Ref. Ares(2025)2379981 - 24/03/2025
Ref. Ares(2025)2380049 - 24/03/2025

EUROPEAN
  COMMISSION

Brussels, 17.12.2024
C(2024) 8110 final
ANNEX 2

ANNEX

to the
Commission Implementing Decision
establishing the report of the 2024 Schengen evaluation of Poland

EN

  EN

SCHENGEN EVALUATION OF POLAND
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A Schengen evaluation of Poland was carried out in March - April 2024 by Commission and
Member  State  experts  accompanied  by  observers  from  relevant  Agencies  and  bodies1  .  It
covered key areas of the Schengen acquis including external border management, absence of
controls  at  the  internal  borders,  return  policy,  police  cooperation,  the  common  visa  policy,
large  scale  information  systems  and  data  protection.  Particular  attention  was  also  paid  to
verifying  the  respect  for  fundamental  rights.  This  activity  results  in  the  report  of  the  2024
Schengen evaluation of Poland2 .
The  war  in  Ukraine  has  an  important  impact  on  Poland’s  implementation  of  the  Schengen
acquis,  as  the  country  is  responsible  for  securing  a  border  section  with  Ukraine  which  is
affected by an unprecedented flow of persons seeking international protection and applying a
special protection scheme established by the EU. Poland is also facing hybrid threats such as
the  instrumentalisation  of  irregular  migration  at  the  border  with  Belarus,  and  possible
evolving  military  and  security  threats  at  the  border  with  Russia  (Kaliningrad  Oblast).
Restrictions  of  cross-border  traffic  and  closure  of  some  of  the  border  crossing  points  are
applied  at  external  borders.  The  situation  at  the  external  borders  of  Poland  is  volatile  and
unpredictable,  therefore  the  Polish  authorities  must  ensure  constant  readiness  and  sufficient
response capabilities. As a Baltic Sea State, Poland must also ensure effective preparedness
and  response  to  maritime  security  challenges,  including  hybrid  threats  on  critical
infrastructure. In addition, Poland is affected by cross-border crime, in particular smuggling
and trafficking of humans and goods.
Despite  the  complex  environment  and  notwithstanding  the  recent  challenges,  Poland  is
overall effectively implementing the Schengen acquis and ensures a strong contribution to the
functioning of the Schengen area.
The  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  at  the  Polish  borders  is  at  high  standards.  The
performance  of  the  Polish  border  management  system  is  guaranteed  by  the  Polish  Border
Guard,  the  sole  national  authority  responsible  for  border  management,  through  effective
border  surveillance,  adequate  border  checks  and  sound  risk  analysis,  supported  by  strong
national capabilities established in accordance with the National Capability Plan, as well as a

1
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, the European Union Agency for the
Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-
LISA) and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Right.
2
The report contains findings and recommendations for remedial actions as well as detailed information
concerning the visits carried out between March and April 2024 (enclosure 1) and on national authorities
responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  various  fields  covered  by  this  report
(enclosure 2).
1

reliable contribution to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Poland’s coherent and
robust  implementation  of  European  integrated  border  management  is  based  on  a  national
strategy  and  inter-agency  cooperation.  Specific  elements  of  cooperation  between  the  border
guards  and  customs  were  considered  a  best  practice,  such  as  the  direct  access  of  customs
officers to the information collected by the border guards in the first line of control.
Poland  uses  military  capability  to  ensure  sufficient  situational  awareness  and  adequate
response  capacity  to  threats,  including  those  of  hybrid  nature.  The  cooperation  between  the
border guards and the Armed Forces is effective, based on clear legislation and supported by
specific  training.  Other  law  enforcement  authorities  such  as  the  police,  as  well  as  the
intelligence services are part of the extensive cooperation for effective border management.
The quality of the land border surveillance is at a high level, even though Poland must apply
different tactics and operational measures at each border section and the extension of state-of-
the art technical border surveillance solutions, the quality of staff and training and financing
for maintenance and running costs, should be constantly guaranteed by using national and EU
funding  schemes.  The  team  considered  the  electronic  integrated  border  surveillance  system
applied  at  the  border  with  Ukraine  and  Russia,  and  the  online  reporting  and  management
system  for  border  surveillance  best  practices.  The  quality  of  the  sea  border  surveillance
carried  out  by  the  Polish  Border  Guard  is  adequate.  However,  a  centralised  national
situational  picture  on  sea  borders  is  not  visible  and  the  sea  border  surveillance  is  not
integrated with the land borders when the geographical situation requires it; consequently, the
national  situational  picture  is  sometimes  fragmented  on  sea  borders,  a  situation  which  is
reflected in the organisation of the National Coordination Centre in Warsaw.
The  quality  of  border  checks  is  adequate,  although  deficiencies  and  room  for  improvement
were identified in  the  refusal  of  entry and visa procedures, the quality  of document checks,
the inconsistency regarding the duration of the basic training and regular refresher training, in
particular on document fraud and language training. Given the high priority assigned to land
borders  requiring  flexibility  in  the  allocation  of  resources  and  frequent  redeployments  of
border guards, the Polish authorities have challenges to ensure constant resources at the sea
and air borders during the peak season.
By  amending  the  Act  on  Foreigners3,  the  Polish  authorities  implement  certain  safeguards
related  to  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights  in  connection  to  border  procedures,  asylum,
migration referral mechanisms, and return. At the same time, the most significant challenge
to  procedures  applied  to  third-country  nationals  apprehended  in  connection  with  an  illegal
border  crossing  still  present  room  for  improvement,  especially  regarding  the  respect  of  the
principle of non-refoulement and a number of important aspects of fundamental rights.
Poland  has  also  implemented  several  measures  to  adapt  its  return  system  at  the  legal,
strategic,  and  operational  levels;  Poland  has  established  a  structured,  coordinated,  and

3
Act of 12  December 2013 on foreigners as amended by Act of 17 December 2021 (Journal of Laws of
2022 item 91).
2

developed  approach  for  the  governance  of  the  return  system  as  necessary  structures  are  in
place, both legally and operationally, to ensure the effective return of third-country nationals
who  do  not  have  the  right  to  legal  stay.  Risks,  threats,  and  necessary  responses  are  clearly
identified, as are the responsibilities of the involved authorities. Detention facilities for third-
country  nationals  in  return  procedures  provide  adequate  conditions  and  best  practices  were
observed  in  the  detention  centres,  including  the  provision  of  extensive  medical  care  and
cultural  support  tailored  to  detained  third-country  nationals,  as  well  as  a  structured  and
efficient approach to maintaining detainee wellbeing.
In  addition  to  the  improvements  needed  to  respect  the  principle  of  non-refoulement,  other
challenges in the area of return are closely tied to safeguards throughout the return process,
including access to legal aid and effective remedies to appeal return-related decisions and the
monitoring system for forced returns which also faces significant shortcomings.
In  the  field  of  police  cooperation,  Poland  is  in  general  implementing  the  Schengen  acquis
adequately. There have not been any remarkable legal or organisational changes in the Polish
internal  security  system  since  the  last  evaluation.  Participation  to  different  EMPACT
activities by Polish law enforcement agencies is very active and well-coordinated and a best
practice  related to  the implementation of one of the EMPACT priorities, including  training,
was identified. Strategic priorities for internal security are not covered by a specific internal
security  strategy  but  they  are  included  in  the  national  security  strategy  and  some  specific
strategies  and  ministerial  level  development  plans.  Connection  to  the  priorities  of  the  EU
internal security was found to be fragmented, and the implementation of the EU legislation in
the field of law enforcement cooperation is not adequately planned and resourced. Points  of
concern  are  related  to  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  national  law  enforcement
authorities and with the Member States, especially given the overall functioning of the Single
Point  of  Contact  and  the  capacity  to  implement  respective  new  EU  legislation.  The  lack  of
joint national level threat assessment including all relevant law enforcement authorities leads
to  fragmented  situational  awareness.  Some  previous  recommendations  were  not
implemented, which indicates persistent problems in some functions.
With regards to large scale IT systems supporting the well-functioning of the Schengen area
and information exchange, notably the Schengen and Visa Information Systems, overall, the
Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  and  SIRENE  procedures  are  sufficiently  integrated  in
border,  migration  and  law  enforcement  processes  in  Poland.  Best  practices  were  identified,
including  a  well-established  procedure  for  end-  users  to  request  the  Central  authority  to
create,  update  and  delete  an  alert  in  emergency  mode  in  case  of  unavailability  of  the  direct
access;  the  systematic  attachment  of  the  European  Arrest  Warrant,  both  in  Polish  and  in
English by the Court and prosecutor Office when creating alerts on wanted persons; and the
“Digital Border” procedures, put in place between Border Guards and Customs authorities at
the  border  crossing  points.  However,  further  improvements  are  needed  to  ensure  a  more
effective use of the SIS, in particular the implementation of dactyloscopic searches in the SIS
AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) for all the competent authorities, as well
as  the  systematic  attachment  of  fingerprints  to  Polish  alerts;  granting  access  to  all  types  of
3

alerts to SIS to the Office for Foreigners as needed for the performance of its tasks, and the
use of the established procedures for prior consultation by the SIRENE Bureau; the training
on  the  new  possibilities  of  renewed  SIS  functionalities;  and  putting  in  place  the  necessary
additional human resources to ensure the N.SIS Office is able to address the current delays in
the IT projects and upcoming tasks related to Interoperability.
As far as the implementation of the EU visa acquis  is  concerned, Poland complies with  the
Visa Code and other relevant legislation. The examination of the applications is solid in the
visited  Guangzhou  and  Manila  consulates,  where  the  IT  system  is  user  friendly  and
functioning  well,  and  the  staffing  level  is  sufficient,  and  staff  is  well  trained.  However,  the
team identified some deficiencies, including difficulties with granting timely appointments to
submit  visa  applications  in  some  locations;  conducting  prior  consultations  and  linking  of
applicants traveling together; the need to strengthen the coherence of decisions so as to limit
the  necessity  for  applicants  to  resort  to  appeals  to  be  issued  a  visa;  the  workflow  at  the
external service provider in Manila.
Poland  overall  complies  with  the  data  protection  requirements.  Shortcomings  are  mainly
related  to  the  exclusion  from  the  scope  of  the  Polish  law  transposing  the  Law  Enforcement
Data Protection Directive of certain processing of personal data in some fields of national law
and regarding certain authorities as far as this also affects the data processed in the Schengen
Information System  and the Visa Information System (VIS); the lack of staff at the Personal
Data  Protection  Office  to  ensure  the  effective  performance  of  its  tasks  related  to  the
supervision  of  EU  large-scale  IT  systems;  Polish  law  does  not  reflect  the  roles  and
responsibilities of Central Technical Authority of the National IT System (CTA-NITS)  and
competent authorities as joint controllers with regards to processing of SIS and VIS personal
data with the effect of certain shortcomings in terms of oversight of the whole systems, such
as  a  lack  of  effective  self-monitoring  and  self-auditing  causing  security  risks;  the  need  to
improve the self-auditing and self-monitoring of the management and use of the SIS and VIS
in particular by a coordinated approach of log checks; the need to align the retention period of
some VIS-logs with the VIS-acquis; several security concerns in the technical management of
N.SIS  and  N.VIS;  the  lack  of  indirect  access  to  data  in  the  SIS  through  the  Personal  Data
Protection Office where the access, rectification or erasure of personal data has been refused
and  that  there  is  no  judicial  remedy  regarding  the  reply  of  the  controller  to  data  subjects’
requests in the context of the SIS and VIS.
Even  though,  overall,  the  Polish  authorities  implemented  most  of  the  recommendations
issued  in  2019  Schengen  evaluation,  due  to  limited  resources  several  important
recommendations  from  the  previous  evaluation  are  not  yet  implemented  and  there  are  still
several recommendations partly implemented or under implementation.
On the basis of the 2024 Schengen evaluation, the priority areas for Poland are:
✓  Guarantee high level of  border control by  constantly ensuring a sufficient number of
trained staff as well as an effective implementation of the state-of-the-art technologies,
based on sufficient financial support from the national budget and EU funding;
4

✓  Ensure the respect of fundamental rights, especially in relation to the principle of non-
refoulement, in  connection to  border-policing  measures. At the same time, make sure
that procedural safeguards are respected throughout the return procedure;
✓  Strengthening  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  law  enforcement  authorities
within  Poland  and  with  Member  States,  especially  by  developing  the  overall
functioning Single Point of Contact supported by a fully operational Case Management
System interconnected to SIENA;
✓  Entry  of  fingerprints  to  the  SIS  also  in  the  view  of  interoperability  and  fully  use  of
fingerprint  searches  in  SIS,  including  access  to  all  types  of  alerts  to  the  Office  for
Foreigners as needed for the performance of its tasks;
✓  Align  the  scope  of  the  Polish  law  transposing  the  Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection
Directive,  as  far  as  it  affects  the  processing  of  personal  data  in  the  SIS  and  VIS  and
guarantee effective self-monitoring and self-auditing of the SIS and VIS system by the
CTA-NITS and competent authorities.

2.  RECOMMENDATIONS
The 2024 periodic evaluation of Poland resulted in 105 recommendations for remedial action
aimed  at  addressing  the  deficiencies  and  areas  for  improvement  identified  in  the  evaluation
report.
Considering  their  importance  for  the  overall  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area,  the
implementation of recommendations 6, 18, 22, 25, 33, 38, 45, 46, 49, 58, 60, 61, 68, 82, 88,
90, 103, highlighted in bold, should be prioritised.
Recommendations 8, 16, 17, 35, 39, 40, 56, 57, 67, 68, 77, 85, 86, 87, 89, 96, 100, 103 relate
to  persistent  deficiencies  which  have  already  been  identified  in  the  previous  Schengen
evaluation of Poland.
Poland is recommended to:
NATIONAL SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE
National strategies and quality control mechanisms
1.
ensure  that  the  national  quality  control  mechanism  covers  all  authorities  involved  in
border management and return and it is implemented in accordance with the instruction
issued by the national authorities;
2.
strengthen  the  connection  of  EU  internal  security  priorities  and  the  relevant  national
strategies  to  guarantee  adequate  implementation  of  the  Schengen  instruments  and.
establish a national strategy for international law enforcement cooperation;
National capabilities
3.
ensure sufficient number of staff at the air and sea border to guarantee effective border
control;
4.
ensure sufficient numbers of trained vessel crews for staffing sea patrol vessels;
5.
ensure that sufficient staff is allocated to the Head Office for Foreigners to avoid delays
in the insertion of alerts for refusal of entry or stay;
5

6.
ensure the appropriate human technical resources to strengthen the current N.SIS
IT  team  and  prevent  staff  turnover  and  further  delays  in  the  implementation  of
the  relevant  IT  systems  and  to  cope  with  new  challenges  in  relation  to
Interoperability; (prioritised recommendation)
7.
ensure  that  the  Personal  Data  Protection  Office  has  sufficient  resources  to  fulfil  the
tasks entrusted to it under the Schengen acquis, especially given the upcoming start of
additional EU large-scale IT systems;
Training
8.
develop training need assessment system and improve continuous and refresher training
in the field of international law enforcement cooperation, including enhancing language
training (especially English)4;
9.
improve the level of foreign language skills (in particular English and Russian) of the
border  guards  by  increasing  the  availability  of  trainings,  making  the  attendance
obligatory  and  verifying  whether  the  acquired  level  is  sufficient  to  carry  out  the
assigned functions properly;
10.  establish a set of mandatory basic and refresher trainings related to the nature of tasks
conducted by Border Guards in the field of return, especially as concerns tasks related
to: detention of third-country nationals, identification of vulnerable persons, issuance of
return  decisions,  forced  return  and  escorting,  assessment  of  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement  and  other  fundamental  rights  issues,  especially  during  apprehension
procedures;
11.  ensure adequate and regular training for all SIS end-users on the new alerts categories
and functionalities of the Schengen Information System;
Functioning of the authorities
12.  transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 into national law and introduce procedures for the
effective  implementation  of  the  new  framework  and  ensure,  once  this  Directive  has
been  transposed,  the  awareness  of  staff  of  the  Police,  Border  Guard,  and  other  law
enforcement agencies of the reporting procedures in  place and the protection afforded
to whistle-blowers.
Fundamental rights safeguards
13.  take measures to ensure that legislation governing border procedures and its application
fully  respect  the  principle  of  non-refoulement,  including  by  issuing  individualised
decisions  and  ensuring  that  appeals  against  non-admission  actions  are  available  and
accessible  in  practice,  while  also  ensuring  that  third-country  nationals  seeking
international  protection  at  the  border  can  effectively  access  protection,  in  accordance
with  Articles  3,  point  (b),  Article  4,  Article  7(1)  and  Article  13  of  Regulation  (EU)

4
Former  recommendation  n.17  of  the  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  12869/20  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of the external border management.
6

2016/399, and Article 4(4) of Directive 2008/115/EC, read in conjunction with Articles
19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
14.  amend the templates used for issuing the ‘order to leave the territory of Poland’ and the
declaration  on  the  lack  of  intention  to  seek  international  protection  and  precisely
include  all  considerations  of  the  principle  of  non-refoulement,  in  accordance  with
Articles  19  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  Article  4,
Article 7(1) and Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399, and Article 4(4) of Directive
2008/115/EC;
15.  ensure that adequate procedures are in place to detect and refer vulnerable persons and
safeguard  the  assessment  of  the  best  interests  of  the  child,  in  accordance  Article  4,
Article 7(1) and Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code, and Article 4(4) of Directive
2008/115/EC, read in conjunction with Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union;
16.  ensure  that  an  effective  forced-return  monitoring  mechanism  is  in  place  according  to
Article 8(6) of Directive 2008/115/EC, especially by5;
a.  putting  in  place  a  framework  that  allows  for  sufficient  financing  and
programming of the monitoring entities;
b.  increasing the frequency of the monitoring activity;
c.  further  enhancing  the  systematic  and  timely  provision  of  information  to  the
monitoring  entities,  in  particular  information  on  vulnerabilities  of  third-country
nationals subject to a forced-return procedure;
d.  expanding the scope of the monitoring activities to cover all types and stages of
forced-return operations;
e.  establishing a transparent reporting system;
Large Scale information systems including data protection requirements
17.  establish  a  procedure  for  the  Office  of  Foreigners  to  attach  biometrics  to  alerts  for
refusal  of  entry  and  stay,  when  they  are  available,  in  line  with  Article  20  and  Article
22(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/18616;
18.  establish  a  procedure  to  attach  fingerprints  to  alerts  when  they  are  available;
(prioritised recommendation)
19.  implement  the  technical  possibility  to  insert  and  search  alerts  on  unknown  wanted
persons in line with Article 9(2) and Article 40 of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1862;
20.  in  the  creation  of  alerts  in  Pobyt2,  implement  the  procedure  to  create  links  between
alerts  and  to  add  all  possible  person  related  remarks  to  the  alerts  in  accordance  with

5
Former  recommendation  n.7  of  Council  Implementing  Decision  9768/20  of  17  July  2020  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of return.
6
Former recommendation n.1 of Council Implementing Decision n.5428/20 on addressing the deficiencies
identified in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of the
Schengen Information System.

7

Article  9(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1861  and  Article  9(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)
2018/1862;
21.  ensure  the  deletion  of  the  alert  on  return  without  delay  following  the  receipt  of  the
confirmation of return and, where applicable, the creation of an alert for refusal of entry
and  stay  without  delay  pursuant  to  Article  6(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860  and
Article 24(1), point (b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861, as applicable to alerts on return;
22.  ensure that the Office for Foreigners has full access to SIS in line with Article 34
of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1861,  Article  44  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1862
and, as applicable to alerts on return with Article 19 Regulation (EU) 2018/1860;
(prioritised recommendation)
23.  ensure  that  systematic  checks  are  carried  out  in  the  SIS  before  the  temporary
registration  of  vehicles  and  boats  in  line  with  Articles  45  and  46  of  Regulation  (EU)
2018/1862;
24.  ensure that  airplane  and  firearms registration services can  carry out  checks in  the SIS
for  the  purpose  of  registration  in  line  with  Articles  46  and  47  of  Regulation  (EU)
2018/1862;
25.  implement the technical possibility and ensure Police and Office for Foreigners to
perform  fingerprints  searches  in  SIS  AFIS  in  line  with  Article  9(1)  and  Article
33(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1861  and  Article  9(1)  and  Article  43(2)  of
Regulation  (EU)  2018/1862,  and  Article  19  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860,  as
applicable to return alerts; (prioritised recommendation)
26.  ensure  that  the  Office  for  Foreigners  systematically  checks  in  the  SIS  the  documents
belonging  to  applicants  when  assessing  applications  for  a  residence  permit,  in
accordance with Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861, Article 9(1) of Regulation
(EU) 2018/1862, and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1860, as applicable to alerts
on return;
27.  implement  the  necessary  technical  changes  in  the  single  search  system  (SPP)  and
command support system (SWD) applications to allow to perform queries in line with
Article 9(1) of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 and with Article 9(1) of the Regulation
(EU) 2018/1862;
28.  ensure  the  display  of  all  available  data  contained  in  the  SIS  alerts,  as  required  by
Article  9(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1861,  Article  9(2)  of  the  Regulation  (EU)
2018/1862  and  Article  19  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860,  as  applicable  to  alerts  on
return;
29.  implement  the  necessary  technical  changes  in  the  STBS  application  to  display  all
available  data  of  the  misused  identity  in  line  with  Article  9(2)  and  (3)  of  Regulation
(EU) 2018/1861, Article 9(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1862, and Article 19 of
Regulation (EU) 2018/1860, as applicable to alerts on return;
30.  ensure that all information contained in the alerts is reproduced in the SIRENE forms;
31.  ensure  that  the  Case  Management  System  STBS  Recast  has  all  the  necessary
functionalities to prevent operators from using two case management systems;
32.  ensure the necessary technical  changes in  the alert creation process  and integration  of
SIS  Powroty  with  the  SIS  to  guarantee  that  all  information  available  is  added  to  the
alerts  and  that  the  SIS  is  systematically  checked  before  creating  an  alert  in  line  with
8

Article  4.2  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  3  of
Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860,  and  with  Article  23  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1862,  and
Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861;
33.  ensure to implement the foreseen procedures for prior consultations according to
Article 31 and art. 35 of Commission Implementing Decision laying down detailed
rules  for  the  tasks  of  the  SIRENE  Bureaux  and  the  exchange  of  supplementary
information  regarding  alerts  in  the  Schengen  Information  System  in  the  field  of
border  checks  and  return  (‘SIRENE  Manual  -  Borders  and  return’)  -  C  (2021)
7900; (prioritised recommendation)
34.  establish  the  correct  follow-up  in  relation  to  consultation  procedures  in  MIGRENE  to
timely  meet  the  legal  deadlines  provided  for  in  Articles  9,  10  and  11  of  Regulation
(EU) 2018/1860 and Article 27, 28 and 29 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861;
35.  establish  a  procedure  or  technical  tool  within  the  Polish  SIRENE  Bureau  for  the
systematic  deletion  of  supplementary  information  at  the  latest  one  year  after  the
deletion  of  the  relevant  alert,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  with  Article  49  of
Regulation (EU) 2018/1961 and Article 69 of Regulation (EU) 2018/18627;
36.  ensure the regular performance of the test of the Business Continuity Plan;
37.  take  appropriate  measures  to  physically  secure  the  Data  Center  to  align  with  security
standards  and  install  CCTV  cameras  inside  the  server  room  as  well  as  additional
security  measures  for  granting  access  to  the  server  room  in  line  with  Article  10(1),
point (b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861;
Protection of personal data in the Schengen Information System
38.  ensure that the roles and responsibilities of CTA-NITS and competent authorities
regards processing SIS personal data are clarified in law and practice in line with
Articles  24  and  26  Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  and  Articles  19  and  21  of  Directive
(EU) 2016/680; (prioritised recommendation)
39.  assess in cooperation with the Personal Data Protection Office the rights of the Central
Anti-Corruption Bureau to enter alert in SIS related to threats to national security8;
40.  ensure  that  all  authorities  managing  and  using  the  SIS  proactively,  regularly  and
randomly check logs regarding all user activities based on a coordinated approach9;
41.  amend the criteria for time-out of computer users’ sessions to require shorter time-out
periods for workstations  in specific work environments e.g. a busy police station with
open office spaces;

7
Former  recommendation  n.4  of  the  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  5428/20  on  addressing  the
deficiencies identified in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen acquis in the
field of the Schengen information System.
8
Former  recommendation  n.22  of  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  6426/22  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of data protection.
9
Former recommendations nn.14, 15, 18 and 22 of Council Implementing Decision n. 6426/22 setting out
a  recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of data protection.
9

42.  ensure that no outdated web-browsers (Internet Explorer) are used on computers in the
SIRENE Bureau;
43.  implement  a  technical  solution  as  soon  as  possible  at  the  National  Police  in  order  to
manage workstations, group policies and software centrally;
44.
implement  a  technical  solution  in  order  to  attach  USB  devices  securely  to  police
computers  using  applications/databases  with  access  to  the  Schengen  Information
Systems  only  when  there  is  a  specific  work-related  need  and  upgrade  any  remaining
outdated operating systems installed in workstations at the police stations10;
45.  ensure  that  data  subjects  can  exercise  their  rights  to  access,  rectification  and
erasure  of  personal  data  in  the  Schengen  Information  System  through  the
Personal  Data  Protection  Office  where  the  access,  rectification  or  erasure  of
personal data in the context of the Schengen Information System has been refused
in  line  with  Article  53(3)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1861  and  Article  67(3)  of
Regulation  (EU)  2018/1862  and  Article  19  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860;
(prioritised recommendation)
46.  guarantee  that  data  subjects  can  exercise  their  right  to  an  effective  judicial
remedy against controller’s decision on data subjects’ rights and are informed of
that  right  in  the  controller’s  reply  in  line  with  Articles  53(3)  and  54  (1)  of
Regulation (EU) 2018/1861, Articles 67(3) and 68 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1862
and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1860; (prioritised recommendation)
47.  ensure  that  the  CTA  (controller  of  NITS)  finds  an  alternative  procedure  to  the  Polish
electronic platform for administration services (ePUAP) for an electronic data subjects’
rights  request,  so  that  data  subjects  without  a  possibility  to  enter  their  request  via
ePUAP can also exercise their data subjects’ rights electronically;
48.  provide proactively information to data subjects about the processing of their personal
data  in  SIS  and  VIS  and  the  exercise  of  their  rights  (e.g.,  flyers,  posters),  at  police
offices, airports including at the second line check;
Data protection supervision
49.  ensure  that  Directive  (EU)  2016/680  is  fully  transposed  in  relation  to  the
processing  of  personal  data  as  listed  in  Article  3  (1)  of  the  Polish  Act  of  14
December  2018  on  the  protection  of  personal  data  processed  in  connection  with
preventing  and  combating  crime.  Furthermore,  ensure  that  Directive  (EU)
2016/680  is  transposed  also  in  relation  to  personal  data  being  processed  on  the
basis of the Schengen acquis by authorities listed in Article 3 (2) of the Polish Act
of 14 December 2018 e.g. processing personal  data from the SIS and VIS  for the
purposes listed in the SIS and VIS acquis; (prioritised recommendation)

10
Recommendation n.17 and 24 of  Council Implementing Decision 6426/22setting out a recommendation
on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the  application  of  the
Schengen acquis in the field of data protection.

10

50.  ensure  that  the  Personal  Data  Protection  Office  conducts  sufficiently  thorough
inspections  and  audits  in  line  with  its  obligations  to  monitor  the  lawfulness  of
processing of personal data in the N.SIS and N.VIS;
51.  ensure  that  the  Personal  Data  Protection  Office  finds  an  alternative  procedure  for
making  a  complaint  about  the  CTA’s  decision  on  SIS  and  VIS  data  subjects’  rights
requests  electronically,  so  that  data  subjects  without  a  possibility  to  enter  their
complaint  via  the  Polish  electronic  platform  for  administration  services  (ePUAP)  can
also exercise their data subjects’ right to complain electronically;
Activities with Union bodies and agencies
52.  in close cooperation with Frontex, ensure that Standing Corps officers when operating
as  members  of  the  deployed  teams  can  consult  relevant  databases,  the  consultation  of
which is necessary for fulfilling operational aims specified in the respective operational
plans;
EXTERNAL DIMENSION
Cooperation with third countries
53.  utilise the possibility of common use of liaison officers with other Schengen countries
and make full use of the Decision 2003/170/JHA;
Visa policy and data protection
54.  monitor  the  situation  closely  and  prudently  increase  the  slots  whenever  possible  to
comply  with  the  two-week  deadline  for  granting  appointments  to  submit  visa
application set out in Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 ;
55.  adapt  the  national  IT-system  to  grant  local  staff  the  possibility  (user  rights)  to  verify
whether fingerprints are already available in the Visa Information System and instruct
local  staff  to  duly  check  whether  fingerprints  were  already  provided  during  the
submission process;
56.  ensure that all its consulates systematically link application files of applicants travelling
in  a  group  or  with  a  family  in  the  central  Visa  Information  System  (grouping)  in
accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 767/200811;
57.  ensure that the prior consultation table is integrated in the national visa processing IT-
system so as to ensure that prior consultation is always performed automatically when
required12;
58.  monitor  the  rate  of  successful  first  instance  appeals  (reconsiderations)  and
introduce  further  measures  to  strengthen  the  coherence  of  decisions;  in
Guangzhou, notably by:

11
Former  recommendation  n.10  of  the  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  15005/19  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of.the visa policy.
12
Former  recommendation  n.15  of  the  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  15005/19  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of the visa policy.

11

-  instructing the local staff to accept all documents provided by the applicants,
irrespective of whether they are required by the consulate
-  stepping  up  the  efforts  to  contact  the  applicants  to  clarify  inconsistencies
(travel  itineraries,  invitation  letters  etc.)  and  record  such  efforts  in  the
application file (prioritised recommendation);
59.  ensure  that  its  consulates  make  optimal  use  of  the  possibility  to  issue  multiple-entry
visas with longer period of validity to frequent bona fide travellers, including based on
Article 24(2c) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 ;
60.  ensure that the external service provider improves the workflow, namely by:
-  separating  front-office  and  back-office  tasks  to  reduce  the  time  that
applicants spend lodging an application;
-  grouping applicants traveling together, either physically or electronically (or
both); (prioritised recommendation)
61.  instruct the external service provider to refrain from requiring repeat applicants,
whose  fingerprints  were  already  collected  within  the  previous  59  months,  to
appear in person at the external service provider only for the purpose of taking a
live facial image; (prioritised recommendation)
62.  until  the  specific  barcode  generated  by  the  E-Konzulat  platform  on  the  visa  sticker  is
not utilised to facilitate data transfer, ensure that applicants can lodge their applications
using the harmonised application form, irrespective of whether it was generated by the
‘E-Konzulat’ system or not;
63.  refrain  from  using  checklists  to  elicit  information  going  beyond  the  application  form
and the harmonised list of supporting documents;
64.  ensure that the online appointment system of the external service provider is adequately
supervised, notably by obtaining remote access to the appointment system;
65.  instruct  the  consulate  to  systematically  use  VISMail  whenever  contacts  need  to  be
made with other Member States;
66.  ensure  that  the  national  IT-system  accurately  provides  to  the  consulates  the  VISMail
messages they are concerned by;
67.  ensure that all recommendations on data protection aspects concerning the management
of the N.SIS are also being followed up for the management of the N.VIS13;
68.  ensure  that  the  Border  Guard  adapts  the  retention  periods  of  N.VIS  logs  in  line
with  Article  34(2)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  767/2008  and  Article  16(3)  of  Decision
2008/633/JHA14; (prioritised recommendation)
69.  ensure that all accesses to the server room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are logged;
70.  ensure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses a more distant site for the second data
center or carries out the backups at a different network;
71.  ensure  that  the  windows  at  the  Office  of  Foreigners’  server  room  to  the  outside  are
taken  out  or  reinforced  to  protect  the  perimeter,  that  the  water  heating  radiators  are

13
Former  recommendations  n.  10  and  11  of  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  6426/22  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of data protection.
14
Former  recommendation  n.  13  of  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.  6426/22setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of data protection.
12

removed and that CCTV or another system are being installed which are giving alarm
in case the door remains open;
MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL BORDERS
National and European situational awareness, early warning system and risk analysis
72.  ensure that tasks related to the National Coordination Centre are designated to regional,
local,  functional  or  other  authorities  only  to  the  extent  set  out  in  Article  21(4)  of
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896;
73.  ensure that information on events  and operational  capabilities from  the sea border are
included into the National Situational Picture maintained by the National Coordination
Centre;
74.  improve  and  align  the  national  methodology  to  collect  and  register  the  statistical  data
with  the  indicators  established  in  the  common  European  framework  provided  by  the
Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN);
Border surveillance
75.  integrate the operational layers of the Maritime Surveillance Centre in Gdansk with the
land borders positioning of the assets in the coastal areas to ensure sufficient situational
awareness and response capacity;
76.  improve  the  knowledge  of  the  operators  in  the  regional  coordination  center  on  vessel
identification features  to ensure complete situational  awareness  and adequate decision
making on the operational response;
Border checks
77.  re-organize  the  border  check  procedures  in  the  first  line  to  increase  the  efficiency  of
border  check  and  decrease  the  waiting  times  by  introducing  the  face-to-face  control
model for vehicles passengers15;
78.  bring  the  refusal  of  entry  procedure  in  compliance  with  Articles  3,  8  and  14  of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
79.  bring  the  procedure  of  issuing  visas  at  the  border  in  accordance  with  Article  35  of
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009;
80.  ensure that border guards involved in border checks, in particular the recently appointed
ones, have a high and uniform level of knowledge on document checks, including the
systematic  use  of  specialized  equipment  for  document  examination  by  improving  the
quality  and  number  of  training  increasing  the  availability  of  refresher  trainings,  and
making the attendance of border guards in such training obligatory if relevant for their
tasks;

15
Former  recommendation  n.21  of  the  Council  Implementing  Decision  n.12869/20  setting  out  a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of the management of external borders.

13

NATIONAL RETURN SYSTEM
81.  ensure that a return decision is issued without delay to any third-country national whose
request for a visa, legal stay or international protection has been denied as envisaged by
Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC;
82.  amend  the  national  law  to  ensure  that  third-country  nationals  are  afforded  an
effective remedy to appeal against or seek review of decisions related to return, in
accordance with Article 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC; (prioritised recommendation)
83.  ensure an effective notification of return decisions of third-country nationals who have
no right to legal stay in Poland within the meaning of Directive 2008/115/EC, detected
upon exit, when failing to provide a physical address or contact in Poland, as envisaged
by Article 12(1) and Article 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC;
84.  ensure  that  third-country  nationals  detained  at  the  Warsaw  Airport  Holding  Facility
have access to an outdoor area and are provided with recreational activities;
85.  ensure  adequate privacy  for families  accommodated in  the  holding facility at  Warsaw
airport,  and  play  and  recreational  activities  taking  account  of  the  needs  of  children,
pursuant to Article 17(2) and (3) of the Directive 2008/115/EC16;
86.  ensure that the regime applicable to the detention for foreigners placed in the arrest for
foreigners in Przemyśl is adjusted to reflect the nature of the administrative detention,
and  that  the  appropriate  measures  are  taken  to  ensure  the  conditions  in  the  facility
guarantee adequate privacy and effective access to leisure activities in accordance with
the provisions of the Directive 2008/115/EC17;
MEASURES WITHIN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
National situational awareness and threat assessment
87.  establish  a  national  threat  assessment  methodology  including  all  law  enforcement
authorities  to  have  a  clear  situational  picture  in  Poland  and  share  the  results  of  the
assessment  to  extent  necessary  with  the  national,  regional,  and  local  law  enforcement
authorities, the neighbouring Member States, and the relevant EU agencies so that the
resources  can  be  allocated  according  to  the  needs  of  national  and  international
cooperation18;
Exchange of information for cross-border and international police cooperation
88.  by  12  December  2024,  proceed  with  the  full  technical  and/or  organisational
integration  into  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of  all  national  law  enforcement

16
Former recommendation n. 4 of the Council Implementing Decision 9768/20 of 17 July 2020setting out a
recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of return.
17
Former recommendation n. 8 of the Council Implementing Decision 9768/20 of 17 July 2020 setting out
a  recommendation  on  addressing  the  deficiencies  identified  in  the  2019  evaluation  of  Poland  on  the
application of the Schengen acquis in the field of return.
18
Former recommendation n.6 Council Implementing Decision 9767/20 setting out a recommendation on
addressing the deficiencies in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen Acquis in
the field of Police Cooperation of 17 July 2020.
14

authorities  that  need  to  be  involved  in  cross-border  information  exchange  to
enable it to be a hub for all incoming and outgoing international law enforcement
information exchange and ensure that the Single Point of Contact has access to the
appropriate  operational  tools,  technical  and  financial  resources,  infrastructure,
and the capabilities, necessary to carry out its tasks in an adequate, effective and
rapid manner; (prioritised recommendation)
89.  develop  clear  written  guidelines  containing  the  rules  and  procedures  of  cross-border
law  enforcement  cooperation  and  information  exchange  (listing  for  instance  practical
examples)  and  dedicated  continuous  training,  including  (but  not  exclusive  to),  on  the
protection  of  personal  data,  including  Directive  (EU)  2016/680,  and  Regulation  (EU)
2016/794  for  the  staff  of  the  SPOC  as  well  as  a  system  to  evaluate  training
effectiveness19;
90.  by  12  December  2024,    improve  the  case  management  system  of  the  SPOC  by
increasing  the  automation  of  information processing,  the  capability  to  search  for
and cross-check available information into relevant national, EU and international
databases in an automated and simultaneous manner, the function to record, in an
automated  manner,  any  relevant  communication  or  exchange  of  information
between  the  SPOC  and  the  national  competent  authorities  or  between  the  SPOC
and the competent authorities of other Member States, including the integration of
Europol’s  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application  (SIENA);
(prioritised recommendation)
91.  ensure  that  a  single  search  system  (SPP)  on  desktop  and  mobile  devices  carries  out
single  searches  for  objects  and  individuals,  whilst  also  ensuring  that  checks  into  the
Schengen Information System and into relevant Interpol databases are mandatory;
92.  ensure full implementation and awareness of the access procedure for law enforcement
purposes  to  the  Visa  Information  System  established  under  the  Decision
2008/633/JHA;
93.  ensure  the  registration  of  aliens  staying  in  hotels  and  other  establishments  providing
accommodation, in accordance  with Article 45 CISA and develop a technical solution
in order to provide law enforcement officers with computerised access to hotel registers
in  accordance  with  national  law,  should  the  need  arise,  subject  to  adequate  data
protection safeguards;
Operational cross-border police cooperation
94.  strengthen and modernise the cross-border law enforcement  cooperation  by creating a
comprehensive  and  well-coordinated  national  concept,  based  on  joint  threat  and  risk
assessment and more integrated common planning and interoperable communication;
95.  develop a formal review mechanism for bilateral agreements, with the aim to regularly
revise  them  in  ensuring  their  operational  effectiveness.  Poland  should  also  revise  the

19
Former recommendation n.5 Council Implementing Decision 9767/20 setting out a recommendation on
addressing the deficiencies in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen Acquis in
the field of Police Cooperation of 17 July 2020.

15

bilateral  law  enforcement  cooperation  agreements  with  all  neighbouring  countries  to
extend  the  possibilities  of  cross-border  cooperation  with  the  aim  to  align  them  with
current  operational  needs.  The  priority  should  be  given  to  the  agreements  with  the
Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia;
96.  continue  discussions  on  cross-border  surveillance  operations  with  the  Czech  Republic
with  involvement  of  all  relevant  authorities  of  both  counterparts  and  find  the
compromise  solution  that  will  allow  a  more  efficient  use  of  cross-border  surveillance
operations to combat cross-border crime20;
97.  raise the awareness  on  cross-border surveillance  operations including  development  on
comprehensive training on it with involvement of all relevant authorities;
98.  raise  awareness  on  cross-border  hot  pursuit  including  development  on  comprehensive
training on it with involvement of all relevant authorities;
99.  establish a mechanism to collate and assess the need to organise joint patrols with the
law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  countries  from  which  most  of  visitors  come  to
Poland. improve the situational awareness and coordination of joint patrolling;
100.  make  a  better  use  of  the  already  existing  PCCCs  by  enhancing  their  operational  role,
developing integrated case management system and by connecting them to SIENA21;
101.  implement,  in  partnership  with  the  neighbouring  countries,  a  standardized  and  secure
real  time  communication  system  compatible  with  all  neighbouring  countries  and
prepare  the  technology,  application  eco-system  and  procedures  for  the  use  of  the  EU
Critical  Communication  System  within  the  BroadEU.net.  to  improve  operational
cooperation in the framework of internal security, while exploring also existing funding
opportunities;
102.  strengthen  the  institutional  and  national  coordination  on  the  deployment  of  liaison
officers in order to exploit this instrument and incorporate it into national strategies.
Cooperation with Europol
103.  urgently  roll-out  SIENA  to  all  competent  law  enforcement  authorities  in  Poland,
including  PCCCs,  integrate  it  into  the  officers’  main  workstations  and  mobile
devices,  with  automated  data  transfer  into  the  CMS,  to  ensure  a  continuous
monitoring  and  a  smooth  and  efficient  handling  of  all  communications22;
(prioritised recommendation)
104.  expand  the  technical  solution  for  automatically  uploading  data  into  the  EIS  to  ensure
that all operationally valuable data is inserted in the system;
105.  further  roll-out  QUEST  to  all  investigators  of  all  law  enforcement  authorities  both  at
the central and regional level and provide necessary training.

20
Former recommendation n.16 Council Implementing Decision 9767/20 setting out a recommendation on
addressing the deficiencies in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen Acquis in
the field of Police Cooperation of 17 July 2020.
21
Former recommendation n.4 Council Implementing Decision 9767/20 setting out a recommendation on
addressing the deficiencies in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen Acquis in
the field of Police Cooperation of 17 July 2020.
22
Former  recommendation n.8 Council Implementing Decision 9767/20 setting out a recommendation on
addressing the deficiencies in the 2019 evaluation of Poland on the application of the Schengen Acquis in
the field of Police Cooperation of 17 July 2020.
16

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