How spoofed vessel tracks undermine maritime border surveillance and what analysts are trained to do about it.

The request was refused by European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Daniel Lasenberg

Dear European Border and Coast Guard Agency,

Under the right of access to documents in the EU treaties, as developed in Regulation 1049/2001, I am requesting documents which contain the following information:

Any documents concerning the detection of AIS spoofing or GNSS interference in the context of maritime border surveillance;

Any guidance, procedures, or training materials for FRONTEX analysts on identifying spoofed or manipulated AIS vessel tracks;

Any use of EMSA's repository of AIS spoofing cases or SafeSeaNet data in FRONTEX operations;

Any internal assessments of how GNSS interference affects the integrity of the EU maritime situational picture used for border security.

I request partial access where full disclosure is not possible.

Yours faithfully,

Daniel Lasenberg

European Border and Coast Guard Agency

New information regarding your application is available under this link
[1]https://pad.frontex.europa.eu/PadCases/P...
Token: 37LZX0T520
Email: [FOI #17402 email]
Case Id: PAD-2026-00267

Please be informed that the link is valid until Saturday, 30 September
2028

[2]Frontex
European Border and Coast Guard Agency
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Tel: +48 22 205 9500 · Fax: +48 22 205 9501
[3]www.frontex.europa.eu

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