Brussels, 31 March 2021
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WORKING PAPER
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WORKING DOCUMENT
From:
General Secretariat of the Council
To:
Delegations
Subject:
Foreign interference and influence operations: The need for joint EU responses
Non-paper by DK, RO, CZ, EE, FI, LV and NL
Delegations will find in Annex a Non-paper on Foreign interference and influence operations: The need
for joint EU responses by DK, RO, CZ, EE, FI, LV, NL.
WK 4514/2021 INIT
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Non-paper – DK, RO, CZ, EE, FI, LV, NL
Foreign interference and influence operations: The need for joint EU responses
Foreign interference and influence operations1 have become a permanent part of the security
policy landscape and the broader picture of hybrid threats.
Countering hybrid threats requires a comprehensive, whole-of government and whole-of-
society approach – both resilience and countermeasures – at the national and EU level. This
paper relates to the development of the Strategic Compass and particularly focuses on the
implementation of the European Democracy Action Plan, which calls for new EU tools for
countering foreign interference and influence operations.
By illegitimately influencing a target audience using coercive or deceptive means, such as
coordinated and inauthentic dissemination of disinformation on social media platforms, hack-
and-leak attacks, or the establishment of false media outlets, foreign interference and
influence operations take advantage of our democratic and open societies. Such actions
undermine our security, prosperity and values. Particularly as digital tools enable rapid online
proliferation of disinformation and other aspects of foreign interference and influence
operations. COVID-19 has highlighted that malicious state and non-state actors will take
advantage of any opportunity, even a global pandemic. The EU and Member States must be
able to respond firmly to foreign interference and influence operations to deter future foreign
attacks on our societies.
The need to respond to foreign interference and influence operations is widely accepted and
the time is right for tangible proposals for joint diplomatic responses. We believe that
diplomatic tools for responding to foreign interference and influence operations should
include, but not be limited to, the following four tools. Moreover, we offer guiding principles
for the use of these tools in the succeeding section.
We emphasize that the ideas put forward in this non-paper are meant to encourage further
EU discussion on the specifics of tools for responding to foreign interference and influence
operations. Furthermore, we underscore that beyond the responses presented in this paper,
there remains a need for increased transparency on online platforms and access to data for
researchers and civil society, which would both have a preventative value in itself by
increasing societal awareness and resilience, and improve the basis for diplomatic responses.
Tools for joint responses
Strengthen dialogue with media, academia, and tech companies:
Establishing a running
format for Member States’ joint dialogues with civil society to share knowledge, raise
awareness of the threat and discuss concrete cases. This dialogue should build on the efforts
by the European Commission, EEAS StratCom and INTCEN to map interference and influence
operations and the actors behind them.
1Foreign interference and influence operations can be broadly defined in line with the European Democracy
Action Plan (COM/2020/790 final), this paper will focus on information influence operations and foreign
interference in the information space.
Non-paper – DK, RO, CZ, EE, FI, LV, NL
Diplomatic dialogue: Joint demarches and EU dialogue, if appropriate, with states behind
foreign interference and influence operations are among the options to leverage the EU’s
diplomatic power and clearly signal that foreign interference and influence operations are
unacceptable.
Public attribution: The EU and member states publicly exposing an actor behind a foreign
interference and influence operation will increase reputational costs for the perpetrator, and
raise public awareness. Publically attributing an operation, while remaining a national
decision within the competence of the member states, would target the covert nature of
these operations and highlight member states’ determination to hold the perpetrator
responsible.
Restrictive measures: By utilising the existing sanctions regimes such as the cyber sanctions
regime to the full and, if deemed necessary, exploring creating a new targeted sanctions
regime entirely, the EU could impose concrete costs on the perpetrators behind foreign
interference and influence operations to change their strategic calculus and raise public
awareness.
Principles for responding
Respect for the fundamental rights: All responses must be in line with the fundamental rights,
including the freedom of expression and information, as well as data protection, which
underpin the founding values of the EU.
Proportionality: The response should be proportional with the foreign interference and
influence operation it addresses. Significant operations should entail a significant joint
response. Strong technical evidence should be the underpinning for any such joint response.
International cooperation: Close cooperation on joint responses, such as declarations,
statements, demarches, attributions and restrictive measures, with our partners, particularly
NATO and its member states, including the US, the UK, Canada, and Norway should be further
explored. Such coordination must not become a hindrance for prompt reactions. Developing
a conceptually similar terminology would contribute to stronger cooperation.
Stronger deterrence: Joint responses will significantly strengthen our deterrence. However,
for these responses to contribute to deterrence we must be able and willing to employ them
quickly and effectively to concrete cases.
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