Ceci est une version HTML d'une pièce jointe de la demande d'accès à l'information 'Implementation status of Resolution 2001/2098(INI) on surveillance'.
EN    EN 

Brussels, 30.9.2010 
COM(2010) 517 final 
2010/0273 (COD) 
Proposal for a 
on attacks against information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 

{SEC(2010) 1122 final} 
{SEC(2010) 1123 final} 

EN    EN 

The purpose of the proposal is to replace Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 
February 2005 on attacks against information systems1. The Framework Decision responded, 
as stated in its recitals, to the objective of improving cooperation between judicial and other 
competent authorities, including the police and other specialised law enforcement services of 
the Member States, by approximating the rules of the criminal law in the Member States in 
relation to attacks against information systems. It introduced EU legislation to deal with 
offences such as illegal access to information systems, illegal system interference and illegal 
data interference, as well as specific rules on the liability of legal persons, jurisdiction and 
exchange of information. Member States were required to take the necessary measures to 
comply with the provisions of the Framework Decision by 16 March 2007. 
On 14 July 2008, the Commission published a report on the implementation of the Framework 
Decision2. In the conclusions to the report, it was noted that significant progress had been 
made in most Member States and that the level of implementation was relatively good, but 
that implementation in some Member States was not yet complete. Further on in the report, it 
was stated that several "emerging threats have been highlighted by recent attacks across 
Europe since adoption of the Framework Decision, in particular the emergence of large-scale 
simultaneous attacks against information systems and increased criminal use of so-called 
'botnets'." These attacks were not the centre of attention when the Framework Decision was 
adopted. In response to these developments, the Commission will consider actions aimed at 
devising better responses to the threat (see next section for the explanation of a botnet). 
The importance of taking further action to step up the fight against cybercrime was underlined 
in the 2004 Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European 
Union as well as the 2009 Stockholm Programme and its respective action plan3. Furthermore, 
the recently presented Digital Agenda for Europe4, the first flagship initiative adopted under 
the Europe 2020 strategy, recognised the need to address the rise of new forms of crime, in 
particular cybercrime, at European level. In the action area focused on trust and security the 
Commission is committed to measures to combat cyber attacks against information systems. 
On the international level, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime ("Cybercrime 
Convention"), signed on 23 November 2001, is regarded as the most complete international 
standard to date, since it provides a comprehensive and coherent framework embracing the 
various aspects relating to cybercrime.5 So far, the Convention has been signed by all 27 
Member States, but it has been ratified by only 15 Member States.6 The Convention entered 
into force on 1 July 2004. The EU is not a signatory to the Convention. Given the importance 
of this instrument, the Commission actively encourages the remaining EU member states to 
ratify the Convention as soon as possible. 

OJ L 69, 16.3.2005, p. 68. 

Report from the Commission to the Council based on Article 12 of the Council Framework Decision of 
24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems - COM(2008) 448. 

OJ C 198, 12.8.2005, OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, COM(2010) 171, 20.4.2010. 

Commission Communication - COM(2010) 245, 19.5.2010. 

Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest 23.11.2001, CETS n° 185.  

For an overview of the ratifications of the Convention (CETS n° 185), see: 

•  General context 
With regard to cybercrime, the main cause of this phenomenon is vulnerability resulting from 
a variety of factors. Insufficient response by law enforcement mechanisms contributes to the 
prevalence of these phenomena, and exacerbates the difficulties, as certain types of offences 
go beyond national borders. Reporting of this type of crime is often inadequate, partly 
because some crimes go unnoticed, and partly because the victims (economic operators and 
companies) do not report crimes for fear of getting a bad reputation and of their future 
business prospects being affected by public exposure of their vulnerabilities.  
Furthermore, variations in national criminal law and procedure may give rise to differences in 
investigation and prosecution, leading to differences in how these crimes are dealt with. 
Developments in information technology have exacerbated these problems by making it easier 
to produce and distribute tools ('malware' and 'botnets'), while offering offenders anonymity 
and dispersing responsibility across jurisdictions. Given the difficulties of bringing a 
prosecution, organised crime is able to make considerable profits with little risk. 
This proposal takes into account the new methods of committing cybercrimes, especially the 
use of botnets. The term 'botnet' indicates a network of computers that have been infected by 
malicious software (computer virus). Such a network of compromised computers ('zombies') 
may be activated to perform specific actions, such as attacking information systems (cyber 
attacks). These 'zombies' can be controlled – often without the knowledge of the users of the 
compromised computers – by another computer. This 'controlling' computer is also known as 
the 'command-and-control centre'. The persons who control this centre are among the 
offenders, as they use the compromised computers to launch attacks against information 
systems. It is very difficult to trace the perpetrators, as the computers that make up the botnet 
and carry out the attack may be in a different location from the offender himself. 
Attacks carried out by a botnet are often executed on a large scale. Large-scale attacks are 
those attacks that can either be carried out with the use of tools affecting significant numbers 
of information systems (computers), or attacks that cause considerable damage, e.g. in terms 
of disrupted system services, financial cost, loss of personal data, etc. The damage caused by 
large-scale attacks has a major impact on the functioning of the target itself, and/or affects its 
working environment. In this context, a 'big botnet' is understood to have the capacity to cause 
serious damage. It is difficult to define botnets in terms of size, but the biggest botnets 
witnessed have been estimated to have between 40,000 and 100,000 connections (i.e. infected 
computers) per period of 24 hours.7 

Number of connections per 24 hours is the commonly used measuring unit to estimate the size of 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 
At EU level, the Framework Decision introduces a minimum level of approximation of 
Member States' legislation to criminalise a number of cybercrimes, including illegal access to 
information systems, illegal system interference, illegal data interference, and instigation, 
aiding and abetting and attempting to do so.  
Although the provisions of the Framework Decision have generally been implemented by the 
Member States, the Decision has a number of shortcomings due to the trend in the size and 
number of the offences (cyber attacks). It approximates legislation only on a limited number 
of offences, but does not fully address the potential threat posed to society by large scale 
attacks. Nor does it take sufficient account of the gravity of the crimes and sanctions against 
Other EU initiatives and programmes in force or planned go some way to addressing 
problems related to cyber attacks or issues, such as network security and the safety of Internet 
users. They include actions supported by the programme 'Prevention of and Fight against 
Crime'8, 'Criminal Justice'9 programme, the 'Safer Internet'10 programme and the 'Critical 
Information Infrastructure Initiative'11. In addition to the Framework Decision, another 
relevant legal instrument in force is Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA on combating the 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. 
At administrative level, the practice of infecting computers, turning them into 'botnets', is 
already prohibited under EU privacy and data protection rules12. Notably national 
administrative agencies are already cooperating under the European Contact Network of 
Spam Authorities. Under those rules, Member States are required to prohibit the interception 
of communications on public communications networks and publicly available electronic 
communications services without the consent of the users concerned or legal authorisation. 
This proposal is compliant with those rules. Member States should pay attention to improving 
the cooperation between administrative and law enforcement authorities for cases subject to 
both administrative and criminal sanctions. 
•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 
The objectives are consistent with EU policies on combating organised crime, increasing the 
resilience of computer networks, protecting critical information infrastructure and data 
protection. The objectives are also consistent with the Safer Internet Programme which was 
set up to promote safer use of the Internet and new online technologies, and to combat illegal 
This proposal was subjected to in-depth scrutiny to ensure that its provisions were fully 
compatible with fundamental rights and, in particular, with the protection of personal data, 
freedom of expression and information, the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence and 
8 See: 
9 See: 
10 See: 
11 See: 
Directive on privacy and electronic communications (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002), as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009). 

the rights of the defence, as well as the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal 
offences and penalties. 
•  Consultation of interested parties 
A broad range of experts in the field have been consulted in a number of different meetings 
dealing with various aspects of the fight against cybercrime, including the judicial follow-up 
(prosecution) of these crimes. They included, in particular, representatives of Member States' 
Governments and the private sector, specialised judges and prosecutors, international 
organisations, European agencies and expert bodies. A number of experts and organisations 
have subsequently sent in submissions and provided information. 
Key messages resulting from the consultation are: 
–  the need for the EU to act in this field; 
–  the need to criminalise forms of offences not included in the current Framework Decision, 
in particular new forms of cyber attacks (botnets); 
–  the need to eliminate obstacles to investigation and prosecution in cross-border cases. 
The input received during the consultation has been taken into account in the Impact 
Collection and use of expertise 
External expertise has been obtained during various meetings with stakeholders. 
Impact Assessment 
Various policy options have been examined as a means of achieving the objective. 
•  Policy option (1): Status Quo / No new EU action 
This option means that the EU will not take any further action to combat this particular type 
of cybercrime, i.e. attacks against information systems. Ongoing actions are due to be 
continued, in particular the programmes to strengthen critical information infrastructure 
protection and improve public-private cooperation against cybercrime.  
•  Policy option (2): Development of a programme to strengthen the efforts to counter attacks 
against information systems by means of non-legislative measures 
Non-legislative measures would, in addition to the programme for critical information 
infrastructure protection, focus on cross-border law enforcement and public-private 
cooperation. These soft-law instruments should aim to promote further coordinated action at 
EU level, including strengthening of the existing 24/7 network of contact points for law 
enforcement agencies; establishment of an EU network of public-private contact points 
involving cybercrime experts and law enforcement agencies; elaboration of a standard EU 
service level agreement for law enforcement cooperation with private sector operators; and 

support for the organisation of training programmes for law enforcement agencies on the 
investigation of cybercrime. 
•  Policy option (3): Targeted update of the rules of the Framework Decision (new Directive 
replacing the current Framework Decision) to address the threat from large-scale attacks 
against information systems (botnets) and, when committed by concealing the real identity 
of the perpetrator and causing prejudice to the rightful identity owner, the efficiency of 
Member States' law enforcement contact points, and the lack of statistical data on cyber 
This option provides for the introduction of specific targeted (i.e. limited) legislation to 
prevent large-scale attacks against information systems. Such strengthened legislation would 
be accompanied by non-legislative measures to strengthen operational cross-border 
cooperation against such attacks, which would facilitate the implementation of the legislative 
measures. The aim of these measures would be to enhance the preparedness, security and 
resilience of critical information infrastructure and exchange best practice. 
•  Policy option (4): Introduction of comprehensive EU legislation against cybercrime 
This option would entail new comprehensive EU legislation. In addition to introducing the 
soft-law measures in policy option 2 and the update in policy option 3, it would also tackle 
other legal problems related to Internet use. Such measures would cover not only attacks 
against information systems, but also issues such as financial cybercrime, illegal Internet 
content, the collection/storage/transfer of electronic evidence, and more detailed jurisdiction 
rules. The legislation would operate in parallel with the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime, and would include the accompanying, non-legislative measures mentioned above  
•  Policy option (5): Update of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
This option would require substantial renegotiation of the current Convention, which is a 
lengthy process and is at odds with the time frame for action that is proposed in the Impact 
Assessment. There seems to be no international willingness to renegotiate the Convention. 
Updating of the Convention therefore cannot be considered a feasible option, as it falls 
outside the required time frame for action.  
Preferred policy option: combination of non-legislative measures (option 2) with a targeted 
update of the Framework Decision (option 3)  
Following the analysis of the economic impact, social impacts, and impacts on fundamental 
rights, options 2 and 3 represent the best approach to deal with the problem and achieve the 
objectives of the proposal.  
In preparing this proposal, the Commission carried out an Impact Assessment.  
•  Summary of the proposed action 
The Directive, while repealing Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, will retain its current 
provisions and include the following new elements: 

–  On substantive criminal law in general, the Directive: 
Penalises the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise 
making available of devices/tools used for committing the offences.  
B. Includes 
•  the large-scale aspect of the attacks - botnets or similar tools would be addressed 
by introducing a new aggravating circumstance, in the sense that the act of putting 
in place a botnet or a similar tool would be an aggravating factor when crimes 
listed in the existing Framework Decision are committed;  
•  when such attacks are committed by concealing the real identity of the perpetrator 
and causing prejudice to the rightful identity owner. Any such rules would need to 
comply with the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and 
penalties and be consistent with existing legislation on the protection of personal 
Introduces 'illegal interception' as a criminal offence. 
Introduces measures to improve European criminal justice cooperation by 
strengthening the existing structure of 24/7 contact points14:  
•  an obligation to comply with a request for assistance by the operational contact 
points (set out in Article 14 of the Directive) within a certain time limit is 
proposed. The Cybercrime Convention does not specify a binding provision of 
this kind. The aim of this measure is to ensure that the contact points indicate 
within a specified time whether they are able to provide a solution to the request 
for assistance, and by when the requesting point of contact can expect such a 
solution to be found. The actual content of the solutions is not specified. 
Addresses the need to provide statistical data on cybercrimes by making it obligatory 
for the Member States to ensure that an adequate system is in place for the recording, 
production and provision of statistical data on the offences referred to in the existing 
Framework Decision and the newly added 'illegal interception'.  
The Directive contains in the definitions of criminal offences listed in articles 3, 4, 5 (illegal 
access to information systems, illegal systems interference and illegal interference) a 
provision allowing to criminalise only 'cases which are not minor' in the process of 
transposition of the directive into national law. This element of flexibility is intended to allow 
Member States not to cover cases that would in abstracto be covered by the basic definition 
but are considered not to harm the protected legal interest, e.g. in particular acts by young 
people who attempt to prove their expertise in information technology. This possibility to 
limit the scope of criminalisation should not however lead to the introduction of additional 
constitutive elements of offences beyond those that are already included in the Directive, 
Such as the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12.7.2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 
37) (currently under revision), and such as the general data protection Directive 95/46/EC.  
Introduced by the Convention, and FD 2005/222/JHA on Attacks against Information Systems 

because this would lead to the situation that only offences committed with the presence of 
aggravating circumstances are covered. In the process of transposition, Member States should 
refrain in particular from adding additional constitutive elements to the basic offences such as 
e.g. a special intention to derive illicit proceeds from crime or the presence of a specific effect 
such as causing a considerable damage. 
•  Legal basis 
Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union15. 
•  Subsidiarity principle 
The subsidiarity principle applies to the actions of the European Union. The objectives of the 
proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States for the following reasons: 
Cybercrime and, more specifically, attacks against information systems have a considerable 
cross-border dimension, which is most obvious in large scale attacks, as the connecting 
elements of an attack are often situated in different locations and in different countries. This 
requires EU action, in particular to keep abreast of the current trend towards large scale 
attacks in Europe and in the world. Action at EU level and an update of the Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA have also been called for in the Council Conclusions of November 
200816, as the objective of effectively protecting citizens from cybercrimes cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by Member States alone. 
Action by the European Union will better achieve the objectives of the proposal for the 
following reasons: 
The proposal will further approximate the substantive criminal law of Member States and the 
rules on procedure, which will have a positive impact on the fight against these crimes. 
Firstly, it is a way of preventing offenders from moving to Member States in which legislation 
against cyber attacks is more lenient. Secondly, shared definitions make it possible to 
exchange information and collect and compare relevant data. Thirdly, the effectiveness of 
prevention measures across the EU and international cooperation are also enhanced. 
The proposal therefore complies with the subsidiarity principle. 
•  Proportionality principle 
The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reason:. 
This Directive confines itself to the minimum required in order to achieve those objectives at 
European level and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose, taking into account 
the need for accuracy of criminal legislation. 
•  Choice of instruments 
Proposed instrument: Directive.  
OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 49. 
‘Concerted Work Strategy and Practical Measures Against Cybercrime’, 2987th JUSTICE and HOME 
AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels, 27-28 November 2008. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: 
The legal basis requires a Directive. 
Non-legislative measures and self-regulation would improve the situation in certain areas 
where implementation is crucial. However, in other areas where new legislation is essential, 
the benefits would be modest. 
The implications of the proposal for the Union budget are small. More than 90% of the 
estimated cost of EUR 5,913,000 would be borne by the Member States and there is the 
possibility of applying for EU funding to reduce the cost. 
•  Repeal of existing legislation 
The adoption of the proposal will lead to the repeal of the existing legislation. 
•  Territorial scope 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties. 

2010/0273 (COD) 
Proposal for a 
on attacks against information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular 
Article 83(1) thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission17, 
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions, 
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
The objective of this Directive is to approximate rules on criminal law in the Member 
States in the area of attacks against information systems, and improve cooperation 
between judicial and other competent authorities, including the police and other 
specialised law enforcement services of the Member States. 
Attacks against information systems, in particular as a result of the threat from 
organised crime, are a growing menace, and there is increasing concern about the 
potential for terrorist or politically motivated attacks against information systems 
which form part of the critical infrastructure of Member States and the Union. This 
constitutes a threat to the achievement of a safer information society and an area of 
freedom, security and justice, and therefore requires a response at the level of the 
European Union.  
There is evidence of a tendency towards increasingly dangerous and recurrent large 
scale attacks conducted against information systems which are critical to states or to 
particular functions in the public or private sector. This tendency is accompanied by 
the development of increasingly sophisticated tools that can be used by criminals to 
launch cyber-attacks of various types. 
17 OJ 

[…], […], p. […]. 

Common definitions in this area, particularly of information systems and computer 
data, are important in order to ensure a consistent approach in the Member States to 
the application of this Directive. 
There is a need to achieve a common approach to the constituent elements of criminal 
offences by introducing common offences of illegal access to an information system, 
illegal system interference, illegal data interference, and illegal interception. 
Member States should provide for penalties in respect of attacks against information 
systems. The penalties provided for should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
It is appropriate to provide for more severe penalties when an attack against an 
information system is committed by a criminal organisation, as defined in Council 
Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised 
crime18, when the attack is conducted on a large scale, or when an offence is 
committed by concealing the real identity of the perpetrator and causing prejudice to 
the rightful identity owner. It is also appropriate to provide for more severe penalties 
where such an attack has caused serious damage or has affected essential interests. 
The Council Conclusions of 27-28 November 2008 indicated that a new strategy 
should be developed with the Member States and the Commission, taking into account 
the content of the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. That 
Convention is the legal framework of reference for combating cybercrime, including 
attacks against information systems. This Directive builds on that Convention. 
Given the different ways in which attacks can be conducted, and given the rapid 
developments in hardware and software, this Directive shall refer to ’tools’ that can be 
used in order to commit the crimes listed in this Directive. Tools refer to, for example, 
malicious software, including botnets, used to commit cyber attacks. 
This Directive does not intend to impose criminal liability where the offences are 
committed without criminal intent, such as for authorised testing or protection of 
information systems.  
This Directive strengthens the importance of networks, such as the G8 or the Council 
of Europe's network of points of contact available on a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-
week basis to exchange information in order to ensure the provision of immediate 
assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal 
offences related to information systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in 
electronic form of a criminal offence. Given the speed with which large-scale attacks 
can be carried out, Member States should be able to respond promptly to urgent 
requests from this network of contact points.  Such assistance should include 
facilitating, or directly carrying out, measures such as: the provision of technical 
advice, the preservation of data, the collection of evidence, the provision of legal 
information, and the locating of suspects.  
There is a need to collect data on offences under this Directive, in order to gain a more 
complete picture of the problem at Union level and thereby contribute to formulating 
more effective responses. The data will moreover help specialised agencies such as 
OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42. 

Europol and the European Network and Information Security Agency to better assess 
the extent of cybercrime and the state of network and information security in Europe. 
Significant gaps and differences in Member States’ laws in the area of attacks against 
information systems area may hamper the fight against organised crime and terrorism, 
and may complicate effective police and judicial cooperation in this area. The 
transnational and borderless nature of modern information systems means that attacks 
against such systems have a trans-border dimension, thus underlining the urgent need 
for further action to approximate criminal legislation in this area. Besides that, the 
coordination of prosecution of cases of  attacks against information systems should be 
facilitated by the adoption of Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA on 
prevention and settlement of conflict of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings. 
Since the objectives of this Directive, i.e. ensuring that attacks against information 
systems are punished in all Member States by effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties and improving and encouraging judicial cooperation by removing 
potential complications, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, as 
rules have to be common and compatible, and can therefore be better achieved at the 
level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of 
subsidarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. This Directive 
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. 
Any personal data processed in the context of the implementation of this Directive 
should be protected in accordance with the rules laid down in the Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters19 
with regard to those processing activities which fall within its scope and Regulation 
(EC) No. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2000 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data20. 
This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised 
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including 
the protection of personal data, freedom of expression and information, the right to a 
fair trial, presumption of innocence and the rights of the defence, as well as the 
principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties.  In 
particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for these rights and principles and 
must be implemented accordingly. 
[In accordance with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Protocol on the position of United 
Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland have notified their wish to participate in the adoption and application of this 
Directive] OR [Without prejudice to Article 4 of Protocol on the position of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland will not participate in the adoption of this Directive and will not 
be bound by or be subject to its application].  
OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p.60. 
OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1. 

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in 
the adoption of this Directive and is therefore not bound by it or subject to its 
Article 1 
Subject matter 
This Directive defines criminal offences in the area of attacks against information systems and 
establishes minimum rules concerning penalties for such offences. It also aims to introduce 
common provisions to prevent such attacks and improve European criminal justice 
cooperation in this field. 
Article 2 
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: 
"information system" means any device or group of inter-connected or related 
devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing 
of computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted 
by them for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance; 
"computer data" means any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form 
suitable for processing in an information system, including a program suitable for 
causing an information system to perform a function; 
"legal person" means any entity having such status under the applicable law, except 
for States or other public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public 
international organisations; 
"without right" means access or interference not authorised by the owner, other right 
holder of the system or of part of it, or not permitted under national legislation. 
Article 3 
Illegal access to information systems 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional access without 
right to the whole or any part of an information system is punishable as a criminal offence, at 
least for cases which are not minor. 
Article 4 
Illegal system interference 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional serious 
hindering or interruption of the functioning of an information system by inputting, 
transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering, suppressing or rendering inaccessible 

computer data is punishable as a criminal offence when committed without right, at least for 
cases which are not minor. 
Article 5 
Illegal data interference 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional deletion, 
damaging, deterioration, alteration, suppression or rendering inaccessible of computer data on 
an information system is punishable as a criminal offence when committed without right, at 
least for cases which are not minor. 
Article 6 
Illegal interception  
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional interception by 
technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a 
information system, including electromagnetic emissions from an information system 
carrying such computer data, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed without 
Article 7 
Tools used for committing offences 
Member States shall take the necessary measure to ensure that the production, sale, 
procurement for use, import, possession, distribution or otherwise making available of the 
following is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally and without right 
for the purpose of committing any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 6: 
device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose 
of committing any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 6; 
a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of 
an information system is capable of being accessed. 
Article 8 
Instigation, aiding, abetting and attempt 
Member States shall ensure that the instigation, aiding and abetting of an offence 
referred to in Articles 3 to 7 is punishable as a criminal offence. 
Member States shall ensure that the attempt to commit the offences referred to in 
Articles 3 to 6 is punishable as a criminal offence. 

Article 9 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred 
to in Articles 3 to 8 are punishable by effective, proportional and dissuasive criminal 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred 
to in Articles 3 to 7 are punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least two years. 
Article 10 
Aggravating circumstances 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred 
to in Articles 3 to 7 are punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least five years when committed within the framework of a 
criminal organization as defined in Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA. 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred 
to in Articles 3 to 6 are punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least five years when committed through the use of a tool 
designed to launch attacks affecting a significant number of information systems, or 
attacks causing considerable damage, such as disrupted system services, financial 
cost or loss of personal data.  
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred 
to in Articles 3 to 6 are punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least five years when committed by concealing the real identity of 
the perpetrator and causing prejudice to the rightful identity owner. 
Article 11 
Liability of legal persons 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be 
held liable for offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8, committed for their benefit by 
any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, and 
having a leading position within the legal person, based on one of the following: 
(a) a power of representation of the legal person; 
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; 
(c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person. 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be 
held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a person referred to in 
paragraph 1 has made possible the commission, by a person under its authority, of 
any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8 for the benefit of that legal person. 

Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal 
proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators of, or accessories to, any of 
the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8. 
Article 12 
Penalties on legal persons 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held 
liable pursuant to Article 11(1) is punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may 
include other sanctions, for example: 
exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; 
(b)  temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial 
placing under judicial supervision;  
(d) judicial 
(e)  temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for 
committing the offence. 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held 
liable pursuant to Article 11(2) is punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties or measures . 
Article 13 
Member States shall establish their jurisdiction with regard to the offences referred to 
in Articles 3 to 8 where the offence has been committed: 
in whole or in part within the territory of the Member State concerned; or 
(b)  by one of their nationals or a person with habitual residence in the territory of 
the Member State concerned; or 
for the benefit of a legal person that has its head office in the territory of the 
Member State concerned. 
When establishing jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1(a), Member States 
shall ensure that the jurisdiction includes cases where: 
(a)  the offender commits the offence when physically present on the territory of 
the Member State concerned, whether or not the offence is against an 
information system on its territory; or 

(b)  the offence is against an information system on the territory of the Member 
State concerned, whether or not the offender commits the offence when 
physically present on its territory. 
Article 14 
Exchange of information 
For the purpose of exchange of information relating to the offences referred to in 
Articles 3 to 8, and in accordance with data protection rules, Member States shall 
make use of the existing network of operational points of contact available 24 hours 
a day and seven days a week. Member States shall also ensure that they have 
procedures in place so that they can respond within a maximum of eight hours to 
urgent requests. Such response shall at least indicate whether and in what form the 
request for help will be answered and when. 
Member States shall inform the Commission of their appointed point of contact for 
the purpose of exchanging information on the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8. 
The Commission shall forward that information to the other Member States. 
Article 15 
Monitoring and statistics 
Member States shall ensure that a system is in place for the recording, production 
and provision of statistical data on the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8.  
The statistical data referred to in paragraph 1 shall, as a minimum, cover the number 
of offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8 reported to the Member States and the 
follow-up given to these reports, and shall indicate on an annual basis the number of 
reported cases investigated, the number of persons prosecuted, and the number of 
persons convicted for the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8.  
Member States shall transmit the data collected according to this Article to the 
Commission. They shall also ensure that a consolidated review of these statistical 
reports is published. 
Article 16 
Repeal of Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA is hereby repealed, without prejudice to the obligations 
of the Member States relating to the time limits for transposition into national law. 
References to the repealed Framework Decision shall be construed as references to this 
Article 17 
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [two years from adoption] at 

the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those 
provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive. When 
Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive 
or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. 
Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions 
of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 
Article 18 
By [FOUR YEARS FROM ADOPTION] and every three years thereafter, the 
Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of this Directive in the Member States including any necessary proposal. 
Member States shall send to the Commission all the information that is appropriate 
for drawing up the report referred to in paragraph 1. The information shall include a 
detailed description of legislative and non-legislative measures adopted in 
implementing this Directive.  
Article 19 
Entry into force 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth  day following its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union
Article 20 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the European Parliament 
For the Council 
The President 
The President 

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