Dies ist eine HTML Version eines Anhanges der Informationsfreiheitsanfrage 'National security guidelines to member states'.

Ref. Ares(2019)6224090 - 08/10/2019
Brussels, 05.12.2001
COM(2001) 743 final
The relationship between safeguarding internal security
and complying with international protection obligations and instruments

This Working Document is the Commission response to Conclusion 29 of the Extraordinary Justice
and Home Affairs Council Meeting of 20 September 2001, in which: “The Council invites the
Commission to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and
complying with international protection obligations and instruments”.

Mechanisms for excluding those not deserving protection from Refugee
Convention status and other forms of international protection

Application of exclusion clauses
Terrorism in relation to the grounds for exclusion from Refugee Convention
Definition of terrorism
Membership of a terrorist group
Cancellation of Refugee Convention status
Re-examination of refugee status granted
Crimes committed on the territory of the country of refuge
Asylum procedure
Access to the asylum procedure
The processing of asylum requests in extradition cases
Suspension of the examination of an asylum claim 
Inadmissible asylum claims
Treatment within asylum procedures
Assessment of the asylum claim in a regular asylum
Assessment of the asylum claim in an accelerated asylum
Standard of proof
Right to appeal the exclusion decision
Administrative treatment of potential article 1(F) cases
Special units in the asylum system for dealing with exclusion clauses
Guidelines on the use of the exclusion clauses
Information exchange mechanisms
Treatment of security risk cases
Exclusion from other forms of international protection

Chapter 2:
Legal follow up to the exclusion of persons from Refugee Convention status or
other forms of international protection

Prosecution or extradition
Universal jurisdiction
Future International Criminal Court
Legal obstacles to extradition or removal
Legal guarantees in extradition cases
The legal position of persons excluded from protection regimes but who are non-

Harmonisation of basic rights granted to persons excluded from protection
regimes  but who are non-removable
Detention and alternatives to detention of of  persons excluded from
protection regimes but who are non-removable
Chapter 3:
Approximation of relevant legislation, regulation and administrative practices
against the background of the Common European Asylum System

General framework
Legislative harmonisation, accompanying measures, administrative co-operation
and  the Open Co-ordination Method

Chapter 4:
Analysis  of  “internal security”-related provisions in EC legislation and
(future) Commission Proposals for EC legislation in the immigration and asylum field 
General analysis
EC legislation in the field of asylum
Temporary Protection
Proposals for EC legislation in the field of asylum
Asylum procedures
Reception conditions
State determination

Qualification for international protection
Proposals for EC legislation in the field of immigration
Economic migration
Family reunification
Long term residency status
Future Proposals for EC legislation in the field of immigration
Students and other third country nationals
Victims of trafficking

At the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting of 20 September 2001, flowing from
the tragic events of the 11th of September in the USA, Conclusion 29 invited “the Commission to
examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with
international protection obligations and instruments”. 
This specific subject has been and will remain
a permanent concern to the Commission, and may result in the mid to long term to Proposals for
(amended) legislation. In answering to the above invitation this Working Paper however aims at
providing for both a rapid reaction as well as a comprehensive review of the issue.
The European Council has in the aftermath of and in response to the 11th September events decided to
develop an “Action Plan on the fight against terrorism”. This Plan covers several policy areas,
including external, economic/financial, transportation and Justice and Home Affairs policy. With
regard to the latter strand, Justice and Home Affairs, a separate plan of action has been developed,
covering more particularly the policy areas of: judicial co-operation, co-operation between police and
intelligence services, financing of terrorism, measures at the border and other measures. In the
measures at the border” Chapter of the Conclusions of the extraordinary JAI Council of 20
September 2001, in which Conclusion 29 is framed, other specific Conclusions relate to border
control, issuing of identity documents, residence permits and visa, and the functioning of the Schengen
Information System (SIS).
These specific Conclusions are very relevant in the fight against terrorism, and more generally they
provide tools for States to strengthen national security.  In particular pre-entry screening, including
strict visa policy and the possible use of biometric data, as well as measures to enhance co-operation
between border guards, intelligence services, immigration and asylum authorities of the State
concerned, could offer real possibilities for identifying those suspected of terrorist involvement at an
early stage. The functioning of Europol, Eurodac and the SIS can also substantially assist in the
identification of terrorist suspects. However, these specific Conclusions are subject of separate actions
and follow up to be taken at European and Member States level, and therefore fall outside the scope of
this Paper. With this Paper , the Commission focuses on the mandate formulated in Conclusion 29.
This Document takes a fourfold approach. Firstly, the Paper will analyse the existing legal
mechanisms for excluding those persons from international protection who do not deserve such
protection, focusing in particular on those suspected of terrorist acts. Subsequently, the Paper will
consider which legal steps can possibly be taken by governments who are confronted with a person
who is excluded from international protection regimes.  The Paper will then elaborate in more detail
on what actions can be initiated and taken at European level regarding the issue at stake, in the short as
well as in the mid to long term. Finally, the Paper will assess the adequacy of the internal security
related provisions in EC legislation and  (future) Commission Proposals for Directives in the asylum
and immigration field
The two main premises on which this Document is built are, firstly, that bona fide refugees and
asylum seekers should not become victims of the recent events, and secondly that there should be no
avenue for those supporting or committing terrorist acts to secure access to the territory of the Member
States of the European Union.  It is therefore legitimate and fully understandable that Member States
are now looking at reinforced security safeguards to prevent terrorists from gaining admission to their
territory through different channels. These could include asylum channels, though in practice terrorists
are not likely to use the asylum channel much, as other, illegal, channels are more discreet and more
suitable for their criminal practices. Any security safeguard therefore needs to strike a proper balance
with the refugee protection principles at stake. In this context the Commission fully endorses the line
taken and expressed by UNHCR that, rather than through major changes to the refugee protection
regime, a scrupulous application of the exceptions to refugee protection available under current law, is
the appropriate approach.

Chapter 1:        Mechanisms  for  excluding  those not deserving protection from the Refugee
Convention status and others forms of international protection
Application of the exclusion clauses
After the 11th September events, UNHCR has publicly called on States to “scrupulously and
rigorously” apply the exclusion clauses, as contained in Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention, as
that Convention was never intended to be a “safe haven” for criminals, nor was it designed to protect
them from criminal prosecution, but quite the opposite: to protect the persecuted and not the
Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention states that refugee status can not be granted to any person with
respect to whom “ there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his
admission to that country as a refugee;

(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”
This Paper is not the appropriate framework for analysing in full detail the application of the three
grounds listed in Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention. In addition to guidelines issued by Member
States, UNHCR has issued special guidelines on the application of this particular article. The
Commission also likes to refer to other relevant documents issued by UNHCR, including background
papers and notes for the UNHCR Standing Committee and within the context of UNHCR’s Global
Consultations process.
Terrorism in relation to the three grounds for exclusion from Refugee

In line with several United Nations General Assembly-  and Security Council Resolutions, most
recently Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, and following international refugee law
jurisprudence, exclusion of persons involved in terrorist acts from refugee status may be based on
either of the three grounds listed in the exclusion clause under Article 1(F), depending on the
circumstances of the case.
·  Art 1F (a):  as it has been recognised that terrorist acts may constitute “war crimes” if
committed in a war context
·  Art.1F (b): in so far as particular cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political
objective, can be classified as serious non-political crimes, and fall within the realm of
extraditable offences.
·  Art. 1F (c) following UN General Assembly Resolutions “Relating to measures combating
terrorism”, which declare that "acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations" and that "knowingly financing, planning and
inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations

Definition of terrorism
Rather than attempting to adopt a general definition of what constitutes terrorism, States have, until
now, preferred to declare certain specific acts as terrorist crimes. They have identified a number of
crimes within this category, such as those related to hijacking, hostage-taking and bomb attacks.
Though within the United Nations context work is accelerated with regard to the preparations for an
international instrument on terrorism, there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism as yet.
In this particular context it is even more relevant that the European Commission has recently adopted
the  Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism1 (which includes the
establishment of minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts) and the Proposal
for a Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures
between the Member States
.2 In particular an EU common definition of what constitutes terrorists
offences, if incorporated in EU extradition treaties, may be a basis for relying on Article 1(F)(b). EU
standards will also be a helpful way of illuminating UN standards of eg “terrorist acts”, and hence
serve as an interpretative aid to application of Article 1 (F) (a) or 1(F) (c).
Membership of a terrorist group
Mere, voluntary, membership of a terrorist group may, in some cases, amount to personal and
knowing participation, or acquiescence amounting to complicity, in the crimes in question, and hence
to exclusion from refugee status. In this assessment the purpose of the group, the status and level of
the person involved, and factors such as duress and self-defence against superior orders, as well as the
availability of a moral choice should be taken into consideration. If it has been determined that the
person is still an actual, active, present and willing member, the fact of mere membership may be
difficult to dissociate from the commission of terrorist crimes.
Cancellation of Refugee Convention status
Refugee Convention’s status can be withdrawn, for instance if it is discovered that the person had
committed serious crimes, including terrorist acts, before having been recognised as a refugee. In such
cases refugee status may be cancelled, following the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status.
Re-examination of refugee statuses granted
Active re-examination of “closed files” of persons granted a refugee status could be considered by
Member States. However, such a re-examination should only be undertaken if there is a clear
inducement for doing so, for instance based upon intelligence services information, identifying
security risks. A review of cases based solely on the grounds of nationality, religion or political
opinion is not considered appropriate. If this re-examination would lead to the conclusion that
someone indeed has committed crimes falling under the scope of the exclusion clauses, his/her refugee
status could be cancelled.
Crimes committed on the territory of the country of refuge
In cases where a refugee has committed a serious crime, including terrorist acts, on the territory of the
country of refuge, protection against expulsion can be withdrawn, in conformity with Article 32 (1),
“The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of
national security or public order”
, and Article 33 (2) (on prohibition of expulsion or return -
“refoulement”): of the Refugee Convention. The purpose of this latter article is to safeguard the
receiving country from persons who present a danger to the public safety or the security of the
country, and states that:  “The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
1 Brussels, 19.9.2001 COM (2001) 521 final
2 Brussels, 19.9.2001 COM (2001)  522 final

refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country”.

Article 33(2) therefore provides an exception to the principle of non-refoulement, laid down in Article
33(1). This means in essence that refugees can exceptionally be returned in case of threat to the
national security of the host country, and in case their proven criminal nature and record constitute a
danger to the community. The various elements of these extreme and exceptional circumstances need,
however, to be interpreted restrictively and require a high standard of proof. However, any person
within the terms of Art. 33(2) may lawfully be expelled, even if the only option is to return him or her
to the country in which persecution is feared, without prejudice to other international legal obligations
of States, in particular Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Asylum Procedure
Access to the asylum procedure
In  order to implement in good faith, and “full and inclusively”, the 1951 Refugee Convention it is
indispensable to determine who fulfils the requirements of the Convention. Therefore all persons
requesting for asylum in the Member State responsible for assessing the claim, should be granted
access to a procedure, enabling such assessment. Automatic bars to accessing an asylum procedure,
even of suspected criminals, for instance by rejection at the border, without providing such persons
access to an asylum procedure, could result in “refoulement”. In addition this would not be in
conformity with article 4 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status3
Channelling all asylum seekers through an asylum procedure with a view to granting or denying
refugee status is also necessary from a practical security perspective. It effectively provides the
opportunity to identify possible suspects of crimes.  Asylum seekers will be known and identified,
their background thoroughly investigated in one or more interviews, and checked against all available
information on countries, groups and events. In addition they will be easily “tracked” during the
procedure, even if they are not detained.
The handling of asylum request in extradition cases  
Suspension of the examination of an asylum claim
After access to the asylum procedure has been granted, it could however be considered to allow for the
immediate suspension, the “freezing” of the actual examination of the asylum request in the following
two situations. Firstly, in cases in which an international criminal tribunal has indicted the individual
who has claimed asylum. In such cases, the appropriate response would be to hand over the individual
concerned to that tribunal for prosecution. The second possible ground for a suspension of the
examination of the asylum request would be where an extradition request from a country other than
the country of origin of the asylum seeker, relating to serious crimes,  is pending. In both cases the
criminal proceedings would take priority over the actual conducting of the asylum procedure.
Following the criminal prosecution of these cases, and following the serving of an eventual
punishment, the old situation of the asylum request would be “unfrozen”. This would effectively mean
that the asylum seeker would be transferred back to the country where he had an asylum request
pending. If opted for this approach the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status4
 would need to be changed
to allow for such an approach.
3 Brussels, 20.09.2000 COM(2000) 578 final
4 Id at 3
Inadmissible asylum claims
An alternative legislative approach for dealing with asylum claims in cases where an extradition
request or an indictment by an International Criminal Court has been made, could consist in the
dismissal of an asylum claim as being “inadmissible”. In this option it would be necessary to add to
article 18 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status5
, dealing with the inadmissibility of certain claims
for asylum, two new grounds for inadmissibility: namely in cases where an extradition request has
been made by a country, other than the country of origin of the asylum seeker, or in cases of an
indictment by an International Criminal Court. In the case of extradition request, and if following
criminal prosecution the asylum seeker wants to re-apply for asylum, the revised article 18 should
include a rule to the effect that the merits of such a renewed asylum claim is to be assessed by the
Member State to whom the person has been extradited.
The advantage of both such approaches would be that the possibilities for criminal prosecution of
alleged criminals would not be hindered by the mere fact of the filing of an asylum request. It would
also be an appropriate response to the several UN General Assembly Resolutions on “Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism”
 which provide that, before considering to grant refugee status,
States should take appropriate measures to ensure that the asylum-seeker has not participated in
terrorist acts, taking into due account any relevant information as to whether the asylum-seeker is
subject to investigation for, is charged with, or has been convicted of offences connected with
Treatment within asylum procedure
The procedure assessing the claim for refugee status, based on the Refugee Convention, also includes
the examination of the applicability of the exclusion clauses, contained in article 1(F) of that
Convention. The rationale underlying these exclusion provisions is that certain acts are so grave as to
render their perpetrators undeserving of protection as refugees. However, because exclusion from
refugee status may have potentially life-threatening consequences, such decisions should be made
within the asylum procedure, by the authority with expertise and training in refugee law and status
determination, in the context of a comprehensive consideration of the refugee claim.  
Assessment of the asylum claim in a regular asylum procedure
The standard rule for assessing claims for asylum should be that this is being done in a comprehensive,
holistic and integral manner.
This means that there should be a comprehensive examination of all relevant facts underlying a claim
for asylum. However, the possible applicability of the exclusion clauses should not be explored in all
cases, as a matter of routine. It should only be explored in cases where there are specific reasons to
believe that the person may fall under one of these clauses. Indeed facts justifying an examination of
the applicant’s excludability will normally emerge in the course of the “inclusion phase” of the
refugee status determination process, checking the reasons for recognising someone as a refugee, and
may then be referred to during the “exclusion phase” of the case.   
Assessment of the asylum claim in an accelerated asylum procedure
There may however be cases in which it has been prima facie established that someone falls under the
scope of the exclusion clauses. In such situations States should be entitled to channel such claims
through an accelerated procedure. In such an procedure States are entitled to start with and, if found
, limit themselves to the particular examination of the applicability of the exclusion clauses,
as a preliminary matter at the commencement of a hearing, without having the need to examine the
5 Id at 3

“inclusion clauses” of the Refugee Convention. “Translated” legally, such cases could be considered
to allow for a dismissal of the asylum claim as being “manifestly unfounded”, as to be then provided
for in a revision of the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status6
. If this option would be pursued, the
issue of whether or not an appeal against a dismissal of such a claim as manifestly unfounded should
automatically have suspensive effect, needs to be further examined.
Standard of proof
In determining the applicable standard of proof in exclusion procedures, it has to be acknowledged
that exclusion proceedings do not amount to a full criminal trial. The term “serious reasons for
 used in the chapeau to article 1 (F), should be interpreted as meaning that the rules on
the admissibility of evidence and the high standard of proof required in criminal proceedings do not
need to apply in this respect. There is therefore no need to prove that the person has committed the act,
which may justify the exclusion from refugee status. It is sufficient to establish that there are serious
reasons for considering that the person has committed those acts. The basis for such a conclusion must
be clearly established. Thus, an investigation should be undertaken, checking the claimant’s potential
links with or involvement with violent acts. In order to consider the possibility of exclusion of refugee
status as a result of individual liability for terrorist acts, the measure of personal involvement required
must be assessed carefully. A person whose actions contribute to the crime, through orders, incitement
or significant assistance, may be excluded from refugee status.
Right to appeal the exclusion decision
The application of any exclusion clause must be individually assessed. The grounds for exclusion
should be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct of the person concerned, and on available
evidence and conform to legal standards of fairness and justice. The person concerned should be
entitled to lodge a legal challenge in the Member State concerned, as also provided for and according
to the standards laid down in the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status
Administrative treatment of potential article 1(F) cases
Special units in the asylum system for dealing with exclusion cases
Without prejudice to paragraph 1.4.5, and the right to appeal a denial of refugee status in front of an
independent Court, Member States may have different logistical arrangements for dealing with claims
of suspected war criminals or terrorists. In some Member States special Units have been set up to
which all security risk cases and cases of suspected involvement in serious violent acts or violations of
human rights are forwarded. Other Member States are considering introducing standard “front-security
checks”, by which all claims for asylum would be checked upon potential security risks, running the
personal data through the available and relevant databases. Such logistical measures are fully
compatible with the legal international obligations impending upon Member States and could
potentially prove useful.
Given the complexities involved, Member States that have no specialised “Exclusion/Security Unit”
within their asylum system could consider introducing it. Referral to such a Unit could either be called
for where there are immediate suspicions of involvement in war or other serious crimes, such as
terrorist involvement (for instance, where an asylum-seeker is alleged to be a member of en extremist
group practising violence), or where these suspicions emerge during the course of assessment under
the normal asylum procedure. Although it is likely that only a relatively small number of cases would
be involved, the specialised “Exclusion Unit” could pursue examination. In order to function properly
6 Id at 3
7 Id at 3

and effectively such a unit should possess expertise in both refugee as well as criminal law and have
an in-depth knowledge of terrorist organisations. Equally important for such a Unit would be its access
to all regularly available country of origin, and if necessary, classified information, and efficient
working links with intelligence and criminal prosecution and enforcement bodies.
A specialised Unit would be able to undertake priority, expedited processing of cases with a potential
exclusion element. Its resources and expertise would enable it to undertake a more thorough
assessment of any asylum claim made by someone suspected of involvement in terrorist acts. The Unit
could subsequently refer such cases to the office of the public prosecutor for criminal prosecution as
the appropriate avenue for bringing suspected terrorists to justice. Its increased specialist expertise and
clearly focused resources would enable prompt and quality decision-making.
Guidelines on the use of the exclusion clauses
Some Member States have issued special internal guidelines on the application of the exclusion
clauses of the Refugee Convention. These could assist in an identification of cases with a potential
exclusion element as early in the process as possible. It could be considered to establish such
guidelines at a European level, making use of the best practises at national level.
Information exchange mechanisms
It could also be considered to set up information exchange mechanisms to help those Member States
which do not have sufficient resources to benefit from the already existing expertise on these issues in
some other Member States, in order to get information and support once they have a potential case.
Such information exchange mechanisms could involve the setting up of contact lists and explore the
usefulness of creating Intranet sites.
It could also serve to inform each other of the presence of an exclusion case, in order to avoid the
person trying to get protection in another Member State. Within this context the establishment of a
European list of “Refugee Convention-excluded persons” could also be considered. In the framework
of information sharing it needs to be stressed that the normal rules with regard to the confidentiality of
personal data, in particular as regards possible communication between a Member State and the
country of origin of the person need to be respected.
Treatment of security risk cases
Member States have at their disposal a range of measures to ensure asylum-seekers on their territory
do not abscond during the procedure. These include holding asylum-seekers in reception centres,
reporting requirements, regulations on informing the authorities about any change of address, and
detention. Which measures are appropriate will depend on individual circumstances, although where
there is evidence to show that an individual asylum-seeker has criminal affiliations likely to pose a risk
to public order or national security, detention would be an appropriate tool. It must however be
acknowledged that in most systems there are limits to the detention of asylum applicants; also the
legality and necessity of detention is subject to judicial review.
Exclusion from other forms of international protection
The findings of this Chapter 1 should be considered equally relevant in cases where someone has
requested, respectively has been granted another form of international protection, such as subsidiary

Chapter 2:        Legal  follow  up  to  the  exclusion  of  persons  from  Refugee  Convention  status  or
other forms of international protection
Prosecution or extradition
Following a denial of an appeal against the decision to exclude a person from refugee or subsidiary
protection status, and according to the international law principle known as aut dedere aut judicare,
the State is obliged to either surrender or prosecute the person excluded from protection regimes.  The
above principle provides for a solution of the inherent contradiction between the State's need, and
indeed obligation, to combat criminal acts such as terrorism, and the individual's entitlement to
protection against refoulement. This principle is formulated inter alia in Article 7 of the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.
2.2.1 Universal 
On the implementation of the above principle, the situation differs from one Member State to the
other. Some Member States attempt to actively try such a person, if they have specific criteria to have
jurisdiction on the case, or if their national criminal law provides for an universal competence. In such
a legal system the State can actively prosecute and punish persons suspected of crimes of universal
jurisdiction, without having regard to the territoriality of the crime committed or the nationality of the
person suspected. However, it has to be acknowledged that it is often, de facto, not possible to
prosecute the person for a criminal offence, given the strict rules on the admissibility of evidence and
the high standard of proof required in the criminal justice systems of the Member States of the
European Union. These standards are much higher than for refugee exclusion and or expulsion
proceedings. In particularly the availability of (reliable) witnesses has proved in practice to be a very
serious obstacle for Member States in pursuing successful criminal prosecution of those persons
excluded from the Refugee Convention.
Future International Criminal Court
The future International Criminal Court (ICC) could play an important role in the context of
prosecution of persons covered by the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention. However, the
current mandate of the Court, laid down in its Statute, does not cover terrorism as such, except if it is
associated with the other serious crimes (of concern to the international community)  regarding which
the Court does have jurisdiction. These crimes are also of direct relevance to the interpretation and
application of Article 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention. The future ICC could also help address problems
where national refugee status determination procedures may lack access to relevant intelligence
information and/or resources and tools, such as are available to a judge or prosecutor investigating
such crimes. It is also envisaged that co-operation between the ICC and UN agencies, such as
UNHCR, will be established. It could therefore be useful to consider establishing formal and
confidential co-operation agreements between Member States and the ICC in potential Article 1F
If there is no possibility to bring the person to trial in the country of refuge, nor to have the person
indicted by the International Criminal Court, then in principle such a person needs to be extradited;
that is if extradition is legally and practically possible to either the country of origin, another Member
State or another third country. In connection with extradition requests made against persons accused of
having committed terrorist crimes, both the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism provide
that States Parties are not obliged to accede to the extradition, if they have substantial grounds for
believing that such request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on

account of his/her race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with
the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons.
Legal obstacles to extradition or removal
Extradition may however be impossible because of legal obstacles. The protection against refoulement
as a consequence of the prohibition of certain treatments or punishments, provided for in human rights
instruments such as the United Nations Convention against Torture, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is namely absolute
in nature, that is to say, admits no exceptions. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly
affirmed that the European Convention on Human Rights, even in the most difficult circumstances,
such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, prohibits, in absolute terms, torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised
that, unlike most of the substantive clauses of that particular Convention, Article 3 makes no provision
for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible even in the event of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.  Following the 11th September events, the European Court of Human
Rights may in the future again have to rule on questions relating to the interpretation of Article 3, in
particular on the question in how far there can be a “balancing act” between the protection needs of the
individual, set off against the security interests of a state.
Legal guarantees in extradition cases
Extradition must be considered legal when it is possible to obtain legal guarantees from the State that
is going to trial the person, addressing the concerns connected to the potential violations of the
European Convention of Human Rights. Such “guarantees” by third States could for instance relate to
the non-application of capital punishment in that particular case, though the law of that State allows
for such punishment.
The legal position of persons excluded from protection regimes but who are non-

The question that remains unresolved -and which falls outside the scope of refugee /international
protection law- relates to the status that must be accorded to persons who disqualify for refugee status
or other forms of international protection, who cannot be successfully prosecuted, and yet who cannot
be expelled because of the absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement as laid down in some
international and regional human rights instruments. There are no international legal instruments,
which regulate the status and rights of persons who are excluded from any protection status but cannot
be expelled because of legal obstacles.  However, the UN Committee on Human Rights elaborated on
the obligation of State parties to "keep” some aliens with long links in the country, despite their
criminal activities.
The current situation of Member States having limited policy options for dealing adequately with
excludable but non-removable persons is a very unsatisfactory one. The issue is therefore urgently in
need of further examination, and eventual resolution at European level. In this context it again has to
be stressed that, despite the serious obstacles referred to earlier on, criminal prosecution by the
international community, both at global level as well as Member States level, of those persons having
committed crimes against humanity, war crimes or terrorist attacks, and excluded from protection
regimes, is an appropriate response. In addition to their possible criminal prosecution it may also be
necessary to harmonise the basic rights granted to this category of excludable but non-removable
persons, and to assess the different means for dealing with these persons if they pose a security risk.

Harmonisation of basic rights granted to persons excluded from protection
regimes but who are non-removable

The 15 Member States of the European Union deal differently with the excludable but non-removable
persons. Some Member States do not grant any rights whatsoever to these persons except for the right
not to be refouled. In other Member States, persons do get access to basic human rights, such as urgent
medical health care and education for children. In again other Member States these persons are entitled
to even more socio- and economic rights and benefits. This difference in treatment may call for a
harmonised approach at European level in order to take away potential “pull factors” for persons not
deserving international protection.
Detention and alternatives to detention of persons excluded from protection
regimes but who are non-removable

Persons, who are excluded from protection regimes, yet who can not be removed, do not necessarily
and automatically pose a risk to the national security. For instance many of the war criminals, rightly
excluded from the protection regimes by Member States, are not being automatically detained by these
States. Indeed, so far an administrative unlimited detention system is not made use of in the Member
States, and it may also be useful to further explore alternatives to full detention measures, such as
“residence surveille”.
However there may be cases in which there is a need for the public to be protected against persons
rightly excluded from the protection regimes, such as terrorists, who do pose a risk to the security of
the State. In this context it is relevant to note legislation recently proposed at Member State level with
regard to the detention of foreign nationals whose presence is believed to constitute a risk to national
security and who are being suspected of being international terrorists
. This legislation has been
proposed in anticipation of situations where Article 3 of the ECHR prevents removal or deportation of
the above cases to a place where there is risk that the person will suffer treatment contrary to that
Article. If no alternative destination is immediately available then removal may not, for the time being,
be possible, even though the ultimate intention remains that removal, once satisfactory arrangements
have been made. Notwithstanding this continuing intention to remove a person who is being detained,
it is not possible to say that “action is being taken with a view to deportation” within the meaning of
Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR, interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. To the extent therefore
that the envisaged detention of the above cases may be inconsistent with the obligations under Article
5(1) ECHR the right of derogation conferred by Article 15 (1) of the ECHR could be invoked,
provided that the strict conditions laid down in Article 15 (1) are met, and the envisaged “measures are
not inconsistent with (States) other obligations under international law”.

Chapter 3:        Approximation  of  relevant  legislation, regulation and administrative practices
against the background of the Common European Asylum System
General framework
Continuing working on these issues at the EU level can be done following the method and means
explained in the Commission’s Communication  “Towards a common asylum procedure and a
uniform status, valid throughout the Union for persons granted asylum
”  8and followed up by the
recent “Communication on the common asylum policy, introducing an open co-ordination method-
First Report by the Commission on the application of Communication COM(2000)755 final of 22
November 2000”9
The establishment of the Common European Asylum System will follow a 2-step approach. The
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection
obligations must be fed into both steps.  Indeed it is necessary to work on more efficient, well-
informed and common procedures, more convergent interpretation and application of exclusion
possibilities and on enhancing prosecution and detention possibilities, including alternatives to
detention. It is also necessary to ensure that terrorists, against the background of international
protection, face a comparable treatment in all Member States. If a terrorist is not granted an
international protection status in one Member State or if the status is withdrawn or cancelled, he/she
should expect the same treatment of his/her case in all other Member States.
Legislative harmonisation, accompanying measures, administrative co-operation
and  the Open Co-ordination Method

Quick progress should be made on the negotiation of the different Commission’s Proposals for
Directives on the Council’s table, and appropriate attention should be given to the provisions dealing
with examination and decision making, exclusion, cancellation of status and withdrawal of benefits.
Appropriate and quick transposition of the EC legislative instruments at the national level will also be
necessary. The Commission will prepare regular reports on the implementation of these instruments.
The  Contact Committees created for monitoring the implementation will facilitate consultation
between Member States and the Commission with a view to reaching similar interpretations of the
relevant provisions and comparing national rules and practices. In addition caselaw developed by
national and European courts or review bodies will need to be further analysed. A meeting with
representatives of determining authorities and review bodies could be organised in 2002 in order to
study trends and caselaw and discuss common problems and solutions.
A continuing investment on enhancing common analysis tools is needed. In this context National
points of contact could be nominated for developing co-operation and exchange of information. The
new programme ARGO,  an Action programme for co-operation in the fields of external borders,
visas, asylum and immigration10
, could be used in order to support such administrative co-operation.
The Commission has recommended the use of the open co-ordination method. Illustration of such a
method specially designed for the asylum policy can be found in the “Communication on the common
asylum policy, introducing an open co-ordination method”11
 Attention is drawn to the Second
European Guideline proposed on the development of an efficient asylum system, offering protection
for those in need, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and in
particular on points G (“by identifying principles and techniques for improving the identification of
individuals, covered by the exclusion provisions, who do not deserve international protection.”)
 and J
(“by evaluating…..the use of cessation and exclusion clauses….”). In order to implement this
8 Brussels, 22.11.2000 COM (2000) 755 final
9 Brussels, 28.11.2001 COM (2001) 710 final
10 Brussels, 16.10.2001 COM (2001) 567 final
11 Id at 9

Guideline, Member States have to identify in their national action plans means and objectives to meet
the European goal and analyse implementation of national and EC instruments. This will also facilitate
comparing and identifying good practices and analysing real impact and results of choices made.
Finally, appropriate consultation of and co-operation with the UNHCR, relevant international
organisations and third countries will also be required to efficiently and comprehensively address the
issue subject of this Paper.
All the above instruments will greatly assist in the identification of the necessary improvements,
leading to the adoption of additional rules within the framework of the second step of the
harmonisation of asylum polices in the European Union.

Chapter 4:        Analysis of “internal security”- related provisions in EC legislation  and ( future)
Commission Proposals for EC legislation in the asylum and immigration field
General Analysis
The current EC legislation or Commission Proposals for such legislation in the field of asylum and
immigration all contain, currently, sufficient standard provisions to allow for the exclusion of any third
country national who may be perceived as a threat to national/public security from the right to
international protection, residency or access to certain benefits. However, in the framework of current
and future discussions and negotiations of the different Proposals, these relevant provisions will be
revisited in the light of the new circumstances, without prejudice to the relevant international
obligations underlying the Proposals. The relevant provisions in the different Proposals are shortly
analysed below, and, where appropriate, possibilities for clarifying or enhancing these provisions have
been identified.
EC legislation in the field of asylum
Temporary Protection
The formally adopted Council Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof12  
allows Member
States in its Article 28 (1) (b) to exclude a person from temporary protection if, amongst other
grounds, there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the host
Member State or, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, he or she
is a danger to the community of the host Member State.
The formally adopted Council Regulation concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention13 
allows for the
prompt taking of the fingerprints of all fingers of every applicant for asylum of at least 14 years of age.
For the purposes of applying the Dublin Convention, it is necessary to establish the identity of
applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the
external borders of the Community. However this will simultaneously assist Member States in
knowing who is entering their territory, and subsequently enhance their national security.
Proposals for EC legislation in the field of asylum
Asylum procedures
The  Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status14 
allows in Article 26 for “Cancellation of refugee status” on
the grounds that circumstances have come to light that indicate that this person should never have been
recognised as a refugee in the first place.  Article 33 (2) (c) also allows Member States to derogate
from the rule of suspensive effect for appeals in cases where there are grounds of national security or
public order.
12Directive (2001/55/EC) 20.07.2001
13 Regulation (2725/2000/EC) 11.12.2000
14 Id at 3

As also referred to in paragraph, within the context of the forthcoming revision of this
particular Proposal it could be considered to include rules allowing for a suspension  of the asylum
procedure in situations where an extradition request, relating to a serious crime, for an asylum seeker
has been made by a State, other than the country of origin, or in cases of an indictment by an
International Criminal Court. Alternatively, as explained earlier in paragraph, Article 18 of the
Proposal, on the inadmissibility of certain claims for asylum, could be amended to the effect that it
would allow in the above cases for the dismissal of an asylum claim as being inadmissible.
As elaborated upon in paragraph, the Commission is also considering, deleting article 28 (2)
(b) of the Proposal, which states that cases where there are serious reasons for considering that the
grounds of article 1 (F) of the Refugee Convention apply can not be considered to constitute grounds
for the dismissal of applications for asylum as manifestly unfounded. Following this possible
deletion an additional ground would then need to be added to article 28 (1) allowing for the dismissal
of asylum claims as manifestly unfounded in those cases where it has been prima facie established that
the  exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention apply.
Reception conditions
Following Article 22(1)(d) of the Proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum standards
on the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States15
, Member States may reduce or withdraw
reception facilities if an applicant is regarded as a threat to national security or there are serious
grounds for believing that the applicant has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity or if,
during the examination of the asylum application, there are serious and manifest reasons for
considering that the grounds of Article 1 (F) of the Geneva Convention may apply with respect to the
It could be considered to add a new paragraph (4)(a) in Article 22, regarding the reduction or
withdrawal of reception conditions, to the following extent:  “Should the applicant’s involvement in
terrorist activities be established, either by his having taken an active part therein or by his having
aided and abetted or provided financial support to terrorist organisations as defined by the European
Union, before or after the application for asylum has been lodged, Member States must withdraw the
routine reception conditions in respect of the applicant and enforce the legal protection measures
provided for in their respective legislation.”

It is also relevant to mention in the context of this Paper that the current text of Article 7 of the
Proposal allows, where appropriate, for a limitation of the freedom of movement of asylum seekers to
a specific area of the national territory of the Member States.
State determination
In the Proposal for a Council regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one
of the Member States by a third-country national16 there are no specific provisions relating to
national security. However, such articles are not necessary given that the Proposal contains no
provisions relating to the granting / refusing of rights or status.
15 Brussels, 3.4.2001 COM (2001) 181 final
16 Brussels, 26 .7.2001 COM(2001) 447 final

Qualification for international protection
In Article 14 of the recent Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection17 
Member States have to ensure that an applicant who comes
within the terms of the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention is excluded from refugee status.
This Proposal equally obliges in Article 17 Member States to ensure that an applicant who comes
within the terms of those exclusion clauses is also excluded from subsidiary protection status.
In the framework of the future discussion on this particular Proposal an additional paragraph (2) to
article 19, relating to “Protection from refoulement and expulsion” could be considered. This
additional paragraph, in accordance with article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, holds that the
benefit of that provision (the non-refoulement obligation), “may not be claimed by a persons enjoying
international protection whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security
of the Member State in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State”.

The provisions in the above mentioned articles 14, 17 and the possibly to be proposed new provision
to Article 19, are all without prejudice to Member States other international obligations, in particular
those deriving from article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Proposals for EC legislation in the field of immigration
In the field of legal immigration, all three Commission Proposals for Council Directives submitted so
far on the right to family reunification, the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents, and the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid
employment and self-employed economic activities already contain “public order” clauses. These
clauses allow Member States to refuse admission of third country nationals for reasons of public
policy or domestic security. It appears that a scrupulous application of these clauses is a more
appropriate way of enhancing security than to substantially change the different Proposals at stake.
Invocation of these grounds must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the third country
national concerned. In practice this means that current or past membership to a certain – terrorist –
association might be interpreted to be linked to the “personal conduct” of a person and might therefore
justify the use of this “public order” clause. Within the scope of the Directives, any discrimination
based on race, ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, political opinions or membership of a national
minority is explicitly excluded. The mere ethnic origin or nationality of a person could never justify
use of the “public order” clause, also, as this would be contrary to the principle of non-discrimination
enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Economic migration
Following Article 27 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence
of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic
: “Member States may refuse to grant or to renew or revoke permits in accordance with this
Directive on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The grounds of public policy or
public security must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the third country national
This provision gives Member States a large degree of discretion. The current drafting of Article 27 of
the Proposal can therefore be considered as sufficient and it is not deemed necessary to envisage a
17 Brussels, 12.9.2001 COM (2001) 510 final
18 Brussels, 11.7.2001 COM (2001) 386 final

Family reunification
The Proposal for a Council directive on the right of family reunification19 contains in its article 8  a
provision on public order allowing Member States to refuse: “the entry and residence of family
members on grounds of public policy, domestic security or public health. The grounds of public policy
or domestic security must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the family member

The same logic as set out in 4.4.1 applies equally in the context of this particular Proposal, and
amendment of the text is therefore not considered necessary.
Long term residency status
The Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status of third country nationals who are long
term resident20
 contains several national security related provisions. The Commission is considering
amending these provisions in the following manner:
Following Article 7 on Public policy and domestic security Member States may refuse to grant
long-term resident status where the personal conduct of the person concerned constitutes an actual
threat to public order or domestic security
. It is considered to delete in paragraph 1 the word actual. It
is also proposed to delete in paragraph 2 of Article 7 the reference to the fact that Criminal
convictions shall not in themselves automatically warrant the refusal referred to in paragraph 1”. 
same applies to Article 19, regarding the right to settle in another Member State.
With regard to Article 13 Protection against expulsion the Commission is considering deleting
paragraph in which emergency expulsion procedures are prohibited against long term residents. This
provision applies once the third country national has obtained the long-term resident status, he/she
should therefore benefit from a higher level of protection. Nevertheless, emergency expulsion
procedures can be justified in case of a terrorism threat.
Finally, in  Article 25 on the Withdrawal of residence permit it is stated that: (1) “During a five-year
transitional period, the second Member State may take a decision to expel a long-term resident and/or
family members: on grounds of public policy or domestic security as defined in Article 19; (2)
Expulsion decisions may not be accompanied by a permanent ban on residence
”.  In such cases, the
second Member State shall expel the long-term resident only to the Member State that has granted
him/her the status. In cases of serious threat, as defined in art. 13 (1), the second Member State should
expel the long-term resident directly to his/her country of origin or to another country outside the
European Union. The Commission is considering adding an article 2 bis: “In case of an actual and
sufficiently serious threat the procedure of article 13 may apply”.

Future Proposals for EC legislation in the field of immigration
Students and other third-country nationals
The objectives of the future Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purpose of study and self-employed economic activities are considered to be
best achieved by guaranteeing simultaneously the possibility for Member States to cater for their
domestic security concerns. The Proposal will therefore include a clause allowing Member States to
refuse admission of a third-country national, the renewal of a residence permit or to revoke such a
permit on grounds of public policy, public security or public health based exclusively on the personal
conduct of the third-country national concerned. This drafting seems sufficiently large to give Member
States the necessary margin of maneuver to refuse admission or put an end to the stay of a third-
19 Brussels, 10.10.2000 COM (2000) 624 final
20 Brussels, 13.3.2001 COM (2001) 127 final

country national if objectively needed. Same provisions will be included in the Proposal for a
Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for other purposes.
Victims of trafficking
The Commission services are currently preparing a Proposal for a Directive on short-term permit to
stay for the victims of trafficking. There is no right to this permit to stay as such, its issuing is subject
to a set of conditions being met. One of the conditions for the delivery is that “ no  considerations
regarding public order or national security oppose this delivery”.
 The same applies to the renewal and
consequently the withdrawal of the permit. This wording seems wide enough to enable Member States
to protect their public order and national security.