Ref. Ares(2016)5472981 - 21/09/2016
Meeting between ETNO and Commissioner OETTINGER
At the Cabinet on 6 September 2016
BASIS Request CAB 775
__________________________________________________________________
I. Scene setter
The European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) has 41 members
and observers from Europe and beyond are mostly incumbent operators that often also hold new
entrant positions outside their national markets.
Article 4(3)
Recently ETNO commissioned a study by Plum with recommendations for the review (DG
Connect had met their consultants in December).
Article 4(3)
ETNO views
Article 4(3)
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Article 4(3)
Objective(s):
Our Position
There is a very broad convergence of views on many key elements of the review, including
the connectivity ambition.
Stress the importance of regulatory framework providing the right incentives to rollout high-
capacity networks for all operators.
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II. Line to Take
Incentives for deployment and take-up of very high-capacity networks in competitive markets
To deliver appropriate incentives, the new telecom rules will require regulators, following
guidelines provided by BEREC, to map network investment intentions, enable public
authorities to seek investors in under-served areas, and empower regulators to act against
operators who deviate from their declared intentions in such areas.
The new telecom rules will prioritise network access remedies that directly support
competitive infrastructure deployment wherever feasible, and will reflect the retail
choices already available to end users.
The new telecom rules will establish predictable regulatory conditions to promote co-
investment and wholesale-only business models, facilitating deployment of very high-
capacity networks deeper into suburban and rural areas.
The new telecom rules will clarify that long-term instalment payments for connections
are consistent with end-user protection rules.
Spectrum rules for mobile connectivity and 5G
The new telecom rules will establish key principles for spectrum assignment in Europe,
new Union-level instruments to fix assignment deadlines and licence periods, and a peer
review among national regulators to ensure consistent assignment practices.
The new telecom rules will promote a consistent approach to coverage obligations, to
small-cell deployment and to network sharing, thereby stimulating 5G deployment and
rural connectivity.
The new telecom rules will facilitate spectrum sharing in 5G networks, and promote end-
user access to Wi-Fi-based connectivity.
Incentivising take-up through competitive markets, consumer choice and affordable tariffs
Very high-capacity networks only produce both a return on investment and wider
beneficial externalities if they are taken up by citizens and businesses. The new telecom
rules will modernise end-user switching rights, including for retail bundles.
The new telecom rules will ensure that vulnerable end-users have a right to an affordable
connectivity contract so that no one should be excluded from access to basic connectivity.
Rules adapted to new communications services and to the internal market, a governance model
that ensures regulatory stability and coherence.
The new telecom rules will secure a fair internal market through maximum
harmonization of the main sector-specific end-user rules, applicable as appropriate to
comparable services.
The new telecom rules will establish an efficient EU system of electronic
communications regulators, with common objectives of enhancing end-users' access to
and take-up of very-high capacity connectivity, of promoting a competitive internal
market and of safeguarding end-users' overall interests.
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Speaking points
General / Short Summary
We have been open and transparent regarding our ambitions and intentions. We are
keeping the competition focus and adjusting the framework to deal with the more diverse
situation faced not only at EU level, but at individual markets level.
We are putting an additional emphasis on competition to invest, ensuring that all market
actors have equal chances to invest.
For all of you who own your own networks, we will propose an important set of changes
that will reduce the need for access regulation, for example:
o
The new "retail competition first" principle will lead to less need for regulatory
intervention.
o
With commercial agreements you can now yourself reduce the need for regulatory
interventions.
o
Co-investment projects will be the sustainable route to be largely exempted from
regulations, and it will be your choice!
More generally, we seek recognition of what we call the 1-2-3 principle. While some
access regulation is normally necessary in monopoly situations, it should be excluded
when there are three. And when there are two, commercial access agreements will be
particularly important to determine whether regulation is necessary.
But even in areas where access regulation is still necessary, the burden is lowered, for
example:
o
Infrastructure mapping by NRA will lead to less national and more regionally
targeted regulation only where it is still necessary.
o
Regulated access to duct infrastructures will foster infrastructure competition,
NRAs will need to check whether any other form of access regulation is justified.
We also embed in the legislative proposal the principles of stable copper prices,
and of possible price flexibility for next generation networks provided an
economic replicability test can be met.
All this is of course with an very concrete and very important objective in mind, namely
to ensure that we achieve the connectivity that we need for the DSM.
I believe, here we are in agreement
Topic by topic with more details:
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Connectivity
Without connectivity there will be no DSM. It is a rather general consensus.
I do not think a hollow "competition versus investment" controversy is useful for a
debate. I want to underline that the framework is and will be based on competition law
principles. None of the ideas considered would work at the expense of competition.
However, there will be
no competition in places with where the number of very high
capacity networks is in fact zero. Such situations must be addressed by the framework
if we are serious about the DSM.
Business as usual will not achieve the DSM ambition. Rather than focusing exclusively
on access-based competition, emphasis is also needed on a regulatory model that gives
sufficient space to competition to invest.
Market Regulation, Competition & Investment
I am a strong supporter that competition is the main driver for investments and bringing
the best outcome for consumers.
As I said on many occasions - access regulation to dominant networks will remain a
central mechanism of the telecoms framework.
However, business as usual will not help to achieve the DSM ambition. Adaptations to
the regulatory model are needed if connectivity ambition is to be achieved.
Such adaptations should ensure that every market player would then have to have equal
chances to invest – or if necessary to co-invest – and those who take that chance should
then also get the benefit.
I am a strong believer in encouraging investment projects which are based on open, good
faith and reasonable co-investment offers, including a
possibility for all players to
participate.
This would ensure that
at least the current level of competition is kept when a new
high capacity network is build - by maintaining regulated access for broadband at the
level that was equivalent prior to the new investment.
However, I am of the view that investment projects which are based on open, good faith
and reasonable co-investment offers, should be
accompanied by nuanced regulation of
very high-capacity networks of dominant operators for a period reflecting the most acute
initial investment return risk. That way we keep the existing level of competition but also
ensure sufficient scope for return of investment incentivising new network deployment.
Spectrum
While connectivity is a central theme in the review process, network access is not the
only building block of the telecoms package. The building blocks of the package are not
self-standing topics - they are closely linked to the overall connectivity narrative.
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I want to build spectrum debate on a positive foundation and
Article 4(3)
Article 4(3)
getting Member States on board in terms of the overall
connectivity ambition will facilitate spectrum debate.
It is imperative to enhance spectrum management framework, especially as it is so
important for the success of ubiquitous connectivity.
There will be a need for a large bandwidth of radio spectrum to be used by 5G networks
for various purposes. I count on ETNO's continuous support in spectrum debate and in
outlining the role of wireless connectivity and its implications for the success of 5G in
Europe.
Services
High level consumer protection is a prerequisite for consumer confidence. This is best
achieved if we have a serious look of what is still sector specific, regulate that and leave
the rest for horizontal rules.
We just need to find for the right instruments in ensuring a continuous protection in light
of market and technological advancements.
We are screening carefully all the existing rules to avoid overlaps. Where horizontal rules
are enough, there is no need for sector specific rules.
On the other hand, we have to be clear that when the provision of services is depended on
public resources such as number, the use of these resources is subject to specific
conditions. Whoever uses those resources, be they telcos or OTTs, should be subject to
the same conditions.
But there may also be areas where current sector specific protections may need to be
extended to all new players.
It is this combination which ensures that equivalent services are treated in a similar
manner.
Thus clarification and simplification is expected in the area of services. We also need to
address the divergent rules at national level. The call for more harmonisation is well
founded in my view.
Sector governance
Changes to sector's governance will also be needed in order to support the substantive
adaptations to the framework.
We will need an efficient EU system of regulatory authorities to increase regulatory
predictability for market players. This would necessitate reinforcing the competences of
regulators and their capacity to act towards the single market in the European bodies.
BEREC must have a stronger basis and commitment to work towards the DSM.
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III. Defensives
How can access regulation incentivise investments in very high capacity networks? Should more focus
be put on the assessment of retail competition before regulating wholesale markets? Should
commercial agreement be taken into account in regulation?
Many factors impact investments and many of them, such as overall economic environment, GDP,
population density, have very little to do with regulation.
However, regulation also has an impact on the investment environment. The investment needed to
provide Europe with a future proof infrastructure for the digital age requires ensuring a sufficient
return for new investments relative to risks.
We need to increase certainty for investors. This involves setting the right conditions for investments
in high-capacity networks and reducing divergences between regulatory practices.
Regarding regulation of markets, we indeed should keep in mind that we ultimately regulate only to
address market failures with a view to assuring good level of end-user outcomes. Retail market may
be competitive without heavy regulatory intervention because of competing infrastructures.
Infrastructure-competition often also incentivises operators often to open their networks for third
parties. In this kind of settings indeed we should probably give more space for commercial access
agreements, with of course necessary ex post dispute resolution safeguards by NRAs. The emphasis
on addressing retail-level problems is already accepted practice by many NRAs, even if it is not
directly enshrined in the Framework. However, the emphasis needs to become more central to the
analysis, because the structure of networks and the dynamics of wholesale markets are becoming
increasingly varied and complex.
What is the preferred method to realise high capacity networks in (often rural) areas with one
infrastructure operator and no viable case for infrastructure competition? What innovative access
regulation models would you find acceptable in promoting investment in these areas?
To address the investment challenge we would start from the existing premise that competition is the
main driver for investments. Access regulation has allowed market entry and a healthy level of
competition, especially at retail level. However, more emphasis should be put on regulatory models
that give sufficient space to competition to invest rather than focusing primarily on ensuring access-
based competition. To achieve this we are considering a set of measures.
Our starting point is that public funds can help to reach some of the most remote areas with NGA
networks, but they cannot bridge the connectivity gap that we have in Europe. It is for market forces
to achieve the best possible network in each area.
Co-investments, provided they have the right conditions, can play an important role to ensure that the
risk is shared between operators, including for the riskiest investments, and that the deployment of
new infrastructure is not at the expense of end customer choice. We have seen examples in several
Member States, which are starting to reshape the structures of NGA networks.
In some circumstances, local initiatives aggregate demand and bring enhanced networks to areas
where the market has not delivered. If other operators move in to respond to their investment, their
business case may be fatally compromised. It may be necessary for legislation to intervene and place
some safeguards.
In order to target regulation to the needs of the most disadvantaged areas, national regulators must
have a clear picture of the reach and economic potential for the networks that are deployed within
their territory. For this reason, regulators' powers and role in mapping networks in the national
territory may need to be enhanced.
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Do you consider that a market structure with two or more fixed networks has a risk of causing
consumer harm (less investment, higher prices, lack of product innovation and choice) without some
form of access regulation? What access regulation model would you consider acceptable in these
markets? What are the conditions to be fulfilled (e.g. symmetry, regulatory certainty)? Could access
regulation bring risks to investment incentives in such markets?
In the EU, we started from monopolistic market structures in our sector. The fact that liberalisation
and regulation have led to oligopolistic market structures is already a great achievement for end users.
Infrastructure competition has a positive effect on investments. Where alternative infrastructures
compete for retail and sometimes wholesale customers, they have a greater incentive to improve the
quality and reach of their networks.
There is no magic number of infrastructures that makes a market effectively competitive, or not.
Oligopolies may or may not lead to consumer harm and to retail market problems. This depends on
many economic and technological factors, which can provide incentives for healthy competition, or
rather for the opposite.
The Framework already provides for a test to address a market with several network owners, in the
case where the conditions for tacit collusion, or joint dominance/SMP, are met. Further clarity could
be brought.
As to other situations, we have to protect market dynamics and end users, but also be mindful of the
risk of overregulation. Regulation should only intervene where it is necessary and appropriate,
because the connectivity goals in terms of quality, choice and price are not met for end-users.
For instance in those circumstances, ensuring access to non-replicable parts of the networks can be
key to maintain sustainable competition.
Sector specific regulation for communication services
Is there a political objective to review sector-specific rules for telecom services beyond a mere technical
analysis of overlap with general rules?
The objective of the revision of sector-specific end-user rights is two-fold. First, in REFIT we are
screening the scope for deregulation or adaptation either by concluding redundancy or recourse to
horizontal consumer protection legislation.
Second, we aim at addressing a level regulatory playing field between traditional electronic
communications services and functionally substitutable communications services provided by online
service providers (OTTs), in order to close gaps in the protection of end-users and foster fair
competition.
Which rights of users of communication services are insufficiently guaranteed by general rules and
therefore need sector-specific rules? Does that also apply in case communication services are supplied
by OTT players?
Our current assessment is that the level playing field and focused end-user protection is probably best
achieved by a targeted mix of deregulation and application of a key, but limited, set of sector-specific
rules to OTT communication services.
While the scope for deregulation is the subject of ongoing assessment, we have identified certain
areas where leaner provisions may be warranted.
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For instance we are now considering that provisions on contractual information and transparency
could potentially be limited to IAS only.
Furthermore, we aim at adapting the scope of beneficiaries to the objectives of the relevant provisions
in the Universal Service Directive. The experience shown that the level of protection needed by
(larger) business users is not the same as that of individual consumers and of small and micro
enterprises.
Sector specific rules for communication services appear necessary in areas where these services make
use of public resources such as numbers in the national numbering plan. Therefore provisions on
number portability, access to numbers or emergency calls appear still necessary. Also provisions on
security and confidentiality of communications appear necessary for public policy reasons. It may be
appropriate to apply those latter provisions also to OTT communications services.
Is it necessary and feasible to overhaul the structure of rules, for instance by distinguishing between
digital communication services (whether provided by telcos or OTTs) and communication networks?
Innovative online services ("over the top ('OTT') services") are increasingly relevant for the electronic
communications sector and perform a competitive constraint for traditional electronic
communications providers (e.g. VoIP and IP based-messaging make inroads into traditional revenue
streams such as voice and SMS). At the same time these novel services also boost demand for the
provision of data services.
The level playing field means different things to different stakeholders and the discussion often lacks
clarity. If there is understanding that similar rules should apply to equivalent services it is a
prerequisite to assess when different services are equivalent.
Sector-specific rules for Internet Access Services are largely accepted, divergences exist rather
regarding the exact scope of rights and obligations.
The question of equivalence when communications services are provided in addition to or over the
Internet Access is more complex.
If the provision of a service is dependent on the use of a public resource, such as numbers, in order to
ensure end-to-end connectivity there may be good, if not necessary reasons, to treat the service
differently from a service which is provided on a best effort basis without recourse to such public
resource. It is widely accepted that using public resources is subject to a number of conditions.
We acknowledge, however, that there are also public policy interest which may eventually require
applying certain regulatory obligations to all communications services regardless of the mode of
provision or whether they use public resources or not. Security of communications and confidentiality
of communications are examples of such public interests.
Author: Article 4(1)(b)
, CNECT B2, Article 4(1)(b)
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IV. Background
1. Telecom operators - IoT & new services (5G, spectrum, connectivity)
Article 4(3)
COM position:
Standardisation & Verticals: We share the view that continued efforts in the 5G-PPP will
facilitate economies of scale between different industries such as automotive, healthcare and
utilities. We are co-driving the 5GPPP in this direction.
Spectrum harmonisation: We share your position that appropriate spectrum is needed for
5G, to facilitate timely roll-out and maximise network investment. Where possible, it should
be harmonised spectrum. We expect a larger mix of licensed and unlicensed spectrum, and
this should partially answer the need for affordability that you expressed. We do not know
how much additional spectrum 5G requires. Focus is now on high frequencies (>24 GHz), but
also harmonised bands such as
700 MHz or 800 MHz are potential candidates).
On 5G timing: the common view is that
5G commercial services will start in 2020 (Japan
and Korea earlier, but will be 'faster phones', instead of truly new connectivity). Timing will
also depend on standardisation process.
2. Competition & long-term consumer welfare (broadband roll-out & services)
Article 4(3)
COM: We need significant investment in next generation networks. This requires ensuring a
sufficient return for new investments relative to risks, while maintaining effective competition.
Efficient investment refers to investment that responds to present and upcoming consumer
demand for higher speeds and better quality.
Effective competition drives investment and better market outcomes (e.g. prices, quality). In
competitive markets, operators are in a race to provide better and more affordable services. This
gives them an incentive to invest and innovate. Competition also facilitates consumer adoption of
new products.
We also need increased certainty for investors; by
setting the right conditions for investments and reducing divergences between regulatory
practices in different Member States,
while ensuring that "access seekers" have equivalent opportunities to invest in networks so
that competition is not compromised (i.e. co-deployment models).
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3. More space for innovation, specifically for EU telecoms
Article 4(3)
Article 4(3)
Article 4(3)
COM:
We are aware of the changing landscape in telecoms, especially the rise of ‘novel’/ Over-The-
Top (OTT) communications services. We are assessing the need for changes in the rules. We
want a level playing field and to address current and future problems for end-users, rather
than those associated with past business models.
For consumers, technological differences between traditional electronic communications and
OTT services seem increasingly irrelevant. This also follows from responses to our public
consultation and our on-going studies: OTT services are functional substitutes for traditional
telecoms services in important respects.
But we should not forget to weigh the relevance for end-users of remaining differences, such
as use of numbers or different quality-of-service levels.
We are assessing to what extent the existing framework needs to be adapted to these
developments. We intend to lessen regulatory burden by considering the appropriate level of
harmonisation (i.e. maximum harmonisation brings significant simplification) and clarifying
the scope of beneficiaries of end-user protection rules.
We intend to:
close any gaps in the protection of end-users;
ensure fair competition with a level regulatory playing field functionally substitutable
services.
Our current assessment is that the level playing field and focused end-user protection is
probably best achieved by a targeted mix of deregulation and application of a key, but limited,
set of sector-specific rules to OTT communication services.
If raised,
we have noted your position that
Article 4(3)
The new
net neutrality rules
will allow the offer of specialised services that are innovative and of higher quality, as long they
are not supplied at the expense of the quality of the Internet.
4. The investment gap and ways to fill it
DG CONNECT' performed in 2014 an estimate of the investment gap that needs to be plugged if
Member States are to reach the last two DAE 2020 broadband targets: (i) universal coverage at
30 Mbps, for which the costs of full coverage by FTTC is assumed to be a proxy and (ii) the
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subscription of at least 50% of households to 100Mbps, which we assume would require urban
households to be covered by FTTP or equivalent. The estimate is based on available external
studies, and on the current state of regulatory enforcement, technological capacities and business
practice (all of which are developing fast).
According to these estimates
Europe needs EUR 34 billion to reach the target of 100%
coverage at 30 mbps, and EUR 92 billion to credibly enable reaching the third target (use
of offers at 100 mbps by 50% of household). European Structural and Investment Funds for
broadband (not including other digital and ICT themes), currently estimated at EUR 5.5 billion,
can help plugging such gaps by approximately 20.8% or 7.7% respectively. Further impact can
be expected from leveraging EUR 150 million dedicated to broadband under the Connecting
Europe Facility and by additional national and local funds.
Since the current efforts at the EU level are clearly insufficient to close the investment gap,
stepping up efforts in policy, funding and regulation will be necessary. Furthermore it will be
important to create a platform to strengthen demand for digitally enabled solutions which emerge
from local and regional players and build the credible pitch for more investment in high-speed
broadband. The Juncker Plan, the Connecting Europe facility and the Structural Funds are all
catalysers of investment.
5. Telecom Review
The public consultation on the evaluation and the review of the regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services ended on 7 December 2015. 244 contributions
were received online and around 30 contributions through other sources. A wide array of
stakeholder groups replied, with the majority of contributions coming from the telecom players.
Wider digital economy and traditional non-telco industry players were also active. On 3 March
2016, the results of the consultation were published on the DSM website.
Results of the public consultation
Connectivity is broadly recognised as the underlying driving force for the digital society and
economy, underpinned by technological changes and evolving consumer and market demands.
Indeed, good connectivity is perceived as a necessary condition to achieve the Digital Single
Market. Many respondents pointed to the need for policy measures and possible adjustments to
current policy and regulatory tools to support the deployment of infrastructure in line with future
needs.
A number of inputs asserted that the current regulatory framework does not much advance the
internal market. There is a general perception that the regulatory framework needs to be adjusted
to the current market dynamics. Many respondents however acknowledged the achievements
ushered in by the liberalisation of the telecom markets, in particular in terms of end-user benefits
and competition within most national markets.
On spectrum, the importance of wireless connectivity and wireless broadband are acknowledged.
In general, industry is supportive of a more co-ordinated approach and seeks additional certainty
for investments and possibilities to develop throughout the EU new wireless and mobile
communications including 5G.
Member States' authorities generally underline the achievements in the field of technical
harmonisation, and the need for additional coordination to be bottom-up and voluntary; some of
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them call for a better balance between harmonisation and flexibility. There is general recognition
of the importance of a more flexible access and use of spectrum in the future.
While administrations of several Member States, the regulatory community and consumer
organisations still see a need for a sector-specific end-user protection based on high-level
minimum harmonisation, the telecom sector calls for more reliance on horizontal legislation and
full harmonisation, especially for services. The telecom sector in general but also some
administrations argue that the same rules should apply to similar services while other
administrations, so-called "Over-the-top" players, software and equipment vendors, cable
operators and some broadcasters are of the view that the concept of electronic communications
services as currently defined has proven itself.
While the continuing role of national regulatory authorities and spectrum management
authorities is widely acknowledged, a large group of respondents highlight that the institutional
set-up at EU level should be revised to better ensure legal certainty and accountability.
Policy options/issues in the review
We consider that the framework review should pursue one overall regulatory objective,
articulated in terms of outcomes: widespread access to and take-up of very high-performance
connectivity. It would be made clear, that the current three policy objectives i.e. promotion of
competition, of the internal market, and of citizen interests, as well as the regulatory principles
relative to investment and innovation, are at the service of this overriding objective.
Network access
Our future proposals on network access will aim at responding to the objective of the DSM
strategy to incentivise investment in very high-capacity broadband networks and to the overall
ambition to enhance connectivity, while maintaining a pro-competitive approach. To this end we
are working on a set of measures which provide necessary safeguards for access-based
competition, while limiting regulation to what is necessary and increasing incentives for
incumbents and alternatives to roll out very high-capacity networks and (where feasible)
competing infrastructures.
To address the investment challenge we would start from the existing premise that competition is
the main driver for investments. Market analysis and appropriate remedies, would remain central
tools. However, more emphasis should be put on regulatory models that give sufficient space to
competition to invest rather than focusing primarily on ensuring access-based competition.
To achieve this we are considering a set of measures which aim for (1) the simplification and
geographic focus of access regulation, (2) Value the well-designed access programmes to the
civil infrastructure (ducts, poles, etc.), (3) Improving the investment environment for very high-
performance networks of SMP operators (4) Clarifying regulatory treatment of wholesale-only
models (5) The legal regime on symmetric access to non-replicable assets could be clarified and
(6) To enhance competition in the provision of cross-border business services.
To equip the NRAs with sufficient tools to address the connectivity challenge, in particular in
rural areas, the competences and tasks of independent regulators may need to be reinforced, e.g.
as regards the powers of NRAs to map broadband investment plans across their national
territory.
Spectrum
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Spectrum is a core enabler for the deployment and development of current and next generation
mobile and fixed wireless networks (e.g. 5G). In addition to affecting deployment, the manner in
which spectrum is assigned and the conditions attached to spectrum assignment and usage, are
also major determinants of mobile competition, which in turn influence quality of service, prices,
speed of roll-out and take-up of mobile broadband. At the same time, fixed-mobile and
telecommunications-broadcasting convergence are blurring the distinction between traditional
telecommunications markets, which will lead to significant change in the nature of competition
for products and services.
The Framework review will be a major building block of the 5G strategy. The objective is to
have spectrum rules fit for 5G success and for supporting efficient investments, thereby
contributing to the overall objective of deployment of very high-capacity networks throughout
Europe. Our proposals would focus on (1) a more efficient timing between allocation and
assignment; (2) predictability and consistency for market investors in the next generation of
wireless broadband networks regarding the main conditions for assigning or renewing national
spectrum rights of use and (3) regulatory clarity on additional needs for 5G beyond spectrum.
Regardless of the question as to what extent the above-mentioned issues should be dealt with
exclusively at the national level or co-ordinated at the EU level, it is clear that all of them have a
direct impact on the market functioning at the national level and would benefit from greater
consistency. Therefore we are reflecting on the right balance of competences between various
national authorities, including the role of NRAs acknowledging that, at present, all of them do
not have competences in spectrum matters, and on the appropriate setting in which such peers
can contribute at EU level alongside the Commission to general policy guidance and to peer-
review of specific national proposals, so that the market knowledge is appropriately taken into
account in establishing national award procedures, conditions for renewals and main conditions
attached to spectrum usage rights.
Services
The objective of revised sector-specific end-user rights is two-fold. First, in REFIT we are
screening the scope for deregulation or adaptation either by concluding redundancy or recourse
to horizontal consumer protection legislation. Second, in order to close gaps in the protection of
end-users and foster fair competition we aim at addressing a level regulatory playing field
between traditional electronic communications services and functionally substitutable
communications services provided by online service providers (OTTs).
While the scope for deregulation is the subject of ongoing assessment, we have identified certain
areas where leaner provisions may be warranted. For instance, the provisions on contractual
information and transparency could potentially be limited to IAS only; horizontal rules on
alternative dispute resolution and online dispute resolution may have made sector-specific rules
redundant. Furthermore, we aim at adapting the scope of beneficiaries to the objectives of the
relevant provisions in the Universal Service Directive. The experience and feedback in applying
the current framework has shown that the level of protection needed by (larger) business users is
not the same as that of individual consumers and of small and micro enterprises.
As regards the level playing field discussion, sector-specific rules for Internet Access Services
(IAS) are largely accepted; divergences exist rather regarding the exact scope of rights and
obligations. The question of equivalence when communications services are provided in addition
to (or over) Internet Access is more complex. If the provision of a service is tightly linked to
network operation and is dependent on and benefits from the use of a public resource, such as
numbers, in order to ensure interoperability and end-to-end connectivity via the network, such a
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service may not be in all respects comparable to a service which is provided on a best effort basis
without recourse to such a public resource.
It may thus be opportune, for the purposes of further discussion, to reflect on a possible
distinction between (1) rules applicable only to communications networks, and to
communications services that include provision of connection to the network as a key feature of
the service, and which may use public resources to this effect, and (2) a subset of rules also
applicable, according to need, to other communications services. Services that could be
considered to provide a connection to the network could include POTS telephony, IAS provision,
provision of managed services, or provision of any other services using public numbers (in or
out).
Governance
We consider that an adequate and efficient institutional set-up is key to ensuring a positive
outcome for the overall regulatory framework, and also that an efficient EU system of regulatory
authorities is critical for the "connectivity" based digital single market. NRAs and BEREC have
been, and should continue to be, at the core of the telecoms regulatory system.
A critical aspect of the governance system is the distribution of competences amongst the
different institutional stakeholders (at national level: independent NRAs and other national
authorities; at EU level: BEREC, RSPG, Commission…). Another critical aspect is how to
efficiently ensure the independence of NRAs, including that they should be adequately resourced
to perform their core tasks and to fully participate in BEREC.
In view of market and technological developments, there are areas of pan-European relevance
where BEREC could play a (greater) role, such as coordinating the mapping of network
infrastructures, monitoring the quality of Internet services or the conditions for provision of
cross-border business services, monitoring the development of wider markets for
communications platforms or services, and developing as appropriate technical guidance or
prerequisite preliminary specifications for standardisation. In co-responsibility with the
Commission, BEREC could play a stronger role as repository of regulatory experience.
15
CVs
,
Article 4(1)(b)
Article 4(1)(b)
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