Dear European External Action Service,

Under the right of access to documents in the EU treaties, as developed in Regulation 1049/2001, I am requesting the following: Any documents pertaining to the review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, announced on 20 May, 2025 by High Representative Kaja Kallas, in the context of potential violations to Article 2 of the Agreement.

Please provide any documents or correspondence related to the process of reviewing the EU-Israel association agreement, including any input or interference from any other stakeholders, including specifically contact between European Commission leaders and European Commission Coordinator Katharina von Schnurbein, Israel's EU Ambassador Haim Regev, or Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa'ar.

Yours faithfully,
Kian Seara Rey

Dear EEAS ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS,

I hereby send this as a reminder to fulfill my 14 August request. By law, it should have been responded to promptly and by August 25, 2025.

Yours sincerely,

Kian Seara Rey

Dear European External Action Service,

Please pass this on to the person who reviews confirmatory applications.

I am filing the following confirmatory application with regards to my access to documents request 'EU-Israel association agreement'.

I firstly want to thank you for your response identifying and explaining the documents that you have on file that relate to my request. I would, however, like to appeal the decision to not disclose those documents through this confirmatory application because I believe there is an overriding public interest in transparency.

The decision to not provide the documents was predicated on the notion that, according to your response, "their disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards defence and military matters, the EU’s international relations, as well as the institution’s decision-making process, as per Article 4(1)(a), second and third indents, and Article 4(3), first and second sub-paragraphs,” of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

I feel the need to address this in steps. First, let’s consider the question of whether the release of these documents would “undermine the protection of the public interest as regards defence and military matters” and “the EU’s international relations,” which relates to Article 4(1)(a), second and third indents, of the Regulation.

I argue that it would not “undermine the protection of the public interest as regards defence and military matters.” EU-Israel trade relations have little to do with “defence and military matters,” per se. The EU-Israel Association Agreement, after all, primarily deals with questions of trade. While Title I of the Agreement does address “political dialogue” between the EU and Israel, the rest of the Agreement addresses issues more to do with trade and economic relations than with “defence and military matters.” Those topics include: The free movement of goods (Title II); establishment and supply of services (Title III); capital, payments, procurement, intellectual property, etc (Title IV); “economic cooperation" (Title VI); and so on. In fact, the topics of defence and military matters are hardly even mentioned. Search the Agreement text and you will find the words “defence” and “military” only appear one time each throughout the entire Agreement, in Article 76(b), wherein the context is wholly irrelevant to the discussion here. So, it seems pretty evident to me that the disclosure of documents related to the review of this trade agreement would not undermine anything in terms of the rather unrelated topics of “defence and military matters.” Defending the refusal to disclose the documents requested on this basis, I believe, would require conceding that trade and economic relations between the EU and Israel are overwhelmingly characterized by “defence and military matters” – or in other words, that the trade in arms and military equipment between EU member states and Israel is significant enough so as to dominate the Agreement and thus transcending trade/economics to enter into the realm of defence/military, despite those being two separate realms, and despite the text of the Agreement making far more references to mundane topics like agriculture, energy, tourism, etc., than it does to things like missiles, ammunition, aircraft parts, communication devices, etc. This appears to be an unconvincing argument.

It is also highly debatable whether maintaining the current state of trade with Israel (as it relates to defence and the military) is really in the “public interest,” though the concept of “public interest” is hardly defined in EU law. I would argue, however, that the public interest, in this case, may be quite the opposite. For example, there has been a remarkable amount of public pressure on EU governments to stop trading with Israel, especially in military products, particularly in Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. So even if we were, hypothetically, mainly talking here about “defence and military” trade, I find it difficult to make the case that guarding this type of trade is even really in any kind of “public interest.”

Moving on: Can it be argued that the release of these documents undermines “the EU’s international relations”? Article 4(1)(a), third indent, of the Regulation (referenced in your response) states that documents cannot be released if they “undermine the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.” I think, again, that it is rather difficult to argue on behalf of the “public interest” in this context. But beyond that, and insofar as the question of “international relations”: It appears that the very fact the Agreement was put to review at all is itself testament to the highly fraught international relations between the EU and Israel, as well being indicative of mounting pressure from the European public. Take these few examples: In June of this year, after about a year and half of Israel’s renewed assault on Gaza beginning October 7, 2023, over half of EU member states backed launching a review of the Agreement. On Sep 17, 2025, the Commission proposed suspending certain parts of the Agreement and sanctions on extremist ministers of the Israeli government and violent settlers. Israeli leaders, in response, have not been shy in expressing their displeasure. Reporting from Euroactiv on Jun 22, 2025 describes an Israeli foreign ministry communication to the EU in which the Israeli Foreign Ministry decried the EU’s review process as “outrageous and indecent”, and “rife with bias.” I find it hard to believe that releasing documents on the review process would do any more damage to these frayed international relations than these actual, tangible measures like sanctions have not already done, as evidenced by these harsh diplomatic exchanges.

I would also interrogate what exactly we understand to be “the public interest as regards international relations,” as referenced in Article 4(1)(a), third indent, of the Regulation. The exact nature of the “public interest” in the context of this political topic is also highly debatable. A huge number of people across the EU have continually voiced their opposition to EU trade with Israel, not just via the democratic avenue of public protest, but also by personally boycotting Israeli products and institutions, with some significant organized campaigns pushing private and public institutions to cut ties with Israel. For example, the Guardian reported on 13 September, 2025 that: “A host of universities across Norway, Belgium and Spain have cut ties with Israeli institutions. Others, including Trinity College Dublin, followed suit this summer.” I consider that the argument, in pointing to Article 4(1)(a), third indent, of the Regulation, is that it is in “the public interest” to maintain good relations with Israel and that disclosure of the documents requested could be detrimental to those relations. I argue that it is not abundantly obvious that maintaining relations with Israel is necessarily in any public interest, and that this notion is immediately put into serious question upon even a cursory look at the current state of public sentiment across the EU. The very fact that the EU-Israel Association Agreement is under review at all is indicative of this.

In any case, Article 4(3), first and second sub-paragraphs, of the Regulation (also referenced in your response) both state that disclosure of a document “… shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.” I argue that there is indeed an overriding public interest in disclosure. Protests against the military assault on Gaza, some with participants numbering in the tens of thousands, have become routine in nearly every EU member state over the last two years. Crowd numbers are notoriously hard to calculate, but this wave of protests is almost certainly the largest seen in the EU since at least the protests against the Iraq war in 2003, in which millions participated. It would also be hard to quantify exact levels of public interest in specifically the issue of EU-Israel trade, but mounting public pressure of EU governments is evidenced by the decisions made by several EU governments to recognize the state of Palestine within the past several months. Norway, Ireland, and Spain recognized the State of Palestine on 28 May, 2024. Slovenia recognized Palestine on 4 June, 2024. In September, 2025, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, and Malta recognized Palestine. Belgium has signaled they may follow suit under the right conditions. I argue that the pressure on EU governments required to force this unprecedented policy shift reflects a very high level of public interest in EU-Israel relations and underscores the overriding public interest in the disclosure of the documents I requested. Take these further examples of EU governments acting on this public pressure: At the UN, 13 EU states voted in favor of a September 2024 resolution (with 12 EU states abstaining and only 2 voting against) that demanded Israel “brings to an end without delay its unlawful presence” in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. There was also majority support from EU states on a resolution on 12 December, 2023, only about two months after the attacks of Oct 7, which sought to demand an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire” and the “unconditional release of all hostages.” Among all 27 EU member states, only two voted against the Resolution, 17 members voted in favor, forming a majority, while the remaining eight abstained. Overall, it appears opinions have been shifting, indicating a greater amount of engagement with the issue of EU-Israel relations. An article from the Guardian from 3 June, 2025 showed “public support for Israel in Western Europe at lowest ever recorded by YouGov.” It is clear that a huge number of Europeans are invested in the topic, making the disclosure of information about the review of the Agreement clearly in the public interest. Here, I believe this aforementioned exception to Article 4(3) of the Regulation should override the decision made to deny the disclosure.

Moving on: I would argue that the same exception in Article 4(3) of the Regulation applies to the notion that the release of these documents would undermine “the institution’s decision-making process.” In any case – has a decision not already been made? It has been five months. Here I would even venture to go back to the very beginning and simply invoke the very reason for making this request: The lack of transparency from the EEAS and the Commission on the process of the review of the Agreement. It is clearly in the public interest not only to know what has been discussed behind closed doors in regards a topic so immensely important to so many people, but indeed also try to account for why exactly the process has taken so long. In this regard, and as I believe is self-evident, the current political climate and overwhelming public sentiment speaks for itself in making the case for “an overriding public interest in disclosure” in this case.

If, despite my appeal, the documents in whole still cannot be provided, I ask that they be provided at least in part (partial access) or with redactions of personal information.

A full history of my request and all correspondence is available at this address: https://www.asktheeu.org/request/eu_isra...

Yours faithfully,

Kian Seara Rey