

OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
LAND BORDERS SECTOR

Operational Plan

JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 land on
border surveillance
2016/LBS/01

Prepared by

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Signature

Operational Manager

Approved by

.....
Signature

Berndt Körner

Deputy Executive Director

AMENDMENT No. 2 as of ____ June 2016

Commented [A1]: The blanked out part contains personal data. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents.



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JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 land on border surveillance

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Operational Plan has been agreed with the authorities of the host Member State¹, in consultation with the authorities of the home Member States participating in the joint operation coordinated by Frontex. It covers all necessary elements for a proper and timely organization of the joint operation coordinated by Frontex.

The Operational Plan is composed of the Main part, General and Specific Annex to the Operational Plan. The Main part and its Annex are an integral part of the Operational Plan, having the same importance and legal binding character.

The Main part and Specific Annex of the Operational Plan contain detailed and specific information related to the particular joint operation, while the General Annex enclose operational information applicable to all joint land borders operations. Annex complement the Main part of the Operational Plan by providing complete and comprehensive description of the implementation of the joint operation.

The Main part and Specific Annex of Operational Plan are marked as "Limited" without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, while the General Annex to the Operational Plan have no classification mark indicated.

Operational Plan shall only be made available to the authorities referred in each MS as "Law Enforcement". This document shall be made available to other interested parties only on a need-to-know basis and in accordance with European and national rules on the protection of sensitive/classified information. Such dissemination of this document shall be done only on a case-by-case basis.

This Operational Plan may be revised at any time in order to correspond with the new operational developments. In accordance with Article 3a (2) of Frontex Regulation, any amendments to or adaptations of the Operational Plan require the agreement of the Frontex Executive Director and the host MS. A copy of the amended Operational Plan shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the participating MS via FOSS.

The Legal framework of Frontex, Fundamental rights in Frontex coordinated activities and Code of conduct can be found in the General Annex.

2. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

2.1. South-eastern land borders

The Eastern Mediterranean continued to be one of the most important regions for the entry of irregular migrants to the EU, mostly connected with illegal border-crossings from Turkey to Greece (sea and land borders) and Bulgaria (land border).

According to data reported in JORA in 2015, from 1 January until 31 December [REDACTED], a total of 9 250 irregular migrants were reported for crossing the border illegally (5 758 migrants in the Bulgarian operational area and 3 492 migrants in the Greek operational area), which represents an increase of 68% compared to the same period in 2014, when 5 505 irregular migrants were reported.

Commented [A2]: The blanked out text contains detailed information regarding the operational area. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials operating in the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations taking place in the same area, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

¹ For the purposes of the present document, the term "Member State" includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union.

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Of the total number of irregular migrant apprehensions at the land borders in the operational area during the aforementioned period, 62% were reported at the **Bulgarian-Turkish** border, while only 38% were reported at the **Greek-Turkish** border.

However, although the irregular migratory flow increased in the operational area, an even more significant increase in migration pressure was reported at the Greek sea borders with Turkey. From 1 January to 31 December 2015, a total of **858 752** migrants were apprehended by the Greek authorities compared with **47 738** during the same period in 2014.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A3]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

In regard with the Bulgarian Serbian border, from 1 Jan to 31 October 2015, a total of 8 608 irregular migrants were apprehended by the Bulgarian Border Police on exit at their common land border with Serbia according to data provided by the **Bulgarian Border Police Directorate**. During the same period in 2014, the number of irregular migrant apprehensions on exit was 2 191 which represents an increase of 292% in the period under consideration.

2.2. Western Balkans

The number of migrant apprehensions registered from January to 31 December 2015 (764 038) at the EU's external land borders with the Western Balkans broke all records in terms of the number of illegal border-crossings in any given year since Frontex data collection started in 2008.

[REDACTED] Virtually, the number of migrant apprehensions registered at the Hungarian and Croatian borders with Serbia during the period between January and 31 December 2015 was more than ten times higher than the total number of migrants detected during the period 2008 - 2014 at these border sections.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A4]: The non-disclosed text pertains to detailed information crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the EU which is used for risk analysis and in turn, operational decision making by the Agency. Disclosing this information publicly will disturb the effectiveness of Frontex operations as the risk analysis based on this information and used by Frontex to run its operations, would become common knowledge rather than intelligence to combat crime and prevent illegal cross-border activity. If this information would become public the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities would be undermined. Furthermore, there is a real risk that disclosing all the variables and the information therein would benefit the smuggling networks who would change their modus operandi accordingly, thus putting the life of migrants in danger. The disclosure of those variables is therefore refused, as it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The main nationalities of migrants detected for illegal border-crossings from January to 31 December 2015 at the Hungarian and Croatian borders with Serbia were:

- 'Not specified' 556 258²
- 90 053 Syrian
- 53 237 Afghan
- 23 755 Kosovo citizens
- 17 054 Pakistani
- 7 420 Iraqi.

² These persons were detected at the Croatian border with Serbia and were not screened after apprehensions and they were only reported numerically without nationality.

The thorough assessment of the situation can be found in the Annex 1.

3. OPERATIONAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES

3.1. Operational aim

The operational aim of the joint operation is to implement coordinated operational activities at the EU external land borders in order to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the MS of the European Union (EU) and to tackle cross border crime.

The operational aims will be implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, the respect for fundamental rights in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum.

3.2. Operational objectives

- Enhance border security
- Enhance operational cooperation
- Enhance exchange of information
- Identify possible risks and threats
- Establish and exchange best practices

The main objectives of joint operation will be achieved by combining different type of operational activities, particularly: border surveillance, intelligence gathering (debriefing) and screening activities.

Core idea of the JO Flexible Operational Activities 2016 land on border surveillance is to ensure the appropriate operational response in tackling the situation of irregular migration at the most affected areas of the external land borders with a desired prevention effect.

3.3. Synergy with JO Focal Points 2016 land

JO FOA 2016 land on border surveillance is interconnected with JO Focal Points 2016 land. The latter focuses on the control of clandestine entry at the Border Crossing Points.

In accordance with the supportive role of Focal Points to all joint activities coordinated by Frontex, the officers deployed to Focal Points complement JO FOA 2016 land on border surveillance with border checks and intelligence gathering activities.

The core idea of the JO Focal Point 2016 Land is to facilitate the implementation of the Integrated Border Management concept at the EU external borders by establishing a permanent Focal Points system at the hot spots and using them as a platform for joint operations and information gathering.

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Commented [A6]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the operational area and the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

3.4. Vega Children - Land Borders

With the aim to support Border Guards with practical indications on how to effectively identify children in need of protection, the Vega Children Handbook for Land Borders Operations is going to be developed in cooperation with the Host MSs and other relevant stakeholders and used within the framework of Land Borders joint operations and pilot projects in 2016, based on the best practices already experienced in Air Borders in relation to the "VEGA Children Handbook". When finalized during Land Borders Sector Host Country Network Conference, the implementation will start in the ongoing joint operation.

The detailed information regarding operational objectives and indicators is provided in Annex 2.

4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The activities during the operation include deployment of technical and human resources in order to:

- Provide support to local authorities in border surveillance activities at land borders;
- Support debriefing activities in order to collect information for risk analysis purposes;
- Assist the screening of irregular migrants;
- Harmonise the deployment of debriefing and screening teams at each location in order to achieve the upmost effectiveness;
- Share experiences and exchange expertise as well as to constantly update knowledge on the illegal migration trends in order to adopt countermeasures to tackle the phenomena;
- Collect and assess information in order to improve the detection of human smuggling and trafficking in human beings facilitation by individuals and/or criminal networks and assist wherever possible identification and detention of facilitators;
- Provide a clear and updated situational picture concerning the operational areas, modus operandi, main trends and possible rapid changes in this respect;
- Carry out daily and ad-hoc exchange of information between Frontex and all operational actors and structures involved;
- Promote the inter-agency cooperation and cooperation with other international and EU bodies and Third Countries.

The detailed operational concept and Guidelines for debriefing and screening activities are defined in the General Annex.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. Period of implementation³

Commencement	3 February 2016	00:00 (local time)
Termination	7 December 2016	24:00 (local time)

5.2. Additional information

Operational period	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI
Travel day	02-Feb	01-Mar	29-Mar	26-Apr	24-May	21-Jun	19-Jul	16-Aug	13-Sep	11-Oct	08-Nov
Operational briefing	03-Feb	02-Mar	30-Mar	27-Apr	25-May	22-Jun	20-Jul	17-Aug	14-Sep	12-Oct	09-Nov

³ Foreseeable duration of the joint operation as indicated in the Article 3a (1) (b)- of the Frontex Regulation.

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Operational days	03-Feb	02-Mar	30-Mar	27-Apr	25-May	22-Jun	20-Jul	17-Aug	14-Sep	12-Oct	09-Nov
	02-Mar	30-Mar	27-Apr	25-May	22-Jun	20-Jul	17-Aug	14-Sep	12-Oct	09-Nov	07-Dec
Debriefing	02-Mar	30-Mar	27-Apr	25-May	22-Jun	20-Jul	17-Aug	14-Sep	12-Oct	09-Nov	07-Dec
Travel day	03-Mar	31-Mar	28-Apr	26-May	23-Jun	21-Jul	18-Aug	15-Sep	13-Oct	10-Nov	08-Dec

5.3. Operational areas⁴

The operational activities will be implemented in three separate locations, at South Eastern external land borders and Western Balkan area; an International Coordination Centre will be established for each of the two areas. The location of the ICC can be changed according to the operational needs with the agreement of the Host MS.

5.3.1. South Eastern external land borders

International Coordination Centre (ICC SE)

The ICC SE will be established in [REDACTED]

- At [REDACTED]
- Local Coordination Centre (LCC) [REDACTED]
 - o Border Control Unit (BCU) [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]

- At [REDACTED]
- LCC [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]

- At [REDACTED]
- LCC [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]

*MSs Experts in [REDACTED]

Commented [A7]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the operational area. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials operating/patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

5.3.2. Western Balkans area

International Coordination Centre (ICC WB)

The ICC WB will be established in [REDACTED]

- At [REDACTED]
- Local Coordination Centre (LCC) [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]
 - o BCU [REDACTED]

⁴ Geographical area of the joint operation as indicated in Article 3a (1) (c) of the Frontex Regulation

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At [REDACTED]
Local Coordination Centre (LCC) [REDACTED]
o BCU [REDACTED]
o BCU [REDACTED]
o BCU [REDACTED]
o BCU [REDACTED]
Local Coordination Centre (LCC) [REDACTED]
o BCU [REDACTED]
o BCU [REDACTED]

Commented [A8]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the operational area. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

5.4. Initial participants

Host MS	Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary
Home MS	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom
Third countries	Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine
Other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations	EUROPOL, EASO

5.5. Operational briefings / debriefings

All participants taking part in joint operation will receive the Operational briefing and debriefing delivered by representatives of Frontex and national authorities of host MS.

The detailed information regarding operational areas, initial plan of deployed resources and operational briefing and debriefing is provided in Annex 4-6.

The standard plan of operational briefing and debriefing is available in the General Annex.

6. Cooperation with Third Countries, other Union agencies and bodies or International Organizations

6.1. Cooperation with third countries

Observers from third countries may only advise the guest officers and officers from the border guard services of the host MSs. The main goals of their participation are exchange of experience and obtaining practical experience in implementation of Schengen Border Code.

The more detailed information regarding the participation and tasks of Third Country Observers in joint operation is defined in Annex 7.

6.2. Cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations

During the joint operation cooperation with EUROPOL and EASO will be established.

More detailed information about cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations within land border activity is provided in Annex 8.

7. COORDINATION STRUCTURE

7.1. Partnership

Frontex is the EU coordinator, initiating, promoting and facilitating the EU MS synchronized efforts to control the external borders.

The local authorities are the direct partners of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the joint operation.

The home MSs will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations in particular periods of time.

7.2. Main operational structures / actors and their tasks

7.2.1. Member States

- International Coordination Centre (ICC)
- Head of ICC
- ICC Coordinator
- Joint Coordinating Board (JCB) - ICC Coordinator, NO, FOC, etc.
- National Official (NO) - Officers of home MS deploying aerial assets (*if applicable*)
- Intelligence Officer (IO)
- Experts - GO, SGO, Officers of the host MS, EU experts⁵
- Interpreters/Cultural Mediators
- Local Coordination Centre (LCC)
- Head of LCC
- LCC Coordinator
- FSO Operational
- Debriefing Coordinator
- Team Leader
- Liaison Officer (LO) - (*if applicable*)
- Guest Officers
- Local staff of the hosting MSs

7.2.2. Third Country

- Advisors/Third country observer

7.2.3. Frontex

- Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)
- Operational Manager (OM) and Operational Team (OT)
- Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)
- Frontex Support Officer (FSO)
- Operational Analyst (OA)
- Special Adviser for Debriefing Activities
- Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)
 - Senior Duty Officer (SDO)
 - Frontex Support Officer (FSO FSC)
 - FOSS Service Managers
 - JORA Service Managers

⁵ Definition applicable for officers deployed at Coordination Points

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- Frontex Liaison Office (Piraeus) (FLO)
- Training Unit (TRU)
- Pooled Resources Unit (PRU)

The tasks and roles of operational structures / actors are defined in the General Annex.

Description of the tasks and specific instructions to guest officers and other participants (Rules of engagement) are defined in Annex 3.

8. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING

8.1. Command and control

Operational command of aerial and terrestrial assets of the participating MS remains with the respective MS, while the tactical command of the assets is in the hands of the ICC after consultation with the National Officials (NO).

Command and control of GO, Interpreters / Cultural Mediators and Observers from Third countries remain with the competent national authority of the host MS.

SGO perform their tasks under the instructions from the border guards of the host MS, while their command and control is exercised by Frontex.

GO and SGO under FSO profile perform their tasks under the instructions and command and control of Frontex.

The general command and control provisions are defined in the General Annex.

Command and control scheme is defined in Annex 9.

Names of the host MS border guards and police responsible for cooperating with the teams, in particular those of the border guards/police who are in command of the teams during the period of deployment, and the place of the teams in the chain of command are included in Annex 11.

8.2. Operational communication

The operational communication between Frontex and all operational actors will be ensured via e-mail, cell and fixed line phones and videoconference as well as radio and satellite phones.

The information about joint operations (operational documents) will be accessible via FOSS.

Access

Detailed information about communication and FOSS is provided in the General Annex.

Contact details of participants can be found in Annex 11.

Commented [A9]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to certain instruments used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would jeopardize their work and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

8.3. Communication with Press

Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency, therefore, as a general rule, media should be granted access to operational areas.

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Guest officers are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers below. Each team member taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines.

A network of press offices of all involved authorities will be established and all contact details shall be sent to the press@frontex.europa.eu address. A compiled list will be distributed to all parties involved.

The communication strategy on the Border Control Operational Actions is common for Frontex and the Host Members States.

Host MSs may, depending on the needs, nominate Dedicated Press Officers (DPO) who will be entirely responsible for coordination of all matters related to interview requests, press visits to the operational area and any other press-related matter related to the implementation of the joint operation in general, as well as on the ground and they will work closely with the ICC Coordinators.

Press visits to the operational areas will be organised by Frontex and, depending on the area of interest, by the Host MSs authorities accordingly.

If press officer would like to visit the [REDACTED] section, one week is required for the [REDACTED] authorities to give all the necessary permissions.

Frontex communication policy, rules and guidelines for handling media requests are included in the General Annex.

The contact details of Frontex press office members (Spokesperson and Press Officer) and dedicated press officers of national authority of the host country are indicated in Annex 11.

8.4. Reporting

The examples of templates of all reports are provided in the General Annex. The templates in Word format are stored on FOSS.

8.4.1. Incidents reporting and JORA

All relevant incidents that have occurred within the joint operation shall be reported via JORA System.

Comprehensive information on JORA is provided in the General Annex.

The list of JORA actors, the incidents reporting structure and JORA incident template attributes list are described in Annex 10.

The JORA Guidelines are available in FOSS.

Eurosur Fusion Services

The Eurosur Fusion Services EFS (Geospatial Information Service, Meteo Service and Visual Data Discovery Service) are available for the Member States to support decision-making, planning and execution of missions. Services should support MSs and their existing systems to enhance their situational awareness and reaction capabilities of own assets and human resources.

Aligned with operational needs, these services are accessible via the Eurosur Network and the JORA Visualization Module. For more information, please send an e-mail to [REDACTED].

Commented [A10]: The non-disclosed text contains information regarding the operational area. Ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations of preceding years in the same geographical area. In this regard, disclosing the coordinates of the operational areas of previous years, would be tantamount to disclosing the current operational areas. The result of this will only be to hamper the course of the ongoing operations, by depriving them of any strategy and element of surprise during border surveillance, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border criminality as well as prevent unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regard to public security in the sense of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001.

Commented [A11]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

8.4.2 Reports from participants

Type of report	Description	Responsibility	To be sent to
DAILY REPORTING PACKAGE	ICC Daily report incl. JCB Minutes and Patrolling Schedule	ICC	Shall be sent via functional email to FSC with cc to operational team functional email [REDACTED] NFPOCs of Host MSs, LCCs and participants in the JCB meeting.
	Screening Reports	Screening experts via FSO ICC	Shall be sent via [REDACTED] and emails of respective LCCs
	Interviews	IO/TL/Debriefing Experts	
	Technical Equipment Mission Report	NO	
Operational Briefing	Report from National Briefer	National Briefer	Shall be sent to the Training Unit via email [REDACTED] within 5 days
JORA	Incident reports from Reporting Units	ICC	Shall be sent via the reporting application JORA, according to the reporting timetable in Annex 4
Operational reporting	Shift report	Guest Officer	Shall be sent to LCC FSO every day before 09:00
	Shift report of Focal Point Officer	Guest Officer deployed at Focal Point	Shall be sent to LCC FSO every day before 09:00

Commented [A12]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

8.4.3 Daily package

The daily package shall be prepared by the ICC FSO and shall consist of the reports indicated in the chapter above. The ICC is responsible for the dissemination of the daily package on a daily basis before 13.00 CET to Frontex (Operational Team and FSC) via functional emails [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

The daily package (filename: MS_YYYY MM DD.zip) should sent from official ICC address only.

8.4.4 Serious incident reporting

Type of report	Description	Responsibility
Serious Incident Report	A Serious Incident Report is an alert message that shall be reported immediately (within 2 hours after recognition) to FSC and the host MS' authorities in case an incident, natural or caused by human action, occurs which may affect, or be relevant to a particular Frontex activity, the safety and security of participants in Frontex activities, the Agency's mission and reputation, or any combination thereof, having special regard to any allegation of violation of Fundamental Rights.	All participants of the JO

Shall be sent immediately via functional [REDACTED]

Commented [A13]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The Initial SIR shall be drafted in close cooperation with the LCC Coordinator in order to ensure correct and accurate dissemination of information.

As of 2015 operations the formal SIR has been implemented in JORA and therefore should be reported via JORA according to the SIR procedure in the general annexes of the operational plan.

Serious Incidents Catalogue is available in the General Annex.

8.4.5 Frontex reports

Type of report	Description	Responsibility	To be sent
FOC Weekly Report	Overview of the operational activities related to previous week	FOC	Shall be sent to Frontex via functional [REDACTED]
Analytical Report	Analytical assessment of the factors impacting the situation in the operational area, trends, patterns, on bi-weekly basis	OA	BIWAR shall be sent by FSC to the following email addresses: [REDACTED] The ICC shall disseminate the WAR to the participants deployed in the operational area (experts, NO) and to the contacts of all authorities involved in the JO.
FSC Situational Report	Overview of the operational activities related to the 24-hour period of the preceding day	FSC SDO	Will be uploaded on FOSS under the responsibility of SDO to be accessible for MS and distributed to other stakeholders by email only in case they do not have access to FOSS

9. ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND LOGISTICS

9.1. Arrangements of deployed resources

9.1.1. Operational resources management system (OPERA)

The Operational resources management system (OPERA) is an integrated web-based system for the management of the operational resources pooled and deployed in Frontex coordinated activities. Information related to the availability and deployment of the resources is available in the application.

All information required for issuing accreditation cards for participants shall be introduced by participating MS via Opera.

More information about Opera is provided in the General Annex.

9.1.2. Composition of the teams of guest officers and deployment of other relevant staff

The deployed officer from the home MS will form joint teams with the officers of the host MS in line with Article 10(3) of the Frontex Regulation.

9.1.3. Technical equipment deployed by Member States

Technical equipment deployed by the MS in the operational areas to foster the border control activities may include Helicopters, Fixed Wing Airplanes (FWA), Thermo Vision Vans (TVV), patrol cars, Dog Teams and any other type of equipment agreed and confirmed by Frontex and the MS.

All the patrolling activities performed by the technical equipment deployed by the MS (for the border control activities related to the operational areas) are considered as a part of operational activities under the hereby Operational Plan, disregarding whether, or to what extent, they are financially covered by Frontex.

The technical equipment that is deployed by Frontex and by Member States in the area shall be used only for the achievement of the operational objectives of the current Operational Plan. During the operational briefing, Host MS authorities should provide the duty roster which is drafted with the agreement of the Operational Team. Any changes in the duty roster and the operational area will require the prior consultation and agreement of the Operational Team (i.e. change of deployment location of TVV).

9.1.4. Management of the operational assets deployed by Frontex

Pooled Resources and Joint Operations Units deal with the distribution and retrieval of operational assets in the operational areas, according to the procedures in place.

More information about arrangements of deployed resources and operational assets is available in the General Annex.

The initial plan of deployed resources is available in Annex 5.

All participants shall get familiar and apply the Tasks and specific instructions to guest officers and other participants (Rules of engagement) defined in Annex 3.

9.2. Transport and lodging

The use of rental car is to be approved in advance by the Operational Manager and expenses should be included in the relevant financial documents. In this case all practical/logistic issues should be arranged by participants themselves in advance.

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Hellenic authorities, upon request delivered by the home MS to the Operational Team and the NFPOC of Greece will provide transportation for the deployed experts upon the arrival and prior their departure from [REDACTED] airport.

Bulgarian Border Police will provide transportation to and from [REDACTED] in case of need, preliminary notification and upon agreement in advance. It applies solely for officers with service weapons. In other case, deployed experts will have to arrange their own transportation.

Information regarding accommodation can be found in Annex 12.

9.3. Field visits

Field visits of representatives of Home MSs are subject to approval of the Operational Manager and the Host MS. As a general rule, only up to two Home MS representatives should participate in the field visit.

Prior the deployment of aerial assets, it is recommended for home MS to perform a field visit in order to get familiar with the operational area, local authorities and other stakeholders. The field visit should be approved by the Operational Manager, Host MSs and agreed with the ICC Coordinator in advance.

9.4. Logistics

9.4.1. Heavy equipment, firearms and ammunition

Heavy equipment is highly recommended to be delivered on the day after operational briefing and shipped back on the day before debriefing day.

Delivery addresses and list of contact persons are included in Annex 11.

Information regarding transportation of firearms and ammunitions can be found in Annex 3.

9.4.2. Diplomatic clearance and Night flights under VFR ATC clearance

The home MS deploying aerial assets shall make the necessary arrangements in advance to obtain the Diplomatic clearance and Night flights under VFR ATC clearance (if required by the regulation of host MS) to allow the state aircraft to enter the airspace of host MS.

The home MS should respect the time needed for issuance of flight clearance according to national procedures and submit clearance request for the diplomatic clearance in time in order not to jeopardise the timely start of the mission.

10. EVALUATION

10.1. Member States and Third Countries

Reports	Benchmarks
Report from Participant	Shall be submitted to Frontex within 7 calendar days after deployment via functional email: [REDACTED] Relevant sections of the report will be distributed to TRU. <i>Template of the report is available on FOSS</i>
Final Report from Member State	Shall be submitted to Frontex attached to the request for payment via functional email: [REDACTED].
Final Report from Third Country	<i>Template of the reports is available on FOSS</i>

Commented [A14]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of transportation used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Commented [A15]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



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The final payment will not be processed until the Final Reports from MS and Third country are not submitted to Frontex. In case only up to two GO were deployed by home MS, Report from Participant may be sufficient.

10.2. Frontex

Reports	Benchmarks
Frontex Evaluation Report	The results of the joint operation will be evaluated and Frontex Evaluation Report (FER) will be transmitted within 60 calendar days after the termination of the JO to the Management Board together with the observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer referred to in Article 26a of the Frontex Regulation. FER will be uploaded on FOSS.

11. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

In accordance with the decision of the Frontex Executive Director, Frontex will co-finance the joint operation. Frontex will reimburse eligible costs incurred by participating MS authorities in relation to deployments of human and technical resources provided that the Framework Partnership Agreement is in force.

Detailed financial provisions are described in the General Annex.

ANNEX

Annex 1	Description and assessment of the situation
Annex 2	Operational objectives and indicators
Annex 3	Description of the tasks and specific instructions to guest officers and other participants (Rules of engagement)
Annex 4	Operational area
Annex 5	Initial plan of deployed resources
Annex 6	Operational briefing and debriefing
Annex 7	Cooperation with third countries
Annex 8	Cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations
Annex 9	Command and control scheme
Annex 10	JORA (JORA actors, JORA Incidents Reporting Structure, JORA Incident Template Attributes' List)
Annex 11	Contact details
Annex 12	Accommodation

