Brussels, 31 January 2023
Interinstitutional files:
2022/0155 (COD)
WK 1348/2023 INIT
LIMITE
JAI
FREMP
ENFOPOL
TELECOM
CRIMORG
COMPET
IXIM
MI
DATAPROTECT
CONSOM
CYBER
DIGIT
COPEN
CODEC
This is a paper intended for a specific community of recipients. Handling and
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MEETING DOCUMENT
From:
General Secretariat of the Council
To:
Law Enforcement Working Party (Police)
Subject:
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse
Delegations will find in annex three documents from the Commission services:
- follow-up questions to the Commission after the presentation of the proposal by the Commission in
December to the MEPs in charge of preparing the European Parliament position (Rapporteur and Shadow
Rapporteurs);
- comments on a possibly limited extension of the Interim Regulation;
- sample CSA cases in the EU that started with a report from an online service provider (mostly
interpersonal communication services) to NCMEC.
WK 1348/2023 INIT
LIMITE
EN
ANNEX 1
Follow-up questions
Shadows’s meeting
14 December 2022
EPP
S&D
Renew
Greens
ID ECR
The Left
COM
1.
What is your intention of the
No question
1.
Will you propose to extend the
1.
Technologies such as client-side scanning (CSS) would
relationship between the EU Centre
validity of the interim Regulation, and
need substantial rights in the operating system to scan
and Europol? Will they be
when do you intend to make a
multimedia data being transmitted through a hosting
permitted to share data without any
legislative proposal on this?
service or an interpersonal communication service in
barriers? And what do you consider
2.
What types of procedures and
order to match it to an external database. For the process
it an effective firewall if the Centre
technologies, with what success or
of matching, technical measures would have to be taken
resides at the Europol premises?
failure rates, has the Commission
in order to ensure that users are protected against
2.
Did you consult MS’ authorities on
tested for the detection of unknown
potential misuse. Which technological measures are
the current human resources to
CSAM and of possible grooming
already considered by the COM to ensure end user IT
monitor CSAM and the potential
attempts online, and to what extent?
security and data protection and how can these
impact this proposal will have on
Please answer in detail and with
technological measures guarantee end user IT security
their resources?
references.
and data protection?
3.
According to the proposed legislation,
2.
What is the accuracy of existing technologies for the
the
EU
Centre
should
act
detection of a) known CSAM, b) new CSAM and c)
independently, receive reports from
grooming with regard to false negatives and false
the services and platforms and sort out
positives and what are the possibilities and prospects for
incorrectly identified material therein
improving the accuracy, according to objective and
and
forward
only
"relevant"
accessible research?
(punishable?) material to the law
3.
According to various digital rights organisations, in
enforcement agencies in the Member
particular edri, the Commission repeatedly refused to
States. At the same time, the center
meet with them on the proposal. Is that true? With what
should be responsible for deleting
other stakeholders has the Commission or the
identified CSAM from providers and
Commissioners herself met on the file?
maintain a list of indicators that
4.
According to many experts the proposal lacks a
providers and platforms are obliged to
sufficient legal basis. Could you please comment on
use to find possible CSAM and to
that?
detect possible grooming attempts.
5.
Many stakeholders underline that the proposal fails to
On the basis of which rights and with
meet the key human rights principles of necessity and
whom can data subjects appeal
proportionality and violates several fundamental rights.
wrongly reported data and false
As confirmed by the European Commission’s own
suspicions and, if necessary, claim
internal Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the proposal
damages and the restoration of
may also violate the EU prohibition of general
wrongly deleted data?
monitoring. Can you please comment on that?
ANNEX 1
1
This non-paper prepared by the Commission’s services aims to provide explanations with
regard to the technical elements of the proposal for a Regulation on preventing and combating
child sexual abuse.
This non-paper is based on the relevant Commission proposal and does not present any new
positions with regard to that proposal.
Answers to questions by the S&D
1) What is your intention of the relationship between the EU Centre and Europol?
For the relationship between the EU Centre and Europol (and Coordinating Authorities), please
see document WK 13981/2022.
Will they be permitted to share data without any barriers?
Recital 71 of the proposal states that
“Considering Europol’s mandate and its experience in identifying competent national
authorities in unclear situation and its database of criminal intelligence which can
contribute to identifying links to investigations in other Member States, the EU Centre
should cooperate closely with it, especially in order to ensure the swift identification of
competent national law enforcement authorities in cases where that is not clear or where
more than one Member State may be affected.”
And Article 53(2) on the cooperation of the EU Centre and Europol states that
“Europol and the EU Centre shall provide each other with the fullest possible access to
relevant information and information systems, where necessary for the performance of
their respective tasks and in accordance with the acts of Union law regulating such
access.”
This means that Europol and the EU Centre will not share data without any barriers. Europol
and the EU Centre will share data only where necessary for the performance of their respective
tasks, including the tasks for the EU Centre detailed in Article 43, and only in accordance with
the acts of Union law regulating such access, including the Europol Regulation, the GDPR, as
well as any applicable rule on professional secrecy.
And what do you consider it an effective firewall if the Centre resides at the Europol
premises?
Article 53(3) on the cooperation of the EU Centre and Europol states that
“the terms of cooperation and working arrangements shall be laid down in a memorandum
of understanding.”
ANNEX 1
2
This could include the arrangements to ensure security and data access restrictions.
That said, given the space available at the current Europol’s premises and the space required
to host the EU Centre as described in the proposal, it seems unlikely at this point that the Centre
could reside at such Europol premises.
2) Did you consult MS’ authorities on the current human resources to monitor CSAM
and the potential impact this proposal will have on their resources?
Yes, Member States’ authorities were consulted during the preparation of the proposal. Annex
2 of the Impact Assessments describes the multiple consultations that took place over two years
in the preparation of the Impact Assessment for the proposal, including to Member States’
authorities.
The reporting obligations for the companies (notably the requirements in relation to the
information to be included in the reports) and the check function of the EU Centre will help
ensure that the reports that reach law enforcement are actionable. This will alleviate the current
workload and the time that national law enforcement has to dedicate to filter out non-actionable
reports, mostly because they lack sufficient information for law enforcement to open an
investigation.
In addition, the role that the EU Centre will play in facilitating efforts by Member States on
prevention and assistance to victims, in particular by promoting the exchange of best practices
and serving as a centralised knowledge hub, will likely reduce duplication of efforts and
inefficiencies across the EU. National hotlines already in place could support the work of the
EU Centre on prevention and assistance to victims: they currently constitute an important
stakeholder in this field at national level, hence they are a key interlocutor to identify best
practices and areas of improvements.
ANNEX 1
3
Answers to questions by the Greens
1) Will you propose to extend the validity of the interim Regulation, and when do you intend
to make a legislative proposal on this?
On the possibility to extend the validity of the Interim Regulation, please refer to the comments
made in the dedicated document.
The Commission stands ready to support the co-legislators to achieve an agreement on the proposal
for the Regulation as soon as possible, to prevent the need for such an extension from arising.
Depending on the progress of the negotiations, the Commission, following consultations with the
co-legislators, will decide whether to present such a proposal for an extension.
2) What types of procedures and technologies, with what success or failure rates, has the
Commission tested for the detection of unknown CSAM and of possible grooming
attempts online, and to what extent? Please answer in detail and with references.
It is not within the Commission’s competences to develop for commercial purposes technologies
to detect unknown CSAM or grooming and test them in actual operating conditions, which are the
conditions that produce the most relevant error rates. The Impact Assessment accompanying the
proposal contains the data and evidence available in relation to such error rates as provided by the
companies, civil society organisations and national authorities during the extensive consultations
carried out in the preparation of the proposal.
Please refer to the responses to question 2) by the Left for additional details on these technologies
and to question 3) by the Left on the consultations carried out in the preparation of the proposal.
3) According to the proposed legislation, the EU Centre should act independently, receive
reports from the services and platforms and sort out incorrectly identified material
therein and forward only "relevant" (punishable?) material to the law enforcement
agencies in the Member States. At the same time, the center should be responsible for
deleting identified CSAM from providers and maintain a list of indicators that providers
and platforms are obliged to use to find possible CSAM and to detect possible grooming
attempts. On the basis of which rights and with whom can data subjects appeal wrongly
reported data and false suspicions and, if necessary, claim damages and the restoration
of wrongly deleted data?
Data subjects affected by detection, reporting, removal or blocking of online CSA are entitled to:
- A right to complain with the service provider responsible for the data processing (Articles
10(4)(d)), 15(1), 18(3) of the proposal).
- A right to complain with the competent Coordinating Authority (Article 34 of the proposal).
- A right to effective judicial redress before national court, in accordance with the procedure
available under national law (in line with the principle of national procedural autonomy). This
right includes the right to challenge a detection, removal or blocking order before national
courts (Articles 9(1), 15(1) and 18(1) of the proposal). Effective judicial redress necessarily
encompasses a right of compensation for any damage that might result from wrongful
ANNEX 1
4
processing. In this respect, it might be useful to notice that the proposed regulation does not
derogate from Article 82 GDPR, which provides for the data subject’s right to compensation
for any infringements of that regulation. Similarly, the proposal does not derogate from the
rights attributed to the data subject, among others, by Articles 15 (right of access), 16 (right to
rectification) and 17 (right to erasure) GDPR. Where relevant, the corresponding Articles of
the Law Enforcement Directive (Article 56 on the right to compensation, Article 14 on the
right of access and Article 16 on the right to rectification or erasure) are also applicable.
- A right to be informed about their right to complain to the service provider and Coordinating
Authority, as well as to seek redress before national courts (Articles 10(5)(c), 12(2), 15(3)(c),
17(1)(i) of the proposal)
Data subjects affected by detection, reporting, removal or blocking of online CSA are also entitled
to the rights provided by the Digital Services Act, when the service provider is also subject to the
obligations of the Digital Services Act.
ANNEX 1
5
Answers to questions by the Left
1) Technologies such as client-side scanning (CSS) would need substantial rights in the
operating system to scan multimedia data being transmitted through a hosting service
or an interpersonal communication service in order to match it to an external
database. For the process of matching, technical measures would have to be taken in
order to ensure that users are protected against potential misuse. Which technological
measures are already considered by the COM to ensure end user IT security and data
protection and how can these technological measures guarantee end user IT security
and data protection?
The proposal is technology neutral and future proof. It does not impose the use of any specific
detection technology and leaves the choice of the most appropriate detection measure to
providers having received a detection order, within the limits of the specifications set out in the
proposal to ensure protection of data privacy, security, as well as accuracy and reliability of
detection.
According to Article 50(1) of the proposal, the assessment of specific detection technologies
to be included in the EU Centre list will be carried out by the EU Centre (supported by expertise
in the form of a dedicated Technology Committee) in cooperation with the EDPB, whose
opinion will be particularly relevant to ensure that data protection and privacy is safeguarded.
The deployment of detection technologies on a case-by-case basis requires a judicial or
independent administrative order and must be performed, in accordance with Article 7(3) of
the proposal, under the supervision of the competent data protection authorities, based on the
implementation plan presented by the provider and reviewed by the other authorities involved,
including the data protection authority.
The impact assessment accompanying the proposal contains examples of technologies that
could guarantee end user IT security and data protection (see in particular Annex 9). These
include, for example, on-device CSS partial hashing technologies with remaining hashing and
matching at server. In this case, part of the hash is generated at the device and the rest at the
server, where the matching also takes place. This hybrid approach could be worth considering,
as (compared to full hashing at the client and matching at the server) it makes the process
lighter and ensures even more end user IT security and data protection. That said, the proposal
does not require the use of CSS technologies or any other specific type of technology.
2) What is the accuracy of existing technologies for the detection of a) known CSAM, b)
new CSAM and c) grooming with regard to false negatives and false positives and
what are the possibilities and prospects for improving the accuracy, according to
objective and accessible research?
The accuracy rate of existing technologies is as follows:
a)
For known CSAM, the most widely used technology is a hashing technology known as
PhotoDNA, which has an extremely high accuracy rate. The rate of false positives in tests
has been demonstrated to be below 1 in 50 billion. PhotoDNA has been in use for more
than 10 years by over 150 organisations globally including service providers (Microsoft,
Facebook, Twitter, Apple), NGOs (e.g. NCMEC, Internet Watch Foundation) and law
enforcement in the EU (e.g. Europol, DE, SE and others). In these 10 years, the tool has
been used daily and analysed trillions of images without any accuracy concerns being
ANNEX 1
6
identified. Other examples of hashing technology used for these purposes, and operating
on similar principles, include YouTube CSAI Match, Facebook’s PDQ and TMK+PDQF.
b)
For new CSAM, technologies currently used include
classifiers. A classifier is any
algorithm that sorts data into labelled classes, or categories of information, through
pattern
recognition. Examples of classifiers include those that can detect nudity, shapes or colours.
Classifiers need data to be trained on and their accuracy improves the more data they are
fed. Hence, compulsory detection (based on a judicial or independent administrative order),
coupled with incentives towards innovation in the field, is bound to further improve current
accuracy rates.
Thorn’s CSAM Classifier is one example of industry’s ability to detect new child sexual
abuse material. The tool can be set at a 99.9% accuracy rate1 (false positives). With that
precision rate, 99.9% of the content that the classifier identifies as CSAM is CSAM, and it
identifies 80% of the total CSAM in the data set. With this precision rate, only 1% of the
content flagged as CSAM will end up being non-CSAM. These metrics are very likely to
improve with increased utilization and feedback.
Other tools making use of classifier technology to detect previously new CSAM include
Google’s Content Safety API2, and Meta’s AI technology3.
c)
For grooming, technologies currently used also include classifiers. Like the classifiers
used to detect new CSAM, these tools can only detect patterns, which point to possible
concrete elements of suspicion of online child sexual abuse without being able to deduce
the substance of the content. While not identical in function, these tools use technology
similar to the one used in spam filters4.
Text classifiers used to detect grooming are trained on Large Language Models, which
involve feeding the classifiers with billions of lines of text in order to train the technology
in semantic meaning, and also by inputting use-cases involving instances of grooming.
Tools of this type include the tool developed under Microsoft’s Project Artemis, in
collaboration with The Meet Group, Roblox, Kik and Thorn. This tool analyses text-based
conversations, rating them on a series of characteristics and assigning each conversation an
overall probability that it constitutes grooming. These ratings can be used as a determiner,
set by individual companies, to address flagged conversations for additional review. The
tool was made available to companies, law enforcement, NGOs and other government
entities through Thorn (Anti-grooming starter kit). Microsoft has reported that, in its own
deployment of this tool in its services, its accuracy (false positives rate) is 88%.
It is important to note that in all the above technologies, the accuracy rate (false positives rate)
is a setting, i.e. the tool can be set to detect known CSAM, new CSAM or grooming with more
or less accuracy, depending on the optimal operational settings of that specific online service.
1
Thorn’s data from bench tests.
2
Fighting child sexual abuse online
3
See here and
here for more information on Facebook’s tool to proactively detect child nudity and previously
unknown child exploitative content using artificial intelligence and machine learning.
For more information about content spam filters see
here and
here and for other spam filters see
here, here
and
here. Spam filters are usually run with the receiving end-user’s consent. Some spam filters look only at
the subject line of the email.
ANNEX 1
7
The higher the threshold set, the lower the number of false positives. For example, if a 99%
precision is set, only 1% of the images identified as new CSAM will be a false positive.
However, a higher rate of new CSAM images will be left undetected (false negatives). It is
estimated that for a 99% precision rate, the false negative rate would currently be around 23%,
meaning that 77 of every 100 new CSAM images would be identified5, while 23 would be left
undetected). Idem for grooming: whereas the tool could be set to detect conversations that
have a 99% chance of constituting grooming, the higher the accuracy rate set (less false
positives), the higher the number of grooming conversations that will be left undetected (more
false negatives).
The maximum accuracy rate at which the tool can operate in optimal conditions increases the
broader the dataset on which the classifier is trained. Hence the creation of a data set of child
sexual abuse images and videos and grooming conversations that have each been verified by a
court in an EU Member State, which will set a new standard of quality that does not exist to
date, will be a key contribution to further increasing accuracy over time.
3) According to various digital rights organisations, in particular edri, the Commission
repeatedly refused to meet with them on the proposal. Is that true? With what other
stakeholders has the Commission or the Commissioners herself met on the file?
The Commission met and discussed with EDRI on several occasions concerning the proposal.
In particular:
-
EDRI participated in the workshop organised by the Commission to prepare the drafting of
the proposal, together with other privacy NGOs, on 26 February 2021.
-
Two members of DG HOME, Unit D.4 (in charge of the file) met with EDRI on behalf of
the Commissioner on 17 February 2022.
-
The Commission responded to EDRI’s open letter on Protecting digital rights and freedoms
in the legislation to effectively tackle child abuse (Ares(2022)4863937).
The Commission also exchanged with EDRi on a number of occasions on various public panels
and roundtables. The Commission met with a number of stakeholders on the file, including
privacy organisations, NGOs working on the rights of children, relevant service providers,
technology experts and law enforcement from different Member States. Annex 2 of the Impact
Assessments describes the multiple consultations that took place over two years in the
preparation of the Impact Assessment for the proposal, from February 2020 to January 2022,
which continued until the adoption of the proposal in May 2022.
4) According to many experts the proposal lacks a sufficient legal basis. Could you please
comment on that?
The proposal is correctly based solely on Article 114 TFEU, allowing the EU to take measures
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. In
particular, Article 114 is the appropriate legal basis to address differences between provisions
of Member States’ laws which obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect
5 Thorn’s data from bench tests.
ANNEX 1
8
on the functioning of the internal market, and to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to
trade resulting from differences in the way national laws would otherwise develop.
The main aim of the proposal is to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market,
including through the harmonisation of rules and obligations concerning certain online service
providers in relation to providing services which are at high risk of being used for child sexual
abuse and exploitation online. As explained in the explanatory memorandum and impact
assessment accompanying the proposal, Member States have started taking action unilaterally,
adopting or considering rules to deal with the challenge posed by child sexual abuse online,
which are necessarily national in scope and risk fragmenting the Digital Single Market.
The main content of the proposal consists of (i) obligations on online service providers, meant
to create the best conditions for maintaining a safe online environment and (ii) the
establishment of the EU Centre, to facilitate the relevant service providers’ compliance with
their obligations and ensure coordination and cooperation of the activities under the proposal
at EU level. As such, the initiative should increase legal certainty, trust, innovation and growth
in the single market for digital services.
It should be added that the choice of in internal market legal basis to ensure a level playing
field and a high level of security on the digital single market is in line with the Commission’s
practice. Relevant examples are the TCO regulation (2021/784) and the DSA (Regulation
2022/2065).
It should be added that Articles 82 and 83 TFEU, which constitute the legal basis for the Child
Sexual Abuse Directive (Directive 2011/93/EU), provide a basis for criminal law rules
concerning, inter alia, the rights of victims of crime and the definition of criminal offences and
sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension such as sexual
exploitation of children. As the proposal does not harmonise criminal law, Articles 82 and 83
TFEU could not be considered as appropriate legal basis.
5) Many stakeholders underline that the proposal fails to meet the key human rights
principles of necessity and proportionality and violates several fundamental rights.
As confirmed by the European Commission’s own internal Regulatory Scrutiny
Board (RSB), the proposal may also violate the EU prohibition of general monitoring.
Can you please comment on that?
The European Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board does not provide opinions on
legislative proposals but on draft Impact Assessments which are then adopted by the
Commission to accompany and explain the legislative proposal and considerations that have
gone into its preparation once any concerns of the Board have been comprehensively
addressed. The RSB’s Opinion is published on the Register of Commission Documents with
reference
SEC(2022)209
(https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-
register/detail?ref=SEC(2022)209&lang=en).
ANNEX 1
9
ANNEX 2
Possible limited extension of the Interim Regulation to ensure continued protection
A possible limited extension of the Interim Regulation (which provides for a temporary derogation to
certain articles of the e-privacy Directive to enable the continuation of the voluntary detection and
reporting of child sexual abuse online in number-independent interpersonal communication services)
could be considered to ensure continued protection. The possibility of such an extension would
concern
only the transition period until the long-term framework set-out in the proposed CSA
regulation is implemented and would
in no circumstance eliminate the need to adopt the proposed
CSA regulation.
The possibility of such an extension concerns
only the transition period:
The possibility of a limited extension of the validity of the Interim Regulation (set to expire in
August 2024) could be considered if this was needed to ensure a smooth transition from the
current regime to the one that will emerge once a permanent framework based on the
Commission proposal is adopted. However, the initial duration of the Interim Regulation aims at
respecting the principle of proportionality. Any possible extension of its duration would have to
be carefully assessed, in particular in light of the principle of proportionality.
In the absence of transition measures, certain number-independent interpersonal
communication services could be prevented from continuing detecting online child sexual abuse
on a voluntary basis, if the proposed CSA regulation is not adopted and fully applied before the
end of August 2024. This would give rise precisely to the type of protection gap that the Interim
Regulation intended to prevent in the first place.
A strictly limited extension of the Interim Regulation would be a possible way to prevent such a
gap from emerging, subject to the proportionality considerations mentioned. Such a possible
extension, if considered proportionate, could conceivably be combined with an earlier
application of some provisions of the proposed CSA regulation (especially those concerning risk-
assessment and risk mitigation), and a later application of others, notably those dealing with
detection, until the structures needed for the issuance of detection orders are in place and the
first round of risk assessment and risk mitigation has been conducted by providers. This would
however need to analysed in more detail.
The possibility of such a limited extension would
in no circumstance eliminate the need to adopt the
proposed CSA regulation:
The Interim Regulation was conceived and drafted as a temporary, and strictly limited,
instrument, until the CSA Regulation was adopted. The need for a more permanent instrument,
providing for a long-term solution, remains.
In particular, the Interim Regulation does
not provide for a legal basis for data processing with a
view to detect child sexual abuse online on a voluntary basis. It does not apply to mandatory
online CSA detection measures which can, in principle, be provided for under national law in
accordance with Article 15 of the ePrivacy Directive. It simply enables, as far as the relevant
provisions of that Directive are concerned, providers of number-independent interpersonal
communication to keep detecting online CSA on a voluntary basis and for a limited period of time,
provided that these detection measures are lawful, which refers in particular to – apart from
compliance with the conditions of the Interim Regulation itself – compliance with the GDPR.
This situation is sub-optimal, as it does not provide clarity on the legal basis and legal regime for
processing of personal data for the purpose of detecting online child sexual abuse under the
GDPR. Hence, a comprehensive long term framework expressing a clear decision of the co-
legislators on the legal basis, safeguards and condition for such detection remains absolutely
essential. It is precisely based on the assumption that such a long term framework was in
preparation that the Interim Regulation was adopted as a strictly temporary measure.
ANNEX 2
1
ANNEX 3
SAMPLE CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE EU THAT ORIGINATED
FROM A REPORT BY AN ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDER (2019-2022)
Austria
Company name and service where report
Kik
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by KIK alerting
- Nature of the case (new material,
of the distribution of several images of minors
grooming, active abuse etc.)
performing sexual acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The examination led to the identification of one
victim.
Resolution of the case including:
Identification of one victim
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
KIK
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by KIK alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution of several images of minors performing
grooming, active abuse etc.)
sexual acts. Investigations led to the identification
- Number of offenders involved
of a victim in US and Switzerland.
Resolution of the case including:
Identification of two victims
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
KIK
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC alerting of the distribution of one image
- Nature of the case (new material,
of minors performing sexual acts. Investigations led
grooming, active abuse etc.)
to the investigations of the sexually abused
- Number of offenders involved
daughter
Resolution of the case including:
Identification of one victim
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
1
Company name and service where report
Dropbox
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Austria received a
- Number of victims included in the case
report from NCMEC submitted by Dropbox
- Nature of the case (new material,
alerting
grooming, active abuse etc.)
of the distribution of one image of minors
- Number of offenders involved
performing sexual acts.
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect has been arrested because it was
- Number of victims safeguarded
already his third house search.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Bing
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by Bing alerting
- Nature of the case (new material,
of the distribution of one image of minors
grooming, active abuse etc.)
performing sexual acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The examination led to a self-generated video with
sexual abuse of a 6 months old girl
Resolution of the case including:
Identification of one victim
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
2
Cyprus
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution via Facebook Messenger of 5 videos of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
minors performing sexual acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the conclusion that the
offender found the videos online and sent them to
another person.
Victims: 5x
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and convicted to 4 months
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspended sentence
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
KIK
originated
Details of the case including:
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by KIK alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution of 1 video of minor performing sexual
grooming, active abuse etc.)
acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the conclusion that the
offender found the videos online and sent them to
another person.
Victims: 1x
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and a sentence from the
- Number of victims safeguarded
court is expected to be issued.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution via Facebook Messenger of 1 video of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
minors performing sexual acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the conclusion that the
offender found the videos online and sent them to
another person.
Victims: 2x
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and a sentence from the
ANNEX 3
3
- Number of victims safeguarded
court is expected to be issued.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution of 2 videos of minors performing
grooming, active abuse etc.)
sexual acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the conclusion that the
offender found the videos online and sent them to
another person.
Victims: 2x
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and a sentence from the
- Number of victims safeguarded
court is expected to be issued.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution of 1 video of minors performing sexual
grooming, active abuse etc.)
acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the conclusion that the
offender found the videos online and sent them to
another person.
Victims: 2x
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and a sentence from the
- Number of victims safeguarded
court is expected to be issued.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
ANNEX 3
4
Czechia
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Bureau of Criminal Police and Investigation
- Number of victims included in the case
Service received a report from NCMEC submitted
- Nature of the case (new material,
by Google alerting of keeping homemade pictures
grooming, active abuse etc.)
in Google Drive infrastructure performing possible
- Number of offenders involved
abusing. Investigation led into identification of
victim and also suspect (father of victim). Than
after investigation of regional police the offender
was arrested.
Victim:1
Ofender:1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to identification of the victim. The
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect was arrested.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Victim safeguarded: 1
Offender prosecuted:1
Company name and service where report
BADOO
originated
Details of the case including:
Bureau of Criminal Police and Investigation
- Number of victims included in the case
Service received a report from NCMEC submitted
- Nature of the case (new material,
by Badoo alerting of possible online enticement of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
children for sexual act. A suspect also shows
- Number of offenders involved
CSAM material of her children.
Victims:3
Offenders:1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing. Grooming and hands-on
- Number of victims safeguarded
abuse has not been proved yet. But possessing and
- Number of offenders prosecuted
distributing of CSAM material has been proved.
Victim safeguarded: 3
Offenders prosecuted: ongoing
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Bureau of Criminal Police and Investigation
- Number of victims included in the case
Service received a report from NCMEC submitted
- Nature of the case (new material,
by Google alerting of keeping homemade pictures a
grooming, active abuse etc.)
videos in Google Drive infrastructure showing
- Number of offenders involved
prepubescent females nudes (his daughter and her
friend).
Victims:2
Offender:1
ANNEX 3
5
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing. Possessing and
- Number of victims safeguarded
distributing of CSAM material has been proved.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
But the suspect also organizes camps for kids, so
the number of victims can increase.
Victim safeguarded: 2 (for now)
ANNEX 3
6
Denmark
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
A suspect shared 1 picture on Facebook.
- Number of victims included in the case
Examining the receiver of the picture they found 40
- Nature of the case (new material,
pictures and videos. All known material, just
grooming, active abuse etc.)
sharing, two offenders.
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
0 children safeguarded. Suspect also has no
- Number of victims safeguarded
children.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
1 offender prosecuted:
Sentence: 6 month jail
Company name and service where report
Snapchat
originated
Details of the case including:
Reported 68 illegal files uploaded. During the
- Number of victims included in the case
arrest the suspect admitted to have violated his 6
- Nature of the case (new material,
month old daughter
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
1 offender prosecuted
- Number of victims safeguarded
2 children safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Facebook reported 1 picture shared between 2
- Number of victims included in the case
persons
- Nature of the case (new material,
When his computers where examined they found
grooming, active abuse etc.)
livestream from the Philippines. He was driver for
- Number of offenders involved
disabled and mentally challenged people, whom he
had violated during transport.
Resolution of the case including:
Numerous but unknown number safeguarded in the
- Number of victims safeguarded
Philippines.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Approximately 10 victims safeguarded in
Denmark.
8 years in prison for offender.
Company name and service where report
Snapchat
originated
ANNEX 3
7
Details of the case including:
Sharing 7 pictures. Was under education as
- Number of victims included in the case
caretaker in a kindergarten. No violations “hands
- Nature of the case (new material,
on”.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Probably safeguarded numerous.
- Number of victims safeguarded
One offender.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Suspended 2 month prison sentence.
Company name and service where report
Microsoft Skype
originated
Details of the case including:
1 picture shared through Skype. When examining
- Number of victims included in the case
suspect’s computer 94 pictures and videos was
- Nature of the case (new material,
found. Several victims and also new/previously
grooming, active abuse etc.)
unseen material were discovered.
- Number of offenders involved
Children on the images were identified as Danish
which led to the identity of their mother. She
admitted to have had a sexual relationship with the
suspect and her children, which included hands on
abuse.
Resolution of the case including:
Safeguarding 2 children
- Number of victims safeguarded
2 offender prosecuted. Pending conviction.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
8
Estonia
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement in Estonia received two reports
- Number of victims included in the case
from the NCMEC alerting of the storage of child
- Nature of the case (new material,
sexual abuse material using cloud storage platform.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Google detected the material when Estonian male
- Number of offenders involved
person used a Gmail account to store at least 466
unique video and image files depicting child sexual
abuse and exploitation within the Google
infrastructure (Google Drive and Google Photos).
Victims: 0
Offender: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The reports led to the investigation. The offender
- Number of victims safeguarded
was convicted to one year six months conditional
- Number of offenders prosecuted
imprisonment with a probationary period of two
year.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offender prosecuted: 1
Company name and service where report
Facebook messenger
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Estonia received a report from
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution via Facebook Messenger of three video
grooming, active abuse etc.)
fail depicting child sexual abuse. During the
- Number of offenders involved
observation of suspect´s computer hard drive, more
than 400 image and video files depicting a children
of less than 14-years of age in a pornographic
situation, were found.
Victims: 0
Offender: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the investigation. The offender
- Number of victims safeguarded
was convicted to one year three months conditional
- Number of offenders prosecuted
imprisonment with a probationary period of one
year three months.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offender prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
9
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Our Division received eight (8) different reports
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Facebook, alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the distribution via Facebook Messenger of images
grooming, active abuse etc.)
and videos of minors performing sexual acts. The
- Number of offenders involved
investigation led to the suspect who is a Greek
citizen and who had in his possession child
pornography material.
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and was brought before
- Number of victims safeguarded
the court. The minor victims who were depicted in
- Number of offenders prosecuted
the CSAM couldn’t be identified, while the CSAM
was unknown origin.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offenders prosecuted: 1
Company name and service where report
Facebook messenger
originated
Details of the case including:
Estonian police received a report from NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
submitted by Facebook alerting of the distribution
- Nature of the case (new material,
via Facebook Messenger of a video depicting a
grooming, active abuse etc.)
male person of less than 14-years of age
- Number of offenders involved
performing a sexually exploitative pose.
Victim: 1
Offender: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the investigation. The suspect was
- Number of victims safeguarded
arrested and convicted to two years of
- Number of offenders prosecuted
imprisonment.
Victims safeguarded: 5 (comment: four more
underage victims who were inducing to drink
alcohol were identified and safeguarded a result of
investigation)
Offender prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
10
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement in Estonia received total 259
- Number of victims included in the case
reports from the NCMEC alerting of the storage of
- Nature of the case (new material,
child sexual abuse material using cloud storage
grooming, active abuse etc.)
platform. Google detected the material when
- Number of offenders involved
Estonian male person used a Gmail account to store
video and image files depicting child sexual abuse
and exploitation within the Google infrastructure
(Google Drive and Google Photos).
Victims: 0
Offender: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The reports led to criminal investigation. The
- Number of victims safeguarded
offender was convicted with one year six months
- Number of offenders prosecuted
conditional imprisonment with a probationary
period of two year.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offender prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
11
Greece
Company name and service where report
Yahoo
originated
Details of the case including:
Our Division received three (3) different reports
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Yahoo, alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution via Yahoo App of images and videos of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
minors performing sexual acts, from different
- Number of offenders involved
Yahoo accounts which the suspect had created.
The investigation led to the identification of the
suspect who is a Greek citizen and who had in his
possession child pornography material.
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and was brought before
- Number of victims safeguarded
the court. The minor victims, who were depicted in
- Number of offenders prosecuted
the CSAM, couldn’t be identified, while the CSAM
was unknown origin.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offenders prosecuted: 1
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Our Division received a report from NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
submitted by Google, alerting of of the distribution
- Nature of the case (new material,
via Google App of images and videos of minors
grooming, active abuse etc.)
performing sexual acts. The investigation led to the
- Number of offenders involved
identification of the suspect who is a Greek citizen
and who had in his possession CSAM. From the
investigation also emerged that a minor victim was
sexually abused by the above mentioned suspect,
who produced CSAM with this minor victim.
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and was brought before
- Number of victims safeguarded
the court. Also, the report led to the identification
- Number of offenders prosecuted
of 1 minor victim.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
12
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Our Division received eleven (11) different reports
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Google, alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
possession of child sexual abuse material (photos
grooming, active abuse etc.)
and videos) which was uploaded to the cloud
- Number of offenders involved
storage
application
"Google
drive".
The
investigation led to the identification of a Greek
citizen suspect, who uploaded and had in his
possession child pornography material.
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and was brought before
- Number of victims safeguarded
the court. The minor victims who were depicted in
- Number of offenders prosecuted
the CSAM, couldn’t be identified, while the CSAM
was unknown origin.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offenders prosecuted: 1
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Our Division received five (5) different reports
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Google, alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
production of Child Sexual Abuse Material, which
grooming, active abuse etc.)
subsequently was uploaded in Google Drive. The
- Number of offenders involved
investigation led to the identification of the suspect
who is a Greek citizen, produced CSAM and after
that it was uploaded in his Google Drive account.
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was arrested and was brought before
- Number of victims safeguarded
the court. Also, the report led to the identification
- Number of offenders prosecuted
of 1 minor victim.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
13
Finland
Company name and service where report
Instagram
originated
Details of the case including:
Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
submitted by Instagram regarding the distribution
- Nature of the case (new material,
of CSAM. The user of the Instagram-account was
grooming, active abuse etc.)
identified as a 14-years old boy, suspect A. The
- Number of offenders involved
material on his devices revealed that he had abused
an unidentified 9-10 years old boy a couple years
prior to the investigation, when suspect A was 12-
13 years old.
On suspect A's devices was also found a video,
where he was sexually abused by his 15-years old
cousin, suspect B. Suspect A was 13-years old at
the time.
The investigation is still ongoing.
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to identification of two suspects.
- Number of victims safeguarded
One victim remains unidentified.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Suspect A could not be prosecuted as he was under
the age of 15.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1
Company name and service where report
Discord
originated
Details of the case including:
Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
submitted by a citizen about a Dutch man who had
- Nature of the case (new material,
posted nude images of a Finnish 15-year old girl.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
The investigation revealed that the man is the girl's
- Number of offenders involved
ex-boyfriend, and that he had shared the nude
images after their break-up. This had led to a
suicide attempt by the girl.
The investigation is ongoing.
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to safeguarding of the girl and to a
- Number of victims safeguarded
future prosecution of the man.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
14
Company name and service where report
Snapchat
originated
Details of the case including:
Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
submitted by Snapchat. The report states that
- Nature of the case (new material,
Snapchat themselves got a report from a citizen
grooming, active abuse etc.)
about an account. The reporter states that the user
- Number of offenders involved
of the account is their 10-years old daughter, and
wants Snapchat to remove her account.
Upon reviewing the account, Snapchat found that
the girl had sent a previously unseen CSAM video
to another user.
The investigation revealed that the father was not
aware of his daughter sending any improper videos.
The recipient of the video was located in India, and
the information has been sent to the local
authorities.
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to safeguarding of the girl. As the
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect was located in India, it is not known if any
- Number of offenders prosecuted
action has been taken against the suspect.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 0/1
Company name and service where report
Google Photos
originated
Details of the case including:
Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
submitted by Google regarding the possession of
- Nature of the case (new material,
CSAM. The files seemed unfamiliar to Google.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
The user of the Google Photos account was
- Number of offenders involved
identified as a 14-years old boy and it was found
out that he was abusing his 9-years old half-sister.
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to identification of the victim and the
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect. As the suspect was under the age of 15, he
- Number of offenders prosecuted
could not be prosecuted.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 0
ANNEX 3
15
Hungary
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime
- Number of victims included in the case
Department of Hungary received 5 reports from
- Nature of the case (new material,
NCMEC submitted by Google alerting of the
grooming, active abuse etc.)
distribution via Google Drive of images and videos
- Number of offenders involved
of minors performing sexual acts. There were no
sign of the offender creating CSAM.
Victims: 0
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
There was no sign of creating new CSAM, the
- Number of victims safeguarded
offender only saved and stored the material on his
- Number of offenders prosecuted
computer and on his Google Drive account.
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
Yahoo!, Google, Twitter
originated
Details of the case including:
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime
- Number of victims included in the case
Department of Hungary received 3 reports all about
- Nature of the case (new material,
the same user from NCMEC submitted by Yahoo!,
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Google and Twitter. The Twitter report said that the
- Number of offenders involved
user sent CSAM through his account. The reports
from Yahoo! and Google said that the user
uploaded CSAM to his accounts. There were no
sign of the offender creating CSAM.
Victims: 0
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
There was no sign of creating new CSAM but the
- Number of victims safeguarded
offender saved CSAM on his computer too.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime
- Number of victims included in the case
Department of Hungary received a report from
- Nature of the case (new material,
NCMEC submitted by Google alerting of the
grooming, active abuse etc.)
distribution via Google Photos of images of minors
- Number of offenders involved
performing sexual acts. The offender uploaded
CSAM to his Google Photos account. There were
ANNEX 3
16
no sign of the offender creating CSAM.
Victims: 0
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
There was no sign of creating new CSAM but the
- Number of victims safeguarded
offender saved CSAM on his computer too.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Victims safeguarded: 0
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
MediaLab/Kik
originated
Details of the case including:
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime
- Number of victims included in the case
Department of Hungary received a report from
- Nature of the case (new material,
NCMEC submitted by MediaLab / Kik alerting of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
the distribution via Kik Messenger of images of
- Number of offenders involved
one minor performing sexual acts. The pictures
turned out to be new content taken by the
Hungarian offender. The investigation led to the
identification of a Hungarian citizen living in
Austria. The offender abused three children in his
family and he made pictures of one of them. He
also sent the images to other users.
Victims: 3
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The investigation led to the identification all 3
- Number of victims safeguarded
victims.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Our agency arrested the suspect and the prosecutor
proposed a 12-year prison sentence in the
indictment.
Victims safeguarded: 3
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime
- Number of victims included in the case
Department of Hungary received 5 reports from
- Nature of the case (new material,
NCMEC submitted by Google alerting of the
grooming, active abuse etc.)
distribution via Google Hangouts of images of
- Number of offenders involved
minors performing sexual acts. The offender sent
the images to another user. The pictures turned out
to be new content taken by the Hungarian offender.
The victim was the offender’s daughter.
Victims: 1
Offenders: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The investigation led to the identification of the
ANNEX 3
17
- Number of victims safeguarded
victim.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Our agency arrested the suspect.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
ANNEX 3
18
Latvia
Company name and service where report
Discord
originated
Details of the case including:
1 victim
- Number of victims included in the case
1 suspect
- Nature of the case (new material,
Photo with naked child
grooming, active abuse etc.)
uploading
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Not prosecuted yet, but is on-going
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
1 victim
- Number of victims included in the case
1 perpetrator
- Nature of the case (new material,
Photo with naked child
grooming, active abuse etc.)
uploading
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Not prosecuted yet, but is on-going
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Microsoft Skype
originated
Details of the case including:
1 victim
- Number of victims included in the case
1 perpetrator
- Nature of the case (new material,
Active abuse
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Case is ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
19
Lithuania
Company name and service where report
Meta Platforms (Facebook messenger)
originated
Details of the case including:
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM, grooming
- Number of victims included in the case
Victims: 1
- Nature of the case (new material,
Offenders: 1
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who
- Number of offenders involved
sent another user CSEM. The investigation
revealed that an adult offender was grooming a
child online and solicited CSEM from the child
who sent it via Facebook messenger. The child and
the offender were identified.
Resolution of the case including:
Offenders prosecuted: 1
- Number of victims safeguarded
Victims safeguarded: 1
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Meta Platforms (Facebook messenger)
originated
Details of the case including:
Nature of case: Molestation, child sexual
- Number of victims included in the case
exploitation, possession of CSEM
- Nature of the case (new material,
Victims: 6
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Offenders: 2
- Number of offenders involved
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who
sent another user CSEM. The investigation
revealed that an adult offender was grooming a
child online and solicited CSEM from the child
who sent it via Facebook messenger. When
investigating the child and offender were identified.
It was revealed that the offender was contacting 4
others victims online and solicited CSEM from
them. Search of the offender home yielded CSEM
material of him sexually abusing his daughter
found on his home computer. When interviewing
one of the victims she revealed that she was also
contacted online by another offender who also
solicited CSEM from her and later convinced her to
meet for a sexual encounter. This man was also
identified and apprehended. All victims were
identified and interviewed.
Resolution of the case including:
Offenders prosecuted: 2
- Number of victims safeguarded
Victims safeguarded: 6
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
20
Company name and service where report
Meta Platforms (Facebook)
originated
Details of the case including:
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM
- Number of victims included in the case
Victims: 0
- Nature of the case (new material,
Offenders: 1
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who
- Number of offenders involved
uploaded CSEM material to his Facebook profile.
The offender was identified and charged with
possession of CSEM.
Resolution of the case including:
Offenders prosecuted: 1
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Meta Platforms (Facebook)
originated
Details of the case including:
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM
- Number of victims included in the case
Victims: 0
- Nature of the case (new material,
Offenders: 1
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who
- Number of offenders involved
uploaded CSEM material to his Facebook profile.
The offender was identified and charged with
possession of CSEM.
Resolution of the case including:
Offenders prosecuted: 1
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Google drive
originated
Details of the case including:
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM
- Number of victims included in the case
Victims: 0
- Nature of the case (new material,
Offenders: 1
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who
- Number of offenders involved
uploaded CSEM material to his Google drive
account. The offender was identified and charged
with possession of CSEM.
Resolution of the case including:
Offenders prosecuted: 1
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
21
Luxembourg
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the distribution and possession of a video of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
CSAM.
- Number of offenders involved
he investigation led to the identification of a
suspect.
The number of victims and their identities could
not be determined due to the lack of our work
force.
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Microsoft – Online Operations
originated
Microsoft Microsoft OneDrive
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Microsoft alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the distribution and possession of videos and
grooming, active abuse etc.)
pictures of CSAM.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
suspect. The suspect did as well sexually oriented
chats with a minor.
Two victims have been identified.
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
22
Company name and service where report
Snapchat
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Snapchat alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the distribution and possession of a video of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
CSAM.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
suspect.
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Instagram
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Instagram alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the distribution and possession of videos of CSAM.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
suspect.
One victim have been identified.
Victims: 1
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Snapchat
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Snapchat alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the distribution and possession of a video of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
CSAM.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
suspect. The suspect did as well sexually oriented
chats with a minor.
ANNEX 3
23
Three victims have been identified.
Victims: 3
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Sony
originated
Sony Interactive Entertainment
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Sony alerting of the
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution and possession of pictures of CSAM.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
suspect.
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report
- Number of victims included in the case
from NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material,
the possession of videos and pictures of CSAM.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
suspect.
Five victims have been identified.
Victims: 5
Suspect: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The case is still ongoing.
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
24
Netherlands
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Identification suspect by telephone data. These
- Number of victims included in the case
information were additional to an ongoing
- Nature of the case (new material,
investigation on sexual abuse on a minor. No self-
grooming, active abuse etc.)
made material. Investigation results in an arrest,
- Number of offenders involved
house search and investigation on the seized data
carriers.
Resolution of the case including:
1 victim
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender accused for Child Pornography and
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Sexual Abuse of a minor
Company name and service where report
KIK / Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
1 NCMEC report 8 CP material. Former NCMEC
- Number of victims included in the case
report Facebook 2013 linked to user. On internet a
- Nature of the case (new material,
person with the username was found. This person
grooming, active abuse etc.)
was listed as a teacher on primary school and he
- Number of offenders involved
was connected to a soccer club. With information
in the NCMEC report the person is identified. An
investigation by the regional team followed.
Resolution of the case including:
1 offender / subpoenaed by Justice – no conviction
- Number of victims safeguarded
yet.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Google / Twitter / Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
NCMEC priority indicates current or imminent
- Number of victims included in the case
risk to an individual. On 7 photos a penis is shown
- Nature of the case (new material,
nearby a sleeping minor girl. The name of the user
grooming, active abuse etc.)
and a DOB is mentioned by Google. This matched
- Number of offenders involved
a person known by the Dutch authorities. The photo
of his driver’s licence is compared with the photos
attached to the NCMEC reports. Further there were
3 Twitter and 2 Facebook NCMEC report from
2018 linked to this user. Investigation results in an
arrest, house search and investigation on the seized
data carriers.
Resolution of the case including:
3 victims
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender / convicted on producing CP -
- Number of offenders prosecuted
possession of CP – Sexual Abuse of a minor girl -
fornication of his own baby.
ANNEX 3
25
Company name and service where report
KIK
originated
Details of the case including:
Priority NCMEC report: Indicates possible risk to
- Number of victims included in the case
an individual in the near future of is otherwise
- Nature of the case (new material,
time-sensitive. Video/images were shared from ant
grooming, active abuse etc.)
possibly created by the reported user’s phone
- Number of offenders involved
camera. Images attached to NCMEC report showed
a naked baby girl. A hand is holding her labia apart.
On another photo a buttocks of a child is shown
with an erect penis nearby/ against the child. The
identification took place on the answer of a
subscriber of the e-mail address. On the same day
the regional team followed up with a house search
and the suspect was arrested. Images of penetration
with a finger in the vagina of the daughter were
found. Further evidence of sexual abuse of the
older but also minor child is found.
Resolution of the case including:
2 victims
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender / convicted producing and possession of
- Number of offenders prosecuted
CP – Sexual Abuse of a minor by penetration
against own child – fornication of an own child
Company name and service where report
TikTok
originated
Details of the case including:
1 NCMEC report 1 film. A minor is filming a
- Number of victims included in the case
toddler. The toddler is touching her vagina with her
- Nature of the case (new material,
finger and licking this finger afterwards.
grooming, active abuse etc.)
Identification is easily made by the entities in the
- Number of offenders involved
NCMEC report. The results in our police system
found out the family is known by social help
organisations. Also there were police registrations
about youth help, alcohol - and abuse issues.
Resolution of the case including:
1 victim
- Number of victims safeguarded
The regional team made an official report
- Number of offenders prosecuted
especially for the social help organization.
ANNEX 3
26
Portugal
Company name and service where report
MeWe
originated
Details of the case including:
Not applicable
- Number of victims included in the case
Known material, related to Operation Iceberg –
- Nature of the case (new material,
International cooperation
grooming, active abuse etc.)
1 offender
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Not applicable
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Not applicable;
- Number of victims included in the case
Known material shared on WhatsApp, Telegram,
- Nature of the case (new material,
Viber
grooming, active abuse etc.)
1 offender
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Not applicable
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report
Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
8 victims identified;
- Number of victims included in the case
Grooming on game platform, request of self
- Nature of the case (new material,
generated CSAM on social and encrypted
grooming, active abuse etc.)
platforms, storage on encrypted platform;
- Number of offenders involved
1 offender
Resolution of the case including:
8 victims safeguarded;
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
27
Company name and service where report
Google - WhatsApp
originated
Details of the case including:
Not applicable
- Number of victims included in the case
Known material shared also on Telegram and
- Nature of the case (new material,
Telegram X storage on encrypted platform
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
Not applicable
- Number of victims safeguarded
1 offender prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
28
Romania
Company name and service where report
Facebook Messenger
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Romania received a several
- Number of victims included in the case
reports’ from NCMEC submitted by Facebook
- Nature of the case (new material,
alerting of the distribution via Facebook Messenger
grooming, active abuse etc.)
of images and videos of minors performing sexual
- Number of offenders involved
acts.
The investigation led to the identification of a
citizen living in Romania, who distributed images
and videos of minors performing sexual acts. The
materials were also distributed online to other
users.
Victims: 3
Offenders: 2
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the identification of 2 victims.
- Number of victims safeguarded
The suspects were arrested and convicted:
- Number of offenders prosecuted
The first suspect: 3 years and 6 mounts of
imprisonment.
The second suspect: 2 years of imprisonment.
Victims safeguarded: 2
Offenders prosecuted: 2
Company name and service where report
Facebook Messenger
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Country A received several
- Number of victims included in the case
report from NCMEC submitted by Facebook
- Nature of the case (new material,
alerting of the distribution via Facebook Messenger
grooming, active abuse etc.)
of images and videos of minors performing sexual
- Number of offenders involved
acts. The investigation led to the identification of a
Romania, citizen living in Ireland who forced
minors through the threat of violence to produce
images and videos of themselves performing sexual
acts and to send them to him. The material was also
distributed online to other users. Also, this suspect
raped one of the victims.
Victims: 40
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the identification of all 40 victims.
- Number of victims safeguarded
The suspect was arrested and convicted to 22 years
- Number of offenders prosecuted
of imprisonment.
Victims safeguarded: 40
Offenders prosecuted: 1x
ANNEX 3
29
Company name and service where report
Yahoo mail
originated
Details of the case including:
Our unit has been notified by NCMEC (National
- Number of victims included in the case
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children) via
- Nature of the case (new material,
Europol that the user of the e-mail Yahoo address
grooming, active abuse etc.)
has uploaded several pornographic materials
- Number of offenders involved
involving minors to this e-mail account. Following
analysis of the materials provided by NCMEC
through report no. 61352072, several images were
identified showing two female minors and one male
minor, the young boy having similar markings to
the one appearing in the images on the suspect's
Facebook profile.
Victims: 3
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the identification of victims. The
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect was arrested and convicted to 18 years of
- Number of offenders prosecuted
imprisonment.
Victims safeguarded: 3
Offenders prosecuted: 1
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Romania received several
- Number of victims included in the case
reports from NCMEC submitted by Google alerting
- Nature of the case (new material,
of the distribution of images and videos of minor
grooming, active abuse etc.)
performing sexual acts. The investigation led to the
- Number of offenders involved
identification of a Romania, citizen living in
Romania who forced a minor to be involved in
sexual acts with him. Also, this suspect raped the
victim in question.
Victims: 1
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the identification the victim. The
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect was arrested and convicted to 17 years and
- Number of offenders prosecuted
6 months of imprisonment.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
30
Company name and service where report
KIK Messenger
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Romania received several
- Number of victims included in the case
reports’ from NCMEC submitted by KIK, alerting
- Nature of the case (new material,
of the distribution via KIK Messenger of images
grooming, active abuse etc.)
and videos of minors performing sexual acts.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
citizen living in Romania, who distributed images
and videos of minors performing sexual acts. The
materials were also distributed online to other
users.
Victims: 1
Offenders: 1
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the identification the victim. The
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect was arrested and convicted to 3 years of
- Number of offenders prosecuted
imprisonment.
Victims safeguarded: 1
Offenders prosecuted: 1
ANNEX 3
31
Slovakia
Company name and service where report Facebook
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Slovak Republic received a
- Number of victims included in the case
report from NCMEC submitted by Meta alerting of
- Nature of the case (new material, the distribution via Facebook account of images
grooming, active abuse etc.)
and videos of minors performing sexual act.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
Slovak citizen, who was disseminating images and
videos depicting sexual practices of persons under
the age of 18.
The material was distributed online to other users.
Victims: 0x
Offender: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was convicted to six months of
- Number of victims safeguarded
imprisonment conditionally with a probationary
- Number of offenders prosecuted
period of 1 year.
Victims: 0x
Offender: 1x
Company name and service where report Google Drive
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of Slovak Republic received a
- Number of victims included in the case
report from NCMEC submitted by Google alerting
- Nature of the case (new material, of the possession of images and videos of minors
grooming, active abuse etc.)
performing sexual act on the Google drive.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
Slovak citizen, who has in his possession images
and videos depicting sexual practices with persons
under the age of 18.
The material was not distributed online to other
users.
Victims: 0x
Offender: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect was convicted to five months of
- Number of victims safeguarded
imprisonment.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Victims: 0x
Offender: 1x
ANNEX 3
32
Company name and service where report Snapchat
originated
Details of the case including:
Law enforcement of the Slovak Republic received a
- Number of victims included in the case
report from NCMEC submitted by Snapchat
- Nature of the case (new material, alerting of the distribution via Snapchat of video of
grooming, active abuse etc.)
minors performing sexual act.
- Number of offenders involved
The investigation led to the identification of a
Slovak citizen, who was disseminating videos
depicting the naked parts of the body of a female
minor between the ages of 8 and 10, her genitalia
and, above all, intercourse with an adult man. The
material was distributed online to other users.
Victim: 1x
Offender: 1x
Resolution of the case including:
The report led to the identification of 1 victim. The
- Number of victims safeguarded
suspect was accused and the case is currently
- Number of offenders prosecuted
further investigated.
Victim safeguarded: 1x
Offender prosecuted: 1x
ANNEX 3
33
Sweden
Company name and service where report
Snapchat, Instagram, Kik, Discord
originated
Details of the case including:
- at the moment: 6 victims
- Number of victims included in the case
- multiple child pornography offence, multiple
- Nature of the case (new material,
exploitation of a child for sexual posing
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- 1 offender
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
- at the moment, 6 children
- Number of victims safeguarded
- 1 offender, but the trial has not yet taken place.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
In addition to this, I would like to state that we
experience an extremely high hit rate in the reports
we receive from NCMEC. We do a search on
almost all cases that starts with a report from
NCMEC, with very few exceptions. Our opinion is
that, to a large extent, abuse material is always
found in the seizure. This means that the majority
suspects are prosecuted.
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
- 6 victims
- Number of victims included in the case
- exploitation of a child for sexual posing, intrusive
- Nature of the case (new material,
photography, sexual molestation, child
grooming, active abuse etc.)
pornography offence.
- Number of offenders involved
- 2 offenders
- there were multiple CT-reports from Google for
same account.
Resolution of the case including:
- 6 safeguarded children
- Number of victims safeguarded
- 2 offenders prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
- a verdict has not been reached.
Company name and service where report
Snapchat
originated
Details of the case including:
- 3 victims
- Number of victims included in the case
- rape of a child, multiple gross exploitation of a
- Nature of the case (new material,
child for sexual posing, multiple sexual
grooming, active abuse etc.)
molestation, gross child pornography offence
- Number of offenders involved
- 1 offender
Resolution of the case including:
- 3 victims
- Number of victims safeguarded
- 1 offender
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
34
The case resulted in one more suspect being
identified and 10 new victims (this case is not yet
complete as more plaintiffs are being identified).
Crime: sexual abuse of children, exploitation of
children for sexual posing, sexual molestation,
gross child pornography offence.
Company name and service where report
Yahoo
originated
Details of the case including:
- child pornography offence
- Number of victims included in the case
- 1 suspect
- Nature of the case (new material,
grooming, active abuse etc.)
- Number of offenders involved
Resolution of the case including:
The suspect had a very specific explanation for
- Number of victims safeguarded
why he handled abuse material. He told the
- Number of offenders prosecuted
investigators that he was doing a research of the
development of child sexuality. He was working as
a preschool teacher at the time. A search was
carried out in his home and a seizure was made.
During the investigation in Sweden, the suspect
moved to the United States. In United states he was
suspected of the same crime. United States
authorities requested the Swedish seizure, which
Sweden sent to them. He is now awaiting a very
long prison sentence in United States. The
interesting thing is the difference in punishment
between Sweden and the United States.
Company name and service where report
Yahoo
originated
Details of the case including:
- 2 victims
- Number of victims included in the case
- 2 offender
- Nature of the case (new material,
- 1 offender was a suspect of exploitation of a child
grooming, active abuse etc.)
for sexual posing, instigation to gross exploitation
- Number of offenders involved
of a child for sexual posing, gross child
pornography offence, instigation to child
pornography offence, child pornography offence
- 1 offender was a suspect of gross exploitation of a
child for sexual posing, child pornography offence
Resolution of the case including:
- 2 victims
- Number of victims safeguarded
- 2 offenders prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
35
Company name and service where report
Google
originated
Details of the case including:
- 2 victims
- Number of victims included in the case
- intrusive photography, gross child pornography
- Nature of the case (new material,
offence X 3, gross sexual assault of child, gross
grooming, active abuse etc.)
rape of a child.
- Number of offenders involved
- 1 suspect
Resolution of the case including:
- 2 safeguarded children
- Number of victims safeguarded
- 1 offender prosecuted
- Number of offenders prosecuted
- the sentence was 9 years in prison
Company name and service where report
Kik
originated
Details of the case including:
It is an ongoing investigation right now. As soon as
- Number of victims included in the case
the investigators got the information from the
- Nature of the case (new material,
NCMEC-report and a suspect, they did a search. In
grooming, active abuse etc.)
the seized phone they found abuse material the
- Number of offenders involved
suspect made himself. So, he is now a suspect of
rape of a child, gross sexual assault of child, gross
exploitation of a child for sexual posing, gross child
pornography offence.
- 2 victims so far
- 1 offender
Resolution of the case including:
- 2 safeguarded so far
- Number of victims safeguarded
- 1 offender so far in this case.
- Number of offenders prosecuted
The information led to more suspects in other cases
regarding rape of children with other suspects.
They are now being investigated so the number is
right now unknown.
ANNEX 3
36
o videos of minors performing sexual acts.
o The investigation led to the identification of a Slovak citizen living in Austria who forced
minors through the threat of violence to produce images and videos of themselves
performing sexual acts and to send them to him. The material was also distributed online
to other users.
o The report led to the identification of all
30 victims. The suspect was arrested and
convicted to five years of imprisonment.
Case # 2:
o Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from
KIK Messenger alerting of the
distribution of child sexual abuse material.
o The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen.
o The search of his house and further investigations revealed that he sexually abused his
2
year old daughter, who was
rescued.
Case # 3:
o Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from
Snapchat alerting of the
distribution of child sexual abuse material.
o The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen who had forced several
female minors to produce nude images of themselves and provide them to him, under the
threat of making publicly available images and videos he made in the bathroom of a
soccer field while acting as a referee.
o The report led to the identification of a
large number of victims.
SAMPLE CASES INCLUDED IN THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT ACCOMPANYING
THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION ON PREVENTING AND
COMBATTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Austria
Case # 1:
o Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from NCMEC submitted by
Facebook alerting of the distribution via
Facebook Messenger of images and videos of
minors performing sexual acts.
o The investigation led to the identification of a Slovak citizen living in Austria who forced
minors through the threat of violence to produce images and videos of themselves
performing sexual acts and to send them to him. The material was also distributed online
to other users.
o The report led to the identification of all
30 victims. The suspect was arrested and
convicted to five years of imprisonment.
Case # 2:
o Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from
KIK Messenger alerting of the
distribution of child sexual abuse material.
ANNEX 3
37
o The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen.
o The search of his house and further investigations revealed that he sexually abused his
2
year old daughter, who was
rescued.
Case # 3:
o Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from
Snapchat alerting of the
distribution of child sexual abuse material.
o The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen who had forced several
female minors to produce nude images of themselves and provide them to him, under the
threat of making publicly available images and videos he made in the bathroom of a
soccer field while acting as a referee.
o The report led to the identification of a
large number of victims.
Bulgaria
Law enforcement in Bulgaria received in 2018 a report from the National Child Exploitation
Coordination Centre alerting of the distribution of child sexual abuse material through
KIK
Messenger.
The report led to a criminal investigation in which two mobile phones from a suspect were
seized, containing 517 video files with child sexual abuse material.
The material included videos with
brutal scenes of child sexual abuse with a child around
2
years old.
Czech Republic
Law enforcement in the Czech Republic received in 2017 a report from NCMEC alerting of
the distribution of child sexual abuse material by
email, initiated by
Google.
The report led to a criminal investigation in which a 52 year old man was arrested following
a house search, where additional child sexual abuse material was found.
This person had abused
2 girls and recorded the abuse. The 2 girls were identified and
rescued.
Denmark
Case # 1:
o Following reports from KIK alerting of the distribution of child sexual abuse material
through
KIK Messenger, Danish authorities arrested, a Danish national in his forties
with no criminal record.
o During preliminary examination of his mobile phone, Danish police found several
recordings of himself abusing his
10 year old daughter.
o The
10 year old victim was rescued and the suspect is undergoing criminal
proceedings.
ANNEX 3
38
Case #2 - Operation Umbrella1:
o Facebook reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC) the distribution of videos via
Facebook Messenger2 depicting a Danish
boy and a girl who were engaged in sexual activity.
o NCMEC forwarded the case to Denmark via Europol.
o Over 1000 people had distributed the videos to one or more people via Facebook
Messenger
and were charged for distribution of child pornography.
o This operation, still ongoing, is the single
largest operation ever against child sexual
abuse in Denmark.
Estonia
Law enforcement in Estonia received in 2017 a report from NCMEC alerting of the
distribution of child sexual abuse material by
email.
The report led to a criminal investigation in which a person was arrested for exchanging and
possessing child sexual abuse material.
France
Case # 1:
o French police received in 2018 a NCMEC report submitted by Facebook alerting of
the distribution of child sexual abuse material via
Facebook Messenger.
o The investigation revealed that the offender provided
PlayStation codes to young
boys in exchange of child sexual abuse material.
o The offender was arrested. There were around
100 victims.
Case # 2:
o French police has received a number of cases from NCMEC submitted by KIK
alerting of the distribution of child sexual abuse material via
KIK Messenger.
o The cases typically involve multiple offenders (up to
20 offenders per case).
o The cases have led to
multiple arrests.
Germany
German Federal Police received a NCMEC report in July 2019 submitted by Facebook
alerting of the distribution via
Facebook Messenger of material showing the sexual abuse of
a very young girl.
The NCMEC report also indicated that the material could have been recently produced.
The report led to a criminal investigation and a house search in which a suspect was
incriminated with abusing
his 4 year old daughter, and his 10 year old son, who were
rescued and safeguarded.
1 Europo
l, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 18 September 2018, p. 32.
2 The case was also reported in th
e media (in English).
ANNEX 3
39
Greece
Greek police received two NCMEC reports submitted by Yahoo! informing about a user who
exchanged child sexual abuse material via
Yahoo!’s messenger service.
The house search of the offender revealed that he was also in contact, via Skype, with
individuals (mothers of underage children) in the ASEAN region and was sending money to
them so they would send him indecent pictures of their underage children.
The ASEAN authorities were notified of all the details.
Ireland3
Law enforcement in Ireland received in 2013 a report from NCMEC alerting of the
distribution of child sexual abuse material by
email.
The material was detected by Microsoft when Matthew Horan used a
Gmail account to send
child sexual abuse material to an email address on
Microsoft's platform.
The report led to an investigation in which it was discovered that Horan had been sexually
exploiting children.
Irish police identified
six victims in Ireland as a result of the investigation.
Romania4
Romanian police received in 2016 a NCMEC report submitted by Facebook concerning child
sexual abuse material exchanged via
Facebook Messenger.
The investigation revealed that a mother had been abusing her
9 year old daughter for more
than a year and sent the material generated in the sexual abuse to her boyfriend (not the
father of the girl) in England.
The mother was arrested and
her daughter was rescued.
Sweden
Case # 1:
o Swedish police received a NCMEC report alerting that one person had shared two
child pornographic images on
Facebook Messenger of material known to the police.
o Swedish police carried out a search at the suspect’s home and found child sexual
abuse material in hard drives.
o The material included the suspect
abusing his stepdaughter, who was
rescued in the
operation.
o The suspect was sentenced to nine years in prison for, among other things, gross rape
against children.
3 The case was also reported in th
e media. 4 The case was reported in the media, see
here and
here.
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40
Case # 2:
o Swedish police received a report from the National Child Exploitation Coordination
Centre in Canada in which a person was sharing child sexual abuse material through
KIK Messenger.
o A house search was conducted in which child sexual abuse material was found.
o Thanks to the investigation,
nine Swedish children were identified.
o The suspect was sentenced to four years in prison for different child pornography
offenses.
Case # 3:
o Swedish police received a NCMEC report submitted by Facebook concerning child
sexual abuse material exchanged via
Facebook Messenger.
o The investigation revealed that a female suspect was producing child sexual abuse
material with the children of her romantic partners and sharing it with another male.
o Further investigation revealed a network of two other female producers and three
male consumers of child sexual abuse material.
o
11 victims were identified and rescued, ranging from ages 2 to 14 when the crimes
occurred, out of more than 50 victims in total.
Spain
Law enforcement in Spain received a report from NCMEC alerting of the distribution of
child sexual abuse material by
email.
The investigation by law enforcement in Spain led to the arrest of one person, who actively
shared online with other child sex offenders the child sexual abuse material he produced.
The person arrested produced that material by abusing children within his family circle.
Given the gravity of the situation, law enforcement focused on locating the victims,
eventually
rescuing 2 children within the family circle.
Sample cases in the EU that started with detection of online solicitation
The following are actual, anonymised sample cases of online solicitation in the EU that service
providers reported to NCMEC.
Austria
•
An adult man enticed an 11-year-old female child via an online chat service to produce and
share sexually explicit images.
•
An adult man enticed a 12-year-old female child via an online chat service to produce and
share sexually explicit images. Chat logs submitted with the report showed the man threatened
the child he would notify police if she did not send explicit images and videos. Fearing this
threat, the child produced additional content and sent it to her exploiter.
•
A 45-year-old man enticed a 13-year-old male child via online private messaging to
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41
engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report showed the man was talking to the
child about leaving the country and making plans to meet the same weekend the report was made
to NCMEC. The man was in a position of authority as a coach and talked about wanting to adopt
and marry the child.
Belgium
•
A 21-year-old man enticed a 14-year-old female child via an online private messaging
service to produce and share sexually explicit images. Chat logs submitted with the report
indicated the man previously had enticed the child to meet in person so that he could exploit her
by engaging in sexual activity.
Bulgaria
•
A 15-year-old used an online platform to traffic his 9-year-old girlfriend for sexual abuse
exploitation. His reported profile stated:
"I'm looking for a pedophile who wants to **** my 9 year old girlfriend and want her to
paw him "
•
An adult man used an online chat feature to entice six female children and sent them
graphic images of himself engaged in sex acts. At least one of these children was enticed to
create and send an explicit image of herself to the man who then demanded she produce and send
more images. When she declined, the man threatened to harm her, saying he "knows where she
lives".
•
A 51-year-old man used a messaging service to entice a 13-year-old male child to produce
and share sexually explicit content of himself. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the
man was the child's uncle, had direct access to him, and discussed specific sexual acts with the
child. The chat also indicated the uncle was offering the child money in exchange for sending
sexually explicit files.
Croatia
•
A 48-year-old man used an online chat service to entice a 14-year-old female child to
produce and share sexually exploitative images of herself. The man also enticed her to sexually
abuse her 11-year-old sister and said he wanted to meet in person to abuse her. Chat logs
provided with the report show the child victim disclosing that she used force to abuse her
younger sister, specifically stated the following:
"She screamed"
"It did, but I had to do it by force. She was fighting me....she cried"
Cyprus
•
An adult man used the chat function on an online gaming platform to engage in sexually
exploitative conversation with another adult gamer about his 13-year-old daughter. The man
provided the other adult gamer with his daughter's screenname on another chat platform so the
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other man could contact the child to "seduce" her.
•
A 41-year-old man from Cyprus enticed a 15-year-old child victim from Moldova to
produce and send sexually exploitative imagery of herself. Chat logs submitted with the report
indicated the man previously had enticed the child to travel to Cyprus so he could exploit her
through sexual activity.
Czech Republic
•
A 29-year-old man used a private messaging platform to entice a 14-year-old female victim
to produce and share sexually exploitative images of herself. Chat logs submitted with the report
indicated the man previously had enticed the child to meet in person so he could sexually exploit
her. The man lived close to the child and was making plans to meet her so he could continue to
sexually abuse her.
•
A 29-year-old man enticed five child victims between the ages of 8 and 12 years old. The
man enticed two of the children to engage in sex acts, including bestiality, with each other. He
enticed another victim to sexually abuse her 3-year-old sibling. Chat logs submitted with the
report indicated the man offered money or expensive gifts to the victims to entice them into
producing and sharing the sexually exploitative images.
Denmark
•
An adult man used a platform's chat function to send sexualized messages about children to
another adult. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man planned to sexually abuse
his 13-year-old daughter who was intoxicated at the time.
•
A 41-year-old man in the United States enticed multiple children under the age of 13 to
produce and send sexually exploitative imagery of themselves. This man was communicating
online with a 20-year- old man from Denmark and the two men discussed trading sexually
exploitative images. At least one child, a 9-year-old female child, was coerced to engage in
sexual activity over a video call after being threatened that she would be publicly exposed if she
refused.
Estonia
•
An adult male created and used multiple online accounts to entice over 12 children, some
as young as 9-years-old, to produce and share sexually exploitative imagery. Chat logs submitted
with the report indicated that in some cases the man offered to pay the children in exchange for
initial images and then coerced to send additional images by threatening to publicly expose their
images online.
Finland
•
An adult enticed numerous child victims in Finland, Lithuania, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and the United States to produce and send sexually exploitative imagery of
themselves. After obtaining initial images, this adult would blackmail the children by threatening
ANNEX 3
43
to send the images to the children's families unless they continued producing and sending
additional images. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the adult also was sharing child
sexual abuse material with other adults online.
•
An adult man used an online messaging service to engage in sexualized conversations
about children with another adult. The man made multiple statements indicating he had sexually
abused his young daughter on multiple occasions and had shown her pornography since she was
an infant. Chat logs submitted with the report detailed the man's plans to continue sexually
abusing his daughter.
France
•
A 46-year-old man enticed a 15-year-old female child to meet in person for sexual activity.
The man also disclosed he was sexually molesting his minor daughter.
•
A 36-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 14-year-old female
child to engage in sexual activity. Chat information provided with the report indicated the man
was the child's uncle and had direct access to her.
•
A 38-year-old man in a position of trust as a youth football coach used a platform's
messaging service to entice a 13-year-old female child to meet for sexual activity. Chat logs
submitted with the report indicated the man was a friend of the child's father and had frequent
access to her during weekend visits.
•
A 48-year-old man enticed a female child to meet for sexual activity. Chat information
submitted with the report indicated the man was the child's stepfather and provided the child with
a location where they could meet in secret so that he could sexually exploit her.
•
A 28-year-old man enticed a 14-year-old female child to meet for sexual activity. Chat logs
submitted with the report indicated the man was the child's half-brother and had direct access to
the child victim.
•
An adult man enticed several female children between the ages of 14 and 17 to produce
and share sexually explicit images. After the suspect coerced the children to produce images, he
blackmailed them to produce and send additional content by threatening to publicly expose the
initial images he had received. Chat logs provided with the report included the following
statements showing the severe distress of the children as the man blackmailed them to produce
increasingly egregious content:
"...
you really want to ruin my life"
"I've already tried to commit suicide please don't start again"
"It's going to destroy my life"
"I want to die"
"I'm going to kill myself"
•
A 42-year old man used a platform's private chat function to entice a 12-year-old female
child to engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man was in a
relationship with the child's mother, had direct access to the child, and already had exploited her
by forcing her to engage in painful sexual activity:
"I can't anymore with your mom...
your Mom and I are done ok"
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44
"We should do it softer...
it causes some bleeding usually the first time"
"Wait mom is up...
erase everything"
•
A 36-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 14-year-old female
child. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man was a school teacher in a position of
trust and with access to children. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man already
had met and sexually abused the child and was trying to make plans for future meetings.
•
A 46-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 13-year-old male child
to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs provided with the report indicated the
man was the child's uncle, had direct access to the child, and had sexually molested the child on
multiple occasions. Chat logs also indicated the man was coercing the child to meet him in
isolated areas of the home so he could sexually exploit him when no one else was home.
Germany
•
A 42-year old man used a private messaging service to entice a 13-year old female child to
engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man had previously
enticed the child to meet and had sexually abused her.
•
A 32-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 13-year-old male child
to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the
man had enticed the child to sexually abuse his 9-year old brother and directed him to continue
the abuse as indicated by the following statements:
"Go to him in the room"
"Tell him he should open your pants"
"So you don't want to take the virginity of your brother"
"Tell him to give you a blowjob"
"Come on dare to take your brother's virginity and then you were the first who had"
•
A 32-year-old man used multiple online personas to entice female child victims to engage
in sadistic sexual conversations and produce and share sexually explicit imagery of themselves.
Chat logs provided with the report indicated the man also was communicating with an 18-year-
old woman who he paid to produce imagery of her sexually abusing her infant child.
Greece
•
A 50-year-old man enticed a 14-year-old male child to produce and send sexually
exploitative imagery. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man had enticed the child
to meet in person on previous cases and had sexually abused him. The man also referred to
having made videos of himself sexually abusing the child.
Hungary
•
A 29-year-old man used a platform's messaging services to entice a 13-year-old female
child to engage in sexual acts. Based on the report, it appeared the man had previously enticed
the child to meet and sexually abused her and the two lived in close proximity to one another.
•
A 40-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a minor female child to
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meet for sexual activity. Information submitted with the report indicated the man lived in close
proximity to the child and knew the child as a friend of her family.
•
A 41-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 12-year-old female
child to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs submitted with the report
indicated that after coercing the child to send initial images, the man began to blackmail her to
produce and send additional content. The man threatened to spread the child's images online if
she did not comply and threatened that she had no options but to send more images:
"I have already saved it on my phone so if you don't obey I post it on the web"
"If you do what I say I won't spread your photos on the internet"
”Oh and you can forget about threatening me with the police, I don't care"
"I'm not afraid of the police, I will upload your photos 1000 times by the time the hearings
end"
Ireland
• A 29-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 15-year-old female child
to meet and engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the
man lived in close proximity to the child and previously had enticed her to meet in person
and sexually abused her. The man also sent several messages to the child urging her to
keep their relationship secret because he would go to jail if her parents found out.
Italy
•
A 27-year-old man enticed a 12-year-old female child to produce and share sexually
exploitative imagery. After the man obtained initial images from the child, he blackmailed her to
create and send additional content by threatening to expose her images publicly. Information
provided by the reporting company also indicated the man had direct access to children,
including his minor daughter.
Latvia
•
An adult used a platform's chat room service to entice three children between the ages of 8
to 15 years old. Chat logs submitted with the report referred to the victims appearing nude and
the adult's desire to meet the children in person.
Lithuania
•
An adult male who used a platform's chat feature to entice a 12-year-old male child for
sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report detailed the man pressuring the child to
expose himself in various degrees of nudity and to engage in sexual acts on camera for the man.
Luxembourg
•
The parent of a 15-year-old child in Luxembourg reported that their child was being
enticed into a sexual relationship by an adult man in the United States using a social media
platform's chat feature.
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46
•
An adult used a platform's messaging service to entice a 15-year-old female child to
produce and share sexually explicit images of herself.
Malta
•
A 20-year-old man used a platform's chat service to entice a child to produce and send
sexually exploitative images. The child disclosed the following information:
"we started
chatting, he pretended to be a girl. then he started sending live pics of this girl. he is actually a
boy so this was all false. then he insisted I send him nudes with my face and threating to release
my other nudes. I sent him one and now he has my nudes is is threating to send them to everyone
I know. please help me as soon as possible."
•
A 30-year-old man used a platform's messaging services to entice a 15-year-old female
child to produce and share sexually explicit content. The man threatened the child:
"You have to do as I say if you don't want to get exposed"
"Otherwise I will show everyone your nudes"
Netherlands
•
A 61-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice multiple male children to
produce and share sexually explicit imagery. Chat logs provided with the report spanned several
years and information provided in the report indicated the man was a school teacher and therapist
in a position of trust with direct access to children. The man coerced the victims to engage in
specific sexual acts, including anally penetrating themselves with foreign objects and also asked
several victims if they had access to younger siblings. The man at times groomed the boys by
pretending to be a teenage girl or a football recruiter assessing the children's physical fitness by
requesting images:
”Do you see your brother of 12 ever naked?”
"1. Everything we talk about, so the fact that I'm going to scout you stays between us. It
stays between us as long as I or another scout is coming to visit you at a match. So no
telling trainer, parents or friends. You have to promise that... 2. We try a cam session
where I interview you and do a body check and different tests. You have to be in a room
alone. Is that possible?"
"Show semen in front of the cam"
Poland
•
An 18-year-old man used a platform's messaging services to entice an 11-year-old female
child to create and share sexually exploitative images. After the man enticed the child to create
the initial explicit images, he continued to coerce and threaten the child to create additional
images by threatening to publicly expose her.
Portugal
•
A 56-year-old male used a platform's messaging service to entice a 15-year-old female
child. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man asked the child if she enjoyed
having sex and whether she performed oral, vaginal, and anal sex. Additional information
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47
submitted with the report indicated the man lived in close proximity to the child and had been
trying to entice her over chat to meet in person so he could sexually abuse her.
•
A 43-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 16-year-old male child
to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the
man had enticed the child to sexually abuse and produce exploitative images of his 12-year- old
brother. Chat logs submitted with the reports indicated the man was a success coach in a position
of authority and with direct access to children.
Romania
•
A 23-year-old woman in Romania used a platform's chat service to coordinate transporting
a 13-year- old child victim to an 83-year-old man in Germany so the man could sexually abuse
the child in exchange for financial compensation. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated
that the woman had access to multiple female children between the ages of 10 and 16 years old,
but the 13-year-old child victim was selected because she was still a virgin:
”parents to the 13-Year-old virgin wants me to give them money before don't trust to give
up the girl without giving them money”
”I have the virgin is the 13 year old girl her parents want 5000”
”5000 for the girl and you give us and new a credit ok because the girl is virgin you can
do with take whatever you want”
Slovakia
•
A 21-year-old Austrian man enticed multiple female children in Slovakia to produce and
send sexually exploitative images of themselves over several years. After the man obtained
initial images, he would threaten to publicly expose the child to coerce them to create and send
additional, and often more egregious, sexual images. One child was coerced to record video of
her sexually abusing a younger sister. Two other children expressed suicidal thoughts due to
their severe distress while being blackmailed. The man also threatened the children not to
disclose the exploitation to trusted adults or law enforcement by telling them he would have
them institutionalized or taken away from their families:
"just so you know, I told them that you suffer from mental illness and that you offered me
sexual services and that parents cannot take care of you, you will go into kids shelter"
Slovenia
•
A Slovenian man used the chat service on an online gaming platform to send sexually
exploitative messages regarding children, including that he had sexually molested a child and
raped "little kids."
Spain
• A 22-year-old Spanish man enticed a 14-year-old female child in Chile to produce and
send sexually exploitative images of herself. After the man obtained the images, he
blackmailed the child to produce and send additional exploitative images by threatening to
"ruin her life" and disseminate her sexually explicit images publicly. Chat logs submitted
ANNEX 3
48
with the report indicated the enticement and blackmail caused the child severe distress, and
she stated multiple times that she would kill herself if the images were released.
•
Two apparent adult women used a platform's chat service to engage in sexualized
conversations about children. One of the women disclosed she had sexually molested her 10-
year-old daughter on multiple occasions and provided details of the abuse at the request of the
woman she was chatting with.
Sweden
•
A 31-year-old man used a platform's private messaging service to entice a 14-year-old
female child to engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man
already had enticed the child to meet in person and had sexually abused her and also indicated
the man had produced a child sexual abuse video by recording his exploitation of her.
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Document Outline