

(3) The Border Guard shall ensure that the rights of a person to move from one state to another state are observed.

(4) The Border Guard shall provide an opportunity for arrested persons to exercise their rights to a legal defence.

(b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

(1) A person shall submit an application regarding granting of refugee or alternative status (hereinafter - application) in person to the State Border Guard:

- at the border control point prior to entering the Republic of Latvia; or
- in the territorial unit of the State Border Guard, if the person is in the Republic of Latvia.

(2) An asylum seeker shall be identified by the State Border Guard. The State Border Guard has the following rights:

- to perform inspection of an asylum seeker and possessions thereof, as well as to seize objects and documents, if they may have a significance in examination of an application or if they may pose a threat to the asylum seeker or those around him or her. A report shall be drawn up regarding these activities;
- to specify and organise expert-examinations and inspections of documents, objects or language or medical and other expert-examinations and inspections in order to identify an asylum seeker; and
- to take the fingerprints of an asylum seeker and photograph him or her.
- The State Border Guard shall conduct an interview with an asylum seeker. The interview may be recorded by sound and image recording, informing the asylum seeker thereof beforehand. The interview shall not be conducted if, in accordance with the conclusion of a physician, the asylum seeker has permanent health disorders which do not allow it.
- The State Border Guard shall submit information regarding an asylum seeker at the disposal thereof, the information obtained during interviews and the application to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (hereinafter - Office).

(c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

As specified in Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 (Schengen Borders Code).

(d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

See 2 b) above.

(e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

See 3 c) above.

(f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

See 5 a) above.

(g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

The State Border Guard shall organise a Border Guarding Information System for the provision of the State border regime. The following information shall be registered in the Border Guarding Information System:

- regarding events related to illegal crossing of the State border, non-compliance with the requirements specified for the State border zone, borderland and border area or at border crossing points, illegal movement of property and goods across the State border, as well as the persons involved in such events;
- regarding the vessels registered with the State Border Guard and vehicles, which are used in internal waters, along which the external border has been determined; and
- regarding the persons to whom special passes have been issued, cancelled or refused.

The Cabinet shall determine the amount of information to be included in the Border Guarding Information System and the time periods for storage, as well as the State administrative institutions, which shall be granted access to such information.

(h) Procedure related to stamping

A border guard shall affix, according to the Schengen Borders Code, on the travel document of a third-country national a stamp authorizing crossing of the border if such national has been granted authorization to cross the external border (See Article 10 of Regulation 2007/2004).

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

5(a): Border Guard Law, Section 3.

5(b): Asylum Law, Section 6.

5(g): On the State Border of the Republic of Latvia, Section 9.¹

LITHUANIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT¹⁹

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officials of local staff based on in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

- Patrol
- Observation post
- Barrier
- Ambush
- Video and (or) alarm system operator

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the
- patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the
- patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to
- explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or
- tried to cross the border illegally

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

¹⁹ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

- Patrols: on foot, by ski, bikes, service cars, etc. It is a main border surveillance method to organize border surveillance at the "green border".
- Observation post could be stationary then officers are located in observation towers or other facilities with stationary equipment or mobile then officers perform their duties in one or more designated places without fixed monitoring equipment.
- Barrier - it is border guards group aligned along threshold to detain persons who illegally crossed the border or have intentions to do that in an unspecified location.
- Ambush - it is a type of border surveillance method then border guard have preliminary findings about possible illegal activities at the border and are waiting in hidden places to prevent those activities.
- Video and (or) alarm system operator is working in border stations or BCP and monitor all situation at the border sections where surveillance cameras, alarm systems, etc. are installed.

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

Armory - it is allowed to enter this room only for duty officers, who are responsible for the security of this room, management of the units and gunsmiths who are responsible for weapons maintenance.

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

In accordance with Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act Border Guard officers can carry out hot pursuit at all territory of Republic of Lithuania.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Persons who have not been permitted to cross the border or have illegally crossed the external border shall be detained and returned into the state from or through which they arrived, taking account of the specifications provided for in the Citizen of the European Union Act. Expulsion shall be completed within 48 hours from the moment of detention. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the border stations, BCP or other places where is temporary detention facilities.

(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

In accordance with Lithuanian Administrative Code and Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act Border Guard officers can do searches to check and seize personal as follows (Article 20 point General Officer's powers):

- Make a personal inspection and inspection of objects, to detain individuals suspected of breaking the rules of border crossing and customs rules, border sector or border crossing point regime, deliver offenders to the Office, the police official premises for personal identification and administrative offense protocol recording.

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape by the apprehended person, while ensuring the safety of the apprehended person as well as that of their own.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

(a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

See 2 b) above.

(b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

According to Lithuanian Act "On the legal status of foreigners" the basic human needs are guaranteed only for foreigners who are applying for international protection (including asylum). For them are guaranteed transportation from BCP to Foreigners Registration Centre, accommodation there, food and medical assistance. All basic human needs are only provided till the decision on foreigner status is made.

(c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

In case when a person is trying to cross the border expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum members of the EBGs shall refer to the senior supervising officer of the host MS who will start procedure of the alien's legal status determination.

(d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

All special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc. is provided after delivering them to Foreigner's Registration Centre, so EBGs members will not be involved in this activity in Lithuania.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

Border guard's rights of the use of special measures and service weapons are established in the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act.

Article 22. Firearm and the use of special measures principles:

“Officials have the right to use firearms and the specific measures only in situations, established by legal acts and taking into account kind of offence, the offender’s personality and particular situation.”

The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

If circumstances warrant, the firearm and the use of special measures should be aware of shouts a warning shot.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBGs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

The same answer as in point a)

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

- All type of firearms
- Other equipment:
 - Aerosol gas jets, sticks with built-in sprinklers, gas generators, handcuffs, gas ammunition, forced stopping means of vehicles, electric shock devices, rescue equipment, sticks, special non-lethal ammunition and guns, service dogs and marking cartridges

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

Border guard’s rights of the use of special measures and service weapons are established in the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act.

Article 23. p 1 . The officer has the right to use a firearm:

1. countering an armed invasion of the Republic of Lithuania, the protected object or preventing a theft of aircraft, ship, or other vehicle with no passengers;
2. When a person, ship, aircraft or other vehicle cross the border outlawed in unidentified place or location or cross the border in an unauthorized way and this creates a real risk officer or another person’s life or health, or disobey official’s clearly expressed orders to stop or there was no possibility to arrest them in any other way;
3. detaining the vehicle in border area, if the driver with his act creates a real risk officer or another person’s life or health, or disobey official’s clearly expressed orders to stop or there was no possibility to arrest them in any other way;
4. in other cases established in police law.

Article 23. p 2 . Use of special measures.

The officer performing its official duties have the right to use special tools (batons, handcuffs, strapping, gas, forced vehicle suspension measures, service dogs, a firearm with a special non-lethal munitions and other active and passive defense measures, confirmed by the Minister of Internal Affairs) in case of:

1. Countering the assault against the officers and other persons who carry out duties at the border, at the border control point and other in the protected areas;
2. Detaining violators of the border or other protected areas, who disobey legal requirements of Officer;
3. Releasing the hostages;
4. Preventing violations of law at the border, border crossing points and protected areas;
5. Countering assaults of protected officials, buildings, individual rooms and vehicle or releasing these objects;
6. In other cases established in police legal acts.

Article 23. p 3 . Firearm, special measures may be used without warning:

1. When the officer or other person is attacked using a weapon unexpected;
2. When attacked using combat technique, vessel, aircraft or other vehicle;
3. In case of armed resistance;
4. Releasing of the hostages;
5. In other cases established in police law.

Article 23. p 5 . Use of firearms or any special tools is forbidden:

1. against a ship, aircraft and other vehicles with passengers;
2. against those officers face accidentally crossed the border by accident or in case of force majeure;
3. in places with explosives, ammunition, flammable materials that could pose a risk to human life and health or public safety;
4. against persons, buildings, facilities, vehicles, having the integrity of law;
5. In crowded places if it endangers other persons;
6. against a person who has got a minors with;
7. against women, it is clear that they are pregnant, as well as against individuals, where it is clear that they are disabled, against minors, if their age is known to official or the appearance matches the age, unless they attack in way dangerous to life or health.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

The use of firearms against person shall be reported to the prosecutor immediately and the use of special measures to the direct superior officer.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers

Then person (s) check is performed by dog handler with service dog he/she must be warned that it is not allowed to do sudden moves and resist to legitimate officers actions, otherwise service dog will be used without warning.

During documents check all person should be visible for service dog.

During foot patrol dog handler goes ahead of other officers in distance which allows to keep good interaction between them.

Before a search of locations, buildings or other objects dog handler must loudly announce: "The State Border Guard Service, please go out, otherwise it will be used service dog" and then repeat, "The State Border Guard Service, stand still, service dog is released".

During inspection of the vehicles dog handler with service dog must check passengers, their luggage, also be familiar with vehicle constructions, possible hiding places installations and give special attention to these places. Be aware of the risk factors, to be able according to the risk characteristics to profile passengers, their luggage and vehicles.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

5. Border checks

- (a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travelers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

- (b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

Applications for international protection (including asylum) should be delivered personally by foreigners (exception in case of minors, then one of the family members can do that of behalf of them) to State Border Guard Service officers at BCP, in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, which is covered by the legal regime and Foreigners Registration Centre or to police officers at local Police offices. In 24 hours border guards or police officers should collect all necessary data about foreigner and send his/her case to Migration Department which is responsible for examination of applications. Till decision regarding status of foreigner is made he/she remains in Foreigners Registration Centre.

In case guest officer will have a procedure with a person that would express wish for international protection, she/he would have to inform Lithuanian officer, who would take over the procedure.

- (c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

Border check procedures in Lithuania are carried out in accordance with Schengen Borders Code and Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Act.

- (d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

See 2 b) above.

- (e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

See 3 c) above.

- (f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

See 3 d) above.

- (g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

In purpose to get an access to National data base and SIS, national border guard officer must fill an access request and after short check get an access key. Since the interface of our national databases and SIS is in Lithuanian language, members of the EBGT will be able to consult these national databases only through Lithuanian border guard officers.

- (h) Procedure related to stamping

Members of the EBGT cannot stamp travel documents.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Norway

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBG²⁰

Use of force/weapons

a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

The GO shall follow the instructions of the police/border guard of the host member state.

b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

At Storskog BCP, weapons are not carried by the border guards, police officers or customs officers, neither openly nor concealed

c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

Handcuffs, weapon-stick, pepper spray are being carried by the police and border guard.

Handcuffs are being carried by the Customs.

Access to information systems

Guest officers have access to wi-fi internet. Guest officers will also be given training and access to the registration systems relevant to the border control, in cooperation with Norwegian police/border guard.

Border checks

Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union. All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying

²⁰ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

out border checks, police/border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation

Any GO's practical activities shall be conducted under supervision

Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals:

- to assist at performing border checks in joint teams consisting of officer of police, services of the host MSs, special advisers and observers and share expertise on his specific subject
- to support the first and second line checks
- to profile passengers in order to detect irregular migrants and victims of cross-border crime
- to detect false/falsified documents and more kinds of cross-border criminality
- to detect stolen vehicles in cooperation with the competent authorities
- to share experience and exchange expertise with officers from the border guard service of the host MS.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Norwegian police.

P O L A N D

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBG

All guest officers deployed to perform duties shall realise any service activity under the supervision of the Polish Border Guard officers.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods:

- in the border crossing points:
 - border traffic control
 - border crossing points monitoring
- directly at the state border:
 - patrolling
 - use of surveillance vehicles
 - use of mobile thermo-vision cameras
- in the border region:
 - mobile patrols

(b) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method:

- to cooperate closely with the host staff;
- to perform tasks described in the operational plan especially the ones assigned to the place of deployment;
- to support practically the local staff in carrying out their tasks;
- to contribute actively to the process of full integration of the host officers and other guest officers (FP missions);
- to report any incidents concerning his/her deployment including indisposition, health problems, travels/transportation issues, etc./

(c) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas:

the guest officers will have access to the PBG systems/areas under supervision of the local staff

(d) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit:

General rules for pursuit are indicated in the Art. 41 of the Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. With respect to the Polish Border Guard the pursuit issue is regulated by the bilateral agreements and executive acts in the form of Ordinance No 40 issued on 13.10.2011 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Border Guard.

2. Interception/apprehension.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons;

(b) Rules for security of body searches and evidence collection on the spot;

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

Any GO's activities concerning a, b and c shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a PBG officer.

Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers of 05.09.2014 on the manner and procedure of exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP /reception centre.

(a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre

If any activity concerning body searches or evidence collection is necessary from the EBG Member, it shall be realized under strict supervision of a PBG officer.

Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers of 05.09.2014 on the manner and procedure of exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

(b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBGs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

(c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed;

Members of the EBGs shall support PBG officers in examining the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

Members of the EBG shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

(d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons;

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single

parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

As for the mechanisms applicable at the border for asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors, they are as follows:

The institutions responsible for reception of application for international protection at the border are Commanders of Border Guards Posts. The institution responsible for dealing with the application for refugee status (issuing decisions on refugee status) is the Head of the Office for Foreigners.

As a general rule the decision on international protection is issued within 6 months. If the application is manifestly unfounded the decision is issued within 30 days.

If the applicant is to be located in the open reception centre he/she is obliged to report to the reception centre within 2 days as of submitting the application.

The authority admitting the application for granting the international protection, submitted by an unaccompanied minor shall apply immediately to the custody court having jurisdiction over the place in which such minor stays, with an application to establish a custody to represent the minor in the proceeding for granting the international protection and place the minor in care and educational centre.

In case the fact that the applicant is an unaccompanied minor is disclosed already during the proceeding, the Head of the Office for Foreigners shall submit the above mentioned application to the custody court.

The authority admitting the application shall bring an unaccompanied minor to professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situations, or care of an educational centre.

The unaccompanied minor shall stay in the professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situation or in care of an educational centre until the moment decision is given by the custodian court.

National legislation does not allow the detention of unaccompanied minors seeking a refugee status. Regular unaccompanied minors of age above 15 years staying illegally (not seeking a refugee status) may be placed in the detention centre. The unaccompanied minors placed in a detention centre are separated from the adults. The placement of unaccompanied minor in detention centre however has the character of last resort measure because a general rule is to place such a person in care of an educational centre.

The minors may be located in detention centre with their families if there are grounds for detention. The minors are located only in detention centres with appropriate infrastructure and organisation to accommodate families with children. Such detention centres provide for the minors a possibility to attend school and realize a standard school programme appropriate for their age. Except for school programme, there are also special educational recreation and sport classes organised by professional pedagogues trained also in the area of multicultural education.

4. Use of force/weapons.

1) PERMISSIBLE SERVICE WEAPONS

Border guards are equipped with service weapons on the basis of the Border Guard Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard and implementing provisions, ie:

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of 09.05.2014 on Border Guard's weapons and Ordinance No. 66 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard of 29 December 2005 regulating the quotas of weapons for individual border guards and groups, as well as quotas of special equipment for organizational units and individual Border Guard officers, as well as the conditions of assigning and using the Border Guard's weapons.

The Border Guard is equipped with the following firearms:

- firearms, in the form of:
 - pistols, eg.: 9 mm P-83; 9 mm p-99,
 - revolvers, eg.: 9,65 mm revolver 38 R-2; 9,65 mm revolver 38 R-4,
 - smoothbores, eg.: 12/70 smoothbore MOSSBERG
 - submachine guns, eg.: 9 mm PM-98,
 - carbines, eg.: 7,62 mm carbine AKMS,
 - sniper carbines/rifles, eg.: 7, 62 carbine SWD
 - machine guns, eg. 7,62 mm machine gun PKM
- devices used for throwing chemical and other incapacitating agents (gas pistols and revolvers, gas (gel) throwers, eg.: disabling net throwers /SZO-84 disabling net set/);
- signal pistols eg. 26 mm signal pistol model 78.

2) PERMISSIBLE AMMUNITION

Border Guard officers are equipped with ammunition for their service weapons on the basis of the Border Guard Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard and implementing provisions, ie:

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of 09.05.2014 on Border Guard weapons and Ordinance No. 66 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard of 29 December 2005 regulating the quotas of weapons for individual border guards and groups, as well as quotas of special equipment for organizational units and individual Border Guard officers, as well as the conditions of assigning and using the Border Guard's weapons.

It is allowed to use all types of ammunition used in a given type of weapons certified for use on the territory of Poland.

3) PERMISSIBLE EQUIPMENT

Means of direct coercion allowed for use by Border Guard officers are specified by Regulation of the Minister of Interior of 09.05.2014 on the coercion means and firearms allowed to be used by the Border Guard. They include:

- physical force in the form of incapacitating holds and other similar techniques of defense and attack;
- (multifunctional) service clubs;
- electric paralyzers;
- handcuffs;
- disabling belts;
- leads;
- straitjackets;
- disabling nets;
- road spikes or other obstacles for stopping vehicles;
- chemical agents (gas, gel throwers);
- dogs;
- non-penetrating bullets fired from firearms;
- battlefield simulation systems;
- disabling nets for devices and throwers etc.

Apart from the above: all special technical equipment and individual protection measures, border traffic control equipment, optical, night vision, laboratory and inspection equipment, equipment for securing micro-traces, criminalistics equipment sets, engineering, optical, photographic and audiovisual equipment, individual means for protection against chemical agents and contamination, equipment for small arms and special equipment.

1. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE WEAPONS

Cases in which firearms may be used are specified in the Law on Direct Coercion Means of 24 May 2013.

The permissible weapons may be used in case at least one of the below circumstances occur:

- in order to repel direct and unlawful attempt against life, health or freedom of the officer or another person and in order to counteract activities leading directly to such attempt;
- in order to repel direct and unlawful attempt against structures serving state defense or important to the national economy, as well as structures of the Border Guard or serving state border protection;
- in order to repel attempt against property, also constituting direct threat to human life, health or freedom;
- in order to repel direct attempt against integrity of the State border by a person / persons attempting to cross the State border by force using a vehicle, firearms or other dangerous objects;
- in order to repel a violent, direct and unlawful attempt against a convoy protecting persons, documents containing information constituting a state secret, money or other valuables;
- against a person not obeying the order to immediately drop their weapons or another dangerous tool the use whereof may endanger life, health or freedom of the officer or another person;
- against a person attempting to take, unlawfully and by force, the firearms from the officer or another person authorised to carry firearms;
- in direct pursuit of a person with regard to whom the use of weapons has been permitted in cases provided for in (1) - (6) or of a person with regard to whom there exists a justified suspicion of committing murder, terrorist attack, abduction of a person in order to extort ransom, or of specific behaviour, mugging, robbery with violence, extortion racket, intentional severe bodily injury, rape, arson or otherwise intentional threats to life or health;
- in order to detain a person / persons suspected of committing a crime, if they have taken refuge in a place difficult of access, and accompanying circumstances imply they may use firearms or another dangerous tool the use whereof may endanger life or health;
- in order to detain or prevent the escape of a person / persons detained, temporarily arrested or serving a sentence of imprisonment, if:
 - escape of an imprisoned person / persons constitutes a threat to human life or health,
 - there exists a justified suspicion that an imprisoned person / persons may use firearms, explosives or a dangerous tools;

(...)

In actions by reserve troops within the territorial range of the border crossing point and in the border zone, the use of firearms can solely take place upon the order of the commander thereof.

The use of firearms should not be aimed at deprivation of life; the least possible harm should be caused to the persons against whom firearms have been used; third persons should not be exposed to the risk of losing life or health.

Procedures of use of firearms by border guards.

Border guards may use firearms in cases specified above (the Law on Direct Coercion Means of 24 May 2013).

Use of firearms should be understood as releasing a shot in the direction of a person with the aim to overpower this person, after all other procedures have been used.

When using firearms border guards shall act with particular deliberation, and they should treat their firearms as a means of last resort.

Before using firearms the border guards shall :

- (1) shout "Freeze! Border Guard" ("Stój! Straż Graniczna") and then order the person to act in accordance with the law, and especially to drop weapons or dangerous tools, cease escaping, cease carrying out illegal activities or committing violence.
- (2) in case of disobedience to the orders mentioned in point 1, threaten to use firearms by shouting: "Freeze, or I shoot" ("Stój, bo strzelam"),
- (3) if the orders, mentioned in points 1 and 2, prove ineffective - release a warning shot in such a way as not endanger human life or health.
 - Provisions of section (1) shall not be applied if any delay could cause danger to human life.
 - Use of firearms in the circumstances mentioned in section (2) should be preceded by shouting "Freeze! Border Guard".
 - Use of firearms by releasing a shot shall not involve shooting into the territory of the neighbouring country.

Firearms shall not be used in relation to visibly pregnant women, persons whose appearance suggest that they are in the age of 13 or younger, elderly people or persons with visible disabilities.

If a person is injured as the result of use of firearms, the border guard shall immediately provide first aid to this person, as well as take steps to ensure emergency medical assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services.

The border guard may refrain from providing first aid in case it endangers life, health or safety of the border guard or other persons.

When the use of firearms has caused death of a person or damage of property, the border guard shall:

- 1) secure traces present in the place where the incident occurred and protect this place against access of strangers,
- 2) if possible, identify (establish) witnesses of the incident.

The border guard officer shall inform his/her direct superior about every case of use of firearms and he/she shall submit a report concerning the incident in writing to the superior.

The above mentioned report shall include:

- the rank, name and surname of the border guard involved,
- time and place of use of firearms,
- data of the person against whom the firearms was used,
- particular reasons for use of firearms and type of firearms used,
- description of the procedure preceding the use of firearms,
- effects of use of firearms,
- other important circumstances of the incident,
- data of the identified (established) witnesses of the incident,
- signature of the border guard preparing the report.

Direct superior of the border guard shall immediately secure all traces and evidence connected to the use of firearms and provide the border guard with the necessary assistance.

The competent territorial unit of the Border Guard shall:

- immediately notify every case of use of firearms to a direct superior, and if the use of firearms resulted in death or injury of a person - also to the prosecutor,
- investigate if the use of firearms took place in accordance with applicable provisions.

5. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE AMMUNITION

There are no separate provisions regulating the conditions of use of live ammunition. However, there are general conditions and rules of use means of direct coercion, including firearms (see conditions of use for permissible weapons).

2. THE CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PERMISSIBLE EQUIPMENT

Conditions and methods of use of means of direct coercion by Border Guard officers are provided for in the Law on Direct Coercion Means of 24 May 2013.

Conditions and methods of use of means of direct coercion by Border Guard officers:

- 1) Means of direct coercion may be used after previous order to act in accordance with the law and after a warning about their use, which proves ineffective.
- 2) A border guard may refrain from ordering the person concerned to act in accordance with the law and warning him or her about using the means of direct coercion if any delay could result in a danger to:
 - human life or health,
 - property, if human life, health of freedom is directly threatened at the same time.
- 3) Means of direct coercion shall be used in such a way as to force obedience to the orders given on the basis of the law and at the same time cause the least possible harm.
- 4) Various means of direct coercion may be used at the same time if it is necessary to achieve obedience to the orders given.
- 5) The means of direct coercion should cease to be used once the person, against whom the means were used, begins to obey the orders given.
- 6) In relation to visibly pregnant women, persons whose appearance suggests that they are in the age of 13 or younger, elderly people or persons with visible disabilities only, incapacitating hold may be used.

The border guard has the right to use the following means of direct coercion:

- 1) physical force in the form of incapacitating hold and other similar techniques of defense or attack:
 - physical force may be used in defense against an attack or to force obedience or to apprehend a wanted person;
 - the use of physical force shall not consist in hitting, striking, punching etc. unless the border guard acts in defense of necessity or in defense against an attempt against human life or health;
- 1) technical devices in the form of handcuffs, leads, straitjackets, disabling belts or nets, as well as road spikes or other obstacles for stopping vehicles:

- handcuffs may be used in relation to apprehended persons in order to prevent their escape, attack or active resistance.
 - handcuffs may be used by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior, the court, or the prosecutor.
 - handcuffs are put on hands at the front (of a person). In case a person is aggressive or dangerous, handcuffs may be put on hands at the back (behind the person's back).
 - handcuffs shall be immediately removed after bringing the person to the official premises, as well as during interrogation, unless the person performing the interrogation decides otherwise.
 - handcuffs shall not be used in relation to persons under the age of 17, apart from minors over 15 suspected of committing a crime against life or health.
 - straitjackets, disabling belts or disabling nets may be used in relation to persons whose behaviour constitutes a danger for:
 - human life or health,
 - property, if human life, health or freedom is directly threatened at the same time - if using other means of direct coercion is not possible or have proved not effective,
- 7) straitjackets or disabling belts may be used in relation to persons present in the official premises in case of:
- aggressive behaviour,
 - self-aggression,
 - destruction of property
- 1) disabling net may also be used:
- in pursuit of a person, about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed a crime,
 - in order to prevent escape of a detained or apprehended person.
- 2) Persons in relation to whom a straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net was used, should immediately be provided with medical rescue assistance within the meaning of the provisions on State Medical Emergency Service, if there are medical indications for such assistance;
- 3) A straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net shall be removed immediately if the reasons constituting the grounds for its use cease to exist, or upon the request of a physician;
- 4) An order to use a straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net is issued by local Border Guard authorities, a person authorised by this authority, or during their absence - the officer on duty (shift manager);
- 5) During performance of border surveillance tasks, especially patrols or escorting, the order to use the means mentioned in item 1 is issued by the immediate superior of the border guards who carry out the task.
- 2) individual chemical incapacitating agents in the form of gas weapons and handheld gas throwers,
- Individual chemical incapacitating agents may be used in case of:
 - defense against an attack,
 - counteracting active resistance,
 - pursuit of a person, about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed a crime,
 - prevention (counteraction) of escape by an apprehended or escorted person,
 - prevention (counteraction) of destruction of property.
 - individual chemical incapacitating agents shall be used manually or thrown from firearms.

- individual chemical incapacitating agents should be used carefully, taking into consideration their properties that may constitute a danger to human life.
- The individual chemical incapacitating agents may be used in relation to a person by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

3) dogs,

A dog may be used in case of:

- defense against an attack,
- counteracting active resistance,
- pursuit of a person attempting to cross the Polish state border without the required permission or about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed another crime,
- prevention (counteraction) of an escape by an apprehended or escorted person.

A dog should have a muzzle on, with the exception of situations, when:

- it is used in defense against an attack,
- there is a grounded suspicion of a danger to human life or health during carrying out of the duties by the border guards,

A dog may be used by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

4) service clubs,

A service club may be used in the case of:

- defense against an attack,
- counteracting active resistance,
- prevention (counteraction) of destruction of property.

It is forbidden to:

- hit with a handle of a service club,
- use the service club in relation to persons who:
 - use passive resistance, unless using physical force turned out ineffective,
 - are handcuffed or in relation to whom a lead, a straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net have been used,
- hit or push a person with a service club in the head, neck, abdomen or non-muscle or particularly vulnerable parts of the body, as well using service club for applying a blocking or lever hold on these parts of the body.
- It is permissible to hit or push with a service club as well as use it for applying blocking or lever holds on all parts of the body in order to counteract a direct, unlawful attempt against the border guard's own or another person's life or health.

5) non-penetrating bullets fired from firearms,

- non-penetrating bullets may only be bullets of rubber fired from smoothbore firearms, alarm or signal weapons.
- non-penetrating bullets may be used in case of:

- counteracting a direct, unlawful attempt against human life or health or in a pursuit of a perpetrator of such an attempt,
- preventing from destruction of property, if human life, health or freedom is directly endangered at the same time,
- group disturbances against the public order.
- non-penetrating bullets shall be used:
 - when shooting a warning shot into the air (in the above direction),
 - when aiming at legs.
- the decision on the use of non-penetrating bullets is taken by:
 - competent local Border Guard authority mentioned in Article 5 item 1 of the Act, a person authorised by this authority, or during their absence - the officer on duty (shift manager),
 - in cases mentioned above in item 2 point 1 and 2 the border guard decides himself/herself or the order is given by his/her direct superior.

6) electric paralyzers.

- Electric paralyzers may be used in case all other means of direct coercion is impossible or proved ineffective, in the following cases:
 - for disabling a person who refuses to follow an order to immediately drop a dangerous tool,
 - defense against an attack,
 - counteracting active resistance,
 - apprehending a person or direct pursuit after a person in relation to whom there is a suspicion that he/she committed a crime,
 - prevention (counteracting) of an escape by a apprehended or escorted person,
 - prevention (counteracting) of destruction or theft of property.
- An electric paralysar shall be used with due carefulness, taking into consideration its properties that may constitute a danger to human life.
- The electric paralysar may be used in relation to a given person by a border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

USE OF MEANS OF DIRECT COERCION MENTIONED ABOVE MAY NOT CAUSE EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON THE MANDIBLE AND THE NECK, THE CHEST AND THE ABDOMINAL CAVITY, CAUSE DIFFICULTIES TO BREATHE OR BLOCK BLOOD CIRCULATION.

7) Road spikes

- Road spikes or other obstacle allowing to stop a vehicle may be used by a uniformed border guard for stopping a vehicle driven by a person, who did not stop regardless the appropriate signal (call), when:
 - there is a grounded suspicion that the person crossed the Polish state border without the required permission or committed another crime,
 - he or she transports a person suspected of committing a crime or transporting objects derived from a crime.
- Road spikes shall not be used to stop two-wheeled vehicles. Use of road spikes or other obstacles should be preceded by:
 - a sign imposing speed limit of:

- 30 km/h - in built-up area,
 - 60 km/h, and then 30 km/h - outside built-up area,
 - a sign "stop - border control" ("stój - kontrola graniczna"),
 - a stop signal given by a uniformed border guard in a way understandable and visible for the driver of the stopped vehicle,
 - stopping the road traffic in both directions at the distance of no less than 100 m from the road spikes or other obstacle.
- In case of blocking a road with a marked Border Guard vehicle, it is possible to refrain from stopping road traffic.
- The order to use road spikes shall be issued by the superior who assigns the task. It might be used only upon an order of a direct superior of the border guards who carry out the task.

If, as the result of using a means of direct coercion, a person gets injured, and in result of using an individual chemical incapacitating agent, a serious irritation of mucous membranes occurs, the border guard shall:

- immediately provide first aid to this person, as well as take steps to ensure medical emergency assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services,
- immediately inform the direct superior of this incident.

Medical emergency assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services shall be always provided to a pregnant woman in relation to whom means of direct coercion were used.

If using a means of direct coercion resulted in a death of a person, the border guard shall secure the traces at the place of the incident and not allow third persons to access this location, as well as, as far as possible, establish the witnesses of the incident while the local Border Guard authorities shall immediately inform the direct superior and a prosecutor about the incident.

The fact of use of means of direct coercion shall be noted by the border guard in the service book and reported in writing to the superior. The report shall include:

- the rank, name and surname of the border guard involved,
- the time and place of use of means of direct coercion,
- data of the person against whom the means of direct coercion were used,
- particular reasons for use of means of direct coercion and type of means of direct coercion used,
- description of the procedure preceding the use of means of direct coercion,
- results of applying means of direct coercion,
- if need be, description of the method of application of provisions of §§ 2 and 15,
- other important circumstances of the incident,
- data of the identified (established) witnesses of the incident,
- signature of the border guard preparing the report.

The superior is always obliged to examine the grounds, conditions and methods of application of means of direct coercion by subordinate border guards.

4) Border checks.

(a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross border:

Members of the EBGs shall support PBG officers in examining the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

Members of the EBG shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Any GO's practical activities shall be conducted under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

(b) Define the tasks of the member of the EBG while border checking of third country nationals:

- to assist at performing border checks in joint teams consisting of officer of Border guard services of the host MSs, special advisers and observers and share expertise on his/her specific subject
- to support the first and second line checks
- to profile passengers in order to detect irregular migrants and victims of cross-border crime
- to detect false/falsified documents and more kinds of cross-border criminality
- to detect stolen vehicles in cooperation with the competent authorities
- to share experience and exchange expertise with officers from the border guard service of the host MS.

(c) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP:

If any activity concerning body searches or evidence collection is necessary from the guest officer, it shall be realized under strict supervision of a Polish border guard.

Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers issued of 23.10.2009 on the manner and procedure of exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

(d) Status assessment and procedure to be followed:

Members of the EBG shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

As for the mechanisms applicable at the border for internal protection seekers and unaccompanied minors, they are as follows:

The institutions responsible for reception of application for internal protection at the border are Commanders of Border Guards Posts. The institution responsible for dealing with the application for refugee status (issuing decisions on refugee status) is the Head of the Office for Foreigners.

As a general rule the decision on refugee status is issued within 6 months. If the application is manifestly unfounded the decision is issued within 30 days.

If the applicant is to be located in the open reception centre he/she is obliged to report to the reception centre within 2 days as of submitting the application.

The authority admitting the application for granting the refugee status, submitted by an unaccompanied minor shall apply immediately to the custody court having jurisdiction over the place in which such minor stays, with an application to establish a custody to represent the minor in the proceeding for granting the refugee status and place the minor in care and educational centre.

In case the fact that the applicant is an unaccompanied minor is disclosed already during the proceeding, the Head of the Office for Foreigners shall submit the above mentioned application to the custody court.

The authority admitting the application shall bring an unaccompanied minor to professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situations, or care of an educational centre.

The unaccompanied minor shall stay in the professional, non-related with the child, foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situation or in care of an educational centre until the moment decision is given by the custodian court.

National legislation does not allow the detention of unaccompanied minors seeking a refugee status. Regular unaccompanied minors of age above 15 years staying illegally (not seeking a refugee status) may be placed in the detention centre. The unaccompanied minors placed in a detention centre are separated from the adults. The placement of unaccompanied minor in detention centre however has the character of last resort measure because a general rule is to place such a person in care of an educational centre.

The minors may be located in detention centre with their families if there are grounds for detention. The minors are located only in detention centres with appropriate infrastructure and organisation to accommodate families with children. Such detention centres provide for the minors a possibility to attend school and realize a standard school programme appropriate for their age. Except for school programme, there are also special educational recreation and sport classes organised by professional pedagogues trained also in the area of multicultural education.

Applicable law:

Act on aliens of 12.12.2013

Act on granting protection to aliens on the territory of Poland of 13.06.2003

Code of Criminal Procedure

Code of Petty Offences

(e) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons;

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

Applicable law

The 1951 Refugee Convention

Council Regulation No 343/2003 of 28.07.1951

Act on aliens of 13.06.2003

Act on granting protection to aliens on the territory of Poland of 13.06.2003

Rules regulating consultation of national databases;

1. THE DATABASES THAT MAY BE CONSULTED

For practical reasons Polish national as well as European databases will be accessible only through the Polish Border Guard functionaries only in cases connected directly with ongoing service duties.

Procedure related to stamping;

Guest officers are not empowered to stamp any travel documents.

ROMANIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT pool²¹

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate, carry out measures under the supervision of the officials of local staff, in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

For border control, the police officers of the Romanian Border Police may patrol on foot and by service vehicles on temporary or private roads adjacent to the state border, bodies of water crossing the border or leading there, as well as shore paths, without the consent of the owner or administrator. In performing state border surveillance and ensuring the border regime, the police may use relevant technical, including electronic, devices and equipment for the purposes of detecting illegal border crossings, identifying objects, ensuring safety in border crossing points and combating cross-border crime.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT

The general tasks performed by the members of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook, are:

- survey and patrol the terrain in the operational area,
- ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- perform identity checks on persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators. Specific rules and instructions concerning border surveillance are provided by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 on the state border of Romania. Moreover, a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regulate internally the border surveillance related activities.

²¹ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

(c) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators, as each operational area has particularities. Specific rules and instructions concerning border surveillance are provided by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 on the state border of Romania. Moreover, tailored SOPs provide rules, restrictions and limitations that apply to each operational area.

(d) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

A police official in pursuit of a person who has committed or abetted a criminal offence specified in the Council Framework Decision JHA/584/2002 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States shall be permitted to proceed with the pursuit on the territory of another EU Member State, without previously requested authorisation in cases where the urgency of the matter prevented the official in question from notifying competent authorities prior to the entry on the territory of the other MS, or where the competent authorities of the other Member State were not present at the scene of the event to take over the pursuit. Cross-border pursuit may take place only across land borders. The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other MS of carrying out cross-border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location and the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Pursuit shall be terminated upon completion of the objective, when 1 hour has passed since the crossing of the state border of the country of location or upon the demand of the country of location.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 and SOPs related to each procedure (internal regulations).
Applicable legislation, instructions and relevant information will be provided during the briefing.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Persons who have not been permitted to cross the border or have illegally crossed the external border shall be detained and returned into the state from or through which they arrived, taking account of the specifications provided for in the Citizen of the European Union Act. Expulsion shall be completed within 48 hours from the moment of detainment. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the offices of the police authorities, police detention houses or expulsion centres. Officials shall take fingerprints of persons apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of the border, if he or she is at least 14 years of age, and shall transmit the data collected upon the taking of the fingerprints for comparison to the Central Unit of EURODAC. Unaccompanied minors may be expelled if their custody is arranged and the protection of their rights and interests of is ensured in the admitting country.

No person shall be returned or expelled to places where their lives or freedoms could be threatened. Collective expulsions are prohibited; each person is entitled to an individual decision on his or her expulsion.

(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Upon apprehension, all persons who crossed the border in an illegal manner shall be searched together with their personal effects, including vehicles. Each person shall be searched by an official of the same gender. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be seized and stored for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be logged in a register.

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards, rules and instructions:

Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape of the apprehended persons, while ensuring their safety of the apprehended person as well as that of the police officers. Coercive measures (physical force, use of deterring equipment, weapons or gas devices) may be used in circumstances described under 4 d). The use of force, including weapons, is only permitted when the apprehended person fails to obey the lawful orders of the migration official or offers resistance, or when there is good reason to believe that the person may escape or put in danger other persons or their own lives, after other measures have been exhausted. As a rule, force, including weapons, shall be used as a last resort, gradually and well justified.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW: Government Emergency Ordinance no. 104/2001, consolidated version, articles 32 - 37. Detailed rules and restrictions as well as provisions of the relevant legislation will be provided during the briefing, by the local coordinators

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

(a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre:

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators.

As a rule, body searches and evidence collection shall be carried out only in presence and under coordination of local border guards. Belongings of searched persons, identity / travel documents as well as any type of evidence shall be logged in a register. Each person will be searched in full respect of dignity, by border guards of the same gender.

(b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities:

Members of the EBGs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc. Any procedures and measures shall be postponed until life and health care of intercepted persons are secured.

- In initial reception centres as well as reception centres, asylum seekers shall be provided medical care, accommodation, food, toiletries, essential clothing, translation services, information regarding their rights and duties, transportation, etc.

(c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBGs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person

intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

An apprehended person may not be expelled to a state to which expulsion may result in consequences specified in Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the application of death penalty. The following circumstances shall be taken into account in determining a safe country of origin: to what extent the country guarantees the protection of persons from persecution and abuse, the principle of prohibition of expulsion or return provided for in the Geneva Convention and a system of efficient legal protection instruments against the violation of said rights and freedoms, and whether or not the country has acceded and adheres to the main treaties concerning human rights.

(d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women, victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Applicable legislation, recommendations and relevant information will be provided during the briefing, by the local coordinators; non-refoulement principle fully applies for all irregular migrants requesting for any kind of protection.

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

A police official may apply direct coercion (i.e. physical force, special equipment or a weapon) if the ensuring of the fulfilment of the obligation to counter a threat or eliminate a disturbance imposed on a person by an administrative act is not possible by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. Direct coercion is permitted to be applied without a prior binding administrative act if the issue of the administrative act is not possible due to the circumstances of the case. Binding means (handcuffs, shackles) may be used when the person has been deprived of liberty pursuant to law and there is reason to believe that he or she may attack another person, offer physical resistance to a police official or an assistant police official or damage a proprietary benefit of great value, escape or injure or kill himself or herself.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

- The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBGs shall ensure that it will be done as a last resort, in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

- For countering a serious threat, the police may use a firearm if countering the threat by another measure of direct coercion is not possible or is not possible in a timely manner and with the consideration that in using a firearm, everything possible shall be done in order not to jeopardise another significant benefit.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

Officials from a competent authority of another Member State that is involved in police or customs activity under an international agreement or a legislative act of the European Union may carry firearms (handguns), gas weapons, cut-and-thrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons) or pneumatic weapons. Permissible special equipment includes handcuffs, shackles, binding means, service animals, etc.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

Direct coercive measures (i.e. the use of physical force, special equipment or service weapons) may be used if a threat or a disturbance cannot be countered by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. A verbal warning (legal summons) shall be issued before direct coercion is applied, in accordance with Government Emergency Ordinance no 104/2001, consolidated version, articles 32 to 37. An official from a competent authority of another Member State can use a firearm only in case there is a threat to his/her life or the life of another person. Firearms may not be used against a child, old persons or a woman bearing obvious signs of pregnancy. The use of a firearm in such cases is only allowed in order to prevent an armed attack or an attack from a group of persons or used as an impediment and also for disarming such persons.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

If by the application of direct coercion a bodily injury is caused to a person, the police shall be required to guarantee first aid to the person at the first opportunity and, if necessary, call for emergency medical care.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers

Use of tracking dogs and dogs specialised for border surveillance is regulated by internal specific operating procedures. Detailed information will be provided during the operational briefings by the local coordinators.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 104/2001, consolidated version, Ministerial Instruction no. 636/2005 and internal regulations, tailored for each specialisation of the dog.

5. Border checks

(a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

(b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) logged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

(c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

As specified in Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 (Schengen Borders Code).

(d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

Detailed information, applicable legislation and limitations will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators. Applications for international protection received at the border are only logged by the Romanian border police. Applications and persons are handed over afterwards to Romanian Immigration General Inspectorate for Immigration for assessment and legal solution.

(e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

- Detailed information in accordance with Romanian legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators.

(f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc

(g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

National databases are being administrated by national Romanian authorities and queried based on an username and password subject to national information security protocol. The GOs have access to the information managed in those databases only via the Romanian officers and solely for law enforcement purposes related to their assignment. Further practical information will be provided by local coordinators during the briefing.

(h) Procedure related to stamping

Under the State Borders Act, a police official shall affix, according to the Schengen Borders Code, on the travel document of a third-country national a stamp authorising crossing of the border if such national has been granted authorisation to cross the external border (See Article 10 of Regulation 2007/2004).

During JOs hosted by Romania only Romanian border guards are authorized to use entry/exit stamps. GOs can support and may share their expertise for all necessary clarifications.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Applicable legislation and relevant information will be provided during the operational briefings, by the local coordinators.

SLOVAKIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBG²²

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGs support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc.)

- Patrolling on foot, by service boats or patrol cars in order to prevent, detect and deter unlawful external land border crossing of persons or vehicles and prevent the illegal traffic of goods across external land border outside border crossing points or at border crossing points outside its opening hours. Patrolling can be enhanced by service dogs or technical means.
- Executing checks on persons and vehicles in the borderland territory of the external land borders in order to detect cross-border crimes.
- Conducting covert observations on individual sections.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBG

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBG, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally.

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

²² Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

Specific tasks/instructions for each patrol and the methods of its implementation in the operational area are communicated to the officers at the briefing prior to each service based on risk-analysis conclusions and current situation in the operational area.

(d) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

EBGTs officers shall realise any service activity under the supervision of the local staff.

(e) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

General rules for pursuit are indicated in the Art. 41 of the Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. According Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic with Hungary and Poland cross border pursuit may take place only across the land borders. Policeman in hot pursuit in the territory of another Member State shall demonstrate membership to the Police Force, which should be evident (uniform, reflex tape with Police sign, tactical vest etc.). The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other Member State of carrying out cross border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location, the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Policeman stop hot pursuit if requested by the Member State in whose territory the pursuit is carried out.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland on cooperation in the fight against crime and cooperation in border regions (Warsaw, March 2, 2004)

Treaty between the Slovak Republic and Hungary on cooperation in preventing cross-border crime and the fight against organized crime (Bratislava, October 2, 2006)

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic on cross-border pursuit in the territory of a Member State of the Schengen area No. 18/2012

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic on the activities of border control department of the Police Force No. 120/2012

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

EBGTs officers activities concerning above mentioned shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a local officer.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.301/2005 Coll. - Criminal Procedure

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

(e) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre:

A person who undergoes security body search shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

(f) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities:

Members of the EBGTs officers shall, when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

(g) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGTs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

(h) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

The members of EBGs are rightful to use as coercive means hand hold, grabs, hits and kicks of self-defence, means for removing defiance or avert an attack, handcuffs, a police dog, arresting belt and other means for stopping a vehicle by force, strike by a firearm, threat by a firearm, warning shot in the air and a weapon.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resort of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable, the members of the EBG shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the least possible injuries.

According to the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. regulating Police Force a police officer is authorised to use a weapon only:

- in necessary self - defence and extreme necessity,
- if a dangerous perpetrator, against whom the police officer is taking an action, after having been challenged, does not give up or hesitates to leave his/her hideaway,
- if the resistance, which is about to hamper his service action, cannot be suppressed by any other means,
- in order to prevent escape of a dangerous perpetrator who cannot be stopped by any other means, a person having been challenged by the use of a weapon or a warning shot in the air does not observe the police officer's instructions aimed at ensuring his or another person's safety,
- if there is no other possibility to stop a vehicle whose driver after a repeated challenge or a sign given in accordance with special regulations does not stop and by his/her careless driving seriously endangers life and health of other persons,
- in order to avert a dangerous attack which threatens guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden, and after an unsuccessful challenge to stop the attack,
- to make harmless an animal threatening life or health of people,
- to stop a vehicle within the area of state border when its driver after a repeated challenge or a sign given in accordance with special regulations does not stop.

Before using a weapon, a police officer is obliged to challenge the person he is taking action against to desist from unlawful conduct, and to warn this person that a weapon will be used. Before using a firearm the police officer is obliged to fire a warning shot in the air. A police officer can refrain from a challenge and a warning shot in the air only if he is personally attacked, or the life or health of another person is endangered, or the matter cannot be delayed. While using a weapon, the police officer is obliged to be cautious, primarily not endanger the life of other persons and to protect the life of person, who is the object of intervention.

According Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic § 24 - Extreme Necessity is:

- (1) An act that is otherwise a criminal offence through which someone averts a danger directly threatening an interest protected by this Code is not a criminal offence.
- (2) It shall not be regarded as a matter of extreme necessity if, in the given circumstances, the danger directly threatening an interest protected under this Code, could have been averted otherwise, or the resulting consequence is clearly more serious than the one which was threatened. It shall not be

regarded as extreme necessity too, if the person directly threatened by this danger, was under an obligation to tolerate this danger under national law

According Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic § 25 Necessary Self-defence is:

- (1) A criminal act punishable otherwise, through which someone averts a directly threatening or continuing attack on an interest protected by this Code is not a crime.
- (2) Necessary self-defence is not involved, if the defence was evidently disproportionate to the manner of the attack, primarily concerning form, place and time, circumstances relating to attacker or to defender.
- (3) A person averting the attack by the way stated in paragraph 2, due to extreme disturbance caused by attack, particularly because of a confusion, fear or fright, is excluded for a criminal responsibility.
- (4) If someone - considering the circumstances of case - mistakenly believes, that there is an imminent threat of attack, criminal responsibility is not excluded for a criminal act committed negligently, if the mistake resides in negligence.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

PISTOLS:

Different types of pistols defined as short fire arms, exclusively used type of ammunition 9 x 19 mm LUGER (e.g. CZ 75 and 85, GLOCK 17 and 19, Sig Sauer 226, etc.)

SHOTGUN:

Calibre 12 mm - Winchester 1300 Defender, Benelli M3T, Benelli NOVA

SIGNAL PISTOL:

Calibre 26.5 mm - model 44, model 44/67, model 44/81

Automated machine guns are inhibited and the EBGs officers are not rightful to use weapons of mass effectiveness on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc.)

Coercive Means

Before coercive means can be used, the police officer is obliged to challenge the person he is acting against to stop the unlawful conduct, and warn him/her that one of the coercive means will be applied. The police officer can omit the challenge or warning only if he himself has been attacked, or the life and health of another person

is endangered and the matter cannot be delayed, or if permitted by other circumstances.

The choice of a coercive means to be used is decided by the police officer with respect to actual situation so that the purpose of the intervention could be attained, and the coercive means and intensity of their application are not clearly inadequate to the dangerousness of the attack.

Use of Hand Holds, Grabs, Hits, Kicks of Self-defence and means to remove Defiance or avert an Attack

A police officer is authorised to use handholds, grabs, hits and kicks of self-defence and other means to overcome resistance and avert an attack in order to

- safeguard his or another person's protection against an attack if after a challenge the attack does not stop, there is an immediate threat of an attack, the attack continues or by all symptoms is likely to continue,
- prevent a disturbance, fight, deliberate damage of property or otherwise rowdy conduct whereby the public peace is breached,
- bring in, detain, arrest or put in custody or convey to prison a person, who actively resists,
- prevent coercive entry of unauthorised persons into guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden.

A police officer is authorised to use handholds and grabs to bring in, detain or arrest a person passively resisting or resisting the taking of identification marks according.

Use of Handcuffs and Binding Belt

A police officer is authorised to use handcuffs

- to handcuff a person being brought in, caught, detained or arrested, or a person who should be conveyed to prison or put in custody and who actively resists or attacks other persons or a police officer, damages property even after an unsuccessful challenge to refrain from such conduct,
- to handcuff together two or more persons being brought in, caught, detained or arrested under the conditions referred to in Paragraph a) herein,
- while carrying actions or procedures regarding the persons brought in, detained, caught or arrested, or the persons in lawful custody or deprived of liberty in prison if there is a well-grounded suspicion that they will attempt to escape,
- while performing police escorts of foreigners through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the state border of the neighbouring country.

A police officer is authorised to use the binding belt, if there is a suspicion that the use of handcuffs could be ineffective.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

A police officer is obliged to report immediately to his superior officer each service action where he used coercive means. As soon as the police officer discovers that having used coercive means a person was injured, he is obliged, if circumstance allow, to give the injured person first aid and ensure his/her medical treatment.

If any doubts arise with regard to rightfulness or adequacy of the use of coercive means, or if their use resulted in death, detriment to health or damage to property, the superior officer is obliged to ascertain that they were used in accordance with the law. He shall submit an official record on his findings.

If a police officer has used coercive means in an area other than his operational task force, he shall report its use at the nearest division of the Police Force.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers

Use of a Police Dog

A police officer is authorised to use a police dog in order to

- ensure his own or another person's safety if after a challenge the attack has not ceased, there is an immediate threat of an attack, it continues or by all symptoms is likely to continue,
- prevent a disturbance, fight, deliberate damage of property or otherwise rowdy conduct whereby the public peace is breached,
- prevent forcible entry of unauthorised persons into guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden,
- pursue a person on the run, who is to be detained, arrested or put in lawful custody or conveyed to prison,
- force a hiding person to leave his/her hideaway who is to be detained, arrested or put in lawful custody or conveyed to prison,
- guard a person brought in, detained, caught or arrested who is to be put in lawful custody or conveyed into prison,
- pursue a person who near the state border has not stopped when challenged, and tries to escape and cannot be stopped in another way,
- ensure his/her own safety or other person while performing the police escorts of foreigners through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the state border of a neighbouring country.

A police officer uses a muzzled dog. If required by the nature and intensity of an attack, or in order to overcome a person's resistance or character of carrying action, he can use a police dog without a muzzle guard.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.190/2003 Coll. on Firearms and Ammunition

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.300/2005 Coll. - Criminal Code

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.301/2005 Coll. - Criminal Procedure

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic on service cynology No. 26/2013

5. Border checks

- i) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travelers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

j) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

k) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

As specified in Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 (Schengen Borders Code).

l) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

A person who undergoes security body search shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

m) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGTs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if he/she is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

n) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

o) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

Direct access to the national systems of evidences, or to the national systems of searches of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic is not enabled for EBGTs officers. They may consult the national databases of the Slovak



Republic - in accordance with the Act on personal data protection and other relevant legal provisions - only together with a member of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic.

p) Procedure related to stamping

Members of EBGs are not empowered to stamp any travel documents.


RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.122/2013 Coll. on the protection of personal data and on amendments to certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.301/2005 Coll. Criminal Procedure

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL AREA

Commented [A16]: The non-disclosed image contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

ANNEX 5 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

See Excel Table (FOSS) - Plan of Deployed Resources JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 Land on Border Checks

REMARK:

Any changes related to deployments of the resources in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated Deployment Overview will be available upon request during implementation phase. The final list of deployed resources will be available in Frontex Evaluation Report (FER).

ANNEX 6 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

1. Operational briefing

Operational Briefing of JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 Land on Border Checks consists of two parts. The General Briefing is delivered by Frontex twice per year for all Seconded Guest Officers deployed within the JO, while national briefing is delivered by local authorities during the first day of deployment of the GOs.

1.1. General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex.

- All SGOs will be briefed by OT at the beginning of their deployment according to the provisions of the General Annexes.
- General Briefings will be organized by Frontex for the SGOs.
- Prior to the General Briefing, invitation letter will be sent by Frontex, indicating the exact date and place of the meeting.
- All presentations of the General Briefing will be uploaded on FOSS by OT.

1.2. National briefing delivered by host MS

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS based on the deployment overviews provided by OT.

The National briefers are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by TRU.

The National briefers nominated by local authorities will deliver the National briefing to the Seconded Guest Officers during the first day of deployment in a centralized way. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing, the briefing will be delivered on the spot at agreed timing.

The National briefers nominated by local authorities will deliver the National briefing to the crew members in the operational areas during the first day of deployment.

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Report to the project manager (TRU) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;
- Prepare Report of National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (TRU);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

2. Operational debriefing

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by Local Authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be as part of Operational debriefing.

Standard plan for operational briefing and debriefing is available in the General Annexes.

ANNEX 7 - COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

The Observers from Third Countries participate in the operation pursuant to Article 14(6) of Frontex Regulation and, when signed, the existing working arrangements between Frontex and the competent authorities of the participating Third Country. They have no executive powers to carry out border control tasks, and are not authorized to take any measures against any person. They may only advice and exchange/obtain practical experience.

In particular, the Observers from Third Countries can:

- Intermediate between the national authorities of the host MS and their national authorities on border related incidents and information sharing;
- Support the officers of local authorities of host MS during the examination of travel documents;
- Assist with special language and/or professional skills;
- Participate in combined patrols at the land borders with the local officers;
- Exchange intelligence information regarding the modus operandi, routes and criminal networks operating in the area of concern detected during and in the framework of the operation, in accordance with their respective legislation;
- Participate in JCB meetings, when appropriate and after consultation with the FOC.

Further tasks and duties can be executed according to the national legislation of the host MS.

ANNEX 8 - COOPERATION WITH OTHER UNION AGENCIES AND BODIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS


1. Cooperation with Europol

Frontex and Europol cooperation is foreseen under the JO Focal Points 2016 Land through exchange of information. The details of this cooperation will be described in the Operational Action Plan of the Joint Police Operation implemented under the umbrella of the JO Focal Points 2016.

ANNEX 9 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME

Commented [A17]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the command & control scheme of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

International
Coordination Center
(Frontex HQ)



International Coordination Center
(Frontex HQ)
















































ANNEX 10 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
JORA Administrator / Service Management	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Frontex Situation Centre	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
JORA first line support	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Frontex Situation Centre	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Land Borders Sector	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Delegated Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Land Borders Sector	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Template Creator	[REDACTED]	Frontex	RAU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	Bulgaria	Chief Directorate Border Police	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Croatia	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Estonia	Police and Border Guard Board	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Finland	Finnish Border Guard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Greece	Hellenic Police Headquarters/ Aliens and Borders Protection Branch/Borders Protection Division	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Hungary		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Latvia	SBG	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A18]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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National Access Manager 2		Lithuania	SBGS		
		Norway			
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
		Slovakia	Border and Alien Police Directorate Sobrance		
		Bulgaria	Chief Directorate Border Police		
		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		
		Estonia	Police and Border Guard Board		
		Finland	Finnish Border Guard		
		Hungary			
		Lithuania	SBGS		
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
		Romania	Border Police HQ / RAU		
National Access Manager 3		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		

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National Access Manager 4	[REDACTED]	Poland	Polish Border Guard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 5	[REDACTED]	Croatia	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 6	[REDACTED]	Croatia	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]


Commented [A20]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

2. JORA Incidents Reporting Structure

FRONTEX



Commented [A21]: The non-disclosed text contain detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials. The text contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied during border control activities which would jeopardize the implementation of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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LCC NORWAY

LCC POLAND/

LCC POLAND/


LCC SLOVAKIA

LCC ROMANIA

Commented [A22]: The non-disclosed text contain detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials. The text contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied during border control activities which would jeopardize the implementation of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Timetable for Reporting



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3. JORA Incident Template Attributes' List

General information

No	Name of attribute	Mandatory ²³	Remarks
1	Incident type	X	
2	Incident number	(automatic)	
3	Date of reporting	(automatic)	
4	Detection date	X	
5	On Exit	X	Ticked if on exit

Persons Information

6	Identity type		
7	Person role	X	
8	Travel purpose		
9	Nationality		
10	Gender	X	
11	Age		
12	Immigration status		
13	Refusal reason		
14	Outcome		
15	(add attribute, as necessary)		

Additional Information

16	Route information		
17	Documents Alerts information		
18	Attachments		
19	(add attribute, as necessary)		

²³ Please mark the respective cells under „Mandatory“ if you deem that the relevant field should be mandatorily filled by the Incident Reporter. By doing so, the Incident Reporter will be compelled to enter the mandatory data to submit the Incident Report to the next validation level.

ANNEX 11 - CONTACT DETAILS

1. General

Authority	Address	Email address
Frontex (HQ)	Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	frontex@frontex.europa.eu

2. Frontex

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address
Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team Member	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Analyst	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team Member	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Spokesperson	Ewa Moncure	Tel: +48 22 205 9635 Mob: +48 785 001 374	ewa.moncure@frontex.europa.eu
Press Officer	Izabella Cooper	Tel: +48 22 205 9535 Mob: +48 667 667 292	izabella.cooper@frontex.europa.eu

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3. Host MS

3.1.

Role	Name	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
NFPoC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

NCC

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

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ICC Coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Deputy ICC coordinator	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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LCC
Coordinators

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Focal Point Local Coordinators				

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4. Other

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address	Location
Press officer of national authority (Host MS)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A35]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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REMARK: Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

ANNEX 12 - Logistical information

Bulgaria

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 80 Euro	Sofia
	[REDACTED]	- 40 Euro	Sofia
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	50-60 Euro	Sofia
	[REDACTED]	45-62 Euro	Sofia
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 40 Euro	Sofia
	[REDACTED]	- 35 Euro	Sofia
	[REDACTED]	- 35 Euro	Sofia
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	-45 Euro	Sofia Varna Burgas
	[REDACTED]	-45 Euro	Sofia Varna Burgas
	[REDACTED]	-65 Euro	Sofia Varna Burgas

Commented [A36]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Croatia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 82 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 40 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 82 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 40 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 80 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 75 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 80 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 80 Euro	[REDACTED]

Commented [A37]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 50 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 50 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 40 Euro	[REDACTED]

Commented [A38]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Estonia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 80 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	70 - 110 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	70 - 110 Euro	[REDACTED]

Finland

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	70 - 100 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	70 - 100 Euro	[REDACTED]

	[REDACTED]		
	[REDACTED]	75-105 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	79-126 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	98-118 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 112 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	88-108 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	90 - 120 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	70 - 100 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 84 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 95 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 72 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 92 Euro	[REDACTED]

Commented [A39]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	115 Euro	[REDACTED]
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Greece

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 70 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 60 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 58 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 20 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 25 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 30 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 35 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 20 Euro	[REDACTED]

Commented [A40]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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		- 28 Euro	
		- 38 Euro	
		- 40 Euro	
		- 70 Euro	
		- 80 Euro	
		60 - 65 Euro	
		40 - 45 Euro	

Commented [A41]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Hungary

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rates	Recommended airport
		-40 Euro	
		-50 Euro	

		~ 70 Euro	
		~ 55 Euro	
		~ 70 Euro	
		55-70 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 35 Euro	

Commented [A42]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Latvia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
		~ 70 Euro	
		~ 40 Euro	

Lithuania

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	~ 60 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	~ 55 Euro	[REDACTED]

Commented [A43]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Norway

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	100 - 120 Euro	[REDACTED]

Poland

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	~ 40 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	~ 80 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	~ 40 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	~ 40 Euro	[REDACTED]

	[REDACTED]		
	[REDACTED]	- 60 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 65 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 65 Euro	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	- 50 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 40 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 45 Euro	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	- 30 Euro	[REDACTED]

Commented [A44]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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		40 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 45 Euro	
		~ 65 Euro	

Romania

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
		~ 60 Euro	

Commented [A45]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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		- 61 Euro	
		- 85 Euro	
		- 55 Euro	
		- 55 Euro	
		- 70 Euro	
		- 50 Euro	
		45 - 65 Euro	

Slovakia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport
		- 70 Euro	
		- 60 Euro	
		- 60 Euro	

Commented [A46]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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ANNEX 13 - SGO MONTHLY REPORT TEMPLATE

JO FOA on Border Checks 2016 Land – COUNTRY

SGOs MONTHLY REPORT

Focal Point Name

7th of (Month + 1) 2016

Reporting period: Month 2016

Members of JBCT:

- (SVDO)
- (SLIE)
- (ALDO)

Operational performance: According to the Operational Plan and shift schedules.

- Shift schedule(s) for Month 2016:
- Shift Schedule(s) for the forthcoming month:

Use of the SGOs Rental car(s):

- Kilometers:

Operational activities Month 2016:

- Number of flash reports prepared:
- Number of alerts prepared:
- SGO(s) performance / activities:

	<i>Focal Point Name</i>	
	<i>Entry</i>	<i>Exit</i>
Checked vehicles		
Checked buses		
Checked lorries		
Checked documents		
Checked vehicles (II -line)		
Checked persons (II -line)		

Checked documents (II - line)		
Total:		

Traffic at the BCP (info to be provided by respective FP Local Coordinator):

	Entry	Exit
Passenger		
Car		
Bus		
Truck		
Motorbike		

Detailed information about the incidents from the FP were reported in JORA.

Observations/Comments from the SGOs:

Operational information

- Main trends (changes observed during the reporting period)
- Information concerning clandestine entries, forged documents, stolen cars,...
- Main modus operandi identified at the BCP
- Pull factors (why migrants are directed towards a specific border area)
- Identified routes towards the place of apprehension
- Desired final destination of migrants apprehended
- Any other interesting information in the operational area of responsibility related to border checks
- Trainings/awareness sessions provided to local authorities

• SGO SVDO:

• SGO SLIE:

Recommendations:

Prepared by the SGOs

Date,

Please save it as: FP Name_Month_2016

To be submitted to

Commented [A47]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.