

LIMITED



Warsaw, 27/09/2017

OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
LAND BORDERS SECTOR

Annexes of Operational Plan

Rapid Border Intervention Exercise 2017
2017/PRU/05

¹ Information which is sensitive and limited for use within the European Union Institutions, other offices and agencies established by virtue or on the basis of the Treaties, EU Member States and public administrations; distribution on a need to know basis. Not for public dissemination.

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ANNEX 1 - CODE OF CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO ALL PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN FRONTEX OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Application, scope and objectives

1. This Code of Conduct applies to all Frontex operational activities, including those which take place outside the territory of the Union and, subject to paragraph 2, to all persons participating in them.
2. The basic principles set out in this Code of Conduct should serve as a framework for persons who are seconded national experts, other law enforcement officers or officers or participants from third countries. This Code of Conduct is without prejudice to the provisions of any status agreement pursuant to Article 54 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation².
3. This Code of Conduct aims to promote general values intended to guarantee the principles of the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights with particular focus on vulnerable persons, as well as on persons seeking international protection, and is applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Code of Conduct, the following definitions apply:

- a) The term “participant” refers to any person participating or engaged in a Frontex operational activity;
- b) The term “Frontex operational activity” means any activity coordinated, assisted, financed or co-financed by Frontex in the context of assisting Member States in undertaking border control and return tasks, in accordance with Article 8 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation. Frontex operational activities include Joint Operations, Pilot Projects, Return Operations and Trainings of relevant staff;
- c) The term “law enforcement officers” includes members of the European Border and Coast Guard teams and/or relevant staff from the Member States and/or from third countries, who have law enforcement prerogatives;
- d) The term “vulnerable persons” may include women, children (unaccompanied or with family members), persons with disabilities, the elderly, victims of torture or trauma, persons susceptible to exploitation and victims of exploitation or trafficking in human beings;
- e) The term “Member State” also includes the Schengen Associated Countries;
- f) The term “discrimination” means any unequal treatment or arbitrary action or distinction: based on a person's sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, nationality, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation or other status;
- g) The term “harassment” means intentional behaviour which is unwanted by the person to whom it is directed and which has the purpose or effect of offending that person or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment;
- h) The term “social media” includes blogs, business networks, social networks, forums, photo sharing, products/services review, social bookmarking, social gaming, video sharing, and virtual worlds.

² Pursuant to Article 54 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.09. 2016, p. 1), a status agreement shall be concluded by the Union with the third country concerned in cases where it is envisaged that teams will be deployed to a third country in actions where the team members will have executive powers, or where other actions in third countries require it.

CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES

Article 3

Lawfulness

Participants must:

- a) Comply with international law, Union law as well as the national law of both home and host Member States;
- b) Meet the obligations imposed upon them by the provisions stated in the Operational/Implementation Plan.

Article 4

Fundamental rights

Participants must:

- a) Promote, respect, fulfil and protect human dignity and the fundamental rights of every individual, regardless of their sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, nationality, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation or other status, with particular focus on vulnerable persons;
- b) Ensure respect for the relevant international and European instruments regarding fundamental rights protection, including the asylum acquis.

Article 5

International protection

Participants must:

- a) Promote, respect, fulfil and protect the right of persons seeking international protection to be identified, receive adequate assistance, and be informed in an appropriate way, preferably using a number of the most common languages that third-country nationals understand or are reasonably believed to understand, about their rights and relevant procedures;
- b) Ensure that persons in a) above must be referred without delay to the national authorities responsible for considering their requests, in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition against arbitrary and collective expulsions and the right to seek asylum;
- c) Ensure that persons in their custody are treated in accordance with the right to human dignity, and are provided with basic necessities, including food, water, shelter and medical attention to meet their individual needs;
- d) Ensure that special consideration is given to vulnerable persons as well as to persons seeking international protection.

Article 6

Performance of duties

Participants must:

- a) Ensure that instructions, directives and required duties given to them are carried out promptly and in accordance with the highest ethical standards and the training received on the protection of fundamental rights;
- b) Display that they are on a Frontex operational activity, unless such transparency would compromise either their personal safety or duly justified operational objectives.
- c) Participants are to use resources put at their disposal responsibly and are to avoid unnecessary waste. Such resources may include mobile offices, cars, computers or phones.

Article 7

Responsibility

Participants are primarily responsible for all the actions in the context of their participation in a Frontex operational activity. Any breach of the participants' legal obligations or this Code of Conduct, or any failure by

those participants to refer or report any suspected breaches of this Code of Conduct, should be reported using the appropriate channels.

Article 8
Conflict of interests

Participants must refrain from any activities which would undermine or compromise their impartiality and the appropriate performance of their duties.

Article 9
Confidentiality

1. The processing of personal data by participants must comply with the applicable Union as well as national data protection law.
2. Participants must not record any aspect of Frontex operational activities for private use. Professional information in the possession of a participant in current, past, or planned Frontex operational activities must not be publicly disclosed, including on social media, unless the performance of the duty strictly requires disclosure, or that such disclosure has been appropriately authorised in accordance with the applicable standards.
3. Participants must not express themselves regarding current, past, and planned Frontex operational activities in the media, including social media, unless explicit authorisation is given, in accordance with the Operational/Implementation Plan or other similar agreed rules.

Article 10
Behavioural Standards

Participants, whether on or off duty, must:

- a) Not behave in a way likely to compromise the prestige and the nature of the public mission in which they are invested, or to bring discredit upon their organisation, entity or Frontex;
- b) Act with fairness, impartiality and non-discrimination and treat all persons with dignity, courtesy and respect;
- c) Not take any actions contrary to public order;
- d) Not use vulgar, obscene or otherwise offensive speech or gestures that could be considered abusive;
- e) Not be ignorant of cultural differences when interacting with persons so as to cause misunderstandings.

CHAPTER III
PROHIBITED CONDUCTS

Article 11
Prohibition of abuse of authority and position

All improper use of a position of influence, power or authority is forbidden.

Article 12
Non-Discrimination

All forms of discrimination as defined in Article 2(f) towards persons participating in, involved in or otherwise affected by Frontex operational activities, or the general public is forbidden.

Article 13
Prevention of harassment

All forms of harassment as defined in Article 2(g) towards persons participating in, involved in or otherwise affected by Frontex operational activities, or the general public is forbidden.

Article 14
Consumption of alcohol

1. The consumption of alcohol while on duty is forbidden.
2. The consumption of alcohol off-duty must be moderate, unless the Operational/Implementation Plan prohibits any such consumption.
3. A participant unexpectedly called out for duty is obliged, at no risk of discredit, to say that he/she has consumed alcohol and may not be fit for duty.
4. A participant in a state of intoxication due to the consumption of alcohol must not report for duty or appear in public.

Article 15
Use of narcotics and drugs

1. The use or possession of narcotics or drugs, unless prescribed for medical reasons, is forbidden.
2. A participant in a state of intoxication due to the use of narcotics or drugs must not report for duty or appear in public.

Article 16
Prohibition on sexual services and sexual abuse

1. Using or soliciting services of a sexual nature by participants, whether in public or in private, is forbidden. Engaging in abusive and exploitative sexual activities by participants is strictly prohibited.
2. Participants shall refrain from any conduct of sexual nature that implies an abuse of their power and influence by virtue of their position.
3. Participants should show full awareness of cultural differences in particular related to gender issues when interacting with persons affected by Frontex operational activities in order to avoid any misperceptions.

Article 17
Corruption and misconduct

1. Participants must not engage in any form of corrupt activity.
2. The use by participants of their public position for illegitimate private gains as well as the acceptance of unjustified rewards for actions taken in Frontex operational activities is forbidden.

CHAPTER IV
SPECIAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

Article 18
Use of force and weapons

1. Pursuant to Article 40 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, while performing their tasks, members of teams may only use force, including service weapons, ammunition and equipment, with the consent of the home Member State and the host Member State, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State and in accordance with the national law of the host Member State. The host Member State may, with the consent of the home Member State, authorise members of the teams to use force in the absence of border guards of the host Member State.
2. The host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain service weapons, ammunition and equipment, provided that its own legislation applies the same prohibition to its own border guards or staff involved in return-related tasks. This information is shared in advance with Frontex and the Member States.
3. The use of force, and in particular of weapons, must be as a last resort and not exceed the minimum degree necessitated by the circumstances. It has to be proportionate for the performance of duties or in legitimate self-

defence or in legitimate defence of other persons and must be in strict compliance with the relevant guarantees provided for in national, Union and international law.

CHAPTER V FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 19 Awareness

Participants must:

- a) Prior to their engagement in a Frontex operational activity, get acquainted with the content of this Code of Conduct, for example through appropriate means provided by national authorities responsible for the deployment of the participants or by Frontex;
- b) Keep themselves informed about the most up-to-date Frontex objectives, good practices and policies.

Article 20 Duty to cooperate and to inform

- 1. Participants have the duty to cooperate in the gathering of facts of any incident which was reported during a Frontex operational activity.
- 2. Participants must provide information about the complaints mechanism and complaint form, to any person who wants to report an alleged fundamental rights violation under that mechanism.

Article 21 Sanctions

- 1. In the case of a violation of this Code of Conduct by a member of Frontex staff, the Executive Director takes adequate measures which may include the immediate removal of the member of Frontex staff from the Frontex operational activity, in accordance with the Staff Regulations³ and the Frontex Disciplinary Procedure⁴.
- 2. If the violation was committed by a person deployed by a Member State, the Executive Director communicates the incident to the responsible Member State. The Executive Director expects the relevant authority of the Member State to use its powers regarding the necessary disciplinary measures and, if applicable, suspend or remove the person concerned from the respective pool for a defined period. Nevertheless, if the continued engagement of this person jeopardises the Frontex operational activity in question, the Executive Director may decide to suspend or remove him or her from that activity.

³ Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities (and the Conditions of employment of other servants of those Communities) (OJ L 561, 4.3.1968, p. 1).

⁴ MB Decision 23/2012 adopting Frontex Disciplinary Procedure or its successor.

ANNEX 2 - COMPLAINTS MECHANISM

Background information

Pursuant to Article 72 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation⁵, the Agency shall, in cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), take the necessary measures to set up a Complaints Mechanism to monitor and ensure the respect for fundamental rights in the operational areas where the activities of the Agency are implemented.

Article 16(3)(m) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation mandates the Agency's to adopt in the Operational Plan the mechanism to receive and transmit to the Agency a complaint.

The procedures and instructions of the complaint mechanism defined in this annex apply in the operational areas in which Agency activity takes place: (i) Rapid Border Interventions, (ii) pilot projects, (iii) rapid border intervention, (iv) migration management support team deployment, (v) return operation, (vi) return intervention (vii) rapid return intervention (hereafter - Agency activities).

Complaints include personal data and therefore should be dealt with in confidentiality and not transmitted via any other channel than those specifically designated by the complaints mechanism and established in the rules and procedures that follow.

For more information on Complaints Mechanism please consult Frontex website: www.frontex.europa.eu

General information

Who can complain?

Any person who is directly affected by the actions of staff involved in Agency activity and who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions. The complaint may be presented by any party representing a person with the right to complain.

What is the subject of the complaint?

A concrete fundamental rights violation resulting from an action by participant in Agency activity.

Possible ways to present a complaint

A complaint must be made in writing and may be made on the official complaint form. Although the use of the complaint form is preferable, complaints can be submitted in any format, provided it is in writing.

The complainant has 4 possibilities to present a complaint:

- Using the official complaint form available in Frontex website www.frontex.europa.eu/complaints/
- Sending the complaint via email to complaints@frontex.europa.eu
- Sending the complaint by post:
Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, Complaints
Frontex, Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland
- Handing over the complaint where the activity takes place.

⁵ Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.09.2016, p.1).

Duty to inform

Agency staff and Team Members have the obligation to provide information about the complaints mechanism, including information on the complaint form, the privacy statement and relevant leaflets on procedures to any persons who expresses a wish to report an alleged fundamental rights violation against the staff involved in an Agency activity.

They shall also provide the information on the right to complain when a deployed officer in the Frontex coordinated activity, in the course of any activity (screening, debriefing, etc), indicates a potential violation of fundamental rights or a particular individual is identified as a potential victim of an alleged violation of fundamental rights or expresses in any way a complaint or an interest to lodge a complaint⁶.

Using the hard copy of the complaint form

The hard copy of the complaint form, privacy statement and leaflets are available and accessible to everyone wishing to file a complaint in the operational areas in places where such availability is feasible, namely the local coordination structures and premises where Frontex coordinated activities are taking place.

Persons who want to file a complaint using the hard copy of the form, will be granted the form, the privacy statement, leaflets on the procedures and an envelope with the addressee printed on it provided by Frontex.

The Complaint Form including the Privacy Statement are available in the Handbook and stored on FOSS.

⁶ Awareness material and specific training on the complaints mechanisms is planned to be developed during 2017 and will be regularly delivered in cooperation with the FRO

ANNEX 3 - THOROUGH ASSESSMENT

1. Description and assessment of the situation

From 1 January to 27 August 2017, a considerable decrease in the migratory pressure was reported from the Bulgarian–Turkish land border on entry and from the Bulgarian–Turkish land border on exit compared with the same period last year.

Of the total number of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

According to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Out of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Even though [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In addition to the data [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Bulgarian-Turkish land border

During the period under review, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The reported figure represents a decrease of
84% compared with the same period last year when the number of irregular migrant apprehensions was 1 855.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] For example, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

In 2017, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The main nationalities apprehended [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In addition, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Commented [A1]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Typically, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Bulgarian–Serbian land border

[REDACTED] This figure represents a decrease of 65% compared with the same period last year when the number of irregular migrant apprehensions was 5 063.

The main nationalities [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In addition, 24 people smugglers were arrested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This typically means [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Clandestine entries at the BCPs Kapitan

Since the beginning [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] During the same period [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Therefore, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Smuggling of stolen vehicle at the BGR BCPs with Turkey and Serbia

In the majority of cases stolen vehicles [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The most common modus operandi [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Commented [A2]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001. The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

[illegible]

Focal Points Sea – Burgas [REDACTED]

Since the activation of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in previous years, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thus far in 2017, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As reported in previous years [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

airports

Commented [A4]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their *modus operandi* accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 41(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

[REDACTED] For this reason [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in 2017 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in 2016.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. Recommendations

The unprecedented flows of people travelling along the Eastern European land route are proving to be unmanageable for the border authorities involved and therefore the operational response has to be tailored accordingly [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The main activities which need to be reinforced are:

- Implement [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in addition, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- During the deployment of staff and assets flexibility should be ensured so [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Special attention with regard to the implementation of debriefing activities should be paid in particular to those areas where such activities have not thus far been carried out.

At Sea borders

[REDACTED] it is recommended to
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- Bearing in mind the difficult weather and sea conditions [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], to
carry out SAR operations to rescue migrants during critical weather and sea conditions.

Commented [A5]: The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

Commented [A6]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

- Deploy [REDACTED]
- Consider [REDACTED]

At Air borders

- According to [REDACTED]
- However, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Moreover [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] In this regard [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]


5. Statistical Annex

Bulgarian - Turkish land border

Figure 1: Chart showing the number of irregular migrant apprehensions at the [REDACTED]

60

Figure 2: [REDACTED]



Commented [A7]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text pertains to information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined.

Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger.

Figure 3: Chart showing clandestine entry attempts at the Bulgarian BCPs [REDACTED]





Figure 4: Picture showing the density of migrant apprehensions at the BGR land borders with [REDACTED]




ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

General Objectives	Specific Objectives	Indicators / Benchmarks
Enhance border security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carrying out effective border control at external borders in order to detect all suspicious means of transportation enabling to intercept persons, preventing unauthorized border crossings, countering and preventing cross-border criminality and taking measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities Carrying out border checks of all persons crossing the external borders including means of transport and objects in their possession at Border Crossing Points enabling to intercept persons, refusing entry for third country nationals not fulfilling entry conditions, countering and preventing cross-border criminality and taking measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities Carrying out maritime border surveillance in order to detect, identify and intercept the suspicious objects of interest and persons within the operational area, to prevent unauthorized border crossings, also taking into account that some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies and distress situations at sea Supporting the national authorities in disclosing cases of smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other cross-border crime Fostering MS operational structures (NCC/ICC/R-LCC/FP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Nr of incidents concerning illegal migration.</i> <i>Nr of irregular migrants apprehended.</i> <i>Nr of incidents of forgery/falsification of documents.</i> <i>Nr of incidents of stolen vehicles.</i> <i>Nr of people smugglers apprehended.</i> <i>Nr of incidents concerning the smuggling of drugs / goods.</i> <i>Nr of cross-border crimes detected, prevented, intercepted and reported.</i> <i>Nr of suspicious maritime objects/vessels detected and/or intercepted</i>
Enhance operational cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High level of MS participation in operational activities Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations by implementing multi-character operational concept 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Nr of participating Home MS/SAC</i> <i>Nr of participating Host MS/SAC</i> <i>Nr of man-days deployed</i> <i>Nr of deployment days</i> <i>Nr of participating Authorities/Entities</i> <i>Nr of participating TC</i> <i>Nr of deployed observers</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seeking involvement of Third countries in operational activities / Participation of TC Observers in specific operational activity 	
Provide technical and operational assistance in SAR cases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist MS respective authorities in conducting search and rescue operations as part of joint maritime operations concept in order to render assistance to persons found in distress at sea, whenever and wherever so required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of SAR incidents during the JO in operational area Number of SAR incidents during the JO outside operational area Number of SAR incidents in which Frontex co-financed assets have been engaged
Support MS on carrying out coast guard functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish and enhance cooperation with EFCA and EMSA and with the national authorities carrying out coast guard functions responsible for maritime safety, security, search and rescue, fisheries control, customs control, general law enforcement and environmental protection, to increase maritime situational awareness and to support coherent and cost-efficient action Provide, in cooperation with EFCA and EMSA, services, information, equipment and training To produce common risk analysis involving EFCA, EMSA and Frontex for emerging risks at maritime domain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dedicated contacts established for cooperation with EFCA and EMSA on CG functions Tripartite WA concluded as a basis for interagency cooperation as well as tailored SLAs Dedicated briefings and common patrols, staff exchange implemented among agencies in relation to CG functions
Enhance exchange of information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collection of operational information from all actors involved in order to obtain intelligence Distribution of operational information to all involved actors through authorized channels Implementation of fully automated online reporting system Seeking standardized format and quality of the reports and interviews Use of the "Guidelines for JORA Incident Template" giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Average delay in sending incident reports in JORA Level of cooperation in sharing information among main stakeholders (National authorities, Frontex)


ANNEX 5 - OPERATIONAL AREA

Bulgarian-Turkish Land and Sea Border with Focal Points Air, Land and Sea



Commented [A8]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.
The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.
In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Bulgarian-Serbian Land Border with Focal Points Land



ANNEX 6 - DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT)

BULGARIA

1. Border surveillance

Surveillance methods (stationary surveillance, patrolling, etc)

In general, the tasks performed by the member of the EBCGT, as defined in Schengen Handbook are:

- to monitor the terrain they operate in,
- to ensure that there is no risk to public policy and internal security in the patrolling area,
- to check documents of persons being in the area, who are not known to the patrol team,
- to stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area,
- to stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

(a) Definition of restrictions on access to some areas (e.g., military area and who/under-what-conditions is entitled to access)

(b) Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Patrolling and border surveillance by technical means:

According Article 39 (3) of the Ministry of Interior Act, Chief Directorate Border is national specialised structure for the purposes of the activities mentioned in Article 6 (1) points 1, 2, 5-7 in the border zone, in the areas of the border check-points, the international air and sea ports, the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent area, the continental shelf, the Bulgarian section of the river Danube and the other border rivers and water basins on the territory on the country.

The border zone depth is 30 km. from the border line. The border strip is 10 to 300 m. depth and any activity in it shall be communicated in advance to and coordinated with the Director of the corresponding Regional Directorate of Border Police in which area of responsibility the activity will be conducted.

Depending on the specific tasks for land border surveillance, the following types of patrols/posts are performed:

- **Patrol** - carries out patrol activities on foot or as **Auto patrol** (by vehicle) in search of any signs (traces) for illegal border crossing; checks the presence and condition of the border signs (border marks) as well as the presence of other patrols;
- **Post** - secures preliminary defined area of the border or object; carries out surveillance with/without technical means from preliminary defined position;
- **Secret patrol** - undisclosed implementation of tasks for surveillance, detection and apprehension of persons;
- **Patrol "Border crossing checkpoint"** - carries out checks of passengers and vehicles at the border area;
- **Operational-investigation Team** - carries out hot pursuit and apprehension of wanted persons and persons who have illegally crossed the border or intend to cross the border illegally;
- **Convoy Team** - convoys apprehended persons;

- **Blocking/Cordon Team** - blocks main routes with aim to stop persons/vehicles from passing specific area/territory;
- **Mobile Unit for Control and Surveillance** - Joint patrol unit consisted by Border police and Customs' officers who carry out checks of persons, vehicles and facilities for concealed persons and excise goods;
- **Reserve** - carries out suddenly emerged tasks.

The type, composition and the time for carrying the duties of the patrols are determined by the Team leader. The specific tasks for each patrol and the methods of its implementation, along with risk-analysis conclusions and the current situation in the operational area for twenty-four hour period, are communicated to the officers at their Briefings which are not longer than 30 minutes. Officers are briefed prior to their duties implementation. BGs attendance at the Briefings is obligatory.

Definition of the possibility/conditions of hot pursuit

Hot Pursuit is police pursuit of persons violated or attempting to violate the State border. The pursuit can be done along the 30 km. border area and when needed, beyond the border area with the cooperation of other MoI bodies. The pursuit cannot be done in neighbouring country's territory. When persons have been detected for crossing illegally towards neighbouring country, based on the signed bilateral agreement, the neighbouring authorities shall be informed.

2. Interception/apprehension

Persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally shall be brought to the nearest border guards' station according to the Schengen Handbook.

a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons

Security body searches, transportation to the nearest BPU/BCP, etc.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Transportation of migrants - security standards; rules and instructions;

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Interception/apprehension/detention/arrest:

(a) Definition of the actions to be taken towards apprehended persons and Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

Police officers can do searches, to check and seize personal belongings following the procedures of Ministry of Interior Act, as follows:

Article 80. (1) of MIA: Police bodies shall carry out a search of any person:

1. Detained under the terms of Article 63 (1) of MIA;
 2. Who is reportedly in possession of hazardous or prohibited objects;
 3. Found at the scene of a crime or a violation of the public order, when there is sufficient evidence that he/she is in possession of objects, related to the crime or the violation.
 4. In regard to whom a signal exists in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for applying specific control.
- (2) Personal searches may be carried out only by a person of the same gender as the person searched.

Article 81. (1) Police bodies may search the personal belongings of persons:

1. In respect of persons of whom there is data that they had perpetrated a crime or another violation of the public order;
2. When required for the purpose of detecting or investigating crimes, and in cases of opened administrative penalty proceedings;
3. At checkpoints, established by the police;
4. The identity of a person cannot be established;
5. An alien, seeking protection under the Asylum and Refugees Act, entered at variance with the legal procedure or is illegally staying in the Republic of Bulgaria.
6. Who manifests serious mental disorder and by his/her behaviour disturbs the public order or exposes own life or the life of other individuals to clear danger;
7. A juvenile delinquent, having left his/her home, custodian, guardian or specialised institution in which he/she was placed;
8. Who had evaded a prison sentence or the premises where he/she was detained as accused by virtue of a police administrative measure or by an order of a judicial body;
9. Designated for international investigation upon request from another state in regard to his/her extradition or in fulfilment of an European arrest warrant;
10. When there is sufficient evidence of concealment of physical evidence of crime perpetrated;
11. In other cases, prescribed by a law.

The search shall be done in strictly obeying person's dignity.

Article 83. (1) of MIA: Police bodies may carry out inspections in premises without the consent of the owner or the occupant, or in their absence, only when:

1. When an imminent serious crime or one in progress must be prevented;
2. There is evidence that a perpetrator of a serious crime is hiding on premises;
3. It is required in order to provide urgent assistance to persons whose lives, health or personal freedom are endangered, or another in case of ultimate necessity is at hand.

(2) Upon completion of the inspection police bodies must draw up a protocol, indicating:

1. The name and position of the official and his/her place of work;
2. The identity of the owner or of the occupant;
3. The legal grounds for the inspection;
4. The time and place of conducting it;
5. The outcome.

(b) Transportation of migrants - security standards; rules and instructions;

If the apprehended for illegal border crossing persons cannot be handed over to the neighbouring country in 24 hours period, they shall be transferred to Specialized Facilities for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners which is under the umbrella of Migration Directorate - Mol or to the State Agency for Refugees within the Council of Ministers.

During their transportation, the following internal regulations shall be strictly obeyed:
 Ordinance Iz-1143/04.05.2011 for the organization and rules for carrying escorts in Mol;
 Internal Methodological Guidelines for carrying escorts;

Ordinance Iz-2271/01.10.2010 for the methods and the organization of carrying land/sea/river border surveillance.

Escorting is compulsory transportation of one or more persons in specific route, carried by Escort Teams. It is conducted:

- by feet;
- with specialized escort vehicles or service cars;
- with regular civil transportation busses;
- with railways;
- with airplanes;
- with sea/river transportation;

The escort type is chosen prior to the convoy and individually for each case, depending on the escorted person/s, operational situation, the weather conditions and the available resources.

It is strictly prohibited to appoint officials for escorting activities who:

- does not have police powers;
- have family relations or other personal relations with the escorted person/s;
- are somehow connected and dependent by the results of the criminal process against the escorted person/s;

3. Follow up measures at the BPU/BCP/reception centre

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection in the BPU/BCP/reception centre;

(a) Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

Members of the EBCGTs shall, prior to any other action described below, and when required, support the host MS authority rendering the basic human needs of apprehended persons such as food and medical assistance, etc

(b) Status assessment and procedure to be followed

Members of the EBCGT shall assess whether a possible removal could lead to a violation of the principle of non refoulement. Members of the EBCGTs shall also refer to the authorities of the host MS the cases when a person intercepted/apprehended expresses, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks for asylum.

(c) Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Members of the EBCGTs shall support the host MS authorities providing special treatment to vulnerable groups of apprehended persons, i.e.: unaccompanied minors, women victims of trafficking or pregnant, disabled persons and victims of exploitation or trafficking, etc.

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

Interception/apprehension/detention/arrest:

Rules for security checks and evidence collection;

Police officers can do searches, to check and seize personal belongings following the procedures of Ministry of Interior Act, as follows:

Article 80. (1) of MIA: Police bodies shall carry out a search of any person:

1. detained under the terms of Article 63 (1) of MIA;
 2. who is reportedly in possession of hazardous or prohibited objects;
 3. found at the scene of a crime or a violation of the public order, when there is sufficient evidence that he/she is in possession of objects, related to the crime or the violation.
 4. in regard to whom a signal exists in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for applying specific control.
- (2) Personal searches may be carried out only by a person of the same gender as the person searched.

Article 81. (1) Police bodies may search the personal belongings of persons:

1. in respect of persons of whom there is data that they had perpetrated a crime or another violation of the public order;
2. when required for the purpose of detecting or investigating crimes, and in cases of opened administrative penalty proceedings;
3. at checkpoints, established by the police;
4. the identity of a person cannot be established;
5. an alien, seeking protection under the Asylum and Refugees Act, entered at variance with the legal procedure or is illegally staying in the Republic of Bulgaria.
6. who manifests serious mental disorder and by his/her behaviour disturbs the public order or exposes own life or the life of other individuals to clear danger;
7. a juvenile delinquent, having left his/her home, custodian, guardian or specialised institution in which he/she was placed;
8. who had evaded a prison sentence or the premises where he/she was detained as accused by virtue of a police administrative measure or by an order of a judicial body;
9. designated for international investigation upon request from another state in regard to his/her extradition or in fulfilment of an European arrest warrant;
10. when there is sufficient evidence of concealment of physical evidence of crime perpetrated;
11. in other cases, prescribed by a law.

The search shall be done in strictly obeying person's dignity.

Bulgarian Child Protection Act

Police protection

Article 37.(1) Provision of police protection to a child shall be done by the specialized bodies of the Ministry of the Interior.

(2) The bodies under par. 1 shall work in cooperation with child protection bodies.

Grounds

Article 38, Police protection is an urgent measure to be applied when:

1. the child has become subject of crime or there is an immediate threat for his or her life or health, as well as when there is a danger of the child getting involved in a crime;
2. the child has been lost or is in a helpless condition;
3. the child has been left without supervision.

Police protection measures

Article 39,(1) The specialized bodies of the Ministry of the Interior may:

1. accommodate the child in special premises, where they shall not permit any contacts with the child that may prove harmful to him or her;
2. place the child in specialized institutions and where necessary provide him or her with food;
3. return the child back to his or her parents or the persons entrusted with the parental functions.

(2) The specialized bodies under par. 1 shall inform the child and explain to him or her in an understandable manner the measures undertaken and the grounds for them.

Obligation to notify

Article 40. The police bodies, who have implemented the protection, shall notify immediately:

1. the child's parents;
2. the social assistance directorate of the region where protection has been implemented;
3. the social assistance directorate at the current address of the child;
4. the prosecution.

Period

Article 41. The child may not remain under police protection longer than 48 hours.

Article 43. The order and conditions to provide police protection shall be governed by an ordinance issued by the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the State Agency for Child Protection.

Specialized protection of children at public places

Article 43a, (1) Specialized protection of children at public places is setting up of conditions that do not threaten the physical, mental, and moral development of the children.

(2) Specialized protection of children at public places shall be provided by the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, social assistance directorates, municipality, regional educational inspectorates under the Ministry of Education and Science, regional centers of health as well as the owners, tenants, users and organizers of public events, commercial places, cinemas and theatres.

Basic human needs met prior the reception activities;

According the provisions of Article 12 of Ordinance I-13/29.01.2004 for the procedures of temporary accommodation of foreigners and the organization and tasks of the specialized facilities for temporary accommodation, the foreigners are subject to obligatory medical examination, which results are recorded in Register. The examination must be conducted by medic from the medical services of Mol or by one of the Specialized Facilities for Temporary Accommodation of Foreigners. Emergent medical assistance is provided by the Emergency Assistance Centres within Ministry of Health.

Status assessment and procedure to be followed

CDBP is applying all measures defined in the Ministry of Interior Act (MIA) regarding foreigners detained for irregular crossing of the state border of the Republic of Bulgaria, including those in need of protection. All those measures are mentioned in the MIA and Regulation for the Structure and Functions of Ministry of Interior (RSF of Mol) and respect detainees' rights stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Convention regarding the Status of Refugees since 1951, New York Protocol since 1967 and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Police officers of GDBP-Mol have the power to detain foreigners in the border area while ensuring their rights under the provisions of MIA. Detention of the persons is allowed with written order under the provisions of (RSF of Mol) these written orders cannot be issued for more than 24 hours.

Acting procedures of CDBP officers related to detention of foreigners at the state border Republic of Bulgaria, preparation of the necessary official documents, escort and detention of foreigners in Distribution Centre under State Agency for Refugees (SAR) are based on the existing secondary legislation.

When the foreigner declares in writing, verbally or otherwise to employees GDBP-Mol desire to receive special protection in Bulgaria, pursuant to Art. 59 (1) of Law for Asylum and Refugees (LAR), the document (application) of the applicant should be sent to the SAR.

Verbal or otherwise, the act of an applicant is recorded by an official, signed or otherwise authenticated by the applicant and the translator, interpreter, respectively, as it is obligatory all communication to be performed by them. When communicating with foreigners, with aim to assess the need for protection, the questions used for the interviewing should be open type questions. Thus the interviewee has the opportunity to tell the events in their own way as the open end questions contributing to this.

In the process of their work with detainees border guards should treat them with respect and dignity, which is a necessary condition for successful communication.

In the event of cases in which persons detained in relation with illegal crossing of the state border and have been subjected to violations of their human rights due to illegal actions of law enforcement officers (border guards) from the Ministry of Interior, respectively GDBP the following legal options action are applicable:

disciplinary proceedings can be formed and conducted if there is an evidence of violations of official discipline of employees of the CDBP in relation with the MIA;

an assessment of the professional work of the border guards can be started on the basis of which their employment may be terminated or they can be transferred to another position after a proposal from their relevant management;

investigation and prosecution organs shall be promptly notified of the obtained evidence of an indictable offense under the Penal Code by the staff of the CDBP in order to take actions under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC); when charges are pressed against officers from CDBP suspension actions against their access to classified information under the Law on the Protection of Classified Information and the follow-up actions on termination of their employment relationship as a civil servants in Mol should be taken.

During the implementation of each of the investigative proceedings is legally provided and guaranteed order (according to MIA and CPC) to ensure the confidentiality of the information under investigation as well as the provision of medical and psychological care and to the provision of legal aid and necessary assistance to those who are victims of crime.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Subsequent to persons' apprehension and their temporary accommodation at the facilities for apprehended persons for a period no longer than 24 hours, a Compulsory Administrative Measure is imposed to the foreigners.

According to the Bulgarian Law for Foreigners, Compulsory Administrative Measures are imposed to foreigners, detected for illegal border crossing or detected irregulars at the border area, as well as to those who are illegally staying in Bulgaria. If any obstacles for handling the irregular migrants back to the neighbouring country exist, an ordinance for accommodation at the premises of Migration Directorate's temporary accommodation facilities of foreigners is issued. Their returning back to neighbouring country is carried out when possible.

According to the above mentioned law, foreigners who applied for protection shall not be imposed with Compulsory Administrative Measure until the decision for providing protection of the Chairman of State Agency for Refugees is issued.

As it come to families and children seeking asylum in Bulgaria detained during the current year in the area of responsibility of GDBP, this category of foreigners have precedence over the other detainees.

With Families and children who claimed in front employees GDBP desire to obtain protection in Bulgaria should be proceed according to the order mentioned above (for persons seeking special protection in Bulgaria), the actions and activities in the processing of this category of persons is under the principle of preserving the integrity of the family and in the case of unaccompanied children to observe the principle of the best interests of the child.

The latest amendments in to the Law for the Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria (LFRB) (article. 44 tons. 9) introduced a ban unaccompanied minors to be forcibly detained in detention centres of Migration Directorate - CDBP -Mol. The law requires this category of persons to be transmitted in the Directorate Social Assistance to take measures for **protection under the Law on Child Protection.**

As regards detected unaccompanied minors at the border area, their accommodation at the facilities is considered according Article 44 (9) of the Bulgarian Law for Foreigners. Article 38 of the Child Protection Act provides possibilities for "police protection" (Article 37) during the 24 hours arrest.

The conditions for providing police protection of minors are described in Ordinance I-51/12.03.2001 for the conditions and procedures for providing police protection of minors.

If minors are detected in the border area, according Article 3 of the above mentioned Ordinance, they are being transferred to the National Police's authorities for providing police protection. According Article 6 (2) the protection is provided 24/7 hours a day. Minors under police protection are being accompanied by Border police officers to the National police facilities or to the Home for Temporary Accommodation of Children (aged between 3-18) within 15 days strictly following the conditions of Ordinance I-2019/09.11.2006 for the organization and rules for accompanying minors by Ministry of interior officials. The approach towards each person who belongs to the vulnerable groups is individual according to person's needs.

4. Use of force/weapons

a) Define the principles on the use of force

When using force, members of the EBCGTs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The force of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons.

b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

The use of firearms, as it may affect the life or health of persons is the last resource of the actions of guest officers. Firearms may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the members of the EBCGTs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries.

c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible

d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

f) Special rules to dog handlers

RELEVANT APPLICABLE LAW:

(a) Define the principles on the use of force;

According Ministry of Interior Act (MIA)

Article 85. (1) Police bodies may apply force and auxiliary means in the course of discharging their official functions only if the latter may not be achieved otherwise, in the following cases:

1. Resistance or refusal to obey a legal order;
2. Detention of an offender who does not obey or resists a police body;
3. Escorting a person or when the person attempts to escape or take his/her life or the life or health of other persons;
4. (Supplemented, SG No. 98/2008) rendering assistance to other state bodies or officials, including the inspectors of the European Commission, who are illegally impeded to fulfil their duties;
5. Attacks on citizens and police bodies;
6. Freeing of hostages;
7. Group violations of the public order;
8. Attacks on buildings, premises, facilities and vehicles;
9. Release of illegally occupied sites, if so ordered by a competent body.

(2) (New, SG No. 88/2010) In the course of discharge of their official duties the bodies of receipt, carriage and delivery of correspondence, containing classified information, shall be entitled to apply physical force and auxiliaries in cases of attempted unauthorised access to the correspondence only if protection from unauthorised access may not be ensured in any other way.

(3) (Renumbered from Paragraph 2, SG No. 88/2010) Auxiliaries shall be: handcuffs; strait jackets; rubber, plastic, assault and electric shock batons and devices; chemical substances approved by the minister of health; service animals - dogs, horses; blank cartridges, rubber/plastic/shock cartridges; roadblock applications; forced entry devices, diverting flash and sound devices; water cannons and air jet machines; armoured vehicles and helicopters.

(4) (Renumbered from Paragraph 3, SG No. 88/2010) The procedure for applying auxiliaries shall be determined by an ordinance of the Minister of Interior.

Article 86. (1) Force and auxiliaries shall be used following a warning, with the exception of the cases of sudden attack and release of hostages.

(2) Use of force and auxiliaries shall reflect the specific circumstances, the nature of the public order violation and the identity of the offender.

(3) In the cases mentioned in article 85 police bodies shall use only absolutely necessary force.

(4) In using force and auxiliaries police bodies must, when possible, protect the targets' health and take all possible measures to protect the targets' lives.

(5) The use of force and auxiliaries shall be terminated immediately after achieving the objective of the applied measure.

(6) Force and auxiliaries may not be used in regard to obviously underage persons and pregnant women. This prohibition shall not apply to mass disorders, when all other means had been exhausted.

(7) The uses of life-threatening force for apprehension or prevention the escape of a person who has committed a non-violent offense if the person is not endangering life and health of others is forbidden.

(b) Define the principles on the use of weapons

Use of firearms is defined, according Ministry of Interior Act (MIA)

Article 87. (1) Police bodies may use firearms as a last resort:

1. in cases of armed attack or threat with firearms;
2. in the course of releasing hostages and kidnapped persons;

3. following a warning in the course of detaining a person, committing or having committed a felony, if it resists or tries to escape;
4. after having issued a warning to prevent the flight of a legally detained felon.
- (2) In using firearms, where possible, police bodies must protect the life of the target person and ensure that the life and the health of other persons shall not be jeopardised.
- (3) (Amended in 2010) Police bodies may use firearms without warning when conducting border surveillance:
 1. in the event of armed assault on them;
 2. against persons, putting up armed resistance;
- (4) When conducting border surveillance within the limits of internal sea waters and the territorial sea of the Republic of Bulgaria, police bodies shall be entitled to use firearms in the cases provided for by the Maritime Space, Inland Waterways and Ports of the Republic of Bulgaria Act.
- (5) Police bodies cease use of firearms immediately after the achievement of the legal purpose
- (6) Use of firearms for apprehension or prevention the escape of a person who has committed or who is performing non-violent offense if the person is not endangering life and health of others is strictly prohibited
- (7) After having used firearms, the police bodies shall draw up a report.

(c) Define the type of equipment/weapons permissible;

Service weapons and equipment which can be used by foreign experts officially while performing service on the territory of the Bulgaria have to comply with following characteristics:

1. Non automatic system short barrel handguns with length of the barrel - not more than 300 mm. long;
2. Ammunitions - not more than 50, the first cartridge-clip have to be "stop" type;
3. Blank cartridges
4. Cartridges with rubber
5. Plastic or shock bullets
6. Batons - plastic and patent;
7. Handcuffs;
8. Assault or electric shock stick and devices;
9. Pepper spray;
10. Specific aerosols -containing „kapsaicinid“.

(d) Define the conditions to use coercive measures/weapons (warnings, targets, etc)

While apprehending persons BGs are allowed to use service weapons, force, surveillance equipment as well as auxiliary means according the law.

During the apprehension, any actions and methods which threaten the persons' life or health shall not be undertaken.

Physical force and auxiliary means shall be used after appropriate forewarning except in cases of sudden adversary attack and during hostages rescuing missions.

The usage of physical force and supporting means shall be undertaken according the specific situation, public order violation type and violator's personality.

During the physical force and auxiliary means usage, the BGs are obliged to protect persons' health as well as to take all measures needed to protect the violator's life.

The physical force and auxiliary means usage shall be immediately discontinued after reaching the aim of their use. While using service weapons BGs are obliged to protect, when possible, violator's life and not to threaten the life and health of other persons.

The use of physical force and auxiliary means is prohibited against persons apparently looking as minors and pregnant women. The prohibition is not referring to cases of mass disorders when all other means have been useless.

(e) Define the immediate measures to be taken following the use of coercive measure/weapons

The border guards must provide first aid assistance of persons injured after the use of weapons, force or auxiliary means. For each individual case of use of service weapons, force and auxiliary measures, BGs must prepare written report, signed by the officer who has conducted the action and/or the superior who has ordered their usage.

The written report must consist of:

- Officer's name, rank and service;
- Place, date, time and type of actions taken (use of service weapon/auxiliary means or force);
- The conditions and reasons of its usage;
- Type and amount/quantity of the used impact;
- If possible, any personal data concerning the person/s against whom the actions was/were taken;
- Follow up health/life safety measures taken of injured persons against whom the actions were taken;
- Visible aftereffects of the actions taken;

g) Special rules to dog handlers

As a last resort, when all other measures for apprehension of violators have been useless, the dog handler releases the dog, as prior the releasing is obligated to command loudly "Police, stop immediately! I will release the dog!"

2. Maritime Border surveillance

The patrol vessels (participating units), as well as the Fixed Wing Airplanes, performing border surveillance at the operational area should monitor intensively specific maritime areas on the basis of information provided by the host MS' authorities. The scope of these patrols is to prevent unauthorised border crossings and to tackle cross border crime, in particular smuggling of migrants, trafficking of persons and terrorism.

While implementing the operational concept of the maritime border surveillance the participants, and in particular the Team Members must:

- bear in mind that the prevention of loss of lives has overall priority in all operational actions;
- promote, guarantee protection and respect the fundamental rights consigned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and other relevant international law, including the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees;
- take due account of the safety and security of the vessel, its crew and its cargo;
- not prejudice the national, commercial or legal interests of the Flag State;
- ensure within available means, that any measure taken with regard to a particular vessel is environmentally sound under the circumstances;
- ensure that the master of the intercepted vessel is, or has been, afforded at any time the opportunity to contact the vessel's Flag State, and, subject to preserving the safety and security of operations, is, or has been, afforded the opportunity to contact the vessel's owner or manager.

Maritime Assets

Naval base for the participants will be the Bulgarian port of Varna. However, patrol vessels are asked for a flexible deployment: naval bases will be chosen according to the ships' draught and availability of mooring posts.

Each maritime participating unit must have medical staff on board, if possible and in accordance with the capability of the asset (logistic and operational).

The surface patrolling activities will be implemented within the operational area. In case of available intelligence regarding smuggling of migrants or cross-border criminality, the participating maritime units can be requested by the LCC/ICC to consider extending their range of patrolling activities.

Aerial Assets

For the aerial units, the Bulgarian Air base will be Burgas. Aerial assets are asked for a flexible deployment.

The aerial patrolling activities will be implemented in the operational area, according to the decision taken on a daily basis by the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).

In case of available intelligence regarding smuggling of migrants or cross-border criminality, the participating aerial units can be requested by the ICC to consider extending their range of patrolling activities outside of the Triton operational area, however inside safe Flight Information Regions.

During border surveillance activities, the following specific instructions must be observed:

Detection

Upon detection, the participating units shall approach a vessel suspected of carrying persons circumventing or intending to circumvent checks at border crossing points or of being engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea in order to observe its identity and nationality and, pending further measures, shall survey that vessel at a prudent distance taking all due precautions. The participating units shall collect and immediately report information about that vessel to the ICC, including,

- Position (coordinates)
- The course
- The speed
- The flag or/and registration number
- Size and type of a vessel
- Number of persons visible
- Activity on board
- Description of a vessel including: (colour, other special identifying marks possible recognition of equipment, etc.)
- And where possible, information about the situation of persons on board, in particular whether there is an imminent risk to their lives or whether there are persons in urgent need of medical assistance.

The participating units shall collect and report information about any vessel suspected of being engaged in illegal activities at sea, which are outside the scope of the operation, to the LCC/ICC.

Interception

Interception in the territorial sea

In its territorial sea, the Host Member State authorises the participating units to take one or more of the following measures where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel may be carrying persons intending to circumvent checks at border crossing points or is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea:

- a) host information and documentation on ownership, registration and elements relating to the voyage of the vessel, and on the identity, nationality and other relevant data on persons on board, including whether there are persons in urgent need of medical assistance, and/or persons seeking asylum or international protection, and making persons on board aware that they may not be authorised to cross the border except those seeking to apply for asylum or international protection;
- b) stopping, boarding and searching the vessel, its cargo and persons on board, and questioning persons on board and informing them that persons directing the vessel may face penalties for facilitating the voyage.

If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the Host Member State authorises the participating units to take one or more of the following measures:

- a) seizing the vessel and apprehending persons on board;

- b) ordering the vessel to alter its course outside of or towards a destination other than the territorial sea or the contiguous zone, including escorting the vessel or steaming nearby until it is confirmed that the vessel is keeping to that given course;
- c) conducting the vessel or persons on board to Bulgarian territory.

Any measure taken in accordance with the previous paragraphs shall be necessary and proportionate and shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives.

For the purposes of adopting the aforementioned measures, the Host Member State shall instruct the participating unit appropriately through the LCC/ICC. As soon as it becomes evident that a vessel will be seized or persons apprehended with the aim of prosecuting in Bulgaria, the participating unit should request judicial guidance through the ICC. ICC will relay the request to the judicial authority, where an appointed official will assess the case, and approve the measures taken. In case of need, LO/TE on board the MS co-financed asset will facilitate the communication and liaison between the intervening asset and the Bulgarian judicial authority.

The participating unit shall inform the Host Member State, through the ICC, whenever the master of the vessel requests that a diplomatic agent or a consular officer of the flag State be notified.

Where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a stateless vessel is carrying persons intending to circumvent the checks at border crossing points or is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, Bulgarian authorities authorises one or more of the measures mentioned above and shall instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.

Any operational activities in the territorial sea of a Member State that is not participating in the sea operation shall be conducted in accordance with the authorisation of that Member State. Bulgaria shall instruct the participating unit through the ICC based on the course of action authorised by that Member State.

Interception in the contiguous zone

In the contiguous zone of the host Member State or of a neighbouring participating Member State, the measures laid down for the interception in territorial sea may be adopted by the participating units under the conditions mentioned above.

Any authorisation referred to in those paragraphs may only be given for measures that are necessary to prevent the infringement of relevant laws and regulations within that Member State's territory or territorial sea.

The measures laid down shall not be taken in the contiguous zone of a Member State that is not participating in the sea operation without the authorisation of that Member State. The ICC shall be informed of any communication with that Member State and of the subsequent course of action authorised by that Member State. If that Member State does not give its authorisation and where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is carrying persons intending to reach the border of a Member State, that vessel shall continue to be monitored.

Where a stateless vessel is transiting the contiguous zone, the participating unit may board and search the vessel with a view to verifying its statelessness. If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the participating unit shall inform the host Member State which may take, directly or with the assistance of the Member State to whom the participating unit belongs, further appropriate measures as laid down above in accordance with national and international law.

Interception on the High Seas

On the high seas, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the participating units shall take one or more of the following measures, subject to the authorisation of the flag State, in accordance with the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, and where relevant, national and international law:

- a) requesting information and documentation on ownership, registration and elements relating to the voyage of the vessel, and on the identity, nationality and other relevant data on persons on board, including whether there are persons in urgent need of medical assistance;
- b) stopping, boarding and searching the vessel, its cargo and persons on board, and questioning persons on board and informing them that persons directing the vessel may face penalties for facilitating the voyage.

If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the participating units may take one or more of the following measures, subject to the authorisation of the flag State, in accordance with the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, and where relevant, national and international law:

- a) seizing the vessel and apprehending persons on board;
- b) warning and ordering the vessel not to enter the territorial sea or the contiguous zone, and, where necessary, requesting the vessel to alter its course towards a destination other than the territorial sea or the contiguous zone;
- c) conducting the vessel or persons on board to Bulgaria.

Any measure taken in accordance with the above paragraphs shall be proportionate and shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives. As soon as it becomes evident that a vessel will be seized or persons apprehended with the aim of prosecuting in Bulgaria, the participating unit should request judicial guidance through the LCC/ICC. LCC/ICC will relay the request to the judicial authority, where an appointed official will assess the case, and approve the measures taken. In case of need, LO/TE on board the MS co-financed asset will facilitate the communication and liaison between the intervening asset and the Bulgarian judicial authority.

For the purposes of adopting the aforementioned measures, Bulgaria shall instruct the participating unit appropriately through the LCC/ICC.

- Where the vessel is flying the flag or displays the marks of registry of Bulgaria or of a participating Member State, Bulgaria or that Member State may, after confirming the nationality of the vessel, authorise one or more of the aforementioned measures.

Bulgaria shall then instruct the participating unit appropriately through the LCC/ICC.

- Where the vessel is flying the flag or displays the marks of registry of a Member State that is not participating in the sea operation or of a third country, Bulgaria or a participating Member State, depending on whose participating unit has intercepted that vessel, shall notify the flag State, shall request confirmation of registry and, if nationality is confirmed, shall request that the flag State takes action to suppress the use of its vessel for smuggling of migrants. If the flag State is unwilling or unable to do so either directly or with the assistance of the Member State to whom the participating unit belongs, that Member State shall request authorisation from the flag State to take any of the aforementioned measures. Bulgaria or the participating Member State shall inform the ICC of any communication with the flag State and of the intended actions or measures authorised by the flag State. Bulgaria shall then instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.
- Where, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is, in reality, of the same nationality as a participating unit, that participating unit shall verify the vessel's right to fly its flag. To that end, it may approach the suspect vessel. If suspicion remains, it shall proceed to a further examination on board the vessel.
- Where, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is, in reality, of Bulgarian nationality or of a participating Member State, the participating unit shall verify the vessel's right to fly its flag.
- Where, in the cases referred to in the two previous paragraphs, the suspicions regarding the nationality of the vessel prove to be founded, Bulgaria or that participating Member State may authorise one or more of the measures laid down above. Bulgaria shall then instruct the participating unit appropriately through the LCC/ICC.

Pending or in the absence of authorisation of the flag State, the vessel shall be surveyed at a prudent distance. No other measures shall be taken without the express authorisation of the flag State, except those necessary to

relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or those measures which derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a stateless vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the participating unit may board and search the vessel with a view to verifying its statelessness. If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the participating unit shall inform Bulgaria which may take, directly or with the assistance of the Member State to whom the participating unit belongs, further appropriate measures as referred above in accordance with national and international law.

A Member State whose participating unit has taken any measure shall promptly inform the flag State of the outcome of that measure.

The representative of appropriate Bulgarian authority or the national official from a participating Member State at the LCC/ICC shall be responsible for facilitating communications with the relevant authorities in seeking authorisation to verify the right of a vessel to fly its flag or to take any of the measures aforementioned.

Where the grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants on the high seas prove to be unfounded or where the participating unit does not have jurisdiction to act, but there remains a reasonable suspicion that the vessel is carrying persons intending to reach the border of a Member State and to circumvent checks at border crossing points, that vessel shall continue to be monitored.

Disposal of migrants' boats

In all the above mentioned situations, either the interception is performed in territorial waters, contiguous zone or international waters, the intervening maritime units must assure to the extent of possible that no migrants' boat is left adrift.

Commanding Officers of the intervening assets are responsible to take one of the following actions:

- Within means and capabilities, towing of the vessel or its diversion to a Coastal State shall be the preferred option. Proper coordination must be assured between the intervening assets and the coordination structures. In case of need, Bulgaria shall instruct the participating maritime units, through the ICC, to support the towing of the migrants' boat left adrift to a defined port or position
- In case of small vessels where the seaworthiness has been already compromised, if they represent a danger to maritime safety and there are no practicable alternatives, dumping at sea may be conducted as necessary by the ship's Commanding Officer under force majeure, as defined by applicable international law. The decision will take also in due account practicality of the tow (distance to port or position, considerable operational tempo loss, etc) and possible safety hazards the participating maritime units and their personnel.

Distress situations at sea

Member States participating in the JO shall observe their obligation to render assistance to any vessel or person in distress at sea and, during the operation, they shall ensure that their participating units comply with that obligation, in accordance with international law and respect for fundamental rights. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.

For the purpose of dealing with search and rescue situations that may occur during the operation, the following provisions shall be observed:

- (a) When, in the course of the operation, the participating units have reason to believe that they are facing a phase of uncertainty, alert or distress as regards a vessel or any person on board, they shall promptly transmit all available information to the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) responsible for the search and rescue region in which the situation occurs and they shall place themselves at the disposal of that RCC.
- (b) The participating units shall inform the LCC/ICC as soon as possible of any contact with the RCC and of the course of action taken by them.

- (c) A vessel or the persons on board shall be considered to be in a phase of uncertainty in particular:
- (i) when a person has been reported as missing or a vessel is overdue; or
 - (ii) when a person or a vessel has failed to make an expected position or safety report.
- (d) A vessel or the persons on board shall be considered to be in a phase of alert in particular:
- (i) when, following a phase of uncertainty, attempts to establish contact with a person or a vessel have failed and inquiries addressed to other appropriate sources have been unsuccessful; or
 - (ii) when information has been received indicating that the operating efficiency of a vessel is impaired, but not to the extent that a distress situation is likely.
- (e) A vessel or the persons on board shall be considered to be in a phase of distress in particular:
- (i) when positive information is received that a person or a vessel is in danger and in need of immediate assistance; or
 - (ii) when, following a phase of alert, further unsuccessful attempts to establish contact with a person or a vessel and more widespread unsuccessful inquiries point to the probability that a distress situation exists; or
 - (iii) when information is received which indicates that the operating efficiency of a vessel has been impaired to the extent that a distress situation is likely.
- (f) Participating units shall, for the purpose of considering whether the vessel is in a phase of uncertainty, alert or distress, take into account and transmit all relevant information and observations to the responsible RCC including on:
- (i) the existence of a request for assistance, although such a request shall not be the sole factor for determining the existence of a distress situation;
 - (ii) the seaworthiness of the vessel and the likelihood that the vessel will not reach its final destination;
 - (iii) the number of persons on board in relation to the type and condition of the vessel;
 - (iv) the availability of necessary supplies such as fuel, water and food to reach a shore;
 - (v) the presence of qualified crew and command of the vessel;
 - (vi) the availability and capability of safety, navigation and communication equipment;
 - (vii) the presence of persons on board in urgent need of medical assistance;
 - (viii) the presence of deceased persons on board;
 - (ix) the presence of pregnant women or of children on board;
 - (x) the weather and sea conditions, including weather and marine forecasts.
- (g) While awaiting instructions from the RCC, participating units shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of the persons concerned.
- (h) Where a vessel is considered to be in a situation of uncertainty, alert or distress but the persons on board refuse to accept assistance, the participating unit shall inform the responsible RCC and follow its instructions. The participating unit shall continue to fulfil a duty of care by surveying the vessel and by taking any measure necessary for the safety of the persons concerned, while avoiding taking any action that might aggravate the situation or increase the chances of injury or loss of life.

In case of requested support by the coordinating RCC to the ICC, the participating units shall immediately suspend their border patrolling activities and follow the instructions of the coordinating Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC), authority that will assume the coordination of the unit.

Where the distress situation has been concluded, the participating unit shall, in consultation with the ICC, resume the operation.

Boarding

Operational team recommend to the maritime units to follow the procedures describes in the Boarding Handbook in Frontex Joint Maritime Operations - Best Practices & Guidelines)

Aiming at the fulfilment of the operational tasks, in particular relating to the prevention of irregular migration, the participating unit may board the suspicious vessel.

Pre-boarding activity

Before boarding a particular vessel, the participating unit must take in consideration at least the following elements:

- a) Right of approach: The CO of the EU vessel must be aware that under international law, a war vessel, military aircraft, or other duly authorized vessel may approach in international waters any vessel, other than a war vessel or government vessel on non-commercial service, to verify its nationality.
- b) Authority and jurisdiction: The CO of the participating vessel must ascertain whether their authority and jurisdiction exist prior to conducting a boarding and/or taking follow-up law enforcement action according to national legislation. Additionally, they are required to comply with internal practice guidance that may limit the exercise of authority and jurisdiction without first obtaining a statement of no objection from ICC.
- c) Risk/benefit assessment and safeguards: Given the limited number of enforcement resources, the maritime units cannot board all vessels encountered, and therefore, operational cost/benefit decisions should be made by the CO.

While all possible contingencies cannot be addressed, the following factors figure prominently in deciding whether to initiate a boarding:

- Safety of personnel and property.
- Probability of detecting unlawful conduct.
- Impact on maritime commerce and boating public.

Boarding procedures

Detailed guidance and explicit boarding procedures and tactics have to be developed by each participating MS to ensure that boarding is conducted safely and effectively.

Boarding teams

COs are responsible for ensuring their law enforcement personnel are properly trained and equipped to carry out their duties. At the discretion of the CO, non-qualified Coast Guard personnel (e.g., break-in boarding personnel, cadets, and engineering personnel) may support the boarding team in the progress of their action.

- Boarding officer: The boarding officer, under the CO's supervision, is in charge of the boarding team and is responsible for the proper conduct of the boarding.
- Qualified boarding team members: Law enforcement team members may consist of qualified personnel from different MS.
- Other law enforcement agencies: When multinational boarding team is used, they agree in advance to follow the boarding officer's direction and comply with customary policy governing the use of force. Special circumstances may dictate deviation from this policy with the agreement of the ICC.
- Boarding team qualifications: Boarding officers are required to meet the national criteria related to the boarding.
- Boarding team size: Boarding teams are comprised of at least two qualified personnel, at least one of which is a qualified boarding officer. Boarding team size beyond this minimum requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Factors to be taken into consideration when making these determinations include:

- a) suspicion of criminal activity;
- b) size and condition of the vessel;
- c) number of personnel thought to be on board;
- d) vessel activity being examined or regulated, and
- e) recent experience in the operating area.

- f) When an adequate number of qualified boarding personnel are not available to safely conduct a boarding, the following considerations are made:
- g) postpone the boarding and call for additional personnel, or
- h) postpone the boarding and escort the vessel to a location where the boarding may proceed safely and secure.

Detention and release of persons and property

Vessels, the persons aboard, and property associated with either may be detained at sea, by the participating unit, for the time reasonably necessary to:

- (a) ensure the safety of persons and property;
- (b) complete an assessment of a possible violation of law (including interviewing persons on board). A special attention shall be given to interviews conducted with potential victims of trafficking in human beings in order to support their early identification and referral and to avoid their re-victimization). Information about the aim of the ongoing procedure must be provided;
- (c) effect other law enforcement action (e.g., seizing the boat, detain a facilitator); and
- (d) carry out the enforcement of a judicial decision where the vessel, person or property is subject to such order (e.g., vessel subject to forfeiture or person subject to arrest).

No person shall, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, be forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to the authorities of a third country where, inter alia, there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or from which there is a serious risk of an expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Maritime incident reporting

All the activities shall be implemented with regards to the National law and the eventual necessity to ask the authorization, through the Bulgarian law enforcement entities involved in the operational activities, to the Judicial Authority.

Immediately upon conclusion of an operation, Frontex deployed vessel must communicate to the LCC/ICC via short mail:

- Total number of rescued/intercepted migrants;
- Number of women, men and minors;
- Number of unaccompanied minors;
- Number of persons from other vulnerable groups - special cases to highlight (possible victims of trafficking in human beings, family groups, disabled etc.);
- Number of migrants per claimed nationalities from each particular incident (if this is not possible, give total numbers);
- Basic health status information - alert message in case of migrants with possible contagious diseases;
- Wounded or dead persons.

Furthermore, the Maritime Incident Report must be prepared and made available by the Frontex deployed vessel involved in an apprehension or rescue of migrants. Such report should include, photos and description of the incident, information on the evidence collected and possible identification of smugglers, as well as the updated information provided in the initial communication.

In order to guarantee the correct information flow, the Maritime Incident Report must be sent from the vessel, prior to the disembarkation of migrants, to the LCC/ICC, FOC in ICC and FOC in LCC

Maritime Incident Report template can be found in the Specific Annex 15.

Rules for the identification of migrants on board maritime units

The participating maritime units are requested to identify each of the migrants intercepted/rescued with a numbered colour bracelet. All the migrants from the same incident will have the same colour bracelet.

In case of participation in more than one incident, the migrants embarked should be identified with a different numbered colour bracelet according to the incident.

This procedure allows to identify the migrants on board per incident. The intervening units should, to the extent of possible, separate the migrants per incident if conditions on board allow it.

The use of colour bracelets will allow a better and smoother follow up procedures by the local authorities after disembarkation.

After medical check and first care, if a migrant needs additional medical care, he receives an additional black bracelet. Upon disembarkation, the crew should indicate to the local authorities, the migrants in need of medical care as those with black bracelets.



The participating units must arrive in the operational area already prepared with water proof colour bracelets.

Rules for the communication of the state of health of the migrants on board maritime units

According to "International Health Regulation" of W.H.O it is requested that ships with migrants on board inform the national authorities of the state of health on board prior to arrival to port. Commanding Officers of assets must follow the requirements in the regulation and pay special attention to article 28, paragraph 4, and article 37: (http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/43833/1/9789241580410_eng.pdf)

Medical Evacuation

Considering the need of urgent evacuation to medical facilities ashore, Commanding Officers of surface asset have to maintain the possibility to conduct Medevac from their ship at any time with reduced notice.

Medevac can be conducted by other surface asset.

Training of emergency situations

In order to increase interoperability and preparedness it is recommended to conduct trainings at the beginning of a deployment and whenever the occasion arise.

All trainings need to be coordinated with LCC [REDACTED] and reported to ICC [REDACTED].

Disembarkation

No person shall, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, be disembarked in a country where, inter alia, there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of an expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Before the start of disembarkation procedures in the port, Frontex deployed units shall organise a briefing with local authorities providing basic information about the rescue operations, health status of the migrants (in particular of any contagious disease), presence of family groups and vulnerable groups, collected evidence and possible persons of interest.

Disembarkation of people apprehended subsequently to interception

Commented [A9]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001

The participating units are authorized by Bulgaria to disembark in its territory within the operational area, all persons intercepted and apprehended within the framework of REX 2017.

Disembarkation of people rescued

It shall be ensured that coordination and cooperation with the relevant SAR authorities is carried out in such a way that the persons rescued can be delivered to a place of safety in Bulgaria within the operational area. However, no person rescued in the operational area or outside the operational area within a SAR incident, by a participating maritime asset, will be handed over to Third Country Authorities or disembarked in the territory of that Third Country.

The participating units shall inform the LCC/ICC (and the MRCC when under its coordination) of the presence of any persons in need of international protection and vulnerable persons, and the LCC/ICC shall transmit that information to the competent national authorities where disembarkation takes place.

Follow-up measures

Provision of basic human needs

Each participating unit must be equipped with lifesaving equipment, water, provisions and include at least one person with basic first aid training.

Upon disembarkation, Bulgaria shall, prior to any other action, render the basic human needs of the apprehended and rescued persons such as food, shelter and medical assistance.

Special measures applicable to persons in need of international protection

Bulgaria and the participating MS shall address the special needs of persons in need of international protection.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Bulgaria and the participating MS shall identify vulnerable persons (e.g. children, including unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons in need of urgent medical assistance, disabled persons, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, persons in need of international protection and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation) and provide them appropriate assistance including:

- gender-sensitive processes and facilities,
- child-sensitive measures,
- measures for individuals suspected of being torture survivors and for victims of trafficking in human beings,
- measures and infrastructure for people with disabilities.

3. Activities at Air borders

Based on the operational needs as well as according to the relevant national law and internal regulations of the national Border Guard Services, during any air border joint operations the following tasks may be requested to carry out by the participating airports and, if present, with the support of deployed officers:

• Pre-arrival checks

Target flights will normally include those

[REDACTED]

• Gate checks

Upon operational justified reasons,

[REDACTED]

Commented [A10]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Suspect passengers at this point should be briefly

[REDACTED]

▪ Airside Lounges and Rest Areas random patrols

Airside areas should be

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

▪ Arrival and departure desks / booths passport control

[REDACTED]

Deployed officers in the booths with the agreement of the host Member States or Third Country authorities must be fully aware and mindful of any limitations on their role and responsibilities set out by the host country.

▪ Departure gates checks

After the initial arrival, this is the place where most fraudulent documents come to notice. It is also most often an area outside the perimeter of direct routine immigration/border guard control.

[REDACTED]

As a first priority document checkers should be persuaded, if possible, to undertake a pre-boarding survey of the passenger list beginning with local joiners with no luggage and cash paid tickets, especially if bought recently in the landside area, and examining Passenger Name Record (PNR) of suspect travelers for immediate follow-up. They should also be encouraged to look for reoccurring names of inadmissible arrivals previously notified from destination countries.

[REDACTED]

▪ Follow-up checks and actions

It is also extremely important to react quickly and positively in order to respond to alert information from all the other participating airports and airlines, particularly in respect of incoming passengers.

Local staff will find it mutually beneficial to effectively utilize the experience, skills and contacts of Team Members/special advisers/observers by keeping them in the loop and discussing or referring cases to them for an opinion whenever possible (and vice versa) to facilitate a mutual learning experience and a sharing of specialized knowledge. It should be clearly understood that all decisions in respect of refusals of entry etc. remain entirely in the responsibility of the local border guard authorities that, however, according to art. 40 of EBCG Regulation EU 2016/1624, may delegate this power to the Team Members only.

Airports should ensure that relevant information - as indicated by Frontex that is derived from interviews with migrants - is reported in JORA in the relevant comments box.

▪ Cooperation with Check-in Counter Staff

Where it is determined that

[REDACTED]

Commented [A11]: The non-disclosed text contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. It contains references to the methods applied by law enforcement officers to perform border control tasks in general and to counter illegal activities in particular. Its publicity would expose the working methods applied in those activities which would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and other cross-border crime such as facilitation of irregular immigration, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

ANNEX 7 - PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

Rapid Intervention Exercise 2017 - Human Resources					11.10.2017
MS	Head	EO/OC	Deployment Location	Type	
CHE	BGR			Advanced Level Document Expert	1
CHE				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
CZE				Patrol team	2
DEU				Patrol team	6
EST				Patrol team	2
FRA				Patrol team	4
FRA				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
HRV				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
HRV				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
HRV				Stolen Vehicles Detection Expert	1
HRV				Stolen Vehicles Detection Expert	1
HUN				Second Line Officer	1
HUN				Patrol team	3
HUN				Second Line Officer	1
LTU				Second Line Officer	1
LTU				Patrol team	2
LTU				Second Line Officer	1
LTU				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
LVA				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
LVA				Second Line Officer	1
LVA				Patrol team	2
POL				Patrol team	6
PRT				Patrol team	2
PRT				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
PRT				Advanced Level Document Expert	1
PRT				Second Line Officer	1
ROU				Patrol team	2
SVK				Patrol team	2
SVN				Patrol team	2
SVN				Second Line Officer	1

Commented [A12]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Rapid Intervention Exercise 2017 - Technical Equipment					11.10.18.11
US	Host	ICG/ACC	BCU/BSP Location	Type	
DEU				Patrol car	3
HUN				Patrol car	1
POL				Patrol car	3
PRT				Patrol car	1
ROU				Patrol car	1
SVN				Patrol car	1
Frontex				Fixed wing aircraft	1
ROU				Coastal Patrol Vessel	1

The final list of deployed resources will be available in Frontex Evaluation Report.
 Deployed Team Members may be redeployed in accordance with the operational needs.

ANNEX 8 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

1. Operational briefing

During the first day of deployment all participants taking part in the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS. Use of Power Point presentation is highly recommendable. Participants shall wear uniforms (if applicable). Briefing meetings are to be attended at least by:

- The members of the teams deployed to the operational area,
- Crews of all technical means (deployed by MS or additional by the national Authorities) such as maritime means, aerial means, patrol cars, mobile surveillance vehicles etc.
- Internally deployed officers (if applicable)
- Relevant staff from the hosting law enforcement authorities involved (esp. Military and Customs)

A field visit for all deployed members of the teams shall be organized on the briefing day.

1.1. General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex and national authorities. During the General Briefing all participants should be introduced to the main aspects of the Operational Plan, in particular:

- Legal framework of Frontex (including role, tasks and current structure of Frontex)
- Legal framework of the REX 2017
- Fundamental rights in Frontex activities
- Code of Conduct
- Description and assessment of the situation in the area (if applicable, also specific cross-border crimes like THB, etc.)
- Operational aim and objectives
- Information on implementation (period, briefing/debriefing, operational areas, participation) of the relevant operational activity
- Operational concept
- Cooperation with Third countries other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations in the operational area (if applicable)
- The tasks of participants
- Command, control, communications, contact details of Frontex staff
- JORA, FOSS
- Reporting (incidents, SIR, reports of participants and Frontex, etc.)
- Information flow including the information to be exchanged with other EU entities and international organizations
- Press communication rules
- Evaluation (reports)
- Organizational arrangements and logistics

1.2. National briefing delivered by host MS

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS.

The National briefers are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within Rapid Border Intervention Exercise. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by Frontex Training Unit (TRU).

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Report to the project manager (TRU) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;
- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;
- Prepare Report from National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (TRU);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

During the National part of the Operational Briefing all participants should be introduced to the following topics taking into consideration the Common Briefing Pack, in particular:

- Instructions on the composition of the teams, including shift schedules
- Introduction of the basic structure of the BCU/BCP, the department and the chain of command
- Introduction of the key persons (e.g. Commanding Officers etc.)

In case the local authorities have not nominated National briefers in the location where resources will be deployed, LCC Coordinators are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within the JO.

2. Operational debriefing

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by FOC/FCO/Operational Team members or FSO in close cooperation with local authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- In case the Operational debriefing cannot be organized for each deployed asset, it can be limited to NO within the LCC/ICC;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be as part of Operational debriefing.

National Briefer shall attend the Operational debriefing.

ANNEX 9 - COOPERATION WITH OTHER UNION AGENCIES AND BODIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Cooperation with EFCA and EMSA

European Commission Services DG HOME, DG MARE, DG MOVE have agreed in 2015 to establish closer cooperation at maritime domain among relevant EU Agencies namely among Frontex, EFCA and EMSA. Therefore, tailored activities under the Pilot Project for EU Coast Guard Functions (PP) will be implemented in 2017 after consultation and agreement with the host MS. The PP will help to better realise/understand existing capacities of EU Agencies and MS in the field of Coast Guard Functions while promoting interagency cooperation and information sharing among Frontex-EMSA-EFCA and national authorities.

Cooperation with Europol

Frontex and the European Police Office (Europol) can cooperate during the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise through exchange of information and intelligence.

This cooperation is governed by the Operational Agreement between the two agencies that was signed on 4 December 2015, and is covered by Frontex Management Board Decision 58/2015 adopting Implementing Measures for processing personal data collected during joint operations, pilot projects and rapid interventions.

Cooperation with FRA

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) can support Frontex in the mainstreaming of fundamental rights in all Frontex activities. Upon request, FRA can provide advice on how to operationalise fundamental rights in Frontex operations. Frontex and FRA also cooperate in the planning and implementation of research at the external EU borders. Staff deployed by Frontex is encouraged to use materials published by FRA available at www.fra.europa.eu, in particular the Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration as well as the Handbook on European data protection law.

Cooperation with UNHCR

During the JO UNHCR may cooperate with Frontex in aspects related to international protection and the implementation of the principle of non-refoulement, starting with the operational briefing where UNHCR, together with Frontex, will brief the members of the teams on access to international protection (a theoretical and practical approach) and fundamental rights. The aim is to give the members of the teams an increased knowledge and further skills in how to tackle fundamental rights in sea border operations while performing border checks.

ANNEX 10 - COORDINATION STRUCTURE (Tasks and Roles of Participants)

Member States

International Coordination Centre (ICC)

The ICC shall be located in the premises ensuring the most efficient coordination of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise taking into account all the integrated activities.

The operational activity shall be coordinated from the ICC and be accessible for the Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC), National Officials (NO) and other operational actors on a 24/7 basis.

The ICC shall meet the minimum requirement providing the capability for the ICC to communicate and coordinate the LCCs, assets and experts deployed. The ICC' staff consists of an ICC Coordinator and duty officers. The Host MS has to ensure the participation of English speaking staff in the ICC in order to ensure communication with the participants of Rapid Border Intervention Exercise and Frontex staff.

The ICC shall:

- o Lead and coordinate the implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- o Coordinate, based on a daily threat and risk assessment, the deployment of human and technical resources at the right time and locations;
- o Gather, combine and share information and intelligence about all border related incidents;
- o Plan an intelligence driven tactical and/or strategic synchronization of available human and technical resources;
- o Ensure communication and cooperation between the participants;
- o Administer the patrolling schedule database: plan patrolling activities and working hours for deployed staff, and record planned and delivered activities;
- o Elaborate the daily reports with situational updates from the operational area;
- o Follow up and report the cases which need immediate attention, further reporting and handling;
- o Coordinate and facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area.

Frontex requirements for the ICC:

- o Ensure a 24/7 functioning to achieve the situational awareness and proper coordination of the ongoing operation;
- o Be manned by duty officers/operators, be equipped with necessary technical and administrative staff of the host national authorities involved on a 24/7 basis unless otherwise agreed between Frontex and the host MS;
- o Have staff with operational experience and sufficient skills in English designated for each working shift to supervise, perform and support the coordination of the operational activities;
- o Ensure telecommunication between the ICC and all participants of Rapid Border Intervention Exercise and Frontex;
- o Ensure the radio communication between the ICC and all deployed assets;
- o Ensure access to the internet and printer for the staff in the ICC;
- o Ensure the daily delivery of the Daily Reporting Package to Frontex.

ICC Coordinator

The ICC Coordinator is an officer assigned by the respective national authority of the host MS. He/she is responsible for leading and coordinating the daily operational activities and fulfilment of the tasks of the ICC throughout the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise in the whole operational area. The ICC Coordinator is the chairman of the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).

To ensure the continuous presence of the ICC Coordinator, he/she shall be deputized by an assigned officer who shall take over the responsibilities and tasks during his/her absence.

The ICC Coordinator shall:

- Lead the coordinated implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Initiate and present adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures to Frontex, when it is justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by operational needs;
- Chair the JCB meetings on a daily basis throughout the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Ensure the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (collection of all reports and Daily Reporting Package dissemination);
- Monitor the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further developments regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Work closely and continuously with the NO and the FOC;
- Coordinate and facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations implementing activities in the operational area.

Joint Coordinating Board (JCB)

The JCB runs the operation and is established within the ICC. The JCB is composed at least of the ICC Coordinator, the NO and the FOC. Other relevant Frontex staff may take part in the JCB meetings via videoconference.

The JCB carries out meetings on a daily basis (unless otherwise agreed and properly justified), chaired by the ICC Coordinator.

National Official (NO)

The MS deploying their maritime and aerial assets to the operational area shall appoint and deploy the NO in the LCC/ICC for the period the assets are deployed. As it is already stated under the chapter 3.2.1.2. Terrestrial assets, there is no need for the NO to accompany the deployed Dog Teams, TVV, Patrols Cars or other light TE; nevertheless, it might be accepted if justified based on the operational needs and approved by the Operational Manager.

The NO is responsible for coordinating the actions of his/her respective national asset according to the national legislation in close cooperation with the LCC/ICC Coordinator.

The National Official shall:

- Contribute to the proper implementation of the operational activities as described in the Operational Plan;
- Coordinate the actions of the respective national maritime and aerial assets, deployed contingent according to the national legislation in close cooperation with the LCC/ICC Coordinator;
- Contribute to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or by operational needs;
- Take part and contribute to the JCB meetings on a daily basis;
- Ensure that the decisions of the JCB are followed by the asset for which he/she has the coordination responsibility;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further development regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Coordinate the proper implementation of operational information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Contribute to the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (deliver Technical Equipment Mission Report, contribute to the incidents reporting, Patrolling Schedule, etc);
- Inform the ICC in case the deployed assets become aware of the activities implemented by other EU agencies and bodies or international organizations in the operational area;

- Work closely and continuously with his/her operational entity to ensure an efficient operational management of the assets according to updated risk assessment and operational needs.

Members of the teams and Officers of the host MS

Members of the teams shall have the capacity, under instructions from, and, as a general rule, in presence of the Host Member State officers to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks and/or border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.

On a case by case decision, the host Member State may authorise members of the teams to act on its behalf.

Such authorization and the terms and conditions to act shall be transmitted by the team leader.

The national border guard service of the host MS and its staff have the leading role in the implementation of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise.

Commanding Officer (CO)

The CO is the Commander of the aerial and maritime assets according to the national legislation and responsible for commanding the personnel of the respective asset, being in constant contact with and fulfilling the instructions given by the LCC/ICC, via the NO.

The COs of the deployed assets should provide to the LCC/ICC all details about occurring incidents they deal with (time and coordinates of detection and interception, type, flag, registration number and identification of vessels and engines, numbers of migrants and possible identification of skippers, people smugglers on vessels, as well as objects in their possession, etc).

Local Coordination Centre (LCC)

The host MS in cooperation with Frontex may establish LCC for the coordination of activities at the local level. The LCC shall operate on a 24/7 basis, providing in real time an operational picture in order to coordinate the human resources and technical means deployed. The LCC shall meet the minimum requirement-providing-the capability to communicate and coordinate the resources deployed. The LCC' staff consists of personnel of the respective national authority of the host MS. LCC will operate under the coordination of the ICC, thus both being in permanent contact.

The LCC shall:

- Lead and coordinate the implementation of the operational activity in the area of responsibility as described in the Operational Plan;
- Plan an intelligence driven tactical and/or strategic synchronization of available technical and human resources in the area of responsibility;
- Facilitate the monitoring of the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promotion of further developments regarding organizational and operational issues;
- Facilitate the proper functioning of the reporting system in the ICC (contribute to the Daily Reporting Package);
- Ensure communication and cooperation between the participants;
- Ensure the daily LCC reporting from the area of responsibility;
- Coordinate and facilitate the cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations implementing activities in the operational area on local level.

LCC Coordinator

The LCC Coordinator is a nominated officer of the respective national authority of the host MS. The LCC Coordinator is responsible for leading the daily operational activities in the area of responsibility in close

cooperation with and under coordination of the ICC Coordinator throughout the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise.

To ensure the continuous presence of the LCC Coordinator he/she shall be deputized by an assigned officer who shall take over the responsibilities and tasks during his/her absence.

The LCC Coordinator shall:

- Lead the proper implementation of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise in the area of responsibility as described in the Operational Plan;
- Ensure that the decisions of the JCB and the ICC Coordinator are followed in the area of responsibility;
- Contribute to the needed adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by the risk assessment and/or operational needs;
- Contribute to the proper implementation of information gathering, sharing and dissemination;
- Chair the operational meetings in the LCC;
- Monitor the operational situation in the area of responsibility to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further developments of the organizational and operational issues;
- Provide the ICC with the incident reports on situational updates from the operational area;
- Work closely and continuously with the deployed resources in the area of responsibility and the ;
- Follow instructions of the ICC;
- Coordinate and facilitate the cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations implementing activities in the operational area on local level.

Liaison Officer (LO)

The different authorities of host MS and/or home MS may appoint and deploy a LO in the ICC and LCC if established, to facilitate the cooperation between different components from the involved authorities of host and/or home MS ensuring an effective implementation of the operational activities.

Liaison Officer - Technical Equipment (LO-TE)

The host MS must appoint a LO-TE with good English language skills for the assets deployed by participating MS to facilitate the coordination of the activities and cooperation between the CO and the respective national authorities of host MS.

The LO-TE shall:

- Support the implementation of decisions of the JCB and the LCC/ICC Coordinator by the crew of the asset;
- Ensure the right implementation of the national law/procedures related to the operational activities;
- Support the communication between the LCC/ICC and the asset;
- Propose and prepare combined patrolling schedules;
- Support the proper implementation of information gathering, sharing and dissemination as well as the reporting system;
- Support the CO to ensure the efficient implementation of the operational developments;
- Provide support and cooperate with the national maritime and civil aviation authorities;
- Support in finding solutions on the technical challenges arising during the deployments of assets;
- Work closely and follow instructions of the LCC/ICC Coordinator.

Local staff of the host MS

The experts/assets deployed will be supported by the local staff of different authorities of the host MS during their deployments.

The national authorities of the host MS, have the leading role in the implementation of the operational activities. The participants shall support and, based on their mandate, carry out measures in line and in agreement with the local staff.

The basic tasks of local staff are according to the relevant national law and internal regulations of the national authorities, but additionally they should:

- Cooperate closely and support the participants of the JO to carry out their tasks.
- Be familiar with the Operational Plan and the tasks assigned to the local level;

Based on the operational needs and an agreement between the host MS and Frontex, additional staff of different authorities of the host MS with specific skills and expertise could be deployed to the ICC, LCC or operational area in order to increase the operational capacity and support the participants.

Frontex

Operational Manager and Operational Team

The Operational Team is composed of Operational Manager (OM) and Operational Team Members assigned for the management and coordination of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise.

The OM is responsible for the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise acting as the Frontex representative for the defined activity. The OM will be supported by assigned specialized staff from the relevant Frontex units/sectors forming the Operational Team. The OM is responsible for distribution of tasks between the team members and their proper management, whereas the responsibility for the operation remains within the OM.

The OM shall:

- Coordinate the planning, implementation including reporting and evaluation of the operational activity;
- Prepare the relevant Rapid Border Intervention Exercise related documentation;
- Ensure the professional maintenance and an archiving system of the operational documentation in line with Frontex standards;
- Draft a proposal for the Operational Plan in accordance to the Standard Operational Procedure (SOP), in cooperation and agreement with the host MS and consultation with home MS,, for the defined operational activity ;
- Follow the latest developments of the operation, and propose/initiate the updates /amendments of the Operational Plan, if needed;
- Gather, store and analyse an information received from the different sources;
- Facilitate the cooperation with other units/sectors, the MS and third countries;
- Facilitate cooperation with other EU agencies, bodies and international organizations taking part in the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise;
- Follow instructions received from line managers and keep them informed about the implementation of assigned tasks;

Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)

The role of the FCO is to foster cooperation and coordination amongst host and participating MS. The nominated FCO, as the Frontex representative, is responsible to provide the host and participating MS with all the relevant information related to the Frontex co-financed activities in the framework of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise. The FCO shall act on behalf of Frontex in all aspects of the deployment of the teams.

The FCO shall:

- Act as an interface between Frontex and the host MS;
- Act as an interface between Frontex and the members of the teams, providing assistance, on behalf of the Agency, on all issues relating to the conditions of their deployment;
- Monitor the correct implementation of the operational plan;
- Report to Frontex on all aspects of the deployment of the teams.

The FCO may be authorized by the ED to assist in resolving any disagreement on the execution of the Operational Plan and deployment of the teams.

Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)

The FOC is permanently deployed throughout the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise in the ICC or at the location wherefrom the most efficient coordination can be accomplished.

The FOC shall:

- Monitor and facilitate the implementation of the operational activities as defined in the Operational Plan;
- Initiate adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures when justified by updated threat and risk assessment, and/or operational needs;
- Be present in the JCB meetings, and give advice, particularly to the ICC Coordinator and the NO;
- Monitor the operational situation to ensure the efficient implementation and promote the further organizational and operational developments;
- Monitor and facilitate the information gathering, sharing and dissemination process as well as the functioning of the reporting system;
- Provide Frontex HQ with daily situation reports from the operational area and specific reports on cases which need immediate attention, further reporting and handling;
- Work closely with and be accessible for the ICC Coordinator;
- Work closely with, follow instructions from and be accessible for the OM and Frontex HQ.

Frontex Support Officer (FSO)

The FCO and/or FOC can be assisted by the FSO acting as the Frontex representative and deployed at the operational locations wherefrom the most efficient support can be accomplished on local level, to ensure the efficient implementation of the operational activities by supporting the LCC Coordinator, the deployed resources and promoting further developments.

The FSO shall:

- Support and monitor the proper implementation of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise as described in the Operational Plan;
- Support and initiate adjustments of the operational concept and working procedures, when justified by updated risk assessment and/or by operational needs;
- Support the monitoring and facilitate the proper implementation of the information gathering, sharing and dissemination and the related reporting system;
- Provide FCO and/or FOC with daily reports/updates from the respective operational area;
- Work closely with and follow instructions from the FCO and/or FOC and the OM.

Operational Analyst (OA)

Frontex shall appoint at least one OA to assess constantly relevant information from all available sources and maintain close contacts with the FLO (if applicable) for the gathering of relevant information for risk analysis. The OA shall produce regular analytical assessments related to the operational activities enabling a wider vision on the risks, threats and overall situation affecting the operational area, supporting decision making on proper operational responses both for the hosting authorities and Frontex. In addition, the OA will contribute by providing analytical input to the preparation and the evaluation of the operation.

The OA will generate intelligence requirements for JDT for the gathering of tailored information from migrants.

The OA shall:

- Be responsible for the creation and update of the Incident Template in JORA related to the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise, including marking/unmarking the mandatory fields and draft the Specific Annex of the Operational Plan describing the indicators of the JORA Template;
- Provide guidelines and briefing for the reporting officers involved in JORA reporting and validating;
- Produce analytical assessments, on a weekly or/and bi-weekly or/and monthly and ad-hoc basis, of the given situation of the operational areas and beyond to be distributed to the Operational Team, and via the FOC to the ICC and home MS;

- Provide feedback and guidelines to the JDT on the quality and content of the interview /debriefing/ screening reports and maintain regularly direct contacts with the JDT;
- Monitor the activities of JDTs in the operational area and make proposals for redeployment or changes in relation to the JDT activities when needed based on the operational situation;
- The OA will brief and debrief the Debriefing Experts;
- Provide the FCO and/or FOC with the analytical support needed for the ongoing reporting;
- Give the OM, the FCO, the FOC and the ICC advice and/or proposals on the planning of operational activities in the predefined operational areas and recommend countermeasures to the authorities encouraging a dynamic approach to the situation;
- Contribute with analytical input through the Tactical Focussed Assessment for the purposes of the drafting of the Operational Plan and to the Frontex Evaluation Report (FER) after the termination of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise;
- Be constantly linked with and report to the OM, the FCO, the FOC and the experts regarding intelligence matters.

Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)

Detailed information on the roles, tasks, functioning of FSC and its related products (JORA, FOSS) is provided in this document and in the relevant Specific Annexes.

Situation monitoring – information processing – reporting

The FSC:

- provides a constantly updated picture of the migration situation at the external borders of the EU, with a particular focus on security and irregular migration aspects, as near to real-time as possible;
- carries out situation monitoring;
- carries out validation of incidents reported in the frame of Rapid Border Intervention Exercise;
- maintains situational awareness;
- provides a first response in case of crisis or emergency situations that may occur during the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise;
- acts as the central point of contact for all operational information that have a direct impact on the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise;
- carries out operational media monitoring in open and in grey sources.

More specifically, the FSC is responsible for:

- providing reports showing the figures/data of the JO enriched with additional information from other sources, if available and applicable; the reports shall be uploaded to FOSS and Eurosur;
- collecting and disseminating information related to issues needing specific attention (Serious Incident Reports);
- collecting Document Alerts on false/falsified documents and new modi operandi, and uploading them to FOSS;
- keeping Frontex management and MS updated concerning the situation;
- monitoring the exchange of information and collecting experience in order to provide improved services and products when appropriate;
- Establish communication with the representatives of other EU bodies and international organisations implementing activities in the operational area.

Senior Duty Officer (SDO) Service in FSC

As the central point of contact the FSC provides a 12/7 Senior Duty Officer Service between 08.00 and 20.00 CET. Additionally, the FSC provides a 24/7 on call availability for emergency and crises situations as well as for serious incidents reporting according to the Serious Incident Catalogue.

Deployed Support Officers to FSC

Officers from EU MS are sent to FSC as 'FSC Support Officers' in order to support the SDO in

- validating and processing the reported incidents through JORA

- supporting FSC's situation monitoring processes through JORA/EUROSUR
- ensuring information exchange through FOSS.

The responsibility for the FSC Support Officer remains with the FSC Senior Duty Officer and the Senior Incident Validator.

FSC roles concerning Frontex One Stop Shop (FOSS)

In order to enrich situational awareness and share operational-related information, the FOSS (<https://foss.frontex.europa.eu>) portal is used. More detailed information on FOSS is available under chapter 9 of this document, and in the relevant Specific Annex of the Operational Plan.

FSC roles and responsibilities concerning JORA

The Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) is a framework for operational information exchange, including an IT software system that provides Frontex and its internal and external stakeholders (Member States, other respective external stakeholder) with the capability of sending, verifying, retrieving, visualizing and, in general, managing operational-related data during the entire cycle of the operations coordinated by Frontex. The JORA system is constructed in modules with different capabilities and is continuously developed according to the operational reporting needs.

With reference to the incident reporting for this operation, the Incident Template guidelines shall be made available in FOSS (Operational Activity area).

Training Unit (TRU)

The Frontex Training Unit (TRU) supports the JOU in preparing the material for the briefings in order to ensure that all deployed staff will receive the necessary knowledge regarding Fundamental Rights, access to International Protection, the fight against THB, etc.

Specific EBCGT Profile trainings, as for Debriefing, Screening and Second-line Interview Experts already in place, will be further developed and offered exclusively for EBCGT pool members in order to harmonize knowledge, skills and competences where appropriate. This will ensure, in mid and long term perspective, the promotion of Fundamental Rights under the scope of the specific EBCGT job-competences (in alignment with stipulated EBCGT Profiles) and will further improve the quality of operational activities under Frontex umbrella.

A constantly updated evaluation between operational activities and training is necessary in order to react immediately to latest trends of cross-border crime and to detect training gaps.

The participation in EBCGT training will be documented by TRU via the Opera system.

Frontex REX team (PRU)

- Contribute to the planning and implementation of the activity acting as the contact point between the involved Frontex and HMS entities and coordinating the preparations of the implementation phase,
- Monitor the implementation of the rapid reaction mechanism (in terms of deadlines, procedures, communication etc.),
- Cooperate with the OT for the preparation of the resources needs and addresses MS/SAC with targeted calls for the operational resources,
- Collect feedback from the participating MS and Frontex entities regarding implementation of the rapid reaction mechanism,
- Are responsible for Frontex' financial contribution to the defined activity, ensure the budget and make sure that the administrative and financial procedures are followed;
- Follow up the operational budget consumption and management of the available funds;
- Act as an interface between Frontex and the participating MS as regards financing of the deployments and practical arrangements related to the activation of the rapid reaction pools;
- Prepare an Evolutional Report from implementation of REX (to the operational Evaluation Report).

ANNEX 11 - CONTACT DETAILS

1. Bulgaria

ICC	Name	Contacts
Head of ICC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
ICC Coordinator Bulgaria	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Proxy	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Operational Coordinator	Present on rotation base	
Contact person for reporting	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Contact point in ICC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NFPoC Bulgaria	Name	Contacts
Head of NFPoC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NFPoC Staff	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A13]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

In addition, the non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Hristo		
Contact Person for Press issues		
	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC		
LCC Coordinator		
Debriefing Coordinator		
Contact person for reporting		
Local Coordinator in BCU		
Local Coordinator in BCU		
Contact point for logistics		
	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC		
LCC Coordinator	Duty Officer	
Contact person for reporting	Duty Officer NCC	

Commented [A14]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

In addition, the non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Local Coordinator in FP Varna Port		
Local Coordinator in FP		
	Name	Contacts
Head of LCC		
LCC Coordinator (BCU)		
Contact person for reporting		
Contact Point (BCU)		
Contact point for logistics		

Commented [A15]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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2. Frontex Headquarters

	Name	Contacts
Executive advisor		
Press Office	Name	Contacts
Frontex Spokesperson	Ewa Moncure	Ewa.Moncure@frontex.europa.eu +48 22 205 9635 Office +48 785 001 374 Mobile
Frontex Spokesperson	Izabella Cooper	Izabella.Cooper@frontex.europa.eu +48 22 205 9535 Office +48 667667292 Mobile
Operational Team	Name	Contacts

Frontex Coordinating Officer (LBS)	Alessandro Signoriello	
Frontex Coordinating Officer (LBS)		
Frontex Coordinating Officer (ABS)		
Frontex Coordinating Officer (SBS)		
Operational Manager (LBS)		
Operational Team Member (ABS)		
Operational team member (SBS)		
Operational team member (SBS)		
Operational Analyst		
Operational Team Member		
Operational Team Member		
Frontex Situation Centre		
	Name	Contacts
Senior Duty Officer		
FOSS Service Manager		
REX 2017 Team		
	Name	Contacts
Activity Manager	Urszula	

Commented [A16]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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REX 2017 Team Member		
REX 2017 Team Member		

REMARK:

Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the Rapid Border Intervention Exercise do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

ANNEX 12 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
JORA Administrator / Service Management	Ioana [REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Eurosur Fusion Services / Service Desk	[REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Template Creator	[REDACTED]	FX	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A18]: The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

In addition, the non-disclosed text contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials within the joint operation. Their disclosure could lead to possible abusive usage with a view to jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations and thus facilitating irregular migration and affecting public security. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

1.1. Bulgaria

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]


NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

JORA Reporting Structure

Incidents reporting structure

The JORA incident reporting structure will follow the Command and Control Structure as defined in the Operational Plan

JORA Reporting Timeline




Commented [A19]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operations and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

BULGARIA

Location:


The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Location:



BCU [REDACTED]

Location: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]
Location: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Commented [A21]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.
The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings.
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The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Contact [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A22]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4th [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A23]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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The

Address

At

Commented [A24]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BCU [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] de-identified
[REDACTED] personal data

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A25]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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[15] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

LCC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A26]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.
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is situated

1. Focal Point

	Focal Point	
Address		
GPS Coordinates		
Altitude		
General Contact Details		
Focal Point type		
Number of lanes, entry		
Number of lanes, exit		
Local Coordinator-contact details		

In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the name of an individual. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

68/82

	ucata
Focal Point Office equipment	
Focal Point equipment	
Requirements	
Recommended airport and public transportation	

Commented [A29]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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Note: At

2. Focal Point

	Focal Point
Address	
GPS Coordinates	
Altitude	
General Contact Details	
Focal Point type	
Number of lanes, entry	
Number of lanes, exit	
Local Coordinator-contact details	
Focal Point Office equipment	
Focal Point equipment	
Requirements	
Recommended airport and public transportation	

	Public
--	--------

Note: At

Public

3. Focal Point

	Focal Point
Address	
GPS Coordinates	
Altitude	
General Contact Details	
Focal Point type	
Number of lanes, entry	
Number of lanes, exit	
Local Coordinator-contact details	
Focal Point Office equipment	
Focal Point equipment	
Requirements	
Recommended airport and public transportation	

Commented [A30]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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4. Focal Point

	Focal Point
Address	
GPS Coordinates	
Altitude	
General Contact Details	
Focal Point type	
Number of lanes, entry	

IST

It is considered that

Text is not disclosed pursuant to

BCP

It is considered that

It is usual that

Commented [A32]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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mail: get2ad/1hwy38f0uaw_ba

Commented [A33]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the location of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas.

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BCP

The most flights at

In addition to the above mentioned

Also

Usually



ANNEX 14 - ACCOMMODATION

BULGARIA

name	Recommended hotels	Single room rate	Recommended airport	Transportation (yes or no)
BCU [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO

Commented [A34]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the health and safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>		[REDACTED]	NO
[REDACTED]	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>		[REDACTED]	NO

	[REDACTED]		-	NO
	[REDACTED]			
	[REDACTED]		-	
	[REDACTED]			
	[REDACTED]		-	
	[REDACTED]			
	[REDACTED]			
	[REDACTED]			NO

PRACTICAL INFORMATION FOR BULGARIA

- Chief Directorate Border Police – Headquarters


Address: "Maria Louisa" Blvd., 46. Sofia 1202, Bulgaria

Link:

<https://maps.google.bg/maps?q=%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%BB,%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F+%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%46&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=0x04aa8566f25c8dbd:0xd35f75a946ac0fb7,bulevard+%22Knyaginya+Maria+Luiza%22+46,+1202+Sofia&gl=bg&ei=6VIDUuiPMoblswbahoHIA&ved=0CCcQ8gEwAA>

- Transport

For your comfort and safety, we recommend that you take a taxi at the designated taxi stands in front of the western exits from Arrivals at Terminal 2:



Alternatively, you could request a taxi at the desks of the taxi companies, which are located in the Arrival hall of the terminal.

Contacts:

"OK Supertrans" AD (+359 2) 973 21 21

OK СУПЕРТРАНС
OK
9732121



Whatever means of transport you choose, it is very advisable to have cash Bulgarian Lev (BGN) to pay with. The price per kilometer varies between 0.79 and 0.90 BGN which is 0.40 - 0.50 EUR, and the price for 1 minute idle time is 0.22 BGN. The amount from Sofia Airport to the city center should be 15 to 20 BGN (7 to 10 EUR) depending on the traffic. ATM machines may be found upon your arrival at Terminal 2 at the Public area hall (see the map below). Always check the prices per kilometer due to the fact that there are taxi companies with similar logos but much more different prices. You can find prices per kilometer on a sticker at the right lower corner of the front window (picture1).

Picture 1



The Currency exchange desk is situated in the Arrival Hall however we do not recommend you to exchange big amounts of money. There are also 2 ATM machines. Official exchange rate is 1.95583 BGN for 1 EURO. Normally the exchange rate should be between 1, 92-1, 95 BGN

If you choose the public transport, more details you could find on the airport web site: <http://www.sofia-airport.bg/en/passengers/and-airport/public-transport>.

ANNEX 15 - MARITIME INCIDENT REPORT TEMPLATE



Asset or Foreign organization Logo

MARITIME INCIDENT REPORT

1. Basic Information

Asset Name					
Organization					
Date/position of first indication					
Date/position of interception					
Date/position of rescue					
SAR Authority/Other Assets Involved					
Weather conditions					
Type of Boat Intercepted					
Boat after interception					
Engine Data/Characteristics					
Migrants on board	Bracelet Color	TOTAL	Men	Women	Minor
Claimed Nationalities					

Suspected facilitators nationalities	
Departure Country/Place/Date	

2. Description of the event

3. Evidence collected, facilitators identified, possible testimonies.

Asset or Foreign organization Logo

4. Photos of the event

5. List of objects/documents provided to local authorities upon arrival

Fill-in instruction

Headline #1 is intended to contain minimum required information, any other relevant detailed not originally contained in the initial template can be added in headline #6.

² *Description of the event, information taken on the spot (SAR operations, route followed by migrant vessel, modus operandi, place and time of departure)*

³ *Comments about boat/s used, evidences detected inside the migrants vessel, facilitators identified, people willing to cooperate with local authorities, etc. Always use bracelet number to identify migrants of interest.*

⁴ *Attach relevant picture of the event with a description.*

⁵ *List here objects, document or any other kind of enclosure to this report delivered to local authorities upon disembarkation (GPS, satellite phone, passport, CD with pics, etc).*

⁶ *Use this headline to add any other relevant information.*