Ceci est une version HTML d'une pièce jointe de la demande d'accès à l'information 'Correspondence received on the Copyright Directive between 07/2016-09/2016'.


Ref. Ares(2017)3194500 - 26/06/2017
ANNEX II 
 
1. Email from the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) with legal note, 
15/07/2016, (Ref.Ares(2017)2268842) 
 
4. Email from the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), with legal 
note, 02/08/2016, (Ref. Ares(2017)2269094) 
 
5. Email from the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) with legal 
note,05/08/2016, (Ref. Ares(2017)2269139) 
1

Doc.1
(CNECT)
From:
Olivia Regnier <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxx.xxx>
Sent:
15 July 2016 18:26
To:
 (CNECT)
Cc:
 (CNECT); 
 (CNECT); 
 (CNECT); 

; Frances Moore
Subject:
FW: Legal Note 
Attachments:
Legal note on
....docx
Dear 

FYI. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions in relation to this note. 
We would be happy to catch up with you next week on the latest developments and the preparation of the 
Directive.  
Have a good week-end. 
Kind regards, 
Olivia 
From:
 On Behalf Of Frances Moore 
Sent: vendredi 15 juillet 2016 18:19 
To: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx@xx.xxxxxx.xx 
Cc: xxxx.xxxxxx@xx.xxxxxx.xx; xxxxxxx.xxxxx@xx.xxxxxx.xx; Olivia Regnier <xxxxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxx.xxx> 
Subject: Legal Note 
 
Dear Commissioner 
Thank you for inviting IFPI to participate in the 8th July Round Table consultation on the Commission’s proposal to 
deal with the Value Gap in the forthcoming Copyright package.  
Art. 
  4(3); 
.  
Art. 4 
(2)(2)
We will follow up with your cabinet to discuss and enquire whether anything further is needed. 
Thank you again, Commissioner for your engagement on this issue. 
Best regards  
Frances Moore  
Frances Moore  
Chief Executive Officer 
IFPI – representing the recording industry worldwide 
7 Air Street | London W1B 5AD | UK | T: +44 (0)20 7878 7975 | xxxxxxx.xxxxx@xxxx.xxx 
European Regional Office
 | Square de Meeus 40 | 1000 Brussels | Belgium | T: +32 (0)2 511 92 08  
1
2


www.ifpi.org – representing the recording industry worldwide 
www.pro-music – for all you need to know about getting music on the internet 
@IFPI_org 
2
3


Confidential – Not for public dissemination 
 
 
  
Legal analysis 
Art. 4(2)(2)
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

4

Confidential – Not for public dissemination 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

5

Confidential – Not for public dissemination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 

6

Confidential – Not for public dissemination 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  

7

Doc.4
 (CNECT)
From:
@ifpi.org>
Sent:
02 August 2016 18:16
To:
CNECT); 
 (CNECT); 
 (CNECT)
Cc:
Olivia Regnier
Subject:
Attachments:

ifpi advice 28.7.16.docx; Aereo 13-461_l537.pdf; 13-461 tsac IFPI.PDF
Dear 

I attach some materials 
 

Art. 4(2)
(2)

In addition to our legal note that we have already sent to you, I attach a short legal advice 

 
 
 

US Supreme Court decision in the case Aereo, where the Court found that Aereo, which provided a
service allowing its users to watch TV programs online near – live, fell under the exclusive right of 
public performance. The Court argued that Aereo was not merely an equipment provider and that 
Aereo, and not just its subscribers, “performed” (or “transmitted”), and its activities were similar to 
those of cable systems. 

IFPI amicus brief in the Aereo case
We hope that you will find these materials useful. Note that we are looking into some further arguments, 
and might send you additional papers in the coming days. Do not hesitate to let us know if you would like 
to discuss further. 
Kind regards, 
 
  
 
IFPI – representing the recording industry worldwide  
European Regional Office | Square de Meeûs 40 1000 Brussels Belgium T: +32 (0)2 511 9208 
@ifpi.org  
www.ifpi.org   
www.pro-music.org  
@IFPI_org
1
8

(Slip Opinion) 
OCTOBER TERM, 2013 

Syllabus 
NOTE:  Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS., INC., ET AL. v
AEREO, INC., FKA BAMBOOM LABS, INC. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
No. 13–461.  Argued April 22, 2014—Decided June 25, 2014 
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive 
righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly.”  17 U. S. C. 
§106(4).  The Act’s Transmit Clause defines that exclusive right to in-
clude the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate a performance 
. . . of the [copyrighted] work . . . to the public, by means of any device
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving 
the performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.”  §101.
Respondent Aereo, Inc., sells a service that allows its subscribers to
watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time
as the programs are broadcast over the air.  When a subscriber wants 
to watch a show that is currently airing, he selects the show from a 
menu on Aereo’s website.  Aereo’s system, which consists of thou-
sands of small antennas and other equipment housed in a centralized 
warehouse, responds roughly as follows: A server tunes an antenna, 
which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber alone, to the broadcast 
carrying the selected show.  A transcoder translates the signals re-
ceived by the antenna into data that can be transmitted over the In-
ternet.  A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on
Aereo’s hard drive and begins streaming the show to the subscriber’s
screen once several seconds of programming have been saved.  The 
streaming continues, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, 
until the subscriber has received the entire show. 
Petitioners, who are television producers, marketers, distributors,
and broadcasters that own the copyrights in many of the programs 
that Aereo streams, sued Aereo for copyright infringement.  They
sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing 
9


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Syllabus 
their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.”  The Dis-
trict Court denied the preliminary injunction, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed. 
Held: Aereo performs petitioners’ works publicly within the meaning of 
the Transmit Clause.  Pp. 4–18.
(a) Aereo “perform[s].”  It does not merely supply equipment that 
allows others to do so.  Pp. 4–10.
(1) One of Congress’ primary purposes in amending the Copy-
right Act in 1976 was to overturn this Court’s holdings that the activ-
ities of community antenna television (CATV) providers fell outside
the Act’s scope.  In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc.
, 392 U. S. 390, the Court determined that a CATV provider was 
more like a viewer than a broadcaster, because its system “no more 
than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s sig-
nals [by] provid[ing] a well-located antenna with an efficient connec-
tion to the viewer’s television set.”  Id., at 399.  Therefore, the Court 
concluded, a CATV provider did not perform publicly.  The Court 
reached the same determination in respect to a CATV provider that
retransmitted signals from hundreds of miles away in Teleprompter 
Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U. S. 394.  “The re-
ception and rechanneling of [broadcast television signals] for simul-
taneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective of the
distance between the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer,” 
the Court said.  Id., at 408.  Pp. 4–7.
(2) In 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act in large part to
reject the Fortnightly and Teleprompter holdings.  The Act now clari-
fies that to “perform” an audiovisual work means “to show its images
in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”
§101.  Thus, both the broadcaster and the viewer “perform,” because
they both show a television program’s images and make audible the
program’s sounds.  Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, 
which specifies that an entity performs when it “transmit[s] . . . a 
performance . . . to the public.”  Ibid.  The Clause makes clear that an 
entity that acts like a CATV system itself performs, even when it 
simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television sig-
nals.  Congress further created a complex licensing scheme that sets
out the conditions, including the payment of compulsory fees, under 
which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts to the public.  §111.
Congress made all three of these changes to bring cable system activ-
ities within the Copyright Act’s scope.  Pp. 7–8.
(3) Because Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of
the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach, Aereo 
is not simply an equipment provider.  Aereo sells a service that al-
lows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are 
10

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

Syllabus 
copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast.  Aereo uses its 
own equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its us-
ers’ homes.  By means of its technology, Aereo’s system “receive[s] 
programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by
private channels to additional viewers.”  Fortnightlysupra, at 400. 
This Court recognizes one particular difference between Aereo’s 
system and the cable systems at issue in Fortnightly and Teleprompt-
er: The systems in those cases transmitted constantly, whereas 
Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she
wants to watch a program.  In other cases involving different kinds of 
service or technology providers, a user’s involvement in the operation
of the provider’s equipment and selection of the content transmitted
may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning
of the Act.  But given Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable
companies targeted by the 1976 amendments, this sole technological 
difference between Aereo and traditional cable companies does not
make a critical difference here.  Pp. 8–10.
(b) Aereo also performs petitioners’ works “publicly.”  Under the 
Clause, an entity performs a work publicly when it “transmit[s] . . . a
performance . . . of the work . . . to the public.”  §101.  What perfor-
mance, if any, does Aereo transmit?  Petitioners say Aereo transmits 
a  prior performance of their works, whereas Aereo says the perfor-
mance it transmits is the new performance created by its act of 
transmitting.  This Court assumes arguendo that Aereo is correct and 
thus assumes, for present purposes, that to transmit a performance 
of an audiovisual work means to communicate contemporaneously 
visible images and contemporaneously audible sounds of the work. 
Under the Court’s assumed definition, Aereo transmits a perfor-
mance whenever its subscribers watch a program.
What about the Clause’s further requirement that Aereo transmit
a performance “to the public”?  Aereo claims that because it trans-
mits from user-specific copies, using individually-assigned antennas, 
and because each transmission is available to only one subscriber, it
does not transmit a performance “to the public.”  Viewed in terms of 
Congress’ regulatory objectives, these behind-the-scenes technological 
differences do not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, 
which do perform publicly.  Congress would as much have intended to 
protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as 
from those of cable companies. 
The text of the Clause effectuates Congress’ intent.  Under the 
Clause, an entity may transmit a performance through multiple
transmissions, where the performance is of the same work.  Thus 
when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously percepti-
ble images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] . . . a per-
11


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Syllabus 
formance” to them, irrespective of the number of discrete communica-
tions it makes and irrespective of whether it transmits using a single
copy of the work or, as Aereo does, using an individual personal copy
for each viewer. 
Moreover, the subscribers to whom Aereo transmits constitute “the 
public” under the Act.  This is because Aereo communicates the same 
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to a large number 
of people who are unrelated and unknown to each other.  In addition, 
neither the record nor Aereo suggests that Aereo’s subscribers receive 
performances in their capacities as owners or possessors of the under-
lying works.  This is relevant because when an entity performs to a 
set of people, whether they constitute “the public” often depends upon 
their relationship to the underlying work.  Finally, the statute makes
clear that the fact that Aereo’s subscribers may receive the same pro-
grams at different times and locations is of no consequence.  Aereo 
transmits a performance of petitioners’ works “to the public.”  Pp. 11– 
15. 
(c) Given the limited nature of this holding, the Court does not be-
lieve its decision will discourage the emergence or use of different 
kinds of technologies.  Pp. 15–17. 
712 F. 3d 676, reversed and remanded. 
BREYER,  J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J., and KENNEDY,  GINSBURG,  SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN,  JJ., joined. 
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., 
joined. 
12

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

Opinion of the Court 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
_________________ 
No. 13–461 
_________________ 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AEREO, INC., FKA 
BAMBOOM LABS, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June 25, 2014] 
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the
“exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly.”  17 U. S. C. §106(4).  The Act’s Transmit Clause 
defines that exclusive right as including the right to 
“transmit or otherwise communicate a performance
. . . of the [copyrighted] work . . . to the public, by 
means of any device or process, whether the members 
of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and 
at the same time or at different times.”  §101. 
We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes
this exclusive right by selling its subscribers a technologi-
cally complex service that allows them to watch television 
programs over the Internet at about the same time as the
programs are broadcast over the air.  We conclude that it 
does. 
13


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 


For a monthly fee, Aereo offers subscribers broadcast 
television programming over the Internet, virtually as the 
programming is being broadcast.  Much of this program-
ming is made up of copyrighted works.  Aereo neither 
owns the copyright in those works nor holds a license from 
the copyright owners to perform those works publicly. 
Aereo’s system is made up of servers, transcoders, and 
thousands of dime-sized antennas housed in a central 
warehouse.  It works roughly as follows: First, when a
subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently being
broadcast, he visits Aereo’s website and selects, from a list 
of the local programming, the show he wishes to see.
Second, one of Aereo’s servers selects an antenna, which 
it dedicates to the use of that subscriber (and that sub-
scriber alone) for the duration of the selected show.  A 
server then tunes the antenna to the over-the-air broad-
cast carrying the show.  The antenna begins to receive the
broadcast, and an Aereo transcoder translates the sig- 
nals received into data that can be transmitted over the 
Internet. 
Third, rather than directly send the data to the sub-
scriber, a server saves the data in a subscriber-specific 
folder on Aereo’s hard drive.  In other words, Aereo’s 
system creates a subscriber-specific copy—that is, a “per-
sonal” copy—of the subscriber’s program of choice. 
Fourth, once several seconds of programming have been
saved, Aereo’s server begins to stream the saved copy of
the show to the subscriber over the Internet.  (The sub-
scriber may instead direct Aereo to stream the program at
a later time, but that aspect of Aereo’s service is not before 
us.)  The subscriber can watch the streamed program on 
the screen of his personal computer, tablet, smart phone,
Internet-connected television, or other Internet-connected 
device.  The streaming continues, a mere few seconds 
14

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

Opinion of the Court 
behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has 
received the entire show.  See A Dictionary of Computing
494 (6th ed. 2008) (defining “streaming” as “[t]he process
of providing a steady flow of audio or video data so that an 
Internet user is able to access it as it is transmitted”).
Aereo emphasizes that the data that its system streams
to each subscriber are the data from his own personal
copy, made from the broadcast signals received by the
particular antenna allotted to him.  Its system does not 
transmit data saved in one subscriber’s folder to any other 
subscriber.  When two subscribers wish to watch the same 
program, Aereo’s system activates two separate antennas
and saves two separate copies of the program in two sepa-
rate folders.  It then streams the show to the subscribers 
through two separate transmissions—each from the sub-
scriber’s personal copy. 

Petitioners are television producers, marketers, distrib-
utors, and broadcasters who own the copyrights in many
of the programs that Aereo’s system streams to its sub-
scribers.  They brought suit against Aereo for copyright
infringement in Federal District Court.  They sought a 
preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing 
their right to “perform” their works “publicly,” as the 
Transmit Clause defines those terms. 
The District Court denied the preliminary injunction.
874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (SDNY 2012).  Relying on prior Cir-
cuit precedent, a divided panel of the Second Circuit af-
firmed.  WNET, Thirteen v.  Aereo, Inc., 712 F. 3d 676 
(2013) (citing Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Hold-
ings, Inc.
, 536 F. 3d 121 (2008)).  In the Second Circuit’s 
view, Aereo does not perform publicly within the meaning
of the Transmit Clause because it does not transmit “to 
the public.”  Rather, each time Aereo streams a program to
a subscriber, it sends a private transmission that is avail-
15


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
able only to that subscriber.  The Second Circuit denied 
rehearing en banc, over the dissent of two judges.  WNET, 
Thirteen
 v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F. 3d 500 (2013).  We granted
certiorari. 
II 
This case requires us to answer two questions: First, in 
operating in the manner described above, does Aereo 
“perform” at all?  And second, if so, does Aereo do so “pub-
licly”?  We address these distinct questions in turn.
Does Aereo “perform”?  See §106(4) (“[T]he owner of [a] 
copyright . . . has the exclusive righ[t] . . . to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly” (emphasis added)); §101 (“To 
perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means [among other things] 
to transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the
public . . . ” (emphasis added)).  Phrased another way, does
Aereo “transmit . . . a performance” when a subscriber 
watches a show using Aereo’s system, or is it only the 
subscriber who transmits?  In Aereo’s view, it does not 
perform.  It does no more than supply equipment that 
“emulate[s] the operation of a home antenna and [digital 
video recorder (DVR)].”  Brief for Respondent 41.  Like a 
home antenna and DVR, Aereo’s equipment simply re-
sponds to its subscribers’ directives.  So it is only the 
subscribers who “perform” when they use Aereo’s equip-
ment to stream television programs to themselves. 
Considered alone, the language of the Act does not 
clearly indicate when an entity “perform[s]” (or “trans-
mit[s]”) and when it merely supplies equipment that
allows others to do so.  But when read in light of its pur-
pose, the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in 
activities like Aereo’s performs. 

History makes plain that one of Congress’ primary
purposes in amending the Copyright Act in 1976 was to 
16

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

Opinion of the Court 
overturn this Court’s determination that community 
antenna television (CATV) systems (the precursors of
modern cable systems) fell outside the Act’s scope.  In 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 
U. S. 390 (1968), the Court considered a CATV system
that carried local television broadcasting, much of which
was copyrighted, to its subscribers in two cities.  The 
CATV provider placed antennas on hills above the cities
and used coaxial cables to carry the signals received by the 
antennas to the home television sets of its subscribers. 
The system amplified and modulated the signals in order 
to improve their strength and efficiently transmit them to 
subscribers.  A subscriber “could choose any of the . . . 
programs he wished to view by simply turning the knob on
his own television set.”  Id., at 392.  The CATV provider 
“neither edited the programs received nor originated any 
programs of its own.”  Ibid. 
Asked to decide whether the CATV provider infringed
copyright holders’ exclusive right to perform their works 
publicly, the Court held that the provider did not “per-
form” at all.  See 17 U. S. C. §1(c) (1964 ed.) (granting
copyright holder the exclusive right to “perform . . . in 
public for profit” a nondramatic literary work), §1(d) 
(granting copyright holder the exclusive right to “perform 
. . . publicly” a dramatic work).  The Court drew a line: 
“Broadcasters perform.  Viewers do not perform.”  392 
U. S., at 398 (footnote omitted).  And a CATV provider 
“falls on the viewer’s side of the line.”  Id., at 399. 
The Court reasoned that CATV providers were unlike 
broadcasters: 
“Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV
systems simply carry, without editing, whatever pro-
grams they receive.  Broadcasters procure programs 
and propagate them to the public; CATV systems re-
ceive programs that have been released to the public 
17


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
and carry them by private channels to additional
viewers.”  Id., at 400. 
Instead, CATV providers were more like viewers, for “the 
basic function [their] equipment serves is little different 
from that served by the equipment generally furnished by” 
viewers.  Id., at 399. “Essentially,” the Court said, “a
CATV system no more than enhances the viewer’s capac- 
ity to receive the broadcaster’s signals [by] provid[ing] a 
well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the 
viewer’s television set.”  Ibid.  Viewers do not become 
performers by using “amplifying equipment,” and a CATV
provider should not be treated differently for providing 
viewers the same equipment.  Id., at 398–400. 
In Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 415 U. S. 394 (1974), the Court considered the
copyright liability of a CATV provider that carried broad-
cast television programming into subscribers’ homes from 
hundreds of miles away.  Although the Court recognized
that a viewer might not be able to afford amplifying 
equipment that would provide access to those distant 
signals, it nonetheless found that the CATV provider was 
more like a viewer than a broadcaster.  Id., at 408–409.  It 
explained: “The reception and rechanneling of [broadcast 
television signals] for simultaneous viewing is essentially 
a viewer function, irrespective of the distance between the 
broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer.”  Id., at 408. 
The Court also recognized that the CATV system exer-
cised some measure of choice over what to transmit.  But 
that fact did not transform the CATV system into a broad-
caster.  A broadcaster exercises significant creativity in 
choosing what to air, the Court reasoned.  Id., at 410.  In 
contrast, the CATV provider makes an initial choice about
which broadcast stations to retransmit, but then “ ‘simply
carr[ies], without editing, whatever programs [it] re-
ceive[s].’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Fortnightlysupra, at 400 (altera-
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Opinion of the Court 
tions in original)). 

In 1976 Congress amended the Copyright Act in large 
part to reject the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter.  See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, pp. 86–87
(1976) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (The 1976 amendments 
“completely overturned” this Court’s narrow construction
of the Act in Fortnightly and Teleprompter).  Congress
enacted new language that erased the Court’s line be-
tween broadcaster and viewer, in respect to “perform[ing]” 
a work.  The amended statute clarifies that to “perform”
an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any 
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” 
§101; see ibid.  (defining “[a]udiovisual works” as “works
that consist of a series of related images which are intrin-
sically intended to be shown by the use of machines . . . , 
together with accompanying sounds”).  Under this new 
language, both the broadcaster and the viewer of a televi-
sion program “perform,” because they both show the pro-
gram’s images and make audible the program’s sounds.
See H. R. Rep., at 63 (“[A] broadcasting network is per-
forming when it transmits [a singer’s performance of a
song] . . . and any individual is performing whenever he or 
she . . . communicates the performance by turning on a 
receiving set”).
Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, which
specifies that an entity performs publicly when it “trans-
mit[s] . . . a performance . . . to the public.”  §101; see ibid. 
(defining “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance” as “to communi-
cate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds 
are received beyond the place from which they are sent”).
Cable system activities, like those of the CATV systems in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter, lie at the heart of the activ-
ities that Congress intended this language to cover.  See 
H. R. Rep., at 63 (“[A] cable television system is perform-
19


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
ing when it retransmits [a network] broadcast to its sub-
scribers”); see also ibid. (“[T]he concep[t] of public perfor-
mance . . . cover[s] not only the initial rendition or show-
ing, but also any further act by which that rendition or 
showing is transmitted or communicated to the public”).
The Clause thus makes clear that an entity that acts like 
a CATV system itself performs, even if when doing so, it 
simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast 
television signals. 
Congress further created a new section of the Act to
regulate cable companies’ public performances of copy-
righted works.  See §111.  Section 111 creates a complex,
highly detailed compulsory licensing scheme that sets out 
the conditions, including the payment of compulsory fees, 
under which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts. 
H. R. Rep., at 88 (Section 111 is primarily “directed at the
operation of cable television systems and the terms and
conditions of their liability for the retransmission of copy-
righted works”).
Congress made these three changes to achieve a similar 
end: to bring the activities of cable systems within the 
scope of the Copyright Act. 

This history makes clear that Aereo is not simply an 
equipment provider.  Rather, Aereo, and not just its sub-
scribers, “perform[s]” (or “transmit[s]”).  Aereo’s activities 
are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies 
that Congress amended the Act to reach.  See id., at 89 
(“[C]able systems are commercial enterprises whose basic
retransmission operations are based on the carriage of
copyrighted program material”).  Aereo sells a service that 
allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of 
which are copyrighted, almost as they are being broadcast.
In providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment,
housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ 
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Opinion of the Court 
homes.  By means of its technology (antennas, trans-
coders, and servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s] programs
that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by 
private channels to additional viewers.”  Fortnightly, 392 
U. S., at 400.  It “carr[ies] . . . whatever programs [it]
receive[s],” and it offers “all the programming” of each
over-the-air station it carries.  Id., at 392, 400. 
Aereo’s equipment may serve a “viewer function”; it may
enhance the viewer’s ability to receive a broadcaster’s 
programs.  It may even emulate equipment a viewer could 
use at home.  But the same was true of the equipment that 
was before the Court, and ultimately before Congress, in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter. 
We recognize, and Aereo and the dissent emphasize, 
one particular difference between Aereo’s system and the
cable systems at issue in Fortnightly and Teleprompter
The systems in those cases transmitted constantly; they
sent continuous programming to each subscriber’s televi-
sion set.  In contrast, Aereo’s system remains inert until a 
subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program.
Only at that moment, in automatic response to the sub-
scriber’s request, does Aereo’s system activate an antenna
and begin to transmit the requested program.
This is a critical difference, says the dissent.  It means 
that Aereo’s subscribers, not Aereo, “selec[t] the copy-
righted content” that is “perform[ed],” post, at 4 (opinion of 
SCALIA, J.), and for that reason they, not Aereo, “transmit”
the performance.  Aereo is thus like “a copy shop that 
provides its patrons with a library card.”  Post,  at 5.  A 
copy shop is not directly liable whenever a patron uses the 
shop’s machines to “reproduce” copyrighted materials 
found in that library.  See §106(1) (“exclusive righ[t] . . . to 
reproduce the copyrighted work”).  And by the same token,
Aereo should not be directly liable whenever its patrons 
use its equipment to “transmit” copyrighted television 
programs to their screens. 
21

10 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
In our view, however, the dissent’s copy shop argument,
in whatever form, makes too much out of too little.  Given 
Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable companies
targeted by the 1976 amendments, this sole technological 
difference between Aereo and traditional cable companies 
does not make a critical difference here.  The subscribers 
of the Fortnightly and Teleprompter cable systems also
selected what programs to display on their receiving sets. 
Indeed, as we explained in Fortnightly, such a subscriber 
“could choose any of the . . . programs he wished to view by
simply turning the knob on his own television set.”  392 
U. S., at 392.  The same is true of an Aereo subscriber.  Of 
course, in Fortnightly  the television signals, in a sense,
lurked behind the screen, ready to emerge when the sub-
scriber turned the knob.  Here the signals pursue their
ordinary course of travel through the universe until to-
day’s “turn of the knob”—a click on a website—activates
machinery that intercepts and reroutes them to Aereo’s
subscribers over the Internet.  But this difference means 
nothing to the subscriber.  It means nothing to the broad-
caster.  We do not see how this single difference, invisible 
to subscriber and broadcaster alike, could transform a 
system that is for all practical purposes a traditional cable 
system into “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a 
library card.” 
In other cases involving different kinds of service or 
technology providers, a user’s involvement in the opera-
tion of the provider’s equipment and selection of the con-
tent transmitted may well bear on whether the provider 
performs within the meaning of the Act.  But the many
similarities between Aereo and cable companies, consid-
ered in light of Congress’ basic purposes in amending the
Copyright Act, convince us that this difference is not
critical here.  We conclude that Aereo is not just an
equipment supplier and that Aereo “perform[s].” 
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11 
Opinion of the Court 
III 
Next, we must consider whether Aereo performs peti-
tioners’ works “publicly,” within the meaning of the 
Transmit Clause.  Under the Clause, an entity performs a 
work publicly when it “transmit[s] . . . a performance . . . of 
the work . . . to the public.”  §101.  Aereo denies that it 
satisfies this definition.  It reasons as follows: First, the 
“performance” it “transmit[s]” is the performance created 
by its act of transmitting.  And second, because each of 
these performances is capable of being received by one and
only one subscriber, Aereo transmits privately, not pub- 
licly.  Even assuming Aereo’s first argument is correct, its 
second does not follow. 
We begin with Aereo’s first argument.  What perfor-
mance does Aereo transmit?  Under the Act, “[t]o ‘trans-
mit’ a performance . . . is to communicate it by any device
or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond
the place from which they are sent.”  Ibid.  And “[t]o ‘per-
form’ ” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in
any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.”  Ibid
Petitioners say Aereo transmits a prior performance of
their works.  Thus when Aereo retransmits a network’s 
prior broadcast, the underlying broadcast (itself a perfor-
mance) is the performance that Aereo transmits.  Aereo, 
as discussed above, says the performance it transmits is 
the  new  performance created by its act of transmitting.
That performance comes into existence when Aereo 
streams the sounds and images of a broadcast program to
a subscriber’s screen. 
We assume arguendo that Aereo’s first argument is 
correct.  Thus, for present purposes, to transmit a perfor-
mance of (at least) an audiovisual work means to com-
municate contemporaneously visible images and contem-
poraneously audible sounds of the work.  Cf. United States 
v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
23

12 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
627 F. 3d 64, 73 (CA2 2010) (holding that a download of a
work is not a performance because the data transmitted
are not “contemporaneously perceptible”).  When an Aereo 
subscriber selects a program to watch, Aereo streams the
program over the Internet to that subscriber.  Aereo 
thereby “communicate[s]” to the subscriber, by means of a
“device or process,” the work’s images and sounds.  §101.
And those images and sounds are contemporaneously
visible and audible on the subscriber’s computer (or other 
Internet-connected device).  So under our assumed defini-
tion, Aereo transmits a performance whenever its sub-
scribers watch a program. 
But what about the Clause’s further requirement that
Aereo transmit a performance “to the public”?  As we have 
said, an Aereo subscriber receives broadcast television 
signals with an antenna dedicated to him alone.  Aereo’s 
system makes from those signals a personal copy of the
selected program.  It streams the content of the copy to the 
same subscriber and to no one else.  One and only one
subscriber has the ability to see and hear each Aereo 
transmission.  The fact that each transmission is to only
one subscriber, in Aereo’s view, means that it does not 
transmit a performance “to the public.” 
In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do not
distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do 
perform “publicly.”  Viewed in terms of Congress’ regula-
tory objectives, why should any of these technological differ- 
ences matter?  They concern the behind-the-scenes way in
which Aereo delivers television programming to its view-
ers’ screens.  They do not render Aereo’s commercial objec-
tive any different from that of cable companies.  Nor do 
they significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s 
subscribers.  Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch
a television show care much whether images and sounds 
are delivered to his screen via a large multisubscriber 
antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they 
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13 
Opinion of the Court 
arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or
whether they are transmitted directly or after a personal
copy is made?  And why, if Aereo is right, could not mod-
ern CATV systems simply continue the same commercial
and consumer-oriented activities, free of copyright re-
strictions, provided they substitute such new technologies 
for old?  Congress would as much have intended to protect 
a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo
as from those of cable companies.
The text of the Clause effectuates Congress’ intent.
Aereo’s argument to the contrary relies on the premise
that “to transmit . . . a performance” means to make a 
single transmission.  But the Clause suggests that an
entity may transmit a performance through multiple, 
discrete transmissions.  That is because one can “trans-
mit” or “communicate” something through a set of actions. 
Thus one can transmit a message to one’s friends, irre-
spective of whether one sends separate identical e-mails to
each friend or a single e-mail to all at once.  So can an 
elected official communicate an idea, slogan, or speech to 
her constituents, regardless of whether she communicates
that idea, slogan, or speech during individual phone calls
to each constituent or in a public square.
The fact that a singular noun (“a performance”) follows
the words “to transmit” does not suggest the contrary.
One can sing a song to his family, whether he sings the 
same song one-on-one or in front of all together.  Similarly,
one’s colleagues may watch a performance of a particular 
play—say, this season’s modern-dress version of “Measure
for Measure”—whether they do so at separate or at the 
same showings.  By the same principle, an entity may 
transmit a performance through one or several transmis-
sions, where the performance is of the same work. 
The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation,
for it provides that one may transmit a performance to the 
public “whether the members of the public capable of 
25

14 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
 
 
Opinion of the Court 
receiving the performance . . . receive it . . . at the same 
time or at different times.”  §101.  Were the words “to 
transmit . . . a performance” limited to a single act of 
communication, members of the public could not receive 
the performance communicated “at different times.” 
 
Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, 
we conclude that when an entity communicates the same 
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to 
multiple people, it transmits a performance to them re-
gardless of the number of discrete communications it 
makes. 
  We do not see how the fact that Aereo transmits via 
personal copies of programs could make a difference.  The 
Act applies to transmissions “by means of any device or 
process.”  Ibid.  And retransmitting a television program 
using user-specific copies is a “process” of transmitting a 
performance.  A “cop[y]” of a work is simply a “material 
objec[t] . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the 
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated.”  Ibid.  So whether Aereo transmits from the same 
or separate copies, it performs the same work; it shows the 
same images and makes audible the same sounds.  There-
fore, when Aereo streams the same television program to 
multiple subscribers, it “transmit[s] . . . a performance” to 
all of them. 
  Moreover, the subscribers to whom Aereo transmits 
television programs constitute “the public.”  Aereo com-
municates the same contemporaneously perceptible images 
and sounds to a large number of people who are unre- 
lated and unknown to each other.  This matters because, 
although the Act does not define “the public,” it specifies 
that an entity performs publicly when it performs at “any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is 
gathered.”  Ibid.  The Act thereby suggests that “the pub-
lic” consists of a large group of people outside of a family 
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15 
Opinion of the Court 
and friends. 
Neither the record nor Aereo suggests that Aereo’s
subscribers receive performances in their capacities as
owners or possessors of the underlying works.  This is 
relevant because when an entity performs to a set of peo-
ple, whether they constitute “the public” often depends 
upon their relationship to the underlying work.  When, for 
example, a valet parking attendant returns cars to their
drivers, we would not say that the parking service pro-
vides cars “to the public.”  We would say that it provides
the cars to their owners.  We would say that a car dealer-
ship, on the other hand, does provide cars to the public, for 
it sells cars to individuals who lack a pre-existing relation-
ship to the cars.  Similarly, an entity that transmits a
performance to individuals in their capacities as owners or 
possessors does not perform to “the public,” whereas an
entity like Aereo that transmits to large numbers of pay-
ing subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the 
works does so perform.
Finally, we note that Aereo’s subscribers may receive
the same programs at different times and locations.  This 
fact does not help Aereo, however, for the Transmit Clause 
expressly provides that an entity may perform publicly 
“whether the members of the public capable of receiving 
the performance . . . receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different 
times.”  Ibid.  In other words, “the public” need not be 
situated together, spatially or temporally.  For these 
reasons, we conclude that Aereo transmits a performance
of petitioners’ copyrighted works to the public, within the 
meaning of the Transmit Clause. 
IV 
Aereo and many of its supporting amici argue that to
apply the Transmit Clause to Aereo’s conduct will impose
copyright liability on other technologies, including new 
27

16 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
technologies, that Congress could not possibly have wanted
to reach.  We agree that Congress, while intending the
Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies and 
their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control 
the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.
But we do not believe that our limited holding today will
have that effect. 
For one thing, the history of cable broadcast transmis-
sions that led to the enactment of the Transmit Clause 
informs our conclusion that Aereo “perform[s],” but it does 
not determine whether different kinds of providers in
different contexts also “perform.”  For another, an entity
only transmits a performance when it communicates
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds of a 
work.  See Brief for Respondent 31 (“[I]f a distributor . . .
sells [multiple copies of a digital video disc] by mail to
consumers, . . . [its] distribution of the DVDs merely
makes it possible for the recipients to perform the work
themselves—it is not a ‘device or process’ by which the 
distributor publicly performs the work” (emphasis in 
original)).
Further, we have interpreted the term “the public” to
apply to a group of individuals acting as ordinary mem-
bers of the public who pay primarily to watch broadcast
television programs, many of which are copyrighted.  We 
have said that it does not extend to those who act as own-
ers or possessors of the relevant product.  And we have not 
considered whether the public performance right is in-
fringed when the user of a service pays primarily for 
something other than the transmission of copyrighted 
works, such as the remote storage of content.  See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 31 (distinguishing cloud-
based storage services because they “offer consumers more 
numerous and convenient means of playing back copies 
that the consumers have already  lawfully acquired” (em-
phasis in original)).  In addition, an entity does not trans-
28

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17 
Opinion of the Court 
mit to the public if it does not transmit to a substantial 
number of people outside of a family and its social circle. 
We also note that courts often apply a statute’s highly
general language in light of the statute’s basic purposes. 
Finally, the doctrine of “fair use” can help to prevent
inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause. 
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
464 U. S. 417 (1984).
We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit 
Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply 
to technologies not before us.  We agree with the Solicitor
General that “[q]uestions involving cloud computing,
[remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not before
the Court, as to which ‘Congress has not plainly marked 
[the] course,’ should await a case in which they are 
squarely presented.”  Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae
 34 (quoting Sony,  supra, at 431 (alteration in 
original)).  And we note that, to the extent commercial 
actors or other interested entities may be concerned with
the relationship between the development and use of such
technologies and the Copyright Act, they are of course free 
to seek action from Congress.  Cf. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. §512. 
*  *  * 
In sum, having considered the details of Aereo’s practices,
we find them highly similar to those of the CATV systems
in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.  And those are activities 
that the 1976 amendments sought to bring within the
scope of the Copyright Act.  Insofar as there are differ-
ences, those differences concern not the nature of the 
service that Aereo provides so much as the technological
manner in which it provides the service.  We conclude that 
those differences are not adequate to place Aereo’s activi-
ties outside the scope of the Act. 
For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo “perform[s]” 
29

18 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
Opinion of the Court 
petitioners’ copyrighted works “publicly,” as those terms 
are defined by the Transmit Clause.  We therefore reverse 
the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
30

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SCALIA, J., dissenting 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
_________________ 
No. 13–461 
_________________ 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AEREO, INC., FKA 
BAMBOOM LABS, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June 25, 2014] 
JUSTICE  SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE  THOMAS  and 
JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting. 
This case is the latest skirmish in the long-running 
copyright battle over the delivery of television program-
ming.  Petitioners, a collection of television networks and 
affiliates (Networks), broadcast copyrighted programs on
the public airwaves for all to see.  Aereo, respondent,
operates an automated system that allows subscribers to
receive, on Internet-connected devices, programs that they
select, including the Networks’ copyrighted programs.
The Networks sued Aereo for several forms of copyright 
infringement, but we are here concerned with a single 
claim: that Aereo violates the Networks’ “exclusive righ[t]”
to “perform” their programs “publicly.”  17 U. S. C. 
§106(4).  That claim fails at the very outset because Aereo 
does not “perform” at all.  The Court manages to reach the
opposite conclusion only by disregarding widely accepted 
rules for service-provider liability and adopting in their 
place an improvised standard (“looks-like-cable-TV”) that 
will sow confusion for years to come. 
I. Legal Standard 
There are two types of liability for copyright infringe-
ment: direct and secondary.  As its name suggests, the 
31


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
former applies when an actor personally engages in in-
fringing conduct.  See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.
, 464 U. S. 417, 433 (1984).  Secondary
liability, by contrast, is a means of holding defendants 
responsible for infringement by third parties, even when
the defendants “have not themselves engaged in the in-
fringing activity.”  Id., at 435.  It applies when a defendant
“intentionally induc[es] or encourag[es]” infringing acts by
others or profits from such acts “while declining to exer-
cise a right to stop or limit [them].”  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S. 913, 930 (2005).
Most suits against equipment manufacturers and ser-
vice providers involve secondary-liability claims.  For ex-
ample, when movie studios sued to block the sale of 
Sony’s Betamax videocassette recorder (VCR), they argued
that Sony was liable because its customers were making 
unauthorized copies.  See Sonysupra, at 434–435.  Record 
labels and movie studios relied on a similar theory when 
they sued Grokster and StreamCast, two providers of
peer-to-peer file-sharing software.  See Grokstersupra, at 
920–921, 927. 
This suit, or rather the portion  of  it  before  us  here,  is
fundamentally different.  The Networks claim that Aereo 
directly infringes their public-performance right.  Accord-
ingly, the Networks must prove that Aereo “perform[s]” 
copyrighted works, §106(4), when its subscribers log in,
select a channel, and push the “watch” button.  That pro-
cess undoubtedly results in a performance; the question is 
who does the performing.  See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP 
v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (CA2 2008).  If 
Aereo’s subscribers perform but Aereo does not, the claim
necessarily fails.
The Networks’ claim is governed by a simple but pro-
foundly important rule: A defendant may be held directly 
liable only if it has engaged in volitional conduct that 
violates the Act.  See 3 W. Patry, Copyright §9:5.50 (2013). 
32

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SCALIA, J., dissenting 
This requirement is firmly grounded in the Act’s text,
which defines “perform” in active, affirmative terms: One
“perform[s]” a copyrighted “audiovisual work,” such as a
movie or news broadcast, by “show[ing] its images in any 
sequence” or “mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it audi-
ble.”  §101.  And since the Act makes it unlawful to copy or 
perform copyrighted works, not to copy or perform in 
general, see §501(a), the volitional-act requirement de-
mands conduct directed to the plaintiff ’s copyrighted 
material, see Sony, supra, at 434.  Every Court of Appeals 
to have considered an automated-service provider’s direct 
liability for copyright infringement has adopted that rule. 
See Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F. 3d 
1060, 1066–1068 (CA9 2014); Cartoon Network, supra, at 
130–131 (CA2 2008); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.
373 F. 3d 544, 549–550 (CA4 2004).1    Although  we  have
not opined on the issue, our cases are fully consistent with
a volitional-conduct requirement.  For example, we gave
several examples of direct infringement in Sony, each of 
which involved a volitional act directed to the plaintiff ’s 
copyrighted material.  See 464 U. S., at 437, n. 18. 
The volitional-conduct requirement is not at issue in
most direct-infringement cases; the usual point of dispute 
is whether the defendant’s conduct is infringing (e.g., Does 
the defendant’s design copy the plaintiff ’s?), rather than
whether the defendant has acted at all (e.g.,  Did this 
defendant create the infringing design?).  But it comes 
right to the fore when a direct-infringement claim is 
—————— 
1 An unpublished decision of the Third Circuit is to the same effect. 
Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 Fed. Appx. 833, 836–837 (2007) (per curiam).
The Networks muster only one case they say stands for a different 
approach, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U. S. 483 (2001).  Reply 
Brief 18.  But Tasini is clearly inapposite; it dealt with the question 
whether the defendants’ copying was permissible, not whether the 
defendants were the ones who made the copies.  See 533 U. S., at 487– 
488, 492, 504–506. 
33


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
lodged against a defendant who does nothing more than 
operate an automated, user-controlled system.  See, e.g., 
Fox Broadcasting
supra, at 1067; Cartoon Networksupra
at 131.  Internet-service providers are a prime example. 
When one user sends data to another, the provider’s 
equipment facilitates the transfer automatically.  Does 
that mean that the provider is directly liable when the
transmission happens to result in the “reproduc[tion],”
§106(1), of a copyrighted work?  It does not.  The provid-
er’s system is “totally indifferent to the material’s con-
tent,” whereas courts require “some aspect of volition”
directed at the copyrighted material before direct liability 
may be imposed.  CoStar, 373 F. 3d, at 550–551.2    The
defendant may be held directly liable only if the defendant 
itself “trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright
owner.”  Id., at 550.  Most of the time that issue will come 
down to who selects the copyrighted content: the defend-
ant or its customers.  See Cartoon Network, supra, at 
131–132. 
A comparison between copy shops and video-on-demand 
services illustrates the point.  A copy shop rents out photo-
copiers on a per-use basis.  One customer might copy his 
10-year-old’s drawings—a perfectly lawful thing to do—
while another might duplicate a famous artist’s copyrighted
photographs—a use clearly prohibited by §106(1).  Either 
way,  the customer chooses the content and activates the 
copying function; the photocopier does nothing except in
response to the customer’s commands.  Because the shop
plays no role in selecting the content, it cannot be held
directly liable when a customer makes an infringing copy. 
See CoStarsupra, at 550. 
—————— 
2 Congress has enacted several safe-harbor provisions applicable to
automated network processes, see, e.g.,  17 U. S. C. §512(a)–(b), but
those provisions do not foreclose “any other defense,” §512(l), including
a volitional-conduct defense. 
34

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SCALIA, J., dissenting 
 Video-on-demand services, like photocopiers, respond 
automatically to user input, but they differ in one crucial 
respect: They choose the content.  When a user signs in to
Netflix, for example, “thousands of . . . movies [and] TV 
episodes” carefully curated by Netflix are “available to 
watch instantly.”  See How [D]oes Netflix [W]ork?, online 
at http://help.netflix.com/en/node/412 (as visited June 20,
2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).  That 
selection and arrangement by the service provider consti-
tutes a volitional act directed to specific copyrighted works 
and thus serves as a basis for direct liability.
The distinction between direct and secondary liability
would collapse if there were not a clear rule for deter-
mining whether the defendant committed the infringing 
act.  See Cartoon Network, 536 F. 3d, at 132–133.  The 
volitional-conduct requirement supplies that rule; its
purpose is not to excuse defendants from accountability, 
but to channel the claims against them into the correct 
analytical track.  See Brief for 36 Intellectual Property
and Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae 7.  Thus, in 
the example given above, the fact that the copy shop does
not choose the content simply means that its culpability 
will be assessed using secondary-liability rules rather
than direct-liability rules.  See Sony,  supra, at 434–442; 
Cartoon Networksupra, at 132–133. 
II. Application to Aereo 
So which is Aereo: the copy shop or the video-on-demand 
service?  In truth, it is neither.  Rather, it is akin to a copy
shop that provides its patrons with a library card.  Aereo 
offers access to an automated system consisting of routers,
servers, transcoders, and dime-sized antennae.  Like a 
photocopier or VCR, that system lies dormant until a 
subscriber activates it.  When a subscriber selects a pro-
gram, Aereo’s system picks up the relevant broadcast 
signal, translates its audio and video components into 
35


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
digital data, stores the data in a user-specific file, and
transmits that file’s contents to the subscriber via the 
Internet—at which point the subscriber’s laptop, tablet, or
other device displays the broadcast just as an ordinary 
television would.  The result of that process fits the statu-
tory definition of a performance to a tee: The subscriber’s
device “show[s]” the broadcast’s “images” and “make[s] the 
sounds accompanying” the broadcast “audible.”  §101.  The 
only question is whether those performances are the prod-
uct of Aereo’s volitional conduct. 
They are not.  Unlike video-on-demand services, Aereo 
does not provide a prearranged assortment of movies and 
television shows.  Rather, it assigns each subscriber an
antenna that—like a library card—can be used to obtain
whatever broadcasts are freely available.  Some of those 
broadcasts are copyrighted; others are in the public do-
main.  The key point is that subscribers call all the shots: 
Aereo’s automated system does not relay any program,
copyrighted or not, until a subscriber selects the program 
and tells Aereo to relay it.  Aereo’s operation of that sys-
tem is a volitional act and a but-for cause of the resulting 
performances, but, as in the case of the copy shop, that 
degree of involvement is not enough for direct liability.
See  Grokster, 545 U. S., at 960 (BREYER, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he producer of a technology which permits unlawful 
copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying”).
In sum, Aereo does not “perform” for the sole and simple
reason that it does not make the choice of content.  And 
because Aereo does not perform, it cannot be held directly 
liable for infringing the Networks’ public-performance 
right.3  That conclusion does not necessarily mean that 
Aereo’s service complies with the Copyright Act.  Quite the 
—————— 
3 Because I conclude that Aereo does not perform at all, I do not reach 
the question whether the performances in this case are to the public. 
See ante, at 10–15. 
36

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SCALIA, J., dissenting 
contrary.  The Networks’ complaint alleges that Aereo is 
directly  and secondarily liable for infringing their public-
performance rights (§106(4)) and also their reproduction 
rights (§106(1)).  Their request for a preliminary injunc-
tion—the only issue before this Court—is based exclusively 
on the direct-liability portion of the public-performance 
claim (and further limited to Aereo’s “watch” function, as
opposed to its “record” function).  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 
60a–61a.  Affirming the judgment below would merely
return this case to the lower courts for consideration of the 
Networks’ remaining claims. 
III. Guilt By Resemblance 
The Court’s conclusion that Aereo performs boils down 
to the following syllogism: (1) Congress amended the Act
to overrule our decisions holding that cable systems do not
perform when they retransmit over-the-air broadcasts;4 (2)
Aereo looks a lot like a cable system; therefore (3) Aereo
performs.  Ante, at 4–10.  That reasoning suffers from a 
trio of defects. 
First, it is built on the shakiest of foundations.  Perceiv-
ing the text to be ambiguous, ante, at 4, the Court reaches 
out to decide the case based on a few isolated snippets of 
legislative history, ante, at 7–8 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 94– 
1476 (1976)).  The Court treats those snippets as authori-
tative evidence of congressional intent even though they 
come from a single report issued by a committee whose 
members make up a small fraction of one of the two Houses
of Congress.  Little else need be said here about the severe 
shortcomings of that interpretative methodology.  See 
Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (SCALIA, J., 
concurring in principal part and concurring in judgment) 
(slip op., at 1–2). 
—————— 
4 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 
U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.
392 U. S. 390 (1968).   
37


AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
Second, the Court’s reasoning fails on its own terms
because there are material differences between the cable 
systems at issue in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.,
 415 U. S. 394 (1974), and Fort-
nightly Corp. 
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U. S. 
390 (1968), on the one hand and Aereo on the other.  The 
former (which were then known as community-antenna
television systems) captured the full range of broadcast 
signals and forwarded them to all subscribers at all times,
whereas Aereo transmits only specific programs selected 
by the user, at specific times selected by the user.  The 
Court acknowledges this distinction but blithely concludes 
that it “does not make a critical difference.”  Ante, at 10. 
Even if that were true, the Court fails to account for other 
salient differences between the two technologies.5  Though
cable systems started out essentially as dumb pipes that 
routed signals from point A to point B, see ante,  at 5, by
the 1970’s, that kind of service “ ‘no longer exist[ed],’ ” 
Brief for Petitioners in Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. 
v. Teleprompter Corp., O. T. 1973, No. 72–1633, p. 22. 
At the time of our Teleprompter decision, cable companies 
“perform[ed] the same functions as ‘broadcasters’ by delib-
erately selecting and importing distant signals, originat-
ing programs, [and] selling commercials,” id., at 20, thus 
making them curators of content—more akin to video-on-
demand services than copy shops.  So far as the record 
reveals, Aereo does none of those things. 
—————— 
5 The Court observes that “[t]he subscribers of the Fortnightly  and 
Teleprompter  cable  systems  . . .  selected  what programs to display on
their receiving sets,” but acknowledges that those choices were possible
only because “the television signals, in a sense, lurked behind the 
screen, ready to emerge when the subscriber turned the knob.”  Ante, at 
10.  The latter point is dispositive: The signals were “ready to emerge” 
because the cable system—much like a video-on-demand provider—
took affirmative, volitional steps to put  them there.  As discussed 
above, the same cannot be said of the programs available through
Aereo’s automated system. 
38

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SCALIA, J., dissenting 
Third, and most importantly, even accepting that the
1976 amendments had as their purpose the overruling of 
our cable-TV cases, what they were meant to do and how
they did it are two different questions—and it is the latter 
that governs the case before us here.  The injury claimed
is not violation of a law that says operations similar to 
cable TV are subject to copyright liability, but violation of 
§106(4) of the Copyright Act.  And whatever soothing 
reasoning the Court uses to reach its result (“this looks
like cable TV”), the consequence of its holding is that
someone who implements this technology “perform[s]” 
under that provision
.  That greatly disrupts settled juris-
prudence which, before today, applied the straightforward,
bright-line test of volitional conduct directed at the copy-
righted work.  If that test is not outcome determinative in 
this case, presumably it is not outcome determinative
elsewhere as well.  And it is not clear what the Court 
proposes to replace it.  Perhaps the Court means to adopt 
(invent, really) a two-tier version of the Copyright Act, one 
part of which applies to “cable companies and their equiv-
alents” while the other governs everyone else.  Ante, at 9– 
10, 16. 
The rationale for the Court’s ad hoc rule for cable-
system lookalikes is so broad that it renders nearly a third 
of the Court’s opinion superfluous.  Part II of the opinion 
concludes that Aereo performs because it resembles a
cable company, and Congress amended the Act in 1976 “to 
bring the activities of cable systems within [its] scope.” 
Ante, at 8.  Part III of the opinion purports to address 
separately the question whether Aereo performs “pub- 
licly.”  Ante, at 10–15.  Trouble is, that question cannot
remain open if Congress’s supposed intent to regulate
whatever looks like a cable company must be given legal
effect (as the Court says in Part II).  The Act reaches only
public performances, see §106(4), so Congress could not 
have regulated “the activities of cable systems” without 
39

10 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
deeming their retransmissions public performances.  The 
upshot is this: If Aereo’s similarity to a cable company 
means that it performs, then by necessity that same char-
acteristic means that it does so publicly, and Part III of 
the Court’s opinion discusses an issue that is no longer 
relevant—though discussing it certainly gives the opinion
the “feel” of real textual analysis.
Making matters worse, the Court provides no criteria
for determining when its cable-TV-lookalike rule applies.
Must a defendant offer access to live television to qualify?
If similarity to cable-television service is the measure, 
then the answer must be yes.  But consider the implica-
tions of that answer: Aereo would be free to do exactly 
what it is doing right now so long as it built mandatory 
time shifting into its “watch” function.6  Aereo would not 
be providing live  television if it made subscribers wait to 
tune in until after a show’s live broadcast ended.  A sub-
scriber could watch the 7 p.m. airing of a 1-hour program
any time after 8 p.m.  Assuming the Court does not intend 
to adopt such a do-nothing rule (though it very well may), 
there must be some other means of identifying who is and 
is not subject to its guilt-by-resemblance regime.
Two other criteria come to mind.  One would cover any 
automated service that captures and stores live television
broadcasts at a user’s direction.  That can’t be right, since
it is exactly what remote storage digital video recorders 
(RS–DVRs) do, see Cartoon Network, 536 F. 3d, at 124– 
125, and the Court insists that its “limited holding” does
not decide the fate of those devices, ante,  at 16–17.  The 
other potential benchmark is the one offered by the Gov-
ernment: The cable-TV-lookalike rule embraces any entity 
—————— 
6 Broadcasts accessible through the “watch” function are technically
not live because Aereo’s servers take anywhere from a few seconds to a
few minutes to begin transmitting data to a subscriber’s device.  But 
the resulting delay is so brief that it cannot reasonably be classified as
time shifting. 
40

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 
11 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
that “operates an integrated system, substantially de-
pendent on physical equipment that is used in common by 
[its] subscribers.”  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
20. The Court sensibly avoids that approach because it
would sweep in Internet service providers and a host of 
other entities that quite obviously do not perform. 
That leaves as the criterion of cable-TV-resemblance 
nothing but th’ol’ totality-of-the-circumstances test (which
is not a test at all but merely assertion of an intent to
perform test-free, ad hoc, case-by-case evaluation).  It will 
take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automated
systems now in existence are governed by the tradi-
tional volitional-conduct test and which get the Aereo 
treatment.  (And automated systems now in contemplation 
will have to take their chances.)  The Court vows that its 
ruling will not affect cloud-storage providers and cable-
television systems, see ante, at 16–17, but it cannot deliver 
on that promise given the imprecision of its result-driven 
rule.  Indeed, the difficulties inherent in the Court’s 
makeshift approach will become apparent in this very 
case.  Today’s decision addresses the legality of Aereo’s 
“watch” function, which provides nearly contemporaneous 
access to live broadcasts.  On remand, one of the first 
questions the lower courts will face is whether Aereo’s
“record” function, which allows subscribers to save a pro-
gram while it is airing and watch it later, infringes the
Networks’ public-performance right.  The volitional-
conduct rule provides a clear answer to that question:
Because Aereo does not select the programs viewed by its 
users, it does not perform.  But it is impossible to say how 
the issue will come out under the Court’s analysis, since
cable companies did not offer remote recording and play-
back services when Congress amended the Copyright Act
in 1976. 
41

12 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. AEREO, INC. 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
*  *  * 
I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is 
doing (or enabling to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted
programming ought not to be allowed.  But perhaps we
need not distort the Copyright Act to forbid it.  As dis-
cussed at the outset, Aereo’s secondary liability for per-
formance infringement is yet to be determined, as is its
primary and secondary liability for reproduction infringe-
ment.  If that does not suffice, then (assuming one shares 
the majority’s estimation of right and wrong) what we
have before us must be considered a “loophole” in the law.
It is not the role of this Court to identify and plug loop-
holes.  It is the role of good lawyers to identify and exploit 
them, and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it 
wishes.  Congress can do that, I may add, in a much more 
targeted, better informed, and less disruptive fashion than 
the crude “looks-like-cable-TV” solution the Court invents 
today.
We came within one vote of declaring the VCR contra-
band 30 years ago in Sony.  See 464 U. S., at 441, n. 21. 
The dissent in that case was driven in part by the plain-
tiffs’ prediction that VCR technology would wreak all
manner of havoc in the television and movie industries. 
See id., at 483 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also Brief for 
CBS, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1982, No. 81–1687, p. 2
(arguing that VCRs “directly threatened” the bottom line
of “[e]very broadcaster”). 
The Networks make similarly dire predictions about 
Aereo.  We are told that nothing less than “the very exist-
ence of broadcast television as we know it” is at stake. 
Brief for Petitioners 39.  Aereo and its amici dispute those 
forecasts and make a few of their own, suggesting that a
decision in the Networks’ favor will stifle technological
innovation and imperil billions of dollars of investments in 
cloud-storage services.  See Brief for Respondents 48–51;
Brief for BSA, The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae 5– 
42

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 
13 
SCALIA, J., dissenting 
13. We are in no position to judge the validity of those
self-interested claims or to foresee the path of future 
technological development.  See Sony,  supra, at 430–431; 
see also Grokster, 545 U. S., at 958 (BREYER, J., concur-
ring).  Hence, the proper course is not to bend and twist 
the Act’s terms in an effort to produce a just outcome, but
to apply the law as it stands and leave to Congress the
task of deciding whether the Copyright Act needs an 
upgrade.  I conclude, as the Court concluded in Sony: “It 
may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has examined other 
innovations in the past.  But it is not our job to apply laws
that have not yet been written.  Applying the copyright 
statute, as it now reads, to the facts as they have been
developed in this case, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals must be [affirmed].”  464 U. S., at 456. 
I respectfully dissent. 
43

Art. 4(2)(2)
 
___________________ 
OPINION 
___________________ 
1.
2.
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

44

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

45

 
 
28 July 2016 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46

No. 13-461 
================================================================ 
In The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
-----------------  ----------------- 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
AEREO, INC., F/K/A BAMBOOM LABS, INC., 
Respondent.       
-----------------  ----------------- 
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States  
Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit 
-----------------  ----------------- 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE INTERNATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC 
INDUSTRY (IFPI); ASOCIACIÓN MEXICANA 
DE PRODUCTORES DE FONOGRAMAS Y 
VIDEOGRAMAS (AMPROFON); ASSOCIATION 
LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE INTERNATIONALE 
DU CANADA (ALAI CANADA); AUSTRALIAN 
COPYRIGHT COUNCIL (ACC); BRITISH 
COPYRIGHT COUNCIL (BCC); CANADIAN 
MEDIA PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION (CMPA); 
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF 
MUSIC PUBLISHERS (ICMP); INTERNATIONAL 
CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS 
AND COMPOSERS (CISAC); INTERNATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF ACTORS (FIA); INTERNATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS (FIM); MUSIC 
CANADA; SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS 
AND MUSIC PUBLISHERS OF CANADA (SOCAN); 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SCHOLARS, 
ET AL., IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS 
-----------------  ----------------- 
DAVID O. CARSON 
STEVEN MASON*
IFPI 
MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT LLP 
10 Piccadilly 
TD Bank Tower, Ste. 5300 
London W1J0DD 
Toronto, ON  
United Kingdom  
Canada M5K 1E6 
(+44) (020) 7878 7900 
(416) 601-7703 
xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxx.xxx 
xxxxxx@xxxxxxxx.xx 
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
[Additional Amici Listed On Inside Cover] 
================================================================ 
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM 
47

ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
ALLIANCE OF CANADIAN CINEMA, 
TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS (ACTRA); 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FILM 
PRODUCERS ASSOCIATIONS (FIAPF); 
INTERATIONAL VIDEO FEDERATION (IVF); 
SOCIETIES’ COUNCIL FOR THE COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF PERFORMERS’ RIGHTS (SCAPR) 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SCHOLARS 
PROFESSOR F. JAY DOUGHERTY, 
DR. MIHÁLY FICSOR, PROFESSOR YSOLDE 
GENDREAU, PROFESSOR JUSTIN HUGHES, 
PROFESSOR MARSHALL LEAFER, 
PROFESSOR SILKE VON LEWINSKI, 
PROFESSOR VICTOR NABHAN AND 
PROFESSOR BARRY SOOKMAN (ADJ.) 
48


TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................  
ii 
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE .......................  

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................  

ARGUMENT ........................................................  

 I. 
 
 
THE 
CHARMING BETSY DOCTRINE 
REQUIRES CAUTION IN DEVIATING 
FROM TREATY COMMITMENTS ...........  

II.  
THE DECISION BELOW PLACES THE
UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF
ITS MULTILATERAL TREATY COMMIT-
MENTS ......................................................  9 
III. THE DECISION BELOW PLACES THE
UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF
ITS BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS .........................................   21 
IV.  
THE UNITED STATES ADOPTED A
TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRAL PATH PRIOR
TO ENTERING INTO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS ...........................   26 
  V. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW CON-
FIRMS THE BREADTH OF THE 
TRANSMIT CLAUSE ................................   31 
CONCLUSION .....................................................   38 
APPENDIX 
LIST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................... App.  1 
49

ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES: 
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1983 
(2010) ....................................................................... 31 
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 
U.S. 138 (1957) .......................................................... 7 
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. den. 
sub nom., Cable News Network v. CSC Hold-
ings, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) .................. 6, 35, 36 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ............. 8, 9, 29 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tel., Inc.
392 U.S. 390 (1968) ........................................... 27, 38 
Golan v. Holder, 585 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012) ............................................................... 8, 9, 12 
Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Ent., 471 
U.S. 539 (1985) ........................................................ 27 
Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United States, 304 F.3d 
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................. 7 
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963) ............ 8 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64 (1804) ...................................... 6, 8, 23, 33 
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co.
24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ..................... 8 
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano
457 U.S. 176 (1982) ................................................... 8 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) ................................... 27, 38 
50

iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151 (1975) .................................................. 27, 38 
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) ................................. 7, 21 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d 
Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 6, 35, 39 
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 
217 (1996) .................................................................. 8 
INTERNATIONAL CASES: 
ITV Broadcasting Ltd. and other companies v. 
TVCatchup Ltd., 2013 ECR I-___, [2013] 3 
C.M.L.R. 1 (Case C-607-11, CJEU) .................. 31, 33 
National Rugby League Investments Pty. Ltd. v. 
Singtel Optus Pty. Ltd. [2012] FCAFC 59 
(Austl.) ..................................................................... 36 
NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), et al. 
v. Nagano Shōten Co. Ltd. [Sup. Ct.] January
18, 2011, Case No. 653 (ju) of 2009, 65-1 
Minshū 121 (Japan), unofficial translation 
available at http://www.softic.or.jp/en/cases/ 
manekiTV.pdf .......................................................... 36 
OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k 
dílům hudebním o.s. v. Léčebné lázně 
Mariánské Lázně a.s.
, [2014] ECR 1-___ 
(Case C-466/12, CJEU, February 27, 2014) ........... 34 
Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43 
(Canada) .................................................................. 37 
51

iv 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada
, 2012 SCC 35 (Canada) ..... 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 
Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
Espana (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA, [2006] 
ECR I-11519, [2006] All ER (D) 103 (CJEU) ..... 33, 34 
Svensson and others v. Retriever Sverige AB
[2014] ECR I-___ (Case C-466/12, CJEU, 
February 13, 2014) .................................................. 33 
Telstra Corporation Limited v. Australasian 
Performing Right Association (1997), 146 
ALR 649 (Austl.) ..................................................... 36 
 
STATUTES AND RULES: 
17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) ......................................... passim 
17 U.S.C. §102 (2012) ................................................. 28 
17 U.S.C. §106 (2012) ..................................... 12, 15, 24 
17 U.S.C. §110 (2012) ................................................. 11 
17 U.S.C. §118 (2012) ................................................. 11 
19 U.S.C. §3311(a) (2012) ........................................... 21 
19 U.S.C. §3805(a)(1)(C) ............................................. 24 
19 U.S.C. §3805(a)(2)(A) ............................................. 24 
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 ....................... 12, 21 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) ................................ 20, 21 
52


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. 
L. 109-153, 119 Stat. 462 (2005) ............................. 25 
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. 108-286 §101(a)(2), 
118 Stat. 919 (2004) ................................................ 25 
U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. 109-169, 119 Stat. 
3581 (2006) .............................................................. 25 
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementa-
tion Act, Pub. L. 108-177, 117 Stat. 909 
(2003) ....................................................................... 25 
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation 
Act, Pub. L. 107-143, 115 Stat. 243 (2001) ............. 25 
U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implemen-
tation Act, Pub. L. 112-141, 125 Stat. 428 
(2011) ....................................................................... 25 
U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. 108-302, 118 Stat. 
1103 (2004) .............................................................. 25 
U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement Implemen-
tation Act, Pub. L. 109-283, 120 Stat. 1191 
(2006) ....................................................................... 25 
U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. 112-143, 125 
Stat. 497 (2001) ....................................................... 25 
53

vi 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. 110-138, 121 Stat. 
1455 (2007) .............................................................. 25 
U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. 108-178, 117 Stat. 
948 (2003) ................................................................ 25 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-
465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) ...................................... 21 
 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 ...................................... 12 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (Paris Text 
1971, as amended Sept. 28, 1979), 828 
U.N.T.S. 221 .................................................... passim 
Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, K.A.V. 7157 ......... 24 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Australia, May 18, 
2004, K.A.V. 7141 ................................ 2, 3, 23, 24, 25 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 
2004, K.A.V. 6866 .............................................. 23, 24 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 
2003, K.A.V. 6375 .................................................... 23 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 
2000, K.A.V. 5970 .................................................... 23 
54

vii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 
2004, K.A.V. 7206 .............................................. 23, 24 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 
2006, K.A.V. 8673 .............................................. 23, 24 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 
2003, K.A.V. 6376 .............................................. 23, 24 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor. (Feb. 10, 
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ 
free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text ...... 23, 24 
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 
1992, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, vol. 1 ..... 2, 3, 21, 22, 23 
Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan. June 
28, 2007, K.A.V. 9546 ........................................ 23, 24 
Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 
12, 2006, K.A.V. 8674 ........................................ 23, 24 
WIPO Audiovisual Performances Treaty, (Jun. 
24, 2012), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text. 
jsp?file_id=295837 ................................................... 14 
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, 
S. Treaty Doc. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65..... passim 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
arts. 10, 14, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 
105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76 ............................. passim 
  
 
55

viii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION: 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copy-
right and related rights in the information 
society, 2001 O.J. (L.167) 10 ............................. 32, 33 
 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the 
Berne Convention, 3 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 373 
(1995) ....................................................................... 11 
David O. Carson, Making the Making Available 
Right Available: 22nd Annual Horace S. 
Manges Lecture, February 3, 2009
, 33 Colum.-
VLA J.L. & Arts 135 (2010) .................................... 19 
Mihály Ficsor, Copyright in the Digital Envi-
ronment, WIPO/CR/KRT/05/7 (Feb. 2005), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/arab/en/wipo_ 
cr_krt_05/wipo_cr_krt_05_7.doc ............................. 14 
Mihály Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the 
Internet (2002) ....................................... 14, 17, 18, 19 
Mihály Ficsor, The WIPO ‘Internet Treaties’ and 
Copyright in the “Cloud,” ALAI Congress, Kyoto 
(Oct. 16-18, 2012), http://bit.ly/1fnP0WX ............... 30 
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 513 (1986) ....................... 11 
56

ix 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
Ysolde Gendreau, Intention and Copyright 
Law, in F. Pollaud-Dulian, ed., in Internet 
and Copyright Law
 (Perspectives on Intellec-
tual Property Law series, vol. 5) (1999) ................. 22 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Aereo in International 
Perspective: Individualized Access and U.S. 
Treaty Obligations
, Media Inst., Feb. 18, 
2014, http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/ 
021814.php ........................................................ 19, 30 
Jane C. Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making 
Available to the Public, in Intellectual Prop-
erty in the New Millennium: Essays in Hon-
our of William R. Cornish
 234 (D. Vaver & L. 
Bently, eds. 2004) .................................................... 37 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in U.S. 
Copyright Law – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive 
Rights on the Ebb?
, Revue Internationale du 
Droit d’Auteur 37 (2008) ................................... 17, 19 
Jane C. Ginsburg, WNET v. Aereo: The Second 
Circuit Persists in Poor (Cable)Vision, Media 
Instit., Apr. 23, 2013, www.mediainstitute. 
org/IPI/2013/042313.php ........................................... 5 
Paul Goldstein & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Inter-
national Copyright (2013) ............................... passim 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) ............................. passim 
H.R. Rep. No. 100-609 (1988) ..................................... 29 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 (1998) ......................... 12, 13, 20 
57


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright 
Law and Policy (2008) ................................ 11, 18, 22 
Jörg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski, The 
WIPO Treaties 1996 (2002) ................... 13, 15, 17, 18 
Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, Interna-
tional Copyright and Neighbouring Rights – 
The Berne Convention and Beyond
 (2006) ..... passim 
S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975) ............................................. 4 
S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) ......................................... 20 
Staff of House Comm. on The Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision 
Part 6: Supplementary Report of The Register 
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the 
U.S. Copyright Law
 (Comm. Print 1965) ............... 27 
Statement of Administrative Action, U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, http://waysand 
means.house.gov/media/pdf/australia/hr4579saa. 
pdf ............................................................................ 25 
J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law (2008) ............ 17 
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Copyright Policy, 
Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital 
Economy
 (July 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf .......... 19 
WCT Notification No. 10, Ratification by the 
United States of America, http://www.wipo.int/ 
edocs/notdocs/en/wct/treaty_wct_10.html .............. 20 
58

xi 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 
Page 
WIPO Committee of Experts, Basic Proposal 
for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty 
on Certain Questions Concerning the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works to Be 
Considered by the Diplomatic Conference

WIPO/CRNR/DC/4 (Aug. 30, 1996), www. 
wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_ 
dc_4.pdf .............................................................. 13, 15 
WIPO,  Guide to the Copyright and Related 
Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO and 
Glossary of Copyright and Related Rights 
Terms
 (Nov. 2003), http://www.wipo.int/export/ 
sites/www/freepublications/en/copyright/891/
wipo_pub_891.pdf ........................... 11, 13, 14, 16, 18 
59


INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
This brief is filed by a number of international 
and foreign associations with economic or profes-
sional stakes in the proper interpretation of copyright 
law, including international copyright treaties, and 
by a number of scholars engaged in researching, 
writing and teaching about international copyright 
law issues. More detailed descriptions of each of the 
amici may be found in the Appendix. 
 
Amici wish to bring to the attention of the Court 
a number of international treaties and other agree-
ments into which the United States has entered. 
These commitments impose obligations on the United 
States that must be taken into account when inter-
preting domestic copyright law. International rights 
holders – including the associations joining this brief 
– rely upon the rights guaranteed by the interna-
tional agreements, which provide a legal framework 
that promotes the creation and dissemination of 
copyright works worldwide. Amici include associa-
tions based in Canada and Mexico, parties to the 
 
 
1  No counsel for a party (and no party) authored this brief 
in whole or in part or made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other 
than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation or submission of this brief. Amici von Lewinski (a 
legal scholar based outside the United States) and the British 
Copyright Council rely on counsel and other amici in relation to 
the U.S. law discussed in Part I, but directly endorse the 
submissions set out in Parts II to IV. The parties have consented 
to the filing of this brief. 
60


North American Free Trade Agreement discussed 
herein, and Australia, a party to the U.S.-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement discussed herein, as well as 
associations representing authors, performers and 
rightholders internationally and scholars from vari-
ous countries. 
-----------------  ----------------- 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Copyright law is an increasingly harmonized 
international system supported by bilateral, regional 
and multilateral treaties. These treaties help creators 
and businesses in the United States disseminate 
copyright works worldwide. They also reflect an 
agreement among the treaty parties on the minimum 
standards for copyright protection of works. 
One of the most important underpinnings of this 
international system is technological neutrality. 
Starting in the 1990s, the United States negotiated 
important bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties 
and trade agreements in the knowledge that new 
communications technologies were transforming the 
ways in which copyright works were consumed. With 
an eye to the unpredictability of these technologies, 
these treaties were drafted to apply reliably and 
comprehensively to the provision of access to content, 
regardless of the specific mechanism used to deliver 
it. These treaties were entered into by the Executive 
Branch, ratified by the Senate and implemented by 
domestic legislation. The trade agreements were 
61


entered into by the Executive Branch, approved in 
public laws enacted by both Houses of Congress, and 
signed by the President. In each case, Congress 
confirmed its satisfaction that the scope of the domes-
tic copyright law fulfilled international standards. 
 
Numerous international agreements provide a 
right of communication to the public, which applies 
even when the technology used to effect the transmis-
sions enables members of the public to access works 
or performances of works “from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.” WIPO Copyright 
Treaty art. 8,  Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 105-17 
(1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (“WCT”); WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty arts. 10, 14, Dec. 20, 1996, S. 
Treaty Doc. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76 (“WPPT”); 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Australia, art. 17.5, May 
18, 2004, K.A.V. 7141. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement requires the United States to 
ensure that the term “public” includes “any aggrega-
tion of individuals intended to be the object of, and 
capable of perceiving, communications or perform-
ances of works” even if those individuals engage with 
the works “at the same or different times or in the 
same or different places.” North American Free Trade 
Agreement, art. 1721(2), Dec. 17, 1992, H.R. Doc. No. 
103-159, vol. 1 (“NAFTA”) (definition of “public”). 
These agreements render the particular method of 
transmission irrelevant.  
 
Even before the treaties were executed, this core 
concept of technological neutrality was long embed-
ded in U.S. copyright law. Passed in 1976 to reverse 
62


technology-specific outcomes reached by this Court in 
a trio of cases under the prior copyright statute, the 
definitions section of the Copyright Act confirms that 
to perform or display a work “publicly” means, inter 
alia

to transmit or otherwise communicate a per-
formance or display of the work * * * to the 
public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display re-
ceive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different 
times.  
17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) (defining “To perform or display 
a work ‘publicly’ ”). 
 
The definition of “transmit” – to communicate a 
performance or display – in what has become known 
as the “Transmit Clause,” was intended to be “broad 
enough to include all conceivable forms and combina-
tions of wired or wireless communications media.” 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976). “Each and every 
method by which the images or sounds comprising a 
performance or display are picked up and conveyed is 
a ‘transmission,’ and if the transmission reaches the 
public in any form, the case comes within the scope of 
clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.” S. Rep. No. 94-473, 
at 61 (1975). 
 
As has been observed by respected commentators, 
the decision of the Second Circuit neglected to consider 
important elements of this statutory definition. By 
63


following its prior, incorrect test of examining “who 
precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular trans-
mission of a performance,” the Second Circuit read 
out the “at different times” criterion from the Act. It 
also ignored the “by means of any device or process” 
language that is at the heart of the technologically 
neutral definition of the Transmit Clause.2 In doing 
so, the Second Circuit failed to construe the public 
performance right consistently with the treaty obliga-
tions of the United States. These obligations require 
protection for the transmissions of performances to 
the public even when they are delivered by numerous 
separate transmissions.  
 
The highest courts of America’s major trading 
partners have construed these treaties in analogous 
cases. They have recognized that these treaties 
anticipated and dealt with services that claim as 
“private” a series of performances delivered to the 
public at large. Such decisions have closed the door 
to all “Rube Goldberg-like contrivances” (Pet. App. 
40a, dissent of Judge Chin) that seek to bypass the 
communication to the public right by using point-to-
point technologies.  
2 Jane C. Ginsburg, WNET v. Aereo: The Second Circuit 
Persists in Poor (Cable)Vision, Media Inst., Apr. 23, 2013, 
www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2013/042313.php.  
64


 
The Petitioners have extensively described how 
the Second Circuit’s decisions in Cablevision3 and 
Aereo have misconstrued the Copyright Act. This brief 
does not repeat their arguments. The purpose of this 
brief is to describe how the technology-specific out-
come in Cablevision and Aereo  is fundamentally at 
odds with the international treaty commitments en-
tered into by the United States and with its domestic 
legislative history, each of which demonstrates the 
understanding that existing public performance 
rights comply with those obligations. 
-----------------  ----------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE 
CHARMING BETSY DOCTRINE RE-
QUIRES CAUTION IN DEVIATING FROM 
TREATY COMMITMENTS  

 
More than two hundred years ago, Chief Justice 
Marshall articulated what has become a fundamental 
canon of U.S. statutory construction: “an Act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains.” 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). This principle extends to 
avoidance of conflict with the treaty commitments of 
the United States. “If the United States is to be able 
 
 
3  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. den. sub nom., Cable News Network 
v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (“Cablevision”). 
65


to gain the benefits of international accords and have 
a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, 
its courts should be most cautious before interpreting 
its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate 
international agreements.” Vimar Seguros y Reasegu-
ros, SA v. M
/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995); 
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 
138, 147 (1957) (cautioning against courts “run[ning] 
interference in such a delicate field of international 
relations * * * [without] the affirmative intention of 
Congress clearly expressed.”). The same canon ap-
plies to trade agreements. Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. 
United States,
 304 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 Such  an approach is especially appropriate in 
interpreting domestic copyright law, which has gone 
through a process of increasing harmonization with 
international treaty standards over the years. As this 
Court recently recognized in rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to legislation that removed foreign copy-
rights from the public domain, Congress has “adopted 
measures to ease the transition from a national 
scheme to an international copyright regime” and 
“ensured that most works, whether foreign or domes-
tic, would be governed by the same legal regime,” as 
part of a “trend toward a harmonized copyright 
regime.” In doing so, “Congress determined that U.S. 
interests were best served by our full participation in 
the dominant system of international copyright 
protection. Those interests include ensuring exem-
plary compliance with our international obligations, 
securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad, 
66


and remedying unequal treatment of foreign au-
thors.”  Golan v. Holder, 585 U.S. ___, ___, ___, 132 
S. Ct. 873, 891, 893, 894 (2012). See also  Eldred v. 
Ashcroft,  
537 U.S. 186, 205-206 (2003); Subafilms, 
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co.,
 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 
(9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (cautioning that an impolitic 
approach might “undermine Congress’s objective of 
achieving effective and harmonious copyright laws 
among all nations”).  
 
The clear import of treaty language controls this 
Court’s assessment. Maximov v. United States, 373 
U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (holding that it is “particularly 
inappropriate for a court to sanction a deviation from 
the clear import of a solemn treaty * * * when, as 
here, there is no indication that application of the 
words of the treaty according to their obvious mean-
ing effects a result inconsistent with the intent or 
expectations of its signatories”). It is also settled that 
the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty “is 
entitled to great weight.” Sumitomo Shoji America, 
Inc. v. Avagliano,
 457 U.S. 176, 184-185 (1982).  
 
Last, a treaty’s drafting and negotiating history 
and the post-ratification understanding of the con-
tracting parties may serve as aids to its interpreta-
tion.  Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 
217, 226 (1996). 
 
As described below, the Second Circuit’s interpre-
tation of the Transmit Clause cannot be squared with 
the 210-year old Charming Betsy doctrine. While 
amici believe that the language of the Transmit 
67


Clause unambiguously leads to the conclusion that 
Aereo’s transmissions are public performances, the 
treaty obligations entered into by the United States 
on multiple occasions would require the same conclu-
sion even if the statutory text was ambiguous. 
 
II.  THE DECISION BELOW PLACES THE 
UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF ITS 
MULTILATERAL TREATY COMMITMENTS 

 
This Court has acknowledged that copyright 
involves an international system in which the United 
States is now a full partner. Since the 1970s, a delib-
erate Congressional and Executive Branch policy has 
allowed the United States to “ ‘play a leadership role’ 
in the give-and-take evolution of the international 
copyright system.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195, 205-206 
n. 13; Golan, 585 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 879-883. 
 
The first international treaty commitment of the 
United States bearing examination arises under Arts. 
11, 11bis,  11ter, 14,  and 14bis of the Berne Conven-
tion.4 Each of these articles contains language de-
signed to capture innovations in technology. Article 11 
grants authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and 
musical works the exclusive right of authorizing “(i) 
the public performance of their works, including such 
public performances by any means or process; [and] 
 
 
4 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (Paris Text 1971, as amended Sept. 
28, 1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
68

10 
(ii) any communication to the public of the perform-
ance of their works.” (Emphasis added.) The second 
part of the right is understood to encompass “any 
technology by which a performance can be transmit-
ted other than broadcasting.”5  
 Art. 
11bis(1) of Berne grants authors an exclusive 
right of authorizing: 
 
(i)  the broadcasting of their works or 
the communication thereof to the public by 
any other means
 of wireless diffusion of 
signs, sounds or images; 
 
(ii)  any communication to the public by 
wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of 
the work, when this communication is made 
by an organization other than the original 
one;. . . . 6 
 Art. 
11bis(1)(ii) encompasses both cable retrans-
mission (communication to the public by wire) and 
rebroadcasting (communication to the public by 
wireless means “over the air” of broadcast works in 
all cases where such secondary communication 
(transmission) is made “by an organization other 
than the original one.”) As a result, a third party’s 
 
 
5 Paul Goldstein & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, International 
Copyright 327 (2013); see also Berne Art. 11ter (covering recita-
tions of literary works through communications technologies). 
 
6  Emphasis added. Art. 11ter(1) contains, mutatis mutandis
the same provisions on public recitation of literary works and 
the communication to the public of such recitations as Art. 11(1).  
69

11 
retransmissions of broadcasts come within the scope 
of the Berne rights.7 
 
Separately, Art. 14(1)(ii) gives authors a right to 
authorize “the public performance and communica-
tion to the public by wire” of cinematographic adapta-
tions and reproductions of their works. Under Art. 
14bis(1) of Berne, the owner of copyright in a cine-
matographic work such as a television program or 
movie must also be given the same rights as the 
author of an original work.8  
 
The committee convened by the State Depart-
ment in 1988 to study Berne implementation raised 
no questions as to the compliance of the existing U.S. 
law with these requirements.9  
 
 
7  Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copy-
right and Neighbouring Rights – The Berne Convention and 
Beyond
 12.37-12.51 (2006); Silke von Lewinski, International 
Copyright Law and Policy 
5.144 (2008). 
 
8 WIPO, Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties 
Administered by WIPO and Glossary of Copyright and Related 
Rights Terms
 89 (Nov. 2003) (“WIPO Guide”); Ricketson & 
Ginsburg, supra note 7 at 12.32, 12.40. 
 
9  The Committee reported that the only conflicts involving 
Art. 11bis were (i) an exemption for instructional television 
transmissions granted under 17 U.S.C. §110(2) and (ii) a public 
broadcast compulsory license imposed under 17 U.S.C. §118. See 
William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 373, 395-396 (1995); Final Report of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention

10 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 513, 519-520, 526-527 (1986).  
70

12 
 
In passing the Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 
Congress declared, “The amendments made by this 
Act, together with the law as it exists on the date of 
the enactment of this Act, satisfy the obligations of 
the United States in adhering to the Berne Conven-
tion.”  Id. §2(3) (quoted in Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879). 
Given this unambiguous statement, it must be taken 
that the Executive Branch and Congress were satis-
fied that sections 101 and 106 fulfilled the Berne 
broadcasting, retransmission, and communication 
rights. 
 
The United States became a party to Berne in 
1989. By ratifying the TRIPs Agreement in 1994, the 
United States imported this Berne obligation into the 
WTO dispute settlement regime, giving “teeth” to 
Berne’s requirements.10 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881. 
 
The United States’ alignment with the interna-
tional community was taken a step further when it 
acceded to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”). A 
key purpose of the WCT was to ensure adequate 
worldwide protection of copyrighted works “at a time 
when borderless digital means of dissemination 
[were] becoming increasingly popular.” H.R. Rep. No. 
105-551, at 9 (1998). The WCT also strengthened 
legal frameworks enabling rights holders to fight 
10 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, art. 9(1) Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 81 (requiring compliance with Arts. 1 through 21 of Berne). 
71

13 
“pirates who aim to destroy the value of American 
intellectual property.” Id. at 10. 
 
In Article 8, the WCT provided for a “technologi-
cally neutral and all-encompassing” communication 
to the public right that united the scattered Berne 
rights and applied regardless of the means by which 
the communication is made or the nature of the 
protected work.11 It was agreed that the right had to 
be “technologically neutral” in order to support evolv-
ing delivery models enabled by advances in technol-
ogy in order to avoid being rendered obsolete by any 
particular change in communications technology.12 
It also had to apply consistently to different kinds 
of works which Berne treated under separate head-
ings.13 
 
A “main achievement” of the WCT was its inclu-
sion within the authors’ communication to the public 
right of a right of “making available to the public of 
11 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7 at 12.54, 12.17, 
12.43, 12.46-12.51; Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra  note  5,  at 
335. 
12 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7 at 12.59; Jörg 
Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996 109 
(2002); WIPO Guide, at 208; WIPO Committee of Experts, Basic 
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain 
Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, 
WIPO/ 
CRNR/DC/4 at 10.10-10.11, 10.14 (Aug. 30, 1996) (“Basic 
Proposal”). 
13 Basic Proposal at 10.05, 10.09; Ricketson & Ginsburg, 
supra note 7, at 12.43, 12.56. 
72

14 
their works in such a way that members of the public 
may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.”14 This “making avail-
able” right was crafted to be broad enough to enable 
rightholders to control all means of making works 
available over the Internet and other digital tech-
nologies, including by making available access to 
streams, downloads, and other hybrid or future forms 
of consumption by members of the public from differ-
ent places and at different times.15 It was intended to 
cover any process of providing public access to works, 
14  Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 5 at 335 (celebrating 
the second portion of Article 8 as “one of the treaty’s ‘main 
achievements,’ that for many countries has charted new territo-
ry by securing the right to control individualized, interactive 
uses of copyrighted works”); Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7 
at 12.54, 12.43, 12.46-12.51. Analogous rights were granted for 
fixed performances and sound recordings in Arts. 10 and 14 of 
the WPPT and in Art. 10 of the WIPO Audiovisual Performances 
Treaty (Jun. 24, 2012), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text. 
jsp?file_id=295837, which the United States has signed but not 
yet ratified. Art. 6 of the WCT relates to the making available of 
tangible  copies  of  an  author’s  work;  it  is  not  relevant  to  the 
online setting. Art. 15 of the WPPT gives performers and 
producers of phonograms a right to equitable remuneration for 
the broadcasting or communication to the public of phonograms. 
15  WIPO Guide, at 208-209; Basic Proposal at 10.05, 10.10-
10.11; Mihály Ficsor, Copyright in the Digital Environment
WIPO/CR/KRT/05/7 ¶59 (Feb. 2005); Mihály Ficsor, The Law of 
Copyright and the Internet
 496-499 (2002); Goldstein & 
Hugenholtz, supra note 5, at 335-336. 
73

15 
including through numerous discrete transmissions 
to individual members of the public.16  
 
This purpose was fulfilled by Article 8 of the 
WCT,17 which provided: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Arti-
cles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 
14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Conven-
tion, authors of literary and artistic works 
shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing 
any communication to the public of their 
works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the 
public may access these works from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them. 
 
 
16  Basic Proposal at 10.10-10.11; Reinbothe & von Lewinski, 
supra note 12, at 108-110; Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7, 
at 12.58; Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 5, at 335. 
 
17 The WPPT, which enumerates rights of producers and 
performers of phonograms (the term used to describe what are 
called phonorecords under U.S. law), also provides for a right of 
making available, using similar language to the “making 
available” language in Art. 8 of the WCT, but provides for a 
separate right of equitable remuneration for communication to 
the public. WPPT, Arts. 10, 14, and 15. To the extent that the 
words “perform . . . publicly” in 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (establishing 
the right to perform sound recordings publicly “by means of a 
digital audio transmission”) have the same meaning as the 
identical words in 17 U.S.C. §106(4) (establishing the right to 
perform certain other kinds of words publicly), the WPPT plays 
the same role in interpreting the section 106(6) right that the 
WCT and Berne play in interpreting the section 106(4) right. 
74

16 
 
Article 8 removed any doubt remaining under 
Berne as to coverage for on-demand transmissions of 
performances: it required all member states to extend 
the communication to the public right to all such 
transmissions, even if the recipients were separated 
both in space and in time. Article 8 also put to rest 
any doubts as to whether member states must cover 
on-demand digital technologies. It required member 
states to provide coverage regardless of whether 
members of the public are separated in space or in 
time.18 It also covered interactive transmissions that 
are initiated by users of a service.19 
 
A leading international copyright scholar suc-
cinctly describes the broad, technologically neutral 
nature of the right: 
The making available right targets on-
demand transmissions (whether by wire or 
wireless means), for it makes clear that the 
members of the public may be separated both 
in space and in time. The technological 
means of ‘making available’ are irrelevant; 
the right is expressed in technologically neu-
tral terms. The right covers offering the work 
to members of the public on an individual-
ized basis; “the public” includes subsets of 
the general public, such as aficionados of 
tango music, or members of a particular 
performer’s fan club. As is clear from the 
18 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 12.54-12.61. 
19
WIPO Guide at 207-208. 
75

17 
formulation “such a way that members of the 
public  may access” (emphasis supplied), the 
right is triggered when the public is invited 
to access, rather than when any member of 
the public in fact has accessed. Equally im-
portantly, the right applies to the “work”; it 
is not limited to “performances” of the work. 
Thus it covers making the work available 
both as download and as a stream.20  
 
Professors Reinbothe and von Lewinski confirm 
that “the wording and also purpose of Article 8 WCT 
* * * aims at covering all situations involving an 
individual time and place of access.” (Emphasis 
added.) They conclude that it makes “no difference” 
whether one uses “push-technology” or “pull-
technology,” each of which is fully covered under the 
broad meaning of communication to the public.21  
 
Together, the Berne Convention and WCT cover 
all aspects of the Aereo service. The “Watch” function 
in which performances are streamed to members of 
the public over the Internet is a communication to the 
public which is required to be protected under Berne 
and through the opening clause of WCT Art. 8. The 
 
 
20  Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in U.S. Copyright 
Law – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, Revue 
Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 37 (2008); see also Ricketson & 
Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 12.50; Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra 
note 5, at 335. 
 
21  Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 12, at 110. See also 
Ficsor,  The Law of Copyright and the Internet at 405; J.A.L. 
Sterling, World Copyright Law 9.33 (2008).  
76

18 
“making available” wording in the latter part of WCT 
Art. 8 removes any doubt that the “Record” function 
is covered, as it permits members of the public to 
access works from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them, at the convenience of the person 
receiving the transmission.22 
 
Member states may comply with the obligation to 
provide a making available right through a variety of 
means. They may do so either by including it as part 
of their communication rights, by having a separate 
free standing right of making available, or, for those 
countries like the United States which have applied 
the distribution right to transmissions of digital 
copies, through a combination of a right of public 
performance and a right to digitally distribute copies. 
This “umbrella solution” was adopted at the urging of 
the United States during the drafting period.23  
 
The United States took the path of implementing 
the communication to the public right, including the 
making available right, by using its existing public 
performance and distribution rights, depending on 
 
 
22 Pet. App. 7a (describing Aereo’s functions); Ricketson & 
Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 12.40 (confirming Berne 11bis, 14 and 
14bis application to retransmissions), 12.51-12.52 and 12.56-
12.61 (confirming WCT application to on-demand digital trans-
missions of broadcasts); von Lewinski, supra note 7, at 5.138, 
17.72-17.78; Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 5, at 335-336. 
 
23 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 12.59; Ficsor, The 
Law of Copyright and the Internet at 4.130, 4.135, 4.140; 
Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 12, at 108; WIPO Guide 
at 209. 
77

19 
the circumstances surrounding a particular commu-
nication. It thereby avoided having to amend the 
Copyright Act  to establish a new right of making 
available for works.24 
 
There is compelling evidence that both Congress 
and the Executive Branch were satisfied that Article 
8 was fully consistent with U.S. law. While the WCT 
and WPPT were ratified by the required two-thirds 
majority of the Senate, the President could not de-
posit instruments of ratification with WIPO until the 
U.S. enacted domestic legislation implementing the 
treaties. See S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at III (1997).  
 
Accordingly, it was necessary for both the House 
and the Senate to hold extensive hearings, draft 
legislation, and commission committee reports.  
 
While the Senate Report confirmed that “[w]ith 
this constant evolution in technology, the law must 
adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to 
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials,” it did 
not recommend any changes to exclusive rights in 
 
 
24 Ginsburg, Recent Developments, supra note 21, at 37; U.S. 
Dep’t. of Commerce, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation 
in the Digital Economy 
14-16 (July 2013); Ficsor, The Law of 
Copyright and the Internet 
at 496-504; David O. Carson, Making 
the Making Available Right Available: 22nd Annual Horace S. 
Manges Lecture, February 3, 2009,
 33 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 
135, 143-148, 150-151 (2010); Jane C. Ginsburg, Aereo in 
International Perspective: Individualized Access and U.S. Treaty 
Obligations
, Media Inst., Feb. 18, 2014 (“U.S. Treaty Obliga-
tions
”). 
78

20 
order to implement the WCT’s “broad right of com-
munication to the public that includes the Internet.” 
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2, 10 (1998). Rather, as the 
House Report confirmed, “The treaties do not require 
any change in the substance of copyright rights or 
exceptions in U.S. law.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 9. 
Based on these conclusions, Congress enacted the 
WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms 
Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 as part of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 105 Pub. 
L. 304, §§101-105, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). President 
Clinton then deposited with WIPO ratifications of the 
WCT and WPPT on September 14, 1999.25 
 
As with Berne, TRIPs, and the bilateral and 
regional treaties discussed directly below, the United 
States’ accession to the WCT and WPPT required a 
Presidential determination, ratified by the Senate, 
that United States law fulfilled all treaty obligations. 
None of the domestic enactments altered the public 
performance right or the distribution right – nor did 
the United States add an explicit right of communica-
tion to the public or making available right – reflect-
ing the determination of Congress and the Executive 
Branch that no legislative amendments were neces-
sary to implement that obligation. See generally 
25 Ratification by the United States of America, WCT 
Notification No. 10, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/wct/ 
treaty_wct_10.html 
79

21 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860 (1998); Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-
568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).  
 
Under the principle stated by this Court in Vimar 
Seguros, 515 U.S. at 539, these determinations 
should be assigned great weight because they link to 
binding commitments with numerous international 
partners. They are not merely domestic in nature, but 
also have significant international repercussions. 
 
III. THE DECISION BELOW PLACES THE 
UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF ITS BI-
LATERAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 

 
The United States is also bound internationally 
by a series of bilateral and regional treaty commit-
ments similar in scope to its WCT commitment. 
 
The first of these is the North American Free 
Trade Agreement  (NAFTA), concluded with Canada 
and Mexico in 1992, signed into law on December 
8, 1993, and effective January 1, 1994. See 19 U.S.C. 
§3311(a), approving NAFTA and the statement of 
administrative action submitted to the Congress on 
November 4, 1993. 
 
NAFTA’s intellectual property chapter extends 
Arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14 and 14bis of Berne by requiring 
all parties to protect any communication of works to 
the public. The NAFTA protection applies to: 
80

22 
any aggregation of individuals intended to be 
the object of, and capable of perceiving, 
communications or performances of works, 
regardless of whether they can do so at the 
same or different times or in the same or 
different places, provided that such an ag-
gregation is larger than a family and its im-
mediate circle of acquaintances or is not a 
group comprising a limited number of indi-
viduals having similarly close ties that has 
not been formed for the principal purpose of 
receiving such performances and communi-
cations of work.  
NAFTA art. 1721(2) (defining “public”); see also art. 
1705(2)(c) (requiring that authors be provided the 
right to authorize or prohibit the communication of a 
work to the public). 
 
By focusing on communication of a work to an 
“aggregation of individuals intended to be the object of 


* communications or performances of works” 
regardless of whether those individuals are separated 
in time or space, NAFTA makes it clear that what 
counts is the communication to such individuals, and 
not the technological methods used to do so. (Empha-
sis added.) Further, it clarified that the relevant 
“public” need not be vast in size.26 It applies as an 
26  See Ysolde Gendreau, Intention and Copyright Law in 
Internet and Copyright Law 1, 18 (1999) (explaining that 
NAFTA looks to the communicator’s intention to reach out to 
“small groups of listeners or watchers in more or less private 
surroundings,” which together “form a public.”); von Lewinski, 
(Continued on following page) 
81

23 
independent international commitment of the United 
States, which should not be departed from under the 
Charming Betsy canon.  
 
After NAFTA, and following its accession to the 
WCT and WPPT on September 14, 1999, the United 
States engaged in a series of bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), each requiring the parties to 
provide a communication to the public right, includ-
ing a making available right. For example, the 2005 
U.S.-Australia FTA requires the parties to provide an: 
exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the 
communication to the public of their works, 
by wire or wireless means, including the 
making available to the public of their works 
in such a way that members of the public 
may access these works from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them.27  
 
supra note 7 at 11.11 (confirming that NAFTA was the first 
multilateral treaty specifically capturing on-demand uses and 
similar interactive communications within the communication 
right); 5.147 (explaining why “public” should not be undermined 
by a narrow interpretation). 
 
27 Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl. Art 17.5, May 18, 2004, 
K.A.V. 7141. Similar FTAs requiring provision of the making 
available right have also been concluded with Bahrain, Sept. 14, 
2004, K.A.V. 6866; Chile, Jun. 6, 2003, K.A.V. 6375; Jordan, Oct. 
24, 2000, K.A.V. 5970; Morocco, Jun. 15, 2004, K.A.V. 7206; 
Oman, Jan. 19, 2006, K.A.V. 8673; Panama, Jun. 28, 2007, 
K.A.V. 9546; Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, K.A.V. 8674; Singapore, May 6, 
2003, K.A.V. 6376 and South Korea, Feb. 10, 2011, http:// 
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/ 
final-text. In 2004, the U.S. also negotiated a making available 
(Continued on following page) 
82

24 
 
The U.S.-Australia FTA also provided that “nei-
ther Party may permit the retransmission of televi-
sion signals (whether terrestrial, cable, or satellite) 
on the Internet without the authorisation of the right 
holder or right holders, if any, of the content of the 
signal and of the signal.”28 There is no question that 
retransmission technologies such as Aereo are en-
compassed within this treaty obligation.  
 
Each of these FTAs required review by the Ex-
ecutive Branch and Congress of whether sections 101 
and 106 of the Copyright Act provided the agreed-
upon making available right. Before FTAs enter into 
force, the President must present to Congress (1) the 
final legal text of the FTA, (2) a statement of any 
administrative action proposed to implement the 
FTA, (3) proposed implementing legislation that 
conforms U.S. law to the agreement, and (4) an 
explanation as to how the implementing bill and 
proposed administrative action will change or affect 
existing law. 19 U.S.C. §§3805(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(A). 
right in Art. 15.6 of the Dominican Republic-Central America-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), K.A.V. 7157, entered 
into with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. 
28 U.S.-Australia FTA at Art. 17.4.10(b). Similar prohibi-
tions exist in the Bahrain FTA at 14.4.10(b); South Korea FTA at 
18.4.10(b); Morocco FTA at 15.5.10(b); Oman FTA at 15.4.10(b); 
Panama FTA at 15.5.10(b); Peru FTA at 16.7.9; Singapore FTA 
at 16.4(2)(b); CAFTA-DR at 15.5.10(b). 
83

25 
 
In respect of the U.S.-Australia FTA, the Presi-
dent confirmed that “No statutory or administrative 
changes will be required” to implement the Intellec-
tual Property Rights chapter dealing with, inter alia, 
the making available right and the prohibition 
against the unauthorized retransmission of television 
signals on the Internet.29 Congress then passed, and 
the President signed, the U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act, in which Congress 
approved the President’s statement of administrative 
action containing the assurances with respect to 
making available. Pub. L. 108-286 at §101(a)(2), 118 
Stat. 919 (2004). Like approvals have been provided 
in respect of the other bilateral FTAs requiring that a 
making available right be embodied in domestic law.30 
29  Statement of Administrative Action, U.S.-Austl. Free Trade 
Agreement, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/australia/ 
hr4579saa.pdf at 25-26. 
30  See §101(a)(2) of: U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. 109-169, 119 Stat. 3581 (2006); 
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
108-177, 117 Stat. 909 (2003); U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Area 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. 107-143, 115 Stat. 243 (2001); U.S.-
Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 112-
141, 125 Stat. 428 (2011); U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. 108-302, 118 Stat. 1103 (2004); 
U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
109-283, 120 Stat. 1191 (2006); U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion 
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 112-143, 125 Stat. 497 
(2001); U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation 
Act, Pub. L. 110-138, 121 Stat. 1455 (2007); U.S.-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 108-178, 117 
Stat. 948 (2003); Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free 
(Continued on following page) 
84

26 
Consequently, Congress has now enacted and the 
President has signed numerous laws recording Presi-
dential confirmations that then-existing U.S. law 
provided a required making-available right. These 
confirmations should also be given deference. 
IV.
THE UNITED STATES ADOPTED A TECH-
NOLOGY-NEUTRAL PATH PRIOR
 TO EN-
TERING INTO THE INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS

Long before U.S. accession to the aforementioned 
international obligations, Congress faced the problem 
raised by Aereo and defined the exclusive copyright 
rights in technology-neutral terms so that they would 
continue to apply in the face of dramatic technological 
developments. The technologically neutral norms 
reflected in the agreements were adopted in United 
States copyright reforms before the United States 
made those commitments.31 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 109-153, 119 
Stat. 462 (2005). 
31  This reform effort dates at least to 1965, when a Report of 
the Register of Copyrights noted:  
Obviously no one can foresee accurately and in detail 
the evolving patterns in the ways author’s works will 
reach the public 10, 20, or 50 years from now. Lacking 
that kind of foresight, the bill should, we believe, 
adopt a general approach aimed at providing compen-
sation to the author for future as well as present uses 
of his work that materially affect the value of his 
copyright. * * * A real danger to be guarded against is 
(Continued on following page) 
85

27 
 
As this Court has recognized, the Copyright Act 
of 1976 was “the culmination of a major legislative 
reexamination of copyright doctrine.” Harper & Row 
Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Ent., 
471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).  
 
One important trigger for this legislative re-
examination involved Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists Tel., Inc., 
392 U.S. 390 (1968) and Telepromp-
ter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
 415 U.S. 394 
(1974), where this Court found that cable-television 
systems retransmitting distant broadcast television 
programs were not engaging in performances. See 
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
 422 U.S. 
151 (1975). Congress viewed these decisions as a 
“narrow construction of the word ‘perform’ in the 1909 
statute,” which was “completely overturned by the 
present bill and its broad definition of ‘perform’ in 
section 101.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 86-87. 
 
While spurred chiefly by the Fortnightly, Tele-
prompter  and  Aiken trilogy, Congress was mindful of 
earlier cases in which unanticipated technological 
advances had led to gaps in protection. 
that of confining the scope of an author’s rights on the 
basis of the present technology so that, as the years go 
by, his copyright loses much of its value because of un-
foreseen technical advances.  
Staff of House Comm. on The Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Copyright Law Revision PART 6: Supplementary Report of The 
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. 
Copyright Law
, 13-14 (Comm. Print 1965). 
86

28 
 
In confirming that “Copyright protection subsists 
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed” under §102(a), the House Report 
explained that: 
This broad language is intended to avoid the 
artificial and largely unjustifiable distinc-
tions, derived from cases such as White-
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,
 209 U.S. 
1 (1908), under which statutory copy-
rightability in certain cases has been made 
to depend upon the form or medium in which 
the work is fixed. 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52. 
 
The expansive §101 definition of “perform” under 
the 1976 Act reflected the Berne Art. 11 provisions 
protecting performances “by any means or process,” 
the Berne Art. 11bis, Art. 14 and Art. 14bis rights 
of communication to the public, and anticipated 
the WCT Art. 8 commitment to give rightholders 
the exclusive right of communication to the public 
including making available to the public of works “in 
such a way that members of the public may access 
these works from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.” It did so by confirming that per-
formances of works may be rendered “either directly 
or by means of any device or process,
 whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the per-
formance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different 
times.
  (Emphasis added.) Likewise, the definition of 
the verb “transmit” confirmed that a performance or 
87

29 
display can be communicated “by any device or proc-
ess
 whereby images or sounds are received beyond the 
place from which they are sent.”32 (Emphasis added.) 
The legislative history further confirms that, as of 
1976, technological neutrality was desired, with the 
House Report confirming that the term “any device or 
process” was meant to capture “any sort of transmit-
ting apparatus,” including “techniques and systems 
not yet in use or even invented.”33 
 
The Second Circuit misinterpreted the Transmit 
Clause including by failing to construe it in accordance 
with the United States’ treaty obligations. According 
to a leading scholar: 
Thus, “to transmit or otherwise communicate 
a performance or display of the work . . . to 
the public, by means of any device or proc-
ess” means to communicate the work in a 
way that members of the public can immedi-
ately listen to or view its performance, 
whether or not they are separated in space 
 
 
32  This Court has previously observed that even before the 
United States acceded to Berne in 1989, the 1976 Copyright Act 
brought United States law into compliance with Berne stan-
dards in some respects. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195 (1976 Act 
aligned United States law with Berne with respect to term of 
copyright protection), 206 n.13 (isolationist approach rejected); 
see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 21 (1988), confirming that “It 
can safely be stated that Congress drafted and passed the 1976 
Act with a ‘weather eye’ on Berne. * * * [M]any obstacles to 
adherence were removed by the 1976 revision and a willingness 
to modify further our laws in order to join the Union.” 
 
33  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63-64. 
88

30 
or time. The Second Circuit deviated from 
the international norm by incorrectly read-
ing “whether the members of the public ca-
pable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place, or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different 
times” as a limitation on the scope of the 
communication, rather than as confirmation 
of the coverage of individualized transmis-
sions. The court compounded the error by 
rewriting “it” to mean a particular transmis-
sion from a particular copy of a performance, 
rather than adhering to the grammatical ref-
erent, the statutory phrase performance of 
the work – that is, a communication that 
permits the members of the public to view or 
listen to the work as it is being communi-
cated to them. Only the latter reading of “it” 
corresponds to the scope of the right in both 
the U.S. statute and the WCT.34 
 
In reviewing this case, this Court should thus 
appreciate that the concept of technological neutrality 
is a principle that was not only embraced by the 
United States through treaties, but was also long ago 
embedded within U.S. law as the result of a deliber-
ate Congressional determination. 
 
 
 
34 Ginsburg, U.S. Treaty Obligationssee also Mihály Ficsor, 
The WIPO ‘Internet Treaties’ and Copyright in the “Cloud” 17-18 
ALAI Congress, Kyoto (Oct. 16-18, 2012), http://bit.ly/1fnP0WX 
89

31 
V. 
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW CONFIRMS 
THE BREADTH OF THE TRANSMIT 
CLAUSE 

 
In interpreting treaty text or to support its 
reading, the Court may also turn to authorities from 
foreign jurisdictions that have confronted the ques-
tion before the Court. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. ___, 
130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993-1994, 2007 (2010). Such deci-
sions have been rendered in the European Union and 
Canada, each with direct reference to the multilateral 
treaties that also bind the United States. 
 In 
the TVCatchup case, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) considered a service that 
permitted its users to receive, via the Internet, ‘live’ 
streams of free-to-air television broadcasts. As in this 
case, viewers could obtain access only to content 
which they were already legally entitled to watch. As 
well, the defendant’s server allowed only a “one-to-
one” connection for each subscriber whereby each 
individual subscriber established his or her own 
internet connection to the server and every data 
packet sent by the server onto the internet was 
addressed to only one individual subscriber.  Case  
C-607-11,  ITV Broadcasting Ltd. v. TVCatchup Ltd., 
2013 ECR I-___, [2013] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (CJEU),  ¶9-10, 
18(2)(a). 
90

32 
 
The CJEU was called upon to interpret Art. 3(1) 
of the InfoSoc Directive,35 which incorporates Art. 8 of 
the WCT by requiring that: 
Member States shall provide authors with 
the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit 
any communication to the public of their 
works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them. 
 
It also considered Recital 23 to the Directive, 
which explains that the right of communication to the 
public: 
should be understood in a broad sense cover-
ing all communication to the public not pre-
sent at the place where the communication 
originates. This right should cover any such 
transmission or retransmission of a work to 
the public by wire or wireless means, includ-
ing broadcasting.  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The CJEU noted that a terrestrial broadcast was 
being converted into technical means different from 
that of the original communication, an act that would 
 
 
35  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, 2001 O.J. (L.167) 10. 
91

33 
require permission if to a “public.” Id. at ¶26, 39.36 It 
rejected the view that the “one-to-one” nature of the 
transmissions could convert a “public” activity into a 
plurality of individual and private communications.  
 
In construing the term “public,” it held that 
regard must be paid to “the cumulative effect of mak-
ing the works available to potential recipients * * * it 
is in particular relevant to ascertain the number of 
persons who have access to the same work at the 
same time and successively.” id at ¶33. Accordingly: 
it is irrelevant whether the potential recipi-
ents access the communicated works through 
a one-to-one connection. That technique does 
not prevent a large number of persons having 
access to the same work at the same time.  
Id. at ¶34. 
 
In so concluding, the CJEU relied on its earlier 
Rafael Hoteles decision. This decision is notable 
because it concludes, in harmony with Charming 
36 At ¶39, the CJEU found that when a broadcast is re-
transmitted using a “different technical means” – that is, 
different than the means originally used to transmit it, such as 
from terrestrial to Internet – it is not necessary to consider 
whether the retransmission reaches a “new public.” This 
distinguishes TVCatchup from the recent CJEU decision in Case 
C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2014 ECR I- ___ 
(February 13, 2014), a linking case involving the “same technical 
means,” where the CJEU found at ¶24 that providing an 
ordinary hyperlink to a file posted at a website by the copyright 
holder made the file available to the public, but not a “new 
public.” 
92

34 
Betsy,  that “Community legislation must, so far as 
possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with international law, in particular where its provi-
sions are intended specifically to give effect to an 
international agreement.” Case 306/05, Sociedad 
General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v. 
Rafael Hoteles SA,
 [2006] ECR I-11519, [2006] All ER 
(D) 103 (CJEU), ¶35. With that principle in mind, the 
CJEU held that the communication to the public 
right “must be interpreted broadly” in order to protect 
authors and allow them to obtain “an appropriate 
reward for the use of their works.” Id. at ¶36. It 
considered the cumulative economic effects of making 
the works available to potential television viewers, 
and refused to interpret Article 8 of the WCT in a way 
that would render it “meaningless.” Id. at ¶39, 43, 50-
51.  
 
In February, the CJEU again affirmed a broad 
and technologically neutral interpretation of the 
communication to the public right, confirming that 
“the concept of ‘communication’ must be construed as 
referring to any transmission of the protected works, 
irrespective of the technical means or process used.” 
Case C 351/12, OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro 
práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v. Léčebné lázně 
Mariánské Lázně a.s.
, [2014] ECR 1-___ (February 27, 
2014). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada recently 
construed Article 8 of the WCT in the broadest possible 
terms. In Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada
, 
93

35 
2012 SCC 35, the Supreme Court of Canada was 
called upon to decide whether music streamed on 
demand by separate transmissions to individual 
subscribers over the Internet was a communication to 
the public.37  
The appellants in Rogers adopted the Cablevision/ 
Aereo position of contending that “each transmission 
must be analyzed on its own, as a separate transac-
tion, regardless of whether another communication of 
the same work to a different customer may occur at a 
later point in time.” Id. at ¶27.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously 
rejected this stance. It concluded that viewing the 
question from the perspective of the recipient of each 
transmission would “produce arbitrary results,” and 
thus create an incentive to avoid copyright simply by 
executing a task serially rather than through a mass 
transmission. In its view, “If the nature of the activ-
ity in both cases is the same, albeit accomplished 
through different technical means, there is no justi-
fication for distinguishing between the two for 
copyright purposes.” Id. at ¶29; see also ¶40. “Focus-
ing on each individual transmission loses sight of the 
true character of the communication activity in 
question and makes copyright protection dependent 
37  A stream is a transmission of data that allows the user to 
listen to or view the content transmitted at the time of the 
transmission, resulting only in a temporary copy of the file on 
the user’s hard drive. Id. at ¶1. 
94

36 
on technicalities of the alleged infringer’s chosen 
method of operation.” Id. at ¶30.38 
38  Although the Supreme Court of Canada declined to follow 
Cablevision, partly on the basis of differences between the 
Canadian communication right and the U.S. Transmit clause, id. 
at  ¶50-51, the Court clearly rejected the arguments based on 
Cablevision that would prevent individual transmissions of the 
work from being communications that are to “the public.” The 
Rogers decision focuses on “the true character of the communica-
tion activity in question,” and rejected an approach that did not 
provide “principled” copyright protection. Id. at ¶30, 40. It is also 
noteworthy that the Japanese Supreme Court also rejected the 
“one to one” argument in the “Maneki TV” case, NHK (Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation), et al. v. Nagano Shōten Co. Ltd. 
(65-
1 Minshū 121, Case No. 653 (ju) of 2009, January 18, 2011). It 
found that one-to-one transmissions of television programming 
over the Internet to individual customer’s personal viewing 
devices were to the “public” under Article 23 of the Japanese 
Copyright Act which grants the author “the exclusive right to 
effect a public transmission of his work (including, in the case of 
automatic public transmission, making his work transmitta-
ble).” 
In Australia, the Full Court of the Federal Court adopted a 
similar position in National Rugby League Investments Pty. Ltd. 
v. Singtel Optus Pty. Ltd.
 [2012] FCAFC 59, although its ruling
was based on the reproduction right. It ruled that a communica-
tions provider was jointly and severally liable with its subscrib-
ers for infringement of the reproduction right by recording free 
to air television programs which were then used to transmit the 
programming for viewing at the time and place of the subscrib-
er’s choosing on a mobile device or personal computer. See 
Telstra Corporation Limited v. Australasian Performing Right 
Association
 (1997), 146 ALR 649, 656-659, 686-695 (High Court 
of Australia found music on hold was “to the public” even though 
it was transmitted to each caller individually by means of his or 
her mobile telephone and could be received in private or domes-
tic circumstances.). 
95

37 
In so concluding, the Court considered the obliga-
tions flowing between the United States and Canada 
via the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which 
required both parties to implement a technologically 
neutral communication to the public right to deal 
with evolutions in cable technologies. Id. at ¶37. In 
remarkably similar language to the House and Sen-
ate reports in the 1976 U.S. reform, the Court af-
firmed that “the Copyright Act should continue to 
apply in different media, including more technologi-
cally advanced ones. . . . [I]t exists to protect the 
rights of authors and others as technology evolves.” 
Id. at ¶39, citing Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 
SCC 43 at ¶49. 
Although Canada was not a WCT member at the 
time of the Rogers  decision, the Court also assessed 
whether its approach was consistent with its norms. 
It concluded that the WCT “resolves an ambiguity as 
to whether the old communication to the public rights 
[under the Berne Convention] accommodated or 
excluded ‘pull technologies’ ” and made it clear that it 
“targets on-demand transmissions” regardless of 
whether members of the public are “separated both in 
space and in time.” Id. at ¶46, 48.39 Accordingly, the 
39 In so concluding, the Supreme Court of Canada cited 
Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 7 at 12.57, and Jane C. 
Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public, in 
Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Essays in Honour 
of William R. Cornish,
 234, 246 (David Vaver and Lionel Bently, 
eds. 2004). 
96

38 
Supreme Court was satisfied that its interpretation 
was consistent with an agreement which Canada had 
signed but not yet ratified. 
 
The import of the Rogers decision is twofold. The 
first crucial point is that it locates technological 
neutrality in treaty commitments with the United 
States that tracked the 1976 reforms that reversed 
Fortnightly, Teleprompter and Aiken. This is another 
instance in which the doctrine of technological neu-
trality was an innovation exported by the United 
States to its trading partners, and not vice-versa. The 
second crucial point is the clear unwillingness of the 
Canadian Supreme Court to accept a situation “where 
the existence of copyright protection depends merely 
on the business model that the alleged infringer 
chooses to adopt rather than the underlying commu-
nication activity.” Id. at ¶40. Faced with the same 
problem, and with international comity in mind, this 
Court should adopt the same solution. 
-----------------  ----------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Aereo’s use of thousands of antennas to make 
over-the-air broadcasts available to members of the 
public does not transform them into private perform-
ances merely because they are accessed by members 
of the public at a time or place of their choosing. 
When all is said and done, Aereo’s audience is the 
general public, notionally anyone able to pay to have 
broadcasts streamed over the Internet.  
97

39 
 
The statutory language in the Copyright Act, its 
legislative history, and treaty history make clear that 
Congress intended to enact a broad technologically 
neutral public performance right that would not leave 
open the loophole argued for by Aereo. It did so by 
clarifying that a public performance may be made by 
transmitting or otherwise communicating a perform-
ance of a work “by means of any device or process” 
regardless of whether the members of the public 
“receive it in the same place or in separate places and 
at the same time or at different times.” That is the 
only conclusion that is consistent with the United 
States’ international obligations. Viewed against this 
entire backdrop, the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Aereo cannot stand.  
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID O. CARSON 
STEVEN MASON*
IFPI 
MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT LLP 
10 Piccadilly 
TD Bank Tower, Ste. 5300 
London W1J0DD 
Toronto, ON  
United Kingdom  
Canada M5K 1E6 
(+44) (020) 7878 7900 
(416) 601-7703 
xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxx.xxx 
xxxxxx@xxxxxxxx.xx 
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
98

App. 1 
------------------------------------ 
APPENDIX 
------------------------------------ 
LIST OF AMICI CURIAE 
This  amicus brief is joined by the following interna-
tional copyright scholars and associations: 
International Copyright Scholars* 
 Amicus Professor F. Jay Dougherty is a tenured 
professor at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, and 
Director of its Entertainment & Media Law Institute. 
He teaches Copyright Law and is the author of pub-
lished articles on the subject in the U.S., Europe and 
China, as well as an article about comparative right 
of publicity laws, among others. He teaches Interna-
tional Copyright & Neighboring Rights at the Loyola 
International IP Institute in London, and interna-
tional and comparative Entertainment Law at the 
Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, and in 
Paris and London. He is the Co-Editor in Chief of the 
Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA, and co-
author of an Entertainment Law casebook. A former 
President of the Los Angeles Copyright Society, he 
has also been a Trustee of the Copyright Society of 
the USA. 
* Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.
99

App. 2 
 Amicus 
Dr. Mihály Ficsor was Assistant Director 
General of the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) during the preparation and adoption of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty and played a decisive role in 
the working out and adoption of the provisions on a 
technology-neutral general right of communication to 
the public. Since then he has published a number of 
books and articles on this topic. Dr. Ficsor is cur-
rently the Chairman of the Central and Eastern 
European Copyright Alliance (CEECA), a professional 
organization with permanent observer status at 
WIPO. The Alliance’s objective is to promote well-
balanced but effective copyright protection in that 
part of Europe where the creators and small- and 
medium-size producers are particularly vulnerable to 
online infringements.  
 
Amica  Professor Ysolde Gendreau has been a 
professor at the Faculty of Law of the Université de 
Montréal since 1991, where she teaches intellectual 
property law and competition law. Her main field of 
expertise is copyright law, especially comparative and 
international issues. She is a member of the Bar of 
Quebec. She has also taught at McGill University, 
Université de Paris II, Université de Paris XII, Uni-
versité de Nantes, Université de Strasbourg III, 
Université de Lyon 2, University of Victoria (summer 
programme in Victoria and Oxford), University of San 
Diego (summer programme in Florence), and Monash 
University (Australia). She has published extensively, 
both in Canada and abroad. Among her more recent 
100

App. 3 
publications are contributions to two books she has 
edited: A Shifting Empire: 100 Years of the Copyright 
Act 1911
 (2013) (edited with U. Suthersanen) and 
Langues et droit d’auteur/Language and Copyright 
(2009) (edited with A. Drassinower). She has been the 
President of ATRIP (Association for the Advancement 
of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property) 
(2003-2005) and of ALAI Canada (2006-2011). She is 
a member of the Executive Committee of ALAI and 
an associate member of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law. 
 Amicus Justin Hughes is the William H. Hannon 
Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Ange-
les, where he teaches intellectual property and inter-
national trade courses. From 2002 until 2013, he 
taught at Cardozo Law School in New York, where he 
remains a Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the 
SIPO-Cardozo Program. From 2009 until 2013, 
Professor Hughes also served as Senior Advisor to the 
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Prop-
erty. In that capacity, he was chief negotiator for the 
U.S. at the Diplomatic Conferences that completed 
the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances 
(2012) and the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access 
to Printed Works for the Blind (2013). 
Amicus  Professor Marshall Leaffer is Distin-
guished Scholar in Intellectual Property Law and 
University Fellow at Indiana University School of 
Law. He received his J.D. at the University of Texas 
and his LLM in Trade Regulation at New York Uni-
versity Law School. In addition to his law review 
101

App. 4 
articles, he is the author of Copyright Law: Cases and 
Materials
 (2013), Understanding Copyright (2010), 
and  International Treaties on Intellectual Property 
(1997). Before becoming a full time teacher, Professor 
Leaffer practiced trademark law in New York City 
with American Home Products Corporation, and the 
firm of Haseltine, Lake and Waters. He also served in 
the United States government as Attorney-Advisor in 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and 
as staff member with the General Counsel of the 
United States Copyright Office. He represents the 
United States on the International Executive Board 
of the Association Littéraire Artistique Internationale 
(ALAI), a non-governmental organization that de-
fends authors’ rights worldwide.  
 
Amica Professor Silke von Lewinski is tenured at 
the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Compe-
tition, Department of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, Munich and specializes in interna-
tional and European copyright law. She is also Ad-
junct Professor at Franklin Pierce Center for 
Intellectual Property at the University of New Hamp-
shire Law School, Concord, New Hampshire. Her 
book publications include The WIPO Treaties 1996 
(2002) (with J. Reinbothe); the treatise International 
Copyright Law and Policy 
(2008);  European Copy-
right Law
 (2010) (with M. M. Walter et al.); and, as 
editor,  Copyright throughout the World (2008, with 
annual updates). Dr. von Lewinski is also an Adjunct 
Professor at the Munich Intellectual Property Law 
Center, Munich. She has been a visiting professor at 
102

App. 5 
many universities worldwide, including Paris XI, 
Toulouse 1; Université Laval, Québec, and University 
of Melbourne. She was the first Walter Minton Visit-
ing Scholar at Columbia University School of Law, 
New York; the First Distinguished Visitor to the 
Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia 
(IPRIA); and The Hosier Distinguished Visiting IP 
Scholar, DePaul University, Chicago, July 2005. 
Professor von Lewinski frequently has been an expert 
consultant for the European Commission, in particu-
lar regarding the WIPO Diplomatic Conference 1996 
(preparation, and member of the EC delegation). 
Amicus  Professor Victor Nabhan has taught at 
Laval University (Canada) as a full-time professor 
since 1999. His areas of expertise are intellectual 
property, contract law and consumer protection. He 
has advised the Canadian Government with respect 
to the drafting of four revisions of the Copyright Act, 
as well as the Quebec Ministry of Culture on copy-
right matters. From 1999-2005, he served as a WIPO 
consultant, assisting a number of developing coun-
tries in drafting their copyright laws in compliance 
with TRIPS and/or WCT and WPPT. Since 2005, he 
has been a guest professor at the University of Otta-
wa (Canada), Osgoode Hall Law School (Toronto), 
Institut des Études Politiques (Paris) and Notting-
ham University (UK). He also acts as a consultant 
with different organizations and developing coun-
tries. He is Counsel with the law firm of Kimbrough 
and Associés (Paris) and Chairman of ALAI (Associa-
tion Littéraire et Artistique Internationale). He has 
103

App. 6 
authored a number of articles and publications and 
has exhibited as an occasional artist.  
 
Amicus Professor Barry Sookman is the author of 
the leading six-volume treatise, Sookman: Computer, 
Internet and E-Commerce Law
 (1999-2013); Copy-
right: Cases and Commentary on the Canadian and 
International Law,
 co-authored with Steven Mason 
(2013);  Intellectual Property Law in Canada: Cases 
and Commentary, 
co-authored with Steven Mason 
and Daniel Glover (2012); Computer, Internet and 
E-Commerce Terms: Judicial, Legislative and Techni-
cal Definitions 
(2001-2013); and Sookman: Computer 
Law: Acquiring and Protecting Information Technol-
ogy
 (1989-1999). He is a contributing author to other 
books including Gordon Henderson Copyright Law in 
Canada
 (1994). He is a senior partner with McCarthy 
Tétrault LLP and is the former head of its Intellec-
tual Property Group. He is also an adjunct Professor 
of intellectual property law at Osgoode Hall Law 
School in Toronto, Canada.  
 
International Associations 
 
Amicus  International Federation of the Phono-
graphic Industry (IFPI) represents the recording 
industry worldwide, with a membership comprising 
some 1300 record companies in 66 countries and 
affiliated industry associations in 55 countries. IFPI’s 
mission is to promote the value of recorded music, 
campaign for the rights of record producers and 
expand the commercial uses of recorded music 
104

App. 7 
worldwide. IFPI also represents the recording indus-
try before courts, national legislatures, executive 
authorities and international organizations. 
 Amicus 
Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television 
and Radio Artists (ACTRA) is the national organiza-
tion of professional performers working in the Eng-
lish-language recorded media in Canada. ACTRA 
represents the interests of 22,000 members across 
Canada – the foundation of Canada’s highly ac-
claimed professional performing community. 
Amicus Asociación Mexicana de Productores de 
Fonogramas y Videogramas (Amprofon) represents, 
coordinates and defends the rights and common 
interests of producers of phonograms and videograms 
in Mexico; it is an IFPI member. Amprofon conducts 
the necessary negotiations and arrangements with 
national and foreign authorities, as well as with 
international organizations for the benefit of its 
members, regarding any matter of general or particu-
lar nature involving the interests of all or some of its 
members. The association studies and addresses 
issues related to promoting the development of the 
recording industry and fostering the development of 
music culture. It cooperates with the Government of 
Mexico in the regulatory process to protect the intel-
lectual property rights of phonogram producers. Its 
members comprise 13 major and independent re-
cording companies, having over 70% of the Mexican 
market. 
105

App. 8 
Amicus  Association Littéraire et Artistique 
Internationale du Canada (ALAI Canada) is the 
Canadian branch of ALAI, an international organiza-
tion founded in Paris in 1878 by La Société des Gens 
de Lettres de France under the sponsorship of Victor 
Hugo. ALAI’s efforts gave rise to the Berne Conven-
tion signed on September 9, 1886, established in view 
of protecting literary and artistic works. The Cana-
dian branch was founded in 1978. ALAI’s purpose is 
to promote and protect copyright as well as to study 
questions regarding the protection and applicability 
of copyright. ALAI Canada holds conferences and 
seminars. As well, it publishes and distributes docu-
ments dealing with copyright. These activities com-
bine a strict scientific analysis with a practical 
approach to the various topics considered. They are 
available to specialists as well as to the public at 
large. 
Amicus Australian Copyright Council (ACC) is an 
independent, non-profit organization. Founded in 
1968, it has 24 members consisting of associations 
representing professional artists and content creators 
working in Australia’s creative industries and Austra-
lia’s major copyright collecting societies. In addition 
to providing advice and information on copyright, the 
ACC is an advocate for Australian copyright owners.  
Amicus British Copyright Council (BCC) is a not-
for-profit organization that provides a forum for 
discussion of copyright law and related issues at UK, 
European and International levels. The BCC is 
independent, receives no government funding and is 
106

App. 9 
the only organization of its kind in the UK. The BCC 
aims to provide an effective, authoritative and repre-
sentative voice for the copyright community. It repre-
sents those who create, hold interests in or manage 
rights in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works, films, sound recordings, broadcasts and other 
material in which there are rights of copyright or 
related rights; and those who perform such works. 
In the UK the BCC is consulted by government 
departments, agencies and regulators. It follows 
copyright developments in the European Union and is 
an NGO Observer Member of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. It maintains links with simi-
lar bodies in other countries. 
 
Amicus  Canadian Media Production Association 
(CMPA) represents the interests of Canadian screen-
based media companies engaged in the production 
and distribution of Canadian English-language 
television programs, feature films, and new media 
content in all regions of Canada. The CMPA is also a 
founding member of the Canadian Retransmission 
Collective (CRC), which collects and distributes 
copyright royalties pursuant to a Canadian Copyright 
Board-approved tariff when Canadian independently-
produced programs in over-the-air broadcast signals 
are retransmitted into distant Canadian markets by 
Canadian cable, satellite and telecommunications 
companies. 
 
Amicus  International Confederation of Societies 
of Authors and Composers (CISAC) is the umbrella 
organization representing collective management 
107

App. 10 
organizations for authors worldwide. Founded in 
1926, CISAC is a non-governmental, not-for-profit 
organization based in Paris, France, with regional 
offices in Hungary, Chile, Burkina Faso and China. 
CISAC counts 227 authors’ societies as its members. 
These societies are based in 120 countries, including 
the US. Together, CISAC societies around the world 
represent over 3 million creators from all artistic 
disciplines including music, film, literature, drama 
and visual arts. The majority of royalties collected by 
CISAC societies on behalf of creators come from 
public performance and communication rights (75% of 
all royalties collected, for all categories of repertoire, 
around the world), hence CISAC’s and its members’ 
interests in these proceedings.  
Amicus  International Confederation of Music 
Publishers (ICMP) is the world trade association 
representing the interests of the music publishing 
community internationally. Constituent members of 
ICMP are music publishers’ associations from Europe, 
Middle East, North and South America, Africa and 
Asia-Pacific. Included are the leading independent, 
multinational, and international companies and 
regional and national music publishers, mainly small 
and medium enterprises, throughout the world. As 
the voice and point of reference of music publishers, 
and the community of composers and songwriters, 
ICMP’s mission is to increase copyright protection 
internationally, encourage a better environment for 
the music business, and act as an industry forum for 
consolidating global positions. 
108

App. 11 
Amicus International Federation of Actors (FIA) 
represents some 80 trade unions, guilds and associa-
tions in more than 70 countries around the world 
voicing the interests of professional performers in the 
audiovisual sector. FIA serves as a membership forum 
to promote good practices and as an advocate of 
performers’ social and economic rights internation-
ally. FIA campaigns vigorously for the intellectual 
property rights of performers as they serve to en-
hance their livelihood and protect their reputation.  
 Amicus 
International Federation of Film Produc-
ers Associations (FIAPF) is a trade organization 
dedicated to the defense and promotion of the legal, 
economic and creative interests of film producers 
throughout the world. FIAPF’s members are 33 
national producers’ organizations from 28 countries 
from Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, North and Latin 
America. 
Amicus  International Federation of Musicians 
(FIM), founded in 1948, is the international organiza-
tion for musicians’ unions, guilds and professional 
associations, with about 70 members in 60 countries 
throughout the world. FIM’s main objective is to 
protect and further the economic, social and artistic 
interests of musicians represented by its member 
unions. To achieve that objective, FIM engages in a 
number of activities, including the promotion of 
national and protective legislation and other initia-
tives in the interests of musicians, working with 
collecting societies administering performers’ rights, 
working with other international organizations in the 
109

App. 12 
interests of member unions and of the profession, and 
close collaboration with the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO), which administers the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, as well 
as with the International Labour Office (ILO) and 
UNESCO. 
 
Amicus  International Video Federation (IVF) 
unites associations representing companies active in 
all segments of the film and audiovisual sector in 
Europe. Their activities include the development, 
production, and distribution of films and audiovisual 
content as well as the publication of film and audio-
visual content on digital media and in online chan-
nels. 
 
Amicus  Music Canada is a non-profit trade 
association that represents major music companies 
in Canada and a number of the leading Canadian 
independent recording and music distribution com-
panies. Music Canada’s members are engaged in all 
aspects of the recording industry, including the manu-
facture, production, promotion and distribution of 
music. Music Canada member companies actively 
develop and nurture Canadian talent throughout the 
world. Music Canada also works with some of the 
leading recording studios, live music venues, concert 
promoters, managers and artists in the promotion 
and development of its members’ music.  
110

App. 13 
 Amicus Societies’ Council for the Collective 
Management of Performers’ Rights (SCAPR) is an 
international organization focused on the develop-
ment of the practical cooperation between sound 
recording and audiovisual performers’ collective 
management organizations. Founded in 1986 and 
with 50 collective management organization members 
from 40 countries, SCAPR’s primary aim is to develop 
strategies, formats, and administrative systems to 
improve the exchange of data and performers’ rights 
payments across borders. 
Amicus Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) is a not-for-profit 
organization that represents the Canadian perform-
ing rights of millions of Canadian and international 
music creators and publishers. SOCAN is proud to 
play a leading role in supporting the long-term suc-
cess of its more than 100,000 Canadian members, as 
well as the Canadian music industry. SOCAN licenses 
more than 125,000 businesses in Canada and distrib-
utes royalties to its members and peer organizations 
around the world. SOCAN also distributes royalties 
to its members for the use of Canadian music around 
the world in collaboration with its peer societies. 
111

Doc.5
 (CNECT)
From:
 <
@ifpi.org>
Sent:
05 August 2016 17:49
To:
 (CNECT); 
 (CNECT); 
 (CNECT)
Cc:
Olivia Regnier; Frances Moore; 
Subject:
of Copyright Directive
Attachments:
ifpi advice 5.8.16 final.pdf; Note 
 
s.docx; Annex  - National cases citing 
Recital 27 Copyright Directive.docx; 0609_001.pdf
Art.4(2)(2)
Dear ladies, 
I attach several papers
 


Updated opinion

IFPI note 
and an annex to the note with examples of national case – law citing 
Recital 27 

Extract from the “Commentary of the WIPO treaties” by Reinbothe and Lewinski where they
explain the notion of mere physical facilities in the WCT 
FYI, we will share these materials with
 from the cabinet on a confidential basis. 
Do not hesitate to let us know if you wish to discuss this. 
Kind regards, 
 
  
IFPI – representing the recording industry worldwide  
European Regional Office | Square de Meeûs 40 1000 Brussels Belgium T: +32 (0)2 511 9208 
@ifpi.org  
www.ifpi.org   
www.pro-music.org  
@IFPI_org
1
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Art.4.(2)(2)
 
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OPINION 
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4.6.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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8.11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 August 2016 
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Art.4(2)(2)
Note 
 
 
05 August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


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ANNEX – National cases citing Recital 27 of the Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC 
Court 
Parties 
Reference to Recital 27 
ES 
Madrid Civil Court of Appeal, 14 
Telecinco v YouTube 
No specific reference to Recital 27 but Youtube submitted that it was only 
January 2014, No. 11/2014 
operating a technical infrastructure but court seemed to implicitly reject this 
argument. It held that even if YouTube’s claim that it only provided a technical 
infrastructure was correct, this would not automatically result in YouTube’s liability 
being limited by to the E-Commerce safe harbours. Ultimately, Youtube’s liability 
was rejected because it was entitled to safe harbour protection.  
BE 
Brussels First Instance Court, 13 
SABAM v Belgacom 
Only reference to physical facilities in Para 44 – no further assessment. 
March 2015 No. 13/12839/A 
UK 
High Court, 20 February 2012, 
Dramatico 
Reference to physical facilities but no detailed consideration. 
[2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) 
Entertainment Ltd v 
British Sky 
Finding of infringement by The Pirate Bay and its users. 
Broadcasting Ltd 
UK 
High Court, 18 July 2011, [2011] 
ITV Broadcasting Ltd  “43 Given the broad meaning which the Directive requires to be given to 
EWHC 1874 (Pat) 
v TV Catchup Ltd 
“communication to the public”, it seems that any limitations on the natural 
meaning of the expression need to be kept within tight bounds.” 
“49 Thirdly, TVC do not in the Court’s judgment merely provide technical means to 
ensure or improve reception in the catchment area of the broadcast. The service 
which TVC provide is an alternative service to that of the original broadcaster, 
including its own advertising content, and which is in competition with the service 
provided by the original broadcaster. It is operated for profit. It is intended to 
attract its own public audience. Its activities are therefore, in this Court’s view an 
independent exploitation, of the works and other subject matter. They are not 
merely supportive of the original exploitation of the work.” 
NL 
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 
Stichting 
“4.7 Techno Design cannot be deemed to be a kind of ISP (an internet service 
Fifth Division for Civil Matters, 
Bescherming 
provider), as its actions go considerably further than those of an ISP. That means 
Case No.1157/04, 15 June 2006 
Rechten 
that it does not qualify for the same protection as an ISP, in view of its significance 
124

Entertainment 
in society. In the words of the “Agreed Statement” to Art.8 of the WIPO Copyright 
Industrie Nederland 
Treaty:  
(BREIN) v Techno 
Design “Internet 
“It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or 
Programming” B.V. 
making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the 
meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that 
nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 11 bis (2)”. 
Techno Design's actions were most certainly not restricted to the passive role 
reflected in Art.8. After all, Techno Design not only made it possible for its music-
loving visitors to communicate with other music-lovers, but it also manipulated the 
data it had compiled in such a way that it greatly simplified its visitors' search for 
mp3 music files. It furthermore gave its visitors the necessary information on those 
files.” 
UK 
High Court, 13 November 2013, 
Paramount Home 
Site-blocking action against two sites enabling access to content on third party, and 
[2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) 
Entertainment 
providing search facilities in respect of the content.  Links to content are supplied 
International Ltd, 
by registered users of the websites or by the operators of the websites. Users who 
Sony Pictures Home 
wish to access content via one of the websites are provided with a number of these 
Entertainment Ltd, 
links in response to searches or when browsing. Clicking on a link enables the user 
Twentieth Century 
to view a stream of the chosen content on an embedded player. 
Fox Film Company 
Ltd, Universal 
Summarising CJEU case law: 
Pictures (UK) Ltd, 
“(9) Mere provision of physical facilities does not as such amount to 
Warner Bros. 
“communication”: SGAE at [46]. 
Entertainment UK 
Ltd, Disney 
(10) Nevertheless, the installation of physical facilities which distribute a signal and 
Enterprises, Inc v 
thus make public access to works technically possible constitutes 
British Sky 
“communication”: SGAE at [46]–[47], Organismos (C-136/09) at [39]–[41].” 
Broadcasting Ltd, 
British 
Held: The host sites communicate the claimants’ works to the public and that the 
Telecommunications  operators of the websites in the case are jointly liable. 
Plc, Everything 
125

Everywhere Ltd, 
Talktalk Telecom 
Ltd, Telefónica UK 
Ltd, Virgin Media Ltd 
NO 
Supreme Court of Norway, 10 
Nowaco v Get AS 
The case concerned the liability of a Norwegian cable operator (GET AS) for the 
Mary 2016 
transmission of TV broadcasts that it received via encrypted secure fibre 
Case no. 2015/1101 
connection from the broadcaster SBS. GET AS argued that it was not retransmitting 
any content to the public and that the entire copyright clearance was in the 
responsibility of the broadcaster. The Supreme Court held that GET’s involvement 
is not limited to providing the broadcaster SBS with mere technical broadcasting 
assistant, i.e. GET was not just providing technical means for SBS to communicate 
content. In addition, the Supreme Court held that GET’s cable network were 
“primary broadcasting” activities, i.e. it was not a retransmission of SBS broadcasts. 
Lastly and importantly, the Court held that both SBS and GET were jointly liable for 
the rights clearance by the broadcaster SBS.  
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Document Outline