Council of the
European Union
Brussels, 27 October 2020
(OR. en)
12319/20
COPS 353
CFSP/PESC 912
COVER NOTE
From:
European External Action Service
To:
Political and Security Committee
Subject:
Report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy to the Council "CFSP Report – Our Priorities in 2020"
Delegations will find attached document HR(2020) 155.
Encl.: HR(2020) 155
12319/20
MF/eb
RELEX.1.C
EN
HR(2020) 155
EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE
GREFFE
Report of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
to the Council
of 23/10/2020
CFSP Report – Our Priorities in 2020
HR(2020) 155
HR(2020) 155
1
HR(2020) 155
Report of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
to the Council
“CFSP Report – Our Priorities in 20201”
(A) INTRODUCTION
1.
Over the last decade, Europe has gone through successive crises: the financial crisis, the euro
crisis – as the consequence of the first – and then the migration crisis. In parallel, the world
around us has been getting more complex, more competitive and more dangerous, whereas
climate change is an existential threat to humanity and biodiversity across all countries and
regions, and requires an urgent collective response. Now Europe, with the rest of the world,
faces the COVID-19 pandemic. It poses a new challenge but it has also shown to accelerate
trends, which were already present before.
2.
Asian countries are emerging as increasingly important - in economic, security, and
technological terms. This is the first major crisis in decades where the US is not leading the
international response. The geopolitical rivalry between the US and China is increasing. The
European Union (EU) should follow its own interests and values, and avoid being
instrumentalised by one or the other.
3.
Adapting to this more competitive world, the EU will have to redouble its efforts to protect
and promote a rule-based multilateral order with the United Nations (UN) at its core. There
has never been greater demand for multilateral cooperation, but supply is falling behind. The
EU will work with like-minded partners to help strengthen multilateralism.
4.
The world is becoming more digital, but also more state-driven. The key questions will be:
who will control the digital networks? And who will have the necessary critical mass of skills,
investments and technology to set the rules and standards? It is vital that the EU assumes a
leading global role on technological competition and claims leadership on the rules of the
global digital future.
5.
Globalisation is under pressure. A more strategic approach is needed to managing
vulnerabilities and dependencies, health being a prominent example, but also on economy,
defence and protecting critical functions. We need to avoid sliding into protectionism while
strengthening resilience and capacity to act autonomously.
6.
The world risks becoming less free, less prosperous, more unequal, more fragmented.
Democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law – the EU political model – are
1 This report should be read in conjunction with Council and European Council Conclusions.
HR(2020) 155
2
HR(2020) 155
contested. Some are not shy in exploiting these dynamics. In the digital domain and
elsewhere, there is a real battle of narratives going on. The EU must defend its model and the
values which underpin it, including through fighting disinformation from wherever it comes.
7.
To face all these challenges we need to build a real common strategic culture. We need to
support multilateralism while at the same time strengthening strategic autonomy. We need to
defend EU values and political model while at the same time promoting a greener, sustainable
and socially inclusive recovery. But we also need to act based on global solidarity, because
the big issues of the times require global and collective responses.
8.
EU ambitions are only credible if they are backed with a sense of shared ownership and
responsibility among Member States and institutions, working together according to
respective competences. And we need the resources to be effective. An EU foreign policy that
gets results needs us all to invest in it, politically and financially.
(B)
GEOGRAPHICAL
Europe and Central Asia
Non-EU Western European countries
9.
The EU has very close relations with non-EU Western European countries, based on shared
values and interests including multilateralism and a rule-based global order. As likeminded
partners, these countries generally support EU foreign policy positions and objectives
including in international organisations and cooperate on global issues such as the fight
against the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, migration or security. There is regular
informal political dialogue on CSFP/CSDP matters and on issues such as for instance
sanctions, and human rights, with some of these countries. Relations with Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway are mainly conducted within the framework of the European
Economic Area (EEA) agreement. The close partnership between the EU and the EEA EFTA
States it ensures is the best guarantee of long-term shared economic prosperity and stability,
and of a construction of a Europe based on peace, democracy, the rule of law and human
rights. As regards Switzerland, negotiations on an Institutional Framework Agreement were
concluded in 2018. This agreement sets out crucial horizontal rules and procedures applying
to existing and future agreements that allow Switzerland to participate in the EU internal
market. These rules (such as a “dynamic” takeover of the EU
acquis by Switzerland,
disciplines on State aid and an effective dispute settlement mechanism) are commensurate to
the ambitious, strategic and structured relationship
that the EU and Switzerland deserve.
Furthermore, it is the only key to deepen our relationships, as any future agreement depend on
it, while current access risks eroding as upcoming updates of existing agreements may not
take place. Switzerland is still to take the needed decisions to sign the agreement, and is
expected to move forward on this rapidly. Finally, since 2015, the EU pursues Association
Agreement(s) negotiations with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. While taking duly into
account “the particular situation of these small-sized countries” (as per the Treaty), the aim of
HR(2020) 155
3
HR(2020) 155
this Association Agreement(s) would be to allow their participation in the EU's internal
market in accordance with the EU principles and disciplines that ensure the integrity of the
internal market. The EU and the Holy See are further strengthening their relations including in
the context of the 50th Anniversary of the establishment of the relations in 2020.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)
10. On 1 February 2020, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter
UK) withdrew from the European Union based on the Withdrawal Agreement, which entered
into force on the same date. A transition period has since then begun and will last until 31
December 2020,given that the UK Government has declared that there would be no extension
of the transition period beyond this date. . During the transition period, Union law continues
to apply to and in the UK.
11. Negotiations on the future EU-UK partnership began in March 2020. The EU position at the
negotiations has been set in the negotiating directives, adopted by the Council in February
2020 and publicly available, and based on the Political Declaration on the future relationship
that the EU and the UK agreed in October 2019. In line with the European Council guidelines,
the EU objective in the negotiations is to establish a new comprehensive partnership covering
the policy areas outlined in the Political Declaration, including trade and economic
cooperation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy,
security and defence. The future partnership should also be underpinned by strong governance
and institutional provisions. At the outset of the negotiations, the UK has informed the EU
side that it does not intend to negotiate treaty-based provisions in the areas of foreign, security
and defence policy.
12. In spite of the intensified pace of negotiation and apart from some limited progress, no
significant progress could be recorded after seven formal rounds of negotiations. As noted in
the negotiating mandate, the negotiations of the partnership should be premised on the
effective implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and of its Protocols.
13. Work has continued also on the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and its three
Protocols. In this context, the EU has clearly stated the importance of implementing the legal
obligations of the Protocol, thereby protecting the integrity of the EU single market as well as
the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998 that ensures the peace, stability and
reconciliation on the island of Ireland. The EU has also expressed its view that, within the
framework of the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement, reciprocal protection should
be provided for Union citizens residing in the UK, and for UK nationals residing in the EU, as
well as their respective family members.
14. As the United Kingdom became a third country, on 1 February 2020 the EU has opened a
Delegation to the UK.
HR(2020) 155
4
HR(2020) 155
Western Balkans
15. In 2019 and 2020, Member States, notably through the Council's decision to open accession
negotiations with the Republic of Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia, the
appointment of an EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other
Western Balkan regional issues, and together with the Western Balkans through the Zagreb
Summit on 6 May 2020, reaffirmed their
unequivocal support for the European
perspective of the region. In line with the Zagreb Summit Declaration, the overall priority of
the EU in 2020 is to intensify further its engagement at all levels to support the region’s
political, economic and social transformation. The EU will continue to enhance the region's
resilience, contributing to the security of the EU itself.
16. Throughout 2020, the EU has focused on addressing the following political stability and
security factors, and will continue to do so:
EU facilitation of the dialogue between Belgrade
and Pristina, aiming for a comprehensive legally binding agreement on the
normalisation of
relations between the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo2; in the
Republic of Albania and in
the
Republic of North Macedonia, the first intergovernmental conferences should be
convened as soon as possible after the adoption of the negotiating frameworks by the Council;
supporting
Montenegro's and the
Republic of Serbia's reform efforts, particularly in the rule
of law area, so that they can both progress faster on their EU accession paths, and deepening
cooperation with the
Republic of Serbia on foreign and security policy, with a focus on
strengthening alignment with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy; facilitating
political dialogue and supporting continued reforms in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
completing the Kosovo visa liberalisation process should also be key priorities. The EU will
continue
its public diplomacy and strategic communication actions in co-ordination with
Member States and Western Balkan authorities and on addressing disinformation.
17. To address issues regarding migration, close coordination and cooperation will need to
continue, including protection and assistance to those in need, following up of assistance to
manage borders, improving reception capacities, enhancing support in return, in readmission,
fighting smuggling networks, signing and implementation of the European Border and Coast
Guard Agency status agreements and deployment of EUROPOL liaison officers.
18. The EU will continue to strengthen and expand
cooperation with Western Balkan partners
on foreign policy and defence issues including progressive alignment with the EU's foreign
policy. This will be done notably through regular EU-Western Balkans political dialogues and
capacity-building measures. The EU will continue to promote cooperation on hybrid threats,
counter-terrorism, preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, the fight against organised
crime, border security, illicit firearms and stockpiles of weapons. The EU appreciates the
significant contributions of the Western Balkan partners to CSDP missions and operations
around the world. CSDP tools continue to be deployed in the region. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the
EU military operation, EUFOR Althea, will
continue to make an
2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244
(1999) and the Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
HR(2020) 155
5
HR(2020) 155
important contribution to stability and security. The second Strategic Review of 2019
confirmed the need to focus the Operation on its core mandate to support the Bosnia and
Herzegovina authorities in their responsibility to maintain a safe and secure environment, and
the next review, to be delivered in 2021, will consider possible further adjustments, depending
on assessment of developments in the security situation.
19. The EU
Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo will continue to focus on trial
monitoring, supporting rule of law institutions, residual operational functions, and technical
support to the implementation of EU-facilitated Dialogue agreements.
Turkey
20. Turkey
remains a candidate country and a key partner in many areas. The EU reaffirms the
importance it attaches to relations with Turkey and remains committed to maintaining an open
and frank dialogue to address challenges and to cooperate in essential areas of joint interest.
Handling the relationship of the EU with Turkey, in all its complexity, will continue to be an
important priority in the coming period.
21. The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly demonstrated how the EU and its partners can
tackle
common challenges together. The EU has immediately taken measures in the context of the
EU Solidarity Fund, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and the Facility for Refugees
in Turkey, to support Turkey’s response. This support will continue.
22. The EU values the conduct of comprehensive EU-Turkey dialogues on foreign policy issues,
which should resume and contribute to reversing Turkey’s persistent negative trend of
alignment with the positions of the EU on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU-
Turkey counter-terrorism dialogue also remains important. The Council decision of July 2019
not to hold the Association Council and further meetings of the EU-Turkey high-level
dialogues for the time being remains valid.
23. Continued cooperation on migration remains important. Nevertheless, the March 2020
unprecedented situation at the EU external borders with Turkey was not acceptable. While
acknowledging the increased migratory burden and risks Turkey is facing on its territory and
the substantial efforts it has made in hosting 3,7 million migrants and refugees, the EU
reiterated its serious concern over the situation at the Greek-Turkish border and strongly
rejected Turkey's use of migratory pressure for political purposes. Furthermore, the EU
underlined that migrants should not be encouraged to attempt illegal crossings and called on
the Turkish government and all actors and organisations on the ground to relay this message
and counter the dissemination of false information. Turkey should implement fully the
provisions of the 2016 Joint Statement, which produces tangible results. Both the EU and
Turkey stand to benefit from the continuation of this cooperation and commitment. The EU
continued to provide significant humanitarian assistance to vulnerable refugees in Turkey also
beyond the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Following the meeting of the European Council
President and the Commission President with the President of Turkey on 9 March 2020, the
HR(2020) 155
6
HR(2020) 155
High Representative was tasked, together with his Turkish counterpart, to take stock of the
implementation of the Statement.
24. While recalling its conclusions of July 2016, which strongly condemned the 15 July 2016
coup attempt and expressed solidarity with the Turkish people and full support for the
democratic institutions of Turkey, the EU has repeatedly voiced serious concern about the
disproportionate scale and scope of measures taken by the authorities in its aftermath. Despite
the lifting of the state of emergency, the deeply worrying backsliding continued in the areas of
rule of law and fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. The ongoing
deterioration of the independence and functioning of the judiciary cannot be condoned, nor
can the continuing restrictions, detentions, imprisonments and other measures against people
exercising their fundamental rights and freedoms. Forceful dismissals of elected mayors in the
southeast and their replacement by government-appointed trustees as well as arrests of local
representatives remain a source of great concern. The EU recalled the international standards
and the obligations to which Turkey has subscribed and committed itself and called on Turkey
urgently to reverse these negative trends.
25. The EU has recalled and reaffirmed its position as clearly defined by previous relevant
Council and European Council conclusions on Turkey’s continued illegal activities in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Concrete steps are needed towards creating an environment conducive
to dialogue. Some actions by Turkey regrettably go in the opposite direction, including the
Turkish decision to convert Hagia Sophia back to a mosque that will inevitably fuel mistrust,
promote renewed divisions between religious communities and undermine efforts at dialogue
and cooperation. The Turkish authorities should urgently reconsider and reverse their
decision. The EU has also condemned the escalation of Turkey’s violations of Greek national
airspace, including overflights of inhabited areas, and territorial sea, in violation of
international law. The EU expects Turkey unequivocally to commit to good neighbourly
relations, international agreements and to the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse,
if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. The Turkey-Libya Memorandum of
Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea
infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea
and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States.
26. Turkey should respect international law, including the Law of the Sea, and in particular the
sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their
sovereign rights in their maritime zones, including those generated by islands. All members of
the international community must abide by these principles and should refrain from any
actions undermining regional stability and security.
27. The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. In
this regard, it remains crucial that Turkey commits and actively contributes to such a
settlement, including its external aspects, within the UN framework, in accordance with
relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is
founded and the EU
acquis. In addition, the EU has called repeatedly on Turkey to fulfil its
obligations under the Negotiating Framework, including the full, non-discriminatory
HR(2020) 155
7
HR(2020) 155
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. Recognition of all
Member States remains essential.
28. The EU has taken note of the Turkish government’s stated commitment to EU accession. This
however, needs to be matched by corresponding measures and reforms by Turkish authorities.
As noted by the Council on 18 June 2019, Turkey continues to move further away from the
European Union.
29. The EU and Turkey have a strong interest in an improvement of their relations through a
dialogue, which is intended to create an environment of trust. Abstaining from unilateral
actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond is a basic element to allow the dialogue to
advance. Reversing all the existing negative trends remains a fundamental prerequisite for
improvement across the range of EU-Turkey relations.
Eastern Partnership (EaP) - Multilateral
30. Since 2009, reaffirming the joint commitment to building a common area of shared
democracy, prosperity and stability, the Eastern Partnership has provided an ambitious,
flexible and inclusive framework for cooperation between Member States and Partner
Countries jointly to tackle common and global challenges in a wide range of areas. In line
with the principles of inclusiveness and differentiation, it has allowed to strengthen and
deepen the bilateral relations with each of the six Eastern partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine). It also has advanced on agreed
objectives at the multilateral level, supporting sustainable reform processes and offering close
political association and economic integration with the EU and tangible impact on people’s
lives. The “20 deliverables for 2020” agenda agreed at the 2017 Summit has proved to be a
useful result-oriented implementation framework, to be kept in the future. In addition, in order
to better prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious behaviour in cyberspace, the
Council decided on 30 July 2020 to apply restrictive measures against six individuals and
three entities or bodies involved in various cyber-attacks. These include the attempted cyber-
attack against the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and those
publicly known as 'WannaCry', 'NotPetya', and 'Operation Cloud Hopper'
31. Following a broad and inclusive structured consultation process conducted in 2019, the Joint
Communication on the Eastern Partnership beyond 2020: "Reinforcing resilience – an Eastern
Partnership that delivers for all" was adopted on 18 March 2020. The Joint Communication
identified new challenges and opportunities in the Eastern Partnership region, embracing the
twin digital and ecological transformations. Strengthening resilience will be one of the key
goals, through five broad policy objectives in line with Commission priorities, as well as
addressing the emergence of health as an important area for cooperation in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Launched together with Member States as part as Team Europe, the
EU has put forward a support package to help partner countries tackle the crisis, particularly
in mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on human lives, employment and
economies.
HR(2020) 155
8
HR(2020) 155
32. Strategic communication will remain a key task, in order to promote the visibility and benefits
of cooperation between the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries, not least in the wake of
growing disinformation. In the area of cooperation on foreign policy, security and defence,
the EU appreciates the contributions of the partner countries (Georgia, Republic of Moldova,
Ukraine) to CSDP missions and operations and will not only continue providing regional
training programmes in this field, but also enhance, where appropriate, security dialogues and
cooperation on CSDP matters.
33. The Eastern Partnership Summit in 2021 is expected to endorse the long-term policy
objectives of the Eastern Partnership beyond 2020 based on the Joint Communication, the
Council Conclusions adopted on 11 May 2020, and further input of Member States and
partner countries.
Regional Cooperation Fora
34. In line with the EU priorities in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(
OSCE), the EU will continue to support the strengthening of the Organization as a platform
for political dialogue on all security related issues, especially aiming at finding a sustainable
political solution to protracted conflicts and to crises, including the conflict in and around
eastern Ukraine. The EU and OSCE will continue to use the framework for cooperation set up
by the letters exchanged between the European Commission, the European External Action
Service and the OSCE in June 2018, where tangible progress has already been achieved
across all OSCE dimensions and geographic areas. Considering the May 2020 high-level
VTC exchange, the EU and OSCE will also promote a multilateral approach to address the
short and medium term consequences of the COVID-19 crisis also at OSCE countries level,
the climate-security nexus and will strengthen existing cooperation. The OSCE's
comprehensive concept of security and full implementation of the existing commitments in all
three dimensions will remain key for the EU's approach to the organisation.
35. The EU's engagement with the
Black Sea regional cooperation will be pursued by
implementing the 17 June 2019 Council Conclusions, with the Black Sea Synergy as its core
element and including Green Deal strands. Furthermore, supporting and implementing the
Common Maritime Agenda and the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda for the Black
Sea, adopted in Bucharest on 21 May 2019, remain essential. Enhancing regional and cross
border cooperation, building confidence, boosting multilateralism, supporting civil society,
improving connectivity (by developing the "bridging role of the Black Sea basin") and
strategic communication will be of utmost importance. These actions will deliver tangible
results for the citizens by strengthening the resilience of societies concerned, development of
sustainable blue economy and alleviating COVID-19 pandemic impact. The respect for
international law, including the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including
freedom of navigation, as well as EU policy decisions and its non-recognition policy on the
illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol will remain fundamental when applying the EU's
approach to regional cooperation in the Black Sea.
HR(2020) 155
9
HR(2020) 155
36. The EU will continue to support substantially the existing regional cooperation architecture in
Northern Europe through the
Northern Dimension (ND) policy. Funding and participation
will continue in the work of ND partnerships, regional councils and through cross-border and
transnational cooperation programmes. Links with other EU policies and objectives relevant
for the region, such as the EU Arctic policy and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,
will be pursued, with a particular focus on people-to-people relations, health, climate change,
the environment, and connectivity.
37. The
Arctic regions continue to draw considerable economic, environmental and security
interest globally. During 2020, the High Representative, together with the Commission, will
conduct internal and external consultations regarding a possible update of the EU Arctic
policy, taking into account the conclusions adopted by the Council on 9 December 2019.
Climate change and increase of temperatures across the Arctic lead to an acceleration of the
melting of ice on land and at sea as well as thawing of
permafrost. Increased access to
resources located in Arctic regions has led to new and major investors’ interest. The local,
social impact and demographic shifts may be dramatic, though not uniform, across the Arctic.
The safety and security implications of increased activity will also require thorough analysis.
The EU will continue to increase its visibility
inter alia through the Special Envoy for Arctic
matters in cooperation with the Commission, Member States, and the European Parliament.
Eastern Partnership (EaP) – Bilateral relations
38. The EU remains committed to support
Ukraine's reforms, in line with the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The EU and
Ukraine agreed on the need further to cooperate in tackling cyber and hybrid threats. The EU
Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine continues the strategic advice and practical support in
order to achieve civilian security services that are efficient, accountable, and enjoy the trust of
the public. EUAM will enhance its activities in the southeast of the country, notably through
its field office in Mariupol from June 2020 onwards. The EU reaffirmed its resolute support
for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, within its internationally
recognised borders. The EU will remain fully committed to its non-recognition policy,
including through restrictive measures. The EU condemns the ongoing militarisation of
Crimea by Russia and calls for full compliance with international human rights standards
there. The EU remains a strong supporter of the negotiating efforts of the Normandy Format,
the Trilateral Contact Group and the OSCE with a view to the full implementation of the
Minsk Agreements. Following a Russian presidential decree enabling the simplified issuing of
passports in certain areas of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the European
Commission and the EEAS issued guidance on how to handle visa applications lodged by
residents of these non-government controlled areas of Ukraine. The EU welcomed the mutual
release of prisoners and stands ready to support further implementation of the measures
agreed in the Normandy Summit in December 2019. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic
should not be allowed to have a negative impact on the conflict resolution efforts. The EU
will continue to call on Russia and the armed formations that it backs to allow access to the
HR(2020) 155
10
HR(2020) 155
non-government controlled areas for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) and
humanitarian actors, which has been restricted since March 2020.
39. The EU remains fully committed to its political association and economic integration with
Georgia. It welcomed Georgia's commitment to a successful implementation of the
Association Agreement, including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The EU
remains fully committed to conflict resolution and its policy of non-recognition and
engagement in Georgia, using all instruments at its disposal through an integrated approach,
including through the activities of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South
Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).
40. The EU also remains committed to strengthening cooperation and partnership with the
Republic of
Moldova focused on implementing reforms based on the Association Agreement
with a view to delivering tangible benefits to the Moldovan citizens. Cooperation with
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova will continue to address the socio-economic and other
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in a sustainable manner. The EU also continues to
support a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Transnistrian conflict,
within the 5+2 format, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transnistria.
41. The EU’s engagement with
Armenia focuses on deepening democratic, social, and economic
reforms based on the 2017 Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and
on the 2018 Partnership Priorities. At the EU-Armenia Partnership Committee in December
2019, the EU expressed appreciation for the objectives achieved so far under the Roadmap for
CEPA implementation adopted by the Armenian government. The EU will continue to
provide support to the Armenian government to implement the reforms linked to CEPA.
42. The EU continues its cooperation with
Azerbaijan in the framework of the Partnership
Priorities of 2018. The conclusion of a new ambitious agreement with Azerbaijan reflecting
the current scope of cooperation remains the top priority in our relations. The dialogue in the
area of security continued with the second EU-Azerbaijan Security Dialogue that took place
in December 2019 in Baku.
43. The EU continues to closely follow the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process and
support the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, including through the EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. With respect to the way
forward, the EU expects the sides to follow up on the joint statements of the Foreign
Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Co-Chairs of 30 January and 21 April 2020. The
European Union calls for strict observation of the ceasefire, devoting energy and resources to
fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and meaningful engagement in the Co-Chairs-led
negotiations. The EU stands ready further to support civil society confidence-building
measures across the conflict divide.
44. The EU continued cooperation with
Belarus in line with the Council Conclusions of February
2016. The 2019 November Parliamentary elections in Belarus did not meet important
HR(2020) 155
11
HR(2020) 155
international standards for democratic elections, and the EU called on Belarusian authorities
to resume work on a comprehensive electoral reform. On 17 February 2020 the Council
decided to prolong the remaining restrictive measures against Belarus for one year, until 28
February 2021, due to lack of improvement of the human rights situation in Belarus, including
continued application of the death penalty. In line with the EU commitment to support people
to people contacts and civil society, on 1 July 2020, the EU-Belarus visa facilitation and
readmission agreements entered into force. However, following the clear falsification of 2020
Presidential election results and the subsequent crackdown on peaceful protesters, the EU-
Belarus relations seriously deteriorated. The EU sent a strong signal of the EU’s support to
the Belarusian population in their desire for democratic change. The EU called the Belarusian
authorities to stop the disproportionate and unacceptable violence against peaceful protesters
and to release those detained.
Russia
45. Managing the relationship with the
Russian Federation during 2020 will continue to
represent a key strategic challenge for the European Union. The EU's policy towards Russia
continues to be guided by the five principles as reaffirmed by the EU Foreign Ministers on
several occasions. The balanced and effective implementation of the five principles is flexible
and ensures a united EU approach.
46. The EU's relations with Russia in 2020 have continued to be dominated by Russia's violation
of international law in and around Ukraine, including the illegal annexation of the Crimean
peninsula and Russia's actions in destabilising the situation in eastern Ukraine. All three of the
EU's regimes of restrictive measures (travel ban/asset freeze on individuals and entities;
measures related to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula; and economic measures) are
subject to a regular review. The economic measures remain linked to the full implementation
of the Minsk agreements.
47. In March 2019, the European Council welcomed the important work accomplished and called
for further enhanced coordinated efforts to address the internal and external aspects of
disinformation. In line with European Council conclusions of 22 March 2018, the EU has
continued to take measures to strengthen its resilience to disinformation, chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear-related risks and bolster its capabilities to address hybrid threats,
including in the areas of cyber, strategic communication, and counter-intelligence. The EU
fully supports UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 2166 on the downing of flight MH-17 and calls on
Russia to accept its responsibility and to cooperate fully with all efforts to establish truth,
justice, and accountability. The start of the criminal trial on 9 March 2020 marked an
important milestone towards establishing the truth and achieving justice for the victims and
their next of kin, and holding those responsible to account for the downing of the flight MH-
17.
48. At the same time, the EU remains committed to continue its selective engagement on
international crises, global and other issues that are in the common interest of the EU. The EU
will continue to express its serious concern regarding human rights, rule of law and
HR(2020) 155
12
HR(2020) 155
democracy in Russia, in particular as regards measures that restrict fundamental freedoms and
restrictions imposed to curtail an independent civil society in Russia. The importance of the
role of the Council of Europe is recalled in this context. The EU will maintain and enhance its
support for people-to-people contacts and Russian civil society as an indispensable element of
its relations with Russia.
HR(2020) 155
13
HR(2020) 155
Central Asia
49. The EU strategy on Central Asia adopted in June 2019 guided EU engagement in the region
throughout the year. The EU took forward the negotiation of new-generation Enhanced
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) with Central Asian states, which have
provided a strong vehicle to forge more modern and diversified partnerships and promote
cooperation and regulatory convergence in areas, which are particularly relevant to the reform
processes underway in the region. The EPCA with
Kazakhstan came into force in March
2020. The EPCA with
Kyrgyzstan initialled in July 2019 in Bishkek was prepared to allow
for signature by the end of 2020. Significant progress was achieved in the ongoing EPCA
negotiations with
Uzbekistan. Negotiating directives for an EPCA with
Tajikistan were
prepared by the EEAS. In July 2019, the EU opened a full-fledged Delegation in
Turkmenistan. The EU actively promoted regional cooperation, in particular in the areas of
rule of law and governance, law enforcement, education, water and environment, disaster risk
reduction, as well as sustainable connectivity and trade development in the region. The 16th
EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting to be held in November 2020 will provide a key
opportunity to set out the contribution which the EU can make to post-COVID-19 economic
recovery in the region as well as discuss priorities for EU cooperation in the post-2020 budget
cycle.
Africa
50. Relations with African partners are of a high priority for the EU. This year was announced to
be pivotal for taking EU-African Union (AU) relations to the next level. While continuing
implementing the outcomes of the AU-EU Summit in Abidjan in 2017, proposals have also
been made for the rethinking and scaling up of the EU-Africa Partnership, in view of the next
EU-AU Summit. In parallel, negotiations on a post-Cotonou Partnership agreement with ACP
countries have continued their course.
51. In February 2020, the
10th EU-AU Commission-to-Commission meeting was held at the AU
Headquarters in Addis Ababa, with a part of the meeting chaired by the High Representative
and dedicated to peace and security (pillar 3 of the Abidjan declaration) and another one to
migration and mobility (pillar 4). In all priority areas, the two sides reiterated their
commitment to support multilateralism as an effective modality in addressing global
challenges. The meeting was a critical building block of an enhanced partnership.
52. The
Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative “Towards a
comprehensive Strategy with Africa” was adopted on 9 March 2020. The Joint
Communication sets out ideas to intensify cooperation with Africa. It proposes a
comprehensive framework for future partnership to enable both sides to achieve their
common goals and to tackle global challenges. As a response to new, changing realities, the
proposal for a strategy introduces a specific focus on five key areas: green transition; digital
transformation; sustainable growth and jobs; peace and governance; and migration and
mobility. On 30 June
Council Conclusions reaffirmed that the EU is determined to
HR(2020) 155
14
HR(2020) 155
strengthen its relationship with African states and the African Union and highlighted that,
working towards a joint strategy based on common objectives, the EU looks forward to
stepping up an open and inclusive exchange with citizens, civil society, diaspora, young
people, the private sector, and top-level thinkers and decision-makers from both continents.
The Conclusions called for a closer partnership with Africa notably on multilateralism, peace,
security and stability, sustainable and inclusive development, and sustainable economic
growth.
53. On
Peace, Security and Governance, following the consultations held in the margins of the
EU-AU ministerial meeting in January 2019, two high-level meetings have since been
organised respectively in Addis Ababa in July 2019 and March 2020. These high level
meetings were opportunities to follow up on the shared commitments and steer the
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Peace, Security and
Governance signed in May 2018.
54. The
African Peace Facility (APF) remains the main financial tool for implementing AU-EU
cooperation in support to peace and has reached a total envelope of more than €3,5 billion
since 2004. A new action programme covering the period 2019-2020 was approved by the
Council in 2019. Under the overall objective of “reducing the incidence, duration and
intensity of conflicts in Africa”, the 2019-2020 Action Programme, amounting to €800
million, will allow for a continuation of support to conflict prevention, early response, conflict
management, and the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, as
well as substantial and predictable funding to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs)
and initiatives. A European Peace Facility is under negotiation in the Council and should
encompass the current scope of the African Peace Facility.
55. The 15th
EU-AU Human Rights Dialogue took place in October 2019 in Banjul, The
Gambia. The Dialogue was co-chaired by AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Minata
Cessouma Samate and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Eamon Gilmore.
The issues discussed were recent human rights developments in Africa and in Europe;
transitional justice, human rights promotion and protection, human rights monitoring and
reporting; death penalty, torture and ill treatment; business and human rights; and cooperation
on electoral observation as well as follow-up to election observation missions’
recommendations.
56. The negotiations on a new
Post-Cotonou Partnership agreement started in autumn 2018 and
are to be finalised in 2020. The new agreement will not only be the new framework of the
EU-ACP relations, it will also provide the basis for how the EU and the ACP want to
cooperate at international level, based on joint values and the principle of multilateralism. The
new agreement will consist of a common EU-ACP foundation with three regional pillars for
the (sub-Saharan) African, Caribbean and Pacific region, respectively. The common EU-ACP
foundation will spell out the key objectives and principles, whilst the EU political engagement
with ACP partners will be through the three regional partnerships. Coherence between the
Post-Cotonou Africa Pillar and the AU-EU Partnership will have to be ensured. The AU-EU
will need to provide political steering for the Africa pillar under Post-Cotonou as well. The
HR(2020) 155
15
HR(2020) 155
term of the current Cotonou agreement has been extended until the end of 2020 in order to
give sufficient time for the finalisation of negotiations and the signature of the new
agreement.
57. A partnership on
migration and mobility is proposed as part of the Joint Communication
“Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa”, with the goal of ensuring sustainable and
effective migration management through a balanced, coherent and comprehensive approach.
A key element emphasised is to ensure that migration and mobility is embedded in a balanced
manner in the overall partnership at all levels.
58. On the external aspects of migration, the regional dialogues– the Khartoum and Rabat
Processes – completed their consultations and submitted recommendations for updating to
their respective steering committees. A joint “Rabat/Khartoum processes” steering committee
will endorse the update in the second semester of 2020, followed by submission to a larger
senior officials meeting, proposed for the first quarter of 2021.
59. Progress is being made on establishing the Continent-to-Continent Migration and Mobility
Dialogue (C2CMMD), which, in line with the priorities in the JVAP and the emerging post-
Cotonou discussion, will pay particular attention to strengthened political dialogue on: (i)
development benefits of migration, in particular remittances and diaspora; (ii) legal pathways
for migration and mobility; (iii) protection and asylum; (iv) fight against irregular migration,
including smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings; (v) return, readmission, and
sustainable reintegration; and (vi) research, data and knowledge management. Collaboration
on specific actions for political dialogue and cooperation identified within these areas is
moving forward between the EU and the AU.
60. At country level, the EU has been active in supporting the implementation of the Joint
Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), and is in the process of updating the JVAP database to ensure
diffusion can be made at the beginning of 2021. Attention is being paid in particular to root
causes of migration and the challenges of smuggling and trafficking. The EU has also
continued discussions with a number of countries on either establishing or implementing
arrangements and agreements on returns and readmission, notably in West Africa and the
Horn of Africa.
61. The EEAS, in collaboration with Commission services and the European Investment Bank,
continued to undertake
European Economic Diplomacy (EED) activities across all regions
of Africa, and has now held dedicated EED meetings at the political level with over 30
countries with the members of the Customs Unions EAC and Southern African Customs
Union (SACU), including with the private sector and business-related institutions. EED in
2020 will need to accommodate its priorities to the specific characteristics of the economic
recovery from COVID-19 and to projecting the economic aspects of the External Dimension
of the Green Deal.
West Africa
HR(2020) 155
16
HR(2020) 155
62. In
West Africa, in the light of the Council Conclusions of June 2018 and of May 2019 on
Sahel/Mali, and in response to the continuous deterioration of the security situation in the
Sahel, the EU has further adjusted and operationalised its integrated approach to the region
and G5 Sahel. The EU will continue to work towards greater responsibility of G5 Sahel
partners, based on reciprocal commitment and increased mobilisation of regional and
international actors.
63. The EU has been involved in the preparation and implementation of the Partnership for
Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S), following the G7 Summit in Biarritz in August 2019
and of the International
Coalition for the Sahel, following the Summit between France and
the G5 Sahel Countries in Pau in January 2020. The high-level meeting organised by the EU
with G5 Sahel Heads of States on 28 April 2020 provided a key opportunity to keep the Sahel
high in the international agenda and reaffirm EU's support to the region. During the meeting,
the EU announced an additional €194 million to support security, stability and resilience in
the most vulnerable areas and €449 million to address socio-economic and sanitary impact of
COVID-19 on the Sahel region. The discussion and the joint declaration between the
members of the European Council and the Heads of Sates of the G5 Sahel, adopted on this
occasion, stated important principles to develop and to capitalise on in the coming months. As
a follow up to this meeting, which formally launched the P3S and the Coalition for the Sahel,
on 12 June 2020 a ministerial conference on mobilisation brought together foreign ministers
and high-ranking representatives from over 40 countries and international organisations.
Further impetus was provided during the G5 Sahel Summit organised in Nouakchott on 30
June 2020, which was attended by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the President of the
European Council, the UN, and the AU. The High Representative also announced his
intention to review and adjust the EU Sahel Strategy (adopted in 2011) in light of the recent
developments.
64. The CSDP action in the Sahel has been further strengthened as a major element of the EU's
integrated approach in the region. The regionalisation process of CSDP has increased
cooperation and coordination with international actors such as the UN, the AU, ECOWAS,
G5 Sahel, and also with EU Member States involved in the region through ongoing initiatives
such as the P3S and the coalition for Sahel. The CSDP missions in the Sahel (EUTM Mali,
EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUCAP Sahel Niger) have continued to support Sahelian security
forces in the development of their capacities. Within this framework, the EU is also providing
an important support to the operationalisation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and its related
Police Component. Following the political events in Mali on 128 August 2020, EUTM Mali
and EUCAP Sahel Mali have suspended their activities in support of the Malian security and
defence forces. They will resume as soon as conditions allow.
65. The deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, in particular in Burkina Faso, has had spill-
over effects in the wider West Africa region, which has resulted in a reinforced engagement
of
ECOWAS on regional security issues. An Extraordinary ECOWAS Summit on Terrorism
on 14 September 2019, followed by a Priority Action Plan amounting to USD2.3 billion
adopted in December 2019, demonstrate this reinforced engagement. The EU is supporting
HR(2020) 155
17
HR(2020) 155
several priorities of the Plan, notably in the field of exchange of information and intelligence.
Support to individual countries neighbouring the Sahel (Ghana, Togo, Benin) in counter-
terrorism and prevention of radicalisation has been mobilised at their request. The EU hosted
the joint visit of the Ministers for National security and Defence of Ghana in October 2019.
66. The period of the report saw a dense
electoral calendar in West Africa. In Guinea, a highly
contested double vote (legislative elections and referendum on a new constitution allowing a
third mandate to the current President) took place on 22 March 2020, despite the boycott by
the opposition and protests by civil society. The EU expressed its support to ECOWAS and
OIF’s initiatives to call for a credible and transparent process and called on the political actors
to show responsibility in the light of challenges
Guinea is facing. Serious irregularities were
reported, amid casualties, violent incidents and arrests. The EU also supported dialogue in the
difficult contexts of the Presidential elections in
Togo in February 2020, which brought
President Faure Gnassingbé’s fourth mandate, and Legislative elections in
Mali in May 2020,
which took place under difficult security conditions, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic
67. Like other international partners and African stakeholders, the EU has firmly condemned the
coup that occurred in Mali on 18 August and has reached out to ECOWAS, the UN and the
G5 Sahel to ensure the best possible coordination as the situation remained volatile. The EU
follows closely national consultations organised by the junta and supports a quick transfer of
power to a civilian-led transition.
68. The EU continued to accompany
Guinea Bissau in its political transition, notably by
supporting the electoral process. Within the P5 Group (AU, ECOWAS, UN, CPLP, EU), the
EU supports the ECOWAS-led mediation currently aiming at the appointment of a
consensual, constitutional government.
69. Diplomatic relations with
Benin deteriorated in the context of tension building up since the
parliamentary elections in April 2019, when the EU, like other members of the international
community, pointed out the non-inclusiveness of the elections, leading also to the cancellation
of the planned EU Electoral Expert Mission. The Beninese side declared the EU Ambassador
persona non grata in November 2019 and the EU reciprocated the measure in December
2019. Following a phone call between the High Representative and the Beninese Minister of
Foreign Affairs in March 2020, the EU is now re-engaging with Benin in view of an "Article
8" political dialogue meeting to be held in the autumn 2020 when a new EU Ambassador has
been appointed and deployed.
70. The EU is also revisiting its high-level engagement with
Nigeria, a pivotal country of
strategic importance for Africa and the EU and a key partner in the new comprehensive
strategy with Africa. The 7th EU-Nigeria Ministerial Dialogue is envisaged for the autumn
2020. Dialogue at ministerial level has not taken place for more than 3 years, due to stalled
negotiations on a readmission agreement.
71. Against the backdrop of a fall in incidents, but a rise in kidnappings of seafarers, steady
progress has been made in supporting the
regional Yaoundé Architecture to fight crime at
HR(2020) 155
18
HR(2020) 155
sea, as well as taking the first steps in exploring how the EU might better coordinate its
maritime presence on the high seas in the region. Of note has been the passing of anti-piracy
legislation in Nigeria – a critical state in the anti-piracy struggle – and the training of
prosecutors in this area. Following the High Representative’s statement on Coordinated
Maritime Presences at the end of August 2019 and the proposal to launch a pilot in the Gulf of
Guinea, practical work on an implementation plan has taken place on which the shipping
industry will be consulted in the coming months.
East Africa
72. Council conclusions adopted in December 2019 (Sudan) and April 2020 (South Sudan) reflect
the opportunities triggered by the
historic political transition occurring in the region and the
need to pursue peace efforts in the region. On this basis, and building on past engagement, the
EU has held informal talks with Foreign Ministers of IGAD member countries in Sudan
(February 2020) on regional issues and the Red Sea and organised high level visits to the
region in February to convey a message of support to reforms and regional cohesion, which
complemented the continuing action of EU Special Representative to the Horn of Africa.
73. Since the signature of the power-sharing agreement of the Constitutional Declaration in
August 2019, witnessed by the EU,
Sudan has embarked on a complex 3-year political
transition. In line with the Council Conclusions adopted in December 2019, the EU has
played an active role in supporting and consolidating the political transition in Sudan and in
accompanying the country on its path of political and economic reforms. The EU has been at
the forefront of the international Friends of Sudan initiative, with regular meetings bringing
together major donors and IFIs since spring 2019, including in Brussels in July. In November,
Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok visited Brussels in the margins of the Foreign
Affairs Council, while the High Representative paid a visit to Sudan in February 2020
reconfirming the EU’s strong political and economic support to the ongoing civilian-led
transition. The EU co-hosted with Sudan, Germany and the UN a virtual, ministerial-level
Sudan Partnership Conference on 25 June 2020, raising $1.8 billion in support of Sudan’s
transition and up to $400 million pre-arrears clearance grant from the World Bank.
74. In the Council Conclusions on
South Sudan of April 2020, the EU reaffirmed priority issues
for its engagement with the country. The EU consistently urged all South Sudanese parties to
participate in the peace process and create conditions for sustainable and lasting peace and
stability. Partial progress has been made on the September 2018 peace agreement, notably the
formation of the transition government in February 2020, but many important issues are still
delayed due to a political deadlock. The dire humanitarian situation as well as the widespread
violations of human rights in the country are of serious concern. The EU is involved in the
oversight and monitoring mechanisms of the peace process and keeps supporting political and
technical efforts to address roots causes of the conflict.
75.
EU-Ethiopia relations have intensified with EU high-level visits to Addis Ababa (December
2019 and February 2020) for meetings with President Sahle-Work and Prime Minister Abiy,
while the first set of sectoral dialogues within the framework of the EU-Ethiopia Strategic
HR(2020) 155
19
HR(2020) 155
Engagement was finalized in May 2019. The EU stepped up its support to political reforms
with a “democratic package” to contribute to the preparation of the next general elections,
together with the decision to deploy an Election Observation Mission. In the field of
economic reforms, the EU also increased its commitment with the signature of four
agreements worth €170 million in December 2019.
76. Following the peace declaration in 2018 between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, the European Union
has started to implement the dual track approach with political dialogue meetings in May and
November 2019 and three high level encounters focused on Human Rights in 2019 (May,
September) and February 2020. The EU is supportive of the Government of Eritrea
strengthening ties with Sudan and Ethiopia both at the technical and the political level and
participating in the trilateral cooperation with Ethiopia and Somalia, including on security
issues. The EU also keeps encouraging the announced salary reform in the National Service.
77. The EU has continued strengthening relations with
Kenya through several contacts at
presidential and ministerial level, notably a visit of the High Representative to Nairobi in May
2019, and a succession of visits of Commissioners, who carried coordinated messages on
cooperation on bilateral and global issues of common interest, notably security, sustainable
development, digitalisation, climate change, and migration management. The EU has been
supporting President Kenyatta’s fight against corruption and following closely the prospects
for political reform, notably through the progress of the Building Bridges Initiative. Against
the background of continued Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, relations with Somalia were
further strained by developments around the two countries’ maritime border dispute or the
discord over the newly elected, Kenya-backed President of the Jubaland federal state in
Somalia. The EU worked with Member States to deliver common messages with a view to
ease the situation.
78. The EU continued to invest heavily in
Somalia's state-building through the integrated
approach. The Somalia Partnership Forum in October 2019, to which the EU and its Member
States actively participated, acknowledged significant progress on economic reform, and
some positive developments on the security front despite an evolution of the threat posed
notably by Al-Shabaab. It further recognised, however, that concrete delivery on agreed
benchmarks under the Mutual Accountability Framework must continue, particularly relating
to inclusive politics for the upcoming elections 2020/2021. As a result of the progress of the
reform commitments towards economic recovery, the EU has supported Somalia to make
further positive progress on economic reforms and to reach HIPC decision point in March
2020, which in turn is expected to have a positive impact on stabilisation.
79. The EU pursued its approach towards both the
AU/AMISOM and to the Federal Government
of Somalia – adopted by PSC in autumn 2018 – linking its financial support to the compliance
with benchmarks stemming from the UNSC mandate for AMISOM and the road map of
priorities to be delivered by Somalia as agreed at the “Article 8” Political Dialogue (March
2019). While AMISOM’s continuous transformation/draw-down remains critical to support a
successful transition of the national security to the Somali security forces, the latter’s build-up
needs acceleration. Thus, in late 2019, the EU mobilised €20 million for a complementary
HR(2020) 155
20
HR(2020) 155
package of non-lethal equipment for Somali security forces working alongside AMISOM.
The EU keeps supporting a close coordination between the Federal Government of Somalia
and the Federal Member States (FMS) as well as with international partners, paramount to
foster a longer-term security set-up for Somalia, as the country should assume the lead over
its security by 2021.
80. The EU continued to provide capacity-building support to Somali security forces through its
CSDP missions: EUTM Somalia has been providing advice, mentoring and training to the
Somali National Army (SNA); EUCAP Somalia continued advising on the development of
Coast Guard and maritime policing functions, complemented with support to broader police
development. The Missions have also been advising the SNA and Somali Police Force in
support of ongoing transition security operations in Lower Shabelle; EU maritime operation
ATALANTA has been instrumental in suppressing and deterring piracy off the coast of
Somalia. The EU’s CSDP engagement remains relevant to both build up the capacities of
Somali security forces for a smooth transition from AMISOM to Somali security
responsibilities, and to suppress and deter piracy and enhance maritime security in the Horn of
Africa, an area crucial for the EU’s interests. The 2020 holistic Strategic Review of three
CSDP actions, launched at the end of 2019, provides an opportunity for the Member States to
re-assess and re-adjust the CSDP engagement in Somalia/Horn of Africa.
81. Following the declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU of November 2018,
the EU carried out and concluded a review of its bilateral relations with
Tanzania. Formal
diplomatic relations have been fully restored but full-fledged political dialogue has not yet
resumed.
Central Africa
82. In the
Great Lakes region, the political transition in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
enabled the EU to re-engage with the authorities and to reflect on/launch additional actions in
particular to support the reform agenda announced by the Congolese government, as well as
the stabilisation of the country. The deterioration of the security situation in Eastern DRC will
require a close monitoring, including with the view to potential EU support to the stabilisation
process in the region, taking into account the dynamics in the broader Great Lakes region. In
Burundi, the presidential, legislative and local elections in May 2020 dominated the agenda
and might lead to redefining the relations between the EU and Burundi.
83. In the
Central African Republic the EU continued to be actively engaged, mobilizing all its
instruments, in close coordination with regional and international partners, in supporting the
implementation of the Political Peace and Reconciliation Agreement as well as the
democratization and stabilisation process. The preparation of the December 2020 elections,
benefiting from an important EU financial support, will require a close monitoring by the EU
in a context of growing political tensions. On the CSDP side, the EU CSDP Military Training
Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) further demonstrated the strong EU
commitment to contribute to the restoration of peace and stability in the country, notably
through supporting capacity building of the armed forces and the ongoing Defence Reform
HR(2020) 155
21
HR(2020) 155
Process. The Council States decided to extend EUTM for another two years. At the request of
the CAR authorities, the EU has also reinforced its presence and support to the CAR internal
security forces with the launch of the EU civilian CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central
African Republic (EUAM RCA). In
Cameroon, the crisis in the North-West and South-West
regions further continued, despite some facilitations attempts and the organisation of a
National Dialogue. The EU will continue to promote dialogue as the best way to identify
sustainable solutions to the crisis.
84. The situation in the
Lake Chad Basin region further deteriorated, with a reported increase of
human rights violations. This situation will require close monitoring and careful approach by
the EU, in coordination with its international and regional partners.
85. In the region, the EU will continue to work together with regional and international partners
on democratic consolidation and governance, promotion and protection of the rule of law and
human rights in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African
Republic, Cameroon, Gabon or Chad.
Southern Africa
86. In the
Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region, the signing of the peace agreement
between the
Government of Mozambique and RENAMO in Maputo in August 2019, in the
presence of the High Representative, was an important political milestone. This event, which
followed a cessation of hostilities agreement, allowed the EU to join regional and
international partners in demonstrating political support to a historic step forward in resolving
a conflict that has devastated Mozambique and held back its development since the late
1970s. The Maputo Agreement was also an opportunity for the EU to underline its support for
critical actions and reforms needed to support the effective implementation of the Agreement.
At the invitation of Mozambique, the EU sent an Electoral Observation Mission to the
October elections.
87. Council conclusions adopted in April 2020 called for dialogue in Mozambique and for urgent
action from the authorities as regards the concerning developing insurgency centred on
Cabo
Delgado province. The EU will continue to offer its support to Mozambique and encourage
efforts to improve intelligence and operational cooperation with neighbouring countries, to
tackle effectively the insurgence with full respect for the rule of law, and to research and
address the root causes.
88. In November 2019, the EU held senior-level consultations on political, security, and human
rights issues with
South Africa, within the framework of the EU-South Africa strategic
partnership. The two meetings – Political and Security Dialogue Forum and Human Rights
Dialogue – allowed for in-depth exchange of views with the objective of identifying possible
areas for closer coordination in view of the EU-South Africa Ministerial meeting on 14 July
2020, as well as in the context of South Africa’s non-permanent UNSC membership and 2020
chairmanship of the African Union. Both sides showed interest to cooperate closely on
preventive diplomacy, mediation and post-conflict development of political processes, as well
HR(2020) 155
22
HR(2020) 155
as to continue to work closely at multilateral level. As regards human rights, cooperation in
the area of women’s empowerment/gender equality in the run up to the 25th anniversary of the
Beijing Platform for Action and the 20th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 (HRD) was identified
as the most promising area for coordinated action in 2020.
89. The EU stood ready to support the transition in
Zimbabwe,
but the government did not seize
the opportunity to implement the reforms needed to turn the economy around and to restore
confidence in the political system. Council Conclusions adopted in February 2020 underlined
EU substantial support to Zimbabweans to address the unfolding humanitarian crisis and
called on the government to accelerate the implementation of reforms and to uphold human
rights, democracy, governance and the rule of law in compliance with Zimbabwe’s
constitution.
90. In October 2019, the EU held a Senior Officials’ Meeting with
SADC, chaired by Tanzania,
in Brussels. This allowed a review of political and security priorities in the region, with the
EU expressing its concern over the need for political and reform progress in Lesotho, in DRC,
Zimbabwe and Comoros. Both sides were also able to reiterate their strong commitment to
making a success of the Maputo Peace Agreement in Mozambique. Political transition in
Lesotho was achieved in 2020.
91. A ministerial meeting with Angola, on 8 September 2020, proved important in addressing
regional challenges and deepening relations between the EU and Angola. especially in the
economic and trade fields.
Asia-Pacific
92. The EU adopted a more realistic, robust and multifaceted approach towards
China3. In light
of the shifting global political and strategic environment due to the impact of COVID-19 and
China’s growing influence and assertiveness, we have continued developing this approach
further in the past few months. Our objectives include building a more balanced relationship
across all sectors. The July 2016 EU Strategy and Council conclusions, as well as the Joint
Communication from 2019, provide the guiding policy framework for the EU's engagement
with China.
93. China remains a fundamental trade and economic partner for the EU, as well as an
indispensable partner at global level. Following the successful EU-China Summit in April
2019, progress has been made on a number of issues: aviation agreements signed in May,
Geographical Indications Agreement initialled in November, China’s revised WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) offer, but more efforts are needed from China to
implement the Summit commitments. In terms of multilateral issues, China remains an
important cooperation partner on global challenges such as climate change, Paris Agreement
implementation, and sustainable development goals, whereas the EU-China Dialogue on
Drugs will be launched as soon as the Covid-19 pandemic permits. There was an acceleration
3 Reflected in the Joint Communication of 12 March 2019, "EU-China: a strategic outlook".
HR(2020) 155
23
HR(2020) 155
of EU-China discussions on foreign policy in 2019, although concrete cooperation, except on
Iran/Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), remained limited. At the same time, in
other areas, China continues to be perceived also as an economic competitor, as seen from its
pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of
governance.
94. The bilateral agenda this year includes the EU-China Summit on 22 June 2020 and an EU
Leaders’ meeting with President Xi Jinping. The EU aims to address at these meetings key
bilateral issues and to progress in the implementation of past commitments such as improving
bilateral market access, making decisive progress in investment negotiations, the signature of
the Geographical Indications Agreement, and agreeing a new EU-China Strategic Cooperation
Agenda 2025. Climate change, cooperation on Africa, as well as regional security challenges
should also be discussed. Human rights, especially the situation of human rights defenders
and Xinjiang, and the situation in Hong Kong also remain high on the EU agenda.
95. The EU maintains its "One China" policy and will continue to support the full application of
the Basic Law and the "One Country, Two Systems" principle in both Hong Kong and Macao.
In this regard, the EU expressed its grave concern regarding China’s adoption on 30 June
2020 of a national security law on Hong Kong, which is not in conformity with its
international commitments (Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984) and the Hong Kong Basic
Law.
96. The EU continues to develop its relations and further cooperation with Taiwan, supporting its
system of governance based on human rights, democracy, and rule of law. The EU closely
follows cross-Strait developments and encourages dialogue and constructive engagement as
part of the peaceful development of the Asia-Pacific region.
97. In
Mongolia, focus will remain on implementing the EU-Mongolia Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement's priority areas of cooperation: the modernization of its public
administration, promoting investment to increase connectivity, development of light industry
and support to SMEs for the diversification of the economy. The newly opened European
Cooperation Chamber of Commerce and Industry (8 November 2019) will support the efforts
of the EU Delegation in Ulaanbaatar to enhance European investment in and trade with
Mongolia.
98. The EU will continue to deepen its relations with its strategic partners,
Japan and the
Republic of Korea (ROK). Leaders’ meetings focusing on the COVID-19 response took
place with Japan and ROK in May and June 2020 respectively. The EU remains fully
committed to implementing its Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan, as well as the EU-ROK Framework Agreement and
Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The coordination of sector policy dialogues between the EU
and Japan takes place through the SPA's Joint Committee in areas such as security and
defence and connectivity, where the EU has established a partnership with Japan on
cooperation in third countries.
HR(2020) 155
24
HR(2020) 155
99. The important security challenges of Japan and ROK have direct and indirect implications for
the EU. In 2020, the EU will continue its dialogues and strengthen practical cooperation on
security-related issues with both Japan and ROK. The European Commission received a
mandate to start negotiations with Japan of an Agreement between the European Union and
Japan for the transfer and use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to prevent and combat
terrorism and other serious transnational crime.
100. The EU-ROK Framework Participation Agreement allows for Korean participation in CSDP
missions and operations. The EU welcomes the ROK's participation in the EU's counter-
piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean and off the Horn of Africa, notably in the EUNAVFOR
Operation ATALANTA. In line with the Council Conclusions, the EU’s pilot project on
security cooperation in and with Asia will also see project activities developed with both
countries in the areas of crisis management, cyber security, maritime security and
counterterrorism.
101. In relation to the Korean Peninsula, the EU will continue closely to monitor developments
while standing ready to support potential further diplomatic efforts leading to a peaceful
solution, in consultation with key partners. The EU's focus will remain on ensuring the full
implementation of the existing UN Security Council Resolutions on the
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea by all countries, aimed at achieving the goal of complete, verifiable and
irreversible denuclearisation while continuing to implement the policy of “critical
engagement” and, when need be, taking appropriate measures regarding the DPRK in terms of
its nuclear and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, ballistic missile programmes, and human
rights. At the same time, the EU will contribute to enhancing the implementation of the
current DPRK sanctions regime.
102. Relations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continued to advance
following the biennial EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 2019. Work continues
to operationalise the ministerial agreement in principle to establish an EU-ASEAN Strategic
Partnership. Meanwhile, the EU has given additional priority to key areas of cooperation with
ASEAN from cybersecurity to connectivity. The EU will continue to seek to further its
engagement with the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting structures. The EU aims to extend
its co-chairing roles of the ASEAN Regional Forum inter-sessional meetings responsible for
maritime security and counterterrorism, subject to ARF agreement, once face-to-face
engagement in the ARF structures is again possible. We continue to promote enhanced
involvement by ASEAN member states in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy
activities. The EU will continue to support efforts in strengthening connectivity between
ASEAN and the EU, based on economic, fiscal, environmental sustainability, market
mechanisms and agreed international rules, norms and standards. The EU will continue efforts
to establish the agreed working group between the EU and relevant ASEAN member states to
address issues relating to palm oil. The EU continues to welcome the role played by
Singapore as coordinator for ASEAN relations until summer 2021. Following the EU-
ASEAN Ministerial videoconference on COVID-19 in March 2020, both sides will work
HR(2020) 155
25
HR(2020) 155
together with the WHO and the broader international community to strengthen cooperation
and mitigate the adverse public health, economic and social impact of the pandemic.
103. With
Myanmar the EU will continue its balanced approach of constructive engagement with
the government, supporting the country’s transition to a full civilian system, by continuing to
offer its zero-quota zero-tariff "Everything But Arms" (EBA) market access to Myanmar’s
products, by promoting an ambitious development agenda, and by supporting the country’s
peace and democratisation process, while maintaining political pressure and targeted
restrictive measures with a view to promote accountability for the perpetrators of gross human
rights violations. The EU also engaged with the Myanmar authorities to create conditions for
the safe, dignified and voluntary return of refugees, notably by implementing the
recommendations of the Annan Commission for Rakhine State. In April 2020, the EU
renewed its enhanced arms embargo and targeted sanctions until 30 April 2021.
104. The Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with
Vietnam entered into force on 1 May
2020, making Vietnam the second partner country in Asia to sign such an FPA with the EU,
after the Republic of Korea, and the first in ASEAN. Governing the participation of Vietnam
in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations, this agreement is a significant
step forward in implementing the Council Conclusions on enhanced EU security cooperation
in and with Asia and demonstrates both parties’ commitment to a rules-based multilateral
approach to international peace and security, and to effectively implementing their defence
and security cooperation partnership. The EU and Vietnam are now working together to
establish Vietnam’s first contribution to a CSDP mission. Pilot cooperation projects in crisis
management, maritime security, cyber security and counterterrorism will be developed. This
14th year of EU-Vietnamese relations also saw on 1 August 2020 the entry into force of the
EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.
105. The EU will continue to give priority to relations with
Indonesia and to harness further
opportunities for a closer partnership on promoting multilateralism with the country, notably
during its (and Vietnam’s) membership of the UN Security Council. A key priority with both
countries in 2020 is also the implementation of pilot cooperation projects to advance shared
security interests including in the areas of maritime security, cybersecurity, and
counterterrorism.
106. The EU will continue to take steps towards broadening its engagement with
Thailand,
following the Conclusions adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in October 2019, in
which it underlined the appropriateness of taking such steps, including on issues of human
rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic pluralism, by preparing for the timely signature
of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA).
107. In 2019, discussions continued on the PCA with
Malaysia, following the formation of a new
government. We aim to sign the PCA by the end of 2020. The EU is also advancing
implementation of the PCA with the
Philippines, notably with the convening of the first
meeting of its Joint Committee in early 2020. The EU looks forward to the role of the
Philippines as the coordinator for ASEAN relations as of the summer 2021.
HR(2020) 155
26
HR(2020) 155
108. Due to the serious deterioration of democracy and human rights in
Cambodia, the
Commission launched, in February 2019, the procedure for a temporary withdrawal of the
trade preferences granted to Cambodia under the “Everything But Arms” scheme. A decision
on such a partial withdrawal was taken by the Commission in February and took effect on 12
August 2020. The EU will continue to monitor the situation closely.
109. As regards
South Asia, the EU has started implementing the EU Strategy on
India adopted
by the Council in December 2018, working with India seeking jointly to promote peace and
security, effective multilateralism and to strengthen the rule-based global order. In line with
the Council Conclusions on enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia, practical
cooperation on security-related issues continued to be reinforced in particular in the areas of
counter-terrorism, radicalisation, cyber security, hybrid threats, maritime security, non-
proliferation, and disarmament. Project activities in the framework of the pilot project will
take place in a number of these areas. Military-to-military exchanges will build on the positive
experiences of 2019 including the port visit of a French destroyer to Mumbai in January 2019,
which was supported by the EU, and continue to develop as areas of common interest in the
Indian Ocean. The EU-India Summit took place on 15 July 2020. Leaders adopted a joint
statement affirming their commitment to strengthen the EU-India strategic partnership, the
EU-India Roadmap 2025, as well as a joint declaration on resource efficiency and circular
economy. The EU will pursue regular exchanges and coordination, particularly on
Iran/JCPOA, Afghanistan, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The EU will continue to work
with
Sri Lanka to promote democracy, human rights, accountability and reconciliation as
well as counter-terrorism and maritime security. In the
Maldives, cooperation with the EU
covers counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. The political dialogue with the
new government also focuses on good governance, judicial reform and climate change.
Bangladesh is by far the biggest beneficiary of the EU GSP "Everything But Arms"
preferential trade regime, which provides duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for its
exports (worth approximately €18 billion per year). The EU continued its EBA enhanced
engagement with Bangladesh, aiming to accelerate human and labour rights reforms in
Bangladesh.
110. In 2019, two years passed since the massive influx of approximately 750,000 Rohingya
refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh. The Rohingya crisis became a mid- to long-term
challenge, requiring funding and support for health services, justice, and education in the
world’s most populous refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh (approximately 1 million
inhabitants). The EU and its Member States were the second biggest contributors to the UN
Joint Response Plan in 2019, providing humanitarian and development support to the
Rohingya and the host communities in Bangladesh. The EU worked to keep the crisis on the
international agenda, including at the UN (42nd session of the Human Rights Council, 74th
UNGA).
111. The 2017 EU-
Afghanistan Strategy, as well as the 2018 Cooperation Agreement on
Partnership and Development (CAPD) with Afghanistan, and the 2016 EU-Afghanistan Joint
Way Forward on migration issues (JWF) continue to provide the political framework of the
HR(2020) 155
27
HR(2020) 155
EU's relations with Afghanistan. Throughout 2019, the EU worked to promote peace and
stability, by supporting the preliminary steps of the upcoming peace process. The EU also
became the main political and technical international supporter of the September 2019
Presidential Elections. This parallel track of promoting peace while defending the democratic
institutions and fundamental values of all Afghan citizens, which was endorsed by the Foreign
Affairs Council on 8 April 2019, will carry on in 2020, under the political guidance of the
High Representative and new Council Conclusions adopted in May 2020. In 2020 the EU will
take initiatives to ensure international donors speak with one voice when it comes to
defending the gains of the last 19 years in Afghanistan (in particular fundamental rights of
women and minorities), in view of the upcoming peace negotiations. The EU will support the
preparations of the 2020 Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan, scheduled for November
2020 in Geneva. By supporting three core functions of the Afghan State (security and
democracy, economic growth and jobs, basic social services) EU development cooperation
contributes to the necessary foundation for the ongoing peace efforts. In addition to the
political support to the start of a peace process, the EU is helping to reinforce Afghanistan’s
capacity better to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic and to address its socio-economic impact,
with over €117 million of assistance.
112. EU-
Pakistan relations continued to develop in 2020. In June, the third round of EU-Pakistan
Staff Talks took place in Brussels with discussions on policy developments and cooperation
in areas such as security and defence, maritime security and border management. The main
priority for 2020 is the holding of the first ever EU-Pakistan Security Dialogue, established by
the EU-Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) signed in June 2019 by then High
Representative Mogherini and Foreign Minister Qureshi.
113. The conclusion of a new post-Cotonou agreement with a dedicated pillar on EU-Pacific
relations will continue to raise the profile and presence of the EU in the
Pacific. The EU is
also negotiating free trade agreements with
Australia and
New Zealand while implementing
Framework Agreements with both countries. The EU will carry on its security dialogues with
Australia and New Zealand and work with them on facilitating their possible participation in
EU-led crisis operations via their respective Framework Participation Agreements. In this
context, one Australian advisor joined the EU Advisory Mission in Iraq in June 2019 to
support security sector reform in this country. The European Commission received a mandate
for opening negotiations with New Zealand on an agreement between the European Union
and New Zealand on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for
Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) and the New Zealand authorities competent for
fighting serious crime and terrorism-
114. The EU continued to implement the 2018
Joint Communication on Connecting Europe
and Asia and the related Council Conclusions. The EU strategy calls for better and more
sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity for Europe and Asia in the fields of
transport, energy, digital and people-to-people, working hand-in-hand with Member States
and the private sector. In September 2019, the EU and Japan launched a Partnership on
Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure.
HR(2020) 155
28
HR(2020) 155
115. The EU will continue to promote actions aimed at enhancing
security cooperation in and
with Asia following the adoption of Council Conclusions by the Foreign Affairs Council in
May 2018. Pilot security cooperation partnerships are being developed with selected Asian
countries in the priority areas of counter-terrorism, cyber-security, maritime security, and
crisis management.
116. The 14th
ASEM (Asia-Europe) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting took place in Madrid on 15-16
December 2019. The Ministers dealt with a number of wide ranging common global
challenges, such as improving the effectiveness of multilateralism and the rule-based
international order, climate change, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Asia-
Europe connectivity, as well as a focus on the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day.
117. The 13th ASEM summit at Heads of Government level, originally to be held in Phnom Penh
in November 2020, has been delayed into 2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. In
September 2020, the Cambodian Chair and the four ASEM13 regional coordinators (EU,
Germany, Singapore, Russia) issued a statement on policies and actions being taken by
ASEM partners to tackle COVID-19.
Americas
118. As underlined in the first visit of High Representative Borrell to Washington, on 6-7 February
2020, the EU remains fully committed to the transatlantic partnership, stands firmly behind
the rule-based international order, and is ready to continue working with present and future
US governments willing to collaborate in addressing the key global challenges of our times.
119. The Foreign Affairs Council videoconference of Foreign Ministers with the
US Secretary of
State, Mike Pompeo, on 15 June 2020, gave rise to a positive and encouraging discussion
pointing to a number of converging assessments that could be a basis for further cooperation.
Looking ahead, the key areas to follow-up include: (i) the EU-US dialogue on China and its
role on the world stage; (ii) continued good contacts on the Eastern Neighbourhood; (iii) US
engagement with Russia to discuss strategic security issues; and (iv) converging views on
Libya.
120. Over the reporting period, the EU has taken forward its cooperation with the US
administration and Congress on countries and regions of interest, including Russia/Ukraine,
China, DPRK, Western Balkans, Africa, Syria, Libya, and the Middle East.
121. Security and defence remains a top priority, and the EU continues to engage with the US on
counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, tackling
disinformation and hybrid threats, advancing security at home, and projecting security
globally. The EU will continue advocating for a dedicated EU-US security and defence
dialogue.
122. The EU will also strive to find cooperative solutions with the US in addressing global
developments, including COVID-19, innovation, digital technologies including artificial
HR(2020) 155
29
HR(2020) 155
intelligence, cyber security, climate change and renewable energy. The launch of new people-
to-people initiatives, such as for instance expanding visits and exchanges across the Atlantic,
will support the overarching goal of keeping the partnership strong and deeply rooted.
123. Following provisional application of the EU-
Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)
and Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the 17th EU-Canada Summit
took place in Montreal in July 2019. This gave impetus to comprehensive cooperation,
spanning the promotion of shared values, climate policies, digital innovation including AI,
Women Peace and Security, as well as cooperation on hybrid threats.
124. Canada is a close strategic partner of the EU and an essential ally for the EU in promoting
political priorities relating to climate change, the digital agenda, and making the economy
work for all. A shared commitment to rule-based international order, human rights and
democracy is at the core of the relationship, underpinning cooperation on priorities such as
Russia, Ukraine, China, Syria, Iraq, Iran, DPRK, Mali, and Venezuela.
125. Canadian contributions to CSDP Missions (EUPOL COPPS, EUAM Ukraine, EUCAP Sahel
Mali), as well as the annual security and defence dialogue and the EU Security and Defence
symposia in Ottawa, constitute important elements of our strategic partnership.
126. The EU and Canada plan regular meetings, with conversations between Prime Minister
Trudeau, President of the European Commission von der Leyen, and President of the
European Council Michel. A ministerial meeting took place in September on 8 September,
ahead of the full Joint Ministerial Committee and Leaders’ Summit later in the year or in early
2021.
127. Across the
Caribbean, 2020 will bring a renewed post-Cotonou framework, which will
provide an important impulse to the future of EU-Caribbean relations, also through the EU-
Caribbean Protocol. The new agreement should provide for a mutually beneficial political
partnership as well as identify joint priority areas for future cooperation.
128. The EU-
Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) continued
implementation in 2019, including through several high-level meetings and formal dialogues.
Sectoral dialogues were launched on the environment, climate change, and energy. In 2020,
efforts will continue to support political and economic reforms, including for democracy and
human rights, through the next phase of cooperation.
129. There was no formal political dialogue with
Haiti in 2019, due to the very serious political,
social, and economic crisis. Nonetheless, the EU continues to work with the authorities on the
necessary reforms. At the same time, the EU supports civil society and continues to encourage
a frank and inclusive national dialogue.
130. High-level engagement with Mexico was particularly intense at the end of 2019 and continued
throughout 2020: the Joint Committee meeting of the agreement and preparation for the
annual high-level political dialogue focused, among other issues, on strengthening the
strategic partnership. The EU is committed to complete the modernisation of the EU-Mexico
HR(2020) 155
30
HR(2020) 155
Global Agreement and to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date framework for our
relations. The High Level Dialogue on Human Rights was held in July 2020. A High-Level
Dialogue on Climate Change, the High Level Dialogue on Justice and Security,the Joint
Science and Technology Cooperation Committee meeting, and a High Level Political
Dialogue are scheduled in the autumn 2020.
131. The EU continued to enhance cooperation and intensify relations with
Central America
under the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA), hosting the 3rd Joint
Committee in June 2020. The trade pillar of the EU-Central America Association Agreement
is already being provisionally applied, pending full ratification.
132. The EU continued its principled policy towards
Nicaragua, adopted since the ongoing
political crisis began in April 2018. Given the continuation of repression and the lack of
progress on reforms, in October 2019 the EU adopted a framework for restrictive measures,
leading to subsequent assets freeze and travel bans for six individuals in spring 2020.
133. In
Honduras, the EU deployed an electoral follow-up mission to assess progress on the
recommendations made by the 2017 EU Electoral Observation Mission. In line with those
recommendations, the EU has been providing support for the modernisation of the Civil
Registry, an institution that will play a key role in the new electoral cycle in 2021. The EU
followed the unsuccessful negotiations for renewal of the Mission to Support the Fight against
Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).
134. In
El Salvador, the EU deployed an electoral follow-up mission to assess progress on the
recommendations made by the 2018 (legislative and municipal elections) and 2019
(Presidential elections) Electoral Observation Missions. Continued monitoring and follow-up
of these recommendations will be important in the run-up towards the legislative and
municipal elections in 2021.
135. The EU maintained its consistent policy towards the crisis in
Venezuela. This combined
creating space for a democratic, political solution with calibrated pressure through the
adoption of restrictive measures against persons responsible for human rights violations
and/or for undermining the rule of law. Through the International Contact Group and the
Special Adviser on Venezuela, the EU sought to mobilise the international community in
support of an agreed path to find a peaceful solution for the political and humanitarian crisis
in Venezuela and to hold credible parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2020. On
28-29 October 2019, the EU organised an International Solidarity Conference on the
Venezuelan migration and refugee crisis, together with the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). On 26
May 2020, the EU and the Spanish Government convened the International Donors’
Conference with the support of the UNHCR and the IOM.
136. The EU strengthened its close, long-standing ties with Colombia, building on its political and
financial support to the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, in particular
through the work of Special Envoy Eamon Gilmore and the EU Trust Fund. The Special
HR(2020) 155
31
HR(2020) 155
Envoy visited Colombia in February and – also in his capacity as EUSR for Human Rights –
subsequently held frequent (virtual) meetings with key stakeholder throughout the period also
to discuss the increasing violence in the country. This was also a key issue on the agenda of
the annual EU-Colombia Human Rights Dialogue on 30 July 2020 (held in virtual format),
co-chaired by the SRHR. The EU has also been looking at ways to strengthen new areas
corresponding to common priorities, such as the fight against climate change and illicit drugs
(two ad hoc consultations were held in December 2019 and May 2020), with the perspective
of establishing a dedicated bilateral political framework. The entry into force of the
Framework Participation Agreement on 1 March 2020 represented a milestone in the
establishment of closer security and defence ties.
137. The EU’s relationship with
Brazil continued to be driven by enhancing the Strategic
Partnership, seeking to define joint responses to global challenges and advance dialogue and
cooperation in areas of mutual interest at bilateral, regional, and multilateral level. Following
agreement in principle, on 28 June 2019, on the trade part of the EU-MERCOSUR
Association Agreement, negotiations concluded on the Political Dialogue and Cooperation
pillar on 19 May 2020. Subject to final approval, the agreement can constitute the basis for
renewed political and strategic partnership between both regions.
138. The EU continued to work closely with
Argentina. As a member of MERCOSUR, the
relation of the EU with Argentina will also widely benefit from the new EU-Mercosur
Association Agreement.
139. Relations with
Peru continued to develop through dialogue on issues of common interest. An
EU election mission observed the 26 January 2020 early parliamentary elections in Peru, the
first ones to be held separately from the presidential elections.
140. In Bolivia, the EU (with the UN and Spain), under the lead of the Bishop’s conference, played
an important role in mediation, following the annulled elections of 20 October 2019. This led
to an agreement on new elections in 2020 and to the selection of new Electoral Court Judges
based on a compromise between relevant actors. The EU will continue to support the electoral
process and will send a reinforced Electoral Expert Mission for the 18 October General
Elections.
141. From October 2019, Chile experienced unprecedented public unrest due to socio-economic
grievances. The EU demonstrated its support for Chile, while inviting to respect human rights
under all circumstances. Throughout this period, the EU continued to support Chile in its
efforts to build a stronger and more inclusive country. Negotiations for a modernised
Association Agreement, which started in 2017, continued.
142. The EU revitalised its relations with the
OAS in 2019, including through a high-level Political
Dialogue on 12 December 2019 in Washington DC. This confirmed broad alignment in areas
where the EU and the OAS work together: human rights, democracy (electoral observation),
good governance (fight against corruption), and citizen security. The EU confirmed its
HR(2020) 155
32
HR(2020) 155
support for the Inter-American Human Rights system, including through its financial support
for the work of the Commission and the Court.
143. The EU welcomed Mexico's taking on the Presidency of
CELAC for 2020. Following the
inauguration, bringing together ministers from across the Caribbean and Latin America in
Mexico City, contacts are ongoing about renewing EU political dialogue with the region as a
whole.
144. On 25 September 2019, the EU and the countries of the
Pacific Alliance (Colombia, Peru,
Mexico and Chile) signed a Joint Declaration at Ministerial level. This confirmed interest on
both sides in deepening ties in areas of common interest, as well as strengthening political
dialogue, regional cooperation, and developing mutually beneficial activities.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
145. The European Union remains committed to achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict:
only a political solution based on the full implementation of UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva
Communiqué will allow lasting stability and peace. The European Union continues therefore
to support the UN-led political process in Geneva. The European Union continues also to
support the Global Coalition against Da'esh to stabilise north east Syria and consolidate the
military victory against the terrorist organisation. The EU and its Member States remain
committed to preventing impunity and pursuing justice for violations of international law
committed in the Syrian conflict.
146. The European Union considers that the only sustainable solution for Syrian internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees is returning to their homes in a safe, voluntary, and
dignified manner in line with international law. The European Union continues to work with
UNHCR to provide support until such conditions are met. The EU Regional Trust Fund in
Response to the Syrian Crisis continues to support 1.9m Syrian refugees and internally
displaced persons in neighbouring countries, as well as host communities in the region.
147. The European Union and the United Nations co-chaired the fourth Brussels Conference on
"Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" on 30 June 2020. The conference reaffirmed
the international community's support for UN-led efforts towards achieving sustainable peace
in Syria and permitted the reaffirmation of EU policy on sanctions, reconstruction, non-
normalisation, and returns. Fifty-two countries and 24 international organisations and
agencies participated, together raising a total of €6.9 billion ($7.7 billion) in response to the
crisis. The European Union and its Member States remain the leading donors.
148. The EU will continue to support
Jordan and
Lebanon in tackling the consequences of the
Syria crisis and to foster stability and economic development in both countries in line with
commitments taken at successive international conferences. Further progress was achieved in
cooperation with both countries on security issues, with the EU contributing to the integrated
border management, prevention of violent extremism, counterterrorism, and aviation security.
HR(2020) 155
33
HR(2020) 155
In Lebanon, the EU continued to deliver on its pledge made during the Rome II Conference to
support the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces in March 2018.
Furthermore, the EU has reacted rapidly devastating explosion in Beirut harbour on 4 August
2020. It provided substantial emergency assistance, while supporting calls for the Lebanese
Government to urgently undertake. financial, economic, and political reforms, which the EU
stands ready to support. . In June 2019, Jordan signed a Framework Participation Agreement
with the EU (first country in the MENA region), based on which it will contribute to EU
CSDP missions and operations.
149.
Egypt remains a key partner on many regional issues such as the Middle East Peace Process,
Libya, and the and the Eastern Mediterranean. In September 2019, the EU and Egypt, as co-
chairs of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) East Africa Working Group (EAWG),
organised a side-event on countering the financing of terrorism in the margins of the GCTF
Ministerial in New York. At the bilateral level, the EU will continue the implementation of
the joint Partnership Priorities with Egypt, in full respect of the provisions of the Association
Agreement.
150. Continuing to draw on the 2018 EU Strategy for
Iraq, the EU-Iraq Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement and the Council Conclusions on Iraq of 15 July 2019, in light of the
decision of the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council of 10 January 2020 to step up
engagement with Iraq in support of its sovereignty, the EU is committed to working closely
with the new Iraqi Government on the urgently needed reforms; as demanded by domestic
mass protests since October 2019, in order to strengthen the country’s institutions and to build
an inclusive, prosperous and stable Iraq at peace with its neighbours. As in the past, the EU
will continue to encourage the Government of Iraq to speed up the implementation of the
reconstruction agenda and deliver on its commitments undertaken at the Kuwait International
Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in February 2018. In this regard, the EU will
continue to support with all the instruments and policies at its disposal the government's
efforts, including in fighting corruption, building institutional capacity, improving
governance, preparing for early elections scheduled for 6 June 2021, and supporting socio-
economic reforms aiming at diversifying the vulnerable oil-dependent economy. The EU will
also remain committed to responding to the ongoing and pressing humanitarian needs
resulting from years of conflict, widespread internal displacement and disrupted access to
social services. Strengthening cooperation on migration remains an integral part of the EU's
comprehensive engagement with Iraq.
151. The EU is contributing to strengthening the rule of law, , and support of Civilian Security
Sector Reform in Iraq, including through the CSDP EU Advisory Mission, EUAM Iraq, with
a focus on the implementation of the Iraqi National Security Strategy. For this, the Mission
continues to provide strategic advice and expertise to the Iraqi authorities. On 7 April 2020,
the Council agreed to extend the mandate of EUAM Iraq for a period of two years until 30
April 2022.
152. The EU has supported the efforts of the Global Coalition against Da'esh, and several Member
States have contributed to the security of Iraq and the training of its armed and security forces.
HR(2020) 155
34
HR(2020) 155
The EU continues to work with the Iraqi Authorities to ensure that the EU and its Member
States can maintain their efforts to this end, in full respect of Iraqi sovereignty and of the Iraqi
Constitution.
153. On a region-to-region level, despite the enduring rift among the
Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries, the EU remained active,
inter alia through renewed support efforts for an
intra-GCC settlement, notably in support of continued mediation efforts led by Kuwait. A first
meeting of the EU-GCC Joint Cooperation Committee took place in June 2020 following a
gap of nearly three years, since November 2017.
154. In light of this situation and while pursuing partnership efforts at regional level with the GCC,
the EU continued to work in parallel to consolidate its bilateral relations with all GCC
countries. In this endeavour, Senior Officials Meetings were held with Oman, Qatar, Kuwait
and the United Arab Emirates, while the Council authorized the signature of a Cooperation
Arrangement between the EEAS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain. The
opening
of a new EU Delegation in July 2019 in Kuwait, also responsible for EU relations with
Qatar, further reinforced the EU strategic presence in the region.
155. Deepening the EU’s dialogue and cooperation with the Gulf countries on global challenges,
including in the context of the postponed Dubai EXPO 2020, will remain vital especially in
light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Building on the mandate given to the High Representative
by the Foreign Affairs Council in January 2020, the EU will also continue to work with all
parties to contribute to de-escalation and dialogue efforts in the Gulf region.
156. The EU continued its support for a resumption of UN-led peace negotiations in
Yemen. In
2019, the EU pursued its diplomatic engagement with the parties to the conflict and other
relevant stakeholders. It stepped up its cooperation with the Office of the UN Special Envoy,
assisting in promoting confidence-building measures, funding “track II” dialogues,
sponsoring peace-building initiatives and rebuilding critical state institutions. This included
also continued EU support for the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM).
Moreover, the EU worked to ensure that its substantial involvement in areas such as food
security, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and rural development could build on
humanitarian interventions.
157. With regard to the
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the EU remains committed to a
negotiated and viable two-state solution that takes into account the legitimate aspirations of
both the Palestinians and the Israelis, respecting all relevant UN resolutions and
internationally agreed parameters, including UNSC Resolutions 1860 and 2334 and previous
agreements. The EU continues to believe that serious efforts must be made towards a
resumption of meaningful negotiations aimed at a two-state solution based on the 1967
borders, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States, that meets Israeli and Palestinian
security needs and Palestinian aspirations for statehood and sovereignty, that ends the
occupation and resolves all final status issues in order to end the conflict.
HR(2020) 155
35
HR(2020) 155
158. The EU urges both sides to demonstrate, through policies and actions, a genuine commitment
to the two-state solution as the only realistic way to end the conflict. The EU will continue to
work to that end with its partners, the Israelis and the Palestinians, with regional actors, such
as Jordan and Egypt, and with partners within the Middle East Quartet. The EUSR for MEPP
will continue to play a pivotal role in this regard.
159. From the EU’s perspective, the initiative put forward by the United States in January 2020
provided an occasion to re-launch the urgently needed efforts towards a negotiated and viable
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union studied the proposals on the
basis of the EU’s established position, including the need to respect all relevant UN
resolutions and the internationally agreed parameters.
160. The EU also welcomed the announcements on the normalisation of relations between Israel
and the United Arab Emirates in August 2020 and between Israel and the Kingdom of Bahrain
in September 2020, and acknowledged the constructive role played by the US in this respect.
The EU believes that these developments represent a positive contribution to peace and
stability in the Middle East. In the EU’s view, a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict requires a regional inclusive approach and engagement with both parties.
161. On the ground, the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory has continued to deteriorate
with no prospect of a clear political horizon. Violence, including terrorist attacks, and unrest
continued in the West Bank, in Jerusalem and in and around Gaza. While recalling Israel's
right to defend its legitimate security interests, the EU has stated publicly that it expects the
Israeli authorities to meet fully their obligations under International Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and to take steps against the increasing settler
violence. The EU has firmly condemned all acts of violence, terrorism, and incitement to
hatred and violence, which are fundamentally incompatible with advancing a peaceful two-
state solution.
162. Recalling that settlements are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace,
and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible, the EU also reiterates its strong
opposition to Israel's settlement policy and actions taken in this context. The EU reiterates
that any annexations would constitute a serious violation of international law. Regarding the
Golan Heights, the EU has reiterated its position that, in line with international law and UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 497, the European Union does not recognise Israeli
sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights. In addition, the European Council in December
2017 reiterated its firm commitment to the two-state solution and that, in this context, the EU
position on Jerusalem remains unchanged.
163. The EU calls for all parties to take swift steps to produce a fundamental change to the
political, security and economic situation in the Gaza Strip, including the end of the closure
and a full opening of the crossing points, while addressing Israel's legitimate security
concerns. Recent rocket fire by militant groups is unacceptable and underlines again the
danger of escalation. All stakeholders must commit to non-violence and peace. The return of
the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza strip is needed to durably improve the conditions and
HR(2020) 155
36
HR(2020) 155
the humanitarian situation. The West Bank and Gaza are still not united under one single and
legitimate Palestinian Authority. The EU will continue to call on all Palestinian factions to
work together to address the needs of the Palestinian population. As in previous years, the EU
will continue to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA), both politically and financially, and to support humanitarian
access to all donors. UNRWA is crucial for the stability and security of the region and for the
viability of the two-state solution. The Agency's operations and programmes contribute to the
work against radicalisation and the increase of extremism, in particular in Gaza.
164. The EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) continues to assist
the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future State of Palestine in the areas
of policing and criminal justice. The mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission for the
Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM RAFAH), currently located in Tel Aviv, is to provide a third-
party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement
and Access (AMA), as part of the confidence-building measures between the Government of
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. On stand-by since 2007, it maintains its readiness to
redeploy to Rafah, once conditions allow. In April 2020, Member States agreed to an
extension of the mandates for both EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS for one year, until 30
June 2021.
165. A stable and prosperous
Maghreb is a key priority for the EU in view of its proximity to
Europe and its bridging position with Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the interdependence in
terms of economy/trade, security, and migration.
166. The Joint EU-
Morocco Political Declaration, endorsed by the Association Council held in
June 2019, signalled a renewed dynamic of the long-standing and deep partnership. The EU
reaffirms its commitment to build a solid and ambitious partnership with Morocco and will
focus on the implementation of the key strategic areas and horizontal axes identified therein
for cooperation.
167. The EU, through the deployment of an Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), supported the
2019 Presidential and legislative elections in
Tunisia, an important step in the democratic
transition of the country. The EU intends further to deepen its partnership with Tunisia and
will continue to provide a strong support to Tunisia and its Government notably in their
reform plan, which the current pandemic has made more urgent and more challenging.
168. Following a year of domestic political change in
Algeria, the EU will pursue the relaunch of
its cooperation with the new President and Government, in view of supporting the Algerian-
led process of political and economic reforms, in full respect of the provisions of the
Association Agreement.
169. In
Libya, following the Berlin Conference on Libya in February 2020 endorsed by the
subsequent UN Security Council Resolution 2510 (2020), the EU has engaged to support the
UN-led Berlin process that aims at restoring peace and stability across Libya. In line with the
commitments made by participants to the Berlin Conference, the EU has repeatedly called for
HR(2020) 155
37
HR(2020) 155
an immediate cessation of hostilities and urged all the relevant Libyan parties and
international actors to refrain from military action that could further exacerbate the conflict.
The EU has also repeatedly called on all the Libyan parties to return to political negotiations
under the UN-led 5+5 military talks to agree on a total ceasefire and resume the UN-
facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue, paving the way to completing the Libyan transition. The EU
has strongly called on all the UN Member States to respect their international obligations and
compliance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in particular respecting the
arms embargo and safeguarding Libya's oil resources and infrastructure. The EU has
contributed through concrete actions to the implementation of the Berlin Conference
conclusions by launching the new military operation in the Mediterranean EUNAVFOR MED
Operation IRINI, which aims to enforce the UN arms embargo. The EU has also supported
various mediation and stabilisation actions though the Instrument contributing to Stability and
Peace.
170. The EU will continue to consolidate its cooperation with the
League of Arab States (LAS),
notably building on the results of the first-ever EU-LAS Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh in
February 2019. The EU worked together with the LAS also in the framework of the EU-LAS
Ministerial meetings and the EU PSC-LAS Permanent Representatives political dialogue to
defend the global rule-based order and enhance the cooperation on dealing with international
security crises and terrorism, addressing climate change and mass population displacement, as
well as ensuring sustainable growth and investment. The strategic dialogue between the
General Secretariat of the League of Arab States and the European External Action Service
discussed the fields of conflict prevention, early warning and crisis management, counter-
terrorism, transnational organised crime and migration, non-proliferation and arms control.
171. The EU remains committed to promoting regional cooperation, dialogue, and integration in
the framework of the
Union for the Mediterranean, with the aim of contributing to peace,
stability, and prosperity in the Mediterranean region.
Iran
172. In line with the February 2019 Council Conclusions on
Iran, the EU continues to pursue a
balanced, comprehensive policy approach towards Iran. This includes a dialogue that aims at
addressing all issues of concern, being critical when there are divergences and cooperative
when there is mutual interest.
173. The EU remains committed to work towards the full and comprehensive implementation of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As the culmination of 12 years of diplomacy
facilitated by the EU, and following unanimous endorsement by the UN Security Council
through Resolution 2231, the JCPOA continues to be a key element of the global nuclear non-
proliferation architecture and critical for regional stability and international security. In 2020,
the EU will continue its work with Iran, the remaining participants to the JCPOA, and the
international community with the aim of preserving the nuclear agreement. Following the
withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and the subsequent re-imposition of US
sanctions, both of which the EU has strongly regretted, Iran continued to comply with its
HR(2020) 155
38
HR(2020) 155
commitments under the JCPOA for 14 months, as confirmed by consecutive reports of the
IAEA. In July 2019, Iran started to reduce gradually the implementation of its commitments.
This is of deep concern, and the EU has urged Iran to reverse all measures inconsistent with
the JCPOA and to go back to full compliance. As coordinator of the JCPOA Joint
Commission, the High Representative continues to be in close contact with all the JCPOA
participants in view of finding a diplomatic way forward and to preserve the JCPOA.
174. The EU continues to implement its commitments under the JCPOA, including in terms of
lifting of nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions with the aim of normalising trade
and economic relations with Iran. The EU is providing economic operators with
comprehensive updated information on EU sanctions lifting under the JCPOA. The EU
welcomed the registration of INSTEX SAS (Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges) on
31 January 2019 by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as initial shareholders to
support European economic operators engaged in legitimate trade with Iran, in accordance
with EU law and with the UN Security Council resolution 2231. The EU equally welcomed
the successful completion of INSTEX first transaction in March 2020 and the joining as
shareholders of four new European countries (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Norway). The EU continues to support the shareholders’ efforts further to develop INSTEX,
including the possibility to open its services to economic operators from third countries.
175. In the context of the EU’s balanced and comprehensive approach, the EU chaired a number of
meetings with Iran on regional issues, seeking concrete and constructive outcomes, such as on
the situation in Yemen. The most recent of these meetings was held on 18 March 2019. As
regional tensions were on the rise in summer 2019 and January 2020, the EU has called upon
all parties in the region to use constraint and refrain from actions that could lead to a very
dangerous escalation of tensions. The High Representative received a strong mandate from
the EU foreign ministers to carry out all necessary diplomatic efforts to contribute to the de-
escalation in the region, to support political dialogue, and to promote a political regional
solution. As the implementation of the JCPOA has enabled the establishment of a regular EU-
Iran High Level Dialogue, the EU and Iran continue to progress on concrete projects of
cooperation in a number of areas, including trade, SMEs and the economy, energy, nuclear
safety, environment and climate change, migration, refugees and humanitarian issues,
education, and research.
176. The EU continues to address the human rights situation in Iran, including urging the Iranian
authorities to respect the fundamental human rights of Iranian citizens. During 2019, the
European Union and its Member States were particularly dismayed by the authorities’
response to protests in Iran that began in November 2019, and which resulted in a statement
by the High Representative on behalf of the EU. The EU has also continued engaging Iran
regarding the situation of detained dual nationals, as well as urging Iran that all prisoners are
kept in safe and hygienic conditions. There have also been encouraging developments as
regards the significant reduction in drug-related executions in Iran during 2018 and 2019
following the entering into force of a decision in October 2017 to amend Iran's anti-narcotics
law.
HR(2020) 155
39
HR(2020) 155
177. Some ongoing concerns are addressed through sanctions, which include designation of Iranian
individuals and entities, such as those announced on 9 January 2019 in response to hostile
activities that Iran allegedly conducted on the territory of several Member States. In addition,
sanctions to address serious human rights violations in Iran are maintained. As regards
proliferation, a number of sectoral measures are still in place, including an arms embargo,
sanctions related to missile technology, restrictions on certain nuclear-related transfers and
activities, and provisions concerning certain metals and software that are subject to an
authorisation regime. EU restrictive measures vis-à-vis Iran include the provisions of relevant
UN Security Council Resolutions.
(C)
GLOBAL ISSUES
178. Despite being hit hard by the
COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has promptly put in place several
initiatives to counter the worst immediate disruptions caused by the spread of the virus, to
protect its citizens and interests around the world, fruitfully cooperating with partners in order
to provide support to those worst hit. In Europe, the EU has been cooperating with the UK
during the first months of 2020 on external aspects of COVID-19 crisis management, such as
consular coordination on repatriation of citizens, in full respect of the provisions of the
Withdrawal Agreement. To support the Western Balkans to address immediate needs and the
socio-economic impact, the EU swiftly mobilised a package of over €3.3 billion and included
them in some of its own response mechanisms.
179. In the Middle East, Iran has been one of the worst affected countries in the region by the
COVID-19 virus. Responding to the grave humanitarian situation in the country, the EU
provided timely and substantial support, including protective gear, medicines, and testing
material. The European Union is particularly concerned about the possible implications of the
COVID-19 pandemic on Syria's socio-economic situation. The pandemic has further
aggravated the conditions of millions of IDPs and negatively affected the already vulnerable
population, namely women, children, and the elderly. The EU has echoed the UN Special
Envoy for Syria’s call for a nation-wide ceasefire and release of detainees, to support the
measures taken to counter the pandemic and to protect the already struggling population. As
part of the efforts in the global fight against the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the European
Union has recalled that its sanctions in place regarding Syria are designed to avoid impeding
the supply of humanitarian assistance. The EU will continue to make sure that life-saving
equipment reaches those in need in Syria. Member States can make use of existing
humanitarian exceptions, where applicable, if difficulties do occur. Steps have been taken in
response to misinformation on EU sanctions vis-à-vis Syria, including by developing new
guidance for economic operators.
180. EU relations with the Americas in 2020 will be conditioned by the fallout from the unfolding
crisis caused by COVID-19. At the time of writing, the EU had already reoriented a
substantial part of its bilateral cooperation toward supporting those worst affected, with
HR(2020) 155
40
HR(2020) 155
further decisive action in preparation as part of “Team Europe”. The EU is also an active
participant in the Ministerial Coordination Group on COVID-19, established by Canada.
181. COVID-19 arrived in Africa in early March 2020, but the COVID-19-induced global
economic downturn affected Africa already in February. Beyond an immediate financial
response in support to Africa, the EU has led the efforts to develop a coherent multilaterally
coordinated response to the crisis. The EU supported the G20 initiative to put a moratorium
on bilateral public debt payments until the end of 2020 and supports further debate at the
international level on possible debt relief. It further supported the UNSG call for a universal
ceasefire, taking over the AU’s theme for 2020 on “silencing the guns”. The EU was also an
early supporter of the WHO Global preparedness and support plan and called for universal
access to COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, taking a leadership role during
the Coronavirus Global Response online pledging event on 4 May 2020, where it pledged
€1.4 billion.
182. Politically, COVID-19 confirmed the importance of establishing a durable partnership with
Africa. The continent demonstrated good resilience despite fragilities, but this will likely
come at a tremendous cost. The EU played a leading role in the international response in
support to Africa. On 8 April 2020, the EU presented a global COVID-19 response strategy,
adopted the next day with Member State contributions in the FAC as the Team Europe
response to the COVID-19 crisis: the strategy mobilises over €20 billion of existing EU and
Member State funding for reallocation and, where possible, accelerated disbursement to
support the immediate humanitarian needs, to strengthen the resilience of the national health
systems, and to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the crisis. One third of those funds will
be directed to Africa and at least one-quarter (over €5 billion) will support Sub-Saharan
Africa. This support is carefully prepared and monitored to ensure that it does not only
respond to immediate needs, but that it also reinforces governance and human rights.
183. As the airspace was rapidly closing down, the EU helped organise, in close coordination with
and support of Member States' efforts, a worldwide consular repatriation operation for
stranded EU citizens abroad. For Africa, this meant helping more than 50.000 European
citizens return to Europe, a demanding task in often challenging circumstances.
184. The magnitude of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic requires the EU to
operate at all levels. The EU can play an important stabilising role both at home, with a strong
recovery, and abroad, notably through keeping open trade channels and leveraging its
financial firepower and support to global finance and investment. The EU can exercise
leadership and use its political and economic assets to try to play a bridging role to help
moderate geo-political tensions and avoid destabilising repercussions, whether multilaterally
(e.g. at the WHO) or on the ground (e.g. in Africa). Partnerships and cooperation with like-
minded countries, but also with new or less like-minded partners, have to be enhanced across
the board, to promote global public goods as well as multilateralism based on solidarity,
human rights, and the rule-based international order.
HR(2020) 155
41
HR(2020) 155
185. Overall, the biggest short to medium term needs relate to stimulating economic recovery more
than to health-related assistance. The pandemic has affected the highly connected economic
powerhouses along the China-Europe-US axis, which concentrate most of the world’s
trade/economic flows, while threatening negative repercussions in other regions of the world.
Measures to halt the spread of the virus have exposed vulnerabilities and imbalances in global
supply chains and their potentially destabilising effects for the world order.
186. Following the political agreement on a Team Europe approach for the EU global response to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the focus is now to deliver effectively on the close to €36 billion
EU and Member States’ financial commitments on the ground (emergency humanitarian
response, strengthening health systems and research capacities, and addressing socio-
economic consequences).
187. Engagement and support should be consolidated in the EU’s neighbourhood and beyond,
notably in Africa, without neglecting other regions as the COVID-19 spread evolves. The EU
must also continue to promote a coordinated global response through the multilateral system
and to help de-escalate geopolitical tensions, promoting narratives of solidarity and respect for
human rights and democracy as core values to be upheld in fighting the pandemic.
188. 2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. The recurrence coincides with the
unprecedented challenge for the current global order and international peace and security that
is the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU will continue its efforts to implement the 2019 Council
conclusions on EU action to strengthen rule-based
multilateralism. In doing so, it will
actively seek to strengthen and diversify its network of partnerships and enhance cross-
regional cooperation, in order to promote multilateral responses to global challenges. The EU
will in particular seek to lead a coordinated global response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
together with the United Nations, international financial institutions, the G7 and G20. The EU
will rally behind the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to coordinate a UN-wide response, and
aims to lead by example in showing solidarity and supporting partners across the world.
189. The current crisis demonstrates how crucial well-functioning and well-coordinated
multilateral institutions are to global health, prosperity, peace and security. The EU’s
concerted efforts to support the effective implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s
reforms across the UN agencies, funds, and programmes have brought some important
progress in terms of increasing cross-pillar coherence and advancing the humanitarian-
development-peace nexus. The EU will continue prioritising efforts to ensure a more flexible
and efficient multilateral system, from human rights and addressing the root causes of forced
displacement to conflict prevention, from climate change and sustainable development to
digital transformation. In line with the UN Secretary-General’s call to ‘recover better’, the EU
will focus on building more sustainable, inclusive, and equitable societies with particular
attention to mainstreaming human rights and gender equality. The paradigm for action will
continue to be the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change.
HR(2020) 155
42
HR(2020) 155
190. In a world of increasing geopolitical tensions, the pandemic is exacerbating existing
challenges and weakening the resilience of fragile states and regions. The EU has expressed
strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s appeal for a global ceasefire, reiterating the
need to advance political solutions and ensuring access to humanitarian aid. The EU will
continue to promote conflict prevention and to support peace and security around the world,
maintaining its existing engagements and identifying new opportunities to resolve conflicts
and build peace. The EU will take an active role in the 2020 UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Review to ensure continued and effective implementation of the UN reforms, prioritising
predictable and sustainable financing, enhancing the strategic links between the UN
Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Security Council, and better linking early warning
with early action. The EU will also continue efforts to strengthen the EU-UN strategic
partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management.
191. The EU will remain steadfast as a strong defender of
human rights. Significant progress has
been achieved, such as improvements in countries and regions where human rights were
under strain, through innovative engagement and investment in economic and social rights, or
the empowerment of human rights defenders and civil society through strong EU political and
financial support. Yet, the COVID-19 crisis has brought new challenges, and the EU has
reaffirmed the need to pay special attention to the growing impact of the pandemic on all
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Respect for all human rights must remain at the
heart of fighting COVID-19 and supporting the global recovery. In UN Human Rights fora,
the EU will take a leading role in advancing country specific resolutions and thematic
initiatives by building topical, cross-regional coalitions. The cross-regional "Good Human
Rights Stories Initiative" puts the EU at the forefront of efforts to "take back" the human
rights narrative, by promoting success stories about Human Rights initiatives. The EUSR for
Human Rights will remain a key actor of political action. In spring 2020, the Commission and
the High Representative submitted a joint proposal to the Council for a European Council
decision on the next EU Action Plan on Human Rights. The European Council decision
would enable the Council to implement Action Plan initiatives through qualified majority
voting. To this date, the Council has not discussed the proposal of the European Council
decisions. Nevertheless, implementing the ambitious EU Action Plan on Human Rights and
Democracy (2020-2024) will be the key priority to enhance EU leadership in protecting and
promoting human rights worldwide.
192. As regards
gender equality and women’s rights, in 2020 the international community marks
the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the 20th anniversary
of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and celebrates UN Women's 10
years of existence. The EU defined an ambitious approach to the 64th session of the
Commission on the status of women, the Generation Equality Forum, and UNGA75 High-
level Meeting as milestone moments for gender equality and women's rights, although
preparations were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
193. The EU remains at the forefront of actions to achieve gender equality, to ensure the full
enjoyment of all human rights by all girls and women, and to empower them. The EU's
HR(2020) 155
43
HR(2020) 155
commitment to gender equality is demonstrated through a variety of undertakings, in
particular engaging in political and policy dialogues with partner countries and regional
organisations, notably the African Union, NATO and ASEAN, higher profiling in
international decision-making fora, and endorsing gender mainstreaming as the key strategy
for achieving gender equality. The EU continues to forge a significant number of both gender-
focused and gender-related initiatives. The EU-UN Spotlight Initiative is the EU flagship
action to prevent and combat all forms of sexual and gender-based violence worldwide.
194. In the current situation related to the COVID-19 outbreak, the EU promptly responded to
UNSG’s appeal on gender-based violence and COVID-19 by initiating a statement that was
joined by 145 UN Member States and Observers from all regions. A joint statement was also
issued by the High Representative and Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Janez Lenarčič,
calling for the protection and promotion of women’s and girls’ rights worldwide. Political
commitment has been immediately backed up by adequate funding. Women and girls, in
particular from population groups who are in situations of marginalisation and vulnerability,
are a priority group in the EU’s overall coronavirus response and recovery.
195. In a global context where
democracy has been increasingly challenged, the COVID-19 crisis
poses the risk to accelerate negative trends and to jeopardise progress made in fragile
democratisation processes. To counter these developments, the implementation of the Council
Conclusions on Democracy from 2019 and the democracy actions of the EU’s new Action
Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024) will be of utmost relevance. To protect,
defend, and support democracy globally, the EU will for example step up its support to
parliamentary institutions and independent and pluralistic media, as well as its fight against
disinformation, and promote active citizenship and participation in public and political life, in
particular of women and youth. To support building resilient, inclusive, and democratic
societies, the EU will also continue to deploy election missions in agreed priority countries,
subject to the restrictions of the pandemic and in close cooperation with the international
election observation community, and to consolidate the missions’ methodology, including on
observing online campaigns and electoral technologies. The EU will also pursue and
strengthen the consistent follow up of EU Electoral Mission recommendations as well as the
support and cooperation with domestic citizen observers.
196. 2020 is a milestone set in the Paris Agreement to revise short-term commitments and define
long-term trajectories, while climate science still states that global ambition shall be
strengthened rapidly to meet the temperature goals agreed in Paris. In this context, and based
on the assumption that the EU, now accountable for around 9% of global emissions, will not
tackle the challenge of climate change alone, the January 2020 Foreign Affairs Council
Conclusions on
Climate Diplomacy called on “the High Representative, Commission and
Member States to work jointly and urgently towards a strategic approach to Climate
Diplomacy”. In response, the EU and its Member States have already initiated a revitalised
climate outreach that shall be strategic (going beyond traditional climate policy circles),
sustained (with robust messages and proactive proposals for cooperation), and tailor-made
HR(2020) 155
44
HR(2020) 155
(accounting for partner countries' particular challenges and opportunities and sensitive to their
political stance on climate action).
197. This effort will take into account the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
postponement of every major international event from March 2020 (including EU bilateral
summits and Climate COP26, initially planned in November). The concept of
green recovery will guide us in order to ensure that the massive invests coming in response to the
consequences of the pandemic will follow a sustainable pathway and contribute to accelerate
global low carbon transition. As climate change is a defining issue of our time, it will remain
at the top of the European diplomatic agenda for the coming years. The Foreign Affairs
Council will necessarily remain seized of this issue, while assessing progress on the way to
COP26 in Glasgow.
198. Aware of the direct impact of climate change on peace and security around the world, and of
its role of threat multiplier, the EU will strengthen its work on this dimension, in particular to
better anticipate the effects of climate change on stability.
199. In 2020,
migration will continue to be a major priority for the EU in our relationship with
key third countries of origin and transit, ensuring it remains embedded in our overall relations
with these countries. The EU reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive and
geographically balanced external approach on migration that is in line with our principles and
values and fully respects international law and EU and national competences. This approach
aims to save lives, prevent irregular migration and address its root causes, ensure adequate
protection for those in need, fight against smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human
beings, and offer legal migration channels while fully respecting national competencies. The
European Commission will soon present its proposal for a new Pact on Asylum and
Migration.
200. The EU emphasised that no country can address migration and forced displacement on its
own, whether in Europe or elsewhere in the world. The EU will continue to work with
partners – countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as international organizations –
to address jointly these challenges, including in the framework of the UN. The EU will
continue to pursue its comprehensive approach to migration and forced displacement,
including addressing irregular migration, through the building of effective, sustainable, and
tailor-made partnerships. The EU will underline the importance of compliance with
international refugee law including the principle of
non-refoulement, the upholding of human
rights law, and the provision of significant support to key refugee hosting countries.
201. The fight against
people-smuggling networks will remain a priority through enhanced
support to third countries on investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting smugglers, notably
through dedicated partnerships with a view to preventing people from embarking on perilous
journeys. Within the framework of the Civilian CSDP Compact, further appropriate ways to
enhance operational cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) agencies are being explored.
HR(2020) 155
45
HR(2020) 155
Connectivity
202. Given the geopolitical nature of connectivity, both proactive communication of the EU
principles and collaboration with like-minded countries were of particular importance. The
connectivity partnership concluded with Japan in September 2019, the first of its kind entered
into by the EU, was a tangible deliverable one year after the launch of the Joint
Communication “Connecting Europe and Asia”, endorsed by the Council. This partnership
sends a political signal, closely watched by other global actors on connectivity (China with
Belt and Road Initiative, the US with Build Act and Blue Dot Network), about the will for
practical cooperation in all aspects of connectivity, based on shared values of sustainability
and transparency. The Europa Connectivity Forum held in September 2019 visibly
demonstrated the convening power of the EU, attracting huge interest with more than 1,300
participants from 82 countries, and 11.5 million engagements on social media. It also shows
expectations for the EU to be an effective global player, offering a credible and sustainable
alternative to other visions of connectivity.
Digital diplomacy
203. Digital transformation remains at the top of the EU’s global agenda in 2020. In line with
relevant Council conclusions and the European Commission Communication on “Shaping
Europe’s Digital Future” from February 2020, the EU will continue to take strong initiatives
to shape global interactions in the field of new technologies, and to develop digital standards
vested in European values. Digitalization will remain a key tenet of the EU’s enlargement,
neighbourhood and development policies, including the promotion of green digital
technologies in partner countries and regions, in accordance with Europe’s commitment to the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The EU-African Union Digital Economy Task
Force will underpin the support for the digital transformation in Africa.
204. The EU remains a strong supporter of the UN’s efforts on global digital cooperation,
including in the context of the UN 75th Anniversary. The EU contributed substantively to the
recommendations of the UN High Level Panel on Digital Cooperation, including in a joint
meeting with the Global Tech Panel, and will continue to support their implementation and
the UN Secretary-General's Roadmap for Digital Cooperation.
205. The pace of technological innovation raises the stakes to harness its benefits and mitigate
harms. Innovative partnerships like the Global Tech Panel, bringing together diplomacy with
the tech sector and civil society, will be key for governance to keep up. To deepen its digital
diplomacy, in 2020 the EU has set up a new Digital Diplomacy Network, bringing together
the foreign ministries of the Member States and the European Commission under the
auspices of the European External Action Service.
Strategic Communications
HR(2020) 155
46
HR(2020) 155
206. Strategic communications is a vital instrument enabling the EU to meet its ambition for a
more active role and stronger voice for the EU in the world. Defending EU interests and
values in an increasingly polarised world, in a competitive and polluted information
environment, requires continuous investments in strategic communications.
207. The EEAS continued to make steady progress in the area of strategic communications by
professionalising communications, mainstreaming integrated campaigns approach for EU
Delegations and for global campaigns run from EEAS Headquarters, building engaging
digital diplomacy and public diplomacy initiatives, and countering disinformation. A new
approach was further embedded in policy making, focusing on the added value of strategic
communications and anchored in clearly defined thematic priorities for the EU's foreign
policy, in accordance with the High Representative’s guidance.
208. The EU will continue its public diplomacy and strategic communications actions in
coordination with Member States and national authorities; this will include developing and
communicating positive narratives and strengthening its capacity to address disinformation,
including around the COVID-19 pandemic.
209. The strengthened strategic and digital communications will be further employed to project the
EU's high level of ambition and commitment on EU Climate action and to promote a global
EU’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The EEAS will continue championing
multilateralism and working with multiple policy communities at regional and sub-regional
levels. In the context of the 75th anniversary of the UN (SDGs, human rights and the Green
Deal), we will promote the EU as a global actor and strong partner on
inter alia security and
defence, and economic and cultural diplomacy.
Disinformation
210. The General Affairs Council in December 2019 recalled the importance of the continued
implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation. It underlined the need for
sufficient resources for the three Stratcom Task Forces (East, Western Balkans, South) of the
European External Action Service and invited the EEAS to assess the needs and possibilities
for reinforcing its strategic communication work in other geographical areas, such as sub-
Saharan Africa. The Commission and the EEAS were also urged further to develop, together
with Member States, the Rapid Alert System towards a comprehensive platform for
cooperation, coordination and information exchange for Member States and EU institutions.
As regards social media platforms, the Commission is invited to consider ways to further
enhance the implementation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, including possible
enforcement mechanisms. The EEAS continued to tackle the immediate and long-term threats
posed by disinformation as an integral part of strengthening the EU’s resilience against hybrid
threats. The implementation of the Action Plan against Disinformation was at the heart of
investments made in media monitoring, detection and countering of disinformation, and
raising awareness about it in the EU and its neighbourhood.
HR(2020) 155
47
HR(2020) 155
211. The work of the EEAS Strategic Communications Divisions and in particular the three Task
Forces (East, Western Balkans, South) was reinforced with resources allowing to detect,
analyse, and challenge disinformation activities of foreign State actors and external non-State
actors. The Task Forces will continue to contribute to effective and fact-based positive
communication and promotion of Union values and policies in the EU Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. An important work will continue to support
independent media and civil society in the three priority regions.
212. The EEAS-managed Rapid Alert System (RAS) was further upgraded to improve sharing of
information, research and insights between EU institutions, EU Member States, and
international partners. The work continued to develop RAS into a comprehensive platform for
coordination and information exchange in support of addressing disinformation campaigns
and foreign interference.
213. The cooperation with international partners such as NATO and the G7 Rapid Response
Mechanism has been further strengthened, contributing to the exchange of best practices on
proactive communications and better situational awareness.
214. The reorganisation of the Strategic Communications Division allowed reinforcing work on
emerging actors, such as China, and on big data analysis to address new online threats. The
Joint Communication by the High Representative together with the Commission "Tackling
COVID-19 disinformation – Getting the facts right" was published on 10 June 2020. It
outlined lessons learned and short-term measures necessary to address disinformation, which
used COVID-19 related public health crisis and fears to undermine trust in European
governments, polarise societies, and damage the EU’s reputation internationally
215. Recognising the importance of and the role played by civil society, academia, and the private
sector in addressing disinformation and in building resilience, the EEAS engaged with
independent fact checkers, researchers and academia by organising several high-level
conferences and seminars to discuss EU’s response to disinformation.
216. Further work will be needed to strengthen coordinated and joint responses to disinformation
and increasing societal resilience to disinformation. The EEAS will train and develop a new
network of strategic communications officers in the 27 EU Delegations and Offices in the
Neighbourhood and Western Balkans to improve analysis of information environments and
strengthen strategic communications. The EEAS is also assessing the needs and possibilities
for reinforcing its strategic communications work in other geographical areas, such as sub-
Saharan Africa.
(D)
CSDP AND CRISIS RESPONSE
Security and Defence
HR(2020) 155
48
HR(2020) 155
217. The implementation of the Global Strategy in the area of security and defence continues to be
a priority in 2020. In light of the changing security environment and strategic context and in
order to reduce our vulnerabilities, which risk to be amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic,
there is a need to provide further impetus to the fulfilment of the Level of Ambition agreed in
November 2016 by identifying policy goals and objectives that are more specific and updated.
To this end, in 2020 the High Representative launched work, in close cooperation with
Member States and in consultation with the Commission, towards a Strategic Compass for
adoption by the Council in 2022. As a first step, the High Representative will provide a 360
degree threat analysis to Member States with a view to ensure a common understanding of
threats and challenges and build a common strategic culture.
218. The Council remains committed to an ambitious and swift implementation of the EU’s
security and defence initiatives launched since 2016 to protect the Union and its citizens,
while enhancing its role as a global actor and security provider. This will enhance its strategic
autonomy and its ability to cooperate with partners in order to safeguard its values and way of
life, and help shape the global future. The EU remains determined to take more responsibility
for its security, with partners wherever possible and alone when necessary, in the pursuit of
EU values and interests. Further to the progress made since June 2019 on further increasing
the common understanding on the implementation procedures of Mutual Assistance and/or
Solidarity in line with Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU, in 2020 the High
Representative will also address practical issues of possible support by EU Institutions or
existing tools in response to a request of a Member State.
219. 2019 has confirmed the EU-UN mutual commitment to cooperation on peacekeeping and
crisis management on eight jointly defined priority areas 2019-2021 for reinforcing this
strategic partnership. Cooperation has been strengthened between missions and operations in
the field, notably in the Central African Republic, Somalia, Mali (including on the G5 Sahel
Joint Force), Libya, Iraq, Western Balkans, and also with regard to conflict prevention; the
women, peace and security (WPS) agenda; and trilateral EU-UN-AU cooperation. Progress
can be noted in terms of more effective cooperation thanks to more systematic exchanges of
information and increasingly clearly delineated roles. EU and UN missions and operations
have also increased cooperation on logistics and support, with the finalisation of local
technical agreements and MoUs.
220. Work has continued on the implementation of the two Joint Declarations signed by the
President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the
Secretary General of NATO in Warsaw in July 2016 and in Brussels in July 2018
respectively. The fifth progress report submitted jointly by the High Representative/Head of
Agency and the Secretary General of NATO on the implementation of the common set of
proposals (a total of 74 actions) highlights key achievements, including in the areas of
political dialogue, military mobility, strategic communications, as well as defence
capabilities.
221. The institutional framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is almost
finalised, with work still continuing on the adoption by the Council of a Decision on the
HR(2020) 155
49
HR(2020) 155
general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in
PESCO projects. 47 PESCO projects have been launched so far (17 announced in December
2017 and launched in March 2018, 17 in November 2018, and 13 in November 2019). In line
with the PESCO implementation roadmap, in April 2020 the High Representative presented
the second Annual Report on PESCO implementation, including an assessment of the updated
National Implementation Plans (NIPs) communicated by the participating Member States
(pMS). Furthermore, as foreseen in the establishing Council Decision, in December 2019 the
PESCO Strategic Review was launched with the view to be finalized by November 2020.
Concrete recommendations on the Strategic Review were made also in the High
Representative Annual Report. On that basis, the Council adopted in June 2020 a
Recommendation assessing the progress made by pMS to fulfil commitments undertaken in
the framework of PESCO.
222. The first full
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) cycle was launched in
September 2019, with the CARD Report (including political-level messages and relevant
actionable recommendations) to be presented to the Defence Ministers in November 2020.
CARD looks at the entire European defence landscape, including capability, Research and
Technology, industrial, and operational aspects, with a major interim step achieved in late
May 2020 with the release of the CARD Aggregated Analysis (providing an overview and
trends, as well as including the analysis of collaborative opportunities). Beyond the review of
participating Member States’ defence activities, CARD is a key tool in support of overall
coherence in Member States' defence planning and serves as a pathfinder for multinational
collaborative opportunities, thus contributing to promote cooperation and investment in
defence capabilities. The coherence of output between the CARD, as well as the Capability
Development Plan, and respective NATO processes, such as the NATO Defence Planning
Process (NDPP), has been and will continue to be ensured where requirements overlap, and
while recognising the different nature of the two organisations and their respective
responsibilities
223. Progress was also made on developing the
European Defence Fund, aimed at fostering the
global competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the European defence
technological and industrial base throughout the Union. Regarding activities under the current
Multiannual Financial Framework, implementation of the Preparatory Action on Defence
Research continued, with the selection of seven new defence research projects in April 2020
related to the calls for proposals in relation to the work-programme 2019, as well as the
selection of three projects dedicated to disruptive technologies through dedicated calls on 15
June 2020. This dedicated call was designed to prepare the future EDF, which allocates up to
8% of its budget to such actions. Furthermore, the Commission also adopted on 15 June 2020
the first award decisions of the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (2018-
2019). Total grant amount will reach €200 million and will be shared among 16 proposals
covering all 2019 calls. The Programme is stimulating cross border cooperation and opening
new supply chains opportunities throughout the Union, reaching out to SMEs that represent a
significant portion of all entities that will receive funding. It will deliver key capability
priorities identified by the Member States through the CDP and consistent with NATO
HR(2020) 155
50
HR(2020) 155
priorities. The programme proved to be open for the participation of third-country entities.
Entities controlled by third countries, including the US, were assessed eligible for funding.
Regarding the future Multiannual Financial Framework, in February 2019 a partial common
understanding between the European Parliament and the Council was reached, without
prejudice to the overall agreement on the MFF. The conclusions of the European Council in
July 2020 on the package of the future Multi-Annual Financial Framework and the Next
Generation EU included an agreement between Member States on a budget of €7.014 million
(2018 prices) for the European Defence Fund, showing the commitment of EU Member States
to have a meaningful budget for the Fund.
224. Efforts have intensified to ensure
coherence and mutual reinforcement among EU
initiatives (CARD, PESCO, European Defence Fund) aimed at strengthening the Union’s
ability to take more responsibility as a security provider: such efforts supported the
development of needed European capabilities through greater cooperation, thus contributing
to achieving the EU level of ambition on security and defence. In May 2020, the High
Representative/Head of the Agency delivered his second report on coherence among the EU
defence initiatives. The second Report addresses the progress made in the areas identified in
the first Report (May 2019) and reflects on the way forward as regards (i) the use of the EU
Capability Development Priorities as a common reference for EU defence initiatives (CARD,
PESCO and EDF); (ii) the appropriate synergies in the projects dimensions; (iii) the coherent
sequencing of processes, including by embedding EU tools and processes in national
planning. Coherence remains a precondition for effective and efficient implementation of the
complementary and mutually reinforcing EU defence initiatives, which remain distinct and
have different legal bases. The first award decision of the EDIDP proofs that all the efforts
and measures taken to ensure coherence brings expected results. Projects selected for funding
are fully in line with CDP priorities, and PESCO projects will receive around 80% of the
funding.
225. The EU welcomes the positive impact of the
Military Planning and Conduct Capability
(MPCC) in its command and control of the EU’s three military training missions and
underlines the relevance of the MPCC, which was set up in June 2017 as a permanent
planning and conduct capability at the military strategic level in Brussels for these missions,
in accordance with the principle of avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO. The Joint
Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) helps to reinforce civilian/military synergies and
coordination between the MPCC and its civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability (CPCC). In November 2018, the Council agreed to reinforce the MPCC's
mandate in order to be capable, by the end of 2020, also to command one limited executive
operation of battlegroup-size.
226. As part of the security and defence agenda, progress has been made on military mobility at the
EU level with the further implementation of the EU Action Plan of March 2018, as well as in
the framework of PESCO and EU-NATO cooperation, also outlined in the relevant Council
Conclusions. Following the update of the Military Requirements as approved by the Council
in July 2019, the work continued with the updated gap analysis of July 2020, which reflects
HR(2020) 155
51
HR(2020) 155
the changes in the two main elements on the technical parameters and geographical data, as
well as the post-Brexit reality. This will allow the finalisation of the dual-use requirements
before the end of 2020 (in the form of an implementing regulation to the new CEF regulation
once adopted) for future transport infrastructures projects. In accordance with the conclusions
of the European Council of July 2020 on the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework, an
agreement was reached on the amount of 1.5 billion EUR (in constant prices) for the military
mobility envelop, which will allow the launch of the dual-use projects. In the ongoing review
of the trans-European transport Regulation, an evaluation to include certain dual-use
infrastructure requirements is foreseen. In addition, further progress was achieved on the
following areas: cross-border movement permission within the framework of the European
Defence Agency and on customs formalities (establishment of the EU form 302 for military
movements) by the Commission services. The second Joint Progress Report to be presented
by end of summer 2020 is expected to outline the progress achieved in all strands of work.
The close EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility also continued on related issues, as
part of the framework of the implementation of the Joint Declarations, and facilitated by the
established Structured Dialogue at staff-to-staff level between the two organizations. Building
on the previously achieved results, notably the coherence between the respective sets of
military requirements, new deliverables were achieved with the exchange of the lists of
National Points of Contact on military mobility.
227. The Civilian CSDP Compact of November 2018, adopted in the form of "Conclusions of the
Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within
the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact", is a landmark in the process
to strengthen the civilian dimension of CSDP. The Compact encompasses 22 political
commitments by the Member States to undertake a number of actions. Its main objective is to
make civilian CSDP (i) more capable, by having Member States committing to develop the
necessary capabilities to deploy their staff; (ii) more effective, responsive and flexible in
providing an EU response; (iii) and more joined up with other EU instruments such as JHA
agencies and with partners. The Compact calls for its full implementation by early summer
2023 at the latest, including through National Implementation Plans by the Member States
and a joint EEAS/Commission Action Plan. Underlining the importance of the internal-
external security nexus, the Civilian CSDP Compact, highlights that civilian CSDP missions
should also contribute to the EU's wider response to tackle "new" security challenges that may
hinder the host country or regional stabilization and hamper the achievement of the missions
mandate, including those linked to irregular migration, hybrid threats, cyber security,
terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime, border management and maritime security; as
well as preventing and countering violent extremism and the need to preserve and protect
cultural heritage. In this regard, efforts are ongoing to ensure closer CSDP-JHA cooperation
and operational output of such cooperation by considering, where appropriate, new lines of
operations or pilot projects in new or ongoing CSDP missions, also building on targeted mini-
concepts.
228. Countering hybrid threats is primarily a national responsibility, but the EU is assisting
Member States to strengthen their resilience against threats of hybrid nature. The Horizontal
HR(2020) 155
52
HR(2020) 155
Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats established in July
2019 strives to support strategic and horizontal coordination among Member States in the
field of State and societal resilience, improving strategic communication and countering
disinformation. The fourth Annual Progress report on the implementation of the 2016 Joint
Framework and 2018 Joint Communication was adopted in July, together with “Mapping”, a
Joint staff working document providing a comprehensive inventory of countering hybrid
threats-related measures at EU level and listing the corresponding policy and legal documents,
and with the Security Union Strategy. The COVID-19 pandemic and the proliferation of false
information, both mis- and disinformation, around the virus showcased the importance of past
steps taken by the EU to tackle disinformation campaigns. The EEAS-managed Rapid Alert
System (RAS) served as a platform to exchange on disinformation related to the virus and on
proactive communication initiatives put forward by EU institutions and Member States.
Around the RAS, external dimension of cooperation has been developed as well: a separate
collaboration space on the Rapid Alert System that facilitates exchanges between the
platform’s PoCs and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism has been provided. With the aim to
prioritise the protection of missions against hybrid attacks and assist the host nation in
increasing resilience against hybrid threats, a mini-concept on civilian CSDP support to
countering hybrid threats is currently been drafted.Following the adoption of the
implementing guidelines for the Framework for a
Joint EU Diplomatic Response to
Malicious Cyber Activities, EU Member States have on various occasions expressed their
wish to continuously improve the EU's ability to diplomatically respond to malicious cyber
activities, including by organising "cyber diplomacy toolbox" table-top exercises. On 17 May
2019, the Council established a framework that allows the EU to impose targeted restrictive
measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks that constitute an external threat to the EU or
its Member States. On 14 May 2020, the Council adopted the decision extending the cyber
sanctions regime until 18 May 2021. On 30 April, the High Representative issued a
declaration on behalf of the EU on malicious cyber activities exploiting the coronavirus
pandemic. In addition, in order to better prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious
behaviour in cyberspace, the Council decided on 30 July 2020 to apply restrictive measures
against six individuals and three entities or bodies involved in various cyber-attacks. These
include the attempted cyber-attack against the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons) and those publicly known as 'WannaCry', 'NotPetya', and 'Operation
Cloud Hopper'.
229. In 2018 the EU and its MeAamber States updated the
EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework
to further develop EU cyber defence policy by taking into account relevant developments in
other policy areas and the implementation of the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework since
2014. The implementation of this framework in supporting the development of Member
States’ cyber defence capabilities has progressed in 2019, enhancing the protection of CSDP
communications and information systems, promoting civil-military cooperation in research
and technology, improving education, training and exercises opportunities, and also
enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners, particularly by putting forward
EU–NATO cooperation on cyber security and defence.
HR(2020) 155
53
HR(2020) 155
230. On the climate-security nexus, following the discussion of Ministers of Defence in Helsinki at
the end of August 2019 on climate and defence, the EEAS in cooperation with the EDA and
relevant Commission services developed a reflection paper on climate and defence. The
Reflection paper maps relevant ongoing work in different inter-linked areas, notably the
operational context, capability development aspects and partnerships, and identified main
work strands for further consideration. On the basis of the June 2020 Council Conclusions on
security and defence, the next steps will include the development of a coherent set of concrete
and comprehensive short, medium, and long term actions.
231. A joint EU-UN Workshop on
promoting women's meaningful participation in peace
operations, crisis management and peace processes was organised within the framework of
the 2019-2021 priorities to reinforce the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations
and Crisis Management. The Workshop report included recommendations for the EU, the UN,
and their Member States.
232. A joint EU-UN mapping to assess cooperation between EU and UN crisis management and
field missions on
Women Peace and Security related activities was conducted within the
framework of the UN–EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management.
The aim is further to strengthen the cooperation between UN peace operations and CSDP
missions and operations on women, peace and security.
233. In 2020, the EU will actively contribute to the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture
and organise consultation meetings, which will contribute to the formulation of a common EU
position.
International Security
234. The EU has continued to pursue an ambitious international security agenda, both in
multilateral fora, as well as in cooperation with partners. The fight against terrorism,
leadership in the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, maritime security, hybrid and
cyber security are key areas of EU engagement.
235. The EU's external action on countering terrorism contributes to the priority objective of
strengthening the Union's internal security. Therefore, the strategic and policy continuum
between EU's internal and external security will be further reinforced to enhance the
effectiveness of counter-terrorism actions across the board.
236. The EU’s focus is on its closest neighbourhood, which is intrinsically linked to the EU’s
internal security. In addition, the EU continues to reinforce its presence in the Sahel,
considering the increasing threat and the risk of contagion to coastal West African countries,
and, more generally, to address the growing intra-continental dynamic spread of terrorism,
such as in the Horn of Africa and in other African countries, where terrorist activities are
increasing. The global threat picture requires that the EU is open to counter-terrorism
engagement and outreach with countries in other regions that are strategically important for
HR(2020) 155
54
HR(2020) 155
European security, such as Central Asia, South Asia and South-East Asia, supported by the
deployment of CT/Security Experts in 18 EU Delegations.
237. The EU will steadfastly continue to build and strengthen its strategic partnerships with the
leading global actors in this field, first and foremost the United Nations. It will continue to
pursue cooperation and coordination with a number of partners and international and regional
organisations, initiatives and other multilateral platforms, especially with key actors such as
NATO, as agreed in the 2017 EU-NATO Common Set of New Proposals, the Council of
Europe, and the OSCE. The EU is also a member of both the Global Counterterrorism Forum
and its inspired institutions and the Global Coalition against Da’esh and its working groups.
238. Cooperation between Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations and EU
Justice and Home Affairs Agencies is being further promoted, in full respect of the
missions' mandates. Enhancing linkages between military and law enforcement actors for
counter terrorism purposes is being further examined. The EU is further strengthening
international cooperation with key strategic partners, including the United States, Canada, and
Australia; and with key regional and multilateral partners such as the United Nations, NATO,
the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Financial Action Task Force, and other regional
organisations where relevant, including the OSCE, the African Union, the Association of
South-East Asian Nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the League of Arab States.
Efforts continued with a view to expanding and strengthening the network of counter-
terrorism experts in EU Delegations.
239. On the European Union Maritime Security Strategy, the EU has continued to actively enhance
its profile as a global maritime security actor. Civil/military cooperation remained high on the
priority agenda, as shown by the European Border and Cost Guard (EBCG) and EUNVAFOR
SOPHIA setting up and operating their information sharing procedures. The EEAS and the
Commission worked hand in hand to design new programmes/projects of capacity-building
for coastal states, especially in the Indian and Pacific oceans, to enhance their maritime
situation awareness and regional cooperation between all agencies that participate to the
security and safety of the seas. These programmes follow up on the annual round of political
dialogues led by the EEAS, where the maritime security component was present more than
ever. Perspectives have opened to set up several fully-fledged maritime security dialogues in
the next couple of years with major naval powers such as Japan, India, and possibly China. In
this regard, the EU is chairing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Meeting on
Maritime Security (together with Vietnam and Australia), supported by the FPI, and has
sponsored several regional seminars and workshops tackling fundamental issues such as the
emerging challenges that UNCLOS could face (e.g. environmental protection, cooperation
between Law enforcement agencies, maritime domain awareness, etc.). Meanwhile, staff-to-
staff talks between EU and NATO and their respective specialized training centres have
enhanced as agreed in the joint EU NATO Warsaw Declaration. After having developed and
adopted its Coordinated Maritime Presence concept at the FAC in August 2019, the EU is
now testing it with a pilot project in the Gulf.
HR(2020) 155
55
HR(2020) 155
240. We continued to support the multilateral rule-based order in the field of non-proliferation,
disarmament, and arms export control. In this field, the core thrust of the EU action in 2019
has addressed preparations for and EU engagement in Review Conferences, notably through
Council Conclusions on an EU position on strengthening the ban against anti-personnel mines
in light of the Fourth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Oslo,
25-29 November 2019), the implementation of the 2019 CFSP Council Decision (615) in
support of the process leading to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), through a series of thematic and regional seminars.
241. The EU reaffirms its longstanding commitment to verifiable and effective treaty-based
nuclear arms control and disarmament. Bearing in mind the severe and increasingly volatile
security environment, the EU stresses the need to preserve and further advance general arms
control, disarmament, and non-proliferation processes and calls for further progress on all
aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation to enhance global security. The viability and
effectiveness of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements require that
those agreements be fully complied with and enforced. In this context, the EU highlighted the
importance of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The EU encourages the
preservation of the INF Treaty achievements and, taking into account the special
responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, welcomes early and active
dialogue between the US and Russia on the extension of the New START Treaty, and on
other arms control arrangements.
242. The EU continued to promote the early entry into force and universality of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); coordinated diplomatic outreach was
conducted globally by EU Delegations and EU Member States encouraging new ratifications
of the Treaty. On 29 June 2020, the Council also decided to continue its financial support for
the CTBTO for another three years through a new CFSP Council Decision 2020/901, with the
amount of 6.3 million euro. Moreover, the EU continued to promote the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Amendment
to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM) as fundamental
elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture. The United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
(UNOCT) started implementing Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for
the universalisation and effective implementation of ICSANT. The EU and its Member States
continued to be actively involved in the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT) in all areas: nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response, and
mitigation.
243. In 2019, the EU continued to support the universalisation and proper implementation of the
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation (HCoC), through Council
Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370. . Moreover, on 2 June 2020 the Council adopted a Decision that
provides €1.4 million over three years in support of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism
for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons.
HR(2020) 155
56
HR(2020) 155
244. Regarding biological weapons, the Council adopted on 9 December 2019 Decision (CFSP)
2019/2108 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line
with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, which provides
for €2.7 million over three years.
245. The EU continued to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) politically, diplomatically, and financially with a view to the full and effective
implementation and the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Firm
support was provided to the OPCW operations in Syria, in particular by further extending the
implementation period of Decision 2017/2303/CFSP for the provision of satellite imagery to
the OPCW, as well as the implementation of the OPCW Decision dated on 27 June 2018 on
"Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use". The EU strongly supported the OPCW
Executive Council decision of 9 July 2020 requesting the Syrian Arab Republic to take
concrete measures to return to full compliance with the CWC. In October 2020, the Council
is expected to renew the autonomous and horizontal EU sanctions against the use and the
proliferation of chemical weapons, contributing thereby to the upholding of the global norm
against the use of such weapons.
246. The EU demonstrated its continued support to key international instruments in the global non-
proliferation and disarmament architecture and to multilateral export control regimes such as
the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification
(IPNDV), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
247. With a view to making further progress on advancing common ground on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), in 2019 the EU continued actively to support the work of the
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW).
248. At the Fourth Review Conference of the Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Oslo 25-29
November 2019), the EU’s impact and visibility were ensured by a common position, timely
adopted via Council Conclusions on 25 June 2019 and submitted as a Working Paper to the
Convention. It was also ensured by an EU CFSP statement and a coordinated Commission
statement, and by a side-event presenting the EU's support for the implementation of the
Convention.
249. The Council adopted four Decisions in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy
against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW) and their Ammunition:
•
Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1298 in support of an Africa-China-Europe dialogue and
cooperation on preventing the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa, implemented
by Safer world, for an amount of €one million;
HR(2020) 155
57
HR(2020) 155
• Council Decision 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine’s efforts to combat illicit trafficking in
weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE, for an amount of
€5.15 million
•
Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms
control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light
weapons and their ammunition, for an amount of €11.819.605.
•
Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit
small arms and light weapons and other illicit conventional weapons and ammunition to
reduce the risk of their illicit trade (‘iTrace IV’), implemented by Conflict Armament
Research (CAR), for an amount of €5.5 million.
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/979 in support of the development of an internationally
recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to
open international standards, implemented by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining ('GICHD') and its specialised agency, the Ammunition
Management Advisory Team ('AMAT'), for an amount of €1.64 million.
250. Due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Council decided the no-cost extension of the
implementation period of a number of CFSP Council Decisions in support i.a.; of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities in the area of nuclear security; of the
implementation of the UNSC resolution 1540; of the implementation of the Convention on
the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines; of the promotion of effective arms export controls;
of the outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT);
of strengthening the chemical safety and security, as well as the biosafety and security in
Ukraine; of the OSCE activities relating to the reduction of small arms, light weapons and
conventional ammunition in the Republic of North Macedonia and in Georgia.
251. On 16 September 2019, the Council also adopted a Decision amending the Council Common
Position of 8 December 2008 on the control of arms exports, as well as a revised user's guide.
It also adopted Conclusions on the review of the Common Position. The Council reaffirmed
that
military equipment and technology should be traded in a responsible and
accountable way. It also renewed its commitment to promote cooperation and convergence in
Member States' policies, in order to prevent the export of military technology and equipment,
which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to
regional instability. Based on the inputs of the Member States, the EEAS produced the 21st
Annual Report on Arms Exports providing a detailed picture on the granted and denied
exports by EU Member States of military equipment and technology per destination country
and per military list category. The EEAS also set up COARM political dialogues with
Canada, Norway, and the US
252. In addition to the work advanced on cyber in the context of the cyber diplomacy toolbox and
on cyber-defence, following the resumption of the
United Nations processes on cyber
issues, the EU reaffirms its commitment to continue building on the achievements of the
HR(2020) 155
58
HR(2020) 155
previous UN Groups of Governmental Experts, including the applicability of existing
international law in cyberspace and to the Budapest Convention on cybercrime. The EU
recognises the role of the UN in further developing norms for responsible State behaviour in
cyberspace and will continue to work in this direction in multilateral and bilateral discussions.
253.
Cooperation between Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations and
EU Justice and Home Affairs Agencies has been promoted through the development of
mini-concepts and in various forums to enhance CSDP-JHA cooperation.
254. While consular protection of EU citizens in third countries remains a national competence, the
EU made good progress in promoting developing consular cooperation and consular crisis
preparedness, with particular reference to the Council Directive 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on
facilitating consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the EU in third countries. The 74
Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks (JFWs) have become a key tool
enhancing coordination and effectiveness of a joint consular crisis response.
255. They have ensured effective coordinated consular assistance to an increasing number of
unrepresented EU citizens in third countries in crisis situations that required a coordinated EU
crisis response, including the multi terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka, Venezuela's long-lasting
crisis, Latin America, social unrest in Hong Kong, and natural disasters affecting Indonesia,
the Philippines, and the Caribbean Region.
256. Local consular exercises with the participation of EU Delegations, EU Member States, and
third parties improved the coordinated consular crisis preparedness and response together with
the regional video conferences, attended by more than 100 EU Delegations.
257. In this regard, the network of more than 135 Consular Correspondents in 142 EU Delegations
has played an active supporting role in helping EU Member States in several consular crisis
responses worldwide.
258. The roll-out of the IT-tool Consular On-Line platform CoOL in parallel with the testing phase
of the enhanced 2.0 CoOl release, with more than 800 registered users, has provided a
valuable sharing platform with EU Member States Crisis Centres and was successfully
activated in many consular crises.
259. EU Consular Dialogues with Canada, USA, Australia, and from 2019 also with New Zealand
reinforced the international cooperation for the protection of EU citizens in third countries as
well as in time of consular crisis.
260. Negotiations are currently under way in the Council with a view to having an operational
European Peace Facility (EPF) by January 2021, after the African Peace Facility runs out at
the end of this year.
HR(2020) 155
59
HR(2020) 155
Security aspects of the European space policy
261. The High Representative issued on 31 October 2019 the Report on the functioning of the EU
satellite centre (
SatCen) for the period 2014-2019, which highlights the growing user demand
for SatCen geo-intelligence products based on satellite imagery, and hence the increasing
importance of the Centre as a key element of European strategic autonomy. In 2019, the
SatCen delivered a total of 3080 products, representing a 30% increase compared to 2018.
262. However, the High Representative’s Report also underlines the challenges linked to the
strategic evolution of the Centre, notably the necessity to provide it with long-term and
sustainable funding. In 2020, the EEAS (Space Task Force) has and will continue to give
priority to the resolution of these challenges, through options to be submitted to a SatCen
Board at Ministerial level in November.
263. The Space Task Force launched in September 2019 a public diplomacy initiative on
Safety,
Security and Sustainability of Outer Space (SSSOS=3SOS) towards policy-makers,
industry, think-tanks and academia, space agencies and the scientific community throughout
the world in order to raise awareness and build a common understanding on the need to act
swiftly and jointly for security, safety, and sustainability of outer space.
264. There is a need for a timely global, common, and multilateral solution. This is the second
reading of the acronym 3SOS: thrice SOS, meaning that it is important to act swiftly.
265. This common understanding would concretise in voluntary norms and standards defined by
the relevant actors and pave the way for a political commitment in the UN.
Conflict prevention and Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crisis
266. A second implementation report on implementation of
conflict prevention actions was
presented to PSC, drawing out lessons learned on how to enhance an early response. Progress
was also registered in developing horizon-scanning tools. In 2020, the first-ever structured
training programme on conflict prevention will be launched for conflict prevention focal
points within the EU. The new guidance on conflict analysis will be launched as part of
ongoing efforts to improve prevention capacity. The EU conflict Early Warning System will
enhance its focus on ensuring a concrete and continued response to the observed risks for
violent conflict.
267. The EU strengthened its partnership with the UN on
Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR). In particular, the EU participated in the revision of
the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and contributed to the development of a new
IDDRS module “DDR and armed groups designated as terrorist organisations”. In 2020, the
EU and the UN will further expand this collaboration with joint scoping missions in the field.
268. In relation to the stabilisation concept, work has continued on improving
knowledge
management in the area of conflict prevention and crisis response, which also aims at
HR(2020) 155
60
HR(2020) 155
improving the effect and impact of EU stabilisation efforts. A joint EEAS/Commission paper
on "supporting the operationalisation of the Integrated Approach in conflict prevention and
crisis response through reinforced knowledge management" is being drafted and will start a
process to look at methodologies to achieve this.
269. The
Article 28 action in support to UNVIM in Yemen is extended from September 2019
until September 2020. Reflections on the scope and nature of the action beyond the current
mandate are under consideration.
Missions and operations
Europe
270. Following the mandate extension of the
EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo until
June 2020, the Mission completed a reconfiguration period in which it aligned its structure in
accordance with the new mandate, took all necessary steps to reach operational capability, and
downsized staff to meet the new authorised strength. A technical one-year extension of the
mission was signed in July 2020. The Strategic Review of EULEX Kosovo was delivered in
November 2019 and recommended that the current mandate be extended for another two
years without significant changes from June 2020 until June 2022. The Specialist Chambers
in The Hague stand ready to conduct proceedings on the basis of the prosecution conducted
by the Specialist Prosecutor Office (SPO), which has intensified its investigation over the last
months and has announced a ten-count indictment of President Thaci on 24 June 2020.
Following this announcement, the President was interviewed by the SPO during four
consecutive days in July 2020.
271. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
EU military operation EUFOR Althea continues to make
an important contribution to stability and security in the country. Following the Strategic
Review of EUFOR ALTHEA in 2017, the individual training activities of the Armed Forces
of Bosnia and Herzegovina were phased out. EUFOR refocused on its core mandate to
support the BiH authorities to maintain a Safe And Secure Environment (SASE). To this end,
it continues to deploy its intelligence capabilities. The second Strategic Review of 2019
confirmed this direction.
272. Through its monitoring and reporting about developments along the Administrative Boundary
Lines between Tbilisi Administered Territory and the breakaway regions,
EUMM Georgia continues to deliver against all four-core tasks of its mandate, namely monitoring, analysing
and reporting on stabilisation and normalisation, contributing to confidence building and to
informing EU policy. Through its Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM),
regular meetings between EUMM, the UN, the OSCE, Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia take place to discuss and resolve specific issues and incidents. A 24/7 "hotline"
telephone system is attached to the Mechanism, which has proven to be a way to quickly
establish common understanding of events and de-escalate possible tensions. Georgia is also
HR(2020) 155
61
HR(2020) 155
an active contributor to EU CSDP efforts and contributes personnel to the EU Training
Missions in Central African Republic and Mali.
273.
The EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUAM) has been playing a key role in supporting
the Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through
strategic advice and practical support in order to achieve civilian security services that are
efficient, accountable, and enjoy the trust of the public. The EU decided to rename the
Regional presences as Field Offices and decided to open a fourth one in Mariupol: this
decision showed the strong commitment of the EU to provide support to Civilian Security
Sector reform throughout the country. EUAM Ukraine has a mandate until May 2021. EUAM
will enhance the delivery of its activities in accordance with its mandate in the governmental
controlled areas in the east and the south-east of the country. The Mission continues to
promote and advise the reform of the Security Service of Ukraine into a modern Security
Service operating in accordance with European principles, together with the reform of
prosecution system and other legislative changes. EUAM Ukraine remains ready to assist
Ukraine in these important tasks in coherence with its mandate.
Africa
274. The EU continued to provide capacity-building support to Somali security forces through its
CSDP missions:
EUTM Somalia has been providing advice, mentoring and training to the
Somali National Army (SNA);
EUCAP Somalia continued advising federal and regional
authorities in Puntland and Somaliland on the development of Coast Guard and maritime
policing functions, complemented with support to broader police development; the Missions
have also been advising the SNA and Somali Police Force in support of ongoing transition
security operations in Lower Shabelle; EU maritime operation
ATALANTA has been
instrumental in suppressing and deterring piracy off the coast Somalia. EU’s CSDP
engagement remains relevant to both build up the capacities of Somali security forces for a
smooth transition from AMISOM to Somali security responsibilities, and to suppress and
deter piracy and enhance maritime security in the Horn of Africa, an area crucial for the EU’s
interests. The holistic Strategic Review, launched at the end of 2019, provides an opportunity
for the Member States to re-assess and re-adjust the CSDP engagement in Somalia/Horn of
Africa.
275. The CSDP action in the Sahel has been further strengthened as a major element of the EU's
integrated approach in the region. The regionalisation process of CSDP has stepped up
cooperation and coordination with international actors such as the UN, the AU, ECOWAS,
G5 Sahel and also with EU Member States involved in the region through ongoing initiatives
such as the
Partenariat pour la Sécurité et la Stabilité au Sahel (P3S). The CSDP missions in
the Sahel (
EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUCAP Sahel Niger) have continued to
support Sahelian security forces in the development of their capacities. Within this
framework, the EU is also providing an important support to the operationalisation of the G5
Sahel Joint Force and its related Police Component.
HR(2020) 155
62
HR(2020) 155
276.
EUTM Mali in particular was extended until 2024 with a broadened mandate to provide
military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force and to national armed forces in the G5 Sahel
countries through military advice, training, and mentoring.
EUCAP Sahel Mali has
reinforced its support to promote the redeployment of Malian Security forces into the centre
of Mali within the framework of the
Plan de Sécurisation Intégrée pour les Régions du
Centre (PSIRC).
EUCAP Sahel Niger has pursued its efforts at strategic level to support the
development of a National Policy on Defence and Security and the implementation of the
National Internal Security Strategy. Regarding irregular migration, the mission continued to
ensure a follow-up on migration routes and trends and has also supported the creation of the
second
Compagnie Mobile de Contrôle des Frontières (CMCF). The
Regional Advisory and
Coordination Cell (RACC) based in Nouakchott reinforced its network of security and
defence experts in Delegations in the G5 countries and continued to initiate and coordinate
capacity-building activities for all G5 countries and the G5 structures with the support of the
existing CSDP Missions. The International Humanitarian Law continues to be a relevant issue
in the region, and the CSDP is engaged to reinforce the capacities of the local security forces
in that regard.
277. The
EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), the
third CSDP engagement in CAR, has been conducting its second mandate delivering strategic
advice to the CAR government, military and security authorities, education to
Forces Armées
Centrafricaines (FACA) officers and NCOs as well as specialists, training to FACA units,
and has been supporting the interaction with CAR Internal Security Forces, in order to
contribute to the overall locally owned Security Sector Reform (SSR) process coordinated by
MINUSCA. By the end of its current mandate in September 2020, EUTM will have trained
four FACA battalions. With the objective to further support CAR authorities in the
redeployment of the State authority throughout the country, the EU decided to establish a
civilian
EU CSDP Advisory Mission (EUAM RCA) in CAR, tasked to provide support to
the CAR Ministry of the Interior and Public Security (MoI PS) and the Internal Security
Forces. The respective Council Decision to establish EUAM RCA was adopted in December
2019, and the Mission will be launched during summer 2020.
MENA
278. The EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (
EUPOL COPPS) continues to assist
the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future State of Palestine in the areas
of policing and criminal justice. The mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission for the
Rafah Crossing Point (
EUBAM RAFAH), currently located in Tel Aviv, is to provide a third
party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement
and Access (AMA). Despite both Missions' activities and presence having been limited due to
the COVID-19 outbreak, they have managed to provide support to the Palestinians in fighting
the crisis. In April 2020, Member States extended the Missions technically (based on their
current mandates and budgets) until 30 June 2021. The political and security challenges
related to the threat of annexation of parts of the West Bank by Israel may have an impact on
EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah in the second half of 2020.
HR(2020) 155
63
HR(2020) 155
279. Member States have prolonged the
EUAM Iraq’s mandate until April 2022 and have
confirmed an increase from 70 to 80 international staff. The new consolidated mandate
encompasses the provision of strategic advice on the harmonised implementation of national
strategies countering and preventing terrorism (including countering violent extremism) and
organised crime with specific reference to border management, financial crime, in particular
corruption, money laundering, and trafficking of cultural heritage goods.
280. The ongoing military confrontation in Libya has had a significant impact on the deployment
and activities of international actors in Tripoli. In September 2019, a core team of
EUBAM
Libya returned to Tripoli, but the COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020 led to the withdrawal
of international staff in Tripoli and a presence in Tunis. The strategic review discussions were
postponed due to COVID-19 restrictions, and the Mission received a technical extension until
June 2021. EUBAM Libya has continued to support Libyan authorities in their efforts aimed
at disrupting organised criminal networks involved in smuggling of migrants, human
trafficking, and terrorism in the areas of border management, law enforcement, and criminal
justice. Despite the challenging situation, the Mission has remained a valued counterpart for
the Libyan authorities and has ensured the continuity of EU’s presence in Tripoli.
281. One contribution of the EU in supporting the UN leading international efforts towards the
peace process in Libya has also been through the establishment of the
EU Liaison and
Planning Cell (EULPC) in April 2015. The Cell provides a broad expertise in the security
domain, thanks to Voluntary National Contributions, with the prime objective to offer key
security, intelligence and planning expertise both to EU actors in Brussels and in theatre and
to UNSMIL as required. The EULPC is not a CSDP action but, taking into account its goal, it
is an essential enabler for CSDP actions and EU activities in Libya. To that end, the EULPC
liaises with all EU actors in Libya, primarily the EU Delegation to Libya, EUBAM Libya and
EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI. Since the LNA started the offensive against Tripoli in
April 2019, the EULPC has mainly focused on providing an increased support to the EU
Delegation, especially in the context of the Berlin process.
282. The European Union remains committed to supporting UN-led efforts to restore peace and
stability in Libya, thus contributing to a more secure southern neighbourhood, including
through its CSDP tools. As such, the European Union will continue to maintain a military
presence in the Central Mediterranean Sea. In the immediate aftermath of the Berlin
Conference on Libya on 19 January 2020 and the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 January
2020,
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia was instructed to intensify its aerial monitoring
with support provided by satellite surveillance over the whole area of operations in countering
illicit arms trafficking in accordance with UNSCR 2473.
283. The new CSDP military operation,
EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, was launched on 31 March
2020. Like Operation Sophia, Operation Irini is a multi-faceted operation. In addition to the
implementation of the arms embargo, the operation, as secondary tasks, also contributes to the
implementation of UN measures to prevent the illicit export of petroleum from Libya, to
capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and to the disruption of
the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks. Operation Irini is the most
HR(2020) 155
64
HR(2020) 155
concrete EU response to the Berlin Conference and the calls from the international
community to cease hostilities in Libya and respect the arms embargo. Through the
Operation, the EU is the most visible supporter of the arms embargo decided by the UN
Security Council.
HR(2020) 155
65
HR(2020) 155
(E) FINANCIAL IMPLICATION FOR THE UNION’S GENERAL BUDGET
284. The year 2019 marked a high point in the budget for CFSP. The total funds committed
reached their highest level ever recorded amounting to €359.40 million, of which €303.32
million (84,39%) went to CSDP missions, €33.60 million (9,35%) to Non Proliferation and
Disarmament (NPD) actions, and €22.48 million (6,26%) to European Union Special
Representatives.
285. In addition, the Commission’s particularly close monitoring of the budget and its sustained
efforts to actively manage recoveries and decommitments of funds that CSDP Missions and
other beneficiaries of CFSP funding were unable to spend during their mandates enabled the
CFSP budget to secure unused funds amounting to €42.54 million (€24.65 million recovered
and €17.89 million de-committed). These were partly reused in 2019 for other CFSP actions.
An amount of €24.04 million for commitments was transferred to 2020. The impact on the
COVID-19 crisis on the overall CFSP budget and the spending rates of CSDP Missions
remains to be seen in its full extent.
286. Meanwhile, as of the end of March 2020, CSDP Missions had relocated non-essential staff
and operations have been delayed, slowed down or in some cases put on hold. Missions have
been affected to different extents with some being able to maintain pre-crisis levels of
operation. For example, the Mission in Georgia pursued its patrolling routine at the borders
throughout the crisis, while operations in other Missions were severely affected by travel
restrictions imposed by COVID-19. All these elements have clearly had an impact on the
budget consumption, which necessitated constant monitoring throughout the course of the
year.
287. Notwithstanding lower levels of activity in some cases, during the crisis Missions continued
to incur standard running costs, including the cost of staff, rental of premises, insurance, and
security surveillance.
288. COVID-19 also had a severe impact on efforts by the international community in NPD. The
2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which was originally scheduled to begin on 27 April 2020, could not take place.
Several NPD Actions supported by the CFSP budget that perform outreach activities,
capacity-building or develop dialogue with State actors in third countries have been severely
affected by travel restrictions imposed by COVID-19. As a result, the duration of several
NPD Actions was extended with no budgetary impact to allow implementing partners to
postpone activities that could not be performed during the crisis.
289. While the voted CSFP Budget for 2020 amounted to €351.43 million, the carry forward from
2019 has pushed total available commitment appropriations in 2020 to €375.47 million.
HR(2020) 155
66