Ref. Ares(2019)3734997 - 11/06/2019
Ref. Ares(2020)1730255 - 24/03/2020
D6.2 Evolving CONOPS framework (1st
version)
Document Due Date: 31/05/2019
Document Submission Date: 31/05/2019
Work Package 6: Operational Methods and
Acceptability
Document Dissemination Level: CO
Abstract
Deliverable D6.2 Evolving CONOPS Framework (1st Version) reports on initial workshop and field research
intended to establish an operational baseline for the TRESSPASS project representing the current “as-is”
situation for each of the three modalities. An end-user workshop was held in Dublin in December 2018
which led to the drafting of initial proto-CONOPS representations of the key border-crossing point
processes and challenges from the perspective of the end-users themselves. The activity-centred CONOPS
methodology described in D6.1 was applied which required end-users to identify the key personnel,
goals/objectives, tools & technologies, task distribution, organisational context, and rules, in the form of
an abstracted but holistic framework indicating the interdependence of all these elements.
The proto-CONOPS work allowed for the orientation of and planning for more concrete and detailed
empirical fieldwork studies conducted in Piraeus Port, Schiphol airport, and Terespol land BCP,
representing the three different modalities of concern to TRESSPASS. Site visits were conducted by NUIM,
KEMEA, and NCSR”D” personnel during April and May 2019 involving 1-2 days per visit. These visits were
facilitated and hosted by PPA, RNM, and PBG.
Section 1 outlines the purpose and objectives of the deliverable and section 2 presents the methodological
approach taken to acquire the data and perform the analysis. Section 3 discusses the preliminary finding
from the Dublin workshop leading to the proto CONOPS descriptions reported here.
Section 4 details the findings from the field studies of the three BCPs in detail in terms of the personnel,
tools/technologies, information, and other related resources.
Section 5 presents conclusions and future steps towards the continued evolution of the CONOPS and
remaining questions to be addressed.
1
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION
8
1.1 AIM OF THIS DOCUMENT
8
1.2 INPUT / OUTPUT TO THIS DOCUMENT
9
1.3 OVERVIEW OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL BORDERS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
9
1.4 INITIAL HUMAN FACTORS/SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
10
1.4.1 EXPLOITATION OF THE VULNERABILITIES OF RISK-BASED BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BY
ADVERSARIES
10
1.4.2 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY
11
2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
13
2.1 TRESSPASS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
13
2.2 TRESSPASS WORKSHOP IN DUBLIN
14
2.3 OBSERVING THE BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS AT SEA, AIR AND LAND BORDER CROSSING POINTS 15
3 FINDINGS FROM THE DUBLIN WORKSHOP – PROTO CONOPS
17
3.1.1 OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
17
3.1.2 KEY ROLES, TASKS, TOOLS AND INTER-DEPENDENCIES
17
3.1.3 CHALLENGES AND DESIRED OUTCOMES
21
3.2 TASK 3: PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM THE SWIM LANES EXERCISE
27
3.2.1 EXAMPLE ONE: DUBLIN AIRPORT
27
3.2.2 EXAMPLE TWO: SCHIPHOL AIRPORT
28
3.2.3 EXAMPLE THREE: SCHIPHOL AIRPORT
29
3.2.4 EXAMPLE FOUR: LAND BORDER CONTROL PROCEDURE IN POLAND
30
4 DEVELOPING A CONOPS BASED ON THE FINDINGS FROM THREE MODALITIES: LAND, SEA
AND AIR
32
4.1 INTRODUCTION
32
4.2 PIRAEUS SEA PORT – DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
32
4.2.1 KEY ROLES AND TASKS OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN BORDER CONTROL
32
4.2.2 OPERATIONAL PROCESSES AT THE BCP IN PIRAEUS
33
4.2.3 KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
39
4.3 SCHIPHOL AIRPORT - DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
41
4.3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AT SCHIPHOL AIRPORT
41
4.3.2 KEY ROLES OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN BORDER CONTROL
42
4.3.3 KEY TASKS AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT BORDER CONTROL AGENCIES
43
4.3.4 OPERATIONAL PROCESSES
44
4
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4.3.5 KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
49
4.4 TERESPOL LAND BCP
51
4.4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
51
4.4.2 KEY ROLES AND TASKS OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN BORDER CONTROL
53
4.4.3 OPERATIONAL PROCESSES
56
4.4.4 KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
66
5 CONCLUSION
67
5.1 SUMMARY
67
5.2 IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
67
6 REFERENCES
68
5
Table of Figures
6
link to page 11 link to page 17 link to page 27
List of Tables
Table 1: Border Management Agencies ...................................................................................................... 10
Table 2: Agencies Involved in Border Control Activities ............................................................................. 16
Table 3: Data from the Dublin Workshop ................................................................................................... 26
7
1 INTRODUCTION
Deliverable D6.2 reports the findings from activities conducted towards achieving the objectives of T6.1
and T6.2. This document presents the preliminary findings from the
end-user/stakeholder workshop that
NUIM hosted in Dublin on 11th December 2018 and subsequent
ethnographic field-work conducted on
site with at the three BCP – Schiphol Airport in the Netherlands, the Port of Piraeus in Greece, and Terespol
land border in Poland. The Dublin workshop took place as part of a sequence of activities seeking to gather
information from end-users/stakeholders about their work on border crossing facilities, the challenges
they face and potential solutions in order to develop a proto-CONOPS which would form the foundation
for an evolving concept of operations to guide the system development work of the TRESSPASS project.
Following from that we were able to return to the end-user partners PPA, RNM, and PBG for further
validation and observation of the operational processes involved in managing BCP operations.
What is presented here therefore is the first draft of an evolving concept of operations (CONOPS). What
is meant by first draft is the fact that with this reported work we are describing the initial operational
baseline of current operational processes involving systems and technologies already in use. This will allow
us to subsequently identify the optimal operational role and spatiotemporal placement of TRESSPASS
tools and systems in order to achieve improved operational outcomes for secure and efficient border
management. Of critical importance here is the human factor within the system. The work of WP6 in
general and T6.2 in particular will involve looking holistically at the integrated human, technological,
informational, and other resource elements of the TRESSPASS system to ensure that a complete and
workable operational concept is achieved, guided by the overall objectives of border management
operations.
Towards to end of the project we will have integrated the TRESSPASS solutions into the CONOPS following
the pilots and we will then present the final CONOPS model as a guide for the implementation of risk-
based solutions to border management beyond the timeframe of the project.
1.1
Aim of this document
The aim of this document is to present the initial draft of CONOPS for all three BCP modalities (land/sea/air
crossings) which will form the basis of the evolving CONOPS, fed by emerging data from the development
of the TRESSPASS tools as well as empirical findings from WP6 and the pilot evaluations.
The evolving CONOPS will interact with WPs 3-7 which are concerned with the development and
integration of the TRESSPASS systems. It will provide those activities with important contextual
information about the BCPs in concrete detail and will contribute to the evolution of the CONOPS with
details of the emerging technical components of the TRESSPASS system to be demonstrated in the pilots.
8
1.4.2 Over-reliance on technology
Europe’s borders are becoming increasingly technologized (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016; Broeders &
Hampshire, 2013; Dijstelbloem, Meijer, & Besters, 2011), leading to the view that technology does the
jobs of humans better and faster but also changes the substance and nature of policy (Broeders &
Dijstelbloem, 2016, p. 1) leading to new opportunities, but also risks and challenges that border guards
will have to navigate. Menzel and Hesterman (2018) emphasise the value of utilising technological
solutions for risk reduction. However, they caution against an over-reliance on technology highlighting
the importance of human intuition. This resonates with the findings in a Dutch case study of the Royal
Netherlands Marechaussee’s (RNM) Amigo-boras camera system used for migration control (Dekkers, van
der Woude, & Koulish, 2018). The research team investigated whether the use of this camera system
increased objectivity of officers’ decisions. The study found that border guards deemed the system
insufficient for the detection of irregular migrants. Consequently, the officers tended to disregard alerts
from the system and used their discretion relying on their own intuition and experience in their decision-
making processes.
Wong and Brooks (2015) have suggested that since “it is not possible, practical, or necessary to screen all
passengers to the very highest level, a risk-based approach can be used to adjust the level of screening
that a passenger is subject to. sAccording to Wong and Brooks (2015), behaviour detection techniques,
such as “questioning, identification of a set of risk indicators and simple observation” (p. 62) have received
mixed reviews. They suggest that in Israel, each passenger is interviewed. Despite its sophistication, the
authors argue that this method is impractical in a high-traffic environment. Another issue with behaviour
screening may raise concerns about racial and other profiling. A potential solution that was discussed at
the Dublin workshop was the implementation of pre-checks to establish the level of risk posed by a
passenger. According to Wong and Brooks (2015), this method is currently being used by the US
Transportation Security Administration. Pre-screening means that passengers can be transferred to an
express lane which would both increase throughput than non-screened lanes and decrease resources.
According to the authors, pre-checks might indeed be a helpful approach to dealing with ever-increasing
passenger flows. They predict that pre-checks will be used increasingly by border control agents. In
Example Two below, participants suggested that in TRESSPASS, controls at departure could be more
stringent than at arrival. However, this may be problematic as not all countries may acknowledge the
procedures of another country as “equivalent” (Wong & Brooks, 2015, p. 63). However, regardless of
novel and more sophisticated approaches to border control, Poole (2008) highlights that the actual
dilemma lies in the fact that terrorists will be able to find new ways to sidestep any new measures or
technologies implemented.
Another issue which was also highlighted by workshop participants themselves, is the controversial topic
of using passenger data, e.g. the analysis of social media profiles. Participants highlighted that in line with
GDPR as well as ethical requirements, passengers would need to consent to the analysis of their data.
11
Workshop participants highlighted the problem of ‘siloed’ approaches to data management and indicated
that in order to implement a risk-based approach, the acquisition and exchange of data needs to be
facilitated. It was not entirely clear from the data whether they suggested that information sharing needs
to be improved within states and between national authorities, or between states. However, Wong and
Brooks (2015) predict that information sharing between states is unlikely, even though it would be
desirable.
12
2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
2.1
TRESSPASS Concept of Operations
The overall methodological approach of the project was described in detail in the DoA, and in the previous
deliverable “D6.1 Observational studies methodology and research framework”. To summarise,
TRESSPASS uses a conceptual design activity approach called ‘concept of operations’ (CONOPS). CONOPS
refers to a user-oriented description of a proposed system with respect to its operational use context. In
the context of TRESSPASS, we are referring to the risk management processes and systems involved in
critical infrastructure. CONOPS seeks to describe the system’s functions, the roles and responsibilities of
actors within the system, and its relationship to its surrounding dependent systems, along with resource
implications. For example, in the context of border management, there are key dependencies between
border agencies and civil authorities who need to be considered in the context of risk planning and day-
to-day management in a prospective way. Yet, a CONOPS is not a document that provides detail about
the requirements of the system. Instead, a CONOPS aims to address higher-level questions about, for
example:
-
the kinds of innovation or solutions needed;
-
its potential role within the operational process or system;
-
its impacts on the various actors involved;
Answers to these questions will be gathered through an iterative process involving data collection and
analysis, system design, implementation, integration, verification and validation.
The core objective is the development of a document that can clearly communicates the role,
responsibilities, and interdependencies of the
key actors that reside within that system with
respect to the achievement of the overall
objective. This will guide the processes of
development and implementation. Moreover,
the CONOPS will be used to validate that the
development solutions will work and to
improve
operational
key
performance
indicators (KPIs). The CONOPS outlines possible
scenarios and explains to decision makers how
FIGURE 1: CONOPS IN THE "V" DEVELOPMENT CYCLE
innovative solutions, or changes to existing
solutions, may be implemented.
13
2.2
TRESSPASS Workshop in Dublin
The TRESSPASS CONOPS strongly emphasises the requirements of end-users/stakeholders and in so doing,
takes a human-centric approach. This was demonstrated at the Dublin TRESSPASS workshop on the 11th
December 2018 which was used to collect
some initial data from end-users who work in
the following three environments: Air, sea and
land. End-users were representatives of the
Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service
(INIS), the Piraeus Port Authority (PPA), the
Polish Border Guards (PBG) and the Royal
Netherlands Marechaussee (RNM). Data
collection took place in collaboration with
members of the TRESSPASS consortium.
FIGURE 2: CONOPS HEURISTIC
As part of the workshop, we sought to develop
a baseline CONOPS grounded in the knowledge and experiences of border control agents. For the purpose
of TRESSPASS, we sought to explore the characteristics, security structures and processes of current
border crossing points (BCPs). Moreover, we sought to understand what a future, risk-based TRESSPASS
CONOPS might look like. We asked the participants to consider the following questions in their evaluation:
• Who are the stakeholders involved with the system?
• What does your organisation lack that they system will provide?
• What are known elements and the high-level capabilities of the system?
• What is the time-sequence of activities that will be performed?
• What are the geographical and physical locations of the system?
• What resources do we need to design and build the system?
14
FIGURE 3: ACTIVITY SYSTEM FRAMEWORK FOR CONOPS
FIGURE 4: DUBLIN AIRPORT ACTIVITY FRAMEWORK
Seeking to get a better understanding of how border control at airports, seaports and at land borders (e.g.
international trains) currently operates, end-users were invited to participate in three tasks. Based on
Engeström's (1987) activity system, for Task One, end users were asked to identify their operational roles,
primary tasks, key tools and desired outcomes. Task Two required end-users to identify the operational
context, operational rules and key dependencies. A general activity centred CONOPS is depicted in Figure
3s. Figure 4 shows a CONOPS sketch illustrating the current situation at Dublin Airport.
2.3
Observing the border control operations at sea, air and land border crossing points
15
3 FINDINGS FROM THE DUBLIN WORKSHOP – PROTO CONOPS
3.1.1 Operational context
3.1.2 Key roles, tasks, tools and inter-dependencies
17
20
22
23
24
25
26
3.2
Task 3: Preliminary results from the Swim lanes exercise
3.2.1 Example One: Dublin Airport
27
.
3.2.2 Example Two: Schiphol Airport
28
31
4 DEVELOPING A CONOPS BASED ON THE FINDINGS FROM THREE
MODALITIES: LAND, SEA AND AIR
4.1
Introduction
4.2
Piraeus Sea Port – Description of the current situation
4.2.1 Key roles and tasks of agencies involved in border control
32
4.2.2 Operational processes at the BCP in Piraeus
.
4.2.2.1 Pre-arrival
4.2.2.2 Departure
33
34
35
36
4.2.2.3 Arrivals and transit involving Schengen and non-Schengen countries
37
38
4.2.2.4 Departure, arrival and transit processes specific to crew
4.2.3 Key challenges and opportunities
39
4.2.3.1 Description of desired changes
40
4.3.2 Key roles of agencies involved in border control
42
4.3.3 Key tasks and collaboration between the different border control agencies
43
4.3.4 Operational processes
44
45
46
47
48
4.3.5 Key challenges and opportunities
49
50
4.4
Terespol land BCP
4.4.1 Description of the current situation
51
52
4.4.2.1 Equipment used by the PBG for the control of people and cargo.
.
54
57
58
59
61
62
65
4.4.4 Key challenges and opportunities
66
5 CONCLUSION
5.1
Summary
5.2
Implications and next steps
.
67
6 REFERENCES
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robus
T Risk bas
Ed
Screening and alert
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PASSengers and luggage
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