This is an HTML version of an attachment to the Freedom of Information request 'WK documents on CSAM Regulation'.


Brussels, 31 January 2023
Interinstitutional files:
2022/0155 (COD)
WK 1348/2023 INIT
LIMITE
JAI
FREMP
ENFOPOL
TELECOM
CRIMORG
COMPET
IXIM
MI
DATAPROTECT
CONSOM
CYBER
DIGIT
COPEN
CODEC
This is a paper intended for a specific community of recipients. Handling and
further distribution are under the sole responsibility of community members.
MEETING DOCUMENT
From:
General Secretariat of the Council
To:
Law Enforcement Working Party (Police)
Subject:
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse
Delegations will find in annex three documents from the Commission services:
- follow-up questions to the Commission after the presentation of the proposal by the Commission in
December to the MEPs in charge of preparing the European Parliament position (Rapporteur and Shadow
Rapporteurs);
- comments on a possibly limited extension of the Interim Regulation;
- sample CSA cases in the EU that started with a report from an online service provider (mostly
interpersonal communication services) to NCMEC.
WK 1348/2023 INIT
LIMITE
EN

ANNEX 1
Follow-up questions 
Shadows’s meeting 
14 December 2022 
EPP 
S&D 
Renew 
Greens 
ID  ECR 
The Left 
COM 
1.
What is your intention of the 
No question 
1.
Will  you  propose  to  extend  the 
1.
Technologies such as client-side scanning (CSS) would
relationship between the EU Centre 
validity of the interim Regulation, and 
need substantial rights in the operating system to scan
and Europol? Will they be 
when  do  you  intend  to  make  a 
multimedia data being transmitted through a hosting 
permitted to share data without any 
legislative proposal on this? 
service or an interpersonal communication service in
barriers? And what do you consider 
2.
What  types  of  procedures  and 
order to match it to an external database. For the process
it an effective firewall if the Centre 
technologies,  with  what  success  or 
of matching, technical measures would have to be taken
resides at the Europol premises?
failure  rates,  has  the  Commission 
in order to ensure that users are protected against
2.
Did you consult MS’ authorities on 
tested  for  the  detection  of  unknown 
potential misuse. Which technological measures are 
the current human resources to 
CSAM  and  of  possible  grooming 
already considered by the COM to ensure end user IT 
monitor CSAM and the potential 
attempts  online,  and  to  what  extent? 
security and data protection and how can these 
impact this proposal will have on
Please  answer  in  detail  and  with 
technological measures guarantee end user IT security 
their resources? 
references.
and data protection? 
3.
According to the proposed legislation, 
2.
What is the accuracy of existing technologies for the 
the 
EU 
Centre 
should 
act 
detection of a) known CSAM, b) new CSAM and c) 
independently,  receive  reports  from
grooming with regard to false negatives and false 
the services and platforms and sort out 
positives and what are the possibilities and prospects for 
incorrectly identified material therein 
improving the accuracy, according to objective and
and 
forward 
only 
"relevant" 
accessible research? 
(punishable?)  material  to  the  law 
3.
According to various digital rights organisations, in
enforcement agencies in the Member 
particular edri, the Commission repeatedly refused to 
States.  At  the  same  time,  the  center 
meet with them on the proposal. Is that true? With what 
should  be  responsible  for  deleting 
other stakeholders has the Commission or the 
identified CSAM from providers and 
Commissioners herself met on the file?
maintain  a  list  of  indicators  that 
4.
According to many experts the proposal lacks a
providers and platforms are obliged to 
sufficient legal basis. Could you please comment on 
use  to  find  possible  CSAM  and  to 
that? 
detect  possible  grooming  attempts. 
5.
Many stakeholders underline that the proposal fails to 
On the basis of which rights and with 
meet the key human rights principles of necessity and 
whom  can  data  subjects  appeal 
proportionality and violates several fundamental rights.
wrongly  reported  data  and  false 
As confirmed by the European Commission’s own
suspicions  and,  if  necessary,  claim 
internal Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the proposal 
damages  and  the  restoration  of 
may also violate the EU prohibition of general 
wrongly deleted data?
monitoring. Can you please comment on that?
ANNEX 1
1

This  non-paper  prepared  by  the  Commission’s  services  aims  to  provide  explanations  with 
regard to the technical elements of the proposal for a Regulation on preventing and combating 
child sexual abuse. 
This non-paper is based on the relevant Commission proposal and does not present any new 
positions with regard to that proposal. 
Answers to questions by the S&D 
1) What is your intention of the relationship between the EU Centre and Europol?
For the relationship between the EU Centre and Europol (and Coordinating Authorities), please 
see document WK 13981/2022.
Will they be permitted to share data without any barriers? 
Recital 71 of the proposal states that 
“Considering Europol’s mandate and its experience in identifying competent national 
authorities  in  unclear  situation  and  its  database  of  criminal  intelligence  which  can 
contribute to identifying links to investigations in other Member States, the EU Centre 
should cooperate closely with it, especially in order to ensure the swift identification of 
competent national law enforcement authorities in cases where that is not clear or where 
more than one Member State may be affected.”   
And Article 53(2) on the cooperation of the EU Centre and Europol states that 
“Europol and the EU Centre shall provide each other with the fullest possible access to 
relevant information and information systems, where necessary for the performance of 
their  respective  tasks  and  in  accordance  with  the  acts  of  Union  law  regulating  such 
access.” 
This means that Europol and the EU Centre will not share data without any barriers. Europol 
and the EU Centre will share data only where necessary for the performance of their respective 
tasks, including the tasks for the EU Centre detailed in Article 43, and only in accordance with 
the acts of Union law regulating such access, including the Europol Regulation, the GDPR, as 
well as any applicable rule on professional secrecy. 
And what do you consider it an effective firewall if the Centre resides at  the Europol 
premises?
 
Article 53(3) on the cooperation of the EU Centre and Europol states that 
“the terms of cooperation and working arrangements shall be laid down in a memorandum 
of understanding.” 
ANNEX 1
2

This could include the arrangements to ensure security and data access restrictions.  
That said, given the space available at the current Europol’s premises and the space required 
to host the EU Centre as described in the proposal, it seems unlikely at this point that the Centre 
could reside at such Europol premises. 
2) Did you consult MS’ authorities on the current human resources to monitor CSAM
and the potential impact this proposal will have on their resources?
Yes, Member States’ authorities were consulted during the preparation of the proposal. Annex 
2 of the Impact Assessments describes the multiple consultations that took place over two years 
in  the  preparation  of  the  Impact  Assessment  for  the  proposal,  including  to  Member  States’ 
authorities.  
The  reporting  obligations  for  the  companies  (notably  the  requirements  in  relation  to  the 
information to be included in the reports) and the check function of the EU Centre will help 
ensure that the reports that reach law enforcement are actionable. This will alleviate the current 
workload and the time that national law enforcement has to dedicate to filter out non-actionable 
reports,  mostly  because  they  lack  sufficient  information  for  law  enforcement  to  open  an 
investigation.  
In addition, the role that the EU Centre will play in facilitating efforts by Member States on 
prevention and assistance to victims, in particular by promoting the exchange of best practices 
and  serving  as  a  centralised  knowledge  hub,  will  likely  reduce  duplication  of  efforts  and 
inefficiencies across the EU. National hotlines already in place could support the work of the 
EU  Centre  on  prevention  and  assistance  to  victims:  they  currently  constitute  an  important 
stakeholder  in  this  field  at  national  level,  hence  they  are  a  key  interlocutor  to  identify  best 
practices and areas of improvements. 
ANNEX 1
3

Answers to questions by the Greens 
1) Will you propose to extend the validity of the interim Regulation, and when do you intend
to make a legislative proposal on this?
On the possibility to extend the validity of the Interim Regulation, please refer to the comments 
made in the dedicated document.  
The Commission stands ready to support the co-legislators to achieve an agreement on the proposal 
for the Regulation as soon as possible, to  prevent the need for such an extension from arising. 
Depending on the progress of the negotiations, the Commission, following consultations with the 
co-legislators, will decide whether to present such a proposal for an extension.  
2) What types of procedures and technologies, with what success or failure rates, has the
Commission  tested  for  the  detection  of  unknown  CSAM  and  of  possible  grooming
attempts online, and to what extent? Please answer in detail and with references.

It is not within the Commission’s competences to develop for commercial purposes technologies 
to detect unknown CSAM or grooming and test them in actual operating conditions, which are the 
conditions that produce the most relevant error rates. The Impact Assessment accompanying the 
proposal contains the data and evidence available in relation to such error rates as provided by the 
companies, civil society organisations and national authorities during the extensive consultations 
carried out in the preparation of the proposal.  
Please refer to the responses to question 2) by the Left for additional details on these technologies 
and to question 3) by the Left on the consultations carried out in the preparation of the proposal. 
3) According to the proposed legislation, the EU Centre should act independently, receive
reports  from  the  services  and  platforms  and  sort  out  incorrectly  identified  material
therein  and  forward  only  "relevant"  (punishable?)  material  to  the  law  enforcement
agencies in the Member States. At the same time, the center should be responsible for
deleting identified CSAM from providers and maintain a list of indicators that providers
and platforms are obliged to use to find possible CSAM and to detect possible grooming
attempts. On the basis of which rights and with whom can data subjects appeal wrongly
reported data and false suspicions and, if necessary, claim damages and the restoration
of wrongly deleted data?

Data subjects affected by detection, reporting, removal or blocking of online CSA are entitled to: 
- A  right  to  complain  with  the  service  provider  responsible  for  the  data  processing  (Articles
10(4)(d)), 15(1), 18(3) of the proposal).
- A right to complain with the competent Coordinating Authority (Article 34 of the proposal).
- A right to effective judicial redress before national court, in accordance with the procedure
available under national law (in line with the principle of national procedural autonomy). This
right  includes the right  to challenge a detection,  removal or blocking  order before national
courts (Articles 9(1), 15(1) and 18(1) of the proposal). Effective judicial redress necessarily
encompasses  a  right  of  compensation  for  any  damage  that  might  result  from  wrongful
ANNEX 1
4

processing. In this respect, it might be useful to notice that the proposed regulation does not 
derogate from Article 82 GDPR, which provides for the data subject’s right to compensation 
for any infringements of that regulation. Similarly, the proposal does not derogate from the 
rights attributed to the data subject, among others, by Articles 15 (right of access), 16 (right to 
rectification) and 17 (right to erasure) GDPR. Where relevant, the corresponding Articles of 
the Law Enforcement Directive (Article 56 on the right to compensation, Article 14 on the 
right of access and Article 16 on the right to rectification or erasure) are also applicable. 
- A right to be informed about their right to complain to the service provider and Coordinating
Authority, as well as to seek redress before national courts (Articles 10(5)(c), 12(2), 15(3)(c),
17(1)(i) of the proposal)
Data subjects affected by detection, reporting, removal or blocking of online CSA are also entitled 
to the rights provided by the Digital Services Act, when the service provider is also subject to the 
obligations of the Digital Services Act.  
ANNEX 1
5

Answers to questions by the Left 
1) Technologies such as client-side scanning (CSS) would need substantial rights in the
operating system to scan multimedia data being transmitted through a hosting service
or  an  interpersonal  communication  service  in  order  to  match  it  to  an  external
database. For the process of matching, technical measures would have to be taken in
order to ensure that users are protected against potential misuse. Which technological
measures are already considered by the COM to ensure end user IT security and data
protection and how can these technological measures guarantee end user IT security
and data protection?

The proposal is technology neutral and future proof. It does not impose the use of any specific 
detection  technology  and  leaves  the  choice  of  the  most  appropriate  detection  measure  to 
providers having received a detection order, within the limits of the specifications set out in the 
proposal to ensure protection of data privacy, security, as well as accuracy and reliability of 
detection.  
According to Article 50(1) of the proposal, the assessment of specific detection technologies 
to be included in the EU Centre list will be carried out by the EU Centre (supported by expertise 
in  the  form  of  a  dedicated  Technology  Committee)  in  cooperation  with  the  EDPB,  whose 
opinion will be particularly relevant to ensure that data protection and privacy is safeguarded. 
The  deployment  of  detection  technologies  on  a  case-by-case  basis  requires  a  judicial  or 
independent administrative order and must be performed, in accordance with Article 7(3) of 
the proposal, under the supervision of the competent data protection authorities, based on the 
implementation plan presented by the provider and reviewed by the other authorities involved, 
including the data protection authority. 
The  impact  assessment  accompanying  the  proposal  contains  examples  of  technologies  that 
could guarantee end user IT security and data protection (see in particular Annex 9). These 
include, for example, on-device CSS partial hashing technologies with remaining hashing and 
matching at server. In this case, part of the hash is generated at the device and the rest at the 
server, where the matching also takes place. This hybrid approach could be worth considering, 
as  (compared  to  full  hashing  at  the  client  and  matching  at  the  server)  it makes  the  process 
lighter and ensures even more end user IT security and data protection. That said, the proposal 
does not require the use of CSS technologies or any other specific type of technology.  
2) What is the accuracy of existing technologies for the detection of a) known CSAM, b)
new CSAM and c) grooming with regard to false negatives and false positives and
what  are  the  possibilities  and  prospects  for  improving  the  accuracy,  according  to
objective and accessible research?

The accuracy rate of existing technologies is as follows: 
a) For known CSAM, the most widely used technology is a hashing technology known as
PhotoDNA, which has an extremely high accuracy rate. The rate of false positives in tests
has been demonstrated to be below 1 in 50 billion. PhotoDNA has been in use for more
than 10 years by over 150 organisations globally including service providers (Microsoft,
Facebook,  Twitter,  Apple),  NGOs  (e.g.  NCMEC,  Internet  Watch  Foundation)  and  law
enforcement in the EU (e.g. Europol, DE, SE and others). In these 10 years, the tool has
been  used  daily  and  analysed  trillions  of  images  without  any  accuracy  concerns  being
ANNEX 1
6

identified. Other examples of hashing technology used for these purposes, and operating 
on similar principles, include YouTube CSAI Match, Facebook’s PDQ and TMK+PDQF. 
b) For  new  CSAM,  technologies  currently  used  include  classifiers.  A  classifier  is  any
algorithm that sorts data into labelled classes, or categories of information, through pattern
recognition
. Examples of classifiers include those that can detect nudity, shapes or colours.
Classifiers need data to be trained on and their accuracy improves the more data they are
fed. Hence, compulsory detection (based on a judicial or independent administrative order),
coupled with incentives towards innovation in the field, is bound to further improve current
accuracy rates.
Thorn’s CSAM Classifier is one example of industry’s ability to detect new child sexual 
abuse material. The tool can be set at a 99.9% accuracy rate1 (false positives). With that 
precision rate, 99.9% of the content that the classifier identifies as CSAM is CSAM, and it 
identifies 80% of the total CSAM in the data set. With this precision rate, only 1% of the 
content flagged as CSAM will end up being non-CSAM. These metrics are very likely to 
improve with increased utilization and feedback. 
Other tools making use of classifier technology to detect previously new CSAM include 
Google’s Content Safety API2, and Meta’s AI technology3. 
c) For  grooming,  technologies  currently  used  also  include  classifiers.  Like  the  classifiers
used to detect new CSAM, these tools can only detect  patterns, which point to possible
concrete elements of suspicion of online child sexual abuse without being able to deduce
the substance of the content. While not identical in function, these tools use technology
similar to the one used in spam filters4.
Text  classifiers  used  to  detect  grooming  are  trained  on  Large  Language  Models,  which 
involve feeding the classifiers with billions of lines of text in order to train the technology 
in  semantic  meaning,  and  also  by  inputting  use-cases  involving  instances  of  grooming. 
Tools  of  this  type  include  the  tool  developed  under  Microsoft’s  Project  Artemis,  in 
collaboration with The Meet Group, Roblox, Kik and Thorn. This tool analyses text-based 
conversations, rating them on a series of characteristics and assigning each conversation an 
overall probability that it constitutes grooming. These ratings can be used as a determiner, 
set by individual companies, to address flagged conversations for additional review. The 
tool  was  made  available  to  companies,  law  enforcement,  NGOs  and  other  government 
entities through Thorn (Anti-grooming starter kit). Microsoft has reported that, in its own 
deployment of this tool in its services, its accuracy (false positives rate) is 88%.  
It is important to note that in all the above technologies, the accuracy rate (false positives rate) 
is a setting, i.e. the tool can be set to detect known CSAM, new CSAM or grooming with more 
or less accuracy, depending on the optimal operational settings of that specific online service.  
1
Thorn’s data from bench tests. 
2
Fighting child sexual abuse online 
3
See here and here for more information on Facebook’s tool to proactively detect child nudity and previously 
unknown child exploitative content using artificial intelligence and machine learning.  
For more information about content spam filters see here and here and for other spam filters see here, here 
and here. Spam filters are usually run with the receiving end-user’s consent. Some spam filters look only at 
the subject line of the email. 
ANNEX 1
7

The higher the threshold set, the lower the number of false positives. For example, if a 99% 
precision  is  set,  only  1%  of  the  images  identified  as  new  CSAM  will  be  a  false  positive. 
However, a higher rate of new CSAM images will be left undetected (false negatives). It is 
estimated that for a 99% precision rate, the false negative rate would currently be around 23%, 
meaning that 77 of every 100 new CSAM images would be identified5, while 23 would be left 
undetected).   Idem for grooming: whereas the tool could be set to detect conversations that 
have  a  99%  chance  of  constituting  grooming,  the  higher  the  accuracy  rate  set  (less  false 
positives), the higher the number of grooming conversations that will be left undetected (more 
false negatives). 
The maximum accuracy rate at which the tool can operate in optimal conditions increases the 
broader the dataset on which the classifier is trained. Hence the creation of a data set of child 
sexual abuse images and videos and grooming conversations that have each been verified by a 
court in an EU Member State, which will set a new standard of quality that does not exist to 
date, will be a key contribution to further increasing accuracy over time.  
3) According  to  various  digital  rights  organisations,  in  particular  edri,  the  Commission
repeatedly  refused  to  meet  with  them  on  the  proposal.  Is  that  true?  With  what  other
stakeholders has the Commission or the Commissioners herself met on the file?

The Commission met and discussed with EDRI on several occasions concerning the proposal. 
In particular: 
-
EDRI participated in the workshop organised by the Commission to prepare the drafting of
the proposal, together with other privacy NGOs, on 26 February 2021.
-
Two members of DG HOME, Unit D.4 (in charge of the file) met with EDRI on behalf of
the Commissioner on 17 February 2022.
-
The Commission responded to EDRI’s open letter on Protecting digital rights and freedoms
in the legislation to effectively tackle child abuse (Ares(2022)4863937).
The Commission also exchanged with EDRi on a number of occasions on various public panels 
and roundtables. The Commission met with a number of stakeholders on the file, including 
privacy  organisations,  NGOs  working  on  the  rights  of  children,  relevant  service  providers, 
technology experts and law enforcement from different Member States. Annex 2 of the Impact 
Assessments  describes  the  multiple  consultations  that  took  place  over  two  years  in  the 
preparation of the Impact Assessment for the proposal, from February 2020 to January 2022, 
which continued until the adoption of the proposal in May 2022. 
4) According to many experts the proposal lacks a sufficient legal basis. Could you please
comment on that?
The proposal is correctly based solely on Article 114 TFEU, allowing the EU to take measures 
which  have  as  their  object  the  establishment  and  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  In 
particular, Article 114 is the appropriate legal basis to address differences between provisions 
of Member States’ laws which obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect 
5 Thorn’s data from bench tests. 
ANNEX 1
8

on the functioning of the internal market, and to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to 
trade resulting from differences in the way national laws would otherwise develop.  
The  main  aim  of  the  proposal  is  to  ensure  the  proper  functioning  of  the  internal  market, 
including through the harmonisation of rules and obligations concerning certain online service 
providers in relation to providing services which are at high risk of being used for child sexual 
abuse  and  exploitation  online.  As  explained  in  the  explanatory  memorandum  and  impact 
assessment accompanying the proposal, Member States have started taking action unilaterally, 
adopting or considering rules to deal with the challenge posed by child sexual abuse online, 
which are necessarily national in scope and risk fragmenting the Digital Single Market.  
The main content of the proposal consists of (i) obligations on online service providers, meant 
to  create  the  best  conditions  for  maintaining  a  safe  online  environment  and  (ii)  the 
establishment of the EU Centre, to facilitate the relevant service providers’ compliance with 
their obligations and ensure coordination and cooperation of the activities under the proposal 
at EU level. As such, the initiative should increase legal certainty, trust, innovation and growth 
in the single market for digital services.  
It should be added that the choice of in internal market legal basis to ensure a level playing 
field and a high level of security on the digital single market is in line with the Commission’s 
practice.  Relevant  examples  are  the  TCO  regulation  (2021/784)  and  the  DSA  (Regulation 
2022/2065). 
It should be added that Articles 82 and 83 TFEU, which constitute the legal basis for the Child 
Sexual  Abuse  Directive  (Directive  2011/93/EU),  provide  a  basis  for  criminal  law  rules 
concerning, inter alia, the rights of victims of crime and the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension such as sexual 
exploitation of children. As the proposal does not harmonise criminal law, Articles 82 and 83 
TFEU could not be considered as appropriate legal basis.  
5) Many stakeholders underline that the proposal fails to meet the key human rights
principles of necessity and proportionality and violates several fundamental rights.
As  confirmed  by  the  European  Commission’s  own  internal  Regulatory  Scrutiny
Board (RSB), the proposal may also violate the EU prohibition of general monitoring.
Can you please comment on that?

The  European  Commission’s  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  does  not  provide  opinions  on 
legislative  proposals  but  on  draft  Impact  Assessments  which  are  then  adopted  by  the 
Commission to accompany and explain the legislative proposal and considerations that have 
gone  into  its  preparation  once  any  concerns  of  the  Board  have  been  comprehensively 
addressed. The RSB’s Opinion is published on the Register of Commission Documents with 
reference 
SEC(2022)209 
(https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-
register/detail?ref=SEC(2022)209&lang=en). 
ANNEX 1
9

ANNEX 2
Possible limited extension of the Interim Regulation to ensure continued protection 
A possible limited extension of the Interim Regulation (which provides for a temporary derogation to 
certain articles of the e-privacy Directive to enable the continuation of the voluntary detection and 
reporting of child sexual abuse online in number-independent interpersonal communication services) 
could  be  considered  to  ensure  continued  protection.  The  possibility  of  such  an  extension  would 
concern  only  the  transition  period  until  the  long-term  framework  set-out  in  the  proposed  CSA 
regulation is implemented and would in no circumstance eliminate the need to adopt the proposed 
CSA regulation

The possibility of such an extension concerns only the transition period
 The possibility of a limited extension of the validity of the Interim Regulation (set to expire in
August  2024)  could  be  considered  if  this  was  needed  to  ensure  a  smooth  transition  from  the
current  regime  to  the  one  that  will  emerge  once  a  permanent  framework  based  on  the
Commission proposal is adopted. However, the initial duration of the Interim Regulation aims at
respecting the principle of proportionality. Any possible extension of its duration would have to
be carefully assessed, in particular in light of the principle of proportionality.
 In  the  absence  of  transition  measures,  certain  number-independent  interpersonal
communication services could be prevented from continuing detecting online child sexual abuse
on a voluntary basis, if the proposed CSA regulation is not adopted and fully applied before the
end of August 2024. This would give rise precisely to the type of protection gap that the Interim
Regulation intended to prevent in the first place.
 A strictly limited extension of the Interim Regulation would be a possible way to prevent such a
gap  from  emerging,  subject  to  the  proportionality  considerations  mentioned.  Such  a  possible
extension,  if  considered  proportionate,  could  conceivably  be  combined  with  an  earlier
application of some provisions of the proposed CSA regulation (especially those concerning risk-
assessment  and  risk  mitigation),  and  a  later  application  of  others,  notably  those  dealing  with
detection, until the structures needed for the issuance of detection orders are in place and the
first  round of risk  assessment  and risk mitigation has been conducted by providers.  This would
however need to analysed in more detail.
The possibility of such a limited extension would in no circumstance eliminate the need to adopt the 
proposed CSA regulation

 The  Interim  Regulation  was  conceived  and  drafted  as  a  temporary,  and  strictly  limited,
instrument, until the CSA Regulation was adopted. The need for a more permanent instrument,
providing for a long-term solution, remains.
 In particular, the Interim Regulation does not provide for a legal basis for data processing with a
view  to  detect  child  sexual  abuse  online  on  a  voluntary  basis.  It  does  not  apply  to  mandatory
online  CSA  detection  measures  which  can,  in  principle,  be  provided  for  under  national  law  in
accordance  with  Article  15  of  the  ePrivacy  Directive.  It  simply  enables,  as  far  as  the  relevant
provisions  of  that  Directive  are  concerned,  providers  of  number-independent  interpersonal
communication to keep detecting online CSA on a voluntary basis and for a limited period of time,
provided  that  these  detection  measures  are  lawful,  which  refers  in  particular  to  –  apart  from
compliance with the conditions of the Interim Regulation itself – compliance with the GDPR.
 This situation is sub-optimal, as it does not provide clarity on the legal basis and legal regime for
processing  of  personal  data  for  the  purpose  of  detecting  online  child  sexual  abuse  under  the
GDPR.  Hence,  a  comprehensive  long  term  framework  expressing  a  clear  decision  of  the  co-
legislators  on  the  legal  basis,  safeguards  and  condition  for  such  detection  remains  absolutely
essential.  It  is  precisely  based  on  the  assumption  that  such  a  long  term  framework  was  in
preparation that the Interim Regulation was adopted as a strictly temporary measure.
ANNEX 2
1

ANNEX 3
SAMPLE  CASES  OF  CHILD  SEXUAL  ABUSE  IN  THE  EU  THAT  ORIGINATED 
FROM A REPORT BY AN ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDER (2019-2022) 

Austria 
Company name and service where report 
Kik 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by KIK alerting 
- Nature of the case (new material,
of the distribution of several images of minors 
grooming, active abuse etc.)
performing sexual acts. 
- Number of offenders involved
The  examination  led  to  the  identification  of  one 
victim. 
Resolution of the case including: 
Identification of one victim 
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report 
KIK 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC submitted by KIK alerting of the 
- Nature of the case (new material,
distribution of several images of minors performing 
grooming, active abuse etc.)
sexual acts. Investigations led to the identification 
- Number of offenders involved
of a victim in US and Switzerland. 
Resolution of the case including: 
Identification of two victims 
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
Company name and service where report 
KIK 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case
NCMEC alerting of the distribution of one image 
- Nature of the case (new material,
of minors performing sexual acts. Investigations led 
grooming, active abuse etc.)
to the investigations of the sexually abused 
- Number of offenders involved
daughter 
Resolution of the case including: 
Identification of one victim 
- Number of victims safeguarded
- Number of offenders prosecuted
ANNEX 3
1

Company name and service where report 
Dropbox 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Austria received a 
- Number of victims included in the case 
report from NCMEC submitted by Dropbox 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
alerting 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
of the distribution of one image of minors 
- Number of offenders involved 
performing sexual acts.  
 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  has  been  arrested  because  it  was 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
already his third house search. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Bing 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Austria received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC submitted by Bing alerting 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
of the distribution of one image of minors 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
performing sexual acts. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The examination led to a self-generated video with 
sexual abuse of a 6 months old girl 
Resolution of the case including:  
Identification of one victim 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
ANNEX 3
2

Cyprus 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook  alerting  of  the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution via Facebook Messenger of 5 videos of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
minors performing sexual acts. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
offender  found  the  videos  online  and  sent  them  to 
another person.  
Victims: 5x 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The suspect was arrested and convicted to 4 months 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspended sentence 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
 KIK 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC  submitted  by  KIK  alerting  of  the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution of 1 video of minor performing sexual 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
acts. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
offender  found  the  videos  online  and  sent  them  to 
another person.  
Victims: 1x 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  a  sentence  from  the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
court is expected to be issued. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook  alerting  of  the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution  via Facebook Messenger of 1 video of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
minors performing sexual acts. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
offender  found  the  videos  online  and  sent  them  to 
another person.  
Victims: 2x 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  a  sentence  from  the 
ANNEX 3
3

- Number of victims safeguarded 
court is expected to be issued. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook  alerting  of  the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution  of  2  videos  of  minors  performing 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
sexual acts. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
offender  found  the  videos  online  and  sent  them  to 
another person.  
Victims: 2x 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  a  sentence  from  the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
court is expected to be issued. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Cybercrime Unit of Cyprus, received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook  alerting  of  the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution of 1 video of minors performing sexual 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
acts. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
offender  found  the  videos  online  and  sent  them  to 
another person.  
Victims: 2x 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
 The suspect  was arrested and a sentence from the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
court is expected to be issued. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
ANNEX 3
4

Czechia 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Bureau of Criminal Police and Investigation 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Service received a report from NCMEC submitted 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
by Google alerting of keeping homemade pictures 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
in Google Drive infrastructure  performing possible 
- Number of offenders involved 
abusing. Investigation led into identification of 
victim and also suspect (father of victim). Than 
after investigation of regional police the offender 
was arrested. 
Victim:1 
Ofender:1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to identification of the victim. The 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect was arrested. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Victim safeguarded: 1 
Offender prosecuted:1 
 
Company name and service where report 
 BADOO 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Bureau of Criminal Police and Investigation 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Service received a report from NCMEC submitted 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
by Badoo alerting of possible online enticement of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
children for sexual act.  A suspect also shows 
- Number of offenders involved 
CSAM material of her children. 
Victims:3 
Offenders:1   
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. Grooming and hands-on 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
abuse has not been proved yet. But possessing and 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
distributing of CSAM material has been proved.  
Victim safeguarded: 3 
Offenders prosecuted:  ongoing 
 
Company name and service where report 
  Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Bureau of Criminal Police and Investigation 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Service received a report from NCMEC submitted 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
by Google alerting of keeping homemade pictures a 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
videos in Google Drive infrastructure showing 
- Number of offenders involved 
prepubescent females nudes (his daughter and her 
friend). 
Victims:2 
Offender:1 
ANNEX 3
5

Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing.  Possessing and 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
distributing of CSAM material has been proved. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
But the suspect also organizes camps for kids, so 
the number of victims can increase.  
Victim safeguarded: 2 (for now) 
 
ANNEX 3
6

Denmark 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
A suspect shared 1 picture on Facebook. 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Examining the receiver of the picture they found 40 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
pictures and videos. All known material, just 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
sharing, two offenders. 
- Number of offenders involved 
 
Resolution of the case including:  
0 children safeguarded. Suspect also has no 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
children.  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
1 offender prosecuted:  
Sentence: 6 month jail 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Snapchat 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Reported 68 illegal files uploaded. During the 
- Number of victims included in the case 
arrest the suspect admitted to have violated his 6 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
month old daughter 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
 
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
1 offender prosecuted 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
2 children safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Facebook reported 1 picture shared between 2 
- Number of victims included in the case 
persons 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
When his computers where examined they found 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
livestream from the Philippines. He was driver for 
- Number of offenders involved 
disabled and mentally challenged people, whom he 
had violated during transport. 
Resolution of the case including:  
Numerous but unknown number safeguarded in the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
Philippines. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Approximately 10 victims safeguarded in 
Denmark. 
8 years in prison for offender. 
 
Company name and service where report 
Snapchat 
originated 
ANNEX 3
7

Details of the case including: 
Sharing 7 pictures. Was under education as 
- Number of victims included in the case 
caretaker in a kindergarten. No violations “hands 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
on”. 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
Probably safeguarded numerous. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
One offender. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Suspended 2 month prison sentence. 
 
Company name and service where report 
Microsoft Skype 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
1 picture shared through Skype. When examining 
- Number of victims included in the case 
suspect’s computer 94 pictures and videos was 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
found. Several victims and also new/previously 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
unseen material were discovered. 
- Number of offenders involved 
Children on the images were identified as Danish 
which led to the identity of their mother. She 
admitted to have had a sexual relationship with the 
suspect and her children, which included hands on 
abuse. 
Resolution of the case including:  
Safeguarding 2 children 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
2 offender prosecuted. Pending conviction. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
ANNEX 3
8

Estonia 
 
Company name and service where report 
Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement in Estonia received two reports 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from the NCMEC alerting of the storage of child 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
sexual abuse material using cloud storage platform. 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Google detected the material when Estonian male 
- Number of offenders involved 
person used a Gmail account to store at least 466 
unique video and image files depicting child sexual 
abuse and exploitation within the Google 
infrastructure (Google Drive and Google Photos).  
Victims: 0 
Offender: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The reports led to the investigation. The offender 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
was convicted to one year six months conditional 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
imprisonment with a probationary period of two 
year. 
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offender prosecuted: 1 
 
Company name and service where report 
Facebook messenger 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Estonia received a report from 
- Number of victims included in the case 
NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution via Facebook Messenger of three video 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
fail depicting child sexual abuse. During the 
- Number of offenders involved 
observation of suspect´s computer hard drive, more 
than 400 image and video files depicting a children 
of less than 14-years of age in a pornographic 
situation, were found.  
Victims: 0 
Offender: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the investigation. The offender 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
was convicted to one year three months conditional 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
imprisonment with a probationary period of one 
year three months. 
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offender prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
9

 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Our  Division  received  eight  (8)  different  reports 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from  NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook,  alerting  of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the distribution via Facebook Messenger of images 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
and  videos  of  minors  performing  sexual  acts.  The 
- Number of offenders involved 
investigation  led  to  the  suspect  who  is  a  Greek 
citizen  and  who  had  in  his  possession  child 
pornography material. 
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  was  brought  before 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
the court. The minor victims who were depicted in 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
the CSAM couldn’t be identified, while the CSAM 
was unknown origin.    
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
Company name and service where report 
Facebook messenger 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Estonian police received a report from NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
submitted by Facebook alerting of the distribution 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
via Facebook Messenger of a video depicting a 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
male person of less than 14-years of age 
- Number of offenders involved 
performing a sexually exploitative pose. 
Victim: 1 
Offender: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the investigation. The suspect was 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
arrested and convicted to two years of 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
imprisonment. 
Victims safeguarded: 5 (comment: four more 
underage victims who were inducing to drink 
alcohol were identified and safeguarded a result of 
investigation) 
Offender prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
10

Company name and service where report 
Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement in Estonia received total 259 
- Number of victims included in the case 
reports from the NCMEC alerting of the storage of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
child sexual abuse material using cloud storage 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
platform. Google detected the material when 
- Number of offenders involved 
Estonian male person used a Gmail account to store 
video and image files depicting child sexual abuse 
and exploitation within the Google infrastructure 
(Google Drive and Google Photos).  
Victims: 0 
Offender: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The reports led to criminal investigation. The 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
offender was convicted with one year six months 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
conditional imprisonment with a probationary 
period of two year. 
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offender prosecuted: 1 
 
 
ANNEX 3
11

Greece 
Company name and service where report 
 Yahoo 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Our  Division  received  three  (3)  different  reports 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Yahoo, alerting of the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution via Yahoo App of images and videos of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
minors  performing  sexual  acts,  from  different 
- Number of offenders involved 
Yahoo  accounts  which  the  suspect  had  created.  
The  investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  the 
suspect who is a Greek citizen and who had in his 
possession child pornography material. 
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  was  brought  before 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
the court.  The minor victims, who were depicted in 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
the CSAM, couldn’t be identified, while the CSAM 
was unknown origin.    
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Our  Division  received  a  report  from  NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
submitted by Google, alerting of of the distribution 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
via  Google  App  of  images  and  videos  of  minors 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
performing sexual acts. The investigation led to the 
- Number of offenders involved 
identification of the suspect who is a Greek citizen 
and  who  had  in  his  possession  CSAM.  From  the 
investigation also emerged that a minor victim was 
sexually  abused  by  the  above  mentioned  suspect, 
who produced CSAM with this minor victim. 
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  was  brought  before 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
the  court.  Also,  the  report  led  to  the  identification 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
of 1 minor victim. 
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
12

Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Our Division received eleven (11) different reports 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from  NCMEC  submitted  by  Google,  alerting  of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
possession  of  child  sexual  abuse  material  (photos 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
and  videos)  which  was  uploaded  to  the  cloud 
- Number of offenders involved 
storage 
application 
"Google 
drive". 
The 
investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  a  Greek 
citizen  suspect,  who  uploaded  and  had  in  his 
possession child pornography material.  
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  was  brought  before 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
the court. The minor victims who were depicted in 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
the CSAM, couldn’t be identified, while the CSAM 
was unknown origin.    
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Our  Division  received  five  (5)  different  reports 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from  NCMEC  submitted  by  Google,  alerting  of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
production of Child Sexual Abuse Material, which 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
subsequently  was  uploaded  in  Google  Drive.  The 
- Number of offenders involved 
investigation led to the identification of the suspect 
who is a Greek citizen, produced CSAM and after 
that it was uploaded in his Google Drive account. 
 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  arrested  and  was  brought  before 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
the  court.  Also,  the  report  led  to  the  identification 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
of 1 minor victim. 
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
13

Finland 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Instagram 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
submitted by Instagram regarding the distribution 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
of CSAM. The user of the Instagram-account was 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
identified as a 14-years old boy, suspect A. The 
- Number of offenders involved 
material on his devices revealed that he had abused 
an unidentified 9-10 years old boy a couple years 
prior to the investigation, when suspect A was 12-
13 years old. 
On suspect A's devices was also found a video, 
where he was sexually abused by his 15-years old 
cousin, suspect B. Suspect A was 13-years old at 
the time.  
The investigation is still ongoing. 
Resolution of the case including:  
 The report led to identification of two suspects. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
One victim remains unidentified. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Suspect A could not be prosecuted as he was under 
the age of 15.  
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Discord 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
submitted by a citizen about a Dutch man who had 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
posted nude images of a Finnish 15-year old girl. 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
The investigation revealed that the man is the girl's 
- Number of offenders involved 
ex-boyfriend, and that he had shared the nude 
images after their break-up. This had led to a 
suicide attempt by the girl. 
The investigation is ongoing. 
 
Resolution of the case including:  
 The report led to safeguarding of the girl and to a 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
future prosecution of the man. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
ANNEX 3
14

Company name and service where report 
 Snapchat 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
submitted by Snapchat. The report states that 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Snapchat themselves got a report from a citizen 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
about an account. The reporter states that the user 
- Number of offenders involved 
of the account is their 10-years old daughter, and 
wants Snapchat to remove her account.  
Upon reviewing the account, Snapchat found that 
the girl had sent a previously unseen CSAM video 
to another user. 
The investigation revealed that the father was not 
aware of his daughter sending any improper videos. 
The recipient of the video was located in India, and 
the information has been sent to the local 
authorities. 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to safeguarding of the girl. As the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect was located in India, it is not known if any 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
action has been taken against the suspect. 
 
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 0/1 
 
Company name and service where report 
Google Photos 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Finland's NBI received a report from NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
submitted by Google regarding the possession of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
CSAM. The files seemed unfamiliar to Google. 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
The user of the Google Photos account was 
- Number of offenders involved 
identified as a 14-years old boy and it was found 
out that he was abusing his 9-years old half-sister.   
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to identification of the victim and the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect. As the suspect was under the age of 15, he 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
could not be prosecuted. 
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 0 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
15

Hungary 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Department of Hungary received 5 reports from 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
NCMEC submitted by Google alerting of the 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
distribution via Google Drive of images and videos 
- Number of offenders involved 
of minors performing sexual acts. There were no 
sign of the offender creating CSAM.  
Victims: 0 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
There was no sign of creating new CSAM, the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
offender only saved and stored the material on his 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
computer and on his Google Drive account.  
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Yahoo!, Google, Twitter 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Department of Hungary received 3 reports all about 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the same user from NCMEC submitted by Yahoo!, 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Google and Twitter. The Twitter report said that the 
- Number of offenders involved 
user sent CSAM through his account. The reports 
from Yahoo! and Google said that the user 
uploaded CSAM to his accounts. There were no 
sign of the offender creating CSAM.  
Victims: 0 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
There was no sign of creating new CSAM but the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
offender saved CSAM on his computer too.  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Department of Hungary received a report from 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
NCMEC submitted by Google alerting of the 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
distribution via Google Photos of images of minors 
- Number of offenders involved 
performing sexual acts. The offender uploaded 
CSAM to his Google Photos account. There were 
ANNEX 3
16

no sign of the offender creating CSAM. 
Victims: 0 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
There was no sign of creating new CSAM but the 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
offender saved CSAM on his computer too.  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Victims safeguarded: 0 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x  
 
Company name and service where report 
 MediaLab/Kik 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Department of Hungary received a report from 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
NCMEC submitted by MediaLab / Kik alerting of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
the distribution via Kik Messenger of images of 
- Number of offenders involved 
one minor performing sexual acts. The pictures 
turned out to be new content taken by the 
Hungarian offender. The investigation led to the 
identification of a Hungarian citizen living in 
Austria. The offender abused three children in his 
family and he made pictures of one of them. He 
also sent the images to other users.  
Victims: 3 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The investigation led to the identification all 3 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
victims.  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Our agency arrested the suspect and the prosecutor 
proposed a 12-year prison sentence in the 
indictment. 
Victims safeguarded: 3 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
 
Company name and service where report 
Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
The National Bureau of Investigation Cybercrime 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Department of Hungary received 5 reports from 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
NCMEC submitted by Google alerting of the 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
distribution via Google Hangouts of images of 
- Number of offenders involved 
minors performing sexual acts. The offender sent 
the images to another user. The pictures turned out 
to be new content taken by the Hungarian offender. 
The victim was the offender’s daughter.  
Victims: 1 
Offenders: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The investigation led to the identification of the 
ANNEX 3
17

- Number of victims safeguarded 
victim.  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Our agency arrested the suspect.  
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x  
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
18

Latvia 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Discord 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
1 victim 
- Number of victims included in the case 
1 suspect 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Photo with naked child 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
uploading 
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
Not prosecuted yet, but is on-going 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
1 victim 
- Number of victims included in the case 
1 perpetrator 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Photo with naked child 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
uploading 
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
 Not prosecuted yet, but is on-going 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Microsoft Skype 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
1 victim 
- Number of victims included in the case 
1 perpetrator 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Active abuse 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
Case is ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
19

Lithuania 
Company name and service where report 
Meta Platforms (Facebook messenger) 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM, grooming 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Victims: 1 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Offenders: 1 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who 
- Number of offenders involved 
sent another user CSEM. The investigation 
revealed that an adult offender was grooming a 
child online and solicited CSEM from the child 
who sent it via Facebook messenger. The child and 
the offender were identified. 
Resolution of the case including:  
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
Victims safeguarded: 1 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Meta Platforms (Facebook messenger) 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Nature of case: Molestation, child sexual 
- Number of victims included in the case 
exploitation, possession of CSEM 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Victims: 6 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Offenders: 2 
- Number of offenders involved 
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who 
sent another user CSEM. The investigation 
revealed that an adult offender was grooming a 
child online and solicited CSEM from the child 
who sent it via Facebook messenger. When 
investigating the child and offender were identified. 
It was revealed that the offender was contacting 4 
others victims online and solicited CSEM from 
them. Search of the offender home yielded CSEM 
material of him sexually abusing his daughter 
found on his home computer. When interviewing 
one of the victims she revealed that she was also 
contacted online by another offender who also 
solicited CSEM from her and later convinced her to 
meet for a sexual encounter. This man was also 
identified and apprehended. All victims were 
identified and interviewed.   
 
Resolution of the case including:  
Offenders prosecuted: 2 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
Victims safeguarded: 6 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
ANNEX 3
20

Company name and service where report 
 Meta Platforms (Facebook) 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Victims: 0 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Offenders: 1 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who 
- Number of offenders involved 
uploaded CSEM material to his Facebook profile. 
The offender was identified and charged with 
possession of CSEM.  
Resolution of the case including:  
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Meta Platforms (Facebook) 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Victims: 0 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Offenders: 1 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who 
- Number of offenders involved 
uploaded CSEM material to his Facebook profile. 
The offender was identified and charged with 
possession of CSEM.  
Resolution of the case including:  
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Google drive 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Nature of case: Possession of CSEM 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Victims: 0 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Offenders: 1 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Police received a NCMEC report about a user who 
- Number of offenders involved 
uploaded CSEM material to his Google drive 
account. The offender was identified and charged 
with possession of CSEM.  
Resolution of the case including:  
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
21

Luxembourg 
 
Company name and service where report 
Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the distribution and possession of a video of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
CSAM. 
- Number of offenders involved 
he investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect.  
The number of victims and their identities could 
not be determined due to the lack of our work 
force.      
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Microsoft – Online Operations 
originated 
Microsoft Microsoft OneDrive 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Microsoft alerting of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the distribution and possession of videos and 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
pictures of CSAM.  
- Number of offenders involved 
The investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect. The suspect did as well sexually oriented 
chats with a minor.  
Two victims have been identified.   
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
22

Company name and service where report 
Snapchat  
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Snapchat alerting of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the distribution and possession of a video of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
CSAM.  
- Number of offenders involved 
The investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect.  
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Instagram 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Instagram alerting of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the distribution and possession of videos of CSAM. 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
The investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect.         
One victim have been identified. 
Victims: 1 
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Snapchat 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Snapchat alerting of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the distribution and possession of a video of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
CSAM. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect. The suspect did as well sexually oriented 
chats with a minor. 
ANNEX 3
23

Three victims have been identified. 
Victims: 3 
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
Sony  
originated 
Sony Interactive Entertainment 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Sony alerting of the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
distribution and possession of pictures of CSAM.  
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
The investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect.  
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of Luxemburg received a report 
- Number of victims included in the case 
from NCMEC submitted by Facebook alerting of 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
the possession of videos and pictures of CSAM.   
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
The investigation led to the identification of a 
suspect.  
Five victims have been identified. 
Victims: 5 
Suspect: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The case is still ongoing. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
24

Netherlands  
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google  
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 Identification suspect by telephone data. These 
- Number of victims included in the case 
information were additional to an ongoing 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
investigation on sexual abuse on a minor.  No self-
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
made material.  Investigation results in an arrest, 
- Number of offenders involved 
house search and investigation on the seized data 
carriers.  
Resolution of the case including:  
1 victim  
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender accused for Child Pornography and 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Sexual Abuse of a minor  
 
Company name and service where report 
 KIK / Facebook  
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 1 NCMEC report 8 CP material. Former NCMEC 
- Number of victims included in the case 
report Facebook 2013 linked to user. On internet a 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
person with the username was found. This person 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
was listed as a teacher on primary school and he 
- Number of offenders involved 
was connected to a soccer club. With information 
in the NCMEC report the person is identified. An 
investigation by the regional team followed.  
Resolution of the case including:  
 1 offender / subpoenaed by Justice – no conviction 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
yet.  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google / Twitter / Facebook  
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 NCMEC priority indicates current or imminent 
- Number of victims included in the case 
risk to an individual. On 7 photos a penis is shown 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
nearby a sleeping minor girl. The name of the user 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
and a DOB is mentioned by Google. This matched 
- Number of offenders involved 
a person known by the Dutch authorities. The photo 
of his driver’s licence is compared with the photos 
attached to the NCMEC reports.  Further there were 
3 Twitter and 2 Facebook NCMEC report from 
2018 linked to this user. Investigation results in an 
arrest, house search and investigation on the seized 
data carriers.   
Resolution of the case including:  
3 victims  
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender / convicted on producing CP - 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
possession of CP – Sexual Abuse of a minor girl - 
fornication of his own baby.  
ANNEX 3
25

 
Company name and service where report 
 KIK  
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Priority NCMEC report: Indicates possible risk to 
- Number of victims included in the case 
an individual in the near future of is otherwise 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
time-sensitive. Video/images were shared from ant 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
possibly created by the reported user’s phone 
- Number of offenders involved 
camera. Images attached to NCMEC report showed 
a naked baby girl. A hand is holding her labia apart. 
On another photo a buttocks of a child is shown 
with an erect penis nearby/ against the child. The 
identification took place on the answer of a 
subscriber of the e-mail address. On the same day 
the regional team followed up with a house search 
and the suspect was arrested. Images of penetration 
with a finger in the vagina of the daughter were 
found. Further evidence of sexual abuse of the 
older but also minor child is found.   
Resolution of the case including:  
 2 victims  
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender / convicted producing and possession of 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
CP – Sexual Abuse of a minor by penetration  
against own child – fornication of an own child  
 
Company name and service where report 
 TikTok 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 1 NCMEC report 1 film. A minor is filming a 
- Number of victims included in the case 
toddler. The toddler is touching her vagina with her 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
finger and licking this finger afterwards. 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
Identification is easily made by the entities in the 
- Number of offenders involved 
NCMEC report. The results in our police system 
found out the family is known by social help 
organisations. Also there were police registrations 
about youth help, alcohol - and abuse issues.  
Resolution of the case including:  
 1 victim   
- Number of victims safeguarded 
The regional team made an official report 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
especially for the social help organization. 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
26

Portugal 
 
Company name and service where report 
 MeWe 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Not applicable 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Known material, related to Operation Iceberg – 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
International cooperation 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
1 offender 
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
 Not applicable 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender prosecuted 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Not applicable; 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Known material shared on WhatsApp, Telegram, 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Viber 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
1 offender 
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
Not applicable 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender prosecuted  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
8 victims identified; 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Grooming on game platform, request of self 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
generated CSAM on social and encrypted 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
platforms, storage on encrypted platform; 
- Number of offenders involved 
1 offender 
Resolution of the case including:  
 8 victims safeguarded; 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender prosecuted  
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
27

Company name and service where report 
 Google - WhatsApp 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Not applicable 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Known material shared also on Telegram and 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Telegram X storage on encrypted platform  
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
Not applicable 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
1 offender prosecuted 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
28

Romania 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Facebook Messenger 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law  enforcement  of  Romania  received  a  several 
- Number of victims included in the case 
reports’  from  NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
alerting of the distribution via Facebook Messenger 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
of images and videos of minors performing sexual 
- Number of offenders involved 
acts.  
The  investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  a 
citizen  living  in  Romania,  who  distributed  images 
and  videos  of  minors  performing  sexual  acts.  The 
materials  were  also  distributed  online  to  other 
users. 
Victims: 3 
Offenders: 2 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the identification of 2 victims. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
The suspects were arrested and convicted: 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
The first suspect: 3 years and 6 mounts of 
imprisonment.  
The second suspect: 2 years of imprisonment. 
Victims safeguarded: 2  
Offenders prosecuted: 2 
 
Company name and service where report 
Facebook Messenger 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law  enforcement  of  Country  A  received  several 
- Number of victims included in the case 
report  from  NCMEC  submitted  by  Facebook 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
alerting of the distribution via Facebook Messenger 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
of images and videos of minors performing sexual 
- Number of offenders involved 
acts. The investigation led to the identification of a 
Romania,  citizen  living  in  Ireland  who  forced 
minors  through  the  threat  of  violence  to  produce 
images and videos of themselves performing sexual 
acts and to send them to him. The material was also 
distributed online to other users.  Also, this suspect 
raped one of the victims. 
Victims: 40 
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the identification of all 40 victims. 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
The suspect was arrested and convicted to 22 years 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
of imprisonment.  
Victims safeguarded: 40 
Offenders prosecuted: 1x 
ANNEX 3
29

 
Company name and service where report 
 Yahoo mail  
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Our  unit  has  been  notified  by  NCMEC  (National 
- Number of victims included in the case 
Centre  for  Missing  and  Exploited  Children)  via 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
Europol  that  the  user  of  the  e-mail  Yahoo  address 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
has  uploaded  several  pornographic  materials 
- Number of offenders involved 
involving minors to this e-mail account. Following 
analysis  of  the  materials  provided  by  NCMEC 
through  report  no.  61352072,  several  images  were 
identified showing two female minors and one male 
minor,  the  young  boy  having  similar  markings  to 
the  one  appearing  in  the  images  on  the  suspect's 
Facebook profile. 
Victims: 3 
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
  The report led to the identification of victims. The 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect  was  arrested  and  convicted  to  18  years  of 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
imprisonment.  
Victims safeguarded: 3 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law  enforcement  of  Romania  received  several 
- Number of victims included in the case 
reports from NCMEC submitted by Google alerting 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
of  the  distribution  of  images  and  videos  of  minor 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
performing sexual acts. The investigation led to the 
- Number of offenders involved 
identification  of  a  Romania,  citizen  living  in 
Romania  who  forced  a  minor  to  be  involved  in 
sexual  acts  with  him.  Also,  this  suspect  raped  the 
victim in question. 
Victims: 1  
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the identification the victim. The 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect was arrested and convicted to 17 years and 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
6 months of imprisonment.  
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
30

Company name and service where report 
KIK Messenger 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law  enforcement  of  Romania  received  several 
- Number of victims included in the case 
reports’ from  NCMEC submitted by  KIK, alerting 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
of  the  distribution  via  KIK  Messenger  of  images 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
and videos of minors performing sexual acts.  
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  a 
citizen  living  in  Romania,  who  distributed  images 
and  videos  of  minors  performing  sexual  acts.  The 
materials  were  also  distributed  online  to  other 
users. 
Victims: 1  
Offenders: 1 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the identification the victim. The 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect  was  arrested  and  convicted  to  3  years  of 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
imprisonment.  
Victims safeguarded: 1 
Offenders prosecuted: 1 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
31

Slovakia 
 
Company name and service where report  Facebook 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law  enforcement  of  Slovak  Republic  received  a 
- Number of victims included in the case 
report from NCMEC submitted by Meta alerting of 
-  Nature  of  the  case  (new  material,  the  distribution  via  Facebook  account  of  images 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
and videos of minors performing sexual act. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  a 
Slovak citizen, who was disseminating images and 
videos  depicting  sexual  practices  of  persons  under 
the age of 18. 
The material was distributed online to other users. 
Victims: 0x 
Offender: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  convicted  to  six  months  of 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
imprisonment  conditionally  with  a  probationary 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
period of 1 year. 
Victims: 0x 
Offender: 1x  
 
Company name and service where report  Google Drive 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law  enforcement  of  Slovak  Republic  received  a 
- Number of victims included in the case 
report from NCMEC submitted by Google alerting 
-  Nature  of  the  case  (new  material,  of  the  possession  of  images  and  videos  of  minors 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
performing sexual act on the Google drive. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  a 
Slovak  citizen,  who  has  in  his  possession  images 
and videos depicting sexual practices with persons 
under the age of 18. 
The  material  was  not  distributed  online  to  other 
users. 
Victims: 0x 
Offender: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The  suspect  was  convicted  to  five  months  of 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
imprisonment. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
Victims: 0x 
Offender: 1x  
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
32

Company name and service where report  Snapchat 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
Law enforcement of the Slovak Republic received a 
- Number of victims included in the case 
report  from  NCMEC  submitted  by  Snapchat 
-  Nature  of  the  case  (new  material,  alerting of the distribution via Snapchat of video of 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
minors performing sexual act. 
- Number of offenders involved 
The  investigation  led  to  the  identification  of  a 
Slovak  citizen,  who  was  disseminating  videos 
depicting  the  naked  parts  of  the  body  of  a  female 
minor  between  the  ages  of  8  and  10,  her  genitalia 
and, above all, intercourse with an adult man.  The 
material was distributed online to other users. 
Victim: 1x 
Offender: 1x 
Resolution of the case including:  
The report led to the identification of 1 victim. The 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
suspect  was  accused  and  the  case  is  currently 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
further investigated. 
Victim safeguarded: 1x 
Offender prosecuted: 1x 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3
33

Sweden 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Snapchat, Instagram, Kik, Discord 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 - at the moment: 6 victims 
- Number of victims included in the case 
- multiple child pornography offence, multiple 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
exploitation of a child for sexual posing 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- 1 offender 
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
 - at the moment, 6 children 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- 1 offender, but the trial has not yet taken place. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
In addition to this, I would like to state that we 
experience an extremely high hit rate in the reports 
we receive from NCMEC. We do a search on 
almost all cases that starts with a report from 
NCMEC, with very few exceptions. Our opinion is 
that, to a large extent, abuse material is always 
found in the seizure. This means that the majority 
suspects are prosecuted. 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 - 6 victims 
- Number of victims included in the case 
-  exploitation of a child for sexual posing, intrusive 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
photography, sexual molestation, child 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
pornography offence.  
- Number of offenders involved 
- 2 offenders 
- there were multiple CT-reports from Google for 
same account.  
Resolution of the case including:  
- 6 safeguarded children 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- 2 offenders prosecuted 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
-  a verdict has not been reached. 
 
Company name and service where report 
 Snapchat 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 - 3 victims 
- Number of victims included in the case 
-  rape of a child, multiple gross exploitation of a 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
child for sexual posing, multiple sexual 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
molestation, gross child pornography offence 
- Number of offenders involved 
- 1 offender 
Resolution of the case including:  
- 3 victims 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- 1 offender 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
ANNEX 3
34

The case resulted in one more suspect being 
identified and 10 new victims (this case is not yet 
complete as more plaintiffs are being identified). 
Crime: sexual abuse of children, exploitation of 
children for sexual posing, sexual molestation, 
gross child pornography offence. 
 
Company name and service where report 
Yahoo 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
- child pornography offence 
- Number of victims included in the case 
- 1 suspect 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
- Number of offenders involved 
Resolution of the case including:  
The suspect had a very specific explanation for 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
why he handled abuse material. He told the 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
investigators that he was doing a research of the 
development of child sexuality. He was working as 
a preschool teacher at the time. A search was 
carried out in his home and a seizure was made. 
During the investigation in Sweden, the suspect 
moved to the United States. In United states he was 
suspected of the same crime. United States 
authorities requested the Swedish seizure, which 
Sweden sent to them. He is now awaiting a very 
long prison sentence in United States. The 
interesting thing is the difference in punishment 
between Sweden and the United States. 
 
Company name and service where report 
Yahoo 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
- 2 victims 
- Number of victims included in the case 
- 2 offender 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
- 1 offender was a suspect of exploitation of a child 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
for sexual posing, instigation to gross exploitation 
- Number of offenders involved 
of a child for sexual posing, gross child 
pornography offence, instigation to child 
pornography offence, child pornography offence 
- 1 offender was a suspect of gross exploitation of a 
child for sexual posing, child pornography offence 
Resolution of the case including:  
- 2 victims 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- 2 offenders prosecuted 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
ANNEX 3
35

Company name and service where report 
 Google 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
 - 2 victims 
- Number of victims included in the case 
- intrusive photography, gross child pornography 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
offence X 3, gross sexual assault of child, gross 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
rape of a child. 
- Number of offenders involved 
- 1 suspect 
Resolution of the case including:  
- 2 safeguarded children 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- 1 offender prosecuted 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
-  the sentence was 9 years in prison 
 
Company name and service where report 
Kik 
originated 
Details of the case including: 
It is an ongoing investigation right now. As soon as 
- Number of victims included in the case 
the investigators got the information from the 
- Nature of the case (new material, 
NCMEC-report and a suspect, they did a search. In 
grooming, active abuse etc.)  
the seized phone they found abuse material the 
- Number of offenders involved 
suspect made himself. So, he is now a suspect of 
rape of a child, gross sexual assault of child, gross 
exploitation of a child for sexual posing, gross child 
pornography offence. 
 
- 2 victims so far 
- 1 offender 
 
Resolution of the case including:  
- 2 safeguarded so far 
- Number of victims safeguarded 
- 1 offender so far in this case. 
- Number of offenders prosecuted 
 
The information led to more suspects in other cases 
regarding rape of children with other suspects. 
They are now being investigated so the number is 
right now unknown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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36

o  videos of minors performing sexual acts. 
o  The investigation led to the identification of a Slovak citizen living in Austria who forced 
minors  through  the  threat  of  violence  to  produce  images  and  videos  of  themselves 
performing sexual acts and to send them to him. The material was also distributed online 
to other users. 
o  The  report  led  to  the  identification  of  all  30  victims.  The  suspect  was  arrested  and 
convicted to five years of imprisonment. 
  Case # 2: 
o  Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from KIK Messenger alerting of the 
distribution of child sexual abuse material.  
o  The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen.  
o  The search of his house and further investigations revealed that he sexually abused his 
year old daughter, who was rescued
  Case # 3: 
o  Austrian  law  enforcement  received  in  2019  a  report  from  Snapchat  alerting  of  the 
distribution of child sexual abuse material.  
o  The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen who had forced several 
female minors to produce nude images of themselves and provide them to him, under the 
threat  of  making  publicly  available  images  and  videos  he  made  in  the  bathroom  of  a 
soccer field while acting as a referee.  
o  The report led to the identification of a large number of victims
SAMPLE  CASES  INCLUDED  IN  THE  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT  ACCOMPANYING 
THE  LEGISLATIVE  PROPOSAL  FOR  A  REGULATION  ON  PREVENTING  AND 
COMBATTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
 
Austria 
  Case # 1: 
o  Austrian  law  enforcement  received  in  2019  a  report  from  NCMEC  submitted  by 
Facebook alerting of the distribution via Facebook Messenger of images and videos of 
minors performing sexual acts. 
o  The investigation led to the identification of a Slovak citizen living in Austria who forced 
minors  through  the  threat  of  violence  to  produce  images  and  videos  of  themselves 
performing sexual acts and to send them to him. The material was also distributed online 
to other users. 
o  The  report  led  to  the  identification  of  all  30  victims.  The  suspect  was  arrested  and 
convicted to five years of imprisonment. 
  Case # 2: 
o  Austrian law enforcement received in 2019 a report from KIK Messenger alerting of the 
distribution of child sexual abuse material.  
ANNEX 3
37

o  The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen.  
o  The search of his house and further investigations revealed that he sexually abused his 
year old daughter, who was rescued
  Case # 3: 
o  Austrian  law  enforcement  received  in  2019  a  report  from  Snapchat  alerting  of  the 
distribution of child sexual abuse material.  
o  The investigation led to the identification of an Austrian citizen who had forced several 
female minors to produce nude images of themselves and provide them to him, under the 
threat  of  making  publicly  available  images  and  videos  he  made  in  the  bathroom  of  a 
soccer field while acting as a referee.  
o  The report led to the identification of a large number of victims
 
Bulgaria 
  Law enforcement in Bulgaria received in 2018 a report from the National Child Exploitation 
Coordination Centre alerting of the distribution of child sexual abuse material through KIK 
Messenger

  The report led to a criminal investigation in which two mobile phones from a suspect were 
seized, containing 517 video files with child sexual abuse material.  
  The material included videos with brutal scenes of child sexual abuse with a child around 
years old
 
Czech Republic 
  Law enforcement in the Czech Republic received in 2017 a report from NCMEC alerting of 
the distribution of child sexual abuse material by email, initiated by Google
  The report led to a criminal investigation in which a 52 year old man was arrested following 
a house search, where additional child sexual abuse material was found. 
  This  person  had  abused  2  girls  and  recorded  the  abuse.  The  2  girls  were  identified  and 
rescued.  
 
Denmark 
  Case # 1: 
o  Following reports from KIK alerting of the distribution of child sexual abuse material 
through KIK Messenger, Danish authorities arrested, a Danish national in his forties 
with no criminal record. 
o  During  preliminary  examination  of  his  mobile  phone,  Danish  police  found  several 
recordings of himself abusing his 10 year old daughter
o  The  10  year  old  victim  was  rescued  and  the  suspect  is  undergoing  criminal 
proceedings.  
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38

  Case #2 - Operation Umbrella1:  
o  Facebook  reported  to  the  National  Center  for  Missing  and  Exploited  Children 
(NCMEC)  the  distribution  of  videos  via  Facebook  Messenger2  depicting  a  Danish 
boy and a girl who were engaged in sexual activity.  
o  NCMEC forwarded the case to Denmark via Europol. 
o  Over  1000  people  had  distributed  the  videos  to  one  or  more  people  via  Facebook 
Messenger and were charged for distribution of child pornography.  
o  This operation, still ongoing, is the single largest operation ever against child sexual 
abuse in Denmark. 
 
Estonia 
  Law  enforcement  in  Estonia  received  in  2017  a  report  from  NCMEC  alerting  of  the 
distribution of child sexual abuse material by email
  The report led to a criminal investigation in which a person was arrested for exchanging and 
possessing child sexual abuse material.  
 
France 
  Case # 1: 
o  French police received in 2018 a NCMEC report submitted by Facebook alerting of 
the distribution of child sexual abuse material via Facebook Messenger.  
o  The  investigation  revealed  that  the  offender  provided  PlayStation  codes  to  young 
boys in exchange of child sexual abuse material. 
o  The offender was arrested. There were around 100 victims
  Case # 2: 
o  French  police  has  received  a  number  of  cases  from  NCMEC  submitted  by  KIK 
alerting of the distribution of child sexual abuse material via KIK Messenger. 
o  The cases typically involve multiple offenders (up to 20 offenders per case). 
o  The cases have led to multiple arrests 
Germany 
  German  Federal  Police  received  a  NCMEC  report  in  July  2019  submitted  by  Facebook 
alerting of the distribution via Facebook Messenger of material showing the sexual abuse of 
a very young girl.  
  The NCMEC report also indicated that the material could have been recently produced. 
  The  report  led  to  a  criminal  investigation  and  a  house  search  in  which  a  suspect  was 
incriminated  with  abusing  his  4  year  old  daughter,  and  his  10  year  old  son,  who  were 
rescued and safeguarded.  
                                                           
1     Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 18 September 2018, p. 32. 
2    The case was also reported in the media (in English). 
ANNEX 3
39

 
Greece 
  Greek police received two NCMEC reports submitted by Yahoo! informing about a user who 
exchanged child sexual abuse material via Yahoo!’s messenger service.  
  The  house  search  of  the  offender  revealed  that  he  was  also  in  contact,  via  Skype,  with 
individuals (mothers of underage children) in the ASEAN region and was sending money to 
them so they would send him indecent pictures of their underage children.  
  The ASEAN authorities were notified of all the details.  
 
Ireland3 
  Law  enforcement  in  Ireland  received  in  2013  a  report  from  NCMEC  alerting  of  the 
distribution of child sexual abuse material by email.  
  The material was detected by Microsoft when Matthew Horan used a Gmail account to send 
child sexual abuse material to an email address on Microsoft's platform. 
  The report led to an investigation in which it was discovered that Horan had been sexually 
exploiting children.  
  Irish police identified six victims in Ireland as a result of the investigation. 
 
Romania4 
  Romanian police received in 2016 a NCMEC report submitted by Facebook concerning child 
sexual abuse material exchanged via Facebook Messenger
  The investigation revealed that a mother had been abusing her 9 year old daughter for more 
than  a  year  and  sent  the  material  generated  in  the  sexual  abuse  to  her  boyfriend  (not  the 
father of the girl) in England.  
  The mother was arrested and her daughter was rescued
 
Sweden 
  Case # 1: 
o  Swedish  police  received  a  NCMEC  report  alerting  that  one  person  had  shared  two 
child pornographic images on Facebook Messenger of material known to the police. 
o  Swedish  police  carried  out  a  search  at  the  suspect’s  home  and  found  child  sexual 
abuse material in hard drives. 
o  The material included the suspect abusing his stepdaughter, who was rescued in the 
operation.  
o  The suspect was sentenced to nine years in prison for, among other things, gross rape 
against children. 
                                                           
3   The case was also reported in the media. 
4   The case was reported in the media, see here and here. 
 
ANNEX 3
40

  Case # 2: 
o  Swedish police received a report from the National Child Exploitation Coordination 
Centre in Canada in which a person was sharing child sexual abuse material through 
KIK Messenger
o  A house search was conducted in which child sexual abuse material was found.  
o  Thanks to the investigation, nine Swedish children were identified. 
o  The  suspect  was  sentenced  to  four  years  in  prison  for  different  child  pornography 
offenses.  
  Case # 3: 
o  Swedish  police  received  a  NCMEC  report  submitted  by  Facebook  concerning  child 
sexual abuse material exchanged via Facebook Messenger
o  The  investigation  revealed  that  a  female  suspect  was  producing  child  sexual  abuse 
material with the children of her romantic partners and sharing it with another male.  
o  Further  investigation  revealed  a  network  of  two  other  female  producers  and  three 
male consumers of child sexual abuse material. 
o  11 victims were identified and rescued, ranging  from ages 2 to 14 when the crimes 
occurred, out of more than 50 victims in total. 
Spain 
  Law  enforcement  in  Spain  received  a  report  from  NCMEC  alerting  of  the  distribution  of 
child sexual abuse material by email
  The investigation by law enforcement in Spain led to the arrest of one person, who actively 
shared online with other child sex offenders the child sexual abuse material he produced. 
  The person arrested produced that material by abusing children within his family circle.  
  Given  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  law  enforcement  focused  on  locating  the  victims, 
eventually rescuing 2 children within the family circle. 
 
Sample cases in the EU that started with detection of online solicitation 
The following are actual, anonymised sample cases of online solicitation in the EU that service 
providers reported to NCMEC.  
Austria 
• 
An adult man enticed an 11-year-old female child via an online chat service to produce and 
share sexually explicit images. 
• 
An adult man enticed a 12-year-old female child via an online chat service to produce and 
share sexually explicit images. Chat logs submitted with the report showed the man threatened 
the  child  he  would  notify  police  if  she  did  not  send  explicit  images  and  videos.  Fearing  this 
threat, the child produced additional content and sent it to her exploiter. 
• 
A  45-year-old  man  enticed  a  13-year-old  male  child  via  online  private  messaging  to 
ANNEX 3
41

engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report showed the man was talking to the 
child about leaving the country and making plans to meet the same weekend the report was made 
to NCMEC. The man was in a position of authority as a coach and talked about wanting to adopt 
and marry the child. 
 
Belgium 
• 
A  21-year-old  man  enticed  a  14-year-old  female  child  via  an  online  private  messaging 
service  to  produce  and  share  sexually  explicit  images.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the  report 
indicated the man previously had enticed the child to meet in person so that he could exploit her 
by engaging in sexual activity. 
Bulgaria 
• 
A 15-year-old used an online platform to traffic his 9-year-old girlfriend for sexual abuse 
exploitation. His reported profile stated: 
"I'm looking for a pedophile who wants to **** my 9 year old girlfriend and want her to 
paw him " 
• 
An  adult  man  used  an  online  chat  feature  to  entice  six  female  children  and  sent  them 
graphic  images  of  himself  engaged  in  sex  acts.  At  least  one  of  these  children  was  enticed  to 
create and send an explicit image of herself to the man who then demanded she produce and send 
more images. When she declined, the man threatened to harm her, saying he "knows where she 
lives". 
• 
A 51-year-old man used a messaging service to entice a 13-year-old male child to produce 
and share sexually explicit content of himself. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the 
man was the child's uncle, had direct access to him, and discussed specific sexual acts with the 
child. The chat  also indicated the uncle was offering the child money in exchange for sending 
sexually explicit files. 
Croatia 
• 
A  48-year-old  man  used  an  online  chat  service  to  entice  a  14-year-old  female  child  to 
produce and share sexually exploitative images of herself. The man also enticed her to sexually 
abuse  her  11-year-old  sister  and  said  he  wanted  to  meet  in  person  to  abuse  her.  Chat  logs 
provided  with  the  report  show  the  child  victim  disclosing  that  she  used  force  to  abuse  her 
younger sister, specifically stated the following:  
"She screamed" 
"It did, but I had to do it by force. She was fighting me....she cried" 
Cyprus 
• 
An adult man used the chat function on an online gaming platform to engage in sexually 
exploitative  conversation  with  another  adult  gamer  about  his  13-year-old  daughter.  The  man 
provided the other adult gamer with his daughter's screenname on another chat  platform so the 
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42

other man could contact the child to "seduce" her. 
• 
A  41-year-old  man  from  Cyprus  enticed  a  15-year-old  child  victim  from  Moldova  to 
produce and send sexually exploitative imagery of herself. Chat logs submitted with the report 
indicated the man previously had  enticed the child to  travel  to  Cyprus so he could  exploit  her 
through sexual activity. 
 
Czech Republic 
• 
A 29-year-old man used a private messaging platform to entice a 14-year-old female victim 
to produce and share sexually exploitative images of herself. Chat logs submitted with the report 
indicated the man previously had enticed the child to meet in person so he could sexually exploit 
her. The man lived close to the child and was making plans to meet her so he could continue to 
sexually abuse her. 
• 
A 29-year-old man enticed five child victims between the ages of 8 and 12 years old. The 
man enticed two of the children to engage in sex acts, including bestiality, with each other. He 
enticed  another  victim  to  sexually  abuse  her  3-year-old  sibling.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the 
report  indicated  the  man  offered  money  or  expensive  gifts  to  the  victims  to  entice  them  into 
producing and sharing the sexually exploitative images. 
Denmark 
• 
An adult man used a platform's chat function to send sexualized messages about children to 
another adult. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man planned to sexually abuse 
his 13-year-old daughter who was intoxicated at the time. 
• 
A  41-year-old  man  in  the  United  States  enticed multiple  children  under the  age  of  13  to 
produce  and  send  sexually  exploitative  imagery  of  themselves.  This  man  was  communicating 
online  with  a  20-year-  old  man  from  Denmark  and  the  two  men  discussed  trading  sexually 
exploitative  images.  At  least  one  child,  a  9-year-old  female  child,  was  coerced  to  engage  in 
sexual activity over a video call after being threatened that she would be publicly exposed if she 
refused. 
Estonia 
• 
An adult male created and used multiple online accounts to entice over 12 children, some 
as young as 9-years-old, to produce and share sexually exploitative imagery. Chat logs submitted 
with the report indicated that in some cases the man offered to pay the children in exchange for 
initial images and then coerced to send additional images by threatening to publicly expose their 
images online. 
Finland 
• 
An  adult  enticed  numerous  child  victims  in  Finland,  Lithuania,  Norway,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States  to  produce  and  send  sexually  exploitative  imagery  of 
themselves. After obtaining initial images, this adult would blackmail the children by threatening 
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to  send  the  images  to  the  children's  families  unless  they  continued  producing  and  sending 
additional images. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the adult also was sharing child 
sexual abuse material with other adults online. 
• 
An  adult  man  used  an  online  messaging  service  to  engage  in  sexualized  conversations 
about children with another adult. The man made multiple statements indicating he had sexually 
abused his young daughter on multiple occasions and had shown her pornography since she was 
an  infant.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the  report  detailed  the  man's  plans  to  continue  sexually 
abusing his daughter. 
 
France 
• 
A 46-year-old man enticed a 15-year-old female child to meet in person for sexual activity. 
The man also disclosed he was sexually molesting his minor daughter. 
• 
A  36-year-old  man  used  a  platform's  messaging  service  to  entice  a  14-year-old  female 
child to engage in sexual activity. Chat information provided with the report indicated the man 
was the child's uncle and had direct access to her. 
• 
A  38-year-old  man  in  a  position  of  trust  as  a  youth  football  coach  used  a  platform's 
messaging  service  to  entice  a  13-year-old  female  child  to  meet  for  sexual  activity.  Chat  logs 
submitted with the report indicated the man was a friend of the child's father and had frequent 
access to her during weekend visits. 
• 
A  48-year-old  man  enticed  a  female  child  to  meet  for  sexual  activity.  Chat  information 
submitted with the report indicated the man was the child's stepfather and provided the child with 
a location where they could meet in secret so that he could sexually exploit her. 
• 
A 28-year-old man enticed a 14-year-old female child to meet for sexual activity. Chat logs 
submitted with the report indicated the man was the child's half-brother and had direct access to 
the child victim. 
• 
An adult man enticed several  female  children between the  ages of 14 and 17 to  produce 
and share sexually explicit images. After the suspect coerced the children to produce images, he 
blackmailed them to produce and send additional content by threatening to publicly expose the 
initial  images  he  had  received.  Chat  logs  provided  with  the  report  included  the  following 
statements showing the severe distress of the children as the man blackmailed them to produce 
increasingly egregious content: 
"... you really want to ruin my life" 
"I've already tried to commit suicide please don't start again" 
"It's going to destroy my life" 
"I want to die" 
"I'm going to kill myself" 
• 
A 42-year old man used a platform's private chat function to entice a 12-year-old female 
child to engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man was in a 
relationship with the child's mother, had direct access to the child, and already had exploited her 
by forcing her to engage in painful sexual activity: 
"I can't anymore with your mom... your Mom and I are done ok" 
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"We should do it softer... it causes some bleeding usually the first time" 
"Wait mom is up... erase everything" 
• 
A  36-year-old  man  used  a  platform's  messaging  service  to  entice  a  14-year-old  female 
child. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man was a school teacher in a position of 
trust and with access to children. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man already 
had met and sexually abused the child and was trying to make plans for future meetings. 
• 
A 46-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 13-year-old male child 
to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs provided with the report indicated the 
man was the child's uncle, had direct access to the child, and had sexually molested the child on 
multiple  occasions.  Chat  logs  also  indicated  the  man  was  coercing  the  child  to  meet  him  in 
isolated areas of the home so he could sexually exploit him when no one else was home. 
Germany 
• 
A 42-year old man used a private messaging service to entice a 13-year old female child to 
engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man had previously 
enticed the child to meet and had sexually abused her. 
• 
A 32-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 13-year-old male child 
to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the 
man had enticed the child to sexually abuse his 9-year old brother and directed him to continue 
the abuse as indicated by the following statements: 
"Go to him in the room" 
"Tell him he should open your pants" 
"So you don't want to take the virginity of your brother" 
"Tell him to give you a blowjob" 
"Come on dare to take your brother's virginity and then you were the first who had" 
• 
A 32-year-old man used multiple online personas to entice female child victims to engage 
in sadistic sexual conversations and produce and share sexually explicit imagery of themselves. 
Chat logs provided with the report indicated the man also was communicating with an 18-year-
old woman who he paid to produce imagery of her sexually abusing her infant child. 
Greece 
• 
A  50-year-old  man  enticed  a  14-year-old  male  child  to  produce  and  send  sexually 
exploitative imagery. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man had enticed the child 
to  meet  in  person  on  previous  cases  and  had  sexually  abused  him.  The  man  also  referred  to 
having made videos of himself sexually abusing the child. 
Hungary 
• 
A  29-year-old  man  used  a  platform's  messaging  services  to  entice  a  13-year-old  female 
child to engage in sexual acts. Based on the report, it appeared the man had previously enticed 
the child to meet and sexually abused her and the two lived in close proximity to one another. 
• 
A 40-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a minor female child to 
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meet for sexual activity. Information submitted with the report indicated the man lived in close 
proximity to the child and knew the child as a friend of her family. 
• 
A  41-year-old  man  used  a  platform's  messaging  service  to  entice  a  12-year-old  female 
child  to  produce  and  share  sexually  explicit  content.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the  report 
indicated that after coercing the child to send initial images, the man began to blackmail her to 
produce and send additional content. The man threatened to spread the child's images online if 
she did not comply and threatened that she had no options but to send more images: 
"I have already saved it on my phone so if you don't obey I post it on the web" 
"If you do what I say I won't spread your photos on the internet" 
”Oh and you can forget about threatening me with the police, I don't care" 
"I'm not afraid of the police, I will upload your photos 1000 times by the time the hearings 
end" 
Ireland 
• A 29-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 15-year-old female child 
to  meet  and  engage  in  sexual  activity.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the  report  indicated  the 
man lived in close proximity to the child and previously had enticed her to meet in person 
and  sexually  abused  her.  The  man  also  sent  several  messages  to  the  child  urging  her  to 
keep their relationship secret because he would go to jail if her parents found out. 
Italy 
• 
A  27-year-old  man  enticed  a  12-year-old  female  child  to  produce  and  share  sexually 
exploitative imagery. After the man obtained initial images from the child, he blackmailed her to 
create  and  send  additional  content  by  threatening  to  expose  her  images  publicly.  Information 
provided  by  the  reporting  company  also  indicated  the  man  had  direct  access  to  children, 
including his minor daughter. 
Latvia 
• 
An adult used a platform's chat room service to entice three children between the ages of 8 
to 15 years old. Chat logs submitted with the report referred to the victims appearing nude and 
the adult's desire to meet the children in person. 
 
Lithuania 
• 
An  adult  male  who  used  a  platform's  chat  feature  to  entice  a  12-year-old  male  child  for 
sexual  activity.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the  report  detailed  the  man  pressuring  the  child  to 
expose himself in various degrees of nudity and to engage in sexual acts on camera for the man. 
 
Luxembourg 
• 
The  parent  of  a  15-year-old  child  in  Luxembourg  reported  that  their  child  was  being 
enticed  into  a  sexual  relationship  by  an  adult  man  in  the  United  States  using  a  social  media 
platform's chat feature. 
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• 
An  adult  used  a  platform's  messaging  service  to  entice  a  15-year-old  female  child  to 
produce and share sexually explicit images of herself. 
Malta 
• 
A 20-year-old man used a platform's chat service to entice a child to produce and send 
sexually exploitative images. The child disclosed the following information: "we started 
chatting, he pretended to be a girl. then he started sending live pics of this girl. he is actually a 
boy so this was all false. then he insisted I send him nudes with my face and threating to release 
my other nudes. I sent him one and now he has my nudes is is threating to send them to everyone 
I know. please help me as soon as possible." 
• 
A  30-year-old  man  used  a  platform's  messaging  services  to  entice  a  15-year-old  female 
child to produce and share sexually explicit content. The man threatened the child: 
"You have to do as I say if you don't want to get exposed" 
"Otherwise I will show everyone your nudes" 
Netherlands 
• 
A 61-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice multiple male children to 
produce and share sexually explicit imagery. Chat logs provided with the report spanned several 
years and information provided in the report indicated the man was a school teacher and therapist 
in  a position of trust  with  direct  access  to  children. The  man coerced the victims to  engage in 
specific sexual acts, including anally penetrating themselves with foreign objects and also asked 
several victims if they had access to  younger siblings. The man at times groomed the boys by 
pretending to be a teenage girl or a football recruiter assessing the children's physical fitness by 
requesting images: 
”Do you see your brother of 12 ever naked?” 
"1. Everything we talk about, so the fact that I'm going to scout you stays between us. It 
stays between us as long as I or another scout is coming to visit you at a match. So no 
telling trainer, parents or friends. You have to promise that... 2. We try a cam session 
where I interview you and do a body check and different tests. You have to be in a room 
alone. Is that possible?" 
"Show semen in front of the cam" 
Poland 
• 
An 18-year-old man used a platform's messaging services to entice an 11-year-old female 
child to create and share sexually exploitative images. After the man enticed the child to create 
the  initial  explicit  images,  he  continued  to  coerce  and  threaten  the  child  to  create  additional 
images by threatening to publicly expose her. 
Portugal 
• 
A  56-year-old  male  used  a  platform's  messaging  service  to  entice  a  15-year-old  female 
child.  Chat  logs  submitted  with  the  report  indicated  the  man  asked  the  child  if  she  enjoyed 
having  sex  and  whether  she  performed  oral,  vaginal,  and  anal  sex.  Additional  information 
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submitted with the report indicated the man lived in close proximity to the child and had been 
trying to entice her over chat to meet in person so he could sexually abuse her. 
• 
A 43-year-old man used a platform's messaging service to entice a 16-year-old male child 
to produce and share sexually explicit content. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the 
man had enticed the child to sexually abuse and produce exploitative images of his 12-year- old 
brother. Chat logs submitted with the reports indicated the man was a success coach in a position 
of authority and with direct access to children. 
Romania 
• 
A 23-year-old woman in Romania used a platform's chat service to coordinate transporting 
a 13-year- old child victim to an 83-year-old man in Germany so the man could sexually abuse 
the child in exchange for financial compensation. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated 
that the woman had access to multiple female children between the ages of 10 and 16 years old, 
but the 13-year-old child victim was selected because she was still a virgin: 
”parents to the 13-Year-old virgin wants me to give them money before don't trust to give 
up the girl without giving them money” 
”I have the virgin is the 13 year old girl her parents want 5000” 
”5000 for the girl and you give us and new a credit ok because the girl is virgin you can 
do with take whatever you want” 
Slovakia 
• 
A 21-year-old Austrian man enticed multiple female children in Slovakia to produce and 
send  sexually  exploitative  images  of  themselves  over  several  years.  After  the  man  obtained 
initial images, he would threaten to publicly expose the child to coerce them to create and send 
additional, and often more egregious, sexual images. One child was coerced to record video of 
her  sexually  abusing  a  younger  sister.  Two  other  children  expressed  suicidal  thoughts  due  to 
their  severe  distress  while  being  blackmailed.  The  man  also  threatened  the  children  not  to 
disclose  the  exploitation  to  trusted  adults  or  law  enforcement  by  telling  them  he  would  have 
them institutionalized or taken away from their families: 
"just so you know, I told them that you suffer from mental illness and that you offered me 
sexual services and that parents cannot take care of you, you will go into kids shelter" 
Slovenia 
• 
A  Slovenian  man  used  the  chat  service  on  an  online  gaming  platform  to  send  sexually 
exploitative  messages  regarding  children,  including  that  he  had  sexually  molested  a  child  and 
raped "little kids." 
Spain 
•   A  22-year-old  Spanish  man  enticed  a  14-year-old  female  child  in  Chile  to  produce  and 
send  sexually  exploitative  images  of  herself.  After  the  man  obtained  the  images,  he 
blackmailed the child to produce and send additional exploitative images by threatening to 
"ruin her life" and disseminate her sexually explicit images publicly. Chat logs submitted 
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with the report indicated the enticement and blackmail caused the child severe distress, and 
she stated multiple times that she would kill herself if the images were released. 
• 
Two  apparent  adult  women  used  a  platform's  chat  service  to  engage  in  sexualized 
conversations  about  children.  One  of  the  women  disclosed  she  had  sexually  molested  her  10-
year-old daughter on multiple occasions and provided details of the abuse at the request of the 
woman she was chatting with. 
Sweden 
• 
A  31-year-old  man  used  a  platform's  private  messaging  service  to  entice  a  14-year-old 
female child to engage in sexual activity. Chat logs submitted with the report indicated the man 
already had enticed the child to meet in person and had sexually abused her and also indicated 
the man had produced a child sexual abuse video by recording his exploitation of her. 
 
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