Preven-
tion of Terrorism and the Council Framework Decision
2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Frame-
work Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.
According to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, public provocation,
recruitment and training for terrorism are punishable
with maximum imprisonment of 2 years. In the case of
serious offences, the imprisonment shal be imposed for
a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 6 years.