

- pursuit of a person, about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed a crime,
- prevention (counteraction) of escape by an apprehended or escorted person,
- prevention (counteraction) of destruction of property.
- individual chemical incapacitating agents shall be used manually or thrown from firearms.
- individual chemical incapacitating agents should be used carefully, taking into consideration their properties that may constitute a danger to human life.
- The individual chemical incapacitating agents may be used in relation to a person by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

3) dogs,

A dog may be used in case of:

- defense against an attack,
- counteracting active resistance,
- pursuit of a person attempting to cross the Polish state border without the required permission or about whom there are grounded suspicions that he/she committed another crime,
- prevention (counteraction) of an escape by an apprehended or escorted person.

A dog should have a muzzle on, with the exception of situations, when:

- it is used in defense against an attack,
- there is a grounded suspicion of a danger to human life or health during carrying out of the duties by the border guards,

A dog may be used by the border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

4) service clubs,

A service club may be used in the case of:

- defense against an attack,
- counteracting active resistance,
- prevention (counteraction) of destruction of property.

It is forbidden to:

- hit with a handle of a service club,
- use the service club in relation to persons who:
 - use passive resistance, unless using physical force turned out ineffective,
 - are handcuffed or in relation to whom a lead, a straitjacket, a disabling belt or a disabling net have been used,
- hit or push a person with a service club in the head, neck, abdomen or non-muscle or particularly vulnerable parts of the body, as well using service club for applying a blocking or lever hold on these parts of the body.
- It is permissible to hit or push with a service club as well as use it for applying blocking or lever holds on all parts of the body in order to counteract a direct, unlawful attempt against the border guard's own or another person's life or health.

- 5) non-penetrating bullets fired from firearms,
- non-penetrating bullets may only be bullets of rubber fired from smoothbore firearms, alarm or signal weapons.
 - non-penetrating bullets may be used in case of:
 - counteracting a direct, unlawful attempt against human life or health or in a pursuit of a perpetrator of such an attempt,
 - preventing from destruction of property, if human life, health or freedom is directly endangered at the same time,
 - group disturbances against the public order.
 - non-penetrating bullets shall be used:
 - when shooting a warning shot into the air (in the above direction),
 - when aiming at legs.
 - the decision on the use of non-penetrating bullets is taken by:
 - competent local Border Guard authority mentioned in Article 5 item 1 of the Act, a person authorised by this authority, or during their absence - the officer on duty (shift manager),
 - in cases mentioned above in item 2 point 1 and 2 the border guard decides himself/herself or the order is given by his/her direct superior.

6) electric paralyzers.

- Electric paralyzers may be used in case all other means of direct coercion is impossible or proved ineffective, in the following cases:
 - for disabling a person who refuses to follow an order to immediately drop a dangerous tool,
 - defense against an attack,
 - counteracting active resistance,
 - apprehending a person or direct pursuit after a person in relation to whom there is a suspicion that he/she committed a crime,
 - prevention (counteracting) of an escape by a apprehended or escorted person,
 - prevention (counteracting) of destruction or theft of property.
- An electric paralysers shall be used with due carefulness, taking into consideration its properties that may constitute a danger to human life.
- The electric paralysers may be used in relation to a given person by a border guard on the basis of his/her own decision or an order from his/her immediate superior.

USE OF MEANS OF DIRECT COERCION MENTIONED ABOVE MAY NOT CAUSE EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON THE MANDIBLE AND THE NECK, THE CHEST AND THE ABDOMINAL CAVITY, CAUSE DIFFICULTIES TO BREATHE OR BLOCK BLOOD CIRCULATION.

7) Road spikes

- Road spikes or other obstacle allowing to stop a vehicle may be used by a uniformed border guard for stopping a vehicle driven by a person, who did not stop regardless the appropriate signal (call), when:
 - there is a grounded suspicion that the person crossed the Polish state border without the required permission or committed another crime,

- he or she transports a person suspected of committing a crime or transporting objects derived from a crime.
- Road spikes shall not be used to stop two-wheeled vehicles. Use of road spikes or other obstacles should be preceded by:
 - a sign imposing speed limit of:
 - 30 km/h - in built-up area,
 - 60 km/h, and then 30 km/h - outside built-up area,
 - a sign "stop - border control" ("stój - kontrola graniczna"),
 - a stop signal given by a uniformed border guard in a way understandable and visible for the driver of the stopped vehicle,
 - stopping the road traffic in both directions at the distance of no less than 100 m from the road spikes or other obstacle.
- In case of blocking a road with a marked Border Guard vehicle, it is possible to refrain from stopping road traffic.
- The order to use road spikes shall be issued by the superior who assigns the task. It might be used only upon an order of a direct superior of the border guards who carry out the task.

If, as the result of using a means of direct coercion, a person gets injured, and in result of using an individual chemical incapacitating agent, a serious irritation of mucous membranes occurs, the border guard shall:

- immediately provide first aid to this person, as well as take steps to ensure medical emergency assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services,
- immediately inform the direct superior of this incident.

Medical emergency assistance, within the meaning of the Act on State Medical Emergency Services shall be always provided to a pregnant woman in relation to whom means of direct coercion were used.

If using a means of direct coercion resulted in a death of a person, the border guard shall secure the traces at the place of the incident and not allow third persons to access this location, as well as, as far as possible, establish the witnesses of the incident while the local Border Guard authorities shall immediately inform the direct superior and a prosecutor about the incident.

The fact of use of means of direct coercion shall be noted by the border guard in the service book and reported in writing to the superior. The report shall include:

- the rank, name and surname of the border guard involved,
- the time and place of use of means of direct coercion,
- data of the person against whom the means of direct coercion were used,
- particular reasons for use of means of direct coercion and type of means of direct coercion used,
- description of the procedure preceding the use of means of direct coercion,
- results of applying means of direct coercion,
- if need be, description of the method of application of provisions of §§ 2 and 15,
- other important circumstances of the incident,
- data of the identified (established) witnesses of the incident,
- signature of the border guard preparing the report.

The superior is always obliged to examine the grounds, conditions and methods of application of means of direct coercion by subordinate border guards.

4) Border checks.

(a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross border:

Members of the EBGTs shall support PBG officers in examining the personal circumstances of each person before removal. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

Members of the EBGT shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Any GO's practical activities shall be conducted under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

(b) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals:

- to assist at performing border checks in joint teams consisting of officer of Border guard services of the host MSs, special advisers and observers and share expertise on his/her specific subject
- to support the first and second line checks
- to profile passengers in order to detect irregular migrants and victims of cross-border crime
- to detect false/falsified documents and more kinds of cross-border criminality
- to detect stolen vehicles in cooperation with the competent authorities
- to share experience and exchange expertise with officers from the border guard service of the host MS.

(c) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP:

If any activity concerning body searches or evidence collection is necessary from the guest officer, it shall be realized under strict supervision of a Polish border guard.

Actions to be taken towards apprehended persons, rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot as well as transportation of migrants, security standards, rules and instructions are elaborately indicated in the Regulation of Council of Ministers issued of 23.10.2009 on the manner and procedure of exercising certain powers by the border guard officers.

(d) Status assessment and procedure to be followed:

Members of the EBGT shall support the host authorities in assessing whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. No person shall be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from

which there is a serious risk of such an expulsion or removal to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

As for the mechanisms applicable at the border for international protection seekers and unaccompanied minors, they are as follows:

The institutions responsible for reception of application for international protection at the border are Commanders of Border Guards Posts. The institution responsible for dealing with the application for refugee status (issuing decisions on refugee status) is the Head of the Office for Foreigners.

As a general rule the decision on refugee status is issued within 6 months. If the application is manifestly unfounded the decision is issued within 30 days.

If the applicant is to be located in the open reception centre he/she is obliged to report to the reception centre within 2 days as of submitting the application.

The authority admitting the application for granting the refugee status, submitted by an unaccompanied minor shall apply immediately to the custody court having jurisdiction over the place in which such minor stays, with an application to establish a custody to represent the minor in the proceeding for granting the refugee status and place the minor in care and educational centre.

In case the fact that the applicant is an unaccompanied minor is disclosed already during the proceeding, the Head of the Office for Foreigners shall submit the above mentioned application to the custody court.

The authority admitting the application shall bring an unaccompanied minor to professional non-related with the child foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situations, or care of an educational centre.

The unaccompanied minor shall stay in the professional, non-related with the child, foster family functioning as emergency shelter in crisis situation or in care of an educational centre until the moment decision is given by the custodian court.

National legislation does not allow the detention of unaccompanied minors seeking a refugee status. Regular unaccompanied minors of age above 15 years staying illegally (not seeking a refugee status) may be placed in the detention centre. The unaccompanied minors placed in a detention centre are separated from the adults. The placement of unaccompanied minor in detention centre however has the character of last resort measure because a general rule is to place such a person in care of an educational centre.

The minors may be located in detention centre with their families if there are grounds for detention. The minors are located only in detention centres with appropriate infrastructure and organisation to accommodate families with children. Such detention centres provide for the minors a possibility to attend school and realize a standard school programme appropriate for their age. Except for school programme, there are also special educational recreation and sport classes organised by professional pedagogues trained also in the area of multicultural education.

Applicable law:

Act on aliens of 12.12.2013

Act on granting protection to aliens on the territory of Poland of 13.06.2003

Code of Criminal Procedure

Code of Petty Offences

(e) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons:

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing protection to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons. They shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

Any GO's activities in this range shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a Polish border guard.

Applicable law

The 1951 Refugee Convention

Council Regulation No 343/2003 of 28.07.1951

Act on aliens of 13.06.2003

Act on granting protection to aliens on the territory of Poland of 13.06.2003

Rules regulating consultation of national databases;

1. THE DATABASES THAT MAY BE CONSULTED

For practical reasons Polish national as well as European databases will be accessible only through the Polish Border Guard functionaries only in cases connected directly with ongoing service duties.

Procedure related to stamping;

Guest officers are not empowered to stamp any travel documents.

ROMANIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT pool²¹

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs, support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate, carry out measures under the supervision of the officials of local staff, in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1. Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

For border control, the police officers of the Romanian Border Police may patrol on foot and by service vehicles on temporary or private roads adjacent to the state border, bodies of water crossing the border or leading there, as well as shore paths, without the consent of the owner or administrator. In performing state border surveillance and ensuring the border regime, the police may use relevant technical, including electronic, devices and equipment for the purposes of detecting illegal border crossings, identifying objects, ensuring safety in border crossing points and combating cross-border crime.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT

The general tasks performed by the members of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook, are:

- survey and patrol the terrain in the operational area,
- ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- perform identity checks on persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(c) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

²¹ Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators. Specific rules and instructions concerning border surveillance are provided by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 on the state border of Romania. Moreover, a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regulate internally the border surveillance related activities.

(c) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators, as each operational area has particularities. Specific rules and instructions concerning border surveillance are provided by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 on the state border of Romania. Moreover, tailored SOPs provide rules, restrictions and limitations that apply to each operational area.

(d) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

A police official in pursuit of a person who has committed or abetted a criminal offence specified in the Council Framework Decision JHA/584/2002 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States shall be permitted to proceed with the pursuit on the territory of another EU Member State, without previously requested authorisation in cases where the urgency of the matter prevented the official in question from notifying competent authorities prior to the entry on the territory of the other MS, or where the competent authorities of the other Member State were not present at the scene of the event to take over the pursuit. Cross-border pursuit may take place only across land borders. The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other MS of carrying out cross-border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location and the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Pursuit shall be terminated upon completion of the objective, when 1 hour has passed since the crossing of the state border of the country of location or upon the demand of the country of location.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 / 2001 and SOPs related to each procedure (internal regulations).
Applicable legislation, instructions and relevant information will be provide during the briefing.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Persons who have not been permitted to cross the border or have illegally crossed the external border shall be detained and returned into the state from or through which they arrived, taking account of the specifications provided for in the Citizen of the European Union Act. Expulsion shall be completed within 48 hours from the moment of detainment. Persons to be expelled shall be detained in the offices of the police authorities, police detention houses or expulsion centres. Officials shall take fingerprints of persons apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of the border, if he or she is at least 14 years of age, and shall transmit the data collected upon the taking of the fingerprints for comparison to the Central Unit of EURODAC. Unaccompanied minors may be expelled if their custody is arranged and the protection of their rights and interests of is ensured in the admitting country.

No person shall be returned or expelled to places where their lives or freedoms could be threatened. Collective expulsions are prohibited; each person is entitled to an individual decision on his or her expulsion.

(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Upon apprehension, all persons who crossed the border in an illegal manner shall be searched together with their personal effects, including vehicles. Each person shall be searched by an official of the same gender. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be seized and stored for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be logged in a register.

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards, rules and instructions:

Security standards shall depend on circumstances specific to the task and a relevant risk assessment. In general, the escorting officials are required to prevent a possible escape of the apprehended persons, while ensuring their safety of the apprehended person as well as that of the police officers. Coercive measures (physical force, use of deterring equipment, weapons or gas devices) may be used in circumstances described under 4 d). The use of force, including weapons, is only permitted when the apprehended person fails to obey the lawful orders of the migration official or offers resistance, or when there is good reason to believe that the person may escape or put in danger other persons or their own lives, after other measures have been exhausted. As a rule, force, including weapons, shall be used as a last resort, gradually and well justified.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW: Government Emergency Ordinance no. 104/2001, consolidated version, articles 32 - 37. Detailed rules and restrictions as well as provisions of the relevant legislation will be provided during the briefing, by the local coordinators

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre:

Detailed information and applicable legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators.

As a rule, body searches and evidence collection shall be carried out only in presence and under coordination of local border guards. Belongings of searched persons, identity / travel documents as well as any type of evidence shall be logged in a register. Each person will be searched in full respect of dignity, by border guards of the same gender.

b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities:

Members of the EBGs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc. Any procedures and measures shall be postponed until life and health care of intercepted persons are secured.

- In initial reception centres as well as reception centres, asylum seekers shall be provided medical care, accommodation, food, toiletries, essential clothing, translation services, information regarding their rights and duties, transportation, etc.

c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Members of the EBGs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

An apprehended person may not be expelled to a state to which expulsion may result in consequences specified in Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the application of death penalty. The following circumstances shall be taken into account in determining a safe country of origin: to what extent the country guarantees the protection of persons from persecution and abuse, the principle of prohibition of expulsion or return provided for in the Geneva Convention and a system of efficient legal protection instruments against the violation of said rights and freedoms, and whether or not the country has acceded and adheres to the main treaties concerning human rights.

d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women, victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Applicable legislation, recommendations and relevant information will be provided during the briefing, by the local coordinators; non-refoulement principle fully applies for all irregular migrants requesting for any kind of protection.

4. Use of force/weapons

(a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

A police official may apply direct coercion (i.e. physical force, special equipment or a weapon) if the ensuring of the fulfilment of the obligation to counter a threat or eliminate a disturbance imposed on a person by an administrative act is not possible by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. Direct coercion is permitted to be applied without a prior binding administrative act if the issue of the administrative act is not possible due to the circumstances of the case. Binding means (handcuffs, shackles) may be used when the person has been deprived of liberty pursuant to law and there is reason to believe that he or she may attack another person, offer physical resistance to a police official or an assistant police official or damage a proprietary benefit of great value, escape or injure or kill himself or herself.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

- The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officials. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBGTs shall ensure that it will be done as a last resort, in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.
- For countering a serious threat, the police may use a firearm if countering the threat by another measure of direct coercion is not possible or is not possible in a timely manner and with the consideration that in using a firearm, everything possible shall be done in order not to jeopardise another significant benefit.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

Officials from a competent authority of another Member State that is involved in police or customs activity under an international agreement or a legislative act of the European Union may carry firearms (handguns), gas weapons, cut-and-thrust weapons (batons and telescopic batons) or pneumatic weapons. Permissible special equipment includes handcuffs, shackles, binding means, service animals, etc.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

Direct coercive measures (i.e. the use of physical force, special equipment or service weapons) may be used if a threat or a disturbance cannot be countered by another administrative coercive measure or is not possible in a timely manner. A verbal warning (legal summons) shall be issued before direct coercion is applied, in accordance with Government Emergency Ordinance no 104/2001, consolidated version, articles 32 to 37. An official from a competent authority of another Member State can use a firearm only in case there is a threat to his/her life or the life of another person. Firearms may not be used against a child, old persons or a woman bearing obvious signs of pregnancy. The use of a firearm in such cases is only allowed in order to prevent an armed attack or an attack from a group of persons or used as an impediment and also for disarming such persons.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

If by the application of direct coercion a bodily injury is caused to a person, the police shall be required to guarantee first aid to the person at the first opportunity and, if necessary, call for emergency medical care.

(f) Special rules to dog handlers

Use of tracking dogs and dogs specialised for border surveillance is regulated by internal specific operating procedures. Detailed information will be provided during the operational briefings by the local coordinators.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Government Emergency Ordinance no. 104/2001, consolidated version, Ministerial Instruction no. 636/2005 and internal regulations, tailored for each specialisation of the dog.

5. Border checks

- (a) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.*

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travellers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

(b) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) logged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

(c) Define the tasks of the member of the EBGT while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

As specified in Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 (Schengen Borders Code).

(d) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

Detailed information, applicable legislation and limitations will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators. Applications for international protection received at the border are only logged by the Romanian border police. Applications and persons are handed over afterwards to Romanian Immigration General Inspectorate for Immigration for assessment and legal solution.

(e) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

- Detailed information in accordance with Romanian legislation will be provided during the briefing by the local coordinators.

(f) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc

(g) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

National databases are being administrated by national Romanian authorities and queried based on an username and password subject to national information security protocol. The GOs have access to the information managed in those databases only via the Romanian officers and solely for law enforcement purposes related to their assignment. Further practical information will be provided by local coordinators during the briefing.

(h) Procedure related to stamping

Under the State Borders Act, a police official shall affix, according to the Schengen Borders Code, on the travel document of a third-country national a stamp authorising crossing of the border if such national has been granted authorisation to cross the external border (See Article 10 of Regulation 2007/2004).
During JOs hosted by Romania only Romanian border guards are authorized to use entry/exit stamps. GOs can support and may share their expertise for all necessary clarifications.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Applicable legislation and relevant information will be provided during the operational briefings, by the local coordinators.

SLOVAKIA

Description of the tasks and special instructions for the members of the EBGT²²

ARTICLE 3b (4) OF FRONTEX REGULATION

"Members of the European Border Guard Teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures, and human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures..."

The national border guard service of host countries and first of all the local staff has the leading role of the implementation this joint operation. The members of EBGTs support the local staff and based on their (different) mandate carry out measures in line and in agreed way with the officers of local staff in accordance with the Schengen Border Code.

1 Border surveillance

(a) Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc.)

- Patrolling on foot, by service boats or patrol cars in order to prevent, detect and deter unlawful external land border crossing of persons or vehicles and prevent the illegal traffic of goods across external land border outside border crossing points or at border crossing points outside its opening hours. Patrolling can be enhanced by service dogs or technical means.
- Executing checks on persons and vehicles in the borderland territory of the external land borders in order to detect cross-border crimes.
- Conducting covert observations on individual sections.

(b) General tasks of the members of the EBGT

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally.

(g) Specific tasks/instructions in relation to each surveillance method

²² Pursuant to the provision of Article 3a(d) of the Frontex Regulation

Specific tasks/instructions for each patrol and the methods of its implementation in the operational area are communicated to the officers at the briefing prior to each service based on risk-analysis conclusions and current situation in the operational area.

(h) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

EBGTs officers shall realise any service activity under the supervision of the local staff.

(i) Definition of the possiblity/conditions of hot pursuit

General rules for pursuit are indicated in the Art. 41 of the Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. According Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic with Hungary and Poland cross border pursuit may take place only across the land borders. Policeman in hot pursuit in the territory of another Member State shall demonstrate membership to the Police Force, which should be evident (uniform, reflex tape with Police sign, tactical vest etc.). The official in question shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other Member State of carrying out cross border pursuit, and follow the laws of the country of location, the instructions and orders of the competent authority. Policeman stop hot pursuit if requested by the Member State in whose territory the pursuit is carried out.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland on cooperation in the fight against crime and cooperation in border regions (Warsaw, March 2, 2004)

Treaty between the Slovak Republic and Hungary on cooperation in preventing cross-border crime and the fight against organized crime (Bratislava, October 2, 2006)

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic on cross-border pursuit in the territory of a Member State of the Schengen area No. 18/2012

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic on the activities of border control department of the Police Force No. 120/2012

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

(b) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

(c) Transportation of migrants to the nearest BPU/BCP - security standards; rules and instructions;

EBGTs officers activities concerning above mentioned shall be undertaken only under strict supervision and coordination of a local officer.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.301/2005 Coll. - Criminal Procedure

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

a) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre:

A person who undergoes security body search shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

b) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities:

Members of the EBGTS officers shall, when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc.

c) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGTS shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGTS shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

d) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGTS shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

4. Use of force/weapons

a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBGTS shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

The members of EBGs are rightful to use as coercive means hand hold, grabs, hits and kicks of self-defence, means for removing defiance or avert an attack, handcuffs, a police dog, arresting belt and other means for stopping a vehicle by force, strike by a firearm, threat by a firearm, warning shot in the air and a weapon.

b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resort of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable, the members of the EBG shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the least possible injuries.

According to the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. regulating Police Force a police officer is authorised to use a weapon only:

- in necessary self - defence and extreme necessity,
- if a dangerous perpetrator, against whom the police officer is taking an action, after having been challenged, does not give up or hesitates to leave his/her hideaway,
- if the resistance, which is about to hamper his service action, cannot be suppressed by any other means,
- in order to prevent escape of a dangerous perpetrator who cannot be stopped by any other means, a person having been challenged by the use of a weapon or a warning shot in the air does not observe the police officer's instructions aimed at ensuring his or another person's safety,
- if there is no other possibility to stop a vehicle whose driver after a repeated challenge or a sign given in accordance with special regulations does not stop and by his/her careless driving seriously endangers life and health of other persons,
- in order to avert a dangerous attack which threatens guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden, and after an unsuccessful challenge to stop the attack,
- to make harmless an animal threatening life or health of people,
- to stop a vehicle within the area of state border when its driver after a repeated challenge or a sign given in accordance with special regulations does not stop.

Before using a weapon, a police officer is obliged to challenge the person he is taking action against to desist from unlawful conduct, and to warn this person that a weapon will be used. Before using a firearm the police officer is obliged to fire a warning shot in the air. A police officer can refrain from a challenge and a warning shot in the air only if he is personally attacked, or the life or health of another person is endangered, or the matter cannot be delayed. While using a weapon, the police officer is obliged to be cautious, primarily not endanger the life of other persons and to protect the life of person, who is the object of intervention.

According Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic § 24 - Extreme Necessity is:

- (1) An act that is otherwise a criminal offence through which someone averts a danger directly threatening an interest protected by this Code is not a criminal offence.
- (2) It shall not be regarded as a matter of extreme necessity if, in the given circumstances, the danger directly threatening an interest protected under this Code, could have been averted otherwise, or the resulting consequence is clearly more serious than the one which was threatened. It shall not be

regarded as extreme necessity too, if the person directly threatened by this danger, was under an obligation to tolerate this danger under national law

According Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic § 25 Necessary Self-defence is:

- (1) A criminal act punishable otherwise, through which someone averts a directly threatening or continuing attack on an interest protected by this Code is not a crime.
- (2) Necessary self-defence is not involved, if the defence was evidently disproportionate to the manner of the attack, primarily concerning form, place and time, circumstances relating to attacker or to defender.
- (3) A person averting the attack by the way stated in paragraph 2, due to extreme disturbance caused by attack, particularly because of a confusion, fear or fright, is excluded for a criminal responsibility.
- (4) If someone - considering the circumstances of case - mistakenly believes, that there is an imminent threat of attack, criminal responsibility is not excluded for a criminal act committed negligently, if the mistake resides in negligence.

c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

PISTOLS:

Different types of pistols defined as short fire arms, exclusively used type of ammunition 9 x 19 mm LUGER (e.g. CZ 75 and 85, GLOCK 17 and 19, Sig Sauer 226, etc.)

SHOTGUN:

Calibre 12 mm - Winchester 1300 Defender, Benelli M3T, Benelli NOVA

SIGNAL PISTOL:

Calibre 26.5 mm - model 44, model 44/67, model 44/81

Automated machine guns are inhibited and the EBGs officers are not rightful to use weapons of mass effectiveness on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc.)

Coercive Means

Before coercive means can be used, the police officer is obliged to challenge the person he is acting against to stop the unlawful conduct, and warn him/her that one of the coercive means will be applied. The police officer can omit the challenge or warning only if he himself has been attacked, or the life and health of another person

is endangered and the matter cannot be delayed, or if permitted by other circumstances.

The choice of a coercive means to be used is decided by the police officer with respect to actual situation so that the purpose of the intervention could be attained, and the coercive means and intensity of their application are not clearly inadequate to the dangerousness of the attack.

Use of Hand Holds, Grabs, Hits, Kicks of Self-defence and means to remove Defiance or avert an Attack

A police officer is authorised to use handholds, grabs, hits and kicks of self-defence and other means to overcome resistance and avert an attack in order to

- safeguard his or another person's protection against an attack if after a challenge the attack does not stop, there is an immediate threat of an attack, the attack continues or by all symptoms is likely to continue,
- prevent a disturbance, fight, deliberate damage of property or otherwise rowdy conduct whereby the public peace is breached,
- bring in, detain, arrest or put in custody or convey to prison a person, who actively resists,
- prevent coercive entry of unauthorised persons into guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden.

A police officer is authorised to use handholds and grabs to bring in, detain or arrest a person passively resisting or resisting the taking of identification marks according.

Use of Handcuffs and Binding Belt

A police officer is authorised to use handcuffs

- to handcuff a person being brought in, caught, detained or arrested, or a person who should be conveyed to prison or put in custody and who actively resists or attacks other persons or a police officer, damages property even after an unsuccessful challenge to refrain from such conduct,
- to handcuff together two or more persons being brought in, caught, detained or arrested under the conditions referred to in Paragraph a) herein,
- while carrying actions or procedures regarding the persons brought in, detained, caught or arrested, or the persons in lawful custody or deprived of liberty in prison if there is a well-grounded suspicion that they will attempt to escape,
- while performing police escorts of foreigners through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the state border of the neighbouring country.

A police officer is authorised to use the binding belt, if there is a suspicion that the use of handcuffs could be ineffective.

e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

A police officer is obliged to report immediately to his superior officer each service action where he used coercive means. As soon as the police officer discovers that having used coercive means a person was injured, he is obliged, if circumstance allow, to give the injured person first aid and ensure his/her medical treatment.

If any doubts arise with regard to rightfulness or adequacy of the use of coercive means, or if their use resulted in death, detriment to health or damage to property, the superior officer is obliged to ascertain that they were used in accordance with the law. He shall submit an official record on his findings.

If a police officer has used coercive means in an area other than his operational task force, he shall report its use at the nearest division of the Police Force.

f) Special rules to dog handlers

Use of a Police Dog

A police officer is authorised to use a police dog in order to

- ensure his own or another person's safety if after a challenge the attack has not ceased, there is an immediate threat of an attack, it continues or by all symptoms is likely to continue,
- prevent a disturbance, fight, deliberate damage of property or otherwise rowdy conduct whereby the public peace is breached,
- prevent forcible entry of unauthorised persons into guarded premises or a place where entry is forbidden,
- pursue a person on the run, who is to be detained, arrested or put in lawful custody or conveyed to prison,
- force a hiding person to leave his/her hideaway who is to be detained, arrested or put in lawful custody or conveyed to prison,
- guard a person brought in, detained, caught or arrested who is to be put in lawful custody or conveyed into prison,
- pursue a person who near the state border has not stopped when challenged, and tries to escape and cannot be stopped in another way,
- ensure his/her own safety or other person while performing the police escorts of foreigners through the territory of the Slovak Republic to the state border of a neighbouring country.

A police officer uses a muzzled dog. If required by the nature and intensity of an attack, or in order to overcome a person's resistance or character of carrying action, he can use a police dog without a muzzle guard.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.190/2003 Coll. on Firearms and Ammunition

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.300/2005 Coll. - Criminal Code

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.301/2005 Coll. - Criminal Procedure

Regulation of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic on service cynology No. 26/2013

5. Border checks

- i) Rules guaranteeing protection of fundamental rights of any person seeking to cross borders, i.e. prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments, prohibition of discrimination, protection of human dignity, right to be informed, etc.

Fundamental Rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be guaranteed to any person seeking to cross borders. Border control must notably fully comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments and the prohibition of discrimination enshrined, respectively, in Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Articles 4 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.

All travelers have the right to be informed on the nature of the control and to a professional, friendly and courteous treatment, in accordance with applicable international, EU and national law.

EBGTs shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

j) Examinations of applications for international protection (including asylum)

All applications for international protection (including asylum) lodged at the border must be examined by Member States in order to assess, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, whether the applicant qualifies either for refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, or for subsidiary protection status, as defined in the same Directive.

k) Define the tasks of the member of the EBG while border checking of third country nationals (first line check, second line check, etc.)

As specified in Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 (Schengen Borders Code).

l) Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BCP

A person who undergoes security body search shall be searched by an official of the same sex. Examinations requiring a medical procedure may be performed only by a health care professional. Documents, money, valuables and prohibited articles found in the course of a search shall be received for deposit for the time of detention. Prohibited articles shall be handled according to the procedure provided by law. Any items received for deposit upon detention shall be recorded in a report.

m) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBGs shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBGs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if he/she is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

n) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBGs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

o) Rules regulating consultation of national databases

Direct access to the national systems of evidences, or to the national systems of searches of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic is not enabled for EBGs officers. They may consult the national databases of the Slovak Republic - in accordance with the Act on personal data protection and other relevant legal provisions - only together with a member of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic.

p) Procedure related to stamping

Members of EBGs are not empowered to stamp any travel documents.


RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.122/2013 Coll. on the protection of personal data and on amendments to certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.301/2005 Coll. Criminal Procedure

Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force

ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL AREA

Commented [A15]: The blanked out parts contain maps and detailed information regarding the operational area. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations taking place in the same area, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

ANNEX 5 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

See Excel Table (FOSS) - Plan of Deployed Resources JO Focal Points 2016 Land

REMARK:

Any changes related to deployments of the resources in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated Deployment Overview will be available upon request during implementation phase. The final list of deployed resources will be available in Frontex Evaluation Report (FER).

ANNEX 6 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

1. Operational briefing

Operational Briefing of JO Focal Points 2016 Land consists of two parts. The General Briefing is delivered by Frontex twice per year for all Guest Officers deployed within the JO, while national briefing is delivered by local authorities during the first day of deployment of the GOs.

1.1. General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex.

- All GOs will be briefed by OT at the beginning of their deployment according to the provisions of the General Annexes.
- Two General Briefings per year will be organized by Frontex, the first one for the GOs deployed in the period 3 February to 20 July 2016, and the second one for GOs deployed in the period 20 July to 31 December 2016.
- Prior to the General Briefing, invitation letter will be sent by Frontex, indicating the exact date and place of the meeting.
- All presentations of the General Briefing will be uploaded on FOSS by OT.

1.2. National briefing delivered by host MS

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS based on the deployment overviews provided by OT.

The National briefers are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by TRU.

The National briefers nominated by local authorities will deliver the National briefing to the Guest Officers, and observers from Third Countries during the first day of deployment in a centralized way. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing, the briefing will be delivered on the spot at agreed timing.

The National briefers nominated by local authorities will deliver the National briefing to the crew members in the operational areas during the first day of deployment.

National briever shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Report to the project manager (TRU) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;
- Prepare Report of National Briever after each activity and submit it to the project manager (TRU);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

2. Operational debriefing

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by Local Authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be as part of Operational debriefing.

Standard plan for operational briefing and debriefing is available in the General Annexes.

ANNEX 7 - COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

The Observers from Third Countries participate in the operation pursuant to Article 14(6) of Frontex Regulation and, when signed, the existing working arrangements between Frontex and the competent authorities of the participating Third Country. They have no executive powers to carry out border control tasks, and are not authorized to take any measures against any person. They may only advice and exchange/obtain practical experience.

In particular, the Observers from Third Countries can:

- Intermediate between the national authorities of the host MS and their national authorities on border related incidents and information sharing;
- Support the officers of local authorities of host MS during the examination of travel documents;
- Assist with special language and/or professional skills;
- Participate in combined patrols at the land borders with the local officers;
- Exchange intelligence information regarding the *modus operandi*, routes and criminal networks operating in the area of concern detected during and in the framework of the operation, in accordance with their respective legislation;
- Participate in JCB meetings, when appropriate and after consultation with the FOC.


Further tasks and duties can be executed according to the national legislation of the host MS.

ANNEX 8 - COOPERATION WITH OTHER UNION AGENCIES AND BODIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

1. Cooperation with Europol

Frontex and Europol cooperation is foreseen under the JO Focal Points 2016 Land through exchange of information. The details of this cooperation will be described in the Operational Action Plan of the Joint Police Operation implemented under the umbrella of the JO Focal Points 2016.

ANNEX 9 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME



International Coordination Center
(Frontex HQ)
FSC
Frontex Coordination Officer (FCO)
Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)
Operational Team
ICC Coordinators (MSs)

Local Coordination Center - LCC

Border Crossing Point - Focal Point
Local Coordinator
Local Staff
Guest officers
Third Country Observers

ANNEX 10 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
JORA Administrator / Service Management	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Frontex Situation Centre	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Land Borders Sector	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Delegated Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	Frontex	Land Borders Sector	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Template Creator	[REDACTED]	Frontex	RAU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Bulgaria	Chief Directorate Border Police	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	Croatia	Border Police Directorate	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Estonia	Police and Border Guard Board	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Finland	Finnish Border Guard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Greece	Hellenic Police Headquarters/Aliens and Borders Protection Branch/Borders Protection Division	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Hungary		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A16]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the Joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

National Access Manager 2		Latvia	SBG		
		Lithuania	SBGS		
		Norway			
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
		Slovakia	Bureau of Border and Alien Police Bratislava		
		Bulgaria	Chief Directorate Border Police		
		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		
		Estonia	Police and Border Guard Board		
		Finland	Finnish Border Guard		
		Hungary			
		Lithuania	SBGS		
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
		Romania	Border Police HQ / RAU		

Commented [A17]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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		Slovakia	Border and Alien Police Directorate Sobrance		
National Access Manager 3		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
National Access Manager 4		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		
		Poland	Polish Border Guard		
National Access Manager 5		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		
National Access Manager 6		Croatia	Border Police Directorate		


Commented [A18]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

2. JORA Incidents Reporting Structure

FRONTEX



Commented [A19]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

LCC POLAND/Przemyśl

[REDACTED]

LCC POLAND/Chełm

[REDACTED]


LCC SLOVAKIA

[REDACTED]

LCC ROMANIA

[REDACTED]

Timetable for Reporting



Commented [A20]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

3. JORA Incident Template Attributes' List

General information

No	Name of attribute	Mandatory ²³	Remarks
1	Incident type	X	
2	Incident number	(automatic)	
3	Date of reporting	(automatic)	
4	Detection date	X	
5	On Exit	X	Ticked if on exit

Persons Information

6	Identity type		
7	Person role	X	
8	Travel purpose		
9	Nationality		
10	Gender	X	
11	Age		
12	Immigration status		
13	Refusal reason		
14	Outcome		
15	(add attribute, as necessary)		

Additional Information

16	Route information		
17	Documents Alerts information		
18	Attachments		
19	(add attribute, as necessary)		

²³ Please mark the respective cells under „Mandatory“ if you deem that the relevant field should be mandatorily filled by the Incident Reporter. By doing so, the Incident Reporter will be compelled to enter the mandatory data to submit the Incident Report to the next validation level.

ANNEX 11 - CONTACT DETAILS

1. General

Authority	Address	Email address
Frontex (HQ)	Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland	frontex@frontex.europa.eu

2. Frontex

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address
Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Analyst	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team Member/PSO	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team Member	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Spokesperson	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Press Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]


































Commented [A21]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

3. Host MS

3.1.

Role	Name	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
NFPoC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Bulgaria: Sofia
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Croatia: Zagreb
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Estonia: Pärnu mnt - 139, 15183, Tallinn
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Finland: Helsinki
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Greece: Athens
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Hungary: Teve str. 4-6. 1139 Budapest
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Latvia: Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolfa Street 5, Riga
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Lithuania: Vilnius

Commented [A22]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

NCC				Poland: KGSG-BWM-NFPOC, Al. Niepodległości 100, 02-514 Warszawa
				Romania: Bucharest
				Slovakia: Bureau of Border and Alien Police Bratislava
				Bulgaria: Sofia
				Croatia: Zagreb
				Estonia: Tööstuse 52, 10416 Tallinn
				Finland: Helsinki
				Greece: Pireus
				Hungary: Budapest
				Latvia: Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolfā Street 5, Riga
				Lithuania: Vilnius

Commented [A23]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
































ICC Coordinator				Norway: Assistant Chief of Police HQ National Police Directorate Norway
				Romania: Bucharest
				Slovakia: Sobrance -Border and Alien Police Directorate
				Bulgaria: Sofia
				Croatia: Zagreb
				Estonia: Pärnu mnt 139, 15183, Tallinn, Estonia
				Finland: Helsinki
				Hungary: Budapest
				Latvia: Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolf Street 5, Riga
				Lithuania: Vilnius
				Norway: Eastfinnmark police district

Commented [A24]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

			Kirkenes police station
			Poland: Bieszczadzki BG Regional Unit Komenda Bieszczadzkiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej ul. Mickiewicza 34, 37-700 Przemyśl
			Nadbużański BG Regional Unit Komenda Nadbużańskiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej ul. Trubakowska 2 22-100 Chełm
			Romania: Bucharest
			Slovakia: Border and Alien Police Directorate Sobrance
Deputy ICC coordinator			Bulgaria: Sofia
			Croatia: Zagreb
			Finland: [REDACTED]
			Latvia: Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolf Street 5, Riga

Commented [A25]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Commented [A26]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

LCC Coordinators				Poland: Bieszczadzki BG Regional Unit Komenda Bieszczadzkiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej ul. Mickiewicza 34, 37-700 Przemyśl Nadbużański BG Regional Unit Komenda Nadbużańskiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej ul. Trubakowska 2 22-100 Chełm
				Romania: Bucharest
				Slovakia: Border and Alien Police Directorate Sobrance
				Bulgaria: 
				
				
				Croatia: Zagreb
				Estonia: Vestervalli - 3, 20307, Narva, Ida-Virumaa
				Finland: 

Commented [A27]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

			Greece: Athens
			Hungary: Budapest
			Latvia: 
			Lithuania: Vilnius
			Norway: 

Commented [A28]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Focal Point
Local
Coordinators

E

E

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

SECRET



[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Croatia: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Narva [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Luhamaa [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Finland: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A30]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

A			
			Greece:
			Hungary:

Commented [A31]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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Commented [A32]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>

Commented [A34]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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4. Other

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address	Location
Press officer of national authority (Host M5)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Bulgaria:
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Croatia: Zagreb
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Finland: [REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Greece: Athens
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Hungary: Budapest
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Latvia: Headquarters State Border Guard Republic of Latvia Rudolfa Street 5, Riga
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Lithuania: Vilnius
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Norway: National Police Directorate Norway
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Poland: Polish Border Guard HQ Al. Niepodleglosci 100 02-514 Warszawa
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Romania: Bucharest
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Slovakia: [REDACTED]

Commented [A35]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

REMARK: Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

ANNEX 12 - LOGISTICAL INFORMATION

Bulgaria

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	80 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	40 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	50-60 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	45-62 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	40 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	35 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	35 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	~45 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	~45 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	~65 euro	[REDACTED]	NO

Commented [A36]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Croatia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
		82€		No
		40€		No
		82 €		No
		40 €		No
		80,00 €		No
		75 €		No

Commented [A37]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

H	[REDACTED]	80 €	[REDACTED]	No
	[REDACTED]	80 €	[REDACTED]	No
L	[REDACTED]	50€	[REDACTED]	No
L	[REDACTED]	50€	[REDACTED]	No
	[REDACTED]	40€	[REDACTED]	No

Commented [A38]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Estonia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
L	[REDACTED]	Around 80 EUR	[REDACTED]	No local transport provided, rental car is strongly recommended because limitation of local transport (schedule).
	[REDACTED]	For best price please contact directly with [REDACTED]		
	[REDACTED]			

Commented [A39]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]				
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	70 - 110 €	[REDACTED]	No (rental car strongly recommended)
	[REDACTED]	70 - 110 €	[REDACTED]	No (rental car strongly recommended)
[REDACTED]				

Finland

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	70 - 100 €	[REDACTED]	No
	[REDACTED]	70 - 100 €	[REDACTED]	No
	[REDACTED]	103 €/room, including breakfast	[REDACTED]	No

Commented [A40]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	110 €	[REDACTED]	No

Commented [A41]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Greece

FP [REDACTED]

Name of hotel	Price (euro)	Contact details
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A42]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

FP [REDACTED]

Name of hotel	Pice (euro)	Contact details
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A43]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

FP [REDACTED]

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Rented car is suggested

		30 euro (only breakfast)		
		35 euro (only breakfast)		Rented car is suggested
		20 euro (only breakfast)		
		28 euro (only breakfast) Except		Rented car is suggested

Commented [A44]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

FP

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
		38 euro (only breakfast)		NO
		40 euro (only breakfast)		NO
		70 euro (only breakfast)		NO

Commented [A45]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	80 euro (Breakfast and one (1) meal), per day.	[REDACTED]	NO
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FP [REDACTED]

Commented [A46]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	60 - 65 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	40 - 45 euro	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	NO

Hungary

[REDACTED]:

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rates	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	-40 EUR	[REDACTED]	Not provided by hosting authority Rental car necessary Distance from [REDACTED] BCP 50 km
	[REDACTED]	-50 EUR	[REDACTED]	Not provided by hosting authority Rental car necessary Distance from [REDACTED] BCP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A47]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	-70 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested
	[REDACTED]	-55 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested
	[REDACTED]	70 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	month 01-04, 10-12 -55 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested
	[REDACTED]	month 05-09 -70 Euro	[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	45 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested
	[REDACTED]	45 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested
	[REDACTED]	35 Euro	[REDACTED]	Rental car is suggested

Latvia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	approx. 70,- € (Included in price: Breakfast, VAT, parking place, Internet)	[REDACTED]	Not provided by host country

H [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	approx. 40,- € (Included in price: Breakfast, VAT, Internet)	[REDACTED]	Not provided by host country
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Commented [A48]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Lithuania

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	60 EUR	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	55 EUR	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]			

Norway

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (please include all relevant information: transportation from the airport, daily transportation to work - is it provided by local authority, is rental car recommended, etc.)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	100 - 120 Euro pr/night.		[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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Poland

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Local transportation (yes or no)
		~40 EUR		
		~80 EUR		
		~40 EUR		NO
		~40 EUR		
		~40 EUR		
		~60 EUR		NO
		~65 EUR		
		~65 EUR		NO

Commented [A49]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Commented [A50]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 41(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

F	[REDACTED]	- 50 EUR	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	- 40 EUR		
	[REDACTED]	- 30 EUR		
L	[REDACTED]	40 EUR	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	45 EUR	[REDACTED]	
	[REDACTED]	40 EUR	[REDACTED]	

Commented [A51]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]	H [REDACTED]	45 EUR	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	45 EUR		
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	45 EUR	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED]	65 EUR	[REDACTED]	NO

Commented [A52]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Romania

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	60 euro	[REDACTED]	Yes, 24km
	[REDACTED]	61 euro	[REDACTED]	Yes, 24 km

			85 euro		
			55 euro		
			55 euro		
			70 euro		
			50 euro		
			65 euro 45 euro		

Commented [A53]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Slovakia

FP name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
		69,- EUR (including breakfast)		
		60,- EUR		

		60,- EUR		
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ANNEX 13 - SUPPORTING FINGERPRINTING AND REGISTRATION

1. Introduction

In regard to the Commission Staff Working Document on Implementation of the EURODAC Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints, Frontex provides support to Host Member States to the extent agreed in registration and identification processes of irregular migrants. Systematic registration and fingerprinting process in full respect of fundamental rights based on existing EU law and the right to the personal data protection is a key element of full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System.

Taking into consideration abovementioned, the process led by the Host MS should focus in particular on systematic identification, registration and fingerprinting by the following steps:

- ensuring that fingerprints are taken on land, immediately upon apprehension in connection with irregular crossing of the borders, and in full compliance with the EURODAC Regulation;
- If there is no such possibility, due to the technical problems, at least the initial registration should be performed;
-
- taking restrictive measures to prevent absconding in case migrants refuse fingerprinting, ensuring respect of fundamental rights;
- informing migrants in a timely manner of their rights and obligations and consequences of non-compliance with rules on identification.

The important role in the identification process plays the screening activity (which is obligatory) of undocumented migrants as well as for those who claim wrong nationality. Screening interviews establish presumed nationalities of the irregular migrants and facilitate the national registration procedures as well as contribute to return (voluntary and/or forced) activities.

In addition, the examination of travel documents presented by irregular migrants as well as other trip supporting documents, items, belongings, etc., is vital in order to identify migrants who try swapping their nationality, thus also contributing to the identification and registration process.

Thus, Frontex supports the host MSs by deploying experts with the knowledge, experience and expertise in the field of screening, fingerprinting and the documents' forgery in order to enhance the process of identification, fingerprinting and registration of irregular migrants as well as contributing to return activities.

2. Guidelines for the fingerprinting activities

2.1. General information

In accordance to the Eurodac Regulation (EU) No. 603/2013, irregular migrants and persons in need of international protection apprehended in connection with an irregular border crossing - except for children under the age of 14 years - must provide their fingerprints. Host MS have to identify if national law foresees exceptions on this obligation or particular instructions on handling fingerprinting process.

Fingerprints constitute an important element in establishing the exact identity of those arriving at the external borders of the European Union. The European Agenda for Migration, published in May 2015, stresses the importance of fully implementing the rules on systematically taking fingerprints of the irregular migrants at the external borders.

Fingerprinting is part of the first step of identification in any national procedure and must be performed in full respect of the fundamental rights of the migrants and more specifically of the right to data protection.

2.2. Tasks of experts

Fingerprinting and registration activities shall be carried out according to the host Member State's procedures, in close cooperation with the national experts and under the command and control of a Team leader, an officer assigned by the respective law enforcement authority of the host MS.

The tasks can be structured as follows: 1) informing migrants; 2) procedures in case of refusal; 3) lawful use of force; 4) referral and 5) reporting.

Information to migrants

At the start of the fingerprinting process, experts must inform each person on the obligation to give fingerprints, the purpose for collecting the fingerprints and the manner in which fingerprints will be processed, as required by Article 29 of the Eurodac Regulation. Information should be provided orally - in simple terms and taking in consideration the gender, age and cultural considerations - in a language the person understands. The cultural mediators / interpreters can be used in case of the language barriers occur. In order to facilitate information process it is highly recommended that Host MS prepare relevant number of posters in the registration places.

Procedures in case of refusal

When someone refuses to give fingerprints, experts should inquire what the reasons for the refusal are and refer it to the national authorities. In case of refusal, possible counselling with a view to addressing their fears and expectations should be proposed to the national authorities.

Use of force

In case counselling does not succeed, the Host Member State may consider resorting, in full respect of the principle of proportionality and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, to use coercive measures as a last resort in order to enable fingerprinting of migrants. Coercive measures against migrants can be used only by the Host MS officers. If the officer of Host Member States decides to do this, the migrant will be informed that coercion may be used in order to take his/her fingerprints. If the migrant still refuses to cooperate, the officer may apply the minimum level of coercion required, while ensuring respect of the dignity and physical integrity of the migrant. The procedure for the use of force should include a clear explanation to the migrant of the steps the officer intends to take in order to compel cooperation. The officer should demonstrate that there was no other practicable alternative measure to using reasonable coercion. A case by-case assessment should always be made of whether there is no such alternative, taking into account the specific circumstances and vulnerabilities of the person concerned. The use of coercion must always be recorded and a record of the procedure be retained for as long as necessary in order to enable the person concerned to legally challenge the actions of the authority.

Referral - Damage of the fingertips

In cases where an applicant has damaged his/her fingertips or otherwise made it impossible to take the fingerprints (such as via the use of glue), and where there is a reasonable prospect that within a short period of time it will be possible to take such fingerprints, experts must refer it to the national authorities so that his/her fingerprints can be taken at a later stage.

Reporting

At the end of the working day the fingerprinting expert have to report to the team leader the results of his activities, number of migrants fingerprinted, refused or not possible. The reporting of fingerprinting and registration activities will be included to the reporting structure of operation in an appropriate level. Any use of force must be reported accordingly.

2.3. Use of cultural mediators / interpreters

The use of cultural mediators /interpreters within the informative sessions regarding the obligations to give fingerprints, the purpose for collecting the fingerprinting and the manner in which fingerprints will be processed is of the outmost importance.

Moreover, possible support of the cultural mediators /interpreters in the counselling of those migrants refusing fingerprinting is recommended. In those cases where the refusals still remains, the cultural mediators/ interpreters may also be involved for the explanation of the procedures for the use of force with a clear explanation to the migrant of the steps the officer intends to take in order to compel cooperation.

2.4. Vulnerable groups

Special consideration should be given to the vulnerable persons. "Vulnerable persons" refers to minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence. If some degree of coercion is used by Host MS experts for vulnerable persons it should be ensured by the Frontex expert that the procedure used is specifically adapted to such persons. It is suggested that the use of coercion should always be recorded and that a record of the procedure be retained for as long as necessary in order to enable the person concerned to legally challenge the actions of the authority.

2.5. Status of Experts

Experts for fingerprinting and registration enjoys Guest Officer Status and therefore, the rights and obligations set forth in the Frontex Regulation, in particular Article 10, 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c), apply to them. All participants in fingerprinting and registration activities conducted within the framework of an operation coordinated by Frontex should act according to the Frontex Code of Conduct.

ANNEX 14 - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CUSTOMS COOPERATION CENTERS (PCCCs) AND THE FOCAL POINTS (FPs)

Description

The core idea of the product PCCCs (Police and Customs Cooperation Centers) involvement in Focal Points activities to be implemented under umbrella of JO Focal Points 2016 Land operation is to provide the Host MSs local staff and guest officers deployed in Frontex coordinated joint operation Focal Points 2016 Land (at Border Crossing Points/Focal Points) with the possibility to check relevant information on persons and vehicles in the appointed Police Customs Cooperation Centers which will take part in the product for the purpose to render more efficient the border check procedure and decrease the response time.

Initial agreement related the product has been reached among all participating MS and Frontex during the Police and Customs Cooperation Centers Seminar organised on 17 and 18 March 2016 in Warsaw.

Practically, this annex Standard Operating Procedure for the Exchange of Information between Police and Customs Cooperation Centers and the Focal Points established under umbrella of the Joint Operation Focal Points 2016 Land has been prepared in order to describe the working procedures, the communications lines and the list of the designated PCCCs and FPs has been prepared.

After all participating MS (AUT, BGR, CZE, DEU, EST, FRA, HUN, LTU, LVA, POL, PRT, ROU, SVN) agreed on the commonly developed procedures the concept will be tested within JO Focal Points 2016 Land between 17 August and 12 October 2016. Once the concept will be tested and evaluated it could be further developed in the operational activities involving more Member States.

Legal Framework

The exchange of information, including personal data, between officers of the host Member State and/or the guest officers deployed in a Focal Point and the PCCC aims at enhance the operational cooperation between the Member States' national services responsible for border control and between Member States, as provided for in Articles 16 and 17 of the Schengen Borders Code.

Frontex supports and coordinates the activity under the framework of Joint Operations - Focal Points, pursuant to Article 2(1) (a) of its funding Regulation.

The exchange of information and international transmission of personal data as described in this annex shall be authorised by national legal framework of participating Member States and should assure that they are obtained by the officers involved.

Content of requests and replies

Requests from Focal Points may generally refer to information that is available in the PCCC by querying national databases. Therefore a list with the available national databases for each PCCCs is attached to the annex.

According to national data protection restrictions, replies from the PCCC may be provided either as full information or on a limited hit / no-hit base. Such limitations shall be mentioned beforehand in the above mentioned list as well. National procedures are to be respected.

Reasons for requests

Requests from Focal Point may be submitted to PCCC only in urgent cases which are directly connected to the fulfillment of tasks that result from present border checks according to the Schengen Border Code.



Request entitlement

Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or Frontex guest officer on Focal Points can address urgent requests for information directly to the PCCC on behalf of the responsible authority from the host Member State.

Channel

For the submission of requests from the Focal Points to the PCCCs and vice versa, secure information channels have to be used. Therefore the Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or Frontex guest officer have to make use of the official communication infrastructure, e.g. office mailboxes, duty phone and fax machine available on the Focal Point.

The only common secure communication channel that is currently available on all Focal Points and in all PCCCs is the classical fax machine, respective the possibility of electronic fax. Other possible channels may also be used if they are considered as secure.

Individual national solutions do not provide the necessary common harmonized approach.

Timeframe

By using the request template, the Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or Frontex guest officer shall rate (urgent, hours) requests to PCCC according to their urgency, following the provisions of the Swedish Initiative. The addressed PCCC shall provide the Focal Point Local Coordinator/Shift Leader or Frontex guest officer with an answer as soon as possible, but at least within the requested time frame.

Language

The information exchange between Focal Points and the PCCCs shall generally be done in English by using the respective form.

Request Template

The request template shall meet some conditions:

- English
- Short, simple, concise;
- maximum 2 pages;
- mostly predefined text, checkboxes, multiple choice possibilities
- Footnote with reference to legal bases

For the sake of data protection issues, the form must contain the name and nationality of the requesting officer. This information is mandatory and should be kept available for further cross checks with the Frontex Focal Point deployment table.

Focal Points (involved in the PCCC product)

REMARK: Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

Bulgaria

Focal Point	Contacts
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Latvia

Focal Point	Contacts
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Lithuania

Focal Point	Contacts
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Romania

Focal Point	Contacts
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Poland

Focal Point	Contacts
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A54]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

List of PCCCs and available national databases

REMARK: Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

Austria

Contact Details

PCCC	Contac Person(s)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

List of available national databases

Database	Content
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Commented [A55]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Bulgaria

Contact Details

PCCC	Contac Person(s)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

List of available national databases

	Database	Content
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Czech Republic

Contact Details

PCCC	Contact Person(s)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]










Commented [A56]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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List of available national databases

Database	Content
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Database "S-Telefony"	OWNERS OF PHONE NUMBERS IDENTIFICATION

Germany

PCCC				<p>Commented [A57]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.</p> <p>The non-disclosed text contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.</p>
Information about persons	Information from German national databases	Information from German national databases	Information from German national databases	
				
				
				

France

Contact Details

PCCC	Contac Person	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

List of available national databases

	Database	Content
1.	[REDACTED]	Hit/no hit
2.	[REDACTED]	Hit/no hit

Lithuania

Contact Details

PCCC	Contac Person(s)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

List of available national databases

	Database	Content
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A58]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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5	[REDACTED]	A [REDACTED]
6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
7	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
8	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A59]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Latvia

Contact Details

PCCC	Contac Person(s)	(office and mobile)	Phone number Email address	Location
National Coordination centre of the State Border Guard of Latvia	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

The non-disclosed text contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

List of available national databases

	Database	Content
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
7	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
8	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

9	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
11	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
12	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
13	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
14	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
15	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A60]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Poland

Contact Details

PCCC	Contact Person(s)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

List of available national databases

	Database	Content	Other Information that might be relevant
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Portugal

Contact Details

PCCC	Contact Person(s)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

List of available national databases

	Database	Content
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A61]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Romania

	Police and Customs Cooperation Centre (PCCC)	Countries (location)	Organisation	RO side details contact (only for checks in RO databases)	Working Hours
1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Hungary Police	[REDACTED]	24/7
	[REDACTED]		Romania Border Police	[REDACTED]	
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Romania Border Police Customs	[REDACTED]	24/7
			Bulgaria Border Police Customs	[REDACTED]	
3	Romania - Hungary	RO/HU	Romania Border Police	[REDACTED]	24/7

	Police and Customs Cooperation Centre (PCCC)	Countries (location)	Organisation	RO side details contact (only for checks in RO databases)	Working Hours
	Common Contact Point		Hungary Police	[REDACTED]	
4	[REDACTED] Common Contact Centre	RO/MD (BCP Galati)	Romania Border Police Moldova Border Police Customs	[REDACTED]	24/7
5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Romania Border Police Ukraine Border Guard	[REDACTED]	24/7
6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Romania Border Police	[REDACTED]	24/7
* Oradea Contact Point - multilateral international exchange information through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - foreign liaison officers posted in temporary mission within Oradea Contact Point; - cooperation with other PCCCs. 					

Commented [A62]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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List of available national databases

	[REDACTED]
1	[REDACTED]
2	[REDACTED]
3	[REDACTED]

4	[REDACTED]
5	[REDACTED]
6	[REDACTED]
7	[REDACTED]

Slovenia

Contact Details

PCCC	Contac Person)	Phone number (office and mobile)	Email address	Location
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

List of available national databases

	Database	Content
1.	[REDACTED]	Persons, documents, vehicles, etc.
2.	[REDACTED]	Hit/no hit
3.	[REDACTED]	Hit/no hit

Commented [A63]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Information Exchange Sheet

From

Focal Point name (BCP)			
name of the operation	JO Focal Points 2016 Land		
name of the BCP			
name / surname FPO		email:	
		phone no.:	
reference number from BCP register		fax:	
in cause of suspicion (reason of request)			

TO

Germany	side in	PCCC Petrovice
Earlier reference		Name of officer who was working before in case
Priority	answer within:	Urgent
Handling Code	For police purposes only, not for use in judicial proceedings	
statement/report		
short information about case..		
type of information requested		

type of checks

Person

family name	first name	DOB dd/mm/yyyy	nationality	number of ID card	remarks

Addressess

- ☐ temporary
☐ permanent

country of origin	city	postal code	street	number

Vehicles

vehicle type (car/bus/van...)	Manufacture (brand/mark)	Model (brand/mark)	VIN	license number (nationality)

Documents

type and nationality	document number	issuing authority country	validity/expiration date

Communication (if it is possible according to national legislation)

phone number	IMEI	Email

Others

object	serial number	Details (brand/mark)

Attachments

--

date	

Personal data of this request must be thoroughly deleted by the end of the following year of data processing except other national provisions apply!

Data protection



FRONTEX

The data mentioned above are strictly informative. This document can be used only by the police and by the authorities empowered by law for crime research and they cannot be neither prevailed to public nor used as evidence in a court of law. In case you are not the intended addressee, we hereby inform you that the disclosure, copying or distribution of the present information or the initiation of any action based on it, are strictly forbidden and determine legal responsibility. If you have received it by mistake please let us know by reply and then delete it from your system. We appreciate your cooperation.

Answer

From

reference no.



Commented [A64]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.