

Uncertainties under the Microscope

IIAM Sensitivity Scenario Analysis Can Provide a Powerful Policy Lens

A Concawe contribution to the AQPR

Introduction:

In the European arena a key tool that has been at the centre of air quality policy development over the past two decades has been IIASA's RAINS/GAINS Integrated Assessment Model. Both in the UN-ECE and EU context this has provided the all-important link between environmental/health impacts and cost-effective mitigation policies.

Although substantial progress has been made to make greater use of this powerful tool to explore the complete policy envelope, in Concawe's view more needs to be done. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, via a number of examples, the 'policy benefits' of a thorough sensitivity analysis. Today, perhaps more than at any time in recent history, it is imperative to ensure, to the best of our abilities, that we do not unwisely expend precious economic resources in any policy arena. Therefore scenarios used to develop policy options in the context of the current EU Air Quality Policy Review should account for uncertainties by making full use of the policy lens that GAINS provides. In this way it will be possible to arrive at realistic and achievable aims for the EU's future air policy.

Summary of findings:

This paper was prepared as a contribution to the 4th meeting of the Stakeholder Expert Group on the EU Air Policy Review as the review enters its scenario/policy development phase. The paper is based on the results of extensive sensitivity analysis undertaken by Concawe using their in-house Integrated Assessment Model. This is largely based on the data IIASA developed to support their policy scenario analysis recently undertaken in the context of the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol.

The illustrative sensitivity analysis was targeted to support five contentions. Each is addressed in detail in the main section of the paper; here we provide a brief summary of the key findings:

Why the emission reductions expected of Euro VI/6 must be achieved: Policy scenarios leading to revised TSAP targets must account for uncertainties in the reductions in road transport NO_x emissions associated with the introduction of Euro VI/6 standards in 2015/16. Should real-world vehicle performance result in higher than expected NO_x emissions, the sensitivity analysis indicates that, at a given ambition level, this would result in significant increases in costs to the non-transport sector or even in unachievable targets. A realistic sensitivity example based on the gap closure concept as used in the CAFE 2005 program for PM_{2.5} impacts, shows a factor of 3 cost increase is possible, from 7 to 20 G€/year.

Why Cost-Effective Reductions in Ammonia Emissions from Agriculture are important: Ammonia is a key pollutant; if emissions of ammonia are not reduced the scope for compensation by controls on NO_x is extremely limited. It is not possible to meet ambitious acidification, eutrophication or human PM exposure targets if ammonia emissions are not reduced.

Why Multiple Time Horizons are Vital in Policy Scenarios: Policy horizon years are critical. The structural changes (e.g. changing energy use) and the on-going emission reductions resulting from already agreed legislation, have significant effects on emissions with time. This introduces the question of what is the appropriate timing for compliance with any new policy initiatives in a changing world. Investing heavily in

abatement technology for the industry to achieve emissions reductions that will be reached by other means just a few years later could lead to unnecessary additional financial pressures and regret investment for industry.

Why a Range of Energy Scenario Is Important for Robust Policy: Given the uncertainties in defining the 'future world' this sensitivity analysis highlights the need for policy to be tested for a range of energy scenarios. This is vital to ensure that ambition levels (expressed as revised national emission ceilings) based on one energy scenario do not result in significant escalation in compliance costs or non-achievability in a different actual future energy world. The current difficulties in some Member States in meeting 2010 NOx ceilings illustrates the vital need to include such energy uncertainties in policy development.

Why the influence of short Lived Climate Forcers should be more fully examined: Climate impacts of air policy need to be properly accounted for. In the context of the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol the influence of short lived climate forcers (SLCF) began to be examined in the policy process with a particular focus on Black Carbon. Other emissions such as sulphates from SO₂ and Organic Carbon are also recognized to be SLCFs. The sensitivity scenarios in this chapter demonstrate how attributing a CO₂ credit or debit to all three of these SLCF emissions (based on carbon price) and including them in the optimization strategy can give an entirely different perspective to control policies and shifts the policy emphasis away from NOx and SO₂ controls on stationary sources, even at relatively low Carbon prices and long-time horizons.


1. Why the emission reductions expected of Euro VI/6 must be achieved:

The road transport sector remains an important contributor to overall emission levels of regulated pollutants in the EU. As such they continue to be a priority policy target for further reductions, especially in the case of NO_x. However, particularly in the case of NO_x emissions derived from diesel power trains, history stands as a stark reminder of how, from Euro II/2 through to Euro V/5, real world emissions have been substantially greater than forecast from the regulated emission limits. This has led to substantial problems in achieving obligations under the current National Emission Ceiling Directive (NECD) and Ambient Air Quality Directive (AAQD) in a number of Member States.

In the context of the current Air Quality Policy Review (AQPR) process this has resulted in strong calls for Policy Makers to ensure that the planning around the Euro VI (HDV)/6 (LDV) standards is robust enough to ensure legislated limits can be met under real world driving conditions.

Figure 1: Evolution of NO_x Emissions from Road Transport in EU-27: Base Case (COPERT 4)

Source: Concawe STEERS Model



The importance of this is illustrated by Figure 1 which shows the forecasted evolution in NO_x emissions from Road Transport in EU-27 from 1995 out to 2030 and beyond. This is derived from Concawe's in-house road transport emissions forecasting model developed for and used extensively to support the European Auto Oil programmes. The emission algorithms (e.g., COPERT 4 emission relationships) and exogenous assumptions (e.g. fleet numbers, fleet starting vintages and turnover rates) are entirely consistent with the current version of TREMOVE used to support the transport elements of GAINS. For clarity, the trend in NO_x emissions from diesel powered vehicles is shown in the stacked bars while the trend in NO_x emissions of all gasoline powered vehicles is shown separately as the over-plotted red line.

What is evident from this Figure is that between 1995 and 2010 NOx emissions from diesel vehicles have not fallen at anything like the rate at which gasoline vehicle NOx has fallen. This of course is in part due to growth from the dieselisation of the light duty vehicle fleet and the general increase in vehicle kilometres driven. However, an important reason for this slower than expected reduction has been the disappointing real world performance of Euro II/2 to Euro IV/4 vehicles. Between 2010 and 2015 with the 'real world' performance for Euro V/5 already reflected in COPERT 4, this trend is not significantly changed. In contrast, by 2030 LDV diesel NOx is forecast to halve and HDV NOx reduce by eightfold from the introduction of Euro 6/VI in 2015/16 when replacement of the pre 2015/16 fleet is complete. Given past experience how can we be sure Euro VI measures will deliver such significant improvements and what are the implications of under delivery?

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the critical dependence of overall policy on the forecast transport NOx emissions. To undertake this we compare two emissions forecasts: one based on all vehicles achieving emissions as estimated with COPERT 4 and the other assuming higher fleet integrated emissions from the Euro VI/6 diesel fleet component. In so doing, this article does not attempt to go into any detailed considerations of how "future world" emissions from Euro 6/VI will look, especially considering the huge effort being devoted to ensuring that today's "real world" is reflected in the type approval process.

A key advantage of Euro VI/6 diesel power trains is that the standards are premised on the application of Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) technology which incorporates the injection of an ammonia reagent¹ to enable SCR on lean burn engines. This NOx after treatment system removes a constraint on the NOx level at the outlet of the engine, and hence allows simultaneous optimisation of engine fuel consumption through a higher thermal efficiency. The application of SCR with its NOx reduction potential (in excess of 90% for HDV and up to 75% for LDV) is thus foreseen to facilitate the simultaneous delivery of higher fuel efficiency with very low exhaust NOx. Coupled with the use of particulate filters this will also reduce dramatically primary PM from road transport.


Design of sensitivity scenarios: If sensitivity scenarios are to provide insights into the influence of uncertainties on the robustness of policies they of course must have a clear basis for their design. With this in mind the following sensitivity scenarios were constructed:

- **For Euro VI:** We have taken a sensitivity case where the fleet averaged Euro VI real world NOx emission/km would be half the emissions achievable using the Euro V emission factors in COPERT
- **For Euro 6:** We have taken a sensitivity case where the fleet averaged Euro 6 real world NOx emissions would be at the same level as the Euro 5 emissions represented in COPERT.

¹ Currently foreseen to be urea

Figure 2: Evolution of NO_x Emissions from Road Transport in EU-27: Sensitivity Case

Source: Concawe STEERS Model



Policy Implications (e.g. Revised NECD) for higher than expected emissions from Euro VI/6 vehicles:


Figure 2 above shows the implications of the Euro VI/6 sensitivity scenario discussed above on the evolution of NO_x emissions from road transport in the EU. In the 2025-2030 world of 'full penetration' of Euro VI/6, NO_x emissions double over the base case i.e. increase by some 1Mt/y.

What does this imply for NO_x ceilings that are set based on the assumption that the Euro VI/6 measure does deliver forecast emission reductions?

To illustrate the policy implications, multiple optimisation scenarios were carried out using Concawe's in-house Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) which utilises identical source-receptor functions, cost functions and impact algorithms to those used in GAINS to support IIASA's recent work for the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol. The 'optimisation driver' was confined to PM health impacts to simplify the analysis and aid transparency. Transport emissions lie outside the optimisation as they are determined by the forecast fleet development, mileage driven and technical abatement measures in place. i.e. they are input data. The resulting optimised costs are for the additional stationary source abatement measures needed to achieve further PM impact reductions. The results are shown in Figure 3 below. Note that PM impact is related to the concentrations of total PM_{2.5} in the air and this comprises both directly emitted particles and secondary particles (PM_{2.5} formed in the air by chemical reaction). NO_x and NH₃ which we examine in the ammonia study below, contribute to secondary PM_{2.5}.

**Figure 3: Annual Abatement EU-27 Costs For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture)
Above the 2020 Baseline Versus PM Impact Reduction**

Source: Concawe IAM



Three baseline starting points were examined, all derived from the PRIMES 2009 energy scenario used as the central scenario for the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol. For the 'Base Case' the actual baseline PRIMES 2009 was used. This is shown as the dark blue line on Figure 3 and is consistent with optimised delivery of a given EU-27 PM reduction target in 2020 assuming the Euro VI/6 emissions calculated with COPERT 4. The light blue line shows the results recalculated assuming Euro VI only delivers a 50% improvement over Euro V. In this case the baseline NO_x emissions were adjusted in each Member State (MS) to account for the greater transport NO_x emissions before the optimisation scenarios were run. Finally, the red line shows the results assuming a future Euro VI delivers a 50% improvement over Euro V and Euro 6 is the same as Euro 5. Again, for this case, baseline NO_x emissions were adjusted in each MS to account for the 'under-delivery' of Euro VI/6 before the optimisation scenarios were run.

During the Clean Air for Europe Programme, the concept of further "impact gap closure" was adopted as an indicator of policy ambition level. The '100% impact gap closure' being defined as the additional reduction in impacts (beyond the baseline) by implementing Maximum Technically Feasible Measures. Thus a zero gap closure is equivalent to the Baseline and a 100% gap closure is equivalent to MTFR.

The vertical lines on Figure 3 indicate the 50% and 80% PM Impacts gap closure points. At 50% gap closure, the implications for further investments in stationary sources (including ammonia abatement measures in agriculture) to make up for the greater than expected NO_x emissions from road transport, should Euro VI/6 under-deliver, are already clearly significant. For the worst case considered in the sensitivity scenarios, Figure 3 shows annual costs doubling from some 1.5 B€/y to 3B€/y.

At the gap closure of 80% costs escalate since here policy would be hitting the steep part of the cost curve. In this case annual costs rise from some 7B€/y to almost 20B€/y. It is also important to note here that at the higher ambition targets, in some Member States, the resulting NO_x ceilings based on the assumption that Euro VI/6 will deliver may become unachievable even at MTFR in case of under-delivery of Euro VI/6. Such situations have already been experienced in the case of the current NECD.

From a policy point of view, it is also worth noting that at the spend level of 7B€/y, the best achievable gap closure should transport NO_x emissions be greater than the 2020 Baseline according to our “red” scenario is 62%

What then might be a wise way forward in a policy context? Clearly this work first serves to illustrate the importance of making every ‘policy effort’ to ensure the next round of Euro NO_x standards deliver real world emissions consistent with these standards.

But this alone is surely not enough. It is wise to explore the reductions that would be required from other sectors to compensate for a lower than expected delivery of Euro VI/6 for a given overall NO_x emission target. Particularly in a context where the economies of the EU will increasingly struggle to compete in the global market place, these potential unintended consequences should be well understood. Certainly, the implications of such uncertainties (via sensitivity scenarios around the central policy case) need to be explored throughout the policy process, but especially in the final stages including their documentation in the formal ‘impact assessment’.

2. Why Cost-Effective Reductions in Ammonia Emissions from Agriculture are Important:

The Clean Air For Europe (CAFE) programme which underpinned the current Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution clearly identified the reduction in ammonia emissions from agricultural sector as an important component of cost-effective policy designed to deliver improved air quality in Europe. Through earlier policy initiatives such as the NECD and Gothenburg Protocol, the need for agriculture to be part of the solution to Eutrophication and Acidification was already well established. What was new and important in CAFE was the understanding that reductions in ammonia emissions from agriculture were central to cost-effective reductions in human exposure to fine particulates. What follows illustrates why this remains an understanding for the current AQPR and any policy initiatives resulting from this review process.

**Figure 4: Annual Abatement EU-27 Costs For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture)
Above the 2020 Baseline Versus PM Impact Reduction**

Source: Concawe IAM




Figure 4 shows the results of integrated assessment modelling aimed at identifying the least-cost measures to deliver further improvements (beyond the Baseline) in PM health impacts in the EU in 2020. As in the work exploring the policy implications of under-delivery of Euro VI/6, this is based on the PRIMES 2009 energy scenario and associated baseline emissions that formed the central scenario for the recently completed revision of the Gothenburg Protocol.

The blue curve shows the optimised (least-cost) curve of cost versus reduction in long term health impacts of PM in the EU assuming all further abatement measures identified within the GAINS model (version used to


support the Gothenburg Protocol revision work) are available for selection, including ammonia abatement measures. The red curve shows the equivalent curve but in this sensitivity case, assuming no further ammonia abatement measures are available to contribute to the cost-effective delivery of a given PM impact reduction target. In other words, ammonia emissions remain at 2020 Baseline levels.

The important, even essential contribution of reductions in ammonia in achieving optimised delivery of a given PM target is clearly evident in Figure 4. Without ammonia abatement measures, costs at the 50% PM impacts gap closure point essentially double from, some 1.5 B€/y to 3 B€/y. At the 80% gap closure point, this difference dramatically widens from some 7 B€/y to the MTR point for all the 'beyond baseline' abatement for stationary sources of Primary PM_{2.5}, NO_x and SO₂ at a cost of some 32 B€/y.

From a policy point of view, it is also worth noting that at the spend level of 7B€/y, the best achievable gap closure should ammonia emissions remain at the 2020 Baseline, is 60%. Without limit on the spend level, the best achievable gap closure, as implied above, would be 80% at MTR.

Figure 5: Annual Abatement EU-27 Costs For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture) Above the 2020 Baseline Versus Reduction in the Area of Forest Ecosystems Exceeding Acid Critical Loads

Source: Concawe IAM




As already noted, ammonia reductions have long been recognised as the priority for achieving cost-effective further reductions in the areas of ecosystems exceeding acidification or eutrophication critical loads. The two curves showing the optimised cost of further abatement measure versus reduction in the ecosystem areas exceeding their critical loads in Figures 5 (acidification) and 6 (eutrophication) clearly show this.

In the case of further progress in reducing acidification (Figure 5), the maximum further improvement is severely limited if measures are confined to SO₂ and NO_x. In the case of Eutrophication (Figure 6), no significant progress can be achieved without a focus on ammonia.

Figure 6: Annual Abatement EU-27 Costs For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture) Above the 2020 Baseline Versus Reduction in the Area of Ecosystems Exceeding Eutrophication Critical Loads

Source: Concawe IAM



To highlight the significant challenge to the policy process of ensuring the required reductions of ammonia emissions from the agricultural sector are realised, it is worth noting, in the context of the Gothenburg Protocol that ammonia emissions in the 2020 Baseline are predicted to fall by less than 2% between now and 2020. Although a new agricultural baseline scenario is under preparation, the optimisation undertaken in this 'Gothenburg Protocol PRIMES 2009' scenario, foresees the cost-effective contribution to the 50% PM gap closure target to result in a 17% reduction from 'today's' level and a 29% reduction in the case of an 80% PM gap closure target. A challenge indeed!

3. Why Multiple Time Horizons are Vital in Policy Scenarios:

In the policy context of a revision of the TSAP with horizon years out to and possibly beyond 2030, the need to consider the on-going influence of already agreed policies (for example changes induced by structural change driven by climate policy, turnover of the vehicle fleet) is vital. This requires a focus on several policy horizon years. What follows is designed to illustrate the economic importance of such a focus and is based on recent GAINS cost curve data for 2020, 2025 and 2030.

Figure 7: National NOx Cost Curves for Three Policy Horizon Years for One Example Member State

Source: IIASA for 2012 TSAP





Figure 7 compare national cost curves for further abatement measures on NOx in one example Member State of the EU for three policy horizon years: 2020, 2025 and 2030. These are based on IIASA GAINS data developed for their current work on the revision of the TSAP. In each case, the continuing effects of base case changes in emissions are clearly seen. This has significant implications for the cost of achieving further impact reductions as a function of time.

If, for example, GAINS indicated that the revised TSAP targets required this Member State to reduce its baseline NOx emission to 515kt/y this Member State would be faced with an additional cost burden for NOx reducing measures of some 250 M€/y if the targets were required to be met in 2020. However, should the time horizon for achieving the target be moved out by five years to 2025, baseline measures would deliver the ceiling without further burden to that Member State.

This continuing influence of already agreed policies on emissions versus time is not confined to NO_x as indicated by the corresponding cost curves for SO₂ in the same example Member State given in Figure 8.

Figure 8: National SO₂ Cost Curves for Three Policy Horizon Years for One Example Member State

Source: IIASA for 2012 TSAP




Of course in looking at future policies designed to make further progress in air quality in the EU it is also important to recognise the on-going costs of already agreed measures which are delivering these continued reduction in baseline emissions (with their associated further improvements in air quality) with time. For this example Member State for NO_x alone, GAINS indicates the cost of already mandated measures in 2010 to be some 2.8 B€/y, rising to 5.3 B€/y in 2020 and reaching 6.7 B€/y by 2030.

4. Why a Range of Energy Scenarios Is Important for Robust Policy?

The need for consistency/coherency in the central assumptions used in the development of interrelated policy initiatives (e.g. Air Quality and Climate Change) is well recognised. However, this should not be interpreted as a need to base policy on a single view of the 'future world' that the policy is designed to influence. History serves as a constant reminder that actual developments can be quite different from the projections made a few years earlier. Sensitivity scenarios around a central view to test the robustness of future business plans are essential to the business world. In Concawe's view such sensitivity analysis is also essential in the policy arena.

In this regard, along with a number of other stakeholders, Concawe has requested that a range of energy scenarios, around the central PRIMES scenario, should be used in appropriate sensitivity scenarios to test policy options. In this short section, the databases used for the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol have been used to support this call.

Figure 9: Annual Abatement EU-27 Costs For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture)
Above the 2020 Baseline Versus PM Impact Reduction:
Comparison of PRIMES and 'National' Energy Scenarios
Source: Concawe IAM



Although only twelve Member States submitted their alternative national energy scenarios, the consequence of moving from a PRIMES based world to this alternative 'National Energy Scenario' world is already significant. Figure 9, shows the optimised curves of cost beyond the baseline versus further reductions in PM impacts for each energy scenario. The two vertical lines indicate a medium (yellow) and high (red) improvement target. The implications of arriving in the 'National energy future world' having designed policy with a sole focus on the PRIMES world are obvious: costs, justified only for the PRIMES world, double at the medium ambition level and triple to close to MTR costs at the high ambition. In the latter case, at an individual Member State level some individual pollutant ceilings set solely based on PRIMES

would likely at this ambition be unachievable. Given the binding nature of the NECD, this would force Member States to consider measures that would otherwise not be justifiable and could have undesirable economic consequences. Such a situation would be avoided with the inclusion of suitable sensitivity analysis at the policy development phase.

5. Why the influence of short Lived Climate Forcers should be more fully examined:

One key recent development in the context of the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol was the inclusion of considerations over the influence of short lived climate forcers (SLCF) in the policy process with a particular focus on Black Carbon. As a consequence, the GAINS team have begun to incorporate such considerations in a quantitative way into GAINS.

What this work by IIASA has provided is a helpful bringing together of quantified data on the direct greenhouse warming potential (GWP) of all the key SLCFs and was first presented by IIASA in Dublin in May 2010². The following data for GWPs have been abstracted from this presentation:

Table 1: Global Warming Potentials relative to CO₂ (GWP CO₂ = 1)

	20 year GWP	100 year GWP
SO ₂	-140	-40
BC	2200	680
OC	-240	-75

The availability of these relative GWPs allow the “CO₂ compensation costs” implied for a unit reduction in each of the three SLCF to be computed for a given carbon price. The carbon compensation cost here is the cost involved in sustaining ‘no change’ in Baseline GWP by introducing compensating measures. In the case of SO₂, since this is a climate cooler, at a carbon price of 30€/tCO₂, this would imply carbon compensation costs of 4200 € for every tonne of SO₂ emissions reduced (assuming a 20 year integration period) and 1200 €/tSO₂ over a 100 year integration period. In other words, removing the beneficial climate cooling effect of sulphates derived from SO₂ emissions has to be compensated by additional climate mitigation measures. Conversely, in the case of black carbon (a powerful warmer), for the same carbon price carbon the compensation cost would be -66,000 €/tBC and -20,400€/tBC over the two integration periods. In other words, reductions in emissions of this powerful climate warmer result in savings in the climate mitigation costs of the baseline.

The availability of these CO₂ compensation costs provides a means of more fully expressing the implications of air quality policies that results in further reductions in these pollutants. For example in the case of PM abatement measures, the reduction in CO₂ abatement costs implied by attendant reduction in the black carbon fraction of PM can be quantified. Similarly, for SO₂, the implied additional CO₂ compensation cost for removing this ‘climate cooler’ can be quantified.

By building these ‘CO₂ compensation’ costs in the form of adjustment algorithms to the basic cost curves derived from GAINS, these costs can then be accounted for in the optimisation strategy to derive a more complete ‘least cost’ set of measures that delivers the air quality objective accounting for the CO₂ compensation costs. Based on detailed data kindly made available by the GAINS team in the context of the Gothenburg Protocol revision process, Concawe have recently built this capability into their in-house IAM. What follows are some first results which indicate the importance of taking the full implications of SLCF into account in developing future policy. Importantly, the work clearly indicates that the inclusion of the considerations into the optimisation strategy significantly shifts the policy emphasis away from further controls for SO₂ and NO_x on stationary sources, even at relatively low carbon prices and long-time horizons.

² First presented by Markus Amann at the 38th session of the UN-ECE TFIAM meeting in Dublin, May 17-19, 2010

Figure 10 shows the additional cost of stationary source measures (beyond 2020 baseline) for a number of PM impact reduction targets. The costs are shown for each pollutant. Here the optimisation strategy did not include the CO₂ compensation cost for SO₂ and the Organic Carbon (OC) content of PM_{2.5} emissions. Nor did it include the savings in CO₂ mitigation cost in the baseline derived from any reductions in Black Carbon (BC) emissions. Figure 11 shows a repeat of the same analysis, but in this case the SLCF compensation costs were included in the optimisation strategy³. In both figures the net costs (abatement costs plus CO₂ compensation costs) are shown as the grey area. As in earlier sections, this analysis has been based on the PRIMES 2009 GAINS data set used for the central policy analysis for the recent revision of the Gothenburg Protocol.

Figure 10: Annual Abatement Costs for EU-27 by Pollutant For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture) Above the 2020 Baseline versus PM Impact Reduction Including Carbon Compensation Cost for SLCFs
Case 1: 30 €/tCO₂ and SLCFs Compensation Costs not in Optimisation
Source: Concawe IAM




Figure 10 shows how the optimiser, at least up to the 54% improvement target, picks abatement measures on SO₂, NH₃ and NOx rather than primary PM_{2.5} reducing measures. As may be seen this results in a significant additional cost of measures to compensate for reductions in SLCF (here mainly SO₂).


At the 54% point, the cost of further abatement measures would be some 1.5€/B/y. To this needs to be added the implied CO₂ compensation cost, which, assuming a carbon price 30€/t CO₂, would be some 2.1€/B/y. Thus the net cost, as shown on Figure 10, would be 3.6€/B/y. At and beyond the more ambitious improvement target of 58%, most SO₂ measures have been exhausted and the optimiser picks Primary PM_{2.5} measures. Since these emissions include a black carbon component, their reduction results in savings in the

³ With a 2050 target date for Climate Stabilisation in view and a 2020 policy horizon for delivering the PM impact reduction target, an integration period of 30 years was used for the relative GWPs of SLCFs compared to CO₂. These were determined by linear interpolation of the data in Table 1.

cost of climate mitigation measures included in the baseline, and the difference between abatement cost and net overall costs reduces.

An important policy perspective emerges when SLCF compensation costs are included in the optimisation. The results are shown in Figure 11. What is immediately clear in Figure 11 (compared to Figure 10) is that optimiser first targets primary PM_{2.5} abatement measures with a high fraction of BC component. This is not surprising based on the relative GWP for BC given in Table 1. Using the 20 year integration period value of 2200, a carbon price of 30€/tCO₂ and a BC content of PM_{2.5} of 50% yields a compensation cost of -33,000/tPM_{2.5}. If the cost of PM_{2.5} abatement in such a case was 15,000€/tPM_{2.5} the net cost for the measure would be a cost saving of 18,000 €/tPM_{2.5} and that measure would be picked by the optimiser as a ‘first pick’. This is why, at the lower end of the improvement target range in Figure 11, net costs are negative.

Figure 11: Annual Abatement Costs for EU-27 by Pollutant For Stationary Sources (Including Agriculture) Above the 2020 Baseline versus PM Impact Reduction Including Carbon Compensation Cost for SLCFs
Case 2: 30 €/tCO₂ and SLCFs With Compensation Costs in Optimisation Strategy
Source: Concawe IAM



Importantly, while net costs remain negative up to the 53% improvement target, abatement costs themselves are clearly higher than those shown in Figure 10. In other words, as well as moving away from measures controlling secondary sources of PM_{2.5}, the overall abatement burden on some sectors would increase.

Finally, the shift to focussing on black carbon rich PM abatement measures is consistent with the emerging evidence, at least from toxicological studies, that the black carbon fraction of PM is likely to be a more potent actor than the secondary component in impacting human health.

In Concawe’s view, these first results serve to demonstrate the importance of accounting for SLCF in the context of the current Air Quality Review Process.

