WG Public Perception Final version Sept 23.pdf

Ref. Ares(2023)6535859 - 27/09/2023
CCUS Forum WG on public perception of CCUS
Working Group Paper
September 2023
- final version -
This paper is an outcome of the Working Group (WG) on public perception of CCUS, set up by DG
ENER in 2023, as a fol ow-up to the 2022 CCUS Forum1 and anticipating the development of the EU’s
strategy, currently announced as the Industrial Carbon Management Strategy (hereafter, the Strategy).
The aim of this WG is to support the European Commission (hereafter, the Commission) by studying
and communicating how public perception of and engagement with CCUS emerge, and what role they
play in delivering CCUS in the EU. The main objective of this WG is to contribute to the upcoming
Commission’s  Communication  on  the  Strategy,  expected  by  the  end  of  2023,  by  providing  the
Commission with recommendations on accounting for public perception of CCUS in the Strategy.
This paper aims to present the main concepts and the state of knowledge on public perception of CO2
capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) and technology-based carbon dioxide removals (CDRs) in the
EU, by building up on discussions hold during the Working Group meetings and on existing literature.


1   DG ENER (n.d.). CCUS Forum
1

1
The importance of public perception of CCUS
The role of CCUS technologies in climate policy portfolios and emissions reduction scenarios has long
been  debated  and  often  still  is,  leading  to  the  slow  deployment  of  the  technology  and  projects.
However,  framing  the  technology  is  essential  to  understand  where  it  stands  in  terms  of  public
perception and how to address related concerns.
In  this  regard,  it  becomes  essential  to  define  the  topic  and  framework  of  the  discussion  -  CCUS
technologies and public perception, engagement and acceptance, respectively - and to outline the
reasons for the importance of public perception of CCUS technologies, such as the rationale behind
the development of the technology, as well as the concerns related to its deployment, and how the EU
is addressing them in its EU regulatory framework for this technologies.
1.1
The case for CCUS technologies: motivation and rationale
The use of CCUS technologies dates back to the 1950s when some of these technologies were first
introduced to improve oil recovery in the United States of America. But it is only since the 1990s that
CCUS  technologies  became  associated  with  efforts  to  decarbonize  the  energy  sector,  and  more
recently industry2, worldwide. In Europe, the first carbon capture and storage (CCS) project - Sleipner
CO2 Storage – was implemented in 1996 in Norway3.
Since the 1990s, CCUS technologies have progressively gained international attention. In 2008, the G8
committed to deploying 20 large-scale CCS projects globally, and two years later, negotiators at the
16th Conference of Parties (COP16) recognised CCS as an eligible project activity under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) and thus as a climate mitigation tool.
However, in spite of this international recognition, the implementation of CCUS projects to date has
been slow for many reasons. Due to the relative lack of support under the CDM, as well as low and
unstable carbon prices in geographies such as the EU, there has been a lack of investment in CCUS
deployment. Generally, these shortcomings have not been adequately addressed by national funding
programmes or policies to incentivise CCUS4.
Currently, key organisations, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the
International Energy Agency (IEA), have recognised CCUS technologies as being necessary for climate
mitigation in different degrees in a wide range of scenarios to achieve net-zero emissions5.
CCUS technologies also have the potential to contribute to a just transition, which the EU defines as a
transition  to  climate  neutrality  which  leaves  no  one  behind6.  CCUS  technologies  can  help  create
opportunities and potentially prevent the negative social impacts of the transition to a climate-neutral
economy, for instance by offering employment to workers from the oil and gas sector due to the

2   Ma, Ji. Li. L., Wang. H., Du. Y., Ma, Ju., Zhang, X., Wang, Z. (2022). Carbon Capture and Storage: History and the Road Ahead.
3   Global CCS Institute (2022). Global status of CCS 2022
4   Marcu, A., Zakkour, P., and Zaman, P. (2021). Scaling up and trading CO2 storage units (CSUs) under Article 6 of the Paris
Agreement
5   For more information, please consult the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), Working Group III, and the IEA’s Net Zero by
2050 Report
6   European Commission (n.d.). The Just Transition Mechanism: making sure no one is left behind
3

similarity  in  required  competencies  between  this  sector  and  CCUS  project  implementation  and
management.7
1.2
Scope of the paper and definitions
The definition of CCS used in this paper fol ows that of the CO2 Storage Directive (2009/31/EC) in its
preamble.  The  Directive  defines  CCS  as  consisting  of  “the  capture  of  carbon  dioxide  (CO2)  from
industrial  installations,  its  transport  to  a  storage  site  and  its  injection  into  a  suitable underground
geological formation for the purposes of permanent storage”.
Next to CCS, CO2 capture and utilisation (CCU) is also a technology that falls within the scope of this
paper.  A  comprehensive  definition  of  CCU  does  not  yet  exist  in  the  EU  legislative  framework,  as
different uses of CO2 are regulated individually8. This paper uses the IPCC definition of CCU, namely
that  CCU  is  a  “process  in  which  carbon  dioxide  (CO2)  is  captured  and  the  carbon  then  used  in  a
product”9.  This  broad  definition  covers  a  variety  of  CCU  applications  with  different  implications
regarding their climate impact.
Finally, technology-based carbon dioxide removals (CDRs) are also considered under the scope of this
paper as they are based on CCUS technologies. The main examples of CDRs are direct air carbon
capture and storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), among others.
An EU-level definition has not yet been adopted10. The definition used in this paper is that of the IPCC,
which defines carbon dioxide removals as “anthropogenic activities removing carbon dioxide (CO2)
from  the  atmosphere  and  durably  storing  it  in  geological,  terrestrial,  or  ocean  reservoirs,  or  in
products”11.
CCS, CCU and CDRs rely at least partly on the same process chain, which can be split into three main
stages: (1) capture and, if necessary, preparation; (2) transport; and (3) storage or utilization of CO2.
Each process chain component can use different technologies or solutions (e.g., CO2 transport can be
done by pipeline, road, rail, or maritime modes)12.
The terminology used in this paper is aligned with that currently used by the Commission. Therefore,
the term “CCUS” and “CCUS technologies” wil  be used to encompass all applications of CO2 capture,
utilisation and storage technologies, including technology-based CDRs, along the entire process chain,
unless otherwise specified, and irrespective of their contribution to climate change mitigation. As the

7   Bell, R., and Parmiter, P. (2020). The role of CCUS in a just transition. 3rd report of the Thematic Working Group on Policy,
regulation and public perception
8   The three most common CCU pathways are (1) combining captured CO2 with renewable hydrogen to make renewable fuels of
non-biological origin (RFNBOs); (2) using captured CO2 as a feedstock to replace fossil resources for chemicals production; and
(3) storing CO2 in construction products, notably via mineral carbonation. CCU pathways have different climate impacts
according to the way CO2 is utilised
9   IPCC (2022). Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), Working Group III. Annex I: Glossary. Page 1796
10   In Article 2 of the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals
(COM2022 672 final - 2022/0394 (COD)), carbon removal is defined as “the storage of atmospheric or biogenic carbon within
geological carbon pools, biogenic carbon pools, long-lasting products and materials, and the marine environment, or the
reduction of carbon release from a biogenic carbon pool to the atmosphere”. The proposal has not yet been adopted. The text is
available at https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/fad4a049-ff98-476f-b626-b46c6afdded3_en
11   IPCC (2022). Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), Working Group III. Annex I: Glossary. Page 1796
12   For more details refer to the issue paper of WG 1 on CO2 infrastructure entitled ‘ Vision for Carbon Capture, Utilisation and
Storage in the EU’. It is available on the Commission’s website at CCUS Forum
4

focus  is  on  public  perception,  such  analysis  is  out  of  the  scope  of  this  paper13.  Furthermore,  a
technology-neutral approach  is  adopted, with  no  intention  to advocate for the  implementation of
specific CCUS pathways, technologies, or applications.
This paper also frequently uses the terms public perception, public engagement and public acceptance.
Firstly,  the word  “public” is  used  in  this paper  to refer  to all  CCUS  stakeholders  including citizens,
policymakers,  NGOs,  technology  providers,  project  developers,  and  others.  Where  findings  refer
specifically to certain stakeholders, this is specified. Secondly, public perception of CCUS technologies
refers to the beliefs and opinions about CCUS technologies that exist among stakeholders. Thirdly,
public  engagement  with  CCUS  technologies  refers  to  the  involvement  of  stakeholders  in  activities
relevant to CCUS, such as policymaking or project development. This ranges from sharing information
to participatory decision-making. Finally, public acceptance of CCUS technologies refers to the degree
to which the public accepts CCUS technologies and can occur at different levels (as shown in Chapter
3).
This paper broadly explores public perception of and engagement with CCUS technologies. The goal
is to provide insights into the complexities of public perception of and engagement with CCUS, by
focusing on how public perception is formed and why it is important for CCUS technologies.
1.3
Why does CCUS need public perception and engagement?
CCUS technologies are being progressively included in EU and global climate policies and have the
potential to play an important role in the transition to climate neutrality. This already cal s for informing
and  engaging  all  stakeholders  –  citizens,  businesses,  institutions  and  organisations  –  during  the
policymaking and project implementation processes. In addition, there are several specific reasons for
incorporating public perception and engagement into CCUS deployment.
Firstly, despite the international recognition of CCUS as a climate mitigation tool, there are concerns
that its deployment may undermine efforts to implement other emissions reduction measures. At the
same time, in the EU, there is a wide variation between the Member States in terms of the political
attitude towards CCUS. For example, the Netherlands and Denmark are leaders in commercial-scale
CCUS projects, while other countries, including Germany and Poland, currently have a ban on onshore
CO2 storage.
Furthermore,  CCUS  is  rarely  included  in  a  meaningful  way  in national climate neutrality  strategies,
making it difficult to clearly ascertain how CCUS wil  be used as part of a portfolio of climate mitigation
measures. The strategic approach to CCUS is also fragmented  - for example, while some Member
States include CCS and/or CCU in their national energy and climate plans (NECPs)14, CDRs are usually
included in national long-term strategies submitted to the UNFCCC and are governed by a variety of
policies15, with little room for public engagement16. These differences result in a fragmented political

13   For more details, refer to the issue paper of WG 1 on CO2 infrastructure, entitled ‘ Vision for Carbon Capture, Utilisation and
Storage in the EU’, and the issue paper of WG 2, entitled ‘Vision for Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage in the EU’. They are
available on the Commission’s website at CCUS Forum
14   Wettengel, J. (17 Januart 2023). “Quest for climate neutrality puts CCS back on the table in Germany”
15   As an exception, Germany is the only EU country to have concrete plans to develop a dedicated CDR strategy. Ibid
16   Meyer-Ohlendorf, N., and Spasova, D. (01 September 2022). Carbon Dioxide Removals in EU Member States. National
frameworks for Carbon Dioxide Removals: State of play and how to improve it
5

signal and a potentially incoherent image of CCUS technologies, which could result in vacil ating public
perceptions and opinions (see Chapter 3).
Secondly, CCUS technologies are seen by some as presenting well-known and researched risks in the
area of environmental and health safety, such as CO2 leakage from storage sites. Standardised risk
management  procedures  are  being  developed  reflecting  the  current  state  of  implementation.
Moreover, additional perceived risks wil  influence public perception, alongside the capital intensity
and high cost of CCUS projects, which means that these projects require public funding to be deployed,
in most cases.
The need for public funding, as well as the fact that CCUS projects are large infrastructure projects,
means that their implementation requires good governance and involvement of the public, particularly
local communities affected by actual construction and deployment.
Public  perception  can  also  be  significantly  affected  by  proximity  to  projects.  This  is  sometimes
discussed as the so-called “not under my backyard” (NUMBY) effect, which is manifested when local
communities  or  individuals  oppose  the  development  of  projects  close  to  their  homes.  For  these
reasons, appropriate consideration of public perception and efforts for engaging the public are key
components  of  both  the  policymaking  and  project  deployment  processes  for  CCUS.  Such  siting
decisions  require  interaction  with  affected  local  communities,  as  they  raise  questions  about  the
distribution of benefits and burdens within societies, as well as risk and safety measures.
Finally,  learnings  from  efforts  to  deploy  other  technologies  further  evidence  the  importance  of
considering public perception when deploying CCUS. Other approaches and technologies, including
nuclear  power,  large  hydropower  projects,  transmission  lines,  and  environmental  product  markets,
have been impacted by various concerns from the public. However, in many cases, these concerns
changed due to exogenous effects, for example, the recent shift in public perception on nuclear power
in the EU, which moved from a risk-based framework to an economic-based framework related to the
energy crisis17. It is therefore important to take into account the impact of these exogenous effects on
public perception, which can change perceptions of CCUS technologies, sometimes drastically, based
on which issues become more relevant.
1.4
How current EU policies and regulations on CCUS approach
public perception and engagement
The EU has a number of policies and regulations relevant to CCUS, as well as a number of recently
launched regulatory initiatives and consultation processes (such as the proposal for a Net Zero Industry
Act, the carbon removal certification framework (CRCF), as well as the CCUS Forum and its WGs). These
demonstrate  an  increased  interest  in  CCUS  on  the  part  of  the  EU  institutions  and  wil   invariably
influence public perception by signal ing the political wil  to deploy these technologies.
However, CCUS-related policies and frameworks at the EU level mostly limit themselves to highlighting
the importance of public perception and engagement in CCUS project implementation, leaving it up
to  the  Member  States  to  specify  how  this  engagement  should  be  operationalised.  Examples  are
provided by both the CO2 Storage Directive and the CRCF. The former recommends efforts on CCS
demonstration projects which include, inter alia, a legal framework for public awareness measures, and

17   Fondation Robert Schuman (27 March 2023). A return to grace for nuclear power in European public opinion? Some elements of
a rapid paradigm shift
6

states that environmental information relating to CO2 storage should be made publicly accessible. The
latter references the Aarhus Convention (Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006), which obligates the Member
States and the EU to guarantee public access to information by establishing rights for the public and
imposing obligations on public authorities18. However, the CRCF proposal does not specify how the
provisions of this Convention should be considered regarding CDRs.

18   European Commission (n.d.). The Aarhus Convention and the EU
7

2
What influences public perception of CCUS?
Public awareness of CCUS technologies has historically been low across European countries, and this
is still the case today.19,20,21 This lack of awareness and knowledge is found among citizens, but also in
institutions,  organizations  and  policymakers.22  At  the  same  time,  research  has  examined  the
perceptions  of  citizens  more  often  than  those  of  other  groups.  Studies  have  also  identified  some
variations, indicating that awareness and knowledge tend to be higher in some countries that are more
actively involved in CCUS technologies, such as Norway.23 Overal , this means that current perceptions
of CCUS technologies are still emerging which means they are subject to change.
In terms of public perception, earlier studies have documented scepticism, particularly towards CO2
storage, for example around unsuccessful projects in the Netherlands, Poland or Germany. 24 More
recent studies, partly from the same countries, suggest a neutral or slightly positive public perception
of CCUS technologies.252627 After a decline, more large-scale CCS projects are currently announced a
decade ago,28 and the debate on the role of CCUS in climate change mitigation has shifted to focus
more on industrial emissions rather than those from coal-fired power generation. However, it is not
yet  possible  to  draw  conclusions  on  the  extent  to  which  this  different  context  has  influenced  the
changes in perceptions observed in the studies. Furthermore, it is important to note that since the
2011 Eurobarometer survey29, there has been no study on public perceptions of CCUS technologies
covering al  EU Member States.
Perceptions of CCUS technologies vary due to a number of factors, including the geographical and
political context, existing levels of acceptance, the specific application or pathway being investigated,
and the effectiveness of communication and participation activities.
2.1
Acceptance dimensions: perceptions in a multi-actor system
When looking at perceptions through the lens of social acceptance, it is helpful to distinguish between
three dimensions. Socio-political acceptance refers to the general social climate towards a technology
or innovation within a society (see Figure 1), i.e. it refers to typical discussions about an issue or socially

19   European Commission (2011). Special Eurobarometer 364. Public Awareness and Acceptance of CO2 capture and storage
20   Whitmarsh, L.; Xenias, D.; Jones, C.R. (2019): Framing effects on public support for carbon capture and storage
21   Dütschke, E.; Alsheimer, S.; Bertoldo, R.; Ataberk, B.; Delicado, A.; Gonçalves, L. et al. (2022): Community Acceptance. Findings
from community profiles and first local survey
22   Karimi, F.; Komendantova, N. (2017): Understanding experts’ views and risk perceptions on carbon capture and storage in three
European countries
23   Whitmarsh, L.; Xenias, D.; Jones, C.R. (2019): Framing effects on public support for carbon capture and storage
24   Oltra, C.; Upham, P.; Riesch, H.; et al. (2012): Public Responses to CO2 Storage Sites: Lessons from Five European Cases
25   Whitmarsh, L.; Xenias, D.; Jones, C.R. (2019): Framing effects on public support for carbon capture and storage.
26   BVEG (2023): Das denkt Deutschland über die Gas- und Ölförderung im eigenen Land
27   Oltra, C.; Dütschke, E.; Preuß, S.; Gonçalves, L.; Germán, S. (2022): What influences public attitudes and acceptance of CCUS
technologies on the national and regional level? Results from a survey study in France and Spain
28   e.g. Global CCS Institute: 3. Global Status of CCS
29   European Commission (2011). Special Eurobarometer 364. Public Awareness and Acceptance of CO2 capture and storage
8

desirable  opinions.  Socio-political  acceptance  provides  the  general  background  against  which
perception develops and is shaped by opinion leaders and the media on the one hand, and by policy
makers on the other. As mentioned above, surveys can provide a good image of the current state of
socio-political acceptance.The second dimension, community acceptance, is relevant when it comes to
siting decisions and refers to the attitudes and behaviours of those residing or conducting activity
close to an installation, or others who are somehow affected by an innovation or technology without
actual y using it. Finally, the third dimension refers to market acceptance: the adoption of a technology
by actors in the relevant market, i.e. investors, supply and demand side as well as intermediaries such
as installers, consultants, etc. In the case of CCUS, these market actors include, for example, energy-
intensive industries as CO2 sources, operators of CO2 transport systems and, on the demand side, CO2
users or storage site operators. It is important to note that all of these actors play a role in the overall
system, e.g. because new developments may change their business models or affect their operations.
All  of  these  actors  are  needed to  some  extent  for the  emergence  of  a  functioning  system.  Socio-
political acceptance interacts with community and market acceptance, which also overlap - however,
these three dimensions of acceptance are also partly independent of each other. Differentiating these
dimensions can contribute to more clarity in further analysing perceptions of CCUS and developing
the societal debate around these technologies.
This  differentiation  also  points  to  the  different  scales  of  discussions  around  perceptions  and
acceptance,  i.e.  the  different  political  levels  (socio-political  acceptance)  and  the  local  project  level,
connected by the market level. A variation of this approach has also been applied recently: for example,
the  GEFISS30  project  uses  a  similar  conceptualisation,  distinguishing  technology  legitimacy  (socio-
political level) and the quality of deployment (local level).

30   The aim of the GEFISS research and development project is to build a foundation of knowledge on social governance in the field
of subsurface engineering in the context of the energy transition. It is implemented by a multidisciplinary team, funded by a
public and private institutions from France. https://www.gefiss.eu/en
9

Figure 1:
Dimensions of acceptance for CCUS (based on Wüstenhagen 200731)

2.2
Differences across Europe
European countries have adopted different policy approaches to climate change mitigation, and within
that foresee different roles for CCUS technologies, as mentioned in Chapter 1. 32,33,34 These can be
interpreted as manifestations of socio-political acceptance, or more specifically political support for
CCUS technologies. Countries mainly in the Northern part of Europe, in particular, Norway and more
recently  Denmark,  but  also  the  UK  and  the  Netherlands,  have  made  significant  steps  towards
implementing CCUS technologies. The technical potential for CO2 storage in these countries may have
expedited the development of CCUS projects. Additional y, the presence of traditionally higher levels
of trust in government and public institutions35 could have played a role in facilitating the coordination
of citizens and stakeholders in Scandinavian countries for the successful implementation of typically
complex CCUS projects. Countries such as France, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain are involved in
CCUS  technologies,  largely  through  EU-funded  projects  and  with  different  levels  of  (financial)
commitment, while the policy frameworks are not fully developed. In central Europe, Germany has not
been very active in developing CCUS, despite high industrial emissions, and is only now re-opening
the political debate on this topic. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries generally show a lack
of knowledge and awareness about CCUS among the public and stakeholders. In addition, attitudes
towards climate change mitigation are less favourable in some CEE countries compared to the rest of
the EU, and CCUS development is very slow. However, some project-based activities such as CCS4CEE
or StrategyCCUS are trying to ignite the societal debate around CCUS in CEE countries.

31   Wüstenhagen, R.; Wolsink, M.; Bürer, M.J. (2007): Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation. An introduction to the
concept
32
Rütters, H.; Hladik, V.; Koteras, A.; Schmidt-Hattenberger, C.; Tveranger, J,; Vincent, C.; Wheeler, W.H. (2021): State-of-play on
CO2 geological storage in 32 European countries - an update
33
Miu, L.; Nazare, D.; Catuti, M.; Postoiu, C.; Dudau, R. (2021) Assessment of current state, past experiences and potential for CCS
deployment in the CEE region. Current context and opportunities for CCU and CCS in Central and Eastern Europe
34   Duscha, V. (2022) Regulatory framework for CCUS in the EU and its Member States. An analysis for the EU, six Member States
and the UK
35   See analysis of trust in institutions such as by the EU or the OECD
10

2.3
Perceptions of different CCUS technologies
Research and past experiences have revealed variations in the support for and opposition to CCUS
technologies  depending  on  the  specific  application  case,  i.e.  where  the  CO2  is  captured  from,  or
whether and where it is stored and used. It is important to note that this section refers to findings from
research  and  is  not  intended  to  qualify  different  CCUS  pathways  or  technologies  as  more  or  less
preferable. Instead, it should be understood as a summary of the current knowledge on tendencies in
public perceptions and point to the need to increase societal awareness and public debate.
Looking  more  specifically  at  CCS,  studies  have  found  that  storage  of  CO2  from  energy-intensive
industries or in conjunction with biomass tends to be viewed more positively compared to the storage
of captured CO2 from coal-fired power generation. Positive perceptions of industrial CCS were found
to be linked to the perceived significance of the industry for a country's welfare.36 Other studies found
that scenarios involving the use of captured CO2 (CCU) tend to be viewed more positively than storage
scenarios  (CCS).37,3839This  difference  may  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  discussions  and  negative
perceptions  surrounding  CCUS  have  predominantly  centered  around  storage  sites,  while  CCU  has
received comparatively less scrutiny. Perceptions regarding storage may be influenced by a lack of
general familiarity with the subsurface and its characteristics, as well as its potential for exploitation
and associated risks, which may potentially contribute to more negative attitudes. These tendencies
need  to  be  contextualised  in  the  current  low  levels  of  knowledge  and  awareness  of  CCUS;  how
discussions on the climate mitigation impact of CCUS pathways wil  affect public perception remains
an open question.
Research around other CCUS components and application pathways is less extensive. The perception
of CCUS transport options have rarely been analysed, and public perception of CDR technologies, such
as  DACCS and  BECCS, has  been  less  researched.40  Some  studies  show  that  typically,  nature-based
solutions such as reforestation and afforestation are favoured by citizens over more technology-based
solutions such as direct air capture.41,42 This perception is also shared by some societal groups such as
NGOs.43

36   Dütschke, E.; Wohlfarth, K.; Höl er, S.; Viebahn, P.; Schumann, D.; Pietzner, K. (2016): Differences in the public perception of CCS in
Germany depending on CO 2 source, transport option and storage location
37
Linzenich, A.; Arning, K.; Offermann-van Heek, J.; Ziefle, M. (2019): Uncovering attitudes towards carbon capture storage and
utilization technologies in Germany. Insights into affective-cognitive evaluations of benefits and risks
38   Oltra, C.; Dütschke, E.; Preuß, S.; Gonçalves, L.; Germán, S. (2022): What influences public attitudes and acceptance of CCUS
technologies on the national and regional level? Results from a survey study in France and Spain
39   Whitmarsh, L.; Xenias, D.; Jones, C.R. (2019): Framing effects on public support for carbon capture and storage
40   Smith, S. M.; Geden, O.; Nemet, G. F.; Gidden, M. J.; Lamb, W. F.; Powis, C. et al. (2023): The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal - 1st
Edition. The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal
41   Jobin, M.; Siegrist, M.(2020): Support for the Deployment of Climate Engineering: A Comparison of Ten Different Technologies.
42   Bertram, C.; Merk, C. (2020): Public Perceptions of Ocean-Based Carbon Dioxide Removal: The Nature-Engineering Divide?
43   https://www.negemproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/NEGEM_D5.2_Stakeholder-views-on-the-business-case-for-
NETPs.pdf
https://www.negemproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/D-5.1-NETP-analogues-and-Social-License-to-Operate.pdf
11

In relation to CO2 storage, recent research indicates a range of opinions on potential storage areas,
encompassing scepticism as well as stated support.44 Furthermore, the same studies do not show clear
preferences for certain CO2 storage locations, e.g. onshore or offshore. While onshore storage is usually
nearer  to  inhabited  areas,  which  is  a  possible  source  of  concern,  offshore  storage  is  sometimes
perceived as a threat to fishing, tourism or marine or coastal habitats. This shows that perceptions of
CCUS need to be seen in the local and wider contexts of how CCUS technologies are used, and to what
end;  it  also  highlights  the  influence  of  local  context  and  circumstances  on  perceptions  of  the
technology. For example, in Denmark, the rapid progress in CO2 storage for imported emissions has
been attributed to a narrative of solidarity with other nations. Conversely, although perceptions of
CCUS  technologies  have  traditional y  been  positive  in  Norway,  a  recent  study  finds  that  these
perceptions may be less positive when it comes to imported CO2.45
Overal , perceptions of CCUS technologies are influenced by various factors, and understanding these
nuances is crucial in shaping effective strategies for public engagement. While several current projects
include research into perceptions and acceptance, European-wide studies and up-to-date comparisons
of different CCUS application scenarios are missing.
2.4
The role of local engagement and participation (project level)
A  variety  of  factors  influence  perceptions  of  CCUS  projects  on  the  local  level  (cf.  Figure  2).  It  is
important to note that the influence of these factors is not linear or simple, e.g. similar community
characteristics, such as familiarity with underground activities like mining or fossil fuel extraction, can
have a positive or a negative influence on attitudes towards CO2 storage, depending on the specific
local history and narratives including past incidents and their handling. Therefore, recent research, e.g.
the GEFISS project, recommends an analysis of the local context for a planned CCUS project early on.46
Similarly, engagement and participation processes are key factors and can take a variety of forms from
providing  information  to  local  audiences  to  including  them  in  the  decision-making  or  providing
financial compensation. What is most appropriate depends again on the project and the local context,
including existing practices. Based on a broad review47, other authors point out that factors such as (i)
feeling heard by the government and playing a role in the decision-making process and (i ) having a
positive  established  relationship  with  industry  contribute  to  a  more  favourable  perception  of  the
engagement process. These aspects are further detailed in Chapter 3.
Overal , this implies that local perceptions are influenced by multiple actors, and only some of the
factors  influencing  public  perception  of  CCUS  are  in  the  hands  of  project  developers  (e.g.  project
characteristics and the engagement process). Others, such as the socio-political context, are shaped
by actors outside the project context, such as national governments or media.

44   Dütschke, E.; Alsheimer, S.; Bertoldo, R.; Ataberk, B.; Delicado, A.; Gonçalves, L. et al. (2022): Community Acceptance. Findings
from community profiles and first local survey
45   Merk, C.; Nordø, Å.D.; Andersen, G.; Lægreid, O.M.; Tvinnereim, E. (2022): Don't send us your waste gases: Public attitudes toward
international carbon dioxide transportation and storage in Europe
46   https://www.gefiss.eu/en/en/
47   Rothkirch, J. von; Ejderyan, O. (2021): Anticipating the social fit of CCS projects by looking at place factors
12

Figure 2:
Factors influencing community responses from CCS (from Oltra et al., 201248)

In  summary,  the  existing  knowledge  on  CCUS  technology  perceptions  indicates  that  the  broader
societal discussion, particularly among citizens, is still at an early stage across Europe. Oftentimes, most
research  covers  countries  more  advanced  in  the  deployment  of  CCUS  technologies,  with  little
knowledge being produced for countries where CCUS deployment is less advanced. Due to the overall
limited level of public awareness of CCUS, perceptions of these technologies are likely to be subject to
change once the debate progresses and should be monitored by future research.

48   Oltra, C.; Upham, P.; Riesch, H.; et al. (2012): Public Responses to CO2 Storage Sites: Lessons from Five European Cases
13

3
The who and how of public perception
Communication about CCUS is an important factor in shaping public perception,49 particularly given
that the public has relatively low awareness of these technologies50,51 and as a result has vacil ating
opinions which are easily and heavily influenced by new information.52,53 Alongside the message being
shared, the conveyor of CCUS communication (the communication source), as well as the way the
communication is distributed (the method and channel of communication54), wil  in turn influence the
perception of CCUS of the target audience. For instance, it is likely that a CCS storage operator wil
generate  a  different  perception  of  the  risks  of  a  CCUS  project  than  a  representative  of  a  local
community. Trust in the communication source also influences opinions, with distrust of the source

being associated with more negative perceptions of these technologies.55
Any communication about CCUS needs to adopt the dual role of familiarizing audiences with CCUS,
by  providing  information  on  which  they  can  formulate  an  opinion,56  and  of  ensuring  open  and
transparent dialogue between the public and entities implementing CCUS (such as project developers),
tackling not just the risks of deploying a CCUS project but also those of not deploying it. Research on
public perception of CCUS and stakeholders’ inputs on the WG Public Perception both highlight the
complexity of the relationship between CCUS communication and public perception.57 This chapter
briefly outlines the role of CCUS communicators and of methods and channels of communication in

formulating perceptions of these technologies.
3.1
Communicators and communication methods
The  influence  of  the  communicator  and  the  communication  method  on  public  perception  of
technologies has been observed for instance for renewable energy,58,59 nuclear energy,60 and more
generally on climate change61. In addition, the public perception of lesser-known technologies, such

49   Boyd, A., 2017. Communicating about Carbon Capture and Storage
50   Daly, D., Wade, S., 2013. Message Mapping for CCUS Outreach: Testing Communications Through Focus Group Discussion
51   Dütschke, E., Duscha, V., 2022. Is there a future for CCUS in Europe? An analysis of the policy framework and societal support
52   Pietzner, K. et al., 2011. Public awareness and perceptions of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS): Insights from surveys
administered to representative samples in six European countries
53   Ashworth, P., 2010. Communication of carbon capture and storage: Outcomes from an international workshop to summarise the
current global position
54   Wright, S., Neimand, A., Steinman, M., 2021. Finding the Right Messenger for Your Message
55   Broecks, K. et al., 2021. How do people perceive carbon capture and storage for industrial processes? Examining factors
underlying public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (universiteitleiden.nl)
56   Daly, D., Wade, S., 2013. Message Mapping for CCUS Outreach: Testing Communications Through Focus Group Discussion
57   CCS Demonstration Project Network, 2011. Thematic Report: Knowledge-sharing event on public engagement
58   Zhou, J., 2022. Whose policy is it anyway? Public support for clean energy policy depends on the message and the messenger
59   Peterson, T.R., Stephens, J.C., Wilson, E.J., 2015. Public perception of and engagement with emerging low-carbon energy
technologies: A literature review
60   Bearth, A., Siegrist, M., 2021. The Social Amplification of Risk Framework: A Normative Perspective on Trust?
61   Bolsen, T., Palm, R., Kingsland, J., 2019. The Impact of Message Source on the Effectiveness of Communications About Climate
Change
14

as solar geoengineering, is likely to be highly influenced by how messages around these technologies
are framed.62 This could also apply to CCUS technologies, which are similarly lesser-known and which
in some cases involve the use of the subsurface, which cannot be perceived or experienced directly by

communication recipients and whose attributes are unfamiliar to many people.
3.1.1
Communicators
Public perception of CCUS can vary depending on who the communicator is. Journalists, institutional
representatives,  and  influential  individuals  (e.g.,  politicians,  celebrities,  local  leaders,  scientists)
interpret  and  disseminate  complex  issues  for  the  public,  through  various  channels,  and  become
information sources that the public looks to in order to col ect information and form opinions. These
communicators can both formulate a baseline understanding of and positioning on CCUS (e.g., by an
“opinion-maker” such as a politician endorsing CCUS as a climate mitigation tool), as well as deliver
messages around a specific CCUS project (e.g., by a “messenger” such as a developer promoting a
CCUS project planned for a certain location). This links to the differentiation between socio-political
and local levels of acceptance, as referred to in Chapter 2. For the purpose of this paper, opinion-
makers and messengers are considered under the umbrella term of “communicators”; however, it is

worth considering the different roles they have in public engagement with CCUS.
The role of communicators in influencing public perception has been widely researched in the context
of public messaging on critical issues, such as climate change or the Covid-19 pandemic. One research
theme relevant to CCUS is the observed polarisation of public opinion when political leadership has
divergent  opinions63,64  and  the  tendency  to  view  issues  as  less  pressing  if  there  is  wide  political
disagreement over their importance65. Divergent opinions on climate change are less of an issue in the
case of European political leadership than in more polarised countries, such as the United States.66
However,  despite  CCUS  often  being  presented  as  an  issue  of  climate  change  mitigation,  political
commitment to and interest in these technologies varies across Europe, and could lead to divergences
in public opinion on the topic.67 On the other hand, the reconciliation of leaders’ positions on CCUS
may also reconcile public opinion68: cross-party support for CCUS in Denmark may have helped to
shape more  positive public  attitudes  towards these  technologies.  More  research  is  needed on  the

effect of political consensus on public perceptions of CCUS.
Another  finding  of  importance  is  the  relationship  between  perceptions  and  the  „closeness“69  and
trustworthiness of the communicator, as well as the perceived goals of the communicator, and the
alignment with the goals of other communicators.70 “Closeness” of the communicator to the audience

62   Bolsen, T., Palm, R., Kingsland, J.T., 2022. How Negative Frames Can Undermine Public Support for Studying Solar
Geoengineering in the U.S.
63   Al cott, H. et al., 2020. Polarization and public health: Partisan differences in social distancing during the coronavirus pandemic
64   Kousser, T., Trantor, B., 2018. The influence of political leaders on climate change attitudes
65   Pew Research Center, 2019. Views of major problems facing the U.S.
66   Fisher, S.D. et al., 2022. The politicisation of climate change attitudes in Europe
67   Wesche, J. et al., 2023. CCUS or no CCUS? Societal support for policy frameworks and stakeholder perceptions in France, Spain,
and Poland
68   Kousser, T., Trantor, B., 2018. The influence of political leaders on climate change attitudes
69   “Closeness” refers to the perceived psychological proximity between a communicator and a communication recipient
70   Tcvetkov, P., Cherepovitsyn, A., Fedoseev, S., 2019. Public perception of carbon capture and storage: A state-of-the-art overview
15

is  shown  to  be  correlated  to  how  influential  the  message  of  said  communicator  is,  including  the
likelihood  to  cooperate71,  and  trusted  local  messengers  may  amplify  messages  from  less  „close“
communicators72, such as CCUS project developers (e.g. to show the scientific research on the risks of
CCS  projects).  Although  it  is  unclear  how  cooperation  between  project  developers  and  other
communicators might influence perceptions of CCUS, examples of such cooperation exist in actual
CCUS projects: for example, France’s Pycasso project used public-private partnerships to communicate

CCUS.
Other findings of interest relate to i) the purposeful use of communicators, and i ) the role of the public
in  shaping communicators.  In  the first  instance, different communicators may  be better  suited  for
different  roles  in  communicating  CCUS:  scientific  experts  may  be  better  suited  to  “transform
knowledge”  (raise  awareness  and  provide  information),  while  local  leaders  may  prove  better  at
“transforming values” (connect a message to an audience’s identity).73 Secondly, the public also plays
a role in shaping the positions of CCUS communicators. For example, the “newsworthy” themes that
media actors position themselves on, and the way that they frame them, are also driven by the interests
of  their  readers74.  This  means  that  the  concerns  and  priorities  of  the  public,  which  vary  widely
depending on geographical, socio-economic, and demographic factors, wil  influence which aspects
of  CCUS  are  amplified  by  communicators.  An  understanding  of  these  underlying  priorities  can
anticipate  how  different  opinion-makers  might  address  CCUS,  and  what  type  of  framings  can  be

expected at national and local levels in Member States. More research is needed on this topic.
3.1.2
Communication methods and channels
Aside from the influence exerted by communicators, the way in which messages are disseminated is
also a factor in shaping the public opinion of CCUS. This is a function of the method of communication
(such as written, spoken, or visual) and the communication channel (such as media channels, public
meetings, education programmes, or interpersonal communication)75. There wil  be a variation in how
these methods and channels resonate with different audiences, and how accessible and appealing they
are perceived  to  be.  For  example,  the  culture  underpinning  a  specific  audience or community wil
influence  the  type  of  communication  tools  used  for  public  engagement  on  CCUS.  In  Japan,  the
Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project used manga cartoon strips to explain CCS and how it could
contribute to climate mitigation.76 Furthermore, different characteristics of the communication channel
can also affect the absorption of information and the formation of a perception  – for example, the
“pacing” of a channel (the speed at which information is presented, and the receiver’s level of control
over it) and whether it is one-sided or two-sided communication.

71   Dubois, D., Bonezzi, A., De Angelis, M., 2016. Sharing with Friends versus Strangers: How Interpersonal Closeness Influences
Word-of-Mouth Valence
72   Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2020. GFMD Communications Guide on Shaping Public Narratives on Migration
73   Wright, S., Neimand, A., Steinman, M., 2021. Finding the Right Messenger for Your Message
74   Santos, I., Carvalho, L.M., Portugal e Melo, B., 2022. The media’s role in shaping the public opinion on education: A thematic and
frame analysis of externalisation to world situations in the Portuguese media
75   Brunsting, S. et al, 2011. Communicating CCS: Applying communications theory to public perceptions of carbon capture and
storage
76   CCUS Projects Network, 2020. Public perception of CCS: A Review of Public Engagement for CCS Projects
16

Because of the low level of awareness of CCUS, the implementation of public information channels is
important to communicate scientific advances and industrial developments in the area. Social media
technologies could play an important role in disseminating CCUS information to certain audiences, if
used  to  present  CCUS  technologies  in  an  “authentic,  transparent  and  accessible”  way77.  In-person
communication is frequently used in public engagement of CCS projects; the Shell Quest project in
Canada engaged communities in their local coffee shops, as well as through more permanent fixtures
such as a Community Advisory Panel to raise issues during the project implementation.
When it comes to engaging communities with specific CCUS projects, whether communication is one-
or two-way can make a significant difference in the formulation of public opinion. Active listening and
seeking and responding to feedback help to build trust in messengers and may shift public perception
of CCUS.78 Participatory formats such as deliberative town halls, citizens‘ assemblies and citizen juries
may  be  important  formats  for  public  engagement  on  CCUS.79  In  addition  to  offering  meaningful
engagement through actual co-development of the project, they can help depoliticise the issues being
deliberated.80 Such an approach can be used in addition to more one-sided communication methods
such as surveys or consultations, which are primarily analytical tools. However, it should be noted that
the choice of communication tool wil  depend on the “level” of engagement being sought (for example,
informing, consulting, empowering, or col aborating with recipients). For example, in the Shell Quest
project, developers sought to keep citizens informed by offering landowners adjacent to the storage
site sampling and testing services for their groundwater, to ensure freedom from contamination with
stored CO2. If the project was looking to empower citizens, rather than just inform them, a “citizen
science” approach may have been considered instead, to ensure two-way communication and raise

col ective awareness.81
In  summary,  both  the  communicator  and  the  method  of  communication,  and  more  generally  of
engagement, are shown to influence the perception of CCUS by receivers such as members of the
public. While public awareness of CCUS technologies is low, perceptions may be volatile and subject
to change. However, beyond the information deficit related to CCUS, the complexity of the relationship
between public perception and the communicators as well as methods and channels of communication

must be recognized.
3.2
Transparency and trust
A range of research and experience highlights that transparency and trust in communicating CCUS is
paramount  for  high-quality  discussions  on  these  technologies.  Transparency  on  and  a  structured
framing of the benefits, costs, timing, and risks of CCUS technologies, projects and counterfactuals, as
well as on the impact of project-related construction, serves to build trust in communicators and make
public engagement more meaningful. Which benefits resonate wil  depend on the country and the
local context, as pointed out in Chapter 2. Therefore, tailoring project information to the interests of

77   Arning, K. et al., 2019. Same or different? Insights on public perception and acceptance of carbon capture and storage or
utilization in Germany
78   CCUS Projects Network, 2020. Public perception of CCS: A Review of Public Engagement for CCS Projects
79   Climate Assembly UK, n.d. The path to net zero: Greenhouse Gas Removals
80   Citizens’ Assembly of Scotland, n.d. Doing Politics Differently: The vision and recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly of
Scotland
81   Tauginienė, L. et al., 2020. Citizen science in the social sciences and humanities: the power of interdisciplinarity
17

communities being addressed can help sustain interest, as well as to deconstruct myths around CCUS
technologies.82  Some  stakeholders  also  point  to  the  importance  of  context  provision  in  CCUS
communication:  for  example,  when  talking  about  importing  CO2,  communications  should  include
arguments  related  to  the  scaling  of  transport  and  storage  infrastructure,  as  well  as  solidarity  with
countries with no storage capabilities. Finally, a key element of CCUS communication is transparency
of  risks  (both  scenarios  including  CCUS  and  the  counterfactuals)  and  mitigation  measures;  a  key
learning  from  the  QICS  project  was  that  citizens  do  not  want  to  be  told  that  “storage  sites  are
completely  secure  and  wil   never  leak”,  but  rather  be  transparently  presented  with  the  mitigation

measures in place for CO2 storage risks.83
The  trust placed  in  CCUS  communicators and  stakeholders  is  also  significantly correlated with  the
perception  of  CCUS  technologies  and  products.84,85,86  Trust  is  determined  by  a  number  of  factors
including  competence,  objectivity,  consistency,  and  faith.  Trust  is  a  crucial  element  of  public
engagement  of  CCUS,  not  least  because  once  lost,  it  is  not  easily  regained.  In  the  UK,  repeated
attempts by the national government to develop the British shale gas industry led to an increasing
level of public distrust, including distrust of external actors and organisations. A low level of trust in
risk-managing institutions, especially policymaking institutions, is also linked to a tendency to amplify
perceived risks.87 Moreover, the motivation of CCUS communicators is an important element of trust:
for  example,  if  a  CCUS  stakeholder  is  perceived  to  have  purely  commercial  interests,88  such  as  a
perceived motivation to prolong fossil fuel use if they are associated with fossil fuel production), or in
general  if  their  message  is  perceived  as  incongruent  with  their  inferred  motives,  this  may  lead  to

distrust.89,90,91
Beyond the motivations of CCUS communicators, knowledge and reputation play a role in shaping
trust. The perception of a pro-CCUS communicator as knowledgeable about CCUS has been shown to
have a positive influence on the perception of CCUS, and vice versa,92 similar to other technologies.93

82   Ashworth, P., 2010. Communication of carbon capture and storage: Outcomes from an international workshop to summarise the
current global position
83   CCUS Projects Network, 2020. Public perception of CCS: A Review of Public Engagement for CCS Projects
84   L’Orange Seigo, S. et al., 2014. Predictors of risk and benefit perception of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in regions with
different stages of deployment
85   De Beus, N., 2021. BioCO2Recover: Social acceptance of CO2-based products
86   Offermann-van Heek, J. et al, 2018. Trust and Distrust in Carbon Capture and Utilization Industry as Relevant Factors for the
Acceptance of Carbon-Based Products
87   Cox, E., Pidgeon, N., Spence, E., 2021. But They Told Us It Was Safe! Carbon Dioxide Removal, Fracking, and Ripple Effects in Risk
Perceptions
88   Given that most private actors involved in CCUS projects wil  have a commercial interest to justify their investments, other actors
(such as academic experts or local authorities) may be useful in explaining why the success of CCUS projects depends on a solid
business case for private actors.
89   Terwel, B.W. et al, 2009. How organizational motives and communications affect public trust in organizations: The case of carbon
dioxide capture and storage
90   CCUS Projects Network, 2020. Public perception of CCS: A Review of Public Engagement for CCS Projects
91   Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2021. Carbon Capture Usage and Storage
92   L’Orange Seigo, S. et al., 2014. Predictors of risk and benefit perception of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in regions with
different stages of deployment
93   Bearth, A., Siegrist, M., 2021. The Social Amplification of Risk Framework: A Normative Perspective on Trust?
18

In addition, the perception that trusted actors have little influence on the decision-making process
around CCUS negatively affects public perception of CCUS projects. This was found, for example, in an
analysis of the failed Barendrecht project (Netherlands)94, where among other factors, local residents
felt that the actors they trusted (local authorities and environmental groups) had too little influence
relative to distrusted actors (the project developer and the national government).95 The same can be
said about perceived procedural unfairness, which is amplified by pre-existing resistance to or poor
opinion  of  certain  actors  involved  in  CCUS  projects,  such  as  project  developers  with  a  history  of
subsurface exploitation.96 Although trust in these communicators wil  likely be lower than in other
entities involved in CCUS projects, their involvement in deploying CCUS wil  be important due to their
transferable knowledge or track record in delivering large, complex projects with multiple societal and
environmental benefits. Furthermore, if entities which become involved in CCUS projects already have
a good standing and a history of benefits provision within a community, trust may be increased. On
the other hand, if the involvement in and provision of benefits to the said community is sudden and

coincidental with a CCUS project, it may be perceived as an attempt to force acceptance.
Which communicators and stakeholders are trusted by the public wil  vary between and within Member
States.  In  many  countries,  NGOs  and  scientific  institutions  are  often  among  the  most  trusted
organisations,  linked  to  their  public-serving  motivations.97,98  However,  there  is  variation  across
countries  in  trust  in  other  actors,  most  notably  the  government:  for  example,  while  a  majority  of
Norwegian citizens report trusting their government with monitoring CO2 storage sites, only 30% do
so  in  Greece,  and  22%  in  Germany.99  In  some  cases,  trust  in  individuals  may  be  higher  than  in
organisations overall as it is easier to become familiar with them and to understand their goals and
motivations. However, despite all these findings, other research indicates that it may be difficult for
the public to rely on trust to formulate a perception of CCS, because stakeholder positions are often
unknown or unclear, and few have demonstrated a satisfactory management of CCS project risks.100
The conclusion of this chapter is that the picture of public perception of CCUS is further complicated
by the influence of factors relating to the communicator and the channel of communication and by
the  role  that  communicators  play  in  sharing  information,  as  well  as  the  associated  trust  and
transparency.  The  heterogeneous  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  public  and  CCUS
technologies, mediated by the relationship with the communication itself, is stressed in recent research
on the topic. The variety of factors involved means that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach in terms
of the most appropriate way to communicate CCUS.

94   In the Barendrecht project, opposition by local communities to the onshore CO2 storage component of the project eventually led
to its abandonment
95   Terwel, B.W., ter Mors, E., Daamen, D.D.L., 2012. It's not only about safety: Beliefs and attitudes of 811 local residents regarding a
CCS project in Barendrecht
96   Arning, K. et al., 2019. Same or different? Insights on public perception and acceptance of carbon capture and storage or
utilization in Germany
97   Terwel, B.W. et al, 2011. Going beyond the properties of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) technology: How trust in stakeholders
affects public acceptance of CCS
98   Offermann-van Heek, J. et al, 2018. Trust and Distrust in Carbon Capture and Utilization Industry as Relevant Factors for the
Acceptance of Carbon-Based Products
99   Otto, D. et al, 2022. On the Organisation of Translation; An Inter- and Transdisciplinary Approach to Developing Design Options
for CO2 Storage Monitoring Systems
100  L’Orange Seigo, S. et al., 2014. Predictors of risk and benefit perception of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in regions with
different stages of deployment
19

4
Recommendations
Based  on  the  findings  of  this  paper,  we  recommend  that  the  European  Commission  consider  the
fol owing when formulating its upcoming Strategy.
1)  Public perception of CCUS technologies and projects wil  shape their deployment and
implementation in the EU. Hence, the Strategy should recognize the significance of public
perception, consider the existing state of public opinion in the EU, and commit to enhancing
public understanding and awareness of CCUS. Moreover, the Strategy should strive to
incorporate meaningful public engagement as an essential component of CCUS policies and
subsequent project development.
2)  As a first step, it is crucial to establish the legitimacy of CCUS technology among the public
and to initiate discussions on deployment plans at the national and territorial level. The decisions
arising from these discussions wil  provide the framework for local implementation.
Policymakers play a vital role in promoting societal discourse on CCUS and should actively
facilitate dialogue and engagement with the public on this topic.
3)  When communicating about CCUS, it is important to bear in mind that this takes place in a wider
context, including discussions about portfolios of potential decarbonisation pathways, and
ongoing transitions and associated targets and conditions within the EU.
4)  We recommend that the Strategy embraces a comprehensive approach to public engagement
with CCUS, integrating it into all stages of policymaking and project development rather than
treating it as a separate entity. It is essential to also consider the wide range of factors that
influence public perception.
5)  It is crucial to ensure that all stakeholders, including citizens, organisations and institutions,
have the opportunity to be informed and to participate in discussions on CCUS. The objective is
to build trust, share information, and create opportunities for dialogue.
6)  Communication on CCUS also has a role to play in familiarising society with CCUS and sharing
knowledge, given the prevailing lack of awareness in society. Communication and participation
strategies should be adapted to the target audiences, using appropriate communication
sources, methods, and channels.
7)  To facilitate informed societal decision-making regarding CCUS technologies, it is imperative that
communication at the EU, national, or project level enables clear and transparent presentation
of the benefits, costs, and risks associated with CCUS, as well as those associated with
alternative pathways.
8)  This involvement should take place before, during and after the policy-making and project
implementation processes, avoiding one-way dissemination of information and facts. It is
important to involve stakeholders proactively, allowing for their input and preventing
decisions from being made without their participation.
9)  The Strategy should establish an accessible knowledge network on public perceptions of
CCUS to share lessons learned from projects and other activities for the benefit of Member
States, project operators, civil society organisations/NGOs and other interested parties, and to
enable continuous learning.
20

10) Additional y, ongoing monitoring of discussions and perceptions on CCUS technologies,
among the public including al types of stakeholders should be implemented incl. an update of
the CCUS Eurobarometer survey. This allows for responsiveness to evolving needs and
expectations for CCUS applications. The EU research community should continue engaging in
multidisciplinary research on public perception of CCUS, studying the underlying priorities of
different communities in various contexts, to inform how CCUS messages are received and guide
project considerations.
11) Once the Strategy has been adopted, it is proposed to communicate it at EU, national and sub-
national levels, using clear and consistent messages and harmonised definitions, which should
also be used in future policies.

21

This document was prepared by the Working Group co-chairs based on an extensive consultation and
engagement process with the Working Group members.
Co-Chairs for the Working Group
  Energy Policy Group, Luciana Miu
  European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition (ERCST), Elena Bonfiglio
& Andrei Marcu
  Fraunhofer ISI, Elisabeth Dütschke
Working Group Members
  AGH  University  of  Science  and
  CDRterra/LMU Munich
Technology
  Cementir Holding
  Agora Energiewende
  CEMBUREAU
  Air Liquide
  CEMEX Deutschland AG
  Airfix
  Central University of Himachal Pradesh
  Aker Carbon Capture
  Chevron
  Altera Infrastructure
  CICERO  Center  for  International
  ArcelorMittal
Climate Research
  Association  of  the  Austrian  Cement
  City of PAU BEARN PYRENEES
Industry
  Clean Air Task Force (CATF)
  ATIC
  ClientEarth
  Austrian Energy Agency
  Climeworks
  Baker Hughes
  CO2 Value Europe
  Bellona Deutschland gGmbH
  CO2GeoNet
  Bellona Europa
  Coalition for Carbon Capture
  Bioenergy Association of Finland
  Crédit
Agricole
Corporate
and
  Bioenergy Europe
Investment Bank
  Bond Beter Leefmilieu
  CVE
  BrinkmannGroup
  Danish CCS alliance
  British Geological Survey
  Danish Energy Agency
  Bundesverband  Erdgas,  Erdöl  und
  Dansk Fjernvarme
Geoenergie e.V.
  Department  of  Climate  Change,
  Carbo Culture
Energy,  the  Environment  and  Water

(Australia)

Carbon Gap

  DG CLIMA

Carbon Limits

  Dioxycle

carbonengineering

  Dow

CCSA/Zero Emissions Platform
  Drax
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  E3G
-
Third
Generation
  Institute for Energy and Fuels
Environmentalism
  Institute of Building Materials Research
  EBN / Aramis project
/ RWTH Aachen University
  EERA
  Interconnector Limited
  eFuel Alliance e.V.
  IOGP Europe
  Eni
  IOM Law
  EPCM Global Engineering
  Italcementi Spa
  Equinor
  Izmir Institute of Technology
  ETN Global
  Izmir Katip Celebi University
  EuLA - The European Lime Association
  KBR
  Eurogas
  KEFM
  EUROPA Danismanlik
  Kiel Institute for the World Economy
  European  Parliamentary  Research
  Klaipėdos nafta AB
Service
  KlimaDiskurs.NRW
  Evida
  Konya Technical University
  ExxonMobil
  KOREAN EMBASSY
  Galiboff
  LanzaTech
  Gassnova SF
  MCi Carbon
  Gasunie
  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  and
  GE Gas Power
Climate Policy NL
  General Electric
  Ministry  of  Environment  and  Spatial

Planning of Slovenia

GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean
Research Kiel
  Ministry
of
Transport
Baden-

Wuerttemberg

Germanwatch

  Mission of Norway to the EU

Ghent University

  Nabu e.V., nature conservation union

Global CCS Institute

  National Agency for Mineral Resources

HAFFNER ENERGY

  Negative Emissions Platform

Hafslund Oslo Celsio

  Neptune Energy

Heidelberg Materials

  Nippon Gases

Heirloom Carbon

  Norsk e-Fuel AS

Helmholtz-Centre  for  Environmental
Research
  Norsk Hydro
  Holcim
  North Denmark EU Office
  Innovation Norway
  Northern Lights JV
  Institut Symlog
23

  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Petroleum  and
  SWP
Energy
  TANECS Engineering Consultancy Inc
  NRW.Energy4Climate
  TES-H2
  OMV Petrom
  The  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Petroleum
  Open Grid Europe GmbH
and Energy
  PGS
  TNO
  Port of Aalborg
  Tree Energy Solutions GmbH
  Porthos
  University of Stavanger
  Radboud University
  University of Western Macedonia
  Rasmussen Global
  VDZ
  Repsol
  VDZ Technology
  RITE
  Volkswagen AG
  romgaz
  Wintershall Dea AG
  RWE
  WiseEuropa
  Salonit Anhovo d.d.
  Wuppertal  Institute  for  Climate,

Environment, Energy

Sandbag Climate Campaign

  Yara

Shell

  Yıldız Technical University - Economics

Sia Partners
Department
  Sivas Cumhuriyet University
  ZEP
  Snam
  South Scania Waste Company

Contact to the EC CCUS Forum: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx@xx.xxxxxx.xx

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