Esta es la versión HTML de un fichero adjunto a una solicitud de acceso a la información 'National Productivity boards'.


 
 
 
 

Council of the 
 
 

 European Union 
   
 
Brussels, 13 September 2016 
(OR. en) 
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ECOFIN 614 

 
 
UEM 254 
 
LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 
Subject: 
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the establishment of National 
Productivity Boards 
 
 
 
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COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2016/… 
of… 
on the establishment of National Productivity Boards 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular 
Article 292, in conjunction with Article 121(2) and Article 136 thereof, 
Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission, 
 
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Whereas: 
(1) 
Potential growth in the euro area and in the Union as a whole has slowed down 
considerably since 2000. The downward trend in potential output growth is notably due to 
a steady decline in the contribution of total factor productivity. Since 2008, economic 
growth has been further weakened by a fall in investment. Looking forward, economic 
growth will ultimately depend on increasing productivity. Raising productivity is a 
multi-faceted challenge which requires a set of well-balanced policies aimed, in particular, 
at supporting innovation, increasing skills, reducing rigidities in the labour and product 
markets, as well as allowing a better allocation of resources. While there is a need to 
improve the productivity and competitiveness performance within the Union, the recent 
crisis showed that Member States whose currency is the euro ('euro area Member States') 
can be particularly subject to the possible build-up and sudden unwinding of 
macroeconomic imbalances that may spill-over into other euro area Member States and 
non-euro area Member States. In the absence of flexible nominal exchange rates, they need 
adequate adjustment mechanisms to country-specific shocks. Productivity and 
competitiveness dynamics are of relevance both for the accumulation and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances (for example trade and current account deficits, stocks of 
domestic and external liabilities) and for the effective adjustment to asymmetric shocks. 
Research and analysis of policies having a bearing on productivity and competitiveness 
dynamics should provide a basis for developments compatible with the objective of a 
smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union. 
 
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(2) 
While this Recommendation is addressed to the euro area Member States, non-euro area 
Member States are encouraged to identify or set up similar bodies. Non-euro area 
Member States declaring their intention to follow up on this Recommendation should be 
allowed to participate on equal terms in all aspects of the cooperation related to the 
productivity boards. 
(3) 
The European Semester, in particular the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure as 
established in Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council1 and Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council2, provides a framework for integrated economic policy coordination and 
surveillance. In view of fostering progress with structural reforms, these existing 
mechanisms should benefit from strong national ownership. For this purpose, ensuring 
independent analysis at the national level and reinforcing the policy dialogue in 
Member States appears warranted. 
                                                 
1 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
(OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25). 
2 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 8). 
 
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(4) 
The setting up of national productivity boards that track developments and inform the 
national debate in the field of productivity and competitiveness should contribute to the 
enhancement of ownership of the necessary policies and reforms at national level and to 
improving the knowledge basis for Union economic policy coordination. These boards 
should analyse productivity and competitiveness developments including relative to global 
competitors, taking into account national specificities and established practices. 
(5) 
The scope of diagnosis and analysis by productivity boards spans a comprehensive notion 
of productivity and competitiveness. They should take into account the long-term drivers 
and enablers of productivity and competitiveness, including innovation, and the capacity to 
attract investment, businesses and human capital, and to address cost and non-cost factors 
that can affect prices and quality content of goods and services, including relative to global 
competitors in the short term. 
(6) 
Moreover, independent high-quality economic analysis of policy challenges increases 
transparency in policy debates. Assessing policy challenges could raise awareness of all 
stakeholders. This can have a positive impact on public support and ownership for 
necessary reforms. Also, if and to the extent foreseen in their national mandate, the 
productivity boards could assess the effects of policy options by making trade-offs of 
policy explicit. 
 
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(7) 
Productivity boards should have functional autonomy vis-à-vis any public authority in 
charge of the design and implementation of policies in the field of productivity and 
competitiveness in the Member State or at European level. In particular, they should be 
able to produce independent analysis within the scope of their area of work. The 
composition of productivity boards, while subject to national discretion, should be 
unbiased, in the sense that they should not convey only or mainly views of specific groups 
of stakeholders. Such independence and unbiasedness requirements are aimed at ensuring 
that the productivity boards are empowered to produce expert analyses formulated in the 
general interest. 
(8) 
The characteristics of the productivity boards should fully observe Article 152 of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and should respect the national 
practice and institutions for wage formation. In accordance with Article 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the functioning of the productivity boards 
should not affect the right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels or to take collective 
action in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices. 
 
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(9) 
Productivity boards should be engaged in contacts with productivity boards of other 
participating Member States with the aim of exchanging views and best practices, also 
taking into account the broader euro area and Union dimension. The Commission could 
facilitate the exchange of views between the productivity boards of all participating 
Member States. There should also be a regular discussion between the productivity boards 
and the Economic Policy Committee on issues within the latter's area of competence, 
involving relevant experts in non-participating Member States. 
(10) 
Productivity boards should carry out their activities on a countinuous basis. They should 
make their analyses publicly available and publish an annual report, which could be 
integrated into an already existing report. The independent expertise provided by those 
boards, including through the annual reports, could be used by Member States and the 
Commission in the context of the European Semester and the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure. 
 
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(11) 
In order to ease exchange of views at supra-national level, there should be one identifiable 
productivity board in each Member State. It is important to build on existing structures in 
order to preserve what already works and to minimise administrative costs. Where 
appropriate the productivity board could be based on an already established and respected 
national structure including as regards the involvement and consultation of stakeholders. 
However, to carry out their activities properly, productivity boards could in turn rely on 
different separate and existing bodies, provided that their analysis is of the same high 
quality. 
(12) 
This Recommendation does not alter the assigned responsibilities for the European 
Semester, including formulating and monitoring the Country Specific Recommendations, 
or the application of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure as established in 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION: 
 
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I. 
Objectives and scope 
1. 
The objective of this Recommendation is the identification or setting up of national 
productivity boards to analyse developments and policies in the field of productivity and 
competitiveness, thereby contributing to foster ownership and implementation of the 
necessary reforms at the national level, and hence foster sustained economic growth and 
convergence. 
2. 
This Recommendation is addressed to the euro area Member States. The non-euro area 
Member States are also encouraged to identify or set up similar bodies. 
3. 
The application of this Recommendation should fully observe Article 152 TFEU and 
should respect national practices and institutions for wage formation. This 
Recommendation takes into account Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and accordingly does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude or 
enforce collective agreements or to take collective action in accordance with national laws 
and practices. 
 
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II. 
The productivity boards 
4. 
Each Member State should have in place a productivity board tasked with: 
(a)  Diagnosis and analysis of productivity and competitiveness developments in the 
Member State concerned. The analysis should take into account euro area and Union 
aspects and address the long-term drivers and enablers of productivity and 
competitiveness, including innovation, and the capacity to attract investment, 
businesses and human capital, and to address cost and non-cost factors that can affect 
prices and quality content of goods and services including relative to global 
competitors in the short term. Analysis should be based on transparent and 
comparable indicators; and 
(b)  Independent analysis of policy challenges in the field of productivity and 
competitiveness, and, if and to the extent foreseen in their national mandate, 
assessment of the effects of policy options, making trade offs of policy explicit. 
5. 
Each Member State should identify one productivity board, which could in turn rely on, or 
consist of, different existing bodies. 
 
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6. 
Productivity boards should carry out their activities on a continuous basis. They should 
make their analyses publicly available and publish an annual report. They should be 
engaged in contacts with productivity boards of non-euro area Member States with the aim 
of exchanging views and best practices, and where appropriate produce joint analysis, also 
taking into account the broader euro area and Union dimension. The Commission will on a 
regular basis exchange views with all participating productivity boards, including during 
fact-finding missions to Member States, and could faciliate the exchange of views between 
the productivity boards. 
III. 
Characteristics of the productivity boards 
7. 
Productivity boards should have functional autonomy vis-à-vis any public authority in 
charge of the design and implementation of policies in the field of productivity and 
competitiveness in the Member State or at European level. To fullfill the tasks of this 
Recommendation they should be underpinned by national provisions ensuring a high 
degree of functional autonomy and accountability, including: 
(a)  the capacity to communicate publicly in a timely manner; 
(b)  procedures for nominating members on the basis of their experience and competence; 
(c)  appropriate access to information to carry out their mandate. 
 
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8. 
Productivity boards should be objective, neutral and fully independent regarding analysis 
and content. They may consult relevant stakeholders, but should not convey only or mainly 
the opinions and the interests of a particular group of stakeholders. 
9. 
Productivity boards should have the ability to carry out economic and statistical analyses 
with a high degree of quality, including as recognised by the academic community. The 
analysis could be produced by existing and separate bodies provided that it is of the same 
high quality. 
IV. 
Relationship with the European Semester 
10. 
The independent expertise provided by those boards, including through the annual reports, 
could be used by Member States and the Commission in the context of the European 
Semester and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. This Recommendation does not 
alter the assigned responsibilities for the European Semester, including designing and 
monitoring of the Country Specific Recommendations, or the application of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure as established in Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. 
V. 
Accountability and transparency 
11. 
As a rule, the analyses produced by those boards should be made public. 
 
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VI. 
Final provisions 
12. 
The Member States of the euro area are invited to implement the principles set out in this 
Recommendation by … [18 months after the adoption of this recommendation]. 
13. 
By… [30 months after the adoption of this Recommendation], the Commission is invited 
to prepare a progress report, on the basis of relevant information from all Member States 
on the implementation and the suitability of this Recommendation, including whether the 
adoption of further provisions appears necessary. If warranted, the report shall be 
accompanied by a proposal to adapt this Recommendation. 
Done at Brussels, 
 
For the Council 
 
The President 
 
 
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