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TE-SAT 2012
EU TERRORISM SITUATION  
AND TREND REPORT


TE-SAT 2012
EU TERRORISM SITUATION  
AND TREND REPORT

TE-SAT 2012
www.europol.europa.eu
© European Police Office, 2012
All rights reserved. Reproduction in any form or by 
any means is allowed only with the prior permission of 
Europol. 
Acknowledgements
The EU Terrorism and Situation and Trend Report 
(TE-SAT) has been produced by analysts and 
experts at Europol, drawing on contributions from 
EU  Member States and external partners. Europol 
would like to express its gratitude to Member States, 
Eurojust, third countries and partner organisations for 
their high-quality contributions. 
Photographs
Europol: Max Schmits
Jean Francois Guiot, Fotolia, Shutterstock 
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   TE-SAT 2012

Table of contents
1. 
Foreword by the Europol Director ...............................................................................................................4
2.  Key judgments ............................................................................................................................................6
3. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 7
4.  General overview of the situation in the EU in 2011 .....................................................................................8
 
4.1.  Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ...............................................................................................8
 
4.2.  Lone actors .........................................................................................................................................9
 
4.3.  Terrorist and violent extremist activities .............................................................................................9
 
4.4.  Convictions and penalties.................................................................................................................. 12
5.  Religiously-inspired terrorism .................................................................................................................... 15
 
5.1.  Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects ............................................................................................. 15
 
5.2.  Terrorist activities .............................................................................................................................. 18
 
5.3.  Terrorist situation outside the EU ......................................................................................................19
6.  Ethno nationalist and separatist terrorism ................................................................................................22
 
6.1.  Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .............................................................................................22
7. 
Left-wing and anarchist terrorism .............................................................................................................26
 
7.1.  Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .............................................................................................26
 
7.2.  Terrorist and violent extremist activities ........................................................................................... 27
8.  Right-wing terrorism .................................................................................................................................28
 
8.1.  Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects .............................................................................................28
 
8.2.  Violent right-wing extremism ...........................................................................................................28
 
9.  Single-issue terrorism ................................................................................................................................30
 
9.1.  Single-issue terrorist and violent extremist activities ........................................................................30
 
10.  Trends and future outlook ......................................................................................................................... 32
11. Annexes .................................................................................................................................................... 33
TE-SAT 2012  | 3 


1.  Foreword by the Europol 
Director
Terrorism is the attempt to achieve political goals with 
the use or the threat of violence. The ideologies behind 
terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into a 
number of identifiable main drivers. Examples include 
religiously-inspired terrorism and strong ethno-
nationalist sentiments leading to separatist terror-
ism. The identified drivers are not static, however, and 
can evolve or vanish over time in response to political 
or  socio-economic  developments,  merge  with  other 
ideologies or convictions, or be the building blocks of 
new and sometimes very specific and highly individual 
motivations. Unclear or vague motives can blur the dis-
tinction between a terrorist offence and other criminal 
acts. The bomb attack and killing spree in Norway in 
July  2011,  referred  to  in  this  report,  illustrates  that  a 
personal mix of elements from different ideologies can 
lead to extremely serious incidents that are difficult to 
foresee and prevent. 
Following  the  attacks  in  Norway,  Europol  immedi-
ately engaged in close cooperation with Norway and 
the most relevant EU Member States via the First 
Response Network. As well as supporting the Norwe-
gian authorities with the investigation itself, the First 
Response Network also assessed the implications of 
the attack on the threat of violent extremism to the 
EU. 
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   TE-SAT 2012

The  TE-SAT  aims  to  provide  law  enforcement  offi- Europol could not have produced this report without 
cials,  policymakers  and  the  general  public  with  facts  the contributions of quantitative and qualitative data 
and figures regarding terrorism in the EU, while also  from Eurojust and the EU Member States. I would 
seeking to identify trends in the development of this  also  like  to  express  my  gratitude  to Colombia, Croa-
phenomenon.  In  2011,  the  total  number  of  terrorist  tia, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzer-
attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU contin- land, Turkey and the United States of America for their 
ued to decrease. This is a welcome development, but  contributions. Last but not least, I would like to thank 
does  not  necessarily  reflect  a  diminished  threat. The  all members of the Advisory Board, consisting of the 
death of Osama bin Laden has not removed the threat  ‘Troika’ (EU Council Presidencies of Poland, Denmark 
of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Instead, the threat has  and  Cyprus),  France,  Spain,  Eurojust,  the  EU  Intelli-
evolved and lone actors or small EU-based groups are  gence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the 
becoming increasingly prominent, as is the Internet as  EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator for their support 
a key facilitator for terrorism-related activities. 
throughout the year and their valuable contributions 
to the 2012 edition of the TESAT.
The incidents in Norway and the arrests in a number 
of Member States of individuals for the preparation of  Rob Wainwright
terrorist attacks are proof of a continuous need for vigi- Director
lance, and indicate that the reduction of the numbers 
of attacks is at least partly due to effective law enforce-
ment interventions. 
The TE-SAT is a public report produced by Europol on 
the basis of information provided and verified by the 
competent law-enforcement authorities in the Mem-
ber States of the EU. The arrests and terrorist or vio-
lent extremist incidents that took place in the EU, as 
referred to in this report, are those that Member States 
have reported to Europol for the purposes of the TE-
SAT. 
TE-SAT 2012  | 5 

2. Key judgments
2011 presented a highly diverse terrorism picture  Al-Qaeda inspired groups and individuals still aim to 
which will probably be mirrored in 2012, with a pos- cause mass casualties and select targets based on their 
sible increase in lone and solo actor plots. 
perceived symbolic value. The potentially high number 
The death of Osama bin Laden and other important  of victims and psychological impact can have a long-
terrorist leaders did not have an impact on terrorist  term negative effect on society. 
activities  carried  out  in  the  EU.  However,  al-Qaeda’s 
call for individual violent jihad through the execution  The threat of violent right-wing extremism has 
of small-scale attacks may result in an increase in such  reached new levels in Europe and should not be 
attacks. The more al-Qaeda’s core is under pressure,  underestimated. The threat will most likely come from 
and the more difficult it becomes to prepare large scale  lone actors but organised underground groups also 
attacks, the more al-Qaeda will try to recruit individual  have the capability and intention to carry out attacks.
supporters in the West to plan and execute attacks. 
Attacks performed by individually-operating actors are  Cross-border cooperation between violent extrem-
not a practice limited to al-Qaeda inspired terrorism. 
ist groups,  including  the  provision  of  support  for 
violent  activities,  is  steadily  increasing. Terrorist  and 
Radicalisation to violence remains a critical compo- violent extremist groups have taken full advantage of 
nent of the terrorist threat. Radical thinking becomes  developments in the communication and technology 
a threat when individuals or groups engage in violence  sector, allowing them to notify likeminded individuals 
to achieve political, ideological or religious goals. High- and groups about upcoming activities, and inspire oth-
profile media exposure or propaganda efforts via the  ers by promoting the results of their activities online. 
Internet may assist radicalisation and inspire further 
like-minded individuals to plan and commit attacks.
A number of developments in recent years point to a 
convergence of social and technological factors which 
Terrorist and extremist groups have a substantial  may well prove fertile ground for ideologically-moti-
presence in the virtual world of the Internet. 

vated electronic attacks.
The Internet has become the principal means of 
communication for terrorist and violent extremist 
individuals and groups. Social media tools facilitate 
radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist and violent 
extremist purposes.
Numbers of terrorist incidents and arrests continue 
to fall, but overall activity relating to terrorism 
and violent extremism still represents a significant 
threat to EU Member States. 
Between  2009  and  2011,  there  has  been  a  sustained 
decrease in reported attacks and arrests. Neverthe-
less, in 2011, a total of 174 attacks were still executed, 
484 individuals were arrested and 316 individuals were 
charged with terrorist-related offences. 
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   TE-SAT 2012

3. Introduction
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)  The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and 
was established in the aftermath of the 11 September  analyses  the  outward  manifestations  of  terrorism, 
2001 attacks in the United States of America (US), as  i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to 
a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Work- analyse  the  root  causes  of  terrorism,  neither  does  it 
ing Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the Euro- attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of coun-
pean Parliament. The content of the TE-SAT is based  ter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures 
on information supplied by EU Member States, some  taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these. 
third  states  (Colombia, Croatia,  Iceland,  Norway,  the  The methodology for producing this annual report was 
Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US)  developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and 
and  partner  organisations  (Eurojust  and  Interpol),  as  Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.
well as information gained from open sources. 
This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by 
In  accordance  with  ENFOPOL  65  (8196/2/06),  the  Europol in consultation with the 2012 TE-SAT Advisory 
TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview  Board, composed of representatives of the past, pre-
of  the  terrorism  phenomenon  in  the  EU,  from  a  law  sent, and future EU Presidencies, i.e. Poland, Denmark 
enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts  and  Cyprus  (the  EU  ‘Troika’),  along  with  permanent 
and  assemble  figures  regarding  terrorist  attacks  and  members, representatives from France and Spain, the 
arrests in the European Union. The report also aims to  EU  Intelligence  Analysis  Centre  (INTCEN),  Eurojust, 
present trends and new developments from the infor- the  office  of  the  EU  Counter Terrorism  Coordinator, 
mation available to Europol.
and Europol staff.
The  methodology  and  definitions  used  in  this  report 
are explained in Annex 5. 
TE-SAT 2012  | 7 

4.  General overview of the 
situation in the EU in 2011
•  174 terrorist attacks in EU Member States
Not one religiously-inspired terrorist attack on EU ter-
•  484 individuals arrested in the EU for terrorist 
ritory was reported by Member States, nor were any 
related offences
single-issue terrorist attacks registered. The killing of 
•  Lone actors were responsible for the killing 
two American military personnel at Frankfurt airport 
of two persons in Germany, and 77 persons in 
by a religiously-inspired individual in March 2011 is 
Norway
not a terrorist attack according to German legislation, 
•  316 individuals in concluded court proceedings 
although the incident clearly carried some such char-
for terrorism charges 
acteristics. Of all specified affiliations, the majority of 
attacks were committed by separatist groups. 
4.1.  Terrorist attacks and  Most arrests were reported by France (172), followed 
arrested suspects
by the Republic of Ireland and Spain, with 69 and 64 
arrests respectively.3  The number of arrests related to 
The decline in the number of attacks in the EU contin- right- and left-wing violent extremism is still low com-
ued in 2011 with a total of 174 attacks in seven Member  pared to the arrests for offences related to separatist 
States.1  The majority of the reported terrorist attacks  violent extremism and terrorism. The latter still repre-
took  place  in  France  (85),  Spain  (47)  and  the  United  sent the largest part of all arrests, although they have 
Kingdom (26). Spain saw the number of separatist  decreased from 412 in 2009 to 349 in 2010, and further 
attacks decrease by nearly 50% compared to 2010. A  to 247 in 2011. 
total of 484 individuals were arrested for terrorism-
related offences.2  
1200
1000
r 800
mbe 600
Arrests 
Nu
400
Attacks
200
0
2007 2
2007
008 2
2008
009 2
2009
010 2
2010
011
2011
Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects, 2007 to 2011
1  For an overview of all attacks per Member State and per affiliation, see Annex 2.
2  For the UK, figures represent the number of charges for 2011, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in the other Member States. 
However, at this stage in the criminal justice process it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.

3  For an overview of all arrests per Member State and per affiliation, see Annex 3.
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   TE-SAT 2012

Compared to previous years, there were more arrests  reveals that he established his own ideology from vari-
for the membership of a terrorist organisation, prop- ous influences and without a clear affiliation, present-
aganda,  possession  of  arms  and  explosives,  and  the  ing himself as a “cultural conservative”. His ideology is 
dispatch of fighters to conflict. The number of arrests  assessed as opposing multiculturalism and more spe-
for most other offences, including the preparation of  cifically Islamism.
attacks,  attempted  attacks  and  completed  attacks, 
has decreased.
The existence of a group of right-wing terrorists in 
Germany,  connected  to  alleged  politically-moti-
4.2. Lone actors 
vated murders committed between 2001 and 2007, is 
another example and an illustration of the fact that it 
Serious threats emanate not only from established ter- is extremely difficult to detect terrorists operating indi-
rorist organisations but increasingly from lone actors4  vidually or in small groups. 
and  small  groups  in  EU  Member States,  whose  radi-
calisation takes place largely undetected. This devel- 4.3.  Terrorist and violent 
opment  is  facilitated  by  the  Internet,  and  –  in  the 
extremist activities
religiously-inspired strand – is also incited by al-Qaeda 
core  and  its  affiliates  to  compensate  for  diminished  Financing of terrorism 
capabilities to direct operations. The practice of “indi- Terrorist organisations are highly pragmatic in their 
vidual jihad” was advocated by al-Qaeda in the Arab  approach  to  financing  their  activities.  Religious  or 
Peninsula (AQAP) through its online magazine, Inspire,  political boundaries are easily ignored if they stand in 
and in a video published by the organisation in June  the way of the acquisition of funds. By the same token, 
2011.  However,  the  incidents  in  Norway  in  July  2011  these organisations employ tried and trusted methods 
prove that attacks performed by individually-operating  of fundraising, both licit and illicit, such as the collec-
actors are not a practice limited to al-Qaeda inspired  tion  of  donations  from  sympathisers  and  extortion, 
terrorism. 
next to exploring new technologies for the same pur-
pose.
On  22  July  2011,  the  Norwegian  national  Anders 
Behring Breivik killed 8 people through the explosion  Hostage taking with ransom demands has evolved into 
of a car bomb (a ‘vehicle-borne improvised explosive  a tried and trusted method, a highly lucrative option 
device’ (VBIED)) in the government quarter of Oslo. He  for terrorist entities. This method is employed in par-
also randomly shot 69 predominantly young people at  ticular by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as 
a youth camp on the island of Utøya. The perpetrator is  was illustrated by the kidnapping in Algeria of an Italian 
considered to be a lone actor whose targets were the  woman in February 2011, and then of a Spanish male 
Norwegian political system, including the government  and  female  and  another  Italian  woman,  in  October 
and the Labour Party. Moreover, he issued a 1518-page  2011. The kidnapping of hostages for ransom by ter-
long  manifesto  named  “2083  – A  European  Declara- rorist factions is seen throughout Africa, from Niger to 
tion of Independence” on the Internet. The manifesto  Kenya.
4  Lone actors refers to single terrorists operating in isolation from any other organisation or other associates. Solo terrorists refers to individuals executing acts of terrorism 
without others but who are actively supported and assisted by a wider terrorist organisation.

TE-SAT 2012  | 9 

In EU Member States, the abuse of social benefits is  companies in France, Greece, Germany, Italy and Swit-
used to fund terrorist activities. In more substantial  zerland.  Several  improvised  incendiary  devices  (IIDs) 
terms, terrorist organisations also raise funds through  were used in a coordinated action to target railway 
multiple global criminal enterprises in and outside the  infrastructures in Germany in October 2011. 
EU. One example of the latter is the suspected involve-
ment  of  the  PKK  in  narcotics  trafficking  to  fund  and  The Breivik case illustrates that precursor chemicals 
support terrorist activities.
are easily obtainable for anyone capable of inventing 
a plausible reason to procure them. The man responsi-
The cause of Tamil independence is still alive in Europe.  ble for the death of 77 people had been able to procure 
Intelligence suggests that its supporters in the EU  several tonnes of ammonium nitrate-based fertiliser to 
remain engaged in extortion, human trafficking, skim- produce his explosives, on the ostensible grounds that 
ming schemes and other crimes to raise money to fight  they were intended for agricultural use. The materials 
for their cause.
he used were shipped from EU Member States.
The Internet is increasingly used for all purposes, both  Animal rights violent extremists and related single-issue 
legal and illegal, including fundraising to finance terror- organisations are known to use both IEDs and IIDs. 
ist activities. Fundraising via the Internet by self-radical-
ised terrorist supporters is becoming more prevalent.
Communication
Terrorist and violent extremist actors readily make use 
Explosives
of Internet communication channels to exchange infor-
The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by ter- mation they perceive as safe, secure and inconspicu-
rorists of various affiliations is of growing concern. The  ous, and because they have no access to mainstream 
components required for the construction of IEDs are  media. Consequently, for years the Internet has been 
easy  to  procure,  their  production  requires  expertise  firmly established as a facilitating factor for both ter-
that can be obtained through open source information,  rorist and violent extremist organisations, and its use 
and the chemical precursors can be legally obtained  is growing as Internet availability extends worldwide. 
in EU Member States. The use of commercial explo-
sives, by contrast, continues to decrease, partly due to  Online social media sites attract high numbers of users. 
increased monitoring and control by law enforcement  Internet forums are an effective means to address tar-
agencies.
geted  audiences,  including  supporters  who  have  no 
off-line  links  to  terrorist  organisations.  Most  forums 
IEDs are currently the main weapon of choice of ethno- restrict access, wholly or partially, to vetted members 
nationalist  terrorists  in Spain,  France  and  the UK  for  who need to prove their credentials and loyalty, or be 
executing attacks. Both Northern Ireland and France  recommended by established members before admis-
witnessed terrorist attacks in 2011 in which these types  sion. Forum members are strongly advised by their 
of explosives were used. 
moderators to use encryption software for direct com-
munication. 
In 2011, left-wing terrorist groups claimed responsibil-
ity for attacks in which explosives were sent in letters,  Organisations use the Internet for a range of purposes, 
targeting several public and private institutions and  including  instruction,  the  recruitment  of  supporters, 
10 |
   TE-SAT 2012

dispatch  of  members  to  conflict  areas,  fundraising,  controls remotely. The sophisticated computer virus 
facilitating cooperation with other terrorist organisa- called  Stuxnet,  supposedly  designed  to  specifically 
tions,  and  the  planning  and  coordination  of  attacks.  target  the  Natanz  uranium  enrichment  plant  in  Iran, 
Without  the  Internet,  the  audience  reached  would  discovered  in  2011,  illustrates  the  high  potential  of 
undoubtedly not be as wide. The Internet in particular  the use of the Internet with malicious intent. Leading 
continues to be used as an effective means of magni- members of al-Qaeda have already encouraged “elec-
fying the propaganda efforts of violent extremist and  tronic jihad” against critical infrastructure in Western 
terrorist groups. 
countries. The potential threat of such terrorist action 
seems moderate or even high.
A substantial proportion of terrorist propaganda on the 
Internet is distributed by a limited number of Internet  Cyberterrorism
forums. Some have thousands of members, many of  There is a lack of international consensus concerning 
whom will further distribute messages to other forums  the term “cyberterrorism”, which is used variously to 
that have no apparent terrorist affiliation. In addition,  describe activities including electronic attacks on criti-
individuals  posing  as  media  outlets  edit,  translate  cal infrastructure, intellectual property theft relating to 
and publish terrorist content issued by foreign terror- research and development, and even the use of Inter-
ist groups, and texts or multimedia content produced  net technology for the dissemination of propaganda or 
based on such material. Some terrorist organisations  for communication purposes.
have designated particular forums or media outlets as 
their official communication channels.
While the EU is yet to experience a systematic cam-
paign of cyber attacks by established terrorist groups, 
The  boundaries  between  virtual  support  networks,  a number of developments in recent years point to a 
media outlets and terrorist organisations have become  convergence of social and technological factors which 
increasingly  blurred.  Members,  even  administrators,  may well prove fertile ground for an increase in ideo-
of terrorist and violent extremist forums can go on to  logically-motivated electronic attacks.
undertake violent action, an evolution that is framed 
ideologically as a commendable development. 
One of the challenges of investigating cybercrime is 
that in many cases the motivation for criminal activ-
Additionally,  the  Internet  enables  individuals  to  ity becomes apparent only after further investigation. 
undergo a process of radicalisation without necessarily  Often the methods and tools used in ideologically-
being formally recruited, let alone controlled or guided  motivated attacks are the same as in those that are 
by a terrorist organisation, which adds to the risk. 
profit driven. For example, botnets - networks of many 
thousands of compromised computers - may be used 
Apart from its use as a communication tool, the Inter- to distribute phishing emails with the intention of har-
net offers new and additional possibilities to carry out  vesting personal and financial data, to conduct auto-
terrorist  attacks,  such  as  electronic  attacks  on  the  mated intrusions, or to provide the necessary network 
operating systems of critical infrastructure in EU Mem- traffic or bandwidth for Distributed Denial of Service 
ber  States,  such  as  energy  production  facilities  and  (DDoS)  attacks. These  aim  to  saturate  servers,  web-
transport. Attacks could create power outages, disrupt  sites and other networked services until they cease to 
traffic  or  even  destroy  entire  systems  by  taking  over  function.
TE-SAT 2012  | 11 

The EU has also witnessed the development of cyber-
2009
2010
2011
crime from a niche activity into a mature service  Individuals tried
400
317
316
industry.  Criminal  tools  including  botnets,  complete 
crimeware toolkits and coding activity are retailed in  Figure 2: Number of individuals in concluded 
the digital underground economy, often with limited  court proceedings involving terrorist charges in 
knowledge of, or concern for, how these might be used.  2009, 2010 and 20117 
At the same time, the rise of hacktivism has introduced 
a new online model for distributed disorder, with cel- dating back to the 1980s. The concluded court pro-
lular and lone actors operating under the banner of  ceedings in 2011 involved 316 individuals to whom a 
global  brands,  while  using  cybercriminal  tools  such  total of 346 verdicts were handed down. Some verdicts 
as DDoS attacks to express anger or frustration, or as  are pending judicial remedy. Out of the 316 individuals, 
“punishment” for perceived wrongdoing.
40 were female - a slight increase in comparison with 
2010. The majority of the female defendants (33) were 
In the context of electronic attacks, therefore, the dis- tried for separatist terrorism. 
tinction between organised crime and terrorism and/
or violent extremism is increasingly blurred. The use of  The highest number of individuals in concluded court 
the same tools and methods for a range of criminal and  proceedings for terrorist offences in 2011 was again in 
political ends highlights the need not only for a contin- Spain. Denmark, Germany and France saw an increase 
uing holistic response to electronic attacks, whatever  compared to 2010; Belgium and the Netherlands saw a 
their  motivation,  but  also  for  greater  collaboration  decrease, whereas Italy and the United Kingdom have 
between law enforcement and those responsible for  seen a continuous decrease in the past two years. In 
protecting  critical  infrastructure  to  develop  effective  2011, for the first time, Lithuania reported a terrorism-
counter-measures.
related court decision.
4.4.  Convictions and 
In Denmark, several trials took place in 2011 in relation 
penalties5
to attacks targeting the Danish artist who caricatured 
the prophet Mohammed as well as the newspaper 
In  2011,  there  were  153  concluded court proceedings  that  published  the  caricatures.  In  February,  one  indi-
involving terrorist charges reported in 12 Member  vidual was found guilty of attempted terrorism for 
States,  which  is  an  increase  compared  to  2009  and  having tried to kill the artist. He was also found guilty 
2010.6  As  in  previous  years,  court  cases  concluded  of assaulting a policeman and of illegal possession of 
in 2011 relate mainly to events which occurred in the  an axe and knife. He was permanently banned from 
years before the timeframe of the TE-SAT 2012, some  entering Denmark after serving the sentence. In June, 
5    Please refer to Annex 4 for additional information and clarification on the numbers mentioned in this section.
6  If  verdicts  in  2011  were  appealed  in  the  same  year  and  came  to  a  conclusion  before  the  end  of  the  year,  Eurojust  counted  the  proceeding  as 
one. In Spain, in cases when the 1st instance decision was appealed by some of the defendants and the appeal also took place in 2011, the proceed-
ings  were  counted  as  two.  Also,  trials  where  an  appeal  is  pending  have  been  included  in  the  reporting,  but  these  judgments  are  not  considered  final. 
The data for Belgium includes a proceeding in which 3 members of the right-wing group “Blood & Honour” were tried for racism and xenophobia charges. The 
data confirmed by Ireland does not cover the whole 2011. The data received from the United Kingdom does not cover Northern Ireland.

7  Data received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for the TE-SAT 2010 and 2011 could not be included in the respective reports.
12 | TE-SAT 2012

a higher court confirmed the judgment and added one  defendants were also found guilty. The court handed 
more year to the initial sentence of nine years. The  down sentences of between two and six years in prison.
case is due in the Supreme Court in 2012. 
Also,  in  May  2011,  one  individual,  prosecuted  for  an  In Germany, four individuals were charged with mem-
attempted attack against the Danish newspaper  bership of a terrorist organisation and violation of Ger-
 
“Morgenavisen Jyllandsposten” by means of a home- man export laws. They were prosecuted for providing 
made explosive device, was found guilty of attempted  funds and weapons to support the armed struggle of 
terrorism and illegal possession of a firearm. He was  the LTTE and convicted to prison terms of between 
sentenced  to  12  years’  imprisonment,  with  a  perma- nine months and four years, and between nine months 
nent ban from entering Denmark after serving the sen- and two years for violating German export laws.
tence. The decision on the case is final.
The percentage of acquittals (31%) has increased in 
comparison  with  previous  years  (18%  in  2009,  27% 
As in 2009 and 2010, the majority of reported verdicts  in 2010). Of the 40 female defendants, 18 were com-
in 2011 relate to separatist terrorism. Spain has the  pletely acquitted and one was acquitted in one pro-
most  verdicts  for  separatist  cases  in  2011,  as  well  as  ceeding and convicted in another.
the highest number of verdicts for religiously-inspired 
terrorism. France saw the second highest number of  Similar to 2009 and 2010, reported verdicts in relation 
verdicts  handed  down  for  separatist  terrorism,  and  to separatist terrorism in 2011 had the highest acquit-
Germany and the United Kingdom had the next high- tal  rate  (34%),  followed  by  left  wing  and  religiously 
est number of verdicts for religiously-inspired terror- inspired terrorism-related proceedings, with acquittal 
ism. Spain was the only EU Member State with court  rates of 27% and 24% respectively.
decisions on left-wing terrorism in 2011. The only right-
wing case concluded in 2011 took place in Belgium.8 
Six of the 12 countries with court decisions on terror-
ism cases in 2011 have a full conviction rate with no 
In  2011,  five  individuals  were  brought  to  court  in  the  acquittals.9 France and the Republic of Ireland can be 
Netherlands for their links with the LTTE. The two main  seen as having had mostly successful prosecutions. 
suspects were leading members of the Tamil Coordinating 
Committee
 (TCC) in the Netherlands and used the Tamil  The acquittal rate in Spain, which has the highest num-
diaspora for fundraising. Both suspects were acquitted  ber  of  verdicts,  continues  to  increase  (21%  in  2009, 
of membership of an organisation that had the objec- 38% in 2010, and 42% in 2011). As stated in last year’s 
tive of committing terrorist crimes, as the court decided  report, the level of acquittals in Spain can be explained 
that - in the relevant period between 10 August 2004  by  the  characteristics  of  the Spanish  judicial  system, 
and 26 April 2010 - there was an armed conflict within  focused  on  prevention  and  protection.  Often,  Spain 
Sri Lanka. On this basis, it could not be considered that  criminalises and prosecutes preparatory terrorist acts, 
the LTTE was an organisation with the objective of com- such as recruitment and training activities. Also, con-
mitting terrorist crimes. They were, however, convicted  spiracy to commit terrorist activities or the support 
of membership of a criminal organisation. Three other  thereof is prosecuted to prevent acts from occurring. 
8  See footnote 6.
9  These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and the Netherlands.
TE-SAT 2012  | 13 

Member State
Average
safe house in the French town of Tarbes in December 
Belgium
3
2002. Also, traces of biological remains were found in 
Denmark
6
the  residence  of  two  ETA  members,  both  convicted 
for the attack. The court concluded that the evidence 
France
10
effectively  proved  that  the  accused  was  in  contact 
Germany
4
with the perpetrators of the attack; however, it did not 
Ireland (Republic of)
7
demonstrate that he participated in the planning or 
Italy
6
execution, and thus the court acquitted him.
Lithuania
12
The Netherlands
4
The average penalty imposed in 2011 in Europe for acts of 
Spain
14
terrorism is approximately eight years. As for the various 
United Kingdom
17
types  of  terrorism  in  2011,  the  average  punishment  for 
verdicts handed down for separatist and left wing terror-
Figure 3: Average penalty per convicted individu-
ism amounts to 12 years, for religiously-inspired terrorism 
al (in years) 10
7 years (the same as in 2010), and for right-wing, less than 
one year.11 The highest average penalty is for the type 
As  explained  by  the Spanish  prosecution  authorities,  “Not specified” due to life sentences given in France.12
these  offences  are  grounded  in  circumstantial  evi-
dence which is then assessed by the courts.
In  a UK  trial,  a  former  British Airways  software  engi-
neer was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. His 
In a ruling from 2011, a former military chief of ETA was  initial intention had been to go overseas to take part in 
cleared by the Audiencia Nacional based on a lack of  “jihad” but, following contact with others, he decided 
evidence linking him to the 2002 attempted assassina- to stay at BA and explore ways of getting explosives on 
tion of a media group’s executive. In the judgment it  board aircraft and disrupting international air travel by 
was ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecu- crashing the airline’s computer systems. He was found 
tion was “insufficient” to link the accused to the terror- guilty on four counts of engaging in conduct in prepara-
ist action. During the trial, the prosecution argued that  tion of terrorist acts. He pleaded guilty to further terror-
intelligence experts revealed that the perpetrators of  ism offences before the trial began, admitting he was 
the attack were members of the ‘K-Olaia command’,  involved with extremists who wanted to overthrow a 
the defendant allegedly being one of them. The evi- foreign country’s government, as well as to the posses-
dence  consisted,  inter alia,  of  documents  related  to  sion of information likely to be useful to a person com-
the planning of the attack, seized during a raid of ETA’s  mitting or preparing an act of terrorism.
10  The average penalties do not include data from Greece. In Spain cumulative sentences of up to 1000 years were given for separatist terrorism offences. In the 
United Kingdom and France life sentences were imposed. For the purpose of the overview, sentences exceeding 40 years and life sentences have been counted 
as 40 years.

11  See footnote 6. 
12  In some countries, suspended sentences have been imposed. These have been included in the figures above. In Germany, youth penalties, community ser-
vice or probation were also given.
It should be noted that, aside from imprisonment, France often imposes a penalty of banishment from the national territory. Spain has a similar type of punish-
ment, taking away civil rights from individuals. Also, in some cases a financial penalty was imposed.

14 |
   TE-SAT 2012


5.   Religiously-inspired 
terrorism 
•  Violent jihadist terrorist groups provide 
indications of an increase in sophistication, 
but largely continue to exhibit poor skills and 
professional tradecraft, preventing them from 
committing effective attacks in the EU

•  European home-grown groups are becoming 
less homogeneous in terms of ethnicity
•  Political changes in Arab countries in 2011 
did not lead to visibly increased activities by 
al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups in the EU 

•  The death of Osama bin Laden has had little 
impact on the overall threat from al-Qaeda 
affiliated or inspired terrorism

•  In 2011, no al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired 
terrorist attacks were carried out in EU Member 
States

•  Two US military personnel were killed in a 
religiously-inspired attack in Germany13
•  The number of individuals arrested for offences 
Figure 4: Number of individuals arrested for 
related to violent jihadist terrorism dropped 
religiously inspired terrorist offences in Member 
from 179 in 2010 to 122 in 2011
States in 2011
5.1.  Terrorist attacks and  a terrorist act under German legal code. This incident 
arrested suspects
emphasises both the existence and acute danger of 
home-grown extremism and the difficulty of monitor-
The situation relating to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired  ing lone actors.
terrorism in EU Member States continues to be diverse. 
In  2011,  religiously-inspired  attack  plots  included  al- As in recent years, the al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired 
Qaeda-directed groups, home-grown cells inspired by  threat towards Scandinavia and Germany rose stead-
al-Qaeda and self-radicalised, self-directed lone actors.  ily  during  2011,  whilst  other  Member States,  such  as 
However,  Member States  have  not  reported  a  single  France,  Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom,  remained 
al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorist attack actually  constant targets and centres for radical activities. A 
carried out in 2011. The murder of two US military per- number of Member States with a military presence in 
sonnel by a lone actor in Germany in March 2011 is con- Afghanistan likewise experienced a persistent threat in 
sidered a religiously-inspired attack, whilst not judged  various forms. 
13  The killing of two American military personnel at Frankfurt airport by a religiously-inspired individual in March 2011 is not a terrorist attack according to 
German legislation, although the incident clearly carried some such characteristics.

TE-SAT 2012  | 15 

In  2011,  122  persons  were  arrested  in  the  EU  for  An increasing number of the arrested individuals are 
offences related to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired ter- not linked to a known terrorist organisation; this may 
rorism. More than half of these persons were primar- be an indication of an increase in autonomous violent 
ily arrested on suspicion of membership of a terrorist  jihadist cells and lone actors. 
organisation,  such  as AQIM  or  al-Shabab. Seventeen 
persons were arrested for the preparation of a terrorist  Home-grown religiously-inspired terrorist 
attack, a number significantly lower than in 2010, when  networks
there were an unprecedented 89 arrests for that rea- Home-grown,  religiously-inspired  terrorist  networks, 
son. Other offences included, but were not limited to,  particularly those augmented by individuals returning 
propaganda (12), recruitment (7), financing of terrorist  from  violent  jihadist  training  camps  abroad,  remain 
activities (13), the facilitation of terrorist offences (10),  the principal concern of many Member States. Despite 
the possession of arms and explosives (4), or a combi- the death in 2011 of Osama bin Laden and other key 
nation of these and other offences. 
al-Qaeda figures, home-grown al-Qaeda inspired indi-
Over the past three years, there has been a decrease in  viduals and groups based in Europe have continued to 
arrests for attacks and financing-related offences, but  plan attacks directed against their countries of resi-
the percentage of arrests for recruitment and sending  dence. The most significant attack plots in the EU dur-
volunteers to be trained to fight in conflict zones such  ing 2011 centred around home-grown groups based 
as the Afghanistan / Pakistan border area and Somalia  in Germany and the UK. Four persons arrested in Ger-
has increased.
many in April and December 2011 had established con-
The average age of those arrested is 30 years. How- nections to al-Qaeda core and other al-Qaeda affiliates 
ever,  the  individuals  arrested  for  the  preparation  of  and it is believed that there were plans for at least one 
attacks and sending volunteers are, in the majority of  terrorist attack in Germany. The key figure in the cell 
cases, younger than 25. 
had received terrorist training at camps in Pakistan. 
Twelve individuals from Birmingham, arrested in Sep-
Arrests related to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terror- tember and November 2011 in the UK, were charged 
ism were reported by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the  with terrorism offences, including preparing for an act 
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Repub- of  terrorism  in  the UK,  providing  money  for  the  pur-
lic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain,  poses of terrorism, and failing to disclose information 
Sweden, and the UK.14
about potential acts of terrorism. This British-based 
home-grown group likewise demonstrated strong 
More than half of the arrested individuals were non- links to Pakistan. Other home-grown plots with less 
EU nationals. 14 per cent were of Moroccan nationality  sophistication underline the potential of even simplis-
and 12 per cent were Russians. The number of individu- tic attacks to impact upon the EU, as well as the unfal-
als arrested with a Russian nationality increased from 3  tering determination of home-grown violent jihadists 
in 2009, to 9 in 2010 and 16 in 2011. A number of these  to strike.    
arrests are linked to a 2009 investigation into the prep-
aration of an attack. 
14  There have been arrests related to religiously-inspired terrorism in the UK, but they are not specified in the quantitative information received from the UK.
16 |
   TE-SAT 2012

2011 has shown that European home-grown networks  jihadists become more proficient at reaching conflict 
are becoming less homogeneous in terms of ethnic- zones  through  reflecting  upon  their  earlier  errors.  In 
ity. Instead, a common ideology provides the basis for  this context, increased interest in travelling to Somalia 
the establishment of groups. In some instances, there  via Kenya was noted in 2011. In previous years, most 
are increasing contacts between individual networks  followers seeking to fight for al-Shabab tended to be 
within  specific  states.  In  other  instances,  however,  of Somali origin. In 2011, however, al-Shabab attracted 
home-grown networks remain small in number, loose  European violent jihadists from beyond the Somali 
in organisation and lack strong leadership and clear  diaspora. Some radicalised individuals have shown 
objectives. Some Member States have reported that  a preference for travelling to Somalia over Pakistan. 
home-grown groups and individuals are often focused  However, this may be perceived by al-Qaeda inspired 
upon violent jihad abroad rather than committing  extremists as simply an easier route to violent jihad 
attacks in the West. 
rather than a predilection for al-Shabab. 
To  some  extent,  European  home-grown  networks  –  Despite their failure to commit any attacks during 2011, 
particularly those whose members have not attended  home-grown groups in the EU nevertheless continued 
violent  jihadist  training  camps  –  continue  to  exhibit  to act as effective force multipliers for violent jihadist 
poor  professional  tradecraft.  In  this  regard,  suspects  organisations overseas. Despite their relatively small 
engaged in attack planning and preparation have done  size, violent jihadist groups located in the Afghanistan-
so whilst maintaining an overtly high profile through  Pakistan border region, such as the Deutsche Taliban 
open postings on new media channels or committing  Mudschahidin (DTM), interacted with EU home-grown 
minor criminal acts of an extremist nature in tandem  networks to pursue attack plots and gain additional 
with their more clandestine activities. During 2011, a  volunteers. 
suspect resident in Germany sought to acquire compo-
nents for home-made explosives (HMEs) despite hav- Solo terrorists and lone actors
ing had his passport confiscated by German authorities  As  a  consequence  of  sustained  military  pressure,  al-
in 2009 after being suspected of attempting to travel  Qaeda core have publicly discouraged sympathisers 
to a training camp. 
from travelling to conflict zones in order to join them. It 
has instead promoted the idea of individually planned 
Nevertheless,  2011  provided  some  indications  of  and executed attacks in Western countries without the 
increasing sophistication amongst home-grown vio- active assistance of any larger organisation. 
lent jihadists in some respects. Of note is an evolution 
in modus operandi towards the production of HMEs for  An indication of a deliberate shift by al-Qaeda core 
use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) incorporat- towards formalising a strategy of individual violent 
ing components extracted from commercially available  jihad is seen through its media wing’s June 2011 release 
commodities. Also noteworthy is the ongoing interest  of a video message entitled You Are Held Responsible 
in receiving flight training for terrorist purposes which,  Only  For Yourself.  In  this  video,  Osama  bin  Laden’s 
in one instance during 2011, involved the use of a vir- successor,  Aiman  al-Zawahiri,  and  senior  al-Qaeda 
tual flight simulator as an alternative instructional tool.  ideologues,  defined,  glorified  and  incited  individual 
violent jihadist lone actor attacks in addition to pro-
There are also indications that home-grown violent  viding  religious  justification  for  them. The  video  dis-
TE-SAT 2012  | 17 

suades potential jihadists in the West from travelling to  conspicuousness of many lone actors when obtain-
Afghanistan-Pakistan and instead encourages them to  ing component elements for an attack indicates the 
commit attacks in their countries of residence. 
shortcomings of al-Qaeda’s individual jihad strategy. 
Moreover, through continued glorification of incompe-
Attacks by apparent solo terrorists targeted Western  tent attackers, al-Qaeda has not encouraged scrutiny 
interests outside Europe with differing degrees of suc- of failed attacks in order to avoid repeating earlier mis-
cess. Most notable was the Marrakech café bombing  takes. Consequently, many individual violent jihad plots 
in Morocco of 28 April 2011, which killed eight French  have failed or have not achieved their full potential.
nationals, a Briton, a Dutchman, a Swiss and a Portu-
guese national. A solo terrorist firearms attack against  5.2. Terrorist activities
the US embassy in Sarajevo in October 2011 was mark-
edly less successful. Other efforts by radicalised indi- Logistics and facilitation
viduals to commit lone attacks elsewhere were foiled  Home-grown networks or single persons in the EU 
before execution or were poorly executed resulting in  continue to support a variety of violent jihadist groups 
rapid arrests. 
elsewhere through providing funds or logistical assis-
tance. Other home-grown networks directly engaged 
As with home-grown networks, solo home-grown ter- in attack planning have engaged the services of organ-
rorists present larger terrorist structures with the ability  ised crime groups (OCGs) to assist their activities, such 
to magnify their capabilities through offering to con- as in raising funds through common criminal acts. 
duct attacks inside Western states in their name. A solo  OCGs have at times been unaware of the terrorist 
terrorist of Moroccan origin arrested in August 2011  intentions of those they support. 
sought to support al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) in this manner by planning to poison the water  Religiously-inspired terrorism continues to exploit EU 
supplies of tourist locations in Spain, in retaliation for  Member States in Eastern Europe for terrorism-related 
the death of bin Laden.
activities. Various religiously-inspired elements have 
attempted to establish connections with Eastern Euro-
Lone  actor  terrorist  attacks,  however,  remain  largely  pean OCGs involved in the trafficking of human beings 
amateur  in  their  planning  and  execution,  and  a  low- and the production of forged identity documents. 
occurrence phenomenon overall. The success of an  Other religiously-inspired terrorists have sought to 
individual violent jihad attack is likely to be dictated by a  enter the EU through this region, often by claiming ref-
combination of skills and training, together with ease of  ugee status. A small number of known terrorists were 
access to both weaponry and the potential target. Thus  also able to capitalise on the refugee surge from North 
far, individual jihadists have been incapable of reaching  African states to the Italian island of Lampedusa as a 
professional levels of planning and execution. Despite  consequence of the Arab Spring events. Whilst such 
instructing aspiring terrorists on the need for methodi- infiltration is of concern, the principal threat remains 
cal preparation, the impetuous and semi-spontaneous  that posed by home-grown religiously-inspired terror-
nature of many individual violent jihadists’ planning  ism rather than the influx of foreign nationals. 
activities suggests that al-Qaeda remains unable to 
instil discipline and restrain impulsive acts. Despite the  Internet propaganda 
promotion of good tradecraft and security measures  The engagement of religiously-inspired violent extrem-
by  the  online  magazine,  Inspire,  the  indiscretion  and  ists, often converts, in Internet activities to support vio-
18 |
   TE-SAT 2012


magazine also identified potential targets, in particu-
lar  publicly  known  persons  who  have,  at  some  point 
in time, been involved in controversy surrounding the 
religion of Islam.
5.3.  Terrorist situation 
outside the EU 
“Arab Spring” events in North African and 
Middle Eastern countries 

lent jihad remains high. The publication of articles and  The revolts in a number of Arab countries starting in 
videos on al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired Internet sites,  late  2010,  which  resulted  in  the  overturn  of  several 
glorifying attacks for the purposes of recruitment and  authoritarian governments in the region, were a severe 
fundraising for the organisations, remained a constant  setback for terrorist propaganda by al-Qaeda, its affili-
theme during 2011. Violent jihadist groups, such as the  ates and supporters of its ideology. The protest move-
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic Movement of  ments, most of which remained peaceful and secular 
Uzbekistan  (IMU),  received  support  by  EU  nationals  in character, illustrated the limited impact of al-Qaeda 
posting propaganda texts and videos on the Internet,  rhetoric  on  ordinary  Arabs,  and  resulted  in  violent 
to recruit suicide bombers and radicalise viewers. 
jihadists being mere bystanders.
The killing of radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki and  Weak governance in some Arab Spring states, together 
online propagandist Samir Khan in Yemen in Septem- with  the  abundance  of  uncontrolled  Libyan  arms,  in 
ber 2011 had significant impact on the production of  particular, remain causes for concern. Whilst al-Qaeda 
propaganda targeting audiences in Western countries.  and its regional affiliates were notably absent from the 
Al-Awlaki had been one of the most vocal proponents  protests,  demonstrations  and  conflicts  in  early  2011, 
of violence in the name of religion for years, addressing  groups such as AQIM and the Nigerian Boko Haram had 
his audiences in both English and Arabic. Samir Khan  arguably enhanced their positions in some respects by 
was the alleged editor of the English-language online  the end of 2011. Both groups are likely to have used the 
propaganda  magazine,  Inspire.  Since  their  deaths,  Libyan conflict to secure unknown quantities of arms 
no new issues of Inspire have been published. In the  and ammunition from Libyan arsenals either for future 
course of 2010 the magazine had become one of the  operations or for onward sale to finance their activities. 
principal terrorist propaganda tools published in a 
European language.
Al-Qaeda affiliates beyond Europe
AQIM continues to pose a notable threat to France 
Before  their  deaths,  four  new  issues  of  Inspire  were  and  Spain,  in  particular.  Despite  repeated  threaten-
published on the Internet in 2011. The magazine con- ing statements, the group has thus far failed to dem-
tinued its editorial line of encouraging its readers to  onstrate any capacity to directly attack the European 
take part in armed action either on “open fronts” or in  continent. It has instead sought to finance individual 
their home countries. At the same time, the magazine  jihadists with personal connections in Europe who are 
provided information on the handling of weapons and  willing to conduct attacks on its behalf. AQIM never-
the production of improvised explosive devices. The  theless carried out a number of kidnappings of West-
TE-SAT 2012  | 19 


ern nationals in the Sahel and Maghreb regions in 2011. 
Other religiously-inspired terrorist groups and cells in 
the North African region remain intent on attacking 
European  nationals,  as  evidenced  by  the  aforemen-
tioned Marrakech café bombing in Morocco. 
The death of AQAP’s cleric and lead figure, Anwar al-
Awlaki, killed by a drone on 30 September 2011, was 
a substantial blow to the organisation although it did 
not directly reduce its operational capabilities. The 
designer of the bomb packages intercepted on their 
way  to  the US  in October  2010,  and  of  the  portable 
devices used in the attack on the Saudi Prince Muham- pings.  Unknown  groups,  including  Haraket  al-Nahda 
mad bin Nayef and in the failed attempt to create an  wal-Islah (The Movement for Renewal and Reform) in 
explosion on a flight between Amsterdam and Detroit  Lebanon and the AQIM splinter group Jamat Tawhid 
in 2009, is still among AQAP’s leaders. 
Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Unity Movement for Jihad 
in West Africa) in the Sahel region, claimed responsi-
Although al-Shabab has recently increased its appeal  bility for kidnapping EU nationals in 2011. A group of 
for European volunteers, the primary objective of the  terrorists associated with Boko Haram kidnapped a 
group is assessed to be the establishment of an Islamic  British and an Italian engineer working for an Italian 
state in Somalia rather than planning attacks overseas.  construction firm in Nigeria in May 2011. 
Nevertheless, individuals from the Somali diaspora in 
particular may be inspired to initiate attacks by the  The increasing number of groups issuing ransom 
group’s propaganda output. 
demands is likely to result in increased competition 
and  rivalry  between  different  groups,  particularly  in 
Kidnappings 
Northern and Western Africa, where encroachment by 
Western nationals travelling or working in Africa, the  kidnappers into the ‘territory’ of others may result in 
Middle East and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border  confrontation. 
regions are increasingly being targeted for kidnap-
ping operations by al-Qaeda-inspired groups or other  Opportunist  organised  crime  groups  in  different 
religiously-inspired terrorist organisations. Eight EU  regions continue to transfer kidnapped victims to reli-
nationals remained hostages at the start of 2011. This  giously-inspired terrorist groups, most likely for finan-
figure was increased by at least a further 24 in 2011.  cial gain. Other regional OCGs and extremist political 
It is assessed that the kidnappers primarily sought to  groups may also seek to pose as violent jihadist groups, 
secure  financing  for  the  terrorist  groups  concerned  as additional leverage against government authorities. 
through ransom demands rather than securing politi- The case of seven Estonian tourists kidnapped by Hara-
cal objectives. 
ket al-Nahda wal-Islah in Lebanon in March 2011 was 
not related to terrorism and was not politically moti-
2011 also saw an increase in the number of new reli- vated. The  Estonian  investigation  identified  that  the 
giously-inspired terrorist groups engaged in kidnap- hostage-takers’ sole objective was to kidnap foreigners 
20 |
   TE-SAT 2012

for financial gain. The terrorist front group was created  However, the legacy of bin Laden, in terms of radicalisa-
on an ad hoc basis for this specific operation. Similarly,  tion and inspiration, is enormous. In the ten years since 
kidnappings of westerners in the Horn of Africa have  9/11,  al-Qaeda  has  metamorphosised  from  a  small 
blurred the distinction between pure criminality and  group undertaking international plots into a concept of 
terrorism.
global jihad operated by home-grown groups or indi-
viduals without specific direction from bin Laden. His 
Death of Osama bin Laden
alliances with other jihadist groupings and the increas-
Whilst the death of Osama bin Laden is of undoubted  ing concept of leaderless violent jihad are likely to be 
importance, at least in symbolic terms, it has had lit- unaffected by his death. 
tle  immediate  impact  on  the  al-Qaeda  affiliated  or   
inspired terrorism threat in the EU. The many state-
ments by violent jihadist groups and individuals threat-
ening attacks to avenge his death did not translate 
into action in 2011. Nevertheless, EU Member States 
have been highlighted as desirable targets for terrorist 
attacks by al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda. 
To a certain extent, bin Laden’s significance in the lead-
ership and direction of a global jihad against western 
powers had diminished in recent years and his death, 
almost 10 years after 9/11, has far less significance in 
2011 than if it had occurred in the years immediately 
after the attack. The ability of al-Qaeda core in Pakistan 
to direct terrorist attacks abroad has likewise lessened 
in tandem with the isolation of the al-Qaeda hierarchy 
in the Pakistan region. Whilst bin Laden was arguably a 
figure of increasingly peripheral importance, the ongo-
ing Arab Spring developments in the North African and 
Middle East region are currently more significant. 
TE-SAT 2012  | 21 


6. Ethno nationalist and 
separatist terrorism 
•  A significant decrease in the number of terrorist 
attacks in Spain
•  110 attacks carried out in EU Member States 
•  247 individuals arrested for separatist terrorism-

related offences in EU Member States
•  EU Member States provide important logistical 
support bases for groups based outside the EU 
6.1.  Terrorist attacks and 
arrested suspects
In 2011, 110 attacks were claimed or attributed to sepa-
ratist terrorist organisations in France and Spain, while 
247  individuals  were  arrested  for  offences  related  to 
separatist terrorism in EU Member States. 
The majority of the individuals were arrested in France 
(126), Republic of Ireland (68) and Spain (41). 
Figure 5: Number of failed, foiled or completed 
attacks and number of suspects arrested for 

2011  was  characterised  by  a  significant  decrease  in  ethno nationalist and separatist terrorism in 
terrorist activities by ETA and its support groups, fol- Member States in 2011
lowing the announcements made by ETA regarding 
the establishment of a ceasefire and, later, about the 
definitive cessation of its armed activity.
The extortion of entrepreneurs in the Basque region 
In 2011, ETA committed one terrorist attack in France  and Navarre (ETA’s main sources of income) seems to 
(Valliere,  Creuse).  Two  ETA  members  opened  fire  have disappeared, following a decision taken by ETA 
against the Gendarmerie while trying to escape from  in the context of the cease-fire announced in January 
a police checkpoint. In this attack one person was  2011. However, ETA sympathisers reportedly carried 
injured. 
out a “door-to-door” campaign at Christmas to collect 
funds from small shops and stores: a “volunteer” con-
Street violence carried out by ETA sympathisers also  tribution was requested and the names of those who 
decreased significantly in 2011. Only 13 attacks were  refused to contribute were recorded.16
perpetrated in the Basque region and Navarre, mostly 
making use of home-made explosive and incendiary 
devices.15
15  Crónica (bulletin number 1560), Vasco Press, 9 January 2012.
16  Interior afirma que ETA recauda fondos para tener vivo su ‘aparato logístico, El Mundo, 23 January 2012.
22 |
   TE-SAT 2012

The dismantling of several ETA cells and the seizure  Police  and  judicial  activity  against  ETA,  at  national 
of explosives in Spain, France and Portugal over the  and international level, continued in 2011, irrespective 
past few years have brought ETA to one of its weakest  of the announcements made by the organisation. As 
positions ever. 
a result, 55 persons were arrested for their member-
ship, support or criminal/terrorist links to ETA. 
The most relevant communiqués issued in 2011 were 
published on 10 January and 20 October. In the first  The most relevant arrests were made in March in Viz-
one, ETA announced a general and permanent cease- caya  (Spain),  when  an  operational  commando  was 
fire  which  could  be  verified  by  an  “ad-hoc”  inter- dismantled,17 and in April in Guipuzcoa (Spain), when 
national  commission,  in  an  attempt  to  involve  the  a  logistic  cell  in  charge  of  producing,  storing  and 
international community in the so-called Basque  distributing explosive materials was apprehended. 
conflict. In its statement of 20 October (recorded in  This last operation confirms the trend that ETA has 
a  video  and  distributed  to  two  Basque  newspapers,  moved, or tried to move, its logistic bases from the 
as well as to The New York Times and the BBC), ETA  south of France to the north of Spain (Basque region 
made public its decision to definitively cease its armed  and Cataluña), as well as to Portugal.
actions. 
The Galician pro-independence movement carried 
Although in 2011 ETA announced a permanent cease- out 12 attacks in Galicia. Four attacks can be attrib-
fire and the end of its campaign to collect money via  uted with certainty to Resistencia Galega (RG), while 
extortion, the recruitment of new members and the  the remaining eight were perpetrated by persons or 
collection of information on new and future targets  small groups ideologically involved in the so-called 
are still ongoing. ETA has not announced the surren- radical pro-independence fight. 
der of its weaponry or the dissolution of the terrorist 
organisation. 
In October, RG published a communiqué on the Inter-
net claiming responsibility for several attacks carried 
Experience based on similar announcements made  out against political parties, real estate and construc-
in the past may lead to the conclusion that ETA could  tion companies, banks, etc., and announced the con-
resume its terrorist activities at any moment, if they  tinuation of its terrorist activities by increasing its 
fail to achieve their political goals: the establishment  armed attacks.
of a peace talk process with the Spanish and French 
governments  to  create  an  independent  state,  com- In November and December, a total of six RG mem-
prising the Spanish and French Basque regions plus  bers were arrested in Spain. After searching several 
Navarre. The appearance of splinter groups, compris- houses, police seized home-made explosive devices. 
ing the most radical ETA members, who are against  Allegedly, RG had planned coordinated attacks to be 
the  cessation  of  terrorist  activities,  cannot  be  ruled  perpetrated on the anniversary of the approval of the 
out.
Spanish Constitution.
17  The operational commando, made up of four terrorists, was inactive between 2006 and 2009, and is thought to be responsible for, at least, two casualties. 
TE-SAT 2012  | 23 

Dissident republican (DR) terrorist groups (Real Irish  Although the number of individuals arrested linked 
Republican Army (RIRA), Continuity Irish Republican  to the PKK is decreasing, Europe remains a logistical 
Army (CIRA), Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) and others)  support  base  for  funding,  recruitment,  training  and 
remain the most significant threat to national security  propaganda.  To  fulfil  these  logistical  activities,  the 
in Northern Ireland and, over the past two years, DR  PKK has a network of recruiters across Europe, which 
groups have demonstrated the capability to carry out  could be a cause of concern. 
a range of IED and shooting attacks against security  In 2011, individuals were arrested for membership of 
forces and other targets. Most DR groups are heavily  the PKK or criminal support activities to the PKK in 
involved in criminal activities such as robberies, extor- France, Germany and Romania.
tion,  tobacco  and  fuel  smuggling  and  paramilitary 
assaults within their own community.
The majority of the suspects arrested were involved in 
fundraising for guerrilla operations in Turkey and for 
The murder of a Catholic police constable in April 2011  the maintenance of guerrilla camps in northern Iraq. 
in the UK was the first fatal attack by dissident repub- Some of the funds collected are believed to be used 
licans since 2009. Police staff remained the principal  to sponsor EU-based propaganda centres and train-
target  of  dissident  republicans,  although  attacks  on  ing camps. 
premises  in  public  areas,  notably  high  street  banks 
and  the  Londonderry  City  of  Culture  office,  risked  Extortion, money laundering, facilitating illegal immi-
civilian casualties. 
gration, drugs and human trafficking remain the main 
crimes committed by PKK members in Europe as well 
The  CIRA,  which  is  undergoing  a  period  of  internal  as their main profit generators.
turmoil, does not appear to have developed the same 
level of consistency in its capabilities as RIRA. The  The PKK committed several terrorist attacks on Turk-
CIRA is currently undergoing organisational restruc- ish  territory  in  2011;  however,  the  total  number  of 
turing  but  the  effective  takeover  of  the  CIRA  by  a  attacks committed on Turkish soil has decreased. 
potentially more radical internal element remains a 
cause for concern. 
The tactics used to commit attacks are mainly 
unchanged. Use of booby-trapped improvised devices 
The RIRA’s continued success in terms of deployment  and numbers of coordinated armed attacks carried 
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) across a wide  out against the military, security services and border 
range of targets in Northern Ireland is also a cause for  police posts have occurred in predominantly Kurdish 
concern. It is evident that, in the past two years, RIRA  areas of South-East Turkey. 
has improved its engineering and technical capabili-
ties. 
However some changes in modus operandi have been 
observed,  for  example  through  the  kidnapping  of 
In  France,  62  completed  attacks  and  13  attempted  teachers, targeting of schools and hijacking of public 
attacks were reported. All these attacks were carried  transport. 
out by Corsican terrorist groups. Their main target 
remains the tourism sector. Holiday homes and res-
taurants are often targeted. 
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   TE-SAT 2012

In the rest of the world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) did not carry out any attacks; no indi-
viduals were arrested in the Member States in 2011. 
However,  LTTE  was  re-listed  as  a  terrorist  entity  by 
the EU in July 2011 and the organisation is still consid-
ered active in some EU States. 
Currently,  the  LTTE  is  assessed  to  have  split  into 
‘peaceful’ factions that advocate the use of political 
means, and ‘active militant’ factions advocating vio-
lence to achieve their aims. 
The militant factions of the LTTE are actively looking 
for support for their cause in terms of financing, logis-
tics and propaganda in Member States with a large 
Tamil diaspora. These militant factions are suspected 
of using extortion, running illegal lotteries and human 
trafficking to collect funds, and of spreading propa-
ganda on radio and TV stations and via numerous 
websites. Many of these activities have been carried 
out by various front organisations.   
In general, the threat posed by the LTTE is considered 
low and attacks by the LTTE in the EU are unlikely. 
There is a risk, however, that inter-ethnic (Tamil) con-
flicts could sometimes erupt into violence.
TE-SAT 2012  | 25 


7. Left-wing and anarchist 
terrorism 
•  37 terrorist attacks carried out in EU Member States
•  42 individuals arrested in EU Member States
•  Increased cooperation between environmental and 

left-wing violent extremist and terrorist groups
7.1.  Terrorist attacks and 
arrested suspects
In  2011,  Denmark, Germany, Greece,  Italy  and Spain 
reported a total of 37 terrorist attacks by left-wing and 
anarchist groups. This number represents a decrease 
compared to 2010, when 45 attacks were reported. The 
majority of incidents were arson attacks and mainly 
targeted government and businesses. The number 
of bomb attacks decreased from 23 in 2010 to 11 in 
2011. While in 2010 attacks by left-wing and anarchist 
groups claimed the lives of six people, in 2011 one per-
son in Greece lost his life during the construction of an  Figure 6: Number of failed, foiled or completed at-
improvised explosive device (IED) in the basement of a  tacks and number of suspects arrested for left-wing 
building. In Italy, two people were injured in separate  and anarchist terrorism in Member States in 2011 
attacks during the year. 
A total of 42 persons were arrested in 2011 for left-wing  military barracks and a tax collection company in Italy, 
and anarchist terrorist offences in 5 EU Member States:  a prison in Greece, the headquarters of a bank in Ger-
Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy  and  Spain.  As  in  many,  the Greek  Embassy  in  France,  and  the  offices 
2010, when 34 arrested suspects were reported, most  of  the  Nuclear  Industry  Federation  in  Switzerland. 
of the arrests occurred in Greece, Italy and Spain. The  The devices in Germany and Greece were intercepted 
majority of those arrested were suspected of member- before they exploded, but in the other instances three 
ship of a terrorist organisation. 
people were injured. 
The Italian anarchist group FAI (Federazione Anarchica  Similar  to  2010,  when  12  suspected  members  of  the 
Informale) claimed responsibility for a number attacks  terrorist organisation Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias were 
in Italy, Greece, Germany and Switzerland in 2011. For  arrested, continued efforts by law enforcement author-
years, the group’s modus operandi has been the coor- ities in Greece in 2011 resulted in additional arrests and 
dinated delivery of IEDs by mail or the placing of sev- seizures of large quantities of weapons. The number of 
eral IEDs with different targets on the same date. 
terrorist attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups in 
Greece decreased from 20 in 2010 to six in 2011. 
In two separate campaigns, one in March and another  In April 2011, law enforcement authorities in Denmark 
one in December 2011, parcel bombs were sent to a  arrested five persons held responsible for a number of 
26 |
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arson attacks targeting police buildings, a bank and the 
Greek Embassy in Copenhagen. 
Violent extremist anarchists committed 20 attacks in 
2011 in Spain, where the number of arrests has con-
tinued  to  decrease  since  2007.  In  2011,  two  violent 
extremist anarchists were arrested in Spain. A further 
three arrests were carried out in the framework of 
international cooperation to fight terrorism. 
other ideological themes of left-wing/anarchist activ-
7.2. Terrorist and violent  ism in the Netherlands. Also, in France, a number of 
 
extremist activities
incidents were motivated by the expulsion of asylum 
seekers. Besides the traditional meetings and pro-
While the use of incendiary devices by left-wing or  test  demonstrations,  a  number  of  violent  incidents, 
violent anarchist extremists is not new, the targeting  such as arson attacks, clashes with police and criminal 
of specific weak points of the railway infrastructure is  damage, occurred in 2011. A significant incident in the 
notable. Throughout 2011, left-wing/anarchist extrem- Netherlands was a home visit - a tactic frequently used 
ists targeted rail facilities in Germany, Italy and Finland.  by violent animal rights extremists - damaging the 
Between 10 and 13 October 2011, a total of 18 impro- house of the CEO of a construction company. Compa-
vised incendiary devices were discovered at nine rail- nies involved in the construction of detention centres 
way locations in Germany. The attacks were claimed  for asylum seekers or prisons are preferred targets of 
by a previously unknown group. The group justified the  anarchist extremists. 
placement of the devices as a direct response to Ger- Confrontations between anti-fascist groups and their 
man military deployment in Afghanistan and the fact  right-wing opponents have hardened and become 
that the German railway system provides logistical  increasingly violent in recent years. 
support for the German army.
While criminal offences in this context in Germany are 
Attacks linked to Greek or Italian anarchist circles occur  predominantly committed in the context of right-wing 
frequently in Europe. In most cases, the motivation is  meetings and parades, activists in the Czech Republic 
an expression of solidarity with imprisoned anarchists.  focus increasingly on attacking individuals. In Swe-
Similar to 2010, signs of increased transnational coor- den,  actions  have  focused  on  representatives  of  the 
dination between groups were observed in 2011. Com- Sweden Democrats party. In 2011, a number of local 
muniqués issued by the Greek terrorist organisation  and regional party representatives received harassing 
Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias advocated the need to estab- emails and home visits. 
lish “an international network of anarchist individuals  A shift in direction in some anarchist protests towards 
and groups”. The renewed activism of the FAI can be  environmental issues was already identified in 2010 in 
seen in this context. In documents found inside their  the UK. In 2011, anarchists joined the ranks of protest-
parcel bombs, reference is made to the call by Syno- ers in France and Italy during demonstrations against 
mosia Pyrinon Fotias
the construction of the future airport of Notre Dame 
The number of incidents related to the so-called “No  des Landes in Nantes, and the high-speed railway line 
Border” campaign is relatively high in comparison to  linking France and Italy in Val di Susa.
TE-SAT 2012  | 27 

8. Right-wing  terrorism
•  The threat from right-wing terrorism and violent 
Cologne in 2001 and 2004. These attacks injured more 
extremism comes from undetected lone actors 
than 30 people, most of them foreigners.
or small groups rather than established extreme 
right-wing groups

8.2.  Violent right-wing 
•  One right-wing terrorist attack in EU Member 
extremism
States
•  Five individuals arrested for right-wing terrorism in  During  2011,  several  Member  States  reported  activi-
EU Member States
ties by violent right-wing extremist groups. The per-
ception of these incidents among the public is shaped 
in  particular  by  xenophobic  (violent)  offences,  and 
8.1.  Terrorist attacks and  right-wing parades often referring to public occasions 
arrested suspects 
or commemorations. Violent attacks appear to be, in 
most cases, the result of an accidental encounter or a 
One right-wing terrorist attack was reported by Spain  reciprocal provocation.
in 2011. On 2 November, an arson attack was commit-
ted in Terrassa (Barcelona) on the facilities of a publish- In September 2011, Bulgaria experienced heavy unrest 
ing company and an anti-capitalist cooperative society.  after the van of a Roma family ran over and killed a 
The incident did not cause any casualties or fatalities. 
19-year-old man. An angry crowd of about 2000 peo-
ple gathered and attacked three houses owned by the 
Five persons were arrested for being involved in right- Roma  leader  in  the  village,  shouting  anti-Roma  slo-
wing terrorism. All arrests took place in Germany  gans. Further violent demonstrations by nationalist 
and were linked to the right-wing extremist/terror- youths gradually spread to other towns. A total of 127 
ist group called “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund  persons were arrested during the escalations. The vio-
–  NSU”  (National  Socialist  Underground),  connected  lence was thought to be the worst since 1997, when an 
to alleged politically-motivated murders committed  economic crisis and hyperinflation brought Bulgarian 
between 2001 and 2007.
citizens to the streets.
 
The group is suspected of being responsible for the  The  Czech  Republic  has  also  experienced  rising  ten-
murders of nine people of Turkish and Greek origin, as  sions against the ethnic minority of Roma people. The 
well as for the shooting of a German police woman and  escalations started after a group of Roma attacked an 
the attempted murder of a male German police officer.  individual with a machete last summer in a bar close 
The politically- motivated and xenophobic background  to the town of Varnsdorf in Bohemia. The Czech ‘Work-
was  revealed  from  pieces  of  evidence  seized  after  ers Party of Social Justice’ - Delnická Strana Sociálni 
two of the NSU members committed suicide in early  Spravedlnosti (DSSS) - seems to have taken advantage 
November  2011,  having  being  pursued  by  the  police  of this situation and mobilised their regional work by 
following a bank robbery. Apart from this, the two male  establishing  local  and  regional  affiliated  organisa-
suspects are believed to be connected to a series of  tions, as well as organising frequent anti-Roma protest 
bank robberies which they used to finance their opera- marches in several towns. 
tions  and  their  undercover  lives.  Moreover,  the  sus-
pects are allegedly involved in two explosive attacks in  Growing concerns over austerity programmes due to 
28 |
   TE-SAT 2012


for the conviction and imprisonment of important rep-
resentatives of the ‘Portuguese Hammerskins’ (PHS), 
is trying to recover its strength through the right-wing 
music scene and close cooperation with other groups 
in Europe. In doing so, an international meeting called 
“White Christmas” was organised for the PHS on the 
the economic crisis, immigration and multiculturalism  outskirts of Lisbon on 3 December 2011. 
issues, combined with disillusion with mainstream poli-
tics, may lead to an increase in violent right-wing activi- Acquisition of weapons, ammunition 
ties.18
and/or explosives
Several  Member  States  confirmed  that  members  of 
Suggestions made in open sources that the attacks in  the extreme right-wing scene have access to and/or 
Norway in July 2011 were acts of right-wing terrorism,  harbour  ambitions  to  acquire  weapons,  ammunition 
or had links with right-wing extremist groups in the EU,  and/or explosives, both legally and illegally. In particu-
have not been substantiated. 
lar,  the  ideological  orientation  on  historical  National 
Socialism,  combined  with  an  appreciation  of  the  vir-
International links exist within the violent extreme  tue of discipline, often goes along with an affinity for 
right-wing  scene,  but  they  vary  significantly  in  weapons and arms. This explains the fact that legal 
strength. Major public events, such as days of honour,  possession of (fire)arms is relatively common among 
annual  commemoration  marches,  demonstrations  or  violent right-wing extremists.
music concerts, play a key role in establishing contacts. 
Whilst  the  seizure  of  illegal  weapons  and  ammuni-
Propaganda and recruitment
tion,  as  well  as  improvised  explosive  devices  (IEDs) 
Recruitment and the distribution of violent extreme  or materials used for the production of IEDs, may be 
right-wing propaganda are major causes of concern.  an indication of a certain level of militancy for at least 
Several Member States carried out investigations on  some parts of the scene, police authorities say that this 
this matter. 
phenomenon often relates more to the aspect of their 
subculture, than to an intention to use these weapons 
The Internet, and in particular social network platforms  for terrorist ends. Nonetheless, it should be taken into 
where  White  Power  Music  (WPM)  is  promoted,  is  a  account that these illegal weapons might be used in 
cause of concern. 
sporadic incidents to cause significant harm. 
In regard to this, the Swedish authorities reported that  As  in  previous  years,  several  arrested  right-wing  vio-
their WPM movement engages in a series of activities  lent extremists were acting alone. These individuals 
covering many aspects of the activists’ lives. Most of  might share an ideological identification with a violent 
their projects are of a social nature and aim to influ- extremist organisation, but do not necessarily commu-
ence public opinion. Portuguese authorities reported  nicate with the organisation with which they identify 
that their right-wing scene, which has to compensate  themselves. 
18  “Far Right on Rise in Europe”.  www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-europe-report.
TE-SAT 2012  | 29 

9. Single-issue  terrorism
•  Increased activity by violent animal rights extrem-
to have similarities with violent left-wing extrem-
ist groups have a significant impact on the busi-
ist  groups,  which  could  be  an  explanation  for  the 
nesses involved 
increased cooperation between violent left-wing and 
•  Violent single-issue extremist groups focus on a 
violent environmental extremist groups. 
broad range of targets, including indirectly related 
institutions and businesses

These groups will continue to attract radical individu-
•  Increased cross-border cooperation between sev-
als who are ready to use violent tactics. Professional-
eral types of violent extremist groups is a cause for  ism and the often high competencies and capabilities 
concern
of the group members, such as the effective use of the 
Internet for recruitment and propaganda, increase the 
threat posed by these groups. 
No single-issue terrorist attacks or arrests were 
reported by Member States in 2011. Nevertheless, a  9.1.  Single-issue terrorist 
number of incidents were reported by France, Italy, 
and violent extremist 
the Netherlands, the UK and the Republic of Ireland 
activities
and additional monitoring of open sources shows 
that a large number of incidents are never reported  Animal rights violent extremism
to the police. These activities carried out by violent  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  total  number  of Animal 
animal rights extremists (ARE) and violent environ- rights  violent  extremism  (ARE)  incidents  carried  out, 
mental extremist groups range from fairly low-level  because of Member States’ tendency to focus only on 
vandalism incidents to significant acts of destruction  major incidents in their reporting. The pharmaceutical 
and the use of incendiary or improvised explosive  industry reported 262 incidents worldwide in 2011.19 
devices. 
Although the majority of these incidents are demon-
strations with a small number of persons involved, they 
Despite the low number of major incidents, the groups’  have a serious impact on these businesses. In addition, 
activities remain a cause for concern. Incidents result in  they are the main propaganda tool for violent ARE 
damage worth millions of Euros to the companies and  groups. The pharmaceutical industries and research 
institutions involved. Single individuals linked to these  laboratories associated with medical schools and clin-
companies,  or  sometimes  even  random  people,  are  ics which test food, cosmetics, and medicines on ani-
targeted as victims. 
mals, are the favoured target of violent ARE groups. 
Related  businesses,  such  as  the  financial  institutions 
Although there is no prototype of single-issue violent  financing this research, are also becoming a target for 
extremist  groups  or  actors,  some  broad  characteris- these groups. 
tics apply. The majority are relatively young and can 
be  found  in  the  group  of  idealistic,  often  relatively  An  airline  company  transporting  animals  to  different 
deprived,  youngsters  who  do  not  agree  with  some  laboratories throughout the world was also targeted 
movements in society and therefore seek to achieve  by demonstrations; an airline-sponsored golf green 
their goals through violent action. These groups tend  was destroyed.
19  European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA. 
30 |
   TE-SAT 2012


impact  if  carried  out. Additionally,  they  seek  support 
via their websites and social networks through disinfor-
mation campaigns. In one case, an ARE group illegally 
entered multiple pig and rabbit farms. The footage they 
shot inside these farms was published later to show the 
alleged malpractices taking place in these farms. 
Future changes in legislation regarding animal rights 
in the Member States may trigger new and increased 
Although the majority of ARE activities are low-scale  actions by violent ARE groups.
incidents,  an  increasing  number  of  Member  States 
report an intensification of violent extremist activities.  Violent environmental extremist groups focus on tar-
Some of these incidents involve incendiary or impro- gets accused of polluting the environment in a broad 
vised  explosive  devices,  assaults  on  persons  or  hoax  sense, such as construction companies, the energy and 
bomb telephone calls. Groups such as Stop Hunting- transport sectors, nuclear power and nano-technology. 
don  Animal  Cruelty  (SHAC),  Militant  Forces  against  The number of incidents remains limited in the EU. 
Huntingdon Life Sciences (MFAH) and National Anti-
Vivisection  Alliance  (NAVA),  have  been  involved  in  In France, demonstrations against the construction of 
assaults on pharmaceutical company personnel and  two new airports escalated and resulted in eight casu-
have targeted businesses related to the animal testing  alties  among  law  enforcement  officers.  There  were 
sector with improvised explosive devices.
also protests against the construction of high-speed 
rail connections between France and Italy. 
Violent extremist incidents are also related to the 
meat, fish and poultry industry, including fast food res- The use of nuclear power remains a focal issue for 
taurants and even butchers. In Italy, offices of the Food  environmental extremist groups. Traditional actions 
Science Department of the University of Bologna were  against radioactive waste transport between Member 
set on fire and Animal Liberation Front activists set fire  States continue.
to a fast food restaurant. The fur and leather industry 
is another target. In 2011, there were some minor inci- Gene and nano-technology research is a recent tar-
dents: fur shop owners were threatened and fur coats  get for violent environmental extremist groups. Fur-
were sprayed with paint. Incidents also related to other  ther developments in these sectors could lead to an 
activities involving animals, such as hunting shops, cir- increase in violent activities against them. 
cuses and kennels.
Joint transnational protests and actions by violent 
Propaganda on the Internet is one of the main tools of  left-wing extremist and violent environmental extrem-
violent ARE groups. Most of their actions are published  ist groups could be an indication of stronger ties and 
and claimed via their websites. The professional man- increased cooperation between these groups. The 
agement of these websites gives the impression that  future threat of violent environmental extremism 
some ARE groups are supported by a large group and  might be influenced by cooperation with other violent 
that their announced activities might have a serious  extremist groups. 
TE-SAT 2012  | 31 

10.  Trends and future 
outlook 
The outstanding feature identified in this report is the  Returning  jihadists  from  conflict  zones  continue  to 
wide diversity of threats posed by terrorist and vio- pose a threat to the EU Member States. These individ-
lent extremist groups to EU Member States. 
uals not only have the intention, but also the increased 
knowledge, to prepare attacks. 
The efforts of al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorists 
are likely to remain concentrated on attacking their  The connections between terrorist, violent extrem-
long-standing targets in EU Member States and may  ist and organised crime networks may become more 
seek to capitalise on major events such as the London  blurred. Terrorist and violent extremist activities are 
Olympics to maximise their impact. Violent extrem- often  financed  through  crime  or  organised  crime 
ist groups are targeting a broad range of sectors and  activities. In some cases the same individuals who are 
increasing  their  influence  via  social  media  and  the  engaged in terrorism or violent extremism are also 
Internet. 
involved in organised crime activities. 
There is no single factor that explains radicalisation,  The further globalisation of communication increases 
nor is there any agreed method to discover if a radical- the  influence  that  terrorist  and  violent  extremist 
ised individual might commit violence. But, radicalisa- groups have on their communities and followers. 
tion that can lead to terrorism and violent extremism  Through radicalisation and mobilisation in the real and 
is often found among the most vulnerable individuals  virtual worlds, these groups will seek even more advo-
in society. 
cacy, support and participation at political, diplomatic 
Violent extremist groups make use of social tensions  and military levels. 
to increase this radicalisation via their propaganda and 
recruitment practices. 
The different modi operandi used in the violent extrem-
ist incidents in Norway in July 2011, as well as the inves-
Al-Qaeda core will remain a key player  in  the  field  tigation of the “National Socialist Underground” group 
of religiously-inspired terrorism. It will seek to further  in Germany, have demonstrated the devastating effect 
determine the agenda of associated groups but will  of  firearms.  Since  the  Mumbai  attacks  of  2008,  the 
also try to influence the thinking of vulnerable groups  potential impact of a successful firearms assault has 
and individuals. 
been obvious and may be chosen by future attackers.
Religiously-inspired terrorism will continue to be  The increasing sensitivity in society to environmental 
largely driven and sustained by geo-political devel- issues may lead to an increase in violent actions by 
opments
  and  changes  in  the  Middle  East,  the Sahel  single-issue violent extremist groups. 
region and the Horn of Africa. 
It is likely that attacks from violent jihadist home 
grown and independent cells
 will surpass the threat of 
the structured groups such as AQIM and AQAP directly 
linked to al-Qaeda. 
32 |
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11.   Annexes
TE-SAT 2012  | 33 

Annex 1: Acronyms and translations
ALF 
Animal Liberation Front
ANV 
Acción Nacionalista Vasca
 
Basque Nationalist Action
AQAP 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
 
Tanzim qa’idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-‘arab
AQIM 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
 
Tanzim al-qa’ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami
ARE 
Animal rights extremism
CIRA  
Continuity Irish Republican Army
DDoS 
Distributed Denial of Service
DSSS 
Delnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti
 
Workers Party of Social Justice
DTM 
Deutsche Taliban Mudschahidin
ETA 
Euskadi ta Askatasuna
 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
EU 
European Union
FAI 
Federazione Anarchica Informale
 
Informal Anarchist Federation
HME 
Home-made explosives
IED 
Improvised explosive device
IID 
Improvised incendiary device
IMU 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INLA 
Irish National Liberation Army 
INTCEN 
EU Intelligence Analysis Centre 
 
(formerly the European Union Situation Centre (SITCEN))
JHA 
Justice and Home Affairs
LTTE 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFAH 
Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Sciences
NAVA 
National Anti-Vivisection Alliance
NGO 
Non-governmental organisation
NSU 
Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund
 
National Socialist Underground
OCG 
Organised crime group
ONH 
Oglaigh na hEireann 
 
(dissident republican paramilitary group split from CIRA)
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   TE-SAT 2012

PHS 
Portuguese Hammerskins
PKK 
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan
 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
RG 
Resistencia Galega
 
Galician Resistance
RIRA 
Real Irish Republican Army
SHAC 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
Synomosia Pyrinon  
Conspiracy of Fire Cells Athens-Thessalonica 
Fotias Athina-Thessaloniki
TCC 
Tamil Coordinating Committee
TE-SAT 
European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TWP 
Working Party on Terrorism of the Council of the EU
VBIED 
Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WPM 
White power music
TE-SAT 2012  | 35 

Annex 2: Failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2011 
per Member State and per affiliation20
Member State
Religiously- Separatist
Left-
Right-
Single-
Not 
Total
inspired
wing
wing
issue
specified
2011
Denmark
0
0
4
0
0
0
4
France
0
85
0
0
0
0
85
Germany
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
Greece
0
0
6
0
0
0
6
Italy
0
0
5
0
0
0
5
Spain
0
25
21
1
0
0
47
United Kingdom
-
-
-
-
-
26
26
Total
0
110
37
1
0
26
174
20  In 2011, Northern Ireland experienced 26 involved attacks on national security targets - there were no other attacks on national security targets in the UK in 
2011. Attacks on national security include those targeting principally (but not exclusively) the security forces, those who support them and premises and institu-
tions associated with policing, justice and security. 

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   TE-SAT 2012

Annex 3: Arrests in 2011 per Member State and per 
affiliation21
Member State
Religiously- Separatist
Left-
Right-
Single-
Not 
Total 
inspired
wing
wing
issue
specified
2011
Austria
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
Belgium
2
2
0
0
0
0
4
Bulgaria
3
0
0
0
0
0
3
Czech Republic
8
0
0
0
0
0
8
Denmark
0
0
5
0
0
2
7
Finland
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
France
46
126
0
0
0
0
172
Germany
19
4
2
5
0
0
30
Greece
0
0
15
0
0
0
15
Ireland (Rep. of)
1
68
0
0
0
0
69
Italy
13
0
14
0
0
3
30
The Netherlands
3
0
0
0
0
0
3
Portugal
0
2
0
0
0
1
3
Romania
2
2
0
0
0
0
4
Slovakia
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
Spain
17
41
6
0
0
0
64
Sweden
4
0
0
0
0
0
4
United Kingdom
-
-
-
-
-
62
62
Total
122
247
42
5
0
68
484
21  For the UK the figures represent the number of charges for 2011, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in the other 
Member States. However, at this stage in the criminal justice process, it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.

TE-SAT 2012  | 37 

Annex 4: Data convictions and penalties (Eurojust)
Member State
2009
2010
2011
Austria
2
0
0
Belgium
7
10
8
Denmark
10
1
4
France
75
39
45
Germany
7
12
17
Greece
3
11
3
Ireland (Republic of)
15
18
11
Italy
24
22
4
Lithuania
0
0
1
The Netherlands
2
8
5
Spain
217
173
203
Sweden
1
4
2
United Kingdom
37
19
13
Total
400
317
316
4.1. Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorism charges per Member State in 2009, 
2010 and 201122

22  Data received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for the TE-SAT 2010 and 2011 could not be included in the respective reports. 
In 2011 the data for Belgium includes a proceeding in which three members of the right-wing group “Blood & Honour” were tried for racism and xenophobia 
charges. The data confirmed by Republic of Ireland does not cover the whole of 2011. The data for the UK does not cover Northern Ireland. In Republic of Ireland, 
two individuals were brought to court for whom a nolle was later entered. In the UK, one individual pleaded guilty but passed away before the court pronounced 
its decision. These three are included in the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings in 2011 but not in the number of verdicts. According to the 
information provided by national authorities, in 2011 a number of individuals appeared in more than one different court proceeding: one person appeared in five 
different court proceedings, two persons appeared in four different court proceedings, five appeared in three different court proceedings, and 13 appeared in two 
different court proceedings. One of these individuals was tried in France and all the others in Spain. The verdicts pronounced in the different proceedings were 
counted separately when analysing the number of verdicts by country, type of terrorism and severity of penalties.

38 |
   TE-SAT 2012

Member State
Religiously-  Separatist
Left-
Right-
Single-
Not 
Total
inspired
wing
wing
issue
specified
Belgium
4
1
 0
3
0
 0
8
Denmark
2
 0
0
0
0
2
4
France
9
33



4
46
Germany
12
5




17
Greece
0




3
3
Ireland (Republic of)

4



5
9
Italy
4





4
Lithuania

1




1
The Netherlands

5




5
Spain
14
210
11
0
0

235
Sweden
2





2
United Kingdom
12





12
Total
59
259
11
3
0
14
346
4.2. Number of convictions/acquittals for terrorism charges in 2011, per Member State and per affiliation23
23  The numbers do not include the two individuals in Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the UK.
TE-SAT 2012  | 39 

Member State
Convicted
Acquitted
Total verdicts
Acquitted %
Belgium
8
0
8
0%
Denmark
4

4
0%
France
45
1
46
2%
Germany
17
0
17
0%
Greece
2
1
3
33%
Ireland (Republic of)
8
1
9
11%
Italy
4
0
4
0%
Lithuania
1
0
1
0%
The Netherlands
5

5
0%
Spain
137
98
235
42%
Sweden
 
2
2
100%
United Kingdom
8
4
12
33%
Total
239
107
346
31%
4.3. Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per Member State in 201124
24  The numbers do not include the two individuals in the Republic of Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the United Kingdom.
40 |
   TE-SAT 2012

Member State
Final
Pending judicial  remedy
Total
Belgium
5
3
8
Denmark
3
1
4
France
35
11
46
Germany
14
3
17
Greece

3
3
Ireland (Republic of)

9
9
Italy
0
4
4
Lithuania
0
1
1
The Netherlands

5
5
Spain
137
98
235
Sweden
2

2
United Kingdom
12

12
Total
208
138
346
4.4. Number of final and not final verdicts per Member State in 201125
25  The numbers do not include the two individuals in Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the United Kingdom
TE-SAT 2012  | 41 

Annex 5: Methodology
For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qual- In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the Frame-
itative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the  work Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 
EU and data on arrests of people on suspicion of involve- 2012  respects  Member  States’  definitions  of  terrorist 
ment in those offences, provided or confirmed by Mem- offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to 
ber States. Similar data were collected, when available,  assess whether a criminal event is to be regarded as an 
of offences in which EU interests were affected outside  act of ‘terrorism’ or as an act of ‘extremism’. Contrary to 
of the EU. Eurojust has contributed data on convictions  terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of 
and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States.  violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may 
In addition, open source information gathered by Europol  be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural 
was used for the production of this report.
patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2012 mentions criminal 
acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy 
Included as ‘arrests’ are those judicial arrests warranted  the  fundamental  political,  constitutional,  economic  or 
by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person  social structures of a country, when they were reported 
is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing  by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to pro-
a  criminal  offence  for  which  detention  is  permitted  by  vide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation 
national law. The fact that the person may subsequently  to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in 
be provisionally released or placed under house arrest  the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect 
does not impact on the calculation of the number of  incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.
arrests.
Types of terrorism
The definition of the term ‘terrorist offences’ is indicated  The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their 
in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June  source of motivation. However, many groups have a mix-
2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),26 which all  ture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ide-
Member States have implemented in their national leg- ology or motivation dominates. The choice of categories 
islation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist  used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, 
offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or  as reported by Member States. The categories are not 
context, may seriously damage a country or an interna- necessarily mutually exclusive.
tional organisation when committed with the aim of: 
Religiously-inspired terrorism is perpetrated by individu-
•   seriously intimidating a population, or
als, groups, networks or organisations that evoke religion 
•   unduly  compelling  a  government  or  international  to  justify  their  actions.  Al-Qaeda  inspired  or  affiliated 
organisation to perform or abstain from performing  groups belong to this group. 
an act, or
•   seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental  Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures  motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.
of a country or an international organisation. 
26  Amended by the Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008.
42 |
   TE-SAT 2012

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire polit- Eurojust also collected data on the basis of the afore-
ical, social and economic system of a state according to  mentioned EU Council Decision, according to which the 
an extremist leftist model. Their ideology is often Marxist- Member States are equally obliged to collect all relevant 
Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist groups is usu- information concerning prosecutions and convictions for 
ally  revolutionary,  anti-capitalist  and  anti-authoritarian.  terrorist offences and send the data to Eurojust. Eurojust 
Not all Member States distinguish between activities of  cross-checked the collected data with the Member States 
left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contribu- and, in case of divergences or gaps, this data was also cor-
tions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the  rected, complemented and then validated. If convictions 
same chapter of this report.
that took place in 2011 were appealed but came to a con-
clusion before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the 
Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire  proceedings as one. The arrests and convictions may be 
political,  social  and  economic  system  on  an  extrem- related to terrorist offences that took place before 2011 
ist right-wing model. The ideological roots of European  and, consequently, may not be related to activities and 
right-wing extremism and terrorism can usually be traced  attacks referred to in the TE-SAT 2012.
back to National Socialism.
Single-issue terrorism is violence committed with the 
desire to change a specific policy or practice within a tar-
get society. The term is generally used to describe animal 
rights and environmental terrorist groups.
Data collection
The EU Council Decision on the exchange of informa-
tion  and  cooperation  concerning  terrorist  offences  of 
20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA) obliges Member 
States to collect all relevant information concerning 
and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by 
their law enforcement authorities with respect to ter-
rorist offences, and sets out the conditions under which 
this information should be sent to Europol. Europol pro-
cessed the data and the results were cross-checked with 
the Member States and, in case of divergences or gaps, 
corrected and complemented, and then validated by the 
Member States.
TE-SAT 2012  | 43 




Annex 6: Implementation of the EU framework decision 
on combating terrorism in the EU Member States – 
Changes in Member States during 2011
Austria
Belgium 
In Austria a provision concerning training for terrorism  A new DNA law of 7 November 2011 was adopted, where 
was  included  in  the  Criminal  Code  (§  278e),  which  has  terrorism has been inserted in relation to adding the pro-
been in force since 1 January 2011.
file of convicted persons to the database of convicted per-
With  the  Federal  Law Gazette  No.  103/2011,  published  sons.
on  21.11.2011  (BGBl.  103/2011),  §§  278f  and  282a  were 
included in the Austrian Criminal Code implementing 
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 Novem-
Luxembourg 
ber 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA  A law of 28 July 2011 implementing amendments 
on combating terrorism. According to § 278f it is punish- (adopted on 8 July 2005) to the Vienna Convention, on the 
able to provide instructions to commit a terrorist offence;  physical protection of nuclear materials, was adopted and 
§ 282a punishes the public provocation to commit a ter- could have an indirect/potential link to terrorist offences.
rorist offence and approval of terrorist offences.
In  addition,  §  283  of  the Austrian Criminal Code  imple-
ments Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 
November 2008 on combating certain forms and expres-
sions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law 
(this provision deals with preachers of hatred).
§§ 278f, 282a and 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code have 
been in force since 1 January 2012.
44 |
   TE-SAT 2012

TE-SAT 2012
EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
2012 – 45 pp. 21 x 29,7 cm
ISBN Number:978-92-95078-23-9
ISSN Number: 1830-9712
DOI: 10.2813/34212

ISBN Number: 978-92-95078-23-9
ISSN Number: 1830-9712
DOI: 10.2813/34212