

From: [CAB VESTAGER CONTACT](#)
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [JORGENSEN Kim \(CAB-VESTAGER\)](#); [STENGG Werner \(CAB-VESTAGER\)](#); [CAB VESTAGER CONTACT](#)
Subject: RE: [Twitter update] Actions taken during Ukraine Crisis
Date: 01 March 2022 16:37:57

Dear Sir,

We hereby confirm the receipt of your email addressed to Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager.

Best regards,
Cabinet Vestager Team

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 1, 2022 4:26 PM
To: CAB VESTAGER CONTACT <@..>
Cc: JORGENSEN Kim (CAB-VESTAGER) <.@..>; STENGG Werner (CAB-VESTAGER) <.@..>
Subject: [Twitter update] Actions taken during Ukraine Crisis

Dear Executive Vice- President Vestager,

I hope this finds you and your team well during this difficult time.

I wanted to provide you with an update on Twitter's work around the ongoing crisis.

Ever since the first signs of a potential crisis a number of weeks ago, we have been actively working with a cross-functional team within the company to assess the level and scale of Twitter's response and remediations. That team is composed of experts from a range of teams across the company, including our safety and integrity units. These teams are monitoring the situation in Ukraine for potential risks associated with the conflict, including identifying and disrupting attempts to amplify false and misleading information and to advance the speed and scale of our enforcement.

We are aware that Twitter is being restricted for some people in Russia and believe people should have free and open access to the Internet, which is particularly important during times of crisis.

Please find below a summary of our actions to date. Conscious that this is an ever-evolving situation, we will continue to update you as our work progresses.

Our Approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Activity

We use both manual and automated reviews to identify and remove inauthentic coordinated behaviour related to the current war in Ukraine. We have also increased our monitoring efforts on the platform, including our live audio format Spaces, for any potential policy violations.

Of note, while Russian state media disseminate misleading narratives, our teams

have detected relatively few signals of inauthentic coordinated behaviour related to the crisis. Early detection, manual review, and automation of detection/enforcement have allowed us to effectively stop it from reaching a broader audience.

The scale of conversation on Russia and Ukraine has also drawn a range of third-party actors that are seeking to exploit the situation for personal gain, using a range of tactics such as impersonation, attempting to fraudulently solicit donations (particularly in cryptocurrency), and pivoting identities to claim expertise on the conflict. Our teams continue to take action on such content under our Terms of Service.

Our Approach to Synthetic & Manipulated Media

All parties are keen to promote their narratives, resulting in a high volume and velocity of information. We have noted a significant increase in [Synthetic and Manipulated Media](#) (video game footage, videos/images of other global conflicts, or military manoeuvres) in recent days. It's typically intended to mislead the public about the conflict, or unintentionally shared without verification.

While this content often originates on other platforms, some of it has circulated in a misleading context on Twitter. We are proactively monitoring, expediting enforcement workflows, resulting in [labelling](#) of content to provide more context. We will also remove content from the platform based on an assessment of harms associated with the media.

Our Approach to State Propaganda

We endeavour to ensure people on Twitter have as much context as possible about the conversations they're seeing. This includes labels on government and state-affiliated media accounts to give people context about the Tweet they're seeing.

[State-affiliated media](#) is defined as outlets where the state exercises control over editorial content through financial resources, direct or indirect political pressures, and/or control over production and distribution. Twitter will not recommend or amplify state-affiliated media entities accounts or their Tweets with these labels to people.

Since August 2020, we've labelled and de-amplified state-affiliated accounts belonging to the Russian Federation, in addition to [20 other countries](#) to provide important context about who they represent. We [expanded the list](#) of outlets and countries again in 2021. We continue to review and update the lists of accounts labelled as Russian affiliated state media to reflect outlets' use of Twitter and the creation of new accounts. Twitter currently has 100 state-affiliated media labels in place for Russian media.

Since the invasion, we've seen more than 45,000 Tweets a day from individuals on Twitter sharing these links to such state-affiliated media — meaning that now the overwhelming majority of content from state-affiliated media is coming from individuals sharing this content, rather than accounts we've been labelling for years. We have thus recently made the decision to expand our policy and will apply a [label to Tweets sharing links](#) to designated state-affiliated media outlets. This means that Tweets sharing state-affiliated media content won't be amplified

— they won't appear in Top Search and won't be recommended by Twitter.

Our Approach to Monetization

First, we would note again that political advertising has been prohibited on Twitter since 2019.

We have temporarily paused advertisements in Ukraine and Russia to ensure critical public safety information is elevated and that advertisements don't detract from it.

At the same time, content that discusses or focuses on the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not eligible for monetization under Twitter's [Brand Safety Policy](#). Content that is considered false or misleading under the Twitter Rules is also not eligible for monetisation. Additionally, we are demonetizing Search terms related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, preventing ads from appearing on the Search results pages for these words.

Beyond not recommending or amplifying accounts or Tweets of [State-affiliated media](#), advertisements and the promotion of content from state affiliated media is also prohibited on Twitter.

On Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik specifically, in [2017 Twitter made the policy decision](#) to ban advertising from all accounts owned by RT and Sputnik. This decision was based on the retrospective work we did around the 2016 US election and the [US intelligence community's conclusion](#) that both RT and Sputnik attempted to interfere with the election on behalf of the Russian government.

Further Proactive Steps

In addition to the measures noted above, we have taken a number of additional proactive measures to protect the health of the service, including:

- We've launched Search and Home Timeline prompts that point to a dedicated curated Twitter [Moment](#) with digital safety and security resources about how to control your account during times of conflict in English, Ukrainian, and Russian.
- We're proactively reviewing Tweets to detect platform manipulation (or other inauthentic behaviour) and taking enforcement action against [synthetic and manipulated media](#) that presents a false or misleading depiction of what's happening.
- We're continuing to provide as much context around content relating to the crisis as possible, including through Moments and Events on Twitter.
- We're actively monitoring vulnerable high-profile accounts, including journalists, activists, and government officials and agencies to mitigate any

attempts at a targeted takeover or manipulation.

- For people using Twitter in Ukraine and Russia, we also paused some Tweet recommendations from people they don't follow on Home Timeline to reduce the spread of abusive content.
- We're working across features like Topics, Lists, and Spaces to ensure the policies and measures in place can ensure the safety of these products, so they can continue to be resources people trust.
- We regularly share and update the [steps we take](#) to address this crisis publicly with Tweet threads from [Twitter Safety](#) in English, Ukrainian, and Russian.
- We also launched a giving campaign for Twitter employees with donations going toward verified organisations directly supporting Ukrainian refugees seeking shelter and safety. Twitter will match all of the donations, as well as make a direct contribution to a partner organisation.

We are constantly updating our approach and reviewing remediations holistically before deciding on a course of action, while doing everything we can to reduce harm. We'll continue to take steps to safeguard people on the service and the communities they operate within, while enforcing the safety and integrity of the platform during this time.

The challenges we face during times of war are complex and constantly evolving. Industry and Twitter cannot address these alone. Nor is our industry monolithic in its approach to this issue – each of us has different services, varying business models, and often complementary but distinct principles that guide the respective countermeasures to this pressing issue. This should be recognised as we continue our engagement and navigate through the digital repercussions of this war.

Twitter welcomes the opportunity to engage with every stakeholder, and please let us know if you have any questions.

All the best

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